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REPORT OF OPERATIONS  
THE SEVENTH  
UNITED STATES ARMY  
IN FRANCE AND GERMANY  
1944-1945

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To the Officers and Enlisted Men of the  
Seventh United States Army who gave their  
lives this history is respectfully dedicated

Published by A. W. Graf, Heidelberg, Germany, May 1946  
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## CHAPTER XV

### *The XV Corps Joins the Seventh Army*

WITH the passing of the summer the DRAGOON offensive which for more than a month had been driving German troops from defenses throughout southern France came to a halt. What was known in Seventh Army headquarters as a "crisis on the western front" was setting in, and the fall months of 1944 proved to be a critical period for both the American and the enemy forces.

The Seventh Army Command Post had moved by leapfrog advances from the coast at St. Tropez to Brignoles, Grenoble, Lons le Saunier, and Vesoul, behind its rapidly moving combat divisions. Until 1 October, when the army's advance command post opened at the Caserne Bonnard in Epinal, the headquarters had not remained in one place for a period longer than 12 days. Two of these moves, from Brignoles to Grenoble and from Grenoble to Lons le Saunier, had been for airline distances of 155 and 135 miles. At Epinal the Seventh Army headquarters settled down for two months, while its units engaged in slugfest advances against the enemy through the Vosges Mountains.

#### *Claims Before the Vosges*

Operation DRAGOON, according to higher headquarters, had been definitely halted for lack of indispensable supplies. To the north the Third Army was also directed to assume a defensive role until sufficient resources could be accumulated for a renewed attack. The Germans were now ensconced in the slopes and forests of the Vosges foothills and for the month of October at least had the opportunity to



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reorganize routed elements. General Devers, commanding the Sixth Army Group, had been "anxious to stage a powerful offensive as early as possible." Army Group, however, short of troops, had only three corps on an extended front and lacked both artillery and ammunition necessary to give proper support to sustained attacks by both the American Seventh and the First French Armies simultaneously.


Seventh Army's supply situation had been termed "critical", and there was some concern that the enemy might make a desperate use of gas and begin a sabotage and partisan campaign. Nevertheless, planning went confidently ahead for the destruction of the enemy in Lorraine and Alsace and for the crossing of the Rhine River. For a brief period the highly fluid front would be stabilized. Reserves and resources would be built up and a more favorable area of departure gained for the offensive which would seize Strasbourg and turn north to breach the Maginot and Siegfried line defenses.

Holding a relatively stable front the German defenders planned to exploit favorable terrain to the fullest advantage. Mountains and forests were to make up for what the Wehrmacht lacked in men, materiel, and morale. Incapable of military initiative, unable to launch a large-scale attack or display any general purpose other than continued defense, the enemy did his best to contain Allied penetrations of his position and to solve some of his difficult order of battle problems. The German intention was to hold the Vosges as long as possible before falling back to the Siegfried line. To that end divisional organizations were regularized; and the miscellaneous battle groups, which had retreated from southern France, were liquidated and reabsorbed all along the Seventh Army front.

The striking power of General Patch's forces was augmented in late September by the transfer of two divisions already in the line on the immediate left as part of the Third Army of the Twelfth Army Group. The XV Corps, commanded by Major General Wade H. Haislip, was assigned to the Seventh Army and passed to the control of the new headquarters on 29 September. This Corps included the 2nd French Armored Division; the 79th Infantry Division, which had just taken and secured Luneville; the 106th Cavalry Group; and attached troops. Its

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mission, until new operational instructions were issued, was to protect the right flank of the Twelfth Army Group and to continue its offensive to secure the Luneville area south of the line Chaumont-Luneville-Sarrebourg.

Northeast of the city of Luneville the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division attempted to make a stand blocking the advance to a line of departure for the Saverne Gap. In this sector south of the Rhine-Marne Canal the XV Corps was already engaged on 29 September, when it was assigned to Seventh Army. Since the fall of Luneville the enemy had been forced back beyond the Meurthe and had taken up strong positions in the Forest of Parroy against the 79th Division. With the fall of Rambervillers on 30 September and the threat to



MAJOR GENERAL  
WADE H. HAISLIP

to protect the right flank... Baccarat by the 2nd French Armored Division and VI Corps the Germans were losing their river line completely, and were faced with the prospect of being pushed back to the mountains.

The Vosges Mountains east of Luneville are low, generally rounded, heavily forested, and arranged in parallel ridges with an average height of 3,000 feet. The ground slopes more gradually to the west than to the east, falling in a series of plateaus toward the Lorraine Plain. Ascent is usually easy on this side of the range, but the narrow defiles which the arteries of communication follow through the Vosges do not permit free vehicular maneuver. The southern boundary of XV Corps extended northeast through the towns of Rambervillers, Baccarat, and Badonviller, where it ran up to the outline of the High Vosges Massif. The northern boundary was formed by the Rhine-Marne Canal which runs from Nancy east to Strasbourg, passing south of Sarrebourg and through Saverne.

The converging lines of the Rhine-Marne Canal and the High Vosges Massif form a 15-mile funnel which narrows to the east. Einville, on the canal just north of Luneville, is 22 miles from Rambervillers to



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the south; but the swamps beyond Parroy are only seven miles from the High Vosges Massif. This corridor yields access to the Saverne Gap, a low, narrow passage which links the Lorraine and Alsatian Plains and



THE VOSGES MOUNTAINS

*The Vosges Mountains east of Luneville are low, generally rounded, heavily forested.*

serves to divide the higher ranges from the Low Vosges to the north. The hills and mountains taper at both sides of the divide; and, although they provide some defense, they also present possibilities for sharp thrusts directed at the Gap.

The terrain between the boundaries represents a portion of the Lorraine Plain which is relatively level and covered with hardwood forest. Minor rivers cut through the plain. The Meurthe rises in the High Vosges, flows through St. Die and northwest through Raon l'Etape, Baccarat, and Luneville to Nancy, where it joins the Moselle. The Vezouse rises in the Vosges east of Blamont, captures a few streams,

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and flows west through Luneville into the Meurthe. The Mortange, flowing northwest through Rambervillers, also empties into the Meurthe near Luneville. The network of roads, although constricted by the Vosges terrain, is adequate for military traffic. One main road extends along the eastern fringe of the Meurthe Valley linking Luneville with Baccarat. Another runs east through Blamont, Heming, Sarrebourg, through the Gap to Saverne. Railroad lines also bind Luneville with Saverne to the east and with Baccarat and Epinal to the south.

The XV Corps continued to push against German positions east of Luneville; and there was no change in mission, as its transfer from Third to Seventh Army was effected. Third Army troops to the north pressed on against the approaches to Metz. To the south VI Corps fought in the foothills of the Vosges east of the Moselle. The Army mission during October and early November, was to clear approaches to the Vosges passes in zone, to seize terrain from which to launch an offensive designed to carry the Seventh Army through the Vosges defenses, to Strasbourg, and over the Rhine.

#### Into the Forest of Parroy

The Forest of Parroy, the Germans' strongly-held forward bastion, presented the first problem for operations of the XV Corps as a part of Seventh Army. Under what had been until very recently the ordinary circumstances of offensive action, the forest might conceivably have been by-passed. But the general stabilization of the front, in contrast to the highly fluid condition of preceding weeks, led to the decision to "attack it and clean it out . . . preparatory to further advances." XV Corps, too, was handicapped by the general supply crisis. At the time of its transfer to Seventh Army its ammunition and gasoline stocks were gravely depleted. It would be the better part of a month before the rail capacity of the 500-mile army supply line could be increased sufficiently to relieve the critical situation and to begin the accumulation of forward reserves for the support of a full-scale attack. Nor was corps

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and army artillery strength in Sixth Army Group up to a standard required for concurrent Seventh Army and First French Army assaults. "Prior decisions on high level" had committed heavy field artillery units on the *DRAGOON* troop list to the continued support of the forces in Italy. At the time of General Marshall's visit to XV Corps area on



MAJOR GENERAL  
IRA T. WYCHE

*...attack it and clean it out*


9 October, battery strengths were "at the lowest level of their history." Finally, the offensive capabilities of both the 79th Division, commanded by Major General Ira T. Wyche, and the 2nd French Armored Division, commanded by General Philippe Francois Leclerc, had been substantially compromised by previous engagements in the campaign in northern France.

In contrast to the Allied predicament the German situation was in many ways improved. After a month of retrograde movement, elements of the German Nineteenth Army had been able to effect a junction with the First German Army in northern France in the vicinity of Epinal. In the Baccarat-Dieuze area in front of XV Corps and the Third Army's XII Corps, the enemy had concentrated an exceptionally large force of armor in deference to the relatively accessible terrain. A heavy line of defensive works ran from the outskirts of the Vosges Massif at Baccarat through Blamont to the swamps of Heming. This hastily-constructed line consisted of almost continuous fire-trenches supplemented by pillboxes and antitank ditches. Elements of the 11th and 15th Panzer Divisions were combined with a number of miscellaneous units of Fortress Machine Gun and Infantry Battalions to oppose XV Corps. In front of this defense line the enemy strongly held the Forest of Parroy.

This forest is "a vicious tangle of second growth timber and underbrush", about six miles long and five miles wide, blanketing low ridges northeast of Lunéville between the Rhine-Marne Canal and the Vezouse River. It is bisected by an east-west road, the Chemin du Haut

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de la Faite, which generally follows the crest of a low ridge; and it is traversed by a number of tracks and firebreaks, including the abandoned roadbeds of old World War I narrow-gauge railways.



GENERAL MARSHALL VISITS XV CORPS COMMAND POST  
IN FOREST OF PARROY


At the time of General Marshall's visit to XV Corps area on 9 October, battery strengths were at the lowest level of their history.

Within the forest elements of the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division awaited the American assault, and two regiments of the 79th Division were sent in to the attack which had been delayed for several days. The heavy preliminary aerial bombardment of the entrances and road-junctions of the woods had been held up by bad weather. On 28 September bombers were dispatched; and, although the attack was not carried out in the hoped-for strength, the initial infantry assault was successful. The enemy had not been "seriously" affected by the bombardment, but infantry troops of the 79th Division reached the western edge



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of the forest without difficulty. The 315th Infantry Regiment attacked north of the main Faite road and the 313th Infantry south. In the woods resistance stiffened. The enemy was using tanks in support of his



GERMAN TRENCHES DUG IN BEHIND BARBED WIRE  
EMPLACEMENTS AND MINE FIELDS


*...this hastily constructed line consisted of almost continuous fire-trenches...*

hastily-dug positions, and despite the difficulty of terrain the Mark IV's managed to stop farther advance. The employment and maneuver of armor in thick woods became the outstanding feature of the German forest defense and, later, of the American offensive which cleared Parroy.

The attack, begun in the afternoon of 28 September, had by nightfall achieved a penetration of about one kilometer into the forest. Advancing slowly against increasing opposition on the following day, both regiments received counterattacks; and the 313th was forced to fall back until an additional battalion was committed to regain the ground. The enemy attacked again at the junction of the 1st and 3rd

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battalions, with tanks moving up and down the road firing into the lines and infantry making successful infiltrations. That night there was only confusion. With the reorganization of the 3rd battalion, the 2nd bat-



TANK SET UP AS A ROAD BLOCK

*The employment and maneuver of armor in thick woods became the outstanding feature of the German forest defense...*

talion moved up to its rear to protect the northern flank exposed in front of the 315th Regiment. An enemy attack at that point was repulsed late in the afternoon of 30 September; and shortly before midnight contact was established with the 315th Regiment, which had pushed ahead and narrowed the gap. Both regiments had gained about 1,000 yards.

On 1 October the 314th Regiment was committed from Croismare to cut off the southern peninsula of the woods, to move through the sector of the 313th, and to join the 315th at the Faite road. That day, the division made an overall gain of another 1,000 yards against heavy


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mortar and artillery concentrations but only moderate small arms fire. Pockets of resistance, with barbed-wire and mine-field support extending from roads and tracks into the woods themselves, held advances



ELEMENTS OF THE 314TH INFANTRY MOVING TOWARD THE FOREST DE PARROY

*The 314th Infantry Regiment was committed from Croismare to cut off the southern peninsula of the woods.*

down to an almost inch-by-inch pace. The Germans were especially formidable at the central clearing in the southern sector of the forest which covered their supply route from Laneuveville-aux-Bois. All well-defined avenues of approach were registered in by artillery and kept under interdicting fire.

To the north, on the left flank of the Parroy offensive, the 315th Regiment met intense automatic fire at a junction known as Point No. 1 (see map) and suffered a counterattack in battalion strength at a second junction, Point No. 2, farther east. At that stage the 106th Cavalry

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Reconnaissance Squadron, which had been screening the northern flank of XV Corps by maintaining motorized patrols in the narrow area between the edge of the forest and the Rhine-Marne Canal, was drawn into the woods. In the center a battalion of the 314th moving northward succeeded in pinching out the 313th and made their link on the main Faite road. Below, at the central clearing, the enemy held the two other battalions at the western fringe; and there the forces continued to face each other for more than a week, until the enemy evacuated positions on the night of 9-10 October.

### The Battle in the Woods

American difficulties were due in part to natural obstacles and in part to the effective tactics of the German defense. The thickness of forest cover limited visibility to the flanks as well as to the front; attacking units were compelled to maintain close physical contact with each other. Thus the speed of the advance was generally held down to that of the unit meeting the heaviest resistance, and the "tail of the advance" had always to be kept closed in. The deadly effect of enemy artillery fire was increased by a high proportion of tree-bursts throughout the battle in the forest. Troops soon learned that foxholes had to be covered and logs laid over trenches to provide overhead protection. In many cases, old World War I positions were converted into personnel shelters.

The enemy held his main body well behind the nebulous front and kept only small groups forward where they could hear the attackers coming through the woods. Accurate observed fire could be brought down by the Germans without endangering their own main line of resistance placed behind the wide dispersion area affected by tree-bursts. Small arms resistance was only scattered and occasional, thrown out to cover the escape of the forward observers at the last moment.

The 314th Regiment had cut up from the southwest to the Faite road, and the pinched-off 313th sent out patrols to clear the rear areas of enemy who had infiltrated. On 3 October a roadblock, on Point

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No. 3, the Faite trail, just west of the main junction in the forest, was reduced by a flanking movement of tanks swinging around the road behind the block. This employment of armor, despite the difficulties of maneuver, represented a tactical departure for the American forces. The Germans had demonstrated the efficacy of armor as mobile artillery in forest fighting.

The German strongpoint in the heart of the Forest of Parroy was assaulted by two regiments moving in abreast to the vicinity of the main junction. On the left flank elements of the 315th Regiment succeeded on 4 October in reaching the north-south Bossupre road above its junction with the Faite trail, outflanking and reducing Point No. 1, two miles northwest of the junction. The units moving east on the Faite road, however, were stopped short of their objective. The attack of the 314th on the right flank was checked by an enemy "spoiling" drive in company strength supported by six tanks. Again in the afternoon the 2nd Battalion of the 314th was stopped by tank fire down the road and by heavy mortar concentrations. The Germans capped their defensive efforts with an infantry assault which pierced the battalion line.

The next day, a wide-swinging blow designed to envelop the enemy force at the Faite-Bossupre junction was delivered at Point No. 4. The 1st Battalion of the 315th Regiment moved through the left flank and proceeded to sweep down and back to the southwest. The road was reached; but once again German infantry and tanks, elements of the 11th Panzer Reconnaissance Battalion, broke through and some American troops were temporarily cut off to the south. The following morning and afternoon, the whole force managed to abandon its forward positions and swing back into the line defined by the Bossupre road. The 106th Cavalry continued to clear out the northwestern portion of the forest, but the attack generally was suspended to facilitate preparations for the offensive of 9 October.

Just prior to this offensive, units of the 79th Division were disposed as follows: on the right flank the 1st and 3rd Battalions of the 314th still faced the enemy across the clearing in the southern sector of the forest; to their left was a sizeable gap, beyond which the 2nd

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Battalion held its positions before the crucial Faite-Bossupre road-junction (Point No. 4) with its left flank on the main east-west road; north of the road the 3rd Battalion of the 315th Regiment was also close to the junction; to its left were the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 315th Regiment. About one-half of the total area of the Forest of Parroy had been cleared.

The unremitting pressure had compelled the enemy to draft units from quieter sectors just to the north and south to implement the defensive lines in the woods. Replacements entered as units and were committed immediately. Soon the enemy was forced to rely only on the troops already in the forest; adjacent areas had been stripped to a minimum and there was no evidence of large units available in the rear area for replacement purposes. There was a high proportion of older men among German replacements; but the enemy line was bolstered according to availability.

The new assault and a cover plan were initiated simultaneously. At 0630 hours on 9 October a diversion at Marainviller south of the forest was started. Tanks brought up by the 1st Battalion of the 313th Regiment fired into the woods. The Germans "rose to the bait" and shelled Marainviller throughout the morning. Meanwhile, on the northern flank, the 2nd Battalion of the 315th began its push to the high ground in the eastern portion of the forest, which if held would make the enemy's remaining positions untenable. Objectives on the high ground were reached by 1800 hours, and two hours later when the 1st Battalion drew up on the right, the investment of the forest ridge was complete.

The heaviest opposition to the advance was met at the cross-roads in the center of the forest, Point No. 4. The 315th's 3rd Battalion jumped off to push directly east on the north side of the Faite road toward the high-ground objective of the regiment. The Germans were well dug-in east of the Bossupre and the battalion managed to get across only after bitter fighting. At 0835 hours it was diverted from its course by an order to assist in the reduction of Point No. 4. The troops had moved across the Bossupre trail and now wheeled to the southeast


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through intense small arms fire to cut the Faite road several hundred yards behind the crossroads. From the south the 2nd Battalion of the 314th Regiment, moving armor down the track of an abandoned narrow



SMOKE GENERATOR IN ACTION

*Neutralized by heavy smoke, cut off by a double envelopment, the German stronghold in the heart of Parroy was smashed.*

gauge railway which ran past the German strongpoint, succeeded in moving behind the enemy position in a similar flanking maneuver.

Neutralized by heavy smoke, cut off by a double envelopment, the German stronghold in the heart of Parroy was smashed. With the capture of the high ground to the east and the reduction of Point No. 4, the 79th Division had "in effect ended the battle for the forest." The 313th Regiment attacked and drove to the southeastern corner of the forest, delayed only by mines. That night the sole remaining German position, Point No. 5, holding out in the southern peninsula of woods,

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was abandoned. Equipment and unburied dead were left behind. Some 2,000 men committed to stop the American advance had been cleared out. The bold use of armor in the forest was the outstanding feature



UNBURIED GERMANS

*Some 2000 men committed to stop the American advance had been cleared out.*

of German, and later of American, tactics during the operation. The density of cover forced the tanks to keep for the most part to the trails and fire-breaks, but wherever a clearing or thin growth made it possible tanks deployed off the roads. On occasion, tanks had even been used as supply vehicles when the rain-sodden tracks proved impassable for other transport. Artillery tactics were hindered by the virtual impossibility of visual observation through the woods, making it necessary to resort to unobserved fire using map data. Every effort was made to move the infantry through the forest rather than along mapped roads

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and tracks. The whole operation, because of the difficulties of control and orientation in thickly-wooded terrain, was confined to narrow fronts and limited objectives.



MUDDY ROAD IN LUNEVILLE AREA

*On occasion, tanks had been used as supply vehicles when the rain sodden tracks proved impassable for other transport.*

### The Push for High Ground

Having driven the enemy from the forest of Parroy stronghold, the 79th Division pushed farther east to establish itself on more strategic high ground. Two regiments, the 313th and 314th, had taken position astride the railroad and highway south of the forest along a line which included Laneuveville-aux-Bois, former German supply center, and Manonviller. On 13 October Embermenil was occupied, but south of the town strong flanking fire from the railroad station hindered progress until it was captured the next afternoon. Still the Germans had ex-

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cellent observation over the western slope of their high ground and had set up a pillbox, extensive mine fields, and wire entanglements to defend it. The effectiveness of armor was greatly reduced by recent heavy rains.



RESULT OF TORRENTIAL DOWNPOUR IN THE EMBERMENIL AREA

*The effectiveness of armor was greatly reduced by recent heavy rains.*

and most of the tanks in the attack bogged down in the mud. An assault on 15 October by the 313th Regiment fell short of the objective.

During the next few days the Germans supplemented their defense with a series of local attacks supported by tanks. Their blows were aborted and absorbed, and the 79th made new plans for a divisional attack. As early as 23 September staff officers of the Sixth Army Group at a conference at the Seventh Army Command Post had mentioned the possibility that Seventh Army might receive the 44th Infantry Division then at Cherbourg.

In order to prepare new divisions for maximum combat efficiency it was contemplated that they be attached in regimental

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combat teams to experienced divisions. The 44th Division was tentatively attached to XV Corps. An advance party from this division had arrived at Seventh Army Headquarters on 11 October.



MAJOR GENERAL  
ROBERT L. SPRAGINS  
*introduced into the line  
gradually*

On 17 October the 44th Division, commanded by Major General Robert L. Spragins, closed in the Luneville area. One regimental combat team, the 114th, was attached to the 79th Division for operations and eventual relief. It was planned that the other two regiments, the 71st and the 324th, would be introduced into the line gradually. The XV Corps front had remained relatively unchanged for several days.

The 79th Division, according to the provisions of Field Order No. 21, issued on 19 October, was to attack the high ground east of the Forest of Parroy with three regiments. Assistance on the extreme right flank with a demonstration by fire was to be extended by the 114th Regiment of the newly arrived 44th Division. Arrangements were made for additional artillery, and the 44th Division's batteries with five battalions of XV Corps were to fire in direct or general support.

On 21 October the 313th Regiment attacked on the left and overran fixed positions at the Bois de L'Ourson northeast of Embermenil; attacking in the center, the 315th overcame stiff resistance at the Bois Henry, southeast of Embermenil, and by noon had also gained a portion of the high ground. The Germans attempted to exploit the gap between the two regiments, but armor and division artillery drove them off. On the right flank, mired tanks delayed the advance of the 314th Infantry only temporarily. The next day all objectives were taken and positions on the high ground were being consolidated.

On the north flank of XV Corps the Third Army's XII Corps was making only limited progress toward the east. On 21-22 October elements of the 26th Infantry Division were fighting in and around Moncourt, three miles northeast of the village of Parroy. Farther north

Third Army units were meeting stiff resistance on the approaches to Metz. Contact was maintained, however, between XV and XII Corps by cavalry.

The pattern of enemy operations was clear, "his forces defending strongly where threatened by American advances but remaining generally quiet" in other sectors. While the 79th Division was engaged in pounding its way through the German forward positions, the 2nd French Armored Division (or the *Division Blindée*), on the southern flank of XV Corps maintained by and large, a passive attitude. On 30 September one of General Leclerc's combat commands took part in the capture of Rambervillers which the 45th Division entered from the south. The following day, task forces of Combat Command V cut the Rambervillers-Baccarat road as the 45th Division completed occupation of Rambervillers. The success of this operation threatened the northern flank of the enemy facing the VI Corps in the Vosges. Thus the advance of the northern wing of the VI Corps into the Vosges was facilitated. After its cooperation with VI Corps, the 2nd French Armored Division adopted a policy of "watchful waiting" influenced in part at Rambervillers by soggy terrain which impeded the passage of armor. The enemy facing the French appeared to be content with this development.

The limited extent of operations conducted by XV Corps allowed the Wehrmacht time to emerge from its phase of desperate improvisation. Panzer and Grenadier units along the northern sector of the Seventh Army front were showing semblances of greater control and organization. The enemy was absorbing the various battle groups which had been employed as stop-gaps into more substantial formations. The trend now was to shift divisions, though battered, from comparatively quiet areas to sectors which were pressed. The 553rd Volks Grenadier Division arrived on 16 October to replace elements of the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division, which had been opposing the 79th Division. Toward the close of the month the 361st Volks Grenadier Division appeared in the battle order to effect the relief of the remaining elements. Thus, the First and Nineteenth German Armies again had a common boundary. Stop-gap



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units having been absorbed and recommitted, these armies joined in the Baccarat area where elements of the 21st Panzer Division held the line.

The main German defense line from the swamps to the High Vosges was being elaborated continuously; and it was now, according to estimate, some two to three miles deep. Handicapped by supply difficulties, as the heavy volume of daylight railway traffic plainly indicated, the Germans nevertheless were exploiting the advantage of adverse weather conditions which limited the activities of the Allied tactical air force. More than that, in the period immediately after the Battle of Parroy, they offered a series of local counterattacks, increased artillery fire, and stubborn defense of well-prepared positions. The enemy was determined to impose maximum loss and delay before giving ground.

In mid-October the 44th Division had begun to join XV Corps, and the 114th Regiment had taken over the southern sector in the zone of the 79th Division. The new division was to be "prepared for maximum combat efficiency as soon as possible." On 23 October the 71st Regiment was moved into the center of the line. The next day the 324th Infantry Regiment was committed on the left, and relief of the 79th Division was completed. This technique of gradual introduction to the line held to a minimum the shock and confusion attending transition to combat.

The 79th Division, after more than four months of almost continuous fighting, proceeded to a rest area at Luneville; and the 44th occupied the recently-won and tactically strong positions facing the Vosges. On 25 October the new troops underwent their so-called "baptism of fire", as the Germans attacked repeatedly on the left flank. The 324th Infantry held its positions; tanks and assault guns were brought up from the rear for additional defensive support.

The activities of the XV Corps on this front were confined to a consolidation of the gains made previously. The enemy now assumed a passive role and on the night of 28-29 October abandoned forward positions in Le Remabois, a wooded area between Embermenil and Leintrey, and Domjevin, withdrawing to the general line from Leintrey to Blemerey. On 2 November the 114th Regiment occupied Domjevin and the high ground east of the town.

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The final blows in the struggle to secure a suitable area from which to launch the great Vosges offensive were delivered by General Leclerc's *Division Blindée*. On 25 October Seventh Army ordered the capture of Merviller and the cutting of all roads leading out of Baccarat. According to General Patch's directive the attack to isolate Badonviller, Raon L'Etape, and Brouville would begin before 1 November. The 2nd French Armored Division began preparations for this maneuver which would assist the progress of VI Corps toward the Meurthe River between St. Die and Raon L'Etape.

Intelligence reports indicated that the enemy here was prepared for an armored attack. In fact, two lines of antitank defenses had been organized to defend against an attack from the west at the Baccarat road intersection and the axis Baccarat-Montigny-Domevre. Evidently the Germans believed that the rains had limited armored exploitation of terrain to the secure surfaces of the roads. However, the French demonstrated "by experiment" that their tanks could be employed by following the slopes and the high ground.

The first defense line of the Germans barred the routes from Luneville to Baccarat and to Montigny. Antitank forces were distributed from the Meurthe River on the south up to the Vezouse. Hablainville, just east of the Mondon Forest and in the center of the road net, linked the line from Azerailles to Ogeviller. An infantry screen joined the strong points which were encircled by large mine-fields and antitank ditches and defended by 75mm antitank guns. A short distance behind the first, a second supporting line included Gelacourt and Brouville and was extended farther north to Ogeviller by the Verdurette River. Tanks were concentrated in rear areas, and some 22 88mm guns of a German antitank battalion were being brought up to cover the Seventh Army routes of approach.

On the morning of 31 October French armored columns raced out of the Mondon Forest. One column of Combat Command V, which was to screen the northern flank of the attack by progressing to the Verdurette River, by-passed the enemy strong point at Hablainville, searched for intact bridges to make a crossing, and finally at about noon cut the Baccarat route to Domevre. The first mission of General Leclerc

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was accomplished. Other armored columns, operating farther south, reached out to Merviller via Brouville. A northward turn on the main Baccarat-Domevre route resulted in the fall of Montigny before the day was over.

The assault of Combat Command D paralleled the CCV operation. Two armored columns moved out of the southeastern sector of the Mondon Forest. The first drove to Gelacourt, swung south to Baccarat, and, after destroying strong antitank defenses, entered the city. The second column had moved south and had neutralized Azerailles before noon. Elements of this force later completed the occupation of Baccarat. The German positions in this area between the Meurthe and the Vezouse Rivers had been cut, penetrated, and destroyed.

South of the Meurthe, Combat Commands L and R, which had simulated an offensive, moved up to capture Menarmont and Nossoucourt, two villages just north of Rambervillers. They then took up positions just outside the city of Baccarat. In 12 hours the mission had been practically accomplished. By 2000 hours on 31 October the northern portion of Baccarat was completely cleared, and the Blette River near Montigny had been reached. The enemy had been taken completely by surprise at the suddenness and the strength of the armored assaults, and further French exploitation of the advantage was inevitable. In the following days the *Division Blindée* occupied the whole of Baccarat; its southern combat commands crossed the Meurthe and drove north to the Vezouse, reducing Ogeville and Herbeville despite heavy artillery fire and minefields; reconnaissance elements were sent up the Meurthe Valley toward Raon L'Etape and cooperated with the 117th Reconnaissance Troop to capture Bertrichamps. The French 2nd Armored Division was now holding a line from the Meurthe between Baccarat and Raon L'Etape north across the Blette to the Vezouse River.

At points northeast of Baccarat these Seventh Army penetrations threatened the main German defensive positions before the Vosges Mountains. The enemy offered strong opposition to any further armored exploitation beyond Vacqueville toward Blamont and began concentrating his own armor in the Montigny area. General Leclerc's forces,

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however, had facilitated the advance of VI Corps toward Raon L'Etape and had won an excellent zone of departure for the coming offensive.


This pre-Vosges interlude was brought to a close by a Seventh Army Directive dated 5 November which outlined the November offensive. XV Corps and VI Corps in a coordinated maneuver were to break through the Vosges defenses and secure Strasbourg on the Rhine. The part that XV Corps was to play in this offensive was elaborated by the issuance of Corps Field Order No. 11 on 8 November. The limited opening blows by Seventh Army since 1 October had made possible large-scale maneuvers and assaults. The time had been one of preparation for future operations, and both Allied and German forces engaged themselves with problems of regrouping and resupply. XV Corps actions at the Forest of Parroy and at Baccarat were not isolated phenomena undertaken with some vague idea of "maintaining pressure upon the enemy" but were battles which deprived the enemy of his forward positions and pushed him back to his main line of resistance.

During this October and early November interlude VI Corps, to the south of the XV Corps sector, had been engaged in the same sort of activity against the enemy to secure positions from which a new offensive could be launched. The advance on the VI Corps front from the Moselle to the Meurthe had been slow, but the path had been cleared for the November offensive. The Germans had gained time, time to revamp a shattered army, time to erect defensive positions which supplemented favorable terrain features. The new offensive would prove which of the opposing forces had employed that time most effectively.

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## CHAPTER XVI

### *Static Warfare in the Vosges*

WHILE the XV Corps was still fighting in the Parroy-Baccarat sector, the VI Corps, having crossed the Moselle, was engaged on the forested foothills of the Vosges from Rambervillers south to Ferdrupt. VI Corps troops not only faced a strengthened enemy and prepared defenses but fought through rain and cold, fog and mud. For six weeks, from 1 October to 15 November, their advances might be more easily measured in yards than in miles, as they fought only limited engagements for strategic positions.

At the close of September the VI Corps was firmly established in the Vosges foothills along a north-south line running generally from Rambervillers through Autrey, Grandvillers, Fays, St. Jean du Marche, to St. Ame on the Moselotte River and south to Ferdrupt on the Moselle. To the north of the boundary, Epinal-Rambervillers-Baccarat-Badonviller-Wagenbourg, was the newly assigned XV Corps. To the south of the boundary, Lure-Melisey-Le Thillot to Erstein, south of Strasbourg, was the First French Army.

Among the difficulties that developed between the First French and American Seventh Armies was the question of a boundary between the two armies. General Devers of Sixth Army Group indicated on 29 September that General De Lattre had requested that the boundary be moved farther north in order to give the French more room for maneuver. In a discussion between the Seventh Army Chief of Staff, General White, and General Devers it was pointed out that lines of advance would progressively give the desired maneuver space; further-

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more, cramping and narrowing the VI Corps zone would only impede and slow its progress. The boundary remained the same until 14 October when it was modified by a slight shift to the north.

Another problem which sprang up between the armies related to the supply situation. Repeated requests for assistance were made to Seventh Army by the First French Army, and as much aid as possible was given. Tension was perhaps most acute when Colonel Linares presented at Seventh Army Headquarters a copy of an unsigned memorandum prepared for the Commanding General of Sixth Army Group by the French Army. It included the statement:

In any case, it is a truly thankless situation for an Army committed in a full scale battle to thus find itself abandoned without gasoline and without ammunition. On the other hand, it has been proven that, contrary to established forecasts, this Army has been discriminated against during the last 20 days in a way seriously prejudicial to its life and to its capabilities for action.


Complications were partly the result of transfer of responsibility for the First French Army from Seventh Army, which had been operating in the place of an army group, to the Sixth Army Group. Furthermore, the French Staff and Supply Services lacked the efficiency that comes from experience; and there were also the expected differences of language and customs. Patient work by staff and liaison sections was required, particularly during these critical months of snail's-pace advances. Combat units of both armies worked with each other under all conditions to achieve assigned objectives; VI Corps and French troops continued to advance side by side in the operation which had begun on the Riviera beaches.

On 29 September Seventh Army had issued Field Order No. 6, which directed VI Corps to advance on the St. Die-Molsheim axis through the Saales Pass to Strasbourg, prepared to permit the First French Army to participate in the capture of Strasbourg, and directed XV Corps to advance in zone toward Sarrebourg and to assist VI Corps in the capture of Rambervillers, Baccarat, and Badonviller. The direction of army advance was straight to the northeast. It became apparent during the month of October that, although Strasbourg remained an ultimate ob-

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jective, the more immediate problem was to secure the western foothills of the Vosges and break the German Meurthe River winter defense line in front of VI Corps.

The most important town in the VI Corps area blocking the way to the Vosges passes was St. Die on the Meurthe River; it was, therefore, the focal point of the VI Corps drive. St. Die is the industrial, commercial, and communications center of the region. From it radiate roads leading through the Vosges in three directions to the Alsace Plain; one road runs northeast through the Saales Pass to Strasbourg; one runs east through the Ste. Marie Pass to Selestat; and one goes southeast



SLOW PROGRESS IN THE VOSGES FORESTS

"...Secondary and local roads are narrow with sharp turns and steep gradients. During wet weather they are generally unsuitable for military traffic..."

through the Bonhomme Pass to Colmar. Along the Meurthe River the Germans had established a winter line of defense, using the area around Raon L'Etape to the north and Gerardmer to the south as anchor strongholds.

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
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Use of roads in the VI Corps area was restricted by rough terrain, and the main routes were often bottlenecked by narrow village streets. Secondary and local roads are narrow with sharp turns and steep gradients. During wet weather they are generally unsuitable for military traffic. Dense forests cover the mountain sides, offering excellent concealment but creating a serious problem in the employment of armor and the movement of troops.

Unfavorable weather worked with the Germans in opposing the VI Corps' drive through the Vosges. After September weather conditions grew worse. During October there were only ten days of




TANK STALLED IN THE BELMONT AREA OF THE VOSGES

*Unfavorable weather worked with the Germans in opposing the VI Corps drive through the Vosges . . .*

good flying, and by 19 November cloudy skies and the unsettled weather of early winter had prohibited effective air support for 15 days. Ground troops suffered from the bad weather—snow, rain, and biting cold.

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In the VI Corps sector elements of the German 21st Panzer, the 16th Infantry, the 716th Infantry, the 198th Infantry, the 338th Infantry, and the 189th Reserve Divisions were identified in the line. Photo interpretation and reports from agents revealed enemy preparations along the Meurthe River and the areas around Raon L'Etape to the north and Gerardmer to the south. Defense in depth featured antitank ditches and machine gun and antitank positions with numerous fire and communication trenches. Strongpoints were strategically located to block the west-east routes of communication through the Vosges. Prisoners reported that a "Fuehrer Befehl", an edict of Hitler, had been issued to hold at all costs. Army Intelligence pointed out on 30 September, "It is evident that the enemy is fighting where he can, and with what troops he can lay hands upon, and shows all signs of attempting to prevent the battle from reaching into Germany. The enemy does not yet show any signs of admitting defeat, and it should be expected that he will continue to hold every piece of ground until he has been forced to surrender it."

During the first two weeks of October warfare was practically static. Supplies were brought up and planning elaborated to carry out the mission assigned VI Corps by Seventh Army Field Order No. 6. On the corps left flank the 45th Division completed mopping up in the Rambervilliers area, then attacked southeast in the direction of Brouvelieures and Bruyeres; in the corps center the 36th Division continued to drive toward Bruyeres while the 3rd Division continued to protect the corps right flank along a wide front. It was recognized that St. Die was the key to the Vosges passes, that towns like Bruyeres and Brouvelieures guarding the approaches to St. Die would have to be taken by assault, and that the German Winter Line along the Meurthe would have to be cracked before the Alsace Plain and Strasbourg could be reached.

On 11 October Operations Instructions No. 1 was issued by VI Corps outlining operations to secure a suitable line of departure for an assault to capture the southwest bank of the Meurthe River from St. Die north to Moyennoutier. First, Bruyeres and Brouvelieures were to be taken by the 36th and 45th Divisions in an assault after 13 October.



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Then the 3rd Division, after making a surprise shift in position from the south flank to the north, between the 45th and 36th, was to attack after 23 October toward St. Die from the northwest. The other two divisions would then continue to advance along the flanks, the 45th in the vicinity of Raon L'Etape and the 36th in the vicinity of La Houssiere. This drive was to be made in coordination with the XV Corps, advancing on Bacarat from the west and northwest, and with the French First Army, driving toward the Belfort Gap.

### The Assault on Bruyeres

Bruyeres has good natural defenses. Southwest of Bruyeres is the Vologne River, which flows into the Moselle between Remiremont and Epinal, 20 to 35 feet wide with a number of main ditches, creating a marshy valley floor and restricting movement to the existing roads. All secondary roads leading south were easily blocked by trees. Buildings along the main road from Docelles to Bruyeres were either organized as strongpoints or strewn with mines and booby traps. The high ground northeast and west of Bruyeres was strongly held by German infantry supported by numerous pillboxes, antitank guns, automatic weapon emplacements, mined areas, and road blocks to make penetration difficult.

The plan of assault was for the 45th Division to sweep through Brouvelieures across the heights north of Bruyeres to approach Bruyeres from the north and northeast. The 36th Division was to attack from the southwest in the direction of Fays-Bruyeres. Attached to the 36th Division was the Nisei 442nd Infantry Regiment, which had just arrived from Italy, under the command of Colonel Charles W. Pence. It was to be in a central position protecting the left flank of the division while maintaining contact with the 45th. Included in the 442nd Regiment was the 100th Infantry Battalion which had received a Presidential Award for its service in Italy. The Nisei troops were to attack Bruyeres from the west. For the attack the 36th Division's artillery ammunition quota was increased by an additional allowance of 110 rounds per howitzer.

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The attack on Bruyeres began at 0800 hours on 15 October after a 15 minute preparation by attached artillery units. Jumping off along the road leading from Fays to Bruyeres, the 1st and 3rd Battalions, 143rd Infantry, advanced abreast. Under the cover of smoke fired by 4.2 mortars from the 3rd Chemical Battalion, Companies I and K fought into the center of Laval on the road to Bruyeres. Company A pushed forward to cut the Bruyeres-Laval road, engaging in a fierce fire fight astride the railroad tracks. A heavy artillery duel continued throughout the day, as the Germans sought to break by heavy concentrations of mortar and artillery fire the regiment's hold on the approaches to Bruyeres.

By early morning on 16 October all resistance in Laval was mopped up by the 3rd Battalion, while the 1st Battalion cleared well-fortified houses on the Laval-Bruyeres road and along the railroad tracks. The 3rd Battalion resumed the attack and was stopped one mile south of Bruyeres by long range heavy artillery fire. On the morning of 17 October, the 1st Battalion was still occupied trying to clear the road from Laval to Bruyeres. Snipers and machine gunners stationed in houses prevented the removal of mines. Artillery fire finally routed them, and the 111th Engineers cleared the mines to permit passage of armor. Antitank fire from 57mm guns and .50 caliber machine gun fire were employed to give the impression that the main attack was to come from south of Bruyeres. Actually the main effort was to be made by the 442nd Infantry from the west.

At 0800 hours on 15 October the Japanese-Americans had launched an attack through the forest west of Bruyeres with the 100th and 2nd Battalions abreast and the 3rd Battalion in reserve. Heavy fire from prepared infantry positions in the thick woods forced the regiment to dig in. On 16 October Company F advanced to within 100 yards of Bruyeres and occupied Hill 555 (altitude in meters) northwest of the town. A counterattack stopped the advance at 1730 hours. The night of 16-17 October was spent under sporadic shelling. The wind was cold and drove before it a heavy rain. On the next day the Germans counter-attacked Hill 555 twice. Six bazooka teams were formed to meet enemy

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armor, since 57mm antitank guns could not be brought into the forest. The enemy was driven back.

To the north of the 442nd, the 179th Infantry of the 45th Division, had also made an assault on 15 October. Heavy close-in infantry action forced the enemy from well dug-in positions in the dense woods. On 16 October after taking important high ground northwest of Bruyeres, the regiment continued the attack toward the Bruyeres-Brouvelieures highway.

On 18 October the 36th Division placed forty 37mm antitank guns south of Bruyeres; tanks were moved up; and smoke from 4.2 mortars was shot into the town. The 143rd Cannon Company threw in 300 rounds of supporting fire to wreck buildings protecting the enemy. By noon the 143rd Infantry had reached the factory area of Bruyeres and was mopping up in spite of a severe enemy mortar barrage. The Germans fought savagely, not even permitting regimental aid men to administer aid or evacuate the wounded. By 1600 hours the 1st Battalion moved under cover of a ridge to reach the road junction in the heart of Bruyeres.

Meanwhile the 442nd Infantry, after over eight hours of bitter fighting, cleared the heights to the northwest, and pushed into Bruyeres to engage in street fighting from house to house. By nightfall the town was under American control, although a barricaded group of Germans continued to resist in the center of town.

On 19 October the 1st Battalion, 143rd Infantry Regiment, moved through Bruyeres and together with the 442nd completed the job of mopping up the town. The 179th to the north had cut the Bruyeres-Brouvelieures road. The enemy now began a continuous shelling of Bruyeres. House to house fighting together with this bombardment damaged or destroyed almost every building in the town. "Bruyeres will long be remembered", reported the 131st Field Artillery Battalion Journal, "for it was the most viciously fought for town we had encountered in our long march against the Germans. The enemy defended it house by house, giving up a yard, only when it became so untenable they could no longer hope to hold it."

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### The 45th Division Drive on Raon L'Etape

To the north of the 36th Division, the 45th Division was engaged in day-to-day limited objective attacks through densely wooded areas in a drive toward Raon L'Etape and the German Winter Line on the Meurthe. The fighting was chiefly against roadblocks of felled trees, and well coordinated strongpoints with all avenues of approach thoroughly mined and booby-trapped. Enemy counterattacks occurred daily. In villages the houses were converted into strongpoints and hard close-in fighting took place. Daily rains, cold weather, and continuous action increased difficulties of the drive.



CLEARING A GERMAN ROAD BLOCK

"... The fighting was chiefly against roadblocks of felled trees, well coordinated strong points with all avenues of approach thoroughly mined and booby trapped."

On 1 October the 45th Division was extended along an eight mile front ranging from approximately ten miles east of Rambervillers south to Grandvillers. On the north the 157th Infantry was engaged in

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the assault of the twin cities of Bru and Jeanmenil; in the center the 180th was meeting stubborn resistance on the outskirts of Fremifontaine; on the south the 179th was fighting from house to house in Grandvillers.

Grandvillers, northwest of Bruyeres, was taken on 2 October. Company B, 179th Infantry, attacked with tank support and cleared the eastern end of the town, while A and C Companies swept around the left flank to take high positions overlooking Grandvillers. Company B then finished clearing the town. On that day General Eagles, Divisional Commander, arrived at the Regimental Command Post to discuss the acute shortage of 105 mm and mortar ammunition and the possibility of resting troops as much as possible. Although these two factors limited operations for the next few weeks, the 179th assisted in the capture of Bruyeres by taking the hill mass to the north during the period 15-19 October.

After the fall of Bruyeres, the 179th moved north to take Brouvelieures. Strong enemy defenses were reported in the dense woods near the town. Following a heavy mortar and artillery preparation on 20 October all three battalions attacked, encountering enemy artillery and tank fire throughout the day. By noon elements of the 2nd Battalion broke through the enemy defenses on the left, then patrolled the slopes of the high ground overlooking the town, and set up positions from which the enemy could be observed. By 1500 hours, 21 October, the enemy began withdrawing northeast. Half an hour later the 2nd Battalion entered Brouvelieures with E Company coming from the left and G Company from the right. The Infantry finished clearing the town of snipers the following day. The regiment then pushed on across the Mortagne River to take the town of Mortagne by 24 October.

To the north of the 179th, the 180th Regiment was pushing from the Fremifontaine area to cross the Mortagne River and drive to the northeast. The advance was slow as the enemy fought back bitterly from firmly entrenched positions. By 1600 hours, 18 October, positions were organized 250 yards short of the river. On 20 October an attack was launched, breaking through the enemy's first line of trenches. Very close contact occasioned numerous grenade duels and small arms clashes,

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but the enemy's wire entanglements finally halted the advance. The river was crossed on 22 October, but heavy fire from the east bank caused a withdrawal. At 0530 hours on 23 October the attack was resumed, and by 0745 hours the bulk of the 1st Battalion had crossed the river in spite of heavy machine gun fire. The bridgehead was secured and the advance continued northeast. On 30 October the 180th Infantry entered the town of St. Benoit, on the road to Raon L'Etape, without opposition.

On the northern flank the 157th Infantry made almost no progress during October following the taking of Rambervillers and the securing of positions overlooking Bru and Jeanmenil to the east. The enemy seemed determined to defend these two towns, located on roads leading to Raon L'Etape and the Meurthe River. Rain and cold increasingly hampered operations. Ammunition, particularly mortar and artillery, was rationed. Jeanmenil and Bru and the woods surrounding them were well defended strongholds. Chemical mortars were fired into Jeanmenil setting the town ablaze. The German observation post in the church steeple was finally battered to the ground by artillery fire. The towns were at last taken as a result of a drive east cutting the road from Jeanmenil to La Salle. The enemy withdrew from both towns which were occupied by American forces on 29 October.

### 3rd Division Pushes on St Die

On the right flank of the VI Corps the 3rd Division at the beginning of October occupied a zone of action from Rupt-sur-Moselle north through St. Ame, four miles east of Remiremont. The division was advancing on Gerardmer and the Schlucht Pass by the two highways through Le Tholy and Vagney. In the division center on the road to Le Tholy the 15th Infantry was held up at the beginning of October by the enemy firmly entrenched in an old quarry near Cleurie. Tanks had to be brought up to blast the rock road blocks. After five days of fighting a battle patrol entered the quarry on 5 October, suffering heavy casualties from enemy mortar and artillery fire. The regiment then continued northeast to positions about 400 yards west of Le Tholy.

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South of the 15th Infantry, the 7th Infantry moved from the vicinity of St. Ame and opened its attack on Vagney on 4 October. Supported by tanks, the 3rd Battalion fought a bitter house to house battle and by morning of 7 October had gained complete control of the town. Sapois, two miles east, was taken on the next day.

On the division left flank the 30th Infantry endeavored to open a route to the southeast on the Tendon-Le Tholy road. On 6 October accurate fire succeeded in driving the enemy from positions astride the highway. The infantry advance slowed to a standstill, as the division prepared for another operation; meanwhile the artillery kept up the appearance of preparation for an assault. From 11 to 21 October every target on the approaches to Gerardmer was covered by artillery, chemical mortar, and .50 caliber machine gun fire.

During the early part of the month plans had been drawn for an assault to seize the southwest bank of the Meurthe River from St. Die north to Moyennoutier. Prior to this assault the 45th Division was to drive to Brouvelieures while the 36th Division was to take Bruyeres. The 3rd Division was given the key role of taking the corps objective, the high ground near St. Die, in a surprise shift to the north. To accomplish this shift the division was to hold its position until relieved on corps order by French elements and by the 36th Division. The 3rd Division was to assemble in the rear of the 45th Division front, ready to attack on corps order by 23 October.

Surprise was vital in this operation. To deceive the enemy as to the direction of the corps attack a cover plan was to be carried out to give the enemy the idea that the attack was to be on Gerardmer from the Le Tholy area by elements of the 3rd and 36th Divisions and the French. It was hoped that the enemy would be contained on the Gerardmer front and would be unable to build up his forces against the main attack toward St. Die.

During the period 15-19 October the 3rd Division simulated a concentration west of Le Tholy while shifting strength to the north. 3rd Division radio nets continued operations in the Le Tholy area; the number and activity of combat patrols were increased; and dummy guns

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were left in vacated positions. A dummy armored group radio net was to be opened at H-Hour in the Tendon-Le Tholy-Remiremont sector. The 36th Division increased patrols along the southern portion of its line



4.2 MORTARS FIRING IN THE LE THOLY AREA

The 3rd Division simulated a concentration west of Le Tholy while shifting strength to the north . . .

and arranged for the "loss" of 3rd Division equipment on the front. VI Corps artillery increased cub plane activity on the right flank of the corps front 48 hours before the attack. The 3rd Division moved to its bivouac position south of Rambervillers in darkness, carefully camouflaging dumps, command installations, and gun positions. Reconnaissance parties wore 45th Division insignia. A period of several days was taken to register artillery by moving single guns to new positions in advance. There was radio silence.

On 20 October the 3rd Division attack lunged forward against only moderate resistance and made substantial progress. The enemy's

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main line was cracked in the first 24 hours. Apparently tactical surprise had been achieved. The 30th Infantry, left behind in the Le Tholy area, reported the enemy alert in that sector. Troops of the 7th Infantry crossed the line of departure at noon, 20 October, and attacked toward Vervezelle, northeast of Bruyeres. After taking the town they advanced over open terrain to occupy Domfaing, on the Bruyeres-St. Die road. By 26 October Les Rouges Eaux had fallen, and the regiment proceeded along the road from Les Rouges Eaux to St. Die.

The 15th Infantry jumped off from a road junction immediately north of Bruyeres on 21 October, knocked out a strong enemy road block just south of Brouvelieures, and aided the 179th Regiment in the taking of the town. The attack continued northeast until commanding high ground was taken whereby artillery observers could bring fire on enemy vehicles and personnel in the villages of La Salle, La Bourgonce and Nompatelize.

The 30th Infantry left the Le Tholy area on 22 October and moved forward from Grandvillers on 24 October to follow the rest of the division through the forests along the Mortagne River. Pushing over narrow trails through heavily wooded, steep-sloped terrain typical of the Vosges, the regiment struck northeast through a gap in the enemy lines between Les Rouges Eaux and the La Salle valley. By 30 October the regiment had seized its objective, the dominating hill mass providing observation south from Rougville to Taintrux and northeast toward St. Die. A salient had been driven into the enemy lines, 3,800 yards deep and 4,400 yards wide. Within this salient numerous high points provided excellent observation from which artillery could shell the roads of the Meurthe Valley. Limited objective attacks were now planned to drive all the enemy from the area west of St. Die and to secure the road net.

The enemy had waged a stubborn defense to stop the 30th Regiment in its advance east. In addition to the usual weapons and well organized defense positions, wire tapping agents, false radio messages, and false field messages were employed by the Germans. Several counterattacks attempted to drive the regiment from key terrain features. On 26 and 27 October the enemy had fired the greatest amount of artillery the regiment had yet experienced in a similar period of time

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in France. Though the enemy had been caught unaware by the 3rd Division attack in strength and had lost control of his units for a time, by the end of the month he had once again fallen back to organized defense positions.



VOSGES MOUNTAINS OVERLOOKING MEURTHE VALLEY

*Within this salient numerous high points provided excellent observation from which artillery could shell the roads of the Meurthe Valley . . .*

Despite the enemy's determined defense on the western fringe of the Vosges, VI Corps had finally succeeded during the month of October in breaking through rough mountain terrain to seize the high ground dominating the Meurthe River Valley in the St. Die area. More than 5,000 prisoners were taken during the month.

#### The "Lost" Battalion

At 0845 hours, 23 October, General Dahlquist of the 36th Division had directed the 141st Infantry to send a patrol of company or battalion strength to work along a trail through the Foret Domaniale

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de Champ, east of Bruyeres, and to secure the heights north of the village of La Houssiere. The 1st Battalion, which had been assigned the mission, moved into the forest before noon and by nightfall had lost contact with the regiment. Germans had overrun the battalion command post, driving back the headquarters personnel and the battalion staff.

On 25 October the 2nd Battalion, 141st Infantry, tried to open a supply route to the men who were cut off but could get no closer than 1,200 yards, as the enemy was covering the trail with machine guns and artillery. An enemy observation post and radio party located in the forest directed artillery fire on every vehicle attempting to move up the trail. The forward elements of the 1st Battalion were now about one mile north of La Houssiere and were engaged with enemy forces that kept infiltrating into their positions. It now appeared that the combat elements of the battalion, 240 men, under the command of 1st Lieutenant Martin J. Higgins Jr. of Company A, senior officer with the group, were cut off except for radio communication with a forward artillery observer.

That evening the Nisei 442nd Infantry Regiment was alerted to come to the rescue of the "lost" battalion. The Japanese-Americans, after the assault on Bruyeres, had been engaged since 19 October clearing the area to the northeast of Bruyeres and east to Biffontaine. At 1400 hours, 25 October, the 2nd Battalion, 442nd Infantry, was ordered to prepare to attack east toward the 1st Battalion of the 141st Regiment; the following day the Nisei 100th and 3rd Battalions were alerted to attack. The isolated troops were now short of supplies and had suffered casualties.

Until relief of the 1st Battalion could be effected, efforts were being made to supply the cut-off elements both by air drops and by artillery. The first drop, attempted at 1100 hours, 27 October, by four planes of the 371st Fighter Bomber Group, failed because of bad weather. One plane was lost. On the following two days, rations, ammunition, plasma, and radio batteries were dropped with limited success. Because of a heavy ground fog, part of the supplies were dropped out of the battalion area; one plane was shot down by friendly ack-ack. On 30 October a radio message from the "lost" battalion requested that no

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additional plane drops be made which might give away the battalion's position. The 131st Field Artillery Battalion attempted to fire medical supplies and chocolate bars to the infantry. Shells used for propaganda leaflets were lobbed in by 105mm and 155mm howitzers. Only fractional success was obtained as the shells buried themselves in the soft ground.

By the second day of separation most of the attention of the surrounding units was devoted to direct relief of the isolated troops. At 1030 hours on 26 October the commanders of VI Corps and the 36th Division arrived at the 141st Regimental Command Post to survey and discuss the problem. The Division Commander ordered the Regimental Commander to have the 1st Battalion attack immediately to the west to break out of the encirclement and to avoid the stalemate that was developing. At 1312 hours a message came from the 1st Battalion stating that contact had been made with the enemy at three different points. At 1345 hours the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, 141st Infantry, were ordered to continue the push through the woods to open the trail.

On 27 October the 1st Battalion reported "morale high", although the men were physically weak. Four men were reported killed, 28 wounded or ill, and 43 missing from the combat patrol which had led the attack to break out of the encirclement. By this time the Nisei troops were approaching. On the afternoon of 29 October the Division Commander sent a message to the "lost" battalion stating that the 442nd was pushing through to approximately 700 yards of the unit and ordered patrols sent out to contact the Nisei unit. The lieutenant in command of the 1st Battalion, 141st Infantry, replied that a patrol would require a large force of men and that, since the loss of his first patrol, men could not be spared. German patrols were active and a counterattack believed imminent. The group now had 22 litter cases, 11 trench foot cases, and 10 walking wounded.

The 442nd Infantry attack moved slowly against small arms and automatic weapons fire. Along the route were numerous road blocks, mine fields, and well prepared positions. General Dahlquist ordered the 442nd to push ahead at all cost to reach the "lost" battalion. Savage hand-to-hand fighting took place, as the men charged machine gun nests with bayonets and grenades. After killing scores of Germans, the


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infantry broke through the major road blocks. A tank dozer arrived to remove the obstructions in order that tanks might advance and support the infantry.

On 30 October a heavy artillery and mortar concentration was laid down on the ridge separating the 442nd from the "lost battalion", and at 0900 hours both battalions again attacked. The heavy losses inflicted on the enemy in the previous fighting resulted in lightened resistance; good progress was made. At 1600 hours the long awaited radio message from the "lost" battalion came over the air, "Patrol from the 442nd here. Tell them we love them." The isolated unit had been



JAPANESE-AMERICANS FIRING THE 105MM HOWITZER  
IN THE VOSGES FORESTS

*On 30 October a heavy artillery and mortar concentration was laid down on the ridge separating the 442nd from the "lost battalion" . . .*

reached by advanced patrols of the 3rd Battalion, 442nd Infantry. The 3rd Battalion dug in on a hill top around the relieved unit, while the 100th Battalion moved up on the right flank. The division commander

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ordered the "lost" battalion wounded to be removed during the night and the remainder of the unit the next morning.

Although press reports stated that the 1st Battalion, 141st Infantry, was cut off and referred to isolated elements as the "lost" battalion, the battalion was never actually surrounded by the enemy in force. The supply lines were cut by enemy infiltration in the dense woods, but at no time was the unit heavily engaged.

On 7 November General White, Seventh Army Chief of Staff, discussed with Sixth Army Group the matter of relief of the 442nd Infantry. The Nisei troops had undergone 15 days of hard fighting in wet and freezing weather from Bruyeres to the "lost" battalion. This had cost the regiment during October 117 killed in action, 657 wounded in action, 40 missing in action, a total of 814 casualties. Many others were suffering from respiratory diseases and trench foot. It was believed that the climate on the flank along the Riviera would be more suitable for them.

#### The Introduction of New Divisions

As the month of November opened, VI Corps was confronted with three problems: first, to bring the corps right and left flanks up to the salient held by the 3rd Division along the Meurthe, thus straightening a "jump" line for another offensive; second, to introduce the newly arrived 100th and 103rd Infantry Divisions into combat; and third, to make final plans and regroup the entire corps for an attack to cross the Meurthe, to crack the German Winter Line, to penetrate the Vosges passes, and to reach the Rhine.

On 27 September the Seventh Army Chief of Staff had announced the assignment of the 100th and 103rd Infantry Divisions and the 14th Armored Division arriving from the United States. It had been planned that the 100th Division would be sent to VI Corps and the 103rd Division to XV Corps, that both would be battle-seasoned by the attachment of their regiments to experienced divisions for first commitment. Once these new divisions were in full operation, one division of each corps in Seventh Army could be rotated in reserve. However, it was decided by 3 November to send the 103rd as well as the 100th Division to the VI Corps initially. The new divisions had arrived in

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Marseille during October. They were staged and equipped by Base Section, then rapidly moved north to the army area.

At the time of the arrival of these fresh troops the left flank of VI Corps was advancing slowly northeast over forested terrain toward Raon L'Etape. The corps center occupied the Vosges ridges dominating the Meurthe River Valley just west of St. Die. The right flank was moving through the Forêt Domaniale de Champ toward Corcieux and the Meurthe River south of St. Die.

The 100th Division arrived in the VI Corps sector only eleven days after debarking from its convoy at Marseille and was assigned the mission of relieving the 45th Division in the vicinity of St. Remy-St. Benoit-Baccarat on the northern sector of the corps by 9 November. The veteran division was to give as much aid as possible in matters of bivouac, assembly areas, available cover and shelter, routes, enemy intelligence, and standard operating procedure in the corps. All possible security measures would be used to insure the secrecy of this relief.

The Century Division, composed of the 397th, 398th and 399th Infantry Regiments and commanded by Major General Withers A.



MAJOR GENERAL  
WITHERS A. BURRESS  
"...protecting the corps left  
flank..."

Burress took over the 45th Division's mission of protecting the corps left flank and of advancing to the high ground near Raon L'Etape. As relief of the 45th Division was being accomplished, that division reverted to army control, moved to a rest area, and was held in readiness to re-enter the line as part of XV Corps. On 9 November the 100th Division was first committed to combat and encountered the same cold, rainy, muddy conditions that were plaguing other troops. On 10 November the 398th Infantry pushed forward toward the Meurthe River in the vicinity of Etival Clairefontaine, meeting only scattered resistance. There were indications that the enemy was withdrawing to the eastern bank. Amid a flurry of the winter's first snow the 100th Division

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jumped off on its first full-scale attack at 0900 hours, 12 November. The 397th and 399th Infantry Regiments moved out of their positions at Baccarat, which had been recently taken by the 2nd French Armored Division, and headed eastward across the Meurthe River. The plan of attack called for the 399th to move to locations just west and south of Neuf-Maisons, a town east of Baccarat and north of Raon L'Etape, to block German movement from the Raon L'Etape area. The 397th Infantry was to send one battalion down the Meurthe River toward Raon L'Etape, while another moved between Neuf-Maisons and the river directly toward the division objective, the high ground north of Raon L'Etape. South of the river the 398th Infantry and the 100th Reconnaissance Troop were to hold the line and on division order to place diversionary fires on the town with 50 calibre machine guns, 57mm guns, and mortars. During the day the infantry advance ran into considerable small arms and artillery fire but was held up even more by rain, snow, and density of the woods. On 13 November the Germans counterattacked in strength. The 374th Field Artillery Battalion and the 69th Armored Field Artillery Battalion laid down a five minute barrage on the area, killing 75 Germans, and dispersed the counter-attack.

Troops of the 100th Division on 15 November broke through the first real German defensive positions they had encountered. The 397th Infantry was stopped by prepared positions from Raon L'Etape to Neuf-Maisons. The 3rd Battalion of the 399th Regiment swung south from the vicinity of Neuf-Maisons to take commanding heights in the rear of the German defenses, thereby cracking the line. The 1st Battalion of the 399th moved rapidly south astride the Neuf-Maisons-Raon L'Etape road to just north of Raon L'Etape. The rest of the division was now in position to assault the town.

On 17 November regrouping and reorganization took place in preparation for an attack the next day toward the high ground southeast of Raon L'Etape. The 398th Regiment had been moved north to cross the Meurthe River at Baccarat and to come into line with the other regiments for the divisional assault. On 18 November the 397th Infantry pushed through the town of Raon L'Etape along the river, only to be

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stopped at the outskirts by Germans entrenched in a stone quarry. The 398th Infantry attacked across the Plaine River near La Trouche but were able to get only one company to the south side against determined opposition. The next day the rest of the 398th crossed the river and occupied positions commanding the road and valley southeast of Raon L'Etape. To the north the 117th Reconnaissance Squadron, attacked, and the 100th Reconnaissance Troop occupied Neuf-Maisons, Pexonne, and Badonwiller without opposition. The securing of the high ground around Raon L'Etape neutralized this bastion of the German Winter Line.



MAJOR GENERAL  
EDWARD H. BROOKS  
"new commander  
of VI Corps..."

The new commander of VI Corps, Major General Edward H. Brooks, commended the 100th Division for its part in the advance. General Brooks, formerly commander of the American V Corps, had officially assumed command of VI Corps on 25 October, when General Truscott was ordered to report to the Twelfth Army Group for further assignment. The letter of commendation to General Burrell hailed the capture of Raon L'Etape as an operation which "breached the hinge of the German defensive position and at the same time drew forces from the center where the main attack was to be made."



MAJOR GENERAL  
CHARLES C. HAFFNER JR.  
"entered combat... west of  
St. Die..."

During the month of November the 103rd Division also entered combat for the first time, in a sector some four miles west of St. Die. This division, commanded by Major General Charles C. Haffner, Jr., was made up of the 409th, the 410th, and the 411th Infantry Regiments.

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During the period 10-15 November the division dug in at the front between the 3rd and 36th Divisions and the men were gradually acclimated to battle conditions; patrols were active, mines were swept, information was secured from prisoners, troops inured to artillery fire, and supply problems mastered.

The 103rd Division Field Order No. 1, issued on 15 November, directed an attack to seize and hold wooded high ground southwest of St. Die. H-Hour was 0900, 16 November. At H minus 15 all available division and corps artillery began a 15-minute preparation. In less than three hours Hill 623 (altitude in meters), the forward point of a triangular



SCORCHED EARTH

During the first week of combat the 103rd Division witnessed the new German "scorched earth" policy, especially evident in the St. Die sector.

mountain objective, was taken and the woods north and east of Taintrux entered. By 17 November the division had consolidated its objective, the hill mass looking directly down on St. Die from the southwest.

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During this first week of combat the 103rd Division witnessed the new German "scorched earth", policy, especially evident in the St. Die sector but extending all along the VI Corps front. On 8 November Gestapo Headquarters at St. Die received orders from General Heckel to form arson and demolition squads capable of destroying and burning as ordered all towns and villages in the path of the German withdrawal. An organized program of evacuation, burning, looting, and destruction began on 10 November. On 11 November women, children, and the aged were evacuated from that part of St. Die north of the Meurthe River. The people were told that the Americans intended to fire-bomb St. Die and that the Germans wanted to save their lives. All able-bodied men between the ages of 18 and 45 had previously been sent to Strasbourg. During 11 and 12 November soldiers systematically looted the evacuated area.

At 1200 hours on 13 November the enemy began burning St. Die by first burning the home of Monsieur Duminel, local pharmacist. On the wall of his home there was a plaque, commemorating the fact that St. Die sent the first shipload of men and supplies from France to the United States during the American Revolution. The other buildings were then destroyed in turn. Both gasoline and incendiary bombs were used to start the fires, and smaller charges of dynamite were used to destroy machinery in local plants.

On the night of 17-18 November a patrol of the 410th Infantry entered St. Die; and from reports of civilians and agents it was learned that 90 percent of the buildings in the northern half of St. Die had been burned and dynamited, crowding 27,000 persons in the southeastern portion of the city. The area between the Meurthe River and a line enclosing Moyenmoutier, St. Jean d'Ormont, Nayemont and Provencheres came under the torch as well. Towns to the south were similarly destroyed: Corcieux, St. Leonard, Ste Marguerite, and Gerardmer. Fortunately the rapid advance in that sector prevented complete destruction. For a long time the sector was to be remembered as a place where "the enemy reached a new low in vicious warfare."

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### VI Corps Reaches the Meurthe Winter Line

On the 3rd Division sector in the VI Corps line the enemy counterattacked at the beginning of November with fanatical fury, as he realized that the division's position overlooking St. Die and the Meurthe River Valley constituted a serious threat to his plans to defend on the eastern bank of the river. Two new well-equipped mountain battalions were thrown into the battle for several days without success. After realizing the impossibility of dislodging the Americans from the high ground, the enemy organized defensive positions to contain them.



WRECKED GERMAN EQUIPMENT ON THE OUTSKIRTS OF  
LA BOURGONCE

"... the 15th Infantry thrust itself into La Bourgonce and established a foothold in the valley ..."

The 15th Infantry had reached the high ground overlooking the La Salle-Nompatelize-Etival-St. Michel area on the west bank of the Meurthe north of St. Die. Its plan was now to pivot so as to bring

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the regiment against the west bank of the river by driving north, thus taking these towns in the valley. In a surprise attack the last night of October the 2nd Battalion, 15th Infantry, spearheaded by E Company, thrust itself into La Bourgonce and established a foothold in the valley. Company F then moved unopposed into Nompateize; and, after an intensive preparation of fire, the battalion attacked and occupied La Salle. The 3rd Battalion then moved on Etival from the south in a coordinated attack with the 2nd Battalion from the west. By 1900 hours, 10 November, the town was completely cleared. The regimental line was then extended to the railroad on the west bank of the Meurthe.


The 7th Infantry Regiment was engaged in clearing the Forêt de Mortagne north of the Brouvelieures-St. Die road. Good natural defenses and miserable weather made the regiment's problem a difficult one. On 4 November the regiment launched an all-out assault. The attack was aided by an intensive artillery program called a "Joe Louis" which was fired four times, expending over 1400 rounds. The regiment pushed eastward along the St. Die highway, sending out aggressive patrols which reached into Rougville. Between the other two regiments the 30th Infantry was engaged in clearing the perimeter defenses of the Mortagne Forest.

After the 103rd Division had entered the line, the 15th Infantry Regiment was left to hold the 3rd Division front, while the other two regiments were pulled out for a program of rehabilitation and training in preparation for a key role in the Seventh Army's November offensive. There was special emphasis on the technique of river crossing. Reconnaissance of crossing sites on the Meurthe River was made, plans discussed, and staff preparations completed. There was continuous patrolling, and listening posts were established on the banks of the river to pick up enemy activity and movement. Training was given in small unit problems in the reduction of pillboxes and fortified houses and attack through woods. H-Hour for the VI Corps part of the new Seventh Army offensive was set for 0645 on 20 November.

On the Corps right flank, in the meantime, the 36th Division had been given the mission of maintaining contact with the First French Army and driving along the Bruyeres-Corcieux axis toward the Meurthe.

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At the beginning of November, the 141st Regiment had been fighting in the forest east of Bruyeres against stubborn resistance. It then pushed south to guard the right flank and maintain contact with the French.



3RD DIVISION MEN CROSSING THE MORTAGNE RIVER  
IN TRAINING EXERCISE

*There was special emphasis on the technique of river crossing in preparation for the Seventh Army's November offensive.*

By 1330 hours of 18 November Companies I and L, after a drive through heavily mined woods, had reached a point overlooking Gerardmer and Lake Gerardmer. Patrols found that the town had been a victim of the "scorched earth" policy of the Germans and that only a few buildings were intact. The greater portion of the city consisted of rubble and scorched walls, which were mined and booby-trapped.

The 142nd Infantry had the mission of driving down the narrow valley from Les Rouges Eaux in a southeasterly direction to reach the Meurthe. The valley has a narrow flat bed with an open clearing 200-

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400 yards wide running through it and the eastern part of the densely wooded Foret Domaniale de Champ. Only a few houses dot the single valley road, on both sides of which the ground rises sharply. For tactical



WEATHER WAS BAD: RAIN, MIST AND SNOW

*"... On the sixth and seventh days of fighting a blanket of wet snow whitened the ground and hung on the tree limbs to make a pretty picture but not the kind to fight a war in'..."*

tical reasons the open ground had to be avoided, and regimental troops pushed up and down over numerous ridges under cover of the woods. Movement was slow. Fighting was often from tree to tree. Tree bursts from artillery fire had a terrifying effect. The weather was bad: rain, mist, and snow. There were many casualties from exposure, particularly trench foot. On the sixth and seventh days of fighting "a blanket of wet snow whitened the ground and hung on the tree limbs to make a pretty picture but not the kind to fight a war in." Rain severely limited employment of air support, while soggy ground in the valley and flatlands confined armor to the roads and restricted artillery emplacements.

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In the regimental drive down the valley from 4 to 12 November casualties were heavy; 41 were killed in action, 3 died of wounds, 235 were wounded in action, 7 were missing in action, and there were 345



THE LES ROUGES EAUX VALLEY

*"Soggy ground in the valley and flatlands confined armor to the roads and restricted artillery emplacements..."*

non-battle casualties. Stiff resistance was encountered by the 142nd infantry until the 3rd Battalion captured the enemy observation post from which the Germans were directing fire on the entire valley to Les Rouges Eaux. On 10 November troops entered Vanemont and La Housiere and cleared these villages at the southeastern end of the valley.

This action was a "turning point" for the regiment "that may be likened to reaching the crest of a hill and starting on a downrun." For over a month it had been fighting almost static warfare. On 10 November a weakening of the enemy became apparent, and the line began to surge forward. On 14 November patrols from the 1st Battalion

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went nearly to Corcieux before they made contact with the enemy. Early in the evening of the next day the glare of fires appeared on the horizon. The German torch was being set to Corcieux. The next night Barbey-Seroux was in flames. Patrols entered Corcieux the night of 17-18 November as the 142nd Infantry moved up to the center of the divisional line, just north of 141st Infantry positions at Gerardmer. The division now had good observation over the Meurthe River Valley.

At the beginning of November the 143rd Regiment likewise encountered stiff resistance which later moderated. Heavy artillery fire was used against the enemy before the regiment made its advance. On 3 November artillery fire was supplemented by a platoon of tanks engaged in harassing fire, while cannon company fired 1,000 rounds of 50 caliber and 80 rounds of 75mm ammunition. On 5 November flak wagons, mortars, machine guns, and antitank guns were used against the enemy. Prisoners told of the effectiveness of these tactics; enemy supply and ration deliveries had been disrupted for several days. Night attacks proved effective against the Germans who were in the habit of occupying hill defensive positions during the day and sleeping in the towns at night.

The 143rd Regiment advanced slowly from positions near Bruyeres directly to the east, as the other two regiments passed to the south to take up their positions on the new front. Troops of the 143rd Infantry, moving through the hills to avoid mined roads, had by 19 November come up to positions along the Meurthe River at St. Leonard and Anould. Here regimental patrols operated on the division's left flank to secure information on potential crossings of the Meurthe. Patrols reported that the river was between 75 and 100 yards wide, six feet deep in the center, and had a very swift current. Plans for 20 November called for a crossing at St. Leonard and Anould.

On 19 November four divisions were lined up on the VI Corps front against the Germans' Meurthe River defenses. To the north the 100th Division had already crossed the river at Baccarat and was in position from Badonviller south to Raon L'Etape. The 3rd Division was in line on the western banks of the Meurthe from Etival through St. Michel. In the St. Die sector along the Meurthe River was the 103rd

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Division, and from St. Leonard south to Gerardmer were the troops of the 36th Division.

By 20 November, when VI Corps was ready to jump off on its mission in the Seventh Army offensive which was aimed at Strasbourg, significant developments had already taken place both to the north and to the south. XV Corps had launched its part of the offensive on 13 November and by 20 November was achieving a major breakthrough at Saverne. An offensive by the First French Army in the south had broken through the Belfort Gap. These events were to contribute to the VI Corps offensive through the Vosges passes, although the enemy continued to resist every thrust by American forces.

### Vosges Warfare

Fighting in the Vosges was characterized by the plugging advances of the infantry, the innovations in tactics of supporting troops, and the desperation of the enemy. Progress of the VI Corps in the Vosges foothills had been slow, limited, and somewhat discouraging in comparison with the seven-league advances from the Riviera beaches. During half of August and the month of September troops had come 400 miles from St. Raphael to Rambervillers. During October and half of November the advance was 15 miles. The battle on the Vosges front was no less significant; and, if less spectacular, it was the more bitterly engaged.

For the infantry, combat in the woods was in many ways comparable to jungle fighting. Maintenance of direction was particularly difficult, leading to erroneous reports as to location of units and enemy positions. Orders based on inaccurate information at times resulted in bitter and unexpected fighting. The compass was in almost continuous use. Fighting at night became impossible unless enemy positions were known beforehand. Otherwise such disorganization resulted that it took hours after daylight to get the men together again.


Advancing in the woods, foot soldiers found that the enemy allowed them to come up so close that friendly artillery could not be employed. Experiment proved it better to have a force in front of the

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main body to draw enemy fire. Attacking through forested terrain, the individual rifleman hardly ever saw his target. The enemy was so well hidden that when he fired only the general direction of his position could



INTERIOR OF AN EMPTY DUGOUT IN THE VOSGES

*Small, dug-in enemy detachments, if not cleared out, would harass supply columns.*

be located. In addition, the infantry squad leader could see only two or three men of the squad at once, so that it was difficult to bring the fire of his squad to bear on any one point. Tommy guns, grenade launchers, and bazookas were found useful under these circumstances. Forest sectors had to be mopped up thoroughly. Small, dug-in enemy detachments, if not cleared out, would harass supply columns. Skirmish lines were sent to "drag" an area by-passed by an infantry attack.

In the Vosges it was necessary to give extra care to the organization of positions for defense. Troops dug deep fox-holes, covering them over for protection against artillery fire. Dugouts where

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groups of men could get warm and dry were also built. Possible lanes of enemy approach were covered by 50 caliber machine guns in positions frequently protected by barbed wire.



COVERING A SHELTER DUGOUT FOR PROTECTION AGAINST ARTILLERY FIRE

*Troops dug deep fox-holes, covering them over for protection against artillery fire, and built dugouts where groups of men could get warm and dry.*

Regimental patrolling was so extensive that it became the main combat action during much of the period of static warfare. It was kept sufficiently aggressive to hold the enemy along the front in expectation of a full scale attack. Patrolling also felt out the enemy's weak points, his strong points, and his intentions. Raiding parties and regular patrols often inflicted on the enemy severe casualties which sapped his strength. Constant patrolling prevented unnecessary deployment for attack on an already abandoned position, the Germans frequently breaking contact to man stronger defenses. It was vital that

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ground abandoned be occupied immediately, or the enemy would be given a chance to reorganize and move back into positions more favorable to his situation.

The strain of hard fighting and the exposure to continuous rain and cold had their effects on the troops. Tree bursts from enemy artillery took a heavy toll and gave the men a certain feeling of helplessness. When caught in attack formation or without overhead cover during a barrage, the troops suffered fewer casualties when they stood upright against trees rather than hit the ground. Respiratory diseases, intestinal disorders, trench foot, and exhaustion cases increased, in some organizations more than doubled, during October. Trench foot became a major problem. It increased in the 3rd Division from 54 in September to 160 in October to 448 in November. Whenever possible battalions took their turns out of the lines for the rest and rehabilitation of the troops. In spite of the difficulties they faced, infantrymen plugged on for their yard by yard gains in the Vosges.

Supporting arms and services found it necessary to improvise to give maximum assistance to the advance. Artillerymen found tactics in the Vosges different from those in open country. Adjustments by sound, at times as close as 100 yards from the target, became the rule rather than the exception. Shortage of ammunition limited artillery support and slowed the advance, for even moderate concentrations of artillery and mortar fire would bring many German soldiers into the American lines to surrender. "Ammunition for our battalion was so limited," reports the 131st Field Artillery Battalion for October, "that if we had been permitted, we could have fired the entire ten days' ration in ten minutes. Such slow shooting was annoying to our cannoneers who remember Cassino, where in one day over 6,000 rounds had been fired."

There was much experimentation to make the most effective use of artillery in the dense forest. The use of delay fuze proved effective, but a combination of quick and delay fuze on concentrations was used most often. Adjustment of fire was difficult. Ground observers had limited visibility, while air observers required white phosphorous smoke shells of which there was a critical shortage. The best procedure

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seemed to be to make precision check point adjustments on open ground and then to use these data to transfer fire to the target area. Other experimentation was made to increase the mobility of artillery from position to position.

Armor could give the infantry only limited support. Tanks lost their maneuverability in the steep and wooded terrain of the Vosges and bogged down even on the shoulders of roads, softened by continuous rain; cross country operations were precluded for the most part. Tanks were vulnerable to enemy rocket fire from concealed positions at close range and easily ambushed at night. Noise of tanks drew down enemy



TANK DESTROYERS SERVING AS ARTILLERY

Tanks and tank destroyers occupied firing positions on high ridges and fired jointly on enemy vehicles or personnel which exposed themselves below.

artillery fire, and their own fire frequently had a more disturbing effect on friendly than on enemy troops.

Tactical armor was used as an addition to artillery for the

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support of an infantry attack. After a road had been taken and swept by the engineers, tanks would follow up in support. Tanks and tank destroyers occupied firing positions on high ridges and fired jointly on enemy vehicles or personnel which exposed themselves below. Track extensions were provided to assist operation in boggy terrain. The medium extension improved mobility, but the light extension was practically worthless. Tank destroyers were extremely vulnerable and of little value to the infantry as a close support weapon in the Vosges fighting. They were difficult to maneuver, and their field of fire was negligible. Tank dozers were used in the herculean job of removing



ENGINEERS SHOVEL TO KEEP THE ROADS OPEN

"... Engineers during October and November worked to keep open communications and supply roads to front line regiments ..."

antitank obstacles and blocks placed by the enemy on nearly every road and trail.

Engineers during October and November worked to keep open communication and supply roads to front line regiments. Under heavy

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rains, roads were immediately broken down even by light vehicles. Rubble from smashed stone buildings was found useful in road repair. Lumber or poles placed crossways on roads served as a base and cushion under several inches of gravel.

The laying of wire in wooded areas tested the ingenuity of communications men. Linemen had to work in groups of two or more, always on the alert for enemy patrols or ambushes. Enemy patrols frequently cut wire lines and waited for linemen to come up to make repairs. It was better to lay a new line, several hundred yards to the flank. Military Police platoons sent carrier pigeons from traffic control posts to the division pigeon lofts with hourly dispatches of weather, road conditions, and traffic. Innovations of all infantry support troops contributed to the final success of the Vosges campaign.

The enemy fought desperately in the foothills of the Vosges and did succeed in gaining time to complete defense preparations on approaches to the fatherland. Backed up by a prepared line in the Vosges hills and forests the Germans showed that they had lost little of their ability to exploit favorable terrain to the fullest. Mountains and forests went far to make up the enemy's deficiency in men, material, and morale. On a stable front shortage of motor transport was no longer his great problem. German troops, below the standard of the past, proved "that even a 4-F can fire a gun from a well-sited position."

When American troops pushed forward during October and November, there was heavy fighting, each advance drawing sharp reactions and counterattacks; but on a quiet front the enemy was generally content to let it remain quiet. His purpose was clear; to gain time to prepare an extensive and elaborate winter defense line along the western slopes of the Vosges. This policy may have proved disastrous; his troops to man these defenses were being decimated and worn out.

All available troops were usually committed in the face of strong probing actions. It was estimated that the enemy had 13,700 troops of diverse units to defend the Vosges mountains. This force was to be considered expendable and to sell the land for as high a price in time and attrition as possible.

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The enemy attempted to break down the morale of American troops. By public address systems he addressed units by name, gave details of their history, compared the lot of the front line soldier with rear echelon service troops and 4-Fs in the United States, and exhorted the doughboys to surrender. At the same time the morale of his own troops was none too good. Prisoners interrogated pointed to bad health, poor food, continuous commitment, lack of medical attention, propaganda pamphlets, difficult terrain, bad weather, and insufficient clothing as reasons for their low morale. Interrogators got a picture of a tired enemy continuing to commit weary, dispirited troops in a desperate bid for time. Soldiers who came to the front fresh from Germany had often a rude awakening when exposed to Allied superiority in artillery, aircraft, and armor.

Although the enemy's facilities for supplying his troops were far from satisfactory, he enjoyed several advantages he did not have in the summer and early fall. The short haul from factory to consumer reduced both the time involved in tying up transports and the time in which transports were vulnerable to air attack. His lines of communications were now more secure than when he was making long hauls through hostile country. The lack of available flying days served as a protection against Allied air attacks.

October and early November were a period of preparation for future action, both the Americans and Germans using the period to regroup and resupply for the more decisive battles to come. The attacks of the Seventh Army in the Forest of Parroy and the western Vosges fitted into the scheme, for they had the purpose of depriving the enemy of his forward defensive positions and pushing him back on his main line of resistance even before the opening of the November offensive. This purpose was achieved. The staff of Seventh Army in Epinal planned and gave orders for the execution of the combined maneuver to take Strasbourg on the Rhine. As VI Corps prepared to press through the Vosges passes on its long front, XV Corps was already pointing the weight of its forces toward the Saverne Gap.

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## CHAPTER XVII

### *Maneuver for Strasbourg*

A Seventh Army directive dated 5 November opened the November offensive. The mission was stated in simple terms: the Seventh Army attacks on D-Day; destroys enemy in zone west of the Rhine; captures



GENERAL VIEW OF STRASBOURG. IN THE BACKGROUND IS THE BLACK FOREST. IN THE CENTER OF THE PICTURE CAN BE SEEN THE RHINE RIVER

"... The Seventh Army attacks on D-Day; destroys enemy in zone west of Rhine; captures Strasbourg and maintains contact with right flank of Twelfth Army Group ..."



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Strasbourg and maintains contact with right flank of Twelfth Army Group. The VI Corps was to continue present operations, introduce to combat the 100th and 103rd Divisions, and to attack not later than D plus 2 on the axis St. Die-Strasbourg. The XV Corps, maintaining active, close contact with the enemy, was to attack on D-Day, capture and secure Sarrebourg, thereafter to force the Saverne Gap and be prepared to exploit east of the Vosges. It was at that time planned that the 45th Division would be relieved on the VI Corps front, revert to army control, and be released to the XV Corps when operations required its use. This plan for the Seventh Army November offensive was one part of the larger picture of Allied operations in France.

During the months of September and October the German armed forces had continued to reinforce their defenses in the west, particularly along the Westwall, so as to deny the Allies entry into Germany proper. The enemy's main concentrations were found in front of and to the west of the Saar, and more particularly the Ruhr regions. He was also sensitive to any Allied threat against the Belfort approaches to the upper Rhine Valley. The German Army hoped to preserve complete freedom of movement along the entire length of the Rhine.

To the north, the Supreme Commander Allied Expeditionary Force, sent one army group against the Ruhr. In the center of the front the Twelfth Army Group was to conduct operations against the enemy in the Saar. The Sixth Army Group in the south, including the First French and American Seventh Armies, was to act aggressively against the enemy west of the Rhine who still held the focal territory of Alsace. All army groups were to prepare to strike blows deep into Germany itself. The Seventh Army route of advance pointed toward Bavaria.

At the end of October the Seventh Army occupied a zone from the Rhine-Marne Canal east of Luneville south to positions in the foothills of the Vosges between Remiremont on the Moselle and Gerardmer at the headwaters of the Meurthe. On its northern flank the American Third Army was directing its forces against the fortresses of Metz, which would have to be overcome before any general advance could be made to the east. As the Seventh Army pushed farther to the east than the Third, it would offer full protection to the right flank of

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the Third Army but would have to provide its own protection for its own left flank. On the southern flank of the Seventh Army the First French Army was already probing for openings into the German-held Belfort Gap. Combined operations by these two components of Sixth Army Group would be required to sweep the enemy from Alsatian plains. The selection of the Seventh Army as the chief tactical unit to penetrate the Alsatian Plain was dictated by geographical considerations.

### Terrain and Tactics

The normal avenue of approach to the plain of Alsace from the southwest or the west is through the Belfort Gap. This geographical depression, the ancient Gate of Burgundy, is the great trade route joining the Rhine and Rhone Valleys by canal, by rail, and by highway. However, this gap or gate is but 15 miles wide at its narrowest point and lies between the commanding peaks of the High Vosges on the north and the Jura Alps on the south. A force advancing northeast through the Belfort Gap toward the upper Rhine would be almost continually anchored against the Swiss frontier. But the left and center of this advancing force, even after breaking through the heavy German defenses southwest of the town of Belfort, would still remain under direct observation and fire from the high peaks of the Vosges along the northwest side of the corridor. Once the advance northeast through the Belfort Gap had been completed, the direction of movement would of necessity have to turn north down the Rhine Valley, since the Vosges on the west bank and the Black Forest on the east bank restrict the width of the Alsatian Plain to an average of from 15 to 20 miles. The Black Forest with its rough hills and extensive woods, would not make a favorable military entrance into Germany. In this area on the east bank of the Rhine and almost 30 miles south of Strasbourg is the Kaiserstuhl. This promontory is but three miles inland from the river with an elevation of over 1,600 feet, possessing advantages of observation similar to those of the High Vosges. Hostile elements advancing northward down the river would be caught in the crossfire from these respective heights. Only by outflanking enemy positions in the High Vosges

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from the north could forces penetrating the Belfort Gap stand reasonable chances of success on the Alsatian Plain.

The granite massif of the Vosges rises abruptly from the plain of Alsace, blocking easy entrance into the Rhine Valley from the west. The Saverne Gap divides the High Vosges to the south from the Hardt Mountains, sometimes called the Low Vosges, to the north. The High Vosges terminate in a series of summits towering above the Belfort Gap. The lower Vosges gradually descend to the forested hilltops in and about Kaiserslautern in the German Palatinate. These lower mountains present a more difficult military obstacle than the High Vosges, because



FRENCH BAR MEN IN POSITION OVERLOOKING BELFORT

*For the French, that mission involved both frontal assault and an outflanking maneuver.*

they have steeper valleys and are more heavily forested. Although the High Vosges reach elevations of over 4,000 feet, the western face of the mountain formation slopes gradually by a series of plateaus toward the Lorraine Plain. The eastern side drops abruptly into the Alsatian Plain

and the upper Rhine Valley. The topography of the Vosges would exclude penetration eastward in the Lower Vosges and embarrass progress northeast along the Belfort Gap. It remained, therefore, for the Seventh Army to force the passes which cut through the High Vosges in order to deploy upon the Alsatian Plain.

Sixth Army Group outlined the missions assigned to the First French Army and the American Seventh. For the French that mission involved both frontal assault and an outflanking maneuver. On D-Day of the November drive the French Army was to exert maximum pressure along its entire front to hold the enemy in line and to launch a strong attack against the Belfort Gap defenses. But before D-Day the French were to initiate their outflanking movement. Not later than 1 November the First French Army was to launch a strong effort on its left flank, to pass to the south of Gerardmer, and to assist the American Seventh Army in the capture of the Schlucht Pass. The Schlucht Pass cuts through the High Vosges between Gerardmer and Colmar, one of the main east-west routes of communications through the mountains. Allied possession of the Schlucht Pass would tactically outflank German forces south of the Pass. Enemy withdrawal from the summits at the extreme southern tip of the High Vosges would aid the First French Army in breaking through the Belfort Gap.

The offensive of the American Seventh Army was aimed at Strasbourg. The army was to secure a line of departure for the attack not later than 5 November and to cooperate with the First French Army during the same period on the approaches to the Schlucht Pass. With the clearing of the Forest of Parroy by XV Corps, positions were secured for an attack through the Saverne Gap. Farther south VI Corps continued to push the enemy back to the Meurthe River line while building up its striking power for the November offensive.

The enemy still hoped to keep the war out of Germany proper. East of the Vosges and directly in front of the Seventh Army advance lay the Rhine River. In the Lower Vosges and on the northern flank of the Seventh Army was the Saar region. Both the Rhine and the Saar were integrated into the German defense system, the Siegfried Line; but both would be threatened by the capture of Strasbourg and the loss



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of the plains of Alsace. Even the capture of Strasbourg and the Belfort Gap, however, would not assure complete Allied possession of the Alsatian Plain. The enemy was firmly entrenched in the Vosges and had sufficient bridges across the Rhine between Strasbourg and Belfort, well protected by guns of the Siegfried Line, to enable him to continue operations. The German command elected to remain in this area after the capture of both Belfort and Strasbourg and waged war bitterly in the so-called Colmar Pocket.

The Vosges Mountains were the enemy's natural defense for the upper Rhineland. To supplement the advantages of topography the Germans built fortifications and outlined defensive tactics to hold the Vosges until at least the spring of 1945 so that time could be gained to strengthen the Siegfried Line. It was estimated that the enemy had the equivalent of only four infantry and one or two armored divisions guarding the main line of resistance from the Saverne Gap, southward, to the Swiss border. This southern sector of the western front had remained almost static for over a month, and German forces were needed farther north to defend more vulnerable and more valuable objectives.

The defenses of the Vosges were more impressive than their defenders. Between the Seventh Army and the Rhine were two lines of defenses, the pre-Vosges line and the main line of defense. The pre-Vosges line was located along the inferior heights of the western side of the Vosges. Constructed by the efforts of both German troops and conscript Alsatian labor, it presented the aspect of an almost continuous line from the Saverne Gap to the extreme southern end of the High Vosges, complete with trenches, networks of barbed wire, and antitank ditches. The main line of defense, along the military crest of the western side of the mountain range, was composed only of a series of strongpoints but so located as to block effectively the east-west entrances into and through the Vosges. These strategically located strongpoints included antitank ditches across the corridors of approach, machine gun and antitank positions, and numerous fire and communications trenches.

Such was the setting for the Seventh Army's November offensive. The enemy, with his traditional tactical skill, had exploited topographical features for defense to the maximum. He held the strongly-

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fortified Vosges in front of the Seventh Army. He resisted stoutly the efforts of the First French Army to force the Belfort Gap. His occupation of the Siegfried Line and the Black Forest east of the Rhine were to render exceedingly complex the problem of complete occupation of the Alsatian Plain. The Seventh Army was committed to two missions: the capture of Strasbourg and the destruction of the enemy in Alsace west of the Rhine. The first mission was to be completed by XV Corps in an operation lasting only ten days. The second objective was to involve two American corps as well as the First French Army and was to be very costly in time, effort, and resources.

### The Saverne Gap

In a field order dated 8 November, XV Corps outlined its plan for the capture of Sarrebourg and the forcing of the Saverne Gap. The



SAVERNE GAP

"... In a field order dated 8 November, XV Corps outlined its plan for the capture of Sarrebourg and the forcing of the Saverne Gap ..."



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44th and 79th Infantry Divisions were to occupy the corps north and south flanks respectively. The corps boundary on the north was still the Rhine-Marne Canal and on the south the Baccarat-Badonviller-Wangenbourg axis. The 44th Division was to attack Sarrebourg from the north and west, while the 79th Division was to assault the town from the south and east. Sarrebourg was the first major bastion in front of the Saverne Gap.

The pass at Saverne is the only depression through the Vosgian chain with gradient gentle enough to carry an artificial waterway. The Marne-Rhine Canal, a railroad line, and a minor highway traverse the gap proper. However, the main highway is to be found paralleling the pass some two miles to the north. The highway spans the five miles between Phalsbourg on the west side of the Vosges and Saverne on the east side at the narrowest part of the Vosgian chain. Although the high-



THE MAIN HIGHWAY LEADING TO THE SAVERNE GAP

"...The main highway is to be found paralleling the pass some two miles to the north..."

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way is not as defiladed as the gap proper, it is subject to commanding flank terrain. Both highway and gap had been prepared for defense. At Phalsbourg were antitank ditches in a series, two or three lines of trenches, and a few blockhouses. As in other strategic points in the Vosgian region, there were also remains of fortifications designed by Vauban in the age of Louis XIV. Sarrebourg, ten miles to the west of Phalsbourg astride the main route, Luneville-Saverne-Strasbourg, was also included in the formal defense system of the western Vosges.

The chief maneuvering element of the XV Corps in its November offensive was to be the French 2nd Armored Division. The 8 November field order directed the armored division to assemble on corps order prepared to: 1) In the event of a breakthrough, pass through the infantry divisions on corps order and seize the east exits of the Saverne Gap. 2) Displace one combat command promptly to the vicinity of Avricourt, on the 44th Division front some 10 to 15 miles southwest of Sarrebourg. 3) Advance on corps order to the vicinity of Weyer, ten miles northeast of Sarrebourg. The maneuver of the 2nd French Armored Division through minor routes north and south of the Saverne Pass were to make possible the XV Corps "left end run" and to carry the Seventh Army into Strasbourg.

When and where the breakthrough might occur would depend upon the tactical situation produced by the offensive activities of the two American infantry divisions. The displacement of a combat command to the vicinity of Avricourt was to await the penetration of the pre-Vosges line. Avricourt is on the main highway leading into Sarrebourg. The highway traversed the extreme left flank of the Seventh Army and, should the rate of advance be rapid, necessary precautions would have to be taken to prevent the enemy's driving down from the north and cutting in behind forward elements of the American forces pushing eastward. The preparation for advance to the vicinity of Weyer was primarily for purposes of tactical encirclement. Armored units at Weyer could drive southwest to Sarrebourg, southeast to Phalsbourg, eastward through the Vosges barrier by a minor route north of the Saverne Gap, or maintain a defensive position against aggressive German forces to the north.

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D-Day of the XV Corps offensive was 13 November; H-Hour was 0700 hours. The advance, three-divisional in strength, reached all corps tactical objectives. The 44th Division pushed directly east to Sarrebourg. On the southern flank the 79th Division opened the way for the French 2nd Armored Division to force the Saverne Gap and ultimately to capture Strasbourg.

On the morning of 13 November the two infantry divisions jumped off as planned. The 314th and 315th Regiments of the 79th Division began their attack on the axis Montigny-Blamont. Initially there was very little resistance; but as the assault battalions continued to advance to the northeast, rolling up the entrenched positions of the German winter line, the enemy threw in heavy artillery, mortar, and small arms fire. By 16 November the enemy had been driven from Ancerville and Halloville, and fighting was in progress at Barbas and Nonhigny. Elements of French armor began operating in the division sector and captured Nonhigny. On the following day elements of the 79th Division drew up to the banks of the Vezouse between Blamont and Cirey-sur-Vezouse and forced a passage of the river against withering enemy fire.

Troops of the 44th Division had made a slow start, but after cracking the enemy's main line of resistance east of Leintrey, took Avricourt on the afternoon of 17 November against heavy enemy action. Two days later the 44th Division advanced in parallel strides with the 79th Division on its right flank, sweeping up the towns of Ibigny and St. Georges on the approaches to Sarrebourg. Elements of Combat Command V of the French 2nd Armored Division had seized Badonviller in the VI Corps zone by a rapid surprise attack on the morning of 17 November and pushed on to Bremenil on the road to Cirey.

The German pre-Vosges line of defense had begun to crumble, and the enemy had to withdraw along the entire XV corps front. The town of Cirey straddles the Vezouse River. Its defenses were being outflanked by the attack of the 315th Regiment of the 79th Division against Fremonville from the west and the south. Fremonville, on the north bank of the Vezouse between Cirey and Blamont, was defended by the enemy from high ground to the northeast. All American move-

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ment was covered by effective and accurate German fire delivered from the highlands. Enemy resistance was the severest since the clearing of the Forest of Parroy. On 18 November the 2nd Battalion of the 314th Infantry was brought up to the western outskirts of Fremonville, which was not completely cleared until 1100 hours on the next day. By this time the other battalions of the 314th and 315th Regiments were advancing well to the north of the Vezouse on the roads to Sarrebourg.

Also on 19 November, the seventh day of the offensive, elements of the 2nd French Armored Division captured Cirey and spread out in all directions. A breakthrough now seemed certain. On 19 November XV Corps issued operations instructions relieving the 79th Infantry Division of its mission of assisting the 44th Division in the capture of Sarrebourg. The 79th Division was further directed to prepare for movement by all available transport to exploit any success of the 2nd French Armored Division and to protect the corps south flank. To the 44th Division was assigned the capture of Sarrebourg, advancing to the limit of its capabilities, and the protection of the corps north flank. At 1345 hours on the same day the 2nd French Armored Division was directed to execute the plan set forth in the field order of 8 November, to pass through the infantry divisions and seize the eastern exits of the Saverne Gap. The German main line of resistance had been broken along the Vezouse between Blamont and Cirey, and the tactical situation called for the employment of swift-moving armored elements to carry the Seventh Army through the Vosges to the Alsatian Plain.

Careful planning preceded the maneuver of the French 2nd Armored Division through the Saverne Gap. On D-Day minus 1, 12 November, the Division had issued a preliminary field order outlining routes to be followed, methods to be employed, and ends to be achieved. The provisions of the order were to become effective when it was certain that the principle line of enemy resistance had been broken, that only delaying elements would be met, and that sufficient depth of terrain was available to permit deploying on the axis of advance and of maneuvering without being stopped by obstacles.

It was intended to push a first echelon of armored sub-task forces in the direction of the Saverne Gap from the moment of the in-

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fantry breakthrough, avoiding urban centers and usually travelled roads. The less obvious routes north and south of the gap would be traversed. This first echelon was to be followed by other combat elements. The forward echelon would probe for the point of weakest resistance, at which point the greatest mass of armor would be employed. Close liaison was to be maintained with the American infantry units to avoid interruption between the infantry breakthrough and armored exploitation. Liaison units were to keep armored elements informed of the tactical situation and the condition of the road network. It was planned to form four combat commands or tactical groups, L, D, V, and R. Combat Command L was to operate on the right flank with the 79th Division and Combat Command D on the left flank with the 44th Division. The remaining two combat commands were to be held in reserve to be employed on either or both flanks as the tactical situation might dictate. Combat Commands L and D, carrying their own fuel and rations and reinforced by engineers, tank destroyers, and reconnaissance troops, were placed on a three hour alert, prepared to move into their respective zones. Finally, no limit was to be set to the advance, nor were pre-arranged routes to be binding. It was believed that this freedom would permit the combat commands to reach the eastern exits of the Saverne Gap more quickly.

In the early afternoon of 19 November Combat Command L of the French 2nd Armored Division left Cirey to initiate the forcing of the Saverne Gap. The route to the east was through the Wolfsberg Pass, just north of Wangenbourg. This pass is on the Dabo road, parallel to and south of the Marne-Rhine canal as it traverses the Saverne Gap proper. Two alternate roads constituted the axis of approach to merge into a single road just before passing through the mountain village of Dabo and the defiladed pass of Wolfsberg. Combat Command L was divided into Task Force Massu and Task Force Minjonnet, in order to exploit all possible routes and to engage in outflanking maneuvers should one or the other task force be halted. Both task forces of Combat Command L encountered increasing enemy action as they progressed along these minor roads south of the canal. At 1600 hours, 20 November, Combat Command V was committed. Combat Commands V and R had

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been held in reserve to be thrown along that axis which demanded reinforcement or which promised the maximum tactical returns. The commitment of Combat Command V along the southern route enabled the column of Combat Command L to overcome enemy defenses and to penetrate the Wolfsberg Pass. At 1400 hours on 21 November, Task Force Massu broke out on the Alsatian Plain south of Saverne at the village of Birkenwald.

The Vosges Mountains had been crossed, but only through a minor and tenuous route. The Saverne Gap proper, although outflanked from the south by Combat Commands L and V, was not forced. Phalsbourg on the west and Saverne on the east remained in enemy hands. A flanking movement to the north was necessary.

The penetration of the German southern flank at Cirey on 19 November had compelled the entire enemy line to withdraw toward the defenses of Sarrebourg. In this withdrawal the American 44th Division exerted a constant pressure against the German northern flank. An opportunity for an enveloping movement on the north flank developed, and another combat command of the French 2nd Armored Division initiated its maneuver to outflank the Saverne Gap from the north. Combat Command D was the second maneuvering element in the outline plan for the forcing of the Gap. At 1900 hours on 20 November Combat Command D was committed. Combat Command D had been divided into two task forces, Quilichini and Rouvillois. Progressing northward behind the 44th Division, passing Sarrebourg to the west, they turned abruptly east and crossed the Sarre River north of Sarrebourg. On the east bank of the river the two task forces followed diverse routes, Task Force Quilichini continuing its eastward course and Task Force Rouvillois executing a sweeping arc to the northeast.

Phalsbourg, the western gate to the Saverne Gap, was the goal of Task Force Quilichini. The French attack carried the task force through the first line of defense, but the German commander was determined to carry out his orders to hold Phalsbourg. Phalsbourg was not to be captured until later.

The broad sweep of Task Force Rouvillois carried the French armor through the Petite-Pierre route, a minor road through the Vosges

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crest north of the main Phalsbourg-Saverne highway. This task force encountered an enemy strong in numbers but totally disorganized. The forward advance of the American Third Army, on the northern flank, had thrown elements of the 361st Volks Grenadier Division into the zone of French operation. Prisoners were taken and the advance continued. On the evening of 21 November Task Force Rouvillois reached the village of Bouxwiller on the plain of Alsace.

Two forces approached Saverne and were to meet in the town at about the same hour, 1415 on 22 November. Task Force Rouvillois of Combat Command D arrived from the north, and Task Force Massu of Combat Command L from the south. The subsequent capture of Saverne occurred without incident.

Task Force Minjonnet, also of Combat Command L, arrived in Saverne, having penetrated the Vosges along the Dabo road behind Task




PASS ON DABO ROAD. RHINE VALLEY IN BACKGROUND

*Task Force Minjonnet . . . arrived in Saverne, having penetrated the Vosges along the Dabo Road behind Task Force Massu . . .*




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Force Massu. The Minjonnet group, however, upon reaching Saverne, reversed its direction of advance and pushed its armored units westward out of Saverne, along the main highway towards Phalsbourg. Advance elements of the task force approached Phalsbourg from the east to discover that most of the "88" guns in defense were pointing west to engage Task Force Quilichini of Combat Command D, which had been held up at the western approach to the town on the previous day. All resistance in Phalsbourg finally collapsed upon the arrival of American infantry, the 314th Infantry of the 79th Division on 23 November.

### Strasbourg

On 19 November the American 79th Infantry Division had broken through the German pre-Vosges defense line southwest of Sarrebourg. Through this hole passed the French 2nd Armored Division. By




ABANDONED GERMAN "88" GUN

"...Most of the "88" guns in defense were pointing west to engage Task Force Quilichini of Combat Command D..."

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22 November the Saverne Gap had been outflanked from the north and the south. Saverne, on the east exit, was captured from the north and south, and Phalsbourg, on the west approach, was isolated from the east



STRASBOURG

*"...To their rear were the Vosges. Before them lay Strasbourg..."*

and west. French armored units were pouring into the Alsatian Plain. To their rear were the Vosges. Before them lay Strasbourg.

Strasbourg is the metropolis of the Alsatian Plain. Land routes, but more especially waterways, both natural and artificial, have contributed to its importance. The east-west passes through the Vosges in France and through the Black Forest in Germany converge upon the Alsatian Plain. At Strasbourg these land routes are joined with the Rhine River for communication with the north. The Rhine-Rhone Canal, passing through the Belfort Gap, and the Marne-Rhine Canal, following the Saverne Gap, terminate in Strasbourg to join the city by water with southern and northern France, respectively.

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These peace-time considerations, however, were outweighed by the exigencies of wartime psychology. Strasbourg is the political capital of Alsace, a province annexed to Germany in 1871, returned to France in 1918, only to be re-occupied by Germany in 1940. The so-called "liberation" of Strasbourg was mandatory for the prestige of France. But the military possession of Strasbourg was not the tactical key to the Alsatian Plain. Strasbourg was captured by the Seventh Army, and the Rhine River was reached; but some time was to elapse before the Allied forces were to control the Alsatian Plain or to cross the upper Rhine River.

The extreme flatness of the Alsatian Plain had demanded for the protection of Strasbourg that the city be ringed by the construction of forts and the excavation of ditches, since natural terrain defenses were absent. The forts were located along main highways leading into Strasbourg or upon slight elevations immediately outside the city. These strongholds were 16 in number and were mostly infantry forts with no prepared emplacements for heavy guns. Their fields of fire, however, encompassed 360 degrees. The more important bastions were the forts Ney, Rapp, Ducrot, Marshal Petain, and Marshal Foch. The antitank ditch formed a single continuous semi-circle, originating near the Rhine-Rhone Canal to the south of Strasbourg, arching out westward and then northward to include the major forts in its zone of defense, and curving eastward toward the Rhine north of the city. The Vosges, not the forts or the antitank ditches, had been relied upon as the strongest defense for the city.

A Seventh Army directive of 5 November had initiated the offensive which began on 13 November. Rapid military developments, culminating in the outflanking of the Saverne Gap by the French 2nd Armored Division, called for new tactical instructions. Accordingly, a Seventh Army directive, dated 21 November, set the pattern for the final phase of the maneuver for Strasbourg.

The VI Corps, pushing through the Vosges passes between Saverne and Belfort, was to capture Strasbourg and to be prepared to cross the Rhine on army orders or to exploit through a bridgehead established by the XV Corps. The XV Corps was to force the Saverne

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Gap, to capture Haguenau and Soufflenheim, to occupy the fortification at Mutzig, and to attack Strasbourg, employing armored elements to assist in the capture of the city. The XV Corps was then to reconnoiter the Rhine between Strasbourg and Soufflenheim and to take advantage of any opportunity for a quick crossing of the Rhine River. Both corps were to seize and to guard all bridges, barges, ponton equipment, cranes, and pile-drivers discovered on the Rhine and its tributaries.

The directive of 5 November had instructed the VI Corps, on the Seventh Army's south flank, to force the Vosges passes and to capture Strasbourg, while the XV Corps, on the north flank, was to capture Sarrebourg and to force the Saverne Gap. But by 21 November Sarrebourg had been encircled and the Saverne Gap outflanked by the XV Corps, while the VI Corps was making but slow progress in its push eastward through the High Vosges. The later directive of 21 November gave Strasbourg as the objective of either corps. The XV Corps, in addition to the drive towards Strasbourg, was assigned the mission of flank protection to the north, outflanking tactics to the south, and crossing opportunities on the Rhine to the east.

Haguenau and Soufflenheim lie on the Alsatian Plain, north of Strasbourg and west of the Rhine River. Haguenau was a strongly fortified city, outposting the Siegfried Line. Soufflenheim was a bridgehead town through which enemy traffic moved from Germany east of the Rhine to the upper Alsatian Plain on the west bank. To capture Haguenau would protect the Seventh Army's left flank. To capture Soufflenheim would interrupt lateral enemy communications across the Rhine north of Strasbourg.

Mutzig is a village controlling the eastern exit of the St. Die-Strasbourg highway, as it winds through the Vosges via the Saaes Pass and Schirmeck, the main avenue of advance of the VI Corps. Since the XV Corps had already arrived upon the Alsatian Plain, it was directed to secure Mutzig in order to cut off enemy elements opposing the advance of the VI Corps east of St. Die. Should opportunities be present for a crossing of the Rhine River in the Seventh Army zone of eastward advance, the 40th Engineer Combat Regiment was directed to assemble stream-crossing equipment for assault crossings on a two-regimental

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front. All equipment for one regiment was to be assembled and to be available on six hours notice after 0600 on 23 November. The remainder of the equipment for a complete division was to be made available after 0600 on 25 November.

At 1130 hours on 22 November General Leclerc, commanding the French 2nd Armored Division, received the order from XV Corps to aid the VI Corps in attacking Strasbourg, or to attack Strasbourg alone if the VI Corps were not in a position to do so. To follow this order the armored division employed the same four combat commands and the same sub-division into task forces as had been utilized in outflanking the Saverne Gap. However, the Saverne Gap operation had been characterized by wide encirclement and envelopment. The Strasbourg operation demanded rapid and concerted attack on the city from all possible directions. Speed was essential in order to deny the enemy the opportunity of regrouping within Strasbourg. Multiplicity of avenues of attack was mandatory, since all points in the enemy defensive ring about Strasbourg would have to be probed. The armored division was neither prepared nor equipped to lay siege to the city. Its mission was to find the weak spot and to drive through to the Rhine River.

Strasbourg was to be approached from the north, the west, and the southwest. The eastward thrust of the armored division across the Alsatian Plain would be protected by flanking screens to the north and to the south. Combat Command D, the group which had approached Phalsbourg from the west and which had outflanked the Saverne Gap to the north, was charged with holding the Saverne Gap, the main line of communication between the French 2nd Armored Division on the plain and the bulk of the American Seventh Army still in the mountains. Combat Command R, which had protected the southern flank in the armored push through the Vosges, was to continue to protect the south flank on the plain. Combat Command R, moreover, was to drive southward along the eastern ridge of the Vosges in the direction of Mutzig to fulfill the mission assigned by the Seventh Army directive of 21 November. The two remaining groups, Combat Commands L and V, were to execute the actual tactical maneuver for Strasbourg. Combat Command L, which had outflanked the Saverne Gap to the south, would

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approach Strasbourg from the north. Combat Command V, which had followed Combat Command L through the southern routes of the Saverne Gap, was to approach Strasbourg from the south.

At 0715 hours on 23 November the four combat commands left the eastern flank of the Vosges to cross the Alsatian Plain into Strasbourg. The two maneuvering combat commands encountered enemy delaying action in front of the antitank ditch and along the forts. It remained for Task Force Rouvillois of Combat Command D, the group charged with holding the Saverne Gap, to discover the weak spot in the German defenses of the city and to lead the armored division into Strasbourg.

Task Force Rouvillois, having left the security of the exits of the Saverne Pass to Task Force Quilichini, embarked upon its southeastward sweep, which was to carry it through the city of Strasbourg and up to the Rhine River. The task force followed the north bank of the Marne-Rhine Canal in the waterway's eastward course from Saverne to Brumath on the Zorn River. At Brumath the task force headed due south for the northern suburbs of Strasbourg. At 1030, just three hours and 15 minutes after the departure time, the command post of the French 2nd Armored Division received the cryptic message, "Tissue est dans Iode" (Cloth is in iodine), or "Rouvillois enters Strasbourg and drives on to the bridge."


Task Force Rouvillois left the formal capture of Strasbourg to the other combat commands which were to enter the city later the same day, 23 November. The chief military objective in Strasbourg was the Kehl Bridge across the Rhine. Actually a series of bridges, spanning an artificial waterway, the Petit Rhin, and the Rhine River proper, this crossing was protected by permanent blockhouses and by machine guns placed on the bridge and reinforced by German artillery on the east bank of the Rhine. Strasbourg was captured but the Rhine was not crossed.

#### Tactical Problems

The French 2nd Armored Division had launched its drive on 19 November to exploit the breakthrough achieved by American

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infantry. Similarly both the American 44th and 79th Divisions had been instructed by XV Corps to exploit the success of the French armored drive. The encirclement of Sarrebourg and the isolation of Phalsbourg by the French combat commands gave the advantage to the 44th and the 79th Divisions in the capture of both towns, which were quickly taken by the American infantry. The Saverne Gap was opened up, and infantry was pushed through toward Haguenau and Soufflenheim, the capture of which had been directed by the Seventh Army on 21 November. General Leclerc of the armored division had radioed the Commanding General of XV Corps at 1310 hours on 23 November that



MAJOR GENERAL WADE H. HAISLIP SHOWS A SITUATION MAP TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL ALEXANDER M. PATCH JR., DURING THE LATTER'S VISIT TO XV CORPS HEADQUARTERS

On 24 November General Eisenhower, accompanied by General Patch and General Devers, visited the XV Corps Command Post . . .

"because of capture of Strasbourg push maximum infantry elements soon as possible east of Saverne". By the close of the following day the

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79th Infantry Division, elements of the 45th Division, and the 324th Regiment were in that part of the corps zone east of the mountains. However, large numbers of infantry were not dispatched to Strasbourg until after several days, when the American 3rd Division assumed the occupation of the city. Problems of flank protection were more pressing than were dangers of immediate German counterattack from the Kehl Bridge at Strasbourg.

The main enemy threat developed north of Sarrebourg and Saverne. On the Third Army front most of November had been required to reduce the fortresses of Metz, about 60 miles northwest of Saverne. Metz was finally cleared of all resistance on 22 November, but the Third Army was able to make only limited advances to the east on the Seventh Army's northern flank. To meet the enemy attack which had developed some four miles north of Sarrebourg the 44th Division less one regiment, the bulk of the 45th Division, which had been released to XV Corps control at midnight 23-24 November, and the 106th Cavalry Group were stationed on the western side of the Saverne Pass. On 24 November General Eisenhower, accompanied by General Patch and General Devers, visited the XV Corps Command Post at Sarrebourg. The mission of XV Corps was changed by General Eisenhower's "verbal orders to army group and army from an advance east to an advance generally towards the north astride the Vosges Mountains." This change in mission became effective at once. The spearhead of advance was for the present aimed not at Germany across the Rhine but at Germany west of the Rhine.

It had long been appreciated that the crossing of the Rhine at the Kehl Bridge would lead only into the maze of the Black Forest, which would deny an army suitable ground for offensive maneuvers against important objectives in Germany. As early as October of 1944 the Seventh Army had formulated detailed plans for crossing the Rhine in the Rastatt area, north of Strasbourg, with Rastatt as the immediate objective, Pforzheim and Stuttgart as the secondary objective. Two river-crossing schools, at Valbonne and Dole, had been established under the supervision of the Army Engineer during the fall. Rastatt was chosen for the proposed crossing because it controlled the road-net leading to southeastern Germany and would open the way for an advance

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northeast in the general direction of Nuremberg. The Seventh Army's crossing plans had by early November reached such an advanced stage that orders were issued to the 40th Engineer Combat Regiment to assemble bridging equipment. At the time General Eisenhower's order was issued, loaded DUKW's were actually moving toward selected forward assembly areas.

After the capture of Strasbourg the Seventh Army forward line assumed the outline of a large reverse "S". The northern flank constituted the upper portion of this imaginary figure. Running from west to east, this upper segment of the main line of resistance originated at a point of junction with the American Third Army northwest of Sarrebourg, and cut through the Vosges on a curve to reach the Rhine River at Strasbourg. At Strasbourg the line reversed its direction and followed a southwest course across the Alsatian Plain back into the Vosges to form the front line of the VI Corps still progressing through the mountains. The forward line then reversed its course once more to effect a union to the southwest with the front of the First French Army pushing northward down the Alsatian Plain.

This reverse "S" pattern of the Seventh Army's front line raised flank protection problems along four separate sectors: 1) The extreme left portion of the north flank west of the Vosges; 2) The right portion of the north flank east of the Vosges; 3) The extreme eastern tip of the main line of resistance at Strasbourg on the Rhine River; 4) The entire lower arc of the reverse "S", subsequently to develop into the "Colmar Pocket."

The enemy attack north of Sarrebourg had begun on 23 November, when a battle group of the 130th Panzer Division and elements of the 11th Panzer and 25th Panzer Grenadier Divisions struck south in an attempt to cut off the forward divisions of the Seventh Army, which were extended through the Saverne Gap to Strasbourg. This immediate threat, lasting until 27 November, was forestalled by the regrouping of XV Corps and by intervention of armor from the American Third Army. However, a potential threat to the Seventh Army's north flank west of the Vosges would continue as long as the enemy remained in possession of the Siegfried Line along the Franco-German border from

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Lauterbourg on the Rhine to Saarbruecken on the Sarre. The northern flank, east of the Vosges, also remained vulnerable not only because of the Siegfried Line positions to the north, but also because of enemy bridgehead sites west of the Rhine. Here by 25 November the 79th Division and elements of the 45th Division consolidated positions north and northwest of Strasbourg. XV Corps attack was still pointed toward Haguenau and Soufflenheim.

To the south the American Seventh Army held positions on the Rhine at Strasbourg, and the First French Army had reached the Rhine north of Basel. The 2nd French Armored Division, which had



FRENCH GUN TEAM FIRING AT ENEMY 100 YARDS  
UP RHINE RIVER BANK

*The First French Army had reached the Rhine north of Basel.*

entered Strasbourg on 23 November, spent the next two days cleaning out pockets of resistance and the forts surrounding the city. Strasbourg remained under periodic enemy artillery fire emanating from the east bank of the Rhine. So tenuous was the Allied occupation of Strasbourg

that at the advent of the German counteroffensive complete evacuation of the city was seriously considered.

The line originating at Strasbourg to the north, sweeping westward to the Vosges and then southward to end at Basel, constituted the enemy's Alsatian bridgehead or "Colmar Pocket". This German pocket was supplied by two railroad and three ponton bridges across the upper Rhine south of Strasbourg and was to be stubbornly defended for some two or three months. The Seventh Army's VI Corps had broken through the High Vosges passes by the end of November but found only bitter fighting on its front on the northern circle of the Colmar Pocket.

By 24 November the German defense lines along the Vosges had been broken. Historically these mountains had been regarded as an impregnable position. Supplemented, as they had been, by extensive prepared defenses they constituted on paper an effective barrier to Allied advance. The German High Command, however, had failed to man the position with enough troops to transform the appearance of strength into reality. The German main line of resistance opposing the Seventh Army on 13 November was held by not more than 10,000 men. Opposing them were six American infantry divisions, with another in reserve, a reinforced French armored division, and a combat command of an American armored division.

The German high command had regarded the Vosges sector as static. Accordingly, troops had been diverted to meet threats to the enemy's right and left flanks and had been withdrawn to be saved for the German Ardennes counter-offensive. The 198th Infantry and the 269th Mountain Divisions had been diverted to the enemy south flank to ward off the French drive through the Belfort Gap, while the 11th and 21st Panzer Divisions had been shifted to the American Third Army sector on the north to meet the immediate threat in the Metz area.

When the Seventh Army November offensive opened, coordinated with attacks along the full length of the western front, the enemy was in no position to fill all the gaps which opened simultaneously in his line. The three infantry divisions opposing the XV Corps on the Seventh Army north flank were split and scattered. The German 361st Division, on the enemy's extreme north, was forced out of its defensive



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positions in the Vosges and squeezed northward into a salient, between the American Seventh and Third Armies, from which only remnants escaped. The 553rd Division, caught unprepared as it was about to leave the Seventh Army sector, was forced eastward before the XV Corps drive, was decimated in its attempts to make a stand, and was virtually liquidated in the envelopment of the Saverne Gap. Finally, the German 708th Division was shouldered southward into the Vosges and into the path of the VI Corps advance.

#### New Objectives


A Sixth Army Group letter of instruction dated 28 October had given as its mission the offensive to capture Strasbourg and to clear the area west of the Rhine. The French 2nd Armored Division fulfilled the first part of that mission on 23 November. The German retention of the Colmar and the Haguenau areas of the Alsatian Plain and of both sides of the Vosges Mountains along the Seventh Army northern flank delayed the fulfillment of the second term of the mission. Hence, on 24 November, a Sixth Army Group message dispatched to the Seventh Army Headquarters advised that no operational boundary had been projected for the Sixth Army Group east of the Rhine River. The Rhine River would be held at Strasbourg and north of Basel. The First French Army would concern itself with the liquidation of the Colmar Pocket. The Seventh Army would change its zone of advance to attack northward and would assist the American Third Army in breaking the Siegfried Line west of the Rhine. In this advance of the Seventh Army toward the Siegfried Line, the XV Corps would operate west of the crest of the Vosges, while the VI Corps would be active on the Alsatian Plain to the east of the mountains.

The destruction of the enemy west of the Rhine now became the new tactical phase in the operations of the Seventh Army. To complete its newly assigned mission Seventh Army had to reorganize its corps components and redistribute the weight of its forces. The VI Corps scheduled for a major shift in the line, was on 24 November pinned down in the fighting on the eastern slopes of the Vosges. Five days of combat had brought VI Corps units from the Meurthe River line through the mountains.

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## CHAPTER XVIII

### *VI Corps Penetration of Vosges*

By 19 November the VI Corps had reached the Meurthe River and was in position to cross the river and drive for the Vosges passes. Since D-Day of the Seventh Army offensive, 13 November, VI Corps troops had been engaged on one part of its assigned mission; the continuance of present operations. When the 3rd Division prepared to launch its attack across the Meurthe, there was no break in action; the drive con-




LE BONHOMME PASS

"... Farther south the St. Die-Colmar highway cuts through ... the Bonhomme Pass ..."



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tinued along an axis pointed toward Strasbourg. From St. Die, focal point of corps strength, several avenues of advance fan out through the Vosges. One is the long narrow valley running through the Saales Pass,



GERMAN 20MM BOFORS GUN, PART OF THE MEURTHE RIVER LINE DEFENSE

*The enemy's Meurthe River line had by 19 November been at least partially broken by the 100th Division.*

northeast through Schirmeck, and along the Bruche River towards Strasbourg. Another branches off to the east from the Saales Pass, winds through the passes of Steige and Le Hohwald, and drops out of the mountains at the town of Barr. A third is a lower and shorter route across the backbone of the Vosges, through the Ste. Marie Pass leading to Selestat. Farther south the St. Die-Colmar highway cuts through Fraize, the Bonhomme Pass, and Kaisersberg. These four routes through the Vosges were the most important in the VI Corps zone between the XV Corps pass at Saverne and the First French Army, which followed the Gerardmer-Colmar road and the Belfort highways to Mulhouse.

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The enemy's Meurthe River line, a system of trenches generally following the east bank of the river from Raon L'Etape to Fraize, with numerous machine gun positions, occasional antitank, heavy and light antiaircraft, and self-propelled gun positions, had by 19 November been at least partially broken by the 100th Division with the capture of Raon L'Etape. The main line of defense along the crest of the Vosges consisted of fortifications at the passes. Their purpose was to provide protection to important installations against unexpected ground attacks or to provide delay if there were a general advance.

On 18 November VI Corps Headquarters issued Field Order No. 8 to outline the direction of the drive through the Vosges. The 100th Division was to protect the corps left flank; to maintain contact with the XV Corps, and to advance east from the vicinity of Moyemoutier and Raon L'Etape. The 3rd Division, south of the 100th Division, was to attack to the northeast through the Saales Pass to Strasbourg. The 103rd Division was to seize the high ground northeast of St. Die, capture St. Die, and then advance southeast to the line Anould, Fraize, Ban-de-Laveline. On the south flank the 36th Division was to block on the line Anould-Gerardmer, to relieve the 103rd Division on corps order, and to protect the corps right flank, maintaining contact with the French.

The 14th Armored Division upon release by Seventh Army was to pass through the 100th and 3rd Infantry Division and to attack toward Strasbourg. The arrival of the 14th Armored Division, commanded by Brigadier General Albert C. Smith, coming from the United States through the port of Marseille, had been anticipated since the end of September. Combat Command A of this division was attached to VI Corps for operations effective 0600 hours on 19 November by Seventh Army Operations Instructions No. 15.


To deceive the enemy as to the direction of the main corps effort to the northeast and to influence the movement and commitment of enemy troops a show of force was to be made in another direction. The 45th and 36th Divisions were to be used as decoys to simulate preparations for an attack southeast toward Fraize, while the 3rd Division carried on its moves in darkness and secrecy.

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### Through the Saales Pass to Strasbourg

The 3rd Division, scheduled to spearhead the VI Corps drive, had made a careful survey of the terrain. The Meurthe River in its



A BAILEY BRIDGE OVER THE SWIFT FLOWING MEURTHE

*The banks were generally suitable for the construction of military bridges and were an average of five to seven feet high.*

sector averaged 50 to 60 feet in width and three feet in depth, but might rise to five and six feet during heavy rains. The banks were generally suitable for the construction of military bridges and were an average of five to seven feet high.

Plans outlined 3rd Division operations for D-Day. After a maximum preliminary air attack against the assault area supporting artillery fire was to be directed on suspected enemy gun positions, concentration points, communication command posts, and targets of opportunity. On the night prior to D-Day the division was to cross the

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Meurthe, rapidly establish a bridgehead, and advance aggressively beyond. The 7th Infantry Regiment was to cross the river and hold a bridge site at St. Michel. The 30th Infantry was to cross on the left



ARTILLERY SOFTENING UP THE MEURTHE RIVER DEFENSES

*Supporting artillery fire was to be directed on suspected enemy gun positions, concentrated points, communication command posts, and targets of opportunity.*

flank, holding a bridge site at Clairefontaine and maintaining contact with the 100th Division. The 15th Infantry was to protect the assembly of the other two regiments, secure the line of departure, and cross the Meurthe on division order in the zone of either regiment. The 10th Engineer Combat Battalion, together with the 1st Battalion of the 36th Engineer Regiment, was to operate rubber boats at assault crossing sites, construct one infantry foot bridge per assault battalion, and one infantry assault bridge per assault regiment. It would select and mark suitable fords and provide dozers at assault sites to assist in the preparation of crossings for armored vehicles. Tanks and tank destroyers were to be


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stationed in hull-down positions to support the crossing by direct fire, while the 3rd Chemical Battalion was prepared to smoke crossing areas and bridge sites after daylight.



MEN OF THE 7TH INFANTRY REGIMENT MOVING  
TO ASSAULT ST. MICHEL

*The 7th Infantry Regiment was to cross the River and hold a bridge site at St. Michel . . .*

Operations Instructions No. 9, issued on 19 November, indicated H-Hour as 0645 hours on 20 November; and the 3rd Division was instructed to follow the Saales route to Strasbourg after the crossing. Last minute reconnaissance showed that the Meurthe River was at flood stage. The river banks were probably too soft to support armor. All bridges in the division sector had been demolished.

During the early morning hours before H-Hour and under cover of darkness both the 7th and 30th Regiments successfully crossed the Meurthe between Clairefontaine and St. Michel and gained vantage

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points for assaulting enemy defenses. Foot bridge equipment and assault boats had been moved to the river bank by the engineers. A division battle patrol did valuable work in seizing and holding a bridge site.



MEMBERS OF THE 10TH ENGINEERS PRACTICING FOR THE  
MEURTHE CROSSING

*The 10th Engineer Combat Battalion . . . was to construct one infantry foot bridge per assault battalion, and one infantry assault bridge per assault regiment . . .*

H-Hour was preceded by 30 minutes of the most intense artillery preparation fired for the 3rd Division since the breakout at Anzio. This was followed by 30 minutes of counterbattery and deepening fires on enemy positions. The initial preparation was fired on the enemy's main line of resistance, from which infantry elements were but 200 yards away. After H-Hour the artillery continued to engage enemy targets including a convoy evacuating Moyennoutier. A number of targets were marked with smoke for the air corps to bomb. Over 6,500 rounds were fired by 3rd Infantry Division Artillery alone, in addition to that fired by corps and group. In support of the VI Corps assault

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across the Meurthe eight missions of 64 sorties were flown by the XII Tactical Air Corps prior to noon. Enemy troop concentration areas, strong points and gun positions were attacked with blaze, demolition, and fragmentation bombs.

Although the enemy had prepared extensive earthworks to oppose the river crossing, the intensity of the preparation and the momentum of the assault so disrupted his communications that he was never able to offer more than slight delaying resistance. The majority of prisoners captured reported that the attack came as no surprise, although the exact date was not known. Increased air activity on 19 November caused the enemy to assume that an attack was imminent, and artillery fire on 19-20 November strengthened this belief. Prisoners reported that Meurthe positions, not completed and greatly undermanned were not strong enough to delay the advance. Enemy troops, unable to oppose the river crossing, were generally resigned to the situation. The small respite which had been gained by the German 716th Infantry Division between 12 and 20 November did not much improve the division's morale. There were no reserves in the area for relief, and prisoners were skeptical about holding up the advance.

As the 3rd Division spearheaded the VI Corps attack, both the XV Corps on the left and the First French Army on the right were making rapid advances. On 20 November the XV Corps was engaged in wide sweeping movements through the Saverne Gap. The French had already overrun Belfort and had reached the Rhine River in the vicinity of Mulhouse. These major breakthroughs by the French at Belfort and by the XV Corps at Saverne were causing a cave-in at the center of the line where the VI Corps was located. The enemy was forced to withdraw from certain of his outflanked defense positions.

The 30th Infantry pushed north along the St. Die-Raon L'Etape road beside the Meurthe to establish a firm bridgehead. Clairefontaine was assaulted and Hurbache and Le Paire below Moyénmoutier taken. The 7th Infantry overran La Voivre. This town, heavily mined and booby-trapped, was taken by a flanking movement from the south. The regiment suffered 150 casualties from mines alone.

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On 21 November the 30th Infantry Regiment attacked east in three columns, sweeping through several small villages north of St. Die. The 7th Infantry Regiment, attacking southeast, occupied St. Jean d'Or-



AMERICAN ARMOR CROSSING THE MEURTHE OVER BAILEY  
BRIDGE BUILT BY THE 36TH ENGINEERS

*The enemy covered the bridge site with artillery and self propelled fire.*

mont. Rising waters of the Meurthe River had washed out assault foot-bridges and threatened to slow down the attack, but a Bailey bridge was rapidly constructed at St. Michel by the 36th Engineers. The enemy covered the bridge site with artillery and self-propelled fire, but an effective smoke screen obscured the target and there were no direct hits.

All along the Sixth Army Group front rapid progress was being made. Just before midnight 21-22 November, Major General Brooks, VI Corps Commander, telephoned all divisions that in view of enemy withdrawals there be organized a fast moving and hard hitting mobile task force of tanks, tank destroyers, artillery, motorized infantry.

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engineers, and reconnaissance elements in each division to strike for corps objectives. All scattered resistance was to be by-passed and disposed of by the follow-up infantry.

In answer to these instructions the 3rd Division formed Task Force Whirlwind from the 1st Battalion, 15th Infantry, reinforced. It jumped off in the morning of 22 November and moved rapidly along minor routes through the mountains north of St. Die in the direction of St. Blaise midway between Saales and Schirmeck. By nightfall the task force reached the mountain town Saulxures. Columns of the 30th Infantry spread out and pressed on toward St. Blaise behind Task Force



7TH INFANTRY MORTARMEN IN THE ST. JEAN AREA  
The 7th Infantry, on the division right flank, attacked east from St. Jean d'Ormont toward the pass.

Whirlwind. The 7th Infantry, on the division right flank, attacked east from St. Jean d'Ormont toward the pass and town at Saales.

The town of Saales, astride the main route through the Vosges to Strasbourg, was now a key objective of the 3rd Division. Enemy

defenses here were well dug-in with prepared emplacements surrounded by barbed wire. In the area from Saales to Saulxures to the northeast enemy positions consisted of a series of trenches, overhead dugouts, tank traps, obstacles, and wire entanglements.

On 22 November the 2nd Battalion, 30th Infantry, had driven to high ground overlooking Saales. Night patrols reconnoitering toward the town met heavy enemy opposition. The battalion put pressure and fire against the northern flank of the town, while the 7th Infantry attacked from the south and the west. Before dawn of 23 November the 7th Infantry had infiltrated through the enemy fortifications into



SOME OF THE DEFENSES ENCOUNTERED BY THE 3RD DIVISION  
IN THEIR DRIVE FOR SAALES

From Saales, to Saulxures to the northeast, enemy positions consisted of a series of trenches, overhead dugouts, tank traps, obstacles, and wire entanglements.

Saales. House to house fighting followed. By 1430 hours the 30th Infantry reported the town clear of snipers. Quantities of wire, ammunition, and other supplies were captured to substantiate reports that

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Saales had been planned as a key bastion of the enemy's winter defenses. However, few of the larger weapons were installed; and fortifications were found incomplete. The enemy's withdrawal from Saales by way of St. Blaise, Schirmeck, Mutzig, and Strasbourg became almost a flight. Even bridges were left intact. The capture of Strasbourg by the 2nd French Armored Division of the XV Corps meant that enemy positions in front of the 3rd Division were now untenable.

On 23 November the 30th Infantry captured Saulxures after heavy fighting. The next day, Task Force Whirlwind, spearheading the 3rd Division advance along the Bruche River Valley toward Strasbourg, reached Rothau. This enemy supply point yielded four warehouses of supplies. Near Saales the 7th Infantry entered Bourg-Bruche and engaged a 300 man force seemingly intent on retaking Saales. Driving along the Rothau-Schirmeck-Mutzig axis against virtually no opposition, 3rd Division troops made contact with 45th Division elements of the XV Corps on the outskirts of Mutzig near the entrance to the Alsace Plain on 25 November.

Interrogation revealed confusion of enemy troops caused by the rapidity of the advance and the enemy's ignorance of corps disposition. German morale was low, and the troops were extremely tired and in many cases short of food. Prisoners referred constantly to American heavy superiority in men, infantry weapons, and armor. It was evident that the enemy had planned to hold a winter line in the Vosges; but, finding himself outflanked and in a precarious position, he withdrew to the Rhine.

Surging eastward with all possible speed, 3rd Division elements broke out of the Vosges Mountains and onto the Alsace Plain at numerous points on 26 November. On the left flank one battalion of the 15th Infantry was engaged in clearing Mutzig, while the rest of the regiment advanced northeast and east without opposition, occupying Molsheim and nearby villages. American units were now experiencing a significant transition in the push to Germany. "With startling suddenness," reports one journal, "the battalion switched from positions high in the Vosges to small towns in Alsace that were battered by the enemy. From cities and villages that were predominantly French, we

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moved to cities and villages where speech, dress, and customs were predominantly German."

3rd Division G-2 had received reports that eight miles from Rothau there was a German concentration camp near Natzviller. A documents team sent to investigate reached the camp at 1000 hours on 26 November. They found an enclosure which was rectangular in shape, surrounded by two barbed wire fences which could be charged with electricity. At regular intervals watchtowers with floodlights were set around the area. Two men who managed to escape from the camp several days before the arrival of the American troops aided the



SNIPERS IN THE SAALES AREA BEING INTERROGATED  
*"Prisoners referred constantly to American heavy superiority in men, infantry weapons, and armor..."*

investigators in realizing the full horror of the establishment. Among the deathdealing devices was a "shower room", where prisoners could be asphyxiated, and a crematorium with an elevator-like device to

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simplify the placing of victims in the furnace. The camp had a normal capacity of 3,000 prisoners and a maximum of 4,200. The vast majority were political opponents of the Nazi regime, but there were also Bible students, Jews, priests of various denominations, homosexuals, "socially unfit" elements, and habitual criminals. Most of the prisoners had been evacuated on 16 November with the threat of the American advance. Plans had been made to blow up the place, and documents had been packed ready to be moved. So rapid had the corps progress been that explosives could not be brought into the camp in time and the SS men had fled.

Leaving a battalion behind in the Rothau-St. Blaise area to mop up and hold roadblocks, the 7th Infantry moved by vehicle during the night of 26-27 November to Strasbourg and the next night relieved the 2nd French Armored Division of front line positions there. A enemy holding force still remained on the west bank of the Rhine guarding three escape bridges across the river. The 15th Infantry likewise crossed the Alsace plain for its watch on the Rhine, while the 30th Regiment remained behind to mop up several villages south of Molsheim.

Although units of the 3rd Division entered Strasbourg to occupy and defend positions, they were not the first American troops in the area. A special "T" Force had been organized for special operations in the city of Strasbourg according to instructions from Sixth Army Group. "T" Force, including combat elements from VI Corps, reached its destination by 25 November. On 29 November the "T" Force commander reported that Alsations were antagonistic toward assumption of control by French newcomers, that assassination of French officials had occurred, and that in his opinion American troops instead of French should be kept in the city until violent feeling had subsided. Strasbourg was caught in the ancient struggle between German and French loyalties. The careful balance between French and American control in Strasbourg was almost upset by conflicting proclamations. General Leclerc, commanding the 2nd French Armored Division, had issued orders for the execution of sharpshooters and persons sheltering sharpshooters, five German hostages for each French soldier shot in the city. Since such orders were obviously at variance with international

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law, there were immediate repercussions. General O'Daniel, commanding the 3rd Division, became involved when he was quoted as approving General Leclerc's regulations. Subsequent investigation indicated that the American general had not subscribed to the penalties involved for infractions of the normal regulations of civilian control. Instructions from Seventh Army at all times conformed to the Geneva Convention. A statement to such effect, refused for newspaper publication by the French military governor in Strasbourg, was ordered proclaimed in the city by means of posters. However, on 10 December the French agreed to a newspaper interview. International policy and French policy had been satisfied.

In the meantime 3rd Division units organized anti-paratroop defenses under the threat of possible counterattack. Troops were kept



HOLE THAT WAS BLASTED IN THE WALL OF THE GERMAN  
FORTRESS NORTH OF MUTZIG

On 4 December Company E exploded a three and one-half ton demolition charge  
against the fort . . .

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on the alert, and there was continuous patrolling of areas of responsibility. From across the Rhine the enemy shelled the area between Strasbourg and the river with 240mm shells, scoring two



PREPARING GERMAN HALFTRACK WITH THREE AND ONE-HALF TONS OF TNT TO BE RAMMED INTO ENEMY HELD FORTIFICATION

*Using a captured German halftrack to roll the charge up to the fortification*

direct hits on Strasbourg's main power plant. 3rd Division artillery destroyed three power launches and several rubber boats launched by the enemy under cover of a smoke screen. Harassing fire was also placed on the bridges across the Rhine at Strasbourg.

Though enemy resistance in the 3rd Division sector had practically collapsed, an old Maginot line fortress north of Mutzig still held out and refused to surrender. Company E of the 30th Infantry was given the mission of neutralization. Despite direct fire of a 155mm howitzer and a 155mm gun, this enemy group continued to hold out and even sent a radio message requesting equipment, food, and medical

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supplies. On 2 December the XII Tactical Air Command attacked the fort with blaze bombs with no apparent effect on the fort or its occupants. On 4 December Company E exploded a three and one-half ton demolition charge against the fort, using a captured German halftrack to roll the charge up to the fortification, and breached an eight foot hole in one wall. Under cover of darkness nine of the enemy including two officers were captured after a small arms fight, as they attempted to escape from the fort. Interrogation indicated that there were 82 stragglers from miscellaneous units still in the subterranean passages. The fort finally succumbed on 5 December after being subjected to dive-bombers and demolitions.

In the Strasbourg area 3rd Division elements had pushed out to eliminate the enemy-held bridgehead on the eastern outskirts of the city near Kehl. Enemy forces located in apartment houses and buildings used machine gun and sniper fire to hold the bridgehead. On 1 December all important Rhine bridges at Strasbourg had been blown and the bridgehead was gradually withdrawn. The bulk of enemy forces were evacuated by boat under cover of heavy fog.

The 100th Division, which had been engaged in clearing the area around Raon L'Etape, was instructed by Field Order No. 8 of the VI Corps to drive east from Moyenmoutier to protect the corps left flank. On 20 November the division captured the remainder of the hill southeast of Raon L'Etape against light resistance. The 1st Battalion, 397th Infantry, attacked southeast to seize Moyenmoutier against no opposition on the next day and then continued east until it was just short of Senones, along the Rabodeau River Valley.

Under corps instructions the 2nd Battalion of the 398th Infantry, reinforced, was organized as a task force commanded by Colonel Nelson I. Fooks. The task force was given the mission of a rapid motorized movement to St. Blaise on the Bruche River along the 3rd Division axis of advance. Senones was finally taken by elements of the 397th Infantry in a flanking movement to the east. The task force, which had been held up by mined roadblocks at Senones, followed and passed through the 397th Infantry only to be stopped by other barricades along the mountain roads south of the Moyenmoutier-St. Blaise highway.

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The 397th Infantry, following the main highway, reached St. Blaise, which it captured in conjunction with 30th Infantry troops.

Both the 100th and 3rd Divisions were now on the Bruche River road. Since the 3rd Division had first priority on this route, the 100th pushed its main effort up the Plaine River Valley northeast of Raon L'Etape. The 117th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron with the 1st Battalion of the 398th Infantry attacked northeast along the valley to clear Celles, Bionville, Vexaincourt, and other valley towns. Elements of the 399th Infantry, operating the road net to the northwest of the Bruche River, advanced rapidly against only delaying detachments to reach the vicinity of Rothau. The 397th Infantry blocked to the north to protect the main division supply route. On 25 November the 100th Division continued its advance as the 117th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron knocked out an enemy roadblock and reach Grandfontaine.

As a part of its reorganization of the two corps Seventh Army issued on 26 November Operations Instruction No. 21, which directed that the 100th Infantry Division be prepared for a shift in advance to the north. The division was instructed to halt all forward movement and assemble in the Raon L'Etape area for immediate movement to the vicinity of Sarrebourg. As of 27 November at 0800 hours the 100th Division was relieved of attachment to VI Corps and attached to XV Corps.

#### Through the Steige and Le Hohwald Passes to Barr

The 103rd Division had been given the mission of assembling two infantry regiments in the vicinity of Etival, crossing the Meurthe, seizing the high ground northeast of St. Die, and capturing St. Die. On the morning of 20 November the 3rd Division established its bridgehead across the Meurthe. At 1600 hours that day the 409th and 410th Infantry Regiments of the 103rd Division were directed to move behind the 3rd Division front, prepared to cross the river at the site of the 30th and 7th Infantry bridgeheads.

On the night of 20-21 November the 409th and 410th Regiments crossed the Meurthe. Since the river had risen and washed

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out most of the bridges used by the 3rd Division, ammunition and supplies had to be carried across one remaining footbridge. Once the crossing was made, both regiments attacked to the southeast. Before nightfall of 21 November St. Die was outflanked, when the dominating hill mass to the north fell to the advance of the 410th Infantry. The 411th Regiment on the west bank of the Meurthe maintained positions along the previous division front west and south of St. Die. On 22 November a company from the 409th Infantry entered St. Die unopposed. So grateful was the town for its liberation that the mayor named the town square after the 103rd Division. The key to the roads in the central Vosges sector was now in American hands.

The 410th Infantry seized Nayemont east of St. Die, while the 409th Infantry continued its attack east to reach a line 3,000 yards west of Provencheres. At 0430 hours on 22 November the 411th Regiment crossed the Meurthe south of St. Die near Saulcy and, encountering no resistance at first, established a bridgehead. However, well-concealed German positions which had held their fire, then opened up with a heavy concentration of artillery, mortar, machine gun, and sniper fire. This slowed the attack until the enemy positions were overrun.

The 103rd Division had been directed on the previous day to create a small task force to seize and hold the Steige Pass to the east. Task Force Haines was formed by reinforcing the 2nd Battalion, 409th Infantry. Troops of the 409th Infantry moved down from high ground northwest of Provencheres and occupied the town after a sharp fight. The 409th and 410th Regiments then moved east toward Ville, the capture of which would outflank the Steige Pass. The 411th Infantry, meanwhile, was engaged with the 36th Division to the south in the clearance of the Anould-Fraize-Ban de Laveline arc. By 23 November the 411th had reached positions dominating Ban de Laveline.

Under Seventh Army pressure, enemy-withdrawals became disorganized and the divisional advance increased in speed. After leaving Provencheres the 409th was temporarily delayed on 24 November by a blown railroad pass west of Lubine, but the town was soon occupied after a brief fire fight. The Corps Commander issued orders to the

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division to move one regiment to the vicinity of Steige to cut off enemy troops retreating from the Saales-Bourg-Bruche area. One battalion of the 411th Infantry was sent immediately by motor toward Steige by way of Lubine.

It was recognized that the towns of Ville and Steige were the key to advances in the divisional sector. Together they controlled the roads from Saales to Selestat; and between them passages reached north through Le Hohwald to Barr, Obernai, and beyond to Strasbourg. On 25 November Task Force Haines advanced east from Bourg-Bruche toward the Steige Pass where the enemy held well organized positions. Farther south other troops of the 103rd Division moved along secondary roads through heavily wooded hills, by-passed scattered resistance, and travelled cross-country to pull up southwest of Ville. Not only did the infantry follow these tortuous mountain approaches, but two batteries of the 383rd Field Artillery Battalion likewise moved through using winches and other expedients.

The 409th Infantry moving up from the southwest on 26 November occupied Steige, which was heavily defended by riflemen and snipers. At the same time the 411th Regiment moved up to the Steige-Ville road from the southwest, by-passed enemy positions, and cut directly across forest trails, carrying much equipment by hand. Resistance was heavy. Wires were cut repeatedly, and wiremen and messengers became casualties. The regiment finally closed in on the highway and occupied a small village between Steige and Ville. Task Force Haines, advancing through Steige along the Saales-Selestat road, now attacked Ville from the northwest, while the 410th Regiment attacked from the southwest, moving up on the right flank of the 411th Regiment.

Some of the division's toughest fighting took place in its effort to capture Ville. Barricades, thick log entrenchments, and heavy artillery fire from the surrounding hills opposed the advancing troops. The fall of Ville, late in the afternoon of 26 November, cracked the line that the Germans had been holding from Saales southeast to the Rhine Plain. Prisoner identifications indicated that the enemy had his greatest strength on this front, presumably to protect the approaches to Selestat.

The division objective now was to pour out on the Alsace

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Plain, pressing northeast in the direction of Barr. On 27 November the 411th Infantry struck northeast from the Steige-Ville road in a drive through the Le Hohwald Pass. It followed a winding road through rugged mountain terrain to enter the town of Le Hohwald. The next day, the regiment attacked east in a two-pronged drive on Barr. One column travelled over a northerly route on secondary roads to reach the outskirts of Barr unopposed. A second column used the main road through the valley and ran into heavy resistance at a well-defended roadblock. Mortar, and 88mm fire stopped the advance. Barr was occupied on 29 November by the northern column, while the remainder of the 411th Regiment seized Andlau against stiff opposition.

The other two regiments of the 103rd Division, in the meantime, fought along minor roads east of the axis Le Hohwald-Ville in the direction of the Barr-Selestat highway. The enemy engaged in strong delaying action. On 27 November a large motor column of enemy infantry, moving into the Ville-Barr-Selestat triangle, was fired on by division artillery with an estimated destruction of 80 percent of the convoy. During the period 27-30 November the division advance, converging on Epfig on the Barr-Selestat road, was made against enemy artillery fire interdicting all routes of communications and in the face of several determined enemy counterattacks. By 30 November all regiments of the 103rd Division had pushed to positions in a semi-circle around Epfig. Resistance suddenly decreased, indicating that an armored thrust by Combat Command A of the 14th Armored Division south from the vicinity of Barr, was causing the enemy to initiate withdrawals. Contact was established between the armor and infantry troops of the 411th Regiment. The Corps Commander then ordered the 103rd Division to follow Combat Command A south along the axis Barr-Selestat to mop up in the wake of the armor.

#### Through the Ste. Marie Pass to Selestat

At the beginning of the November offensive the 36th Division, holding the right flank of VI Corps from St. Leonard south to Gerardmer made its preparations for a crossing of the Meurthe River, as the 143rd Infantry seized and occupied the ridge overlooking Anould and Clefcy

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on 20 November. The next day the 143rd Regiment moved north to cross the river near St. Leonard. The swollen stream and heavy enemy fire made the crossing difficult. The regimental right flank received one 60 round artillery concentration in four minutes. Farther south elements of the 141st Infantry crossed the Meurthe near Clefcy, moving through a heavily mined area to occupy the town. Advance elements reached the high ground south of Fraize the same day.

On 22 November the enemy showed increasing aggressiveness in attempting to prevent an enlargement of the bridgehead. The 143rd Infantry, slowed by heavy fire, minefields, and booby traps, made only minor gains toward its objective, the high ground north of Fraize. The 141st Regiment resumed its assault on the wooded hill mass south of Fraize. An enemy counterattack at 1030 hours drove the infantry back to Clefcy for reorganization; and, after unsuccessful attempts to regain lost ground, the regiment withdrew to the west bank of the Meurthe to prepare for an attack on the following day through positions of the 143rd Infantry. On 23 November the 143rd cleared Mandray, north of Fraize. Both assault regiments closed in on enemy positions at Fraize, where stiff resistance was encountered. On 23 November the 36th Division was directed by corps operations instructions to seize Ste. Marie, prepared to continue the advance to Selestat or to assemble at Saales to follow the attack of the 3rd and 100th Divisions.

The 142nd Infantry was assigned the mission of spearheading the division drive through the Vosges. The 1st Battalion of the 142nd Regiment, motorized, passed through the 143rd east of Mandray during the night 23-24 November to follow the road to La Croix-Aux-Mines, then north to the road junction town of Ban-de-Laveline as an objective. Before noon on 24 November the battalion had cleared La Croix and entered Ban-de-Laveline. The 2nd Battalion, driving to the north along the east bank of the Meurthe through Saulcy and Ste. Marguerite, pushed east to clear the area northwest of Ban-de-Laveline.

With Ban-de-Laveline in the regiment's hands, plans were formulated for a drive on Ste. Marie. The 3rd Battalion of the 142nd Infantry, which had assembled in Ban-de-Laveline, was to break into two forces — one following the main road to Ste. Marie and the other

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flanking the town from the northeast. The Germans were ready on the more obvious approach through the Ste. Marie Pass. Here a strong roadblock of timber and rocks was defended by approximately 100 troops armed with automatic weapons and two antitank guns.

The flanking column of the 3rd Battalion, achieved a complete surprise by coming in on the town from the north side and rear. Germans were encountered riding bicycles and vehicles in the streets. One hundred and fifty prisoners were taken, while the force suffered only two casualties from minor wounds. Artillery and mortar fire was placed on the enemy roadblock holding up the frontal force. Finally, Company L came behind the main defenses and cleared the sector, taking 28 prisoners and killing an equal number. By 2240 hours on 25 November the engineers had opened the road to Ste. Marie.

The fall of Ste. Marie was a major victory for the division. The town, surrounded by high mountains and resting in a narrow valley below the pass, controlled two important roads in the east, one to Selestat and one to Ribeauville. In addition it had been an important German supply base. Meanwhile the 143rd and the 141st Regiments were making only slight gains east and south of Ban-de-Laveline and Fraize.


Following the Ste. Marie-Selestat road along the valley of a small stream and mountain trails to the north, the 142nd Regimental Combat Team moved east from Ste. Marie the morning of 26 November. Roadblocks, heavily defended by armor and automatic weapons, and street fighting in mountain villages delayed the advance until strong-points were by-passed and the regiment launched a coordinated assault against the town of Liepvre. The 2nd Battalion was instructed to attack from mountain roads to the north. The 3rd Battalion was to go through the woods to attack Liepvre from the south, while the 1st Battalion was to exert pressure frontally. Artillery was to be used against enemy positions. By the morning of 28 November the 2nd Battalion reached Liepvre from the north and found the town clear.

Koenigsbourg Chateau, three miles southeast of Liepvre, sat high on dominating ground to command a wide view of the Rhine Valley and represented the next important regimental objective. At

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1930 hours on 28 November the chateau was taken without a fight, the Germans having abandoned it several hours previously. Inspection of the castle fortifications with moats and thick walls revealed that the



TYPICAL OF THE NUMEROUS ROADBLOCKS ENCOUNTERED IN THE VICINITY OF STE. MARIE PASS

Roadblocks, heavily defended by armor and automatic weapons, . . . delayed the advance . . .

castle might have presented a formidable defense. Artillery observers could now look out from the tall tower and see enemy trains operating in the Alsace Plain. Long range artillery was brought to bear on them with good results. Mopping up near Liepvre took place on 29 November. Two hundred and fifteen prisoners were taken, including the commanding officer of the German 470th Reserve Battalion with the remnants of his unit. In the evening an advance was ordered east to Chatenois on the approaches to Selestat. On 30 November Company K of the 142nd Regiment seized high ground above Chatenois. From here artillery fire

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could be placed on targets plainly seen in the valley below. An attack was planned on Chatenois for the morning of 1 December.

While the 142nd Infantry was pushing through the Ste. Marie Pass to Selestat, the 143rd Regiment was engaged in mopping up activities to the rear to eliminate enemy troops who were harassing the 142nd supply route. After organizing positions on high ground to protect the Fraize-Ban-de-Laveline roads, the regiment advanced east up rugged hill masses to occupy a ridge overlooking the Ste. Marie-Le Bonhomme road on 27 November. During the next two days troops moved south up the valley toward Le Bonhomme. Resistance was light. Only one of three pillboxes located contained enemy troops.

To the right and rear of the 143rd, the 141st Infantry had been engaged in clearing enemy pockets along the Anould-Fraize-Plainfaing approach to Le Bonhomme. On 24 November Companies F and C occupied Fraize. Some opposition was encountered from the enemy on a ridge southeast of the town and from self-propelled gunfire from Plainfaing. Information received from prisoners indicated that the enemy was withdrawing from Fraize to Plainfaing and from there planned to withdraw east to Le Bonhomme. During the night of 25-26 November patrols from Company L entered Plainfaing and found it clear. During the next few days the regiment advanced east to gain high ground overlooking Le Bonhomme near the Bonhomme Pass. On 29 November it was reported that Le Bonhomme had been evacuated by the enemy.

#### Armor Pushes South on the Alsace Plain

Following the capture of Strasbourg two armored forces were committed to clear the Alsace Plain south of the city, Combat Command A of the 14th Armored Division and the 2nd French Armored Division. Combat Command A had been attached to VI Corps on 19 November, had assembled in a corps designated area on the following day, and on 21 November had commenced movement on corps order along the route Rambervillers-Baccaret-Blamont-Cirey, then to turn southeast down the valley road toward Schirmeck. The objective of this movement was

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to block enemy forces withdrawing from the VI Corps front to the northeast. On 22 November Combat Command A was attached to XV Corps, as the armor moved through its sector. Three days later the American combat command made contact with 3rd Division troops north of Schirmeck and once again was attached to VI Corps. At noon it received instructions to reorganize, prepared to move on corps order in multiple columns along the Schirmeck-Mutzig highway and the network of roads to the south to seize the Erstein-Benfeld area in the Alsace Plain.

On 27 November Combat Command A moved from Schirmeck to the Alsace Plain, one column passing through Obernai and reaching the vicinity of Barr. Another column moved southeast to clear Valff, while a third column fanned out to the east from the main axis of advance to sweep toward Erstein. Late in the day the corps commander issued a directive to Combat Command A to clear all roads in the Erstein-Benfeld sector so that the 2nd French Armored Division could attack through the area on 28 November. The primary function of the American Combat Command was then to confine its attack south along the Obernai-Selestat route and to block off the roads leading out of the Vosges.

American armor encountered strong resistance on 28 November, indicating that the enemy had thrown in fresh troops in an effort to extricate the 19th Army. On the east flank an armored infantry column, the 62nd Battalion Combat Team, which had penetrated to a point north of Erstein, was heavily counterattacked. The loss of three half tracks, two M4 tanks, ten trucks and trailers, and one 57mm gun in addition to personnel casualties forced a withdrawal of three miles to the west of the Strasbourg-Benfeld highway. Armored elements of the 25th Battalion Combat Team, attacking south in the road network between Valff and Barr, received two counterattacks, forcing a withdrawal to the north back toward Obernai. The 48th Battalion Combat Team circled to the north of Barr, where contact was made with 103rd division troops. Heavy fighting developed in the town of Barr, as enemy bazooka teams from basement positions in the houses of the narrow streets blasted American tanks. Nine medium tanks were knocked out, and eight were missing from a platoon believed to have been cut off. The column withdrew to the north of Barr for the night.

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On 29 November Combat Command A of the 14th Armored Division attacked south in two columns along the eastern fringe of the Vosges. Blown bridges, minefields, and stubborn infantry opposition supported by antitank and artillery fire kept gains to a minimum. To the east of the Molsheim-Selestat highway one column, the 26th Battalion, advancing to the south, was delayed by wrecked vehicles on the roads but by 30 November entered St. Pierre, where heavy fighting took place until early afternoon before the town was completely cleared and occupied. The enemy threw in automatic weapons fire and 150mm artillery fire from the south. A blown bridge in St. Pierre held up progress. To the west of the main highway the 48th Battalion in column again attacked south to Barr, where enemy small arms and machine gun resistance was overcome. Recovering eight medium tanks in serviceable condition the column pressed south one mile against only sniper fire but was stopped by a mine field covered by machine gun and artillery fire from high ground. Between Andlau and St. Pierre blown bridges halted forward movement. On 1 December Combat Command A was ordered to assemble in its present location in corps reserve.

On 27 November the French 2nd Armored Division had been relieved from attachment to XV Corps and attached to VI Corps. French Armored troops were on that date being relieved by the 3rd Division and were preparing to attack south from Strasbourg down the west side of the Rhine Valley. On 28 November the French jumped off from Strasbourg in two main columns with Combat Command D on the left and Combat Command R on the right, each column being followed by a reserve combat command. The left column advanced without opposition to a point somewhat over a mile south of Plobsheim, where it was held up temporarily by a blown bridge. The right column reached Erstein where stubborn resistance was encountered. Combat Command R assembled to the west in the Obernai-Valff area and drove to the south toward the Strasbourg-Selestat-Colmar highway.

Several towns were occupied and cleared of enemy forces on 29 November, including Erstein; and repeated counterattacks were repulsed. Activities in all sectors were seriously hampered by bridges which the enemy had destroyed. The advance was directed south along

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both sides of the Ill River, but the main effort was made between the Ill and the Rhine. New gains were made on 30 November. Combat Command D, striking south along the Rhine River road against heavy opposition, destroyed five Mark V tanks, one 75mm self-propelled gun, five 88mm antitank guns, killed 50 of the enemy and took 350 prisoners. On 1 and 2 December this combat command reached as far as Friesenheim, which it captured after destroying enemy guns and tanks in a day-long fight. Combat Command R on the division right flank reached Kogenheim on the Strasbourg-Selestat highway southwest of Benfeld and seized the town on 1 December. Here blown bridges over the Ill River halted the advance. Benfeld, now almost completely encircled, was occupied without opposition. Combat Command V, which had been following the eastern column down the Rhine River road, moved west then south toward Herbsheim between the other two commands. The advance on Herbsheim was halted, however, during the night 1-2 December by heavy antitank, mortar, and small arms fire. On 2 December, attacking first with armored infantry and then with the bulk of the armor, Combat Command V cleared and occupied Herbsheim at a cost of 65 casualties in one company and very bitter fighting.

During these early days in December medium caliber artillery fire coming from Germany across the Rhine harassed the units of the 2nd French Armored Division in their advance south. On the night of 23 December troops of the French armored division, encountering very heavy interdictory artillery fire, took up positions on an arc from southeast of Kogenheim to south of Herbsheim to Friesenheim and held firm awaiting corps orders. It was apparent that the enemy was unifying his defensive organization in the vicinity of Colmar and was demolishing bridges and preparing antitank defenses to lessen the efficacy of Allied armor.

### The Fall of Selestat

The town of Selestat on the Ill River with a population of over 11,000 was the junction of several important roads including the main Strasbourg-Colmar highway. By the beginning of December the 103rd

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and the 36th Divisions were closing in on Selestat from the north and from the west.

Having advanced through the Vosges passes to Barr, from which it turned to the south, the 103rd Division attacked on 1 December with three regiments abreast against light and scattered enemy resistance. The 411th Infantry on the left had occupied Epfig during the night and now attacked south and southeast with the armored support of Combat Command A to occupy Ebersheim. On 2 December Combat Command A was withdrawn to corps reserve. The 410th Infantry remained near Epfig to clear the enemy from surrounding villages. On the right flank of the division the 409th Regiment cleared Dambach-La-Ville and attacked south to make contact with the 36th Division in the vicinity of Scherwiller. Preparations were now made to launch a coordinated two-divisional assault against Selestat.

By midnight, 1-2 December, elements of the 1st Battalion of the 409th Infantry had advanced to the railroad tracks in the northern part of town; and house to house fighting took place. On 2 December the 409th with the 1st and 2nd Battalions abreast met sporadic but stiff resistance in the walled section of Selestat. An old city wall which forms a semi-circle in the northern part of the town served as a barrier against penetration. Resistance took the form of armor, artillery, mortar, and automatic weapon fire, as well as roadblocks heavily protected by concentrations of fire power. The enemy defended with tenacity and succeeded in cutting off one infantry company.

The fight for Selestat continued on 3 December, as the two assault battalions of the 409th Infantry advanced house by house and block by block in the northern half of the city. Houses converted into enemy strongpoints were first fired upon by tank destroyers after which infantry rushed in to mop up. Shortly after mid-day an estimated 150 enemy supported by tanks launched a counterattack from the eastern outskirts of the city; but, after an hour of heavy fighting in which severe casualties were suffered from tank fire, the attack was beaten off. The infantry company which had been cut off the previous day also lost approximately half its personnel to tank fire. During the day contact

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was maintained with troops of the 36th Division who were already fighting in the southeastern part of Selestat.

Elements of the 36th Division represented the second prong of the coordinated assault on Selestat. At the beginning of December the division had been engaged on a 22 mile front on the corps right flank. The 141st Infantry was on high ground overlooking Le Bonhomme; the 142nd was continuing its spearhead move from Liepvre to Selestat; while the 143rd held the front between the other two regiments. On 1 December the 143rd Infantry had attacked toward the Ste. Marie-Ribeauville road and toward Ribeauville southwest of Selestat. On 3



EASTERN SECTOR OF SELESTAT FLOODED BY HIGH WATER  
FROM THE RHINE

*During the day contact was maintained with troops of the 36th Division who were already fighting in the southeastern part of Selestat . . .*

December the 143rd Regiment less one battalion occupied Ribeauville. The 142nd Regiment on 1 December had cleared and occupied Chatenois just outside Selestat, while other elements of the regiment cleared

several towns to the southwest in the foothills of the Vosges. Troops of the 142nd assaulted Selestat from the west, reached the railroad, and cut the main road to Colmar before midnight. The 2nd Battalion of the 143rd, was now attached to the 142nd Regiment for the assault on Selestat.

Four battalions converged on Selestat. Two battalions of the 409th Infantry, were already fighting in the northern part of the city; the 2nd Battalion of the 143rd advanced directly east from Chatenois; while the 3rd Battalion of the 142nd moved on Selestat from the south. On 2 December the 2nd Battalion of the 143rd engaged the enemy in a heavy fire fight in the city and encountered machine gun and small arms fire, booby traps, mines, and trip wires. An enemy battalion command post was taken and three German staff officers captured. The 3rd Battalion of the 142nd Infantry, having crossed to the east of the Colmar highway, moved out to attack the southeastern sector of Selestat at 0630 hours on 2 December. The advance was made against intense sniper fire. At 1600 hours, an enemy column of 150 men moving toward Selestat from the southeast was dispersed by artillery fire.

On 2 December Company K led the 3rd Battalion in clearing the southeast corner of the town and reached a bridge over the Ill River which the Germans had blown. Heavy fire stopped the advance. On the next day Company E of the 409th Infantry reached the Ill River and fanned to the south to make contact with the 3rd Battalion of the 142nd Regiment. By 1645 hours on 4 December the city was completely occupied. Troops of the 103rd Division were relieved during the night by the 142nd Infantry, and control of the city passed to the 36th Division. The 103rd Division prepared to move north to the new VI Corps front.

### The Seventh Army Turns North

In the last ten days of November VI Corps had penetrated the High Vosges and poured out its troops on the plains of Alsace. In military history the Vosges had been considered impregnable. However, as the enemy withdrew troops from the Vosges line to block the Allied

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advances north and south through the Saverne Pass and the Belfort Gap, mountain obstacles defended by insufficient manpower were broken by American infantry. General Brooks, VI Corps Commander, gave full credit to the 100th, 3rd, 103rd, and 36th Infantry Divisions and to the 14th Armored Division for their achievement in cracking the enemy Vosges line.

That the enemy fully appreciated the threat which the Vosges drive represented, although possibly somewhat late, is evident from captured documents. On 21 November General Thumm, Commanding the LXIV Corps, which was opposing the VI Corps advance, issued to his soldiers an order of the day in which he called upon them to fight, "standing at the borders of our fatherland," for the life of the people, the life of the soldier's family, and the life of Germany." Five days later General Thumm issued a message to all commanders in his area relaying the order of the German High Command:

The order to hold out to the last man must be executed under all circumstances . . .

Great decisions are falling here now. I expect all commanders, leaders and troops to hold out, not to lose their nerves, and fight to the last breath . . . The decision falls on this side of the Rhine . . .

Although by the beginning of December his Vosges line had been broken and Allied troops had reached the Rhine both at Mulhouse and at Strasbourg, the enemy gave no indication of a general withdrawal from the area between these two Alsatian cities. The liquidation of the Colmar Pocket was to be made as costly as possible for the Allies. It also represented a potential threat to the entire Seventh Army, as that army faced the Siegfried Line north of Strasbourg.

It has been mentioned that the Seventh Army had prepared plans for a crossing of the Rhine to be made presumably in December to the north of Strasbourg, and that this plan was at least temporarily abandoned on 24 November, when General Eisenhower in his direction of operations along the full western front changed both the mission of the Seventh Army and its direction of advance. In the new strategy Seventh Army was to swing north astride the Vosges and west of the Rhine and, in an advance coordinated with the activities of the Third Army, was to breach the Siegfried Line between Lauterbourg on the

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Rhine and Saarbruecken. The main objective of all Allied armies was to destroy the enemy west of the Rhine.

Instructions from Sixth Army Group issued on 26 November elaborated the new plan of operations for its two armies. The First French Army was assigned the mission of protecting the army group flank along the west bank of the Rhine when destruction of the enemy in its zone had been completed. This zone was to reach from Strasbourg south to Switzerland and include the Colmar Pocket. It was at this time planned that units of the Seventh Army to be employed in clearing the Colmar Pocket would be relieved by the French by 0600 hours on 30 November. The American Seventh Army was instructed to complete regrouping rapidly, to attack north with the least possible delay and assist the Third Army in breaching the Siegfried Line. After it had completed this mission, advantage was to be taken of any opportunity to seize and exploit an unopposed bridgehead across the Rhine south of Mannheim.

In a staff memorandum of 25 November Seventh Army had announced to its corps commanders that at present, "no crossing of the Rhine River is contemplated and the direction of advance will be turned north . . . generally parallel to the Rhine." On the following day this change in the tactical plan was made the subject of a letter on future operations. After destruction of the enemy in zone Seventh Army was to regroup with XV Corps west of the crest of the Vosges and with VI Corps east of the Vosges. The 2nd French Armored Division was to pass to the control of the First French Army. With many of its divisions heavily engaged in the line Seventh Army had to complete its regrouping with deliberation and care to avoid jeopardy to its units on the front and to its flanks. On 26 November the boundary between VI Corps and XV Corps was moved to the north of Strasbourg, the beginning of the swing to the left. On that day the 100th Infantry Division was relieved from VI Corps, to assemble still west of the Vosges for attachment to XV Corps.

The Seventh Army Command Post closed at Epinal on 30 November and reopened in Sarrebourg in anticipation of the new direction of advance. An amendment to army directions left up to

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VI Corps the size of the force to be used in clearing the Molsheim-Colmar area, this force to be withdrawn to the corps zone on army order and not necessarily on 30 November. Enemy resistance in the Colmar Pocket was greater than had been anticipated. On 2 December Seventh Army Field Order No. 7 listed the regrouping of units to be attached to each corps. By 5 December VI Corps was to be composed of the 3rd, 45th, 79th, and 103rd Infantry Divisions and the 14th Armored Division. XV Corps was to be composed of the 44th and the 100th Infantry Divisions and the 12th Armored Division. The 12th Armored Division,



MAJOR GENERAL  
RODERICK H. ALLEN  
"arrived in the Lunerville area..."

commanded by Major General Roderick R. Allen, was scheduled to arrive in the Lunerville area on 1, 2, and 3 December. The 36th Infantry Division, still to be supplied and administered by Seventh Army, was to be operationally a part of the First French Army's liquidation of the Colmar Pocket. Seventh Army on 3 December planned the second shift in VI Corps - XV Corps boundary to be effective on 5 December. This line ran roughly along the crest of the Low Vosges from northwest of Saverne through Philippsbourg to the northeast, XV Corps on the left and VI Corps on the right.

Divisions completed movement in accordance with corps orders and the tactical situation. The month of December was to find the Seventh Army pushing along its new front through the Maginot Line and into Germany's Siegfried Line positions. On 8 December the Seventh Army's forward Command Post moved up to Saverne.

## CHAPTER XIX

### *Northward to the German Frontier*

WHEN on 23 November the Seventh Army drive reached through the Saverne Cap and up to the city of Strasbourg, the enemy threat to both flanks of the corridor was accentuated. In the south the enemy had yet to be driven out of the High Vosges, across the plain, and over the Rhine. To the north the Third Army was meeting stiff resistance as it attempted to cross the Sarre River, leaving Seventh Army troops above Sarrebourg exposed to strong German counterattacks. The long spearhead that had cleared the Saverne Cap and reached the Rhine was a narrow lane, tenuous and vulnerable on both its flanks.

When on 24 November General Eisenhower changed the Seventh Army's direction of advance, new plans were quickly formulated. While elements of the Seventh Army were to help the French in driving the Germans across the Rhine in the south, its main force was to drive northeast astride the Low Vosges and up the Rhine Valley. When it had cleared the enemy out of its zone which was bounded by the Rhine, the Siegfried Line, and the Sarre River, then the Seventh Army, in an action coordinated with the Third, would break across the Siegfried Line into that part of Germany known as the Saar-Palatinate.

#### The New Front

The shifting of an army front, along large parts of which the enemy was being actively and at focal points intensively engaged, was a complicated maneuver. With full regard for tactical requirements disengagement, relief, and redeployment were accomplished in the last days of November; and by 5 December both XV and VI Corps were ready to launch the offensive to the north.

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The German counterattacks north of Sarrebourg on 23, 24, and 25 November had been beaten back by the 44th Infantry Division, elements of the 45th Division, the 106th Cavalry Group, and units of the 4th Armored Division, operating with the Third Army, which entered the XV Corps zone north and south of Fenetrangle. At this time XV Corps operations were divided into the front east of the Vosges and the front west of the Vosges. The 79th Infantry Division, holding the corps right flank on the Alsace Plain north of Strasbourg, made limited objective attacks south and west of Haguenau during the last days of November. On 26-27 November the 45th Division was brought into the line east of the Vosges from positions north of Hochfelden on the left flank of the 79th Division west to the passes north of Saverne. One regiment of the 100th Infantry Division, transferred from VI to XV Corps for operations, was attached to the 45th Division on 27 November to strengthen protection of the Saverne Gap bridgehead.

On the corps flank west of the Vosges the 44th Division pushed the attack to the north. After German strength near Rauwiller had been broken, the advance was carried through against little opposition. During the last two days of November the 44th Division captured Tieffenbach; the 45th Division took Ingwiller and positions to the northeast; and Niederschaeffolsheim just southwest of Haguenau. By 3 December the 100th Division had been brought into the line between the 44th and 45th Divisions. Near Wingen-sur-Moder the newly arrived division encountered strong opposition. On the next day XV Corps made slight advances to the north, both east and west of the Vosges.

At 0001 hours on 5 December XV and VI Corps became operational on the new front, the boundary coinciding with that already in existence along the crest of the Low Vosges between the 45th and 100th Divisions. XV Corps was now composed of the 44th and 100th Infantry Divisions together with the newly attached 12th Armored Division and reconnaissance troops. In the VI Corps sector there was little immediate change. The 45th and 79th Divisions continued to advance on the line. The 14th Armored and 103rd Infantry Divisions were assembled in rear areas in preparation for a general offensive. The 3rd Infantry Division continued to hold Strasbourg and positions north

and south of that city. The 36th Division and the 2nd French Armored Division were relieved from attachment to VI Corps and remained in the line from Selestat to the Rhine River.

The change in the Seventh Army's direction of advance, which forfeited the possibility of a short-cut into the heart of Germany, meant giving the enemy time. Although the breakthrough to Strasbourg had split the German First and Nineteenth Armies and weakened both, the First Army in the north was still strong enough to resist the Seventh Army's new drive. Between 15 and 30 November the Germans facing the Seventh Army had lost an estimated 17,500 troops, 13,000 of which number had been taken prisoner of war. Now, in the beginning of December, they had only about 14,000 troops with which to fight a delaying action against seven American divisions. Replacements numbered about 10,500; many were converts from rear echelons, and many were looking for an opportunity to surrender. But the enemy was able to gain sufficient time for other forces to increase the strength of the West Wall.


The Germans had on their side the advantages of weather and terrain. December in Alsace is a cloudy month with low ground fogs and drizzling rain. On only five days of the month was the Tactical Air Force able to give close support to the Seventh Army drive. The ground is cold with frosts, but not sufficiently frozen to support heavy vehicles. Both the softness of the ground and natural terrain obstacles slowed up American armor and put the burden of the advance upon the infantry.

The Germans were to utilize the natural obstacles of both the Alsace Plain and the Lower Vosges Mountains in their withdrawal to the north. The plain, a rolling stretch of farm land, slopes generally to the northeast. It is broken in the center by the great Haguenau Forest, 18 miles long and six miles deep. Between the forest and the Rhine a three-mile-wide corridor narrows as it runs northward to the town of Seltz. Between the forests and the Vosges there is a gap of six miles; but it is broken by rivers, the Moder, the Zintzel, the Falkenstein, and the Seltzbach, and a dense network of villages. To the north lies the rugged country of the Hochwald, and above the Hochwald the Lauter River flows to the Rhine and forms the German border. Bounding the plain on the



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west are the wooded and steep eastern flanks of the Lower Vosges, or Hardt Mountains. On the western side they slope more gradually toward the Sarre Valley. Along the steep roads and trails of the Vosges the



THIS HOUSE HAS BEEN BLASTED BY A BAZOOKA SHELL IN AN ATTEMPT TO ROUT SNIPERS. IN THE BACKGROUND IS THE HAGENAU FOREST

*"It is broken in the center by the great Hagenau Forest, 18 miles long and six miles deep."*

Germans prepared roadblocks and mines. After the counterattacks they launched late in November south toward Sarrebourg, they planned their strongest delaying actions in the towns in the two passes cut by the Moder and the Zintzel Rivers. Here at Wingen on the Moder and at Lemberg and Enchenberg, in the valley west of the sources of the Zintzel, they were to fight stubbornly.

On the plain and through the mountains the Germans were to defend road blocks and towns and, when forced, to withdraw behind minefields and blown bridges to the most defensible point. Seventh

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Army G-2 anticipated the plans of German defense and foresaw also that the enemy would make a stand either at the Maginot Line or at the Siegfried Line.



FORTIFICATIONS IN THE BITCHE SECTION OF THE MAGINOT LINE  
*Even more probably the enemy would try to hold in the Ensemble de Bitche, the toughest fortifications of the entire Maginot Line.*

The Maginot Line runs north along the Rhine from Strasbourg to Ft. Louis, where it bends to the northwest through the Haguenau Forest to Riedseltz near Wissembourg. There it bends to the west and runs through the Hochwald, parallel to the German border, through Lembach and Bitche. Here the Maginot Line runs through rougher terrain and was more likely to be chosen by the Germans for a stand than the French defenses in the Rhine Valley. Even more probably the enemy would try to hold in the Ensemble de Bitche, the toughest fortifications of the entire Maginot Line. Bitche stands at the head of the Lower Vosges in France, on the step made in the mountain line as



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it turns northeastward into Germany. North of Bitche the forests thin out into open country and the hills become lower and spread out. Bitche guards the junction of the road and railroad from Haguenau to Sarreguemines and the roads south from Zweibruecken and Pirmasens into France. It has always been a strong point in the French national defenses; here in the 17th century Vauban built a long fort, and the Camp de Bitche had been for a long time a strong garrison.

Aerial photographs showed few signs of German preparatory activity in the Maginot Line, except for scattered digging in the mountains and around Bitche. Evidently the Germans planned to use the Maginot Line only to delay the attack, while they withdrew across the border to their own Siegfried Line. Here photographs showed intensive preparations in key sectors. That part of the Siegfried Line which was the target of the Seventh Army runs from Neuberg on the Rhine westward to Zweibruecken: from the Rhine through Buchelberg in the Bien Wald, across open country from Stainfeld to Ober-Otterbach, through the forests of the Hardt or Low Vosges Mountains to Bunden-thal and Eppenbrunn, then across open country again northwest to Windsberg, and west to Zweibruecken. The largest concentrations of artillery emplacements appeared from the aerial photographs to be in the two open stretches.

Such were the enemy plans, as Seventh Army G-2 estimated them on 7 December: to delay in successive positions back to the Siegfried Line, and there to stand. During the first few days of the month the enemy had organized his forces above the Moder River. Defending the Plain were the 245th Infantry and the 256th Volks Grenadier Divisions, which had been added to the 361st Volks Grenadier Division, now operating in the eastern part of the Hardt Mountains. On the western slopes of the mountains were elements of both the 130th Panzer and the 25th Panzer Grenadier Divisions.

The American drive north began on 5 December, when both forces, now reorganized and committed to definite missions, faced each other along the general line of the Moder River. Seventh Army's plan, as it evolved through a series of orders, was a double drive, XV Corps

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on the left and VI Corps on the right. This double drive became, in effect, a six-pronged offensive with six divisions lined up from west to east, the 44th, the 100th, the 45th, the 103rd, the 14th Armored, and the 79th,



79TH DIVISION ARTILLERYMEN FIRING INTO THE GERMAN POSITIONS OVER THE MODER RIVER

*Both forces, now reorganized and committed to definite missions, faced each other along the general line of the Moder River.*

probing into the enemy defenses. The Seventh Army pushed the enemy back to the fortifications of the Maginot and then the Siegfried Line.

#### The 45th Division through the Low Vosges


On the VI Corps front four divisional lines of advance developed, but at the beginning of the drive north the 45th and 79th Divisions contained the entire line. On 7 and 13 December, respectively, the 103rd and 14th Armored Divisions drove as a wedge between the widening fronts of the other two divisions. During the month of



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December the 45th Division advanced up the western side of the Alsace Maginot Line at Lembach, and across the German border to Nothweiler and Bobenthal.

The attack of the 45th Division toward Lembach was long and hard. Facing it was open, rolling terrain, studded with villages where the Germans made strong delaying stands. The division had not only to encircle and clear villages along a six-mile front but also to block the mountain passes on its left. "Demolitions, mines, and well covered road blocks became more numerous as the enemy withdrew toward the old Maginot Line; and increased artillery, mortar, self-propelled, and



ENGINEERS SWEEPING FOR MINES IN ONE OF THE MANY ROADBLOCKS WHICH SLOWED UP THE ADVANCE

*"Demolitions, mines, and well covered roadblocks became more numerous as the enemy withdrew toward the old Maginot Line . . ."*

machine gun fire with superior observation made the entrance into Germany and attack on the Siegfried Line difficult . . ." By 1 December

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the division had begun its attack across the Moder and had taken Ingwiller and Kindwiller. It was then ordered to advance to seize the railroad line which runs from Niederbronn to Mertzwiller. On 3 December, Major General Robert T. Frederick, who had commanded the Airborne Task Force in the invasion of southern France, assumed command of the 45th Division. A few days before, General Eagles, who had commanded the division since 21 November 1943, had been wounded when his vehicle exploded a mine.

On the division left flank the 157th Infantry had begun its drive along the edge of the wooded mountains, protected to the west by the 397th Infantry of the 100th Division, then blocking the passes at Wimmenau and Rothbach. Resistance stiffened at Zinswiller. On 1 and 2 December the 157th Regiment fought for and took the hills on the east and west sides of the town; and on 3 December against bitter opposition troops took the town itself and blocked it off. The next day two battalions seeking to reach Niederbronn over open country were pinned down by heavy fire from the outskirts of the town. The 3rd Battalion, however, secured the left flank by surrounding and taking a village on the southwestern approaches to Niederbronn, as it engaged in stiff fighting in the western hills. For the following three days the regiment made little progress; but it blocked the roads in its zone and felt out the enemy defenses of Niederbronn, its objective. On 8 December the 1st Battalion led the attack. The first day's fighting was futile but on the following day the 1st Battalion secured ground to the west and north and fought its way into the town. With the support of the 2nd Battalion troops cleared Niederbronn by mid-afternoon of 9 December.

Meanwhile, the 179th and the 180th Infantry were fighting through the center of the gap between the Haguenau Forest and the Vosges. Engwiller and Mietenheim held them up for two days. On 2 December the 1st Battalion of the 179th Infantry resumed the regimental attack on Engwiller. The enemy stiffly resisted from within the town subjecting the battalion to intense small arms and mortar fire. At the end of the day a portion of the town was still in enemy hands, as the other two battalions moved up on the flanks. By the next day troops were able to continue the attack to the north and to cross the Zintzel

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River. The 180th Infantry had an even more difficult engagement at Mietesheim. Having reached the outskirts of the town on 1 December, the 3rd Battalion entered Mietesheim from the west and south and after bitter street fighting cleared the lower half of the town. Early in the afternoon enemy infantry and tank counterattacks drove the 3rd Battalion back to the outskirts of the village. On 2 December the attack was resumed against stubborn resistance. Mietesheim was cleared of the enemy and blocked off.

The 45th Division was held up in its advance along the western flank by trouble in the east. After the fall of Mietesheim the 2nd Battalion of the 180th Regiment began to patrol and to prepare for an attack on the division right flank to take Mertzwiller at the eastern end of the divisional front. It attacked on 5 December from the south and the west; and by noon it had cleared the southern half of Mertzwiller up to the Zintzel River bridge, which the Germans had blown. In the afternoon two companies crossed the Zintzel River in the face of heavy fire and occupied positions along the railroad lines. On the next day, however, German infantrymen supported by tanks swept back into Mertzwiller and forced a withdrawal to the southern half of the town. During the night of 7-8 December units of the 103rd Division relieved all committed elements of the 180th Infantry at Mertzwiller.

Freed of the burden of too wide a line, the 45th Division drove northward toward Gundershoffen and Reichshoffen, the two most important towns between Mertzwiller and Niederbronn on the railway line and along the Zintzel River. The 179th and 180th Infantry felt out in patrol action the strong defenses of both towns during 8 and 9 December. At 0530 hours on 10 December the 180th Infantry attacked through forward positions of the 179th with two battalions abreast, meeting scattered artillery and mortar fire. One column pushed armor across the railroad bridge at Reichshoffen and assaulted the town from the north and south. Mines, snipers, and machine gun fire opposed the advance; but enemy forces were too thinly spread and the town was quickly taken. Another column crossed the river at Gundershoffen against small arms and self-propelled gun fire and in the afternoon seized the town after an exchange of small arms, machine gun fire, and grenades.

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Having taken its first objective, the Niederbronn-Mertzwiller railroad, the 45th Division then moved north on a narrower front through wooded mountains toward the Maginot Line. Nowhere was enemy resistance as severe as it had been on the plain. The advance was impeded more by Schu and Topf minefields and rugged country than by arms. In order to keep supplies coming forward units of the 45th Division even resorted to pack-trains. Although the Germans fought strong delaying actions in the woods about Lembach, utilizing some Maginot Line fortifications and opposing the advance with sniper and small arms fire, Lembach itself was easily taken on 14 December by units of the 180th Infantry. On 16 December advance elements of the division crossed the German border, cleared Bobenthal and Nothweiler, and established contact with fortifications of the Siegfried Line.

#### The 79th Division Along the Rhine

The 79th Division drive did not get started until 7 December. On that day the 94th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, attached to the division to secure its right flank, attacked the town of Gambenheim near the Rhine. Also on 7 December units of the 103rd Division relieved left flank forces of the 79th Division, as the front narrowed for the assault. On that day, too, the 79th Division issued orders in compliance with VI Corps plans for a major attack toward the Siegfried Line.

Gambenheim had been held as a German strongpoint since the fall of Strasbourg, standing as a threat to any Seventh Army advance north along the Rhine. It took the 94th Cavalry troops a day and a half to capture Gambenheim. Once it was neutralized, however, the right flank of the 79th Division was cleared for movement. During the first several days of December the division had moved slowly up toward the Moder River. It had taken Schweighausen to flank Haguenau on the west, and it had secured positions along the southern edge of the woods, which like an arm of the Haguenau Forest flanks Haguenau. From here it could attack both Haguenau and Bischwiller to the south. After the 94th Cavalry together with elements of the 14th Armored Division had

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
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cleared Gamsheim and moved up the Rhine southeast of Haguenau, the 79th Division began its drive.

It was to attack with three regiments abreast along the axis Bischwiller-Seltz to destroy the Rhine bridges and clear the Rhine Valley on its right flank; it was also to take the city of Haguenau on its left and, with the assistance of the 103rd Division, to clear Haguenau Forest. On 9 December Bischwiller fell easily to the 313th Infantry, which had surprised the enemy by attacking at dawn with no artillery preparation. German soldiers at the main bridge across the Moder River to the north side of town were shot as they were about to detonate prepared charges.



THE NORTHERN SECTOR OF BISCHWILLER WHICH IS UNDER ARTILLERY FIRE FROM GERMAN POSITIONS IN OBERHOFFEN

*"On 9 December Bischwiller fell easily to the 313th Infantry, which had surprised the enemy by attacking at dawn with no artillery preparation . . ."*

Attacking forces pressed on across the Moder and dug in east of the river. The 315th Infantry had jumped off that same morning toward

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Kaltenhouse on the southern outskirts of Haguenau. By evening it had cleared the woods in its zone and had dug in before Marienthal. The next morning Marienthal was taken; but, when the bridge over the Moder south of Haguenau was found blown, troops retraced their steps and went down to Bischwiller to cross the river and to follow the 313th Regiment north and east.

The 314th Infantry had a far more difficult time. Haguenau, a city with a peacetime population of from 15,000 to 20,000, was strongly defended. If the Germans could delay the left flank of the 79th Division drive here, as they had delayed the right flank of the 45th Division at



THE BITTERLY CONTESTED TOWN OF HAGUENAU UNDER AMERICAN MORTAR FIRE

*" . . . The 314th Infantry had a far more difficult time. Haguenau, a city with a peacetime population of from 15,000 to 20,000, was strongly defended . . ."*

Mertzwiller, they would hold up the entire offensive in the plain. The regimental plan was for an attack by three battalions up through the

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arm of the Haguenau Forest and into the city from the southwest and southeast. Reconnaissance troops were to guard the division left flank at Schweighausen. On 9 December the three battalions attacked against what their patrols had assured them would be strong resistance. It took two days and bitter fighting to clear the woods and to complete the occupation of Haguenau.

On 9 December the 314th Infantry had attacked at 1430 hours against heavy small arms, mortar, and artillery fire. By midnight troops had reached the southwestern edge of Haguenau. On the following day heavy opposition met the renewed attack, as enemy troops of the 481st Grenadier Regiment fired from well entrenched positions behind the railroad tracks on the western edge of the city. The 314th Regiment fought its way from house-to-house until resistance crumbled when the line at the railroad tracks was broken. On 11 December the regiment secured the town of Haguenau meeting only occasional sniper fire. The enemy had retreated to the north, blowing the bridge over the Moder behind them. That evening the 314th Infantry installed a Bailey bridge and continued the advance to Soufflenheim, at the southeastern edge of the city forest. Patrols of its reconnaissance troop reported that they had made no contact with the enemy in the Haguenau Forest. By this time the 313th Infantry had reached the defenses of Soufflenheim from the southwest; after a strongly contested engagement the enemy pulled out abruptly on 12 December, covering his withdrawal from Soufflenheim only by sniper fire and heavy harassing artillery fire. With the fall of Haguenau the Germans could not afford to make a stand in the Haguenau Forest, nor had they been able to hold the city long enough to seriously delay the advance of the 79th Division.

During the night of 11 December the three regiments of the division were converted into mobile combat teams; each, reinforced with armor, was to move to the northeast separately, while the 117th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, now attached to the division, was to clear the towns along the right flank on the Rhine. The cavalry had little trouble all the way up to the border. The 313th Infantry sent out two spears toward the Siegfried Line. The 314th, exhausted from the battle of Haguenau, remained in mobile reserve.

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On 12 December the 313th Regiment, on the right, drove from Soufflenheim toward Seltz at the head of the corridor between the forest and the Rhine. It took the southern half of the town that evening, against stiff resistance; and on the evening of the following day it got its armor across the swift Seltzbach River and cleared the northern half. A rifleman shot a civilian who was signalling two German tanks that an American bazooka team was approaching them. Now out of the corridor on the open plain, the regiment drove on 14 December northeast toward Lauterbourg where it drew heavy fire of all kinds from the outskirts. The troops stopped and dug in for the night.

It was suspected that the enemy would make a last strong delaying stand at Lauterbourg before withdrawing to the Siegfried Line. German troops and tanks had been seen moving into the town. At 0550 hours on 15 December the 1st Battalion attacked from the west in the face of artillery fire, while the 2nd Battalion attacked from the south over boggy ground. Both battalions reached the town at about the same time, and against stiff house-to-house resistance they drove the enemy north across the Lauter River. During the afternoon and evening they were pounded by artillery from the German side of the river, which they could find no way of crossing. The only bridge which would carry vehicles had been completely destroyed. Night patrols were able, however, to probe along the river; and on the morning of 16 December engineers installed a bridge and got tanks across. That afternoon the 1st Battalion crossed and moved up to take Berg against only very light resistance. On the next day the other two battalions moved up. They passed beyond Berg into the Bien Wald where they ran into heavy fire from the Siegfried Line.

The other spear of the 79th Division reached the Siegfried Line at about the same time. On 12 December the 3rd Battalion of the 313th Infantry had moved from Soufflenheim up through Haguenau Forest to Niederroedern on the northern bank of the Seltzbach River. Although the bridge had been blown and the river was too swift to ford, a few troops managed to get across to establish a toehold in the southern edge of the town, working around to cut the roads which lead to the north. On the following day the 3rd Battalion of the 315th Infantry

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came up to take the town, relieving the 3rd Battalion of the 313th Regiment so that it might rejoin its parent organization on its march to Lauterbourg. Once a treadway bridge had been built over the Seltzbach, the 2nd Battalion of the 315th came up to Niederroedern and drove to the northeast across the open plain. No serious opposition was met until troops approached the village of Scheibenhardt on the German border. Below Scheibenhardt, in a semicircle, the troops dug in for the night. On the morning of 15 December they attacked and cleared the southern half of the town. During the afternoon patrols crossed the Lauter River into the northern half.

On the next day bridges were constructed against no opposition. The enemy had withdrawn to the Siegfried Line. All units of the regiment, which had now come up to Scheibenhardt crossed over into Ger-



A PATROL OF THE 79TH DIVISION HAVING CROSSED THE BORDER INTO GERMANY PREPARES TO ADVANCE

*Now the entire 79th Division was across the border and ready to assault Germany's line of fixed defenses . . .*

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many. On 17 December the 314th Infantry came up to the center of the division line between the other two regiments and advanced through the Bien Wald to reach the outer defenses of the Siegfried Line. It dug in just below Buchelberg. Now the entire 79th Division was across the border and ready to assault Germany's line of fixed defenses.

### The Corridor to Wissembourg

When, on 5 December, it became apparent that the German strength along the Moder below Haguenau Forest was too great for the 45th and the 79th Divisions to break swiftly, VI Corps ordered the 103rd Division to move in to help them. Its mission was to relieve the 45th's right flank in the vicinity of Mertzwiller and the 79th's left flank in the vicinity of Neubourg and to form a third spear in the drive northeast through the upper Alsace Plain.

According to the initial orders the 103rd Division was to attack across the Zintzel River at Mertzwiller, help the 79th Division clear the Haguenau Forest, and then move northeast across the upper plain toward Oberseebach. But new factors came into play. It was discovered that the enemy was not going to defend Haguenau Forest, and arrangements were made for the 14th Armored Division to cover the zone of open country that runs across the German border between the Vosges and the Bien Wald. Oberseebach lies in the center of this open country. At that time the direction of the 103rd Division attack was turned north toward Wissembourg, and its target became the high ground north of Berg-Zabern. It was to advance as a spear almost parallel to that of the 45th Division, through the Hochwald and across the border just west of Wissembourg.

Early in the evening of 7 December, the day after the Germans had retaken the northern half of Mertzwiller, the 103rd Infantry Division effected its relief of 45th and 79th Division troops. The 410th and 411th Infantry moved into the southern half of Mertzwiller along the southwestern bank of the Zintzel and manned a roadblock at Neubourg. Patrols felt out enemy defenses, and preparations were made for an attack.

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Heavy rains had swollen the Zintzel River, in some places to a width of 400 yards, and all the bridges were out. However, at 0530 hours on 10 December the division attack jumped off. Troops of the 410th Infantry crossed over improvised footbridges, swept into the northern half of Mertzwiller, and assaulted enemy strong points in the houses. Enemy artillery and mortar fire from the northern outskirts fell heavily on the crossing, and a direct hit on a vehicle bridge delayed the attack of tanks and antitank guns for several hours. But by the end of the day the bridge had been repaired, and the 410th Regiment had cleared the town, rescuing 18 men of the 180th Infantry who had been



AMERICAN TANK DOZER AND BULLDOZER WHICH HAS BEEN KNOCKED OUT BY NEW GERMAN PLASTIC MINE

Plastic mines, demolitions, and roadblocks . . . along the way slowed the drive, but failed to stop the advance . . .

cut off in Mertzwiller and who had been in hiding there for several days. Northwest of Mertzwiller the 2nd Battalion of the 411th Infantry had met little opposition in its crossing of the Zintzel River.

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After his defense of Mertzwiller the enemy fought no strong delaying actions against the 103rd Division until he had backed up to the German border. Plastic mines, demolitions, roadblocks defended by small groups, and rearguards in several towns along the way slowed the drive but failed to stop the advance. When it was discovered that the Germans were not going to defend the Haguenau Forest, the 103rd with two regiments abreast drove north across the plain, through the unmanned pillboxes of the Maginot Line in the Hochwald, down the long slope of less densely wooded ground toward Wissembourg. As the division approached the border, however, it met strong rearguards. On



103RD DIVISION INFANTRY MOVING THROUGH ENTANGLEMENTS IN THE MAGINOT FORTRESS NEAR CLIMBACH DURING THEIR DRIVE TO THE GERMAN FRONTIER

As the division approached the border, however, it met strong rearguards. On 14 December one of the stiffest battles of the entire month was fought at Climbach . . .

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Lieutenant Colonel John P. Blackshear, Executive Officer of the 411th Infantry, planned the attack on Climbach, which lay to the left in the division zone southwest of Wissembourg. The purpose of the attack on Climbach was to cut German supply lines which "passed west through it to reinforce Lembach, the objective of the 45th Division coming up from the south." Task Force Blackshear moved up the road on the morning of 14 December in a long motorized column. As the point tank destroyer crossed the crest of the hill and headed down into the valley that cradles Climbach, it was hit by a barrage of artillery and knocked out. The barrage continued bitterly all day long. Negro tank destroyer crews moved their four guns out over the crest into the field of artillery fire, set them up, and in four minutes time were firing into the village. Three of the guns were knocked out; but they fired and had drawn enemy fire effectively enough to enable riflemen and machine gunners to secure the two hills which flank Climbach. The artillery battalion was finally able to fire from behind the crest, and behind its barrage riflemen moved into the town and took it after a stiff fight. At 1800 that evening the Germans counterattacked with 200 infantrymen and four tanks. The 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 410th Infantry were dispatched to go to the aid of Task Force Blackshear and helped break the counterattack.

The 45th and the 103rd Divisions crossed the German border on the same day, 16 December. The 103rd Division advanced in two regimental columns up to the Siegfried Line. On the right flank the 409th Infantry took Rott against the delaying resistance of tanks and infantry of the 21st Panzer Division. It by-passed Wissembourg on 16 December and reached into Germany north of that city. On the next day, reinforced by the 1st Battalion of the 410th Infantry, it attacked to the north with two battalions abreast and ran into heavy fire from the Siegfried Line. On the left flank the 411th Regiment overcame isolated but determined groups of resistance north of Climbach and, followed by a supply train of mules, reached on 17 December the outer defenses of the Siegfried Line near Bobenthal. The 410th Infantry stayed behind, training with Maginot Line pillboxes as dummies for an attack on the Siegfried Line.

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In the meantime VI Corps had ordered the 14th Armored Division into action on the corps front. On 12 December the armor was ordered into position between the 103rd and 79th Divisions to attack north the next morning toward the border in the zone between Wissembourg and Scheibenhart. The 45th and 103rd Divisions on the corps left flank were out far ahead of the 79th Division, which had reached Seltz and could continue the speed of its drive only if the extent of its front were narrowed and its flanks made secure. The 14th Armored Division was, therefore, sent into the line and ordered to clear the open stretches of the upper Alsace Plain. With relatively little difficulty, it moved up to the German border in two columns.

On the left flank Combat Command A drove up to take Soultz-sous-Forêts on 13 December, and the next day it reached Riedseltz where it was held up by a strong fire fight. The next day it cleared Riedseltz but was stopped some 500 yards north of the town by intense and accurate time and percussion fire, and it was counterattacked by six Mark IV tanks. Combat Command A repulsed the counterattack, knocking out two of the Mark IV's. On 16 December, when the enemy had withdrawn to the Siegfried Line, it occupied Wissembourg, crossed the river, and sent a small force to the east to take Schweighofen. The main column advanced a short distance north against only token resistance. Armor was now ready to begin its assault on the fortifications of the Siegfried Line.

On the right flank Combat Command B had advanced by 14 December to Salmbach, which it took together with Schleithal on the following day. But beyond this point it could make little progress against enemy infantry, strongly supported by antitank, mortar, and artillery fire from the northern bank of the Lauter River. On 16 December automatic weapons fire from entrenchments in the Bien Wald forced three groups of infantrymen, who had crossed the river, back to the southern bank. While the other elements of VI Corps were ready to assault the Siegfried Line, Combat Command B was able only to patrol with great difficulty into the outer defenses in the southern edges of the Bien Wald. VI Corps in the first half of December had brought four divisions up to the Siegfried Line.

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### The XV Corps Drive to Bitche

On the left flank of the Seventh Army XV Corps with two infantry divisions had driven northeast through the Vosges and, by 10 December, had outdistanced the drive of VI Corps on the plain. But it was soon brought to a halt. On 10 December the 45th Division was crossing the Zintzel River between Niederbronn and Mertzwiller, the 103rd Division was fighting in Mertzwiller, and troops of the 79th Division were launching their attack against Haguenau for the second day. The 100th and 44th Divisions of XV Corps had reached and occupied Lemberg and Enchenberg less than four miles southwest of Bitche. Within three days, however, VI Corps units had advanced as much as 16 miles, while the Germans had already begun their determined stand against XV Corps in the Ensemble de Bitche fortifications of the Maginot Line.

The XV Corps drive northeast from the Saverne-Sarrebourg axis was a double one: the 44th Division went up through the western slopes of the mountains toward Siersthal, while the 100th Division in a parallel drive between the 44th Division and the crest of the Vosges pointed its attack toward Bitche. The corps left flank was protected by the 106th Cavalry Group and for part of the time by the 12th Armored Division.

During the last five days of November the 44th Division had continued its advance north, after it had repulsed the enemy counterattacks near Rauwiller. It had pushed through rough hill country to take Waldhambach on 2 December and to hold it against four counterattacks. Its mission at that time was to protect the army left flank and to widen the Sarrebourg-Strasbourg corridor. When the Seventh Army shifted its direction of attack to the north, it was intended that the main effort be made "initially on the left" to assist "the Third Army in breaching the Siegfried Line." XV Corps ordered the 44th Division to drive north toward Siersthal and Petit Rederching, to continue without delay to breach and secure the Maginot Line, and then to move on to develop the Siegfried Line.

As the division moved north early in December, it met little resistance. After their failure to retake Waldhambach, the Germans

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withdrew rapidly; bridges were blown and the roads were mined and blocked. The 324th Infantry advanced on the left, the 114th on the right. On 3 December the 324th Regiment reached Ratzwiller, where the enemy was prepared to fight a delaying action. The 1st Battalion on the left and the 3rd Battalion on the right moved in on the town from the west to the edge of the surrounding woods. Here a counterattack forced the 1st Battalion back. It was not until two days later that the 324th Infantry was able to attack Ratzwiller from two sides and seize the town. During the next two days mines, especially plastic and the recently developed Topf mines, held up the regimental advance northeast toward Montbronn. When it arrived there on 7 December it found the town already taken by the 114th Regiment.

Here the two columns split again. The 324th Infantry headed for Petit Rederching, the 114th for Enchenberg. It was now time for XV Corps to employ its armor. The 12th Armored Division on 8 December completed relief of the Third Army's 4th Armored Division, which had suffered heavy losses, and drove swiftly down the Sarre Valley along the boundary between XII Corps and XV Corps. On 9 December it took Singling and Bining and continued the advance to the northeast on the following two days. As the 324th Infantry came out of the woods from Guisberg towards Petit Rederching, it was met by heavy enemy resistance. The 12th Armored had driven in from the west. Against intense artillery fire and a strong line of defense along the railroad tracks in Maierhof, the crossroads below Petit Rederching, the 324th Regiment advanced slowly. After three days of bitter fighting Maierhof fell on 10 December. On the next day the regiment fought its way into Petit Rederching and cleared the town.

Meanwhile, the 114th Infantry had been held up at Enchenberg. After the approach from Montbronn on 7 December troops edged into the town to make a reconnaissance in force. They were pinned down by fire from the houses at the edge of the town and from the railroad tracks that run southeast to Lemberg. While the 1st Battalion tried to bring its guns up to fire on German tanks in the center of town, the 2nd Battalion tried to flank the town through the woods on the left. Both attempts failed. On the morning of 9 December, however, troops of the

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1st Battalion fought their way to the center of the town. Mines and 88mm fire prevented armor from getting into town and put the whole burden upon the infantry; but by afternoon tanks cleared their way across the railroad tracks and the battalion drove the enemy, still resisting strongly, out of Enchenberg. During the night the Germans withdrew to the north; and on 11 December the 71st Infantry, which had come up to relieve the 114th, reached as far north as Sierathal, the division objective. The next day the advance of the 71st Regiment was stopped by blown bridges over a small stream and by artillery fire from Fort Simserhof in the Ensemble de Bitche. The 44th Division had come up to that part of the Maginot Line which the Germans chose to defend.

On the XV Corps right flank, meanwhile, the 100th Division had been making similar progress. On 2 December Corps Field Order No. 14 had directed the division to capture Bitche and to break through



WESTERN SECTOR OF BITCHE, THE KEY GERMAN STRONGHOLD

On 2 December Corps Field Order No. 14 had directed the Division to capture Bitche and to break through the Maginot Line . . .

the Maginot Line. On the next day the 398th Infantry, moving through elements of the 44th Division, came up to the line at the Moder River towns of Puberg and Wingen. The 397th Regiment, temporarily attached to the 45th Division, was moving westward to Wimmenau.

The 2nd Battalion of the 398th Infantry took Puberg against only token resistance, but the 1st Battalion ran into a three-day battle at Wingen. As it approached the town it met a heavy artillery barrage and was pinned down. C Company entered the outskirts but was driven back, while A Company having penetrated the town was cut off and, according to later prisoner of war reports, captured. In the renewed attack on 4 December patrols failed to contact A Company; but C Company outflanked Wingen on the northeast, as other elements of the regiment cut the enemy line of withdrawal to the northwest. When the battalion attacked on 5 December, after its supporting artillery had prepared the way, it found that the enemy had withdrawn, leaving behind only a small rearguard. The Germans were to make their next serious stand at Lemberg near the sources of the Zintzel River.

The 100th Division followed the German force up the two main roads that connect the east-west valleys through the Low Vosges. On the right flank the 397th Infantry, having reverted to control of the 100th Division, took Wimmenau on 5 December. By the evening of 6 December it had moved up to and surrounded Mouterhouse, which it captured on the next day. Meanwhile, the 399th Infantry, which passed through the 398th after the fall of Wingen, advanced to Lemberg. The 398th Regiment on 6 December took Meisenthal, protecting the division left flank. Resistance increased as the 3rd Battalion, spearheading the 399th's attack, approached Lemberg. But by nightfall on 6 December the battalion had surrounded the town. For two days it fought for the hills which command Lemberg from the north and northeast; on 8 December it secured this high ground. The 1st Battalion had come up to launch a fresh attack which carried into the town, and the 2nd Battalion moved around the 3rd to cut the Lemberg-Bitche road. It took still another day to clear the town against heavy fire and strong opposition. The few Germans who escaped withdrew to the northeast to join the rearguard which was pulling out of Enchenberg at the same time.

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When the division forces had regrouped at Lemberg and Mouterhouse, they continued to move north. On 12 December the 397th Infantry advanced to the high ground southeast of Bitche. The 398th Regiment moved up to positions southwest of Bitche, while the 399th Infantry remained in division reserve and conducted training in the attack on fortified positions. The divisional plan now called for the 398th Infantry to move quickly to the northwest "to breach the Maginot Line at once", if it were only partially defended as it had been in other sectors. If heavy resistance was encountered the regiment was to stop and prepare for a major attack. On 14 December the 1st Battalion of the 398th attacked out of the woods to the west of Bitche and was pinned down by overwhelming fire from the Maginot forts. It was now necessary to prepare for a major assault.

#### Assault on Maginot Defenses at Bitche

The Ensemble de Bitche stretches westward along and mostly to the north of the valley road which runs from Camp de Bitche through the town of Bitche to Holbach and Petit Rederching. Four large forts with interconnecting and mutually supporting blocks guard the line between Bitche and Holbach, which the 44th and the 100th Divisions sought to breach. Fort Grand Hohekirkel with eight blocks protects Bitche from the hill to the northeast. Strongest of all the fortifications, Fort Schiesseck with 11 blocks and the support of Fort Fraudenberg guards Bitche and much of the surrounding country from the commanding hill to the northwest. On the large hill east of Holbach, just north of a small tributary of the Schwalb River, stands Fort Simserhof with ten blocks, holding the commanding ground between Holbach and Hottviller. Small forts of from one to five blocks cover the gaps between the large ones.

All along the western front the Germans had made little use of the Maginot forts, most of which were constructed primarily to fire to the east and to the north. But the forts in the Bitche sector were especially strong, and they could fire effectively against an attack from the south. They had surrendered to the Germans in 1940 only after the

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armistice. While the Germans in the VI Corps zone on the Plains of Alsace withdrew by bounds to their own Siegfried Line, those in the XV Corps zone were directed to stand in the Ensemble de Bitch. Prisoners were later to report that the commander of the four large forts, Lieutenant Colonel Zuthe, and the officers under him were all under oath to hold them to the last man. It had been expected as early as 13 December, that the German line would hold at the Bitch positions, from which they might launch a counteroffensive. Elements of the 25th Panzer Division opposed the American assault of Simserhof, while elements of the German 361st Infantry Division were in line to defend Schiesseck and the two eastern forts, Otterbiel and Grand Hohekirkel.

XV Corps had to reduce these positions before it continued its advance. By-passing them might result in tremendous casualties inflicted from the flanks and from the rear. The capture of Fort Schiesseck and Fort Simserhof, the strongest two because of their commanding positions, would insure the reduction of the whole string. On 13 December the 44th Division engaged Fort Simserhof. The 100th Division began its attack on Fort Schiesseck on 14 December.

On 12 December the 324th Infantry of the 44th Division, having advanced from Petit Rederching, had been stopped on the western banks of the Schwalb River below Hottviller. During the next two days it managed to send one battalion across the river to hold its east bank and to move north on both sides of the river to outflank Hottviller from the northwest. Here it remained for several days, defending and patrolling; but there was to be no attack from this quarter until Fort Simserhof had been reduced and the rest of the division had caught up.

Eight of the pillboxes of Fort Simserhof stand on top of the hill which rises northeast of Holbach in the fork made by the Schwalb River and one of its tributaries. A thousand yards to the south of these pillboxes are the personnel and ammunition entrances to the fort. It is from here that the elaborate underground communication, lighting, and ventilation systems of the fort are controlled. The 71st Infantry, as it prepared to attack from its positions between Siersthal and Holbach, secured whatever information on the construction of the fortifications

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it could find. The regiment planned to outflank the fort on the east, pound it with artillery, bomb it from the air, destroy the personnel and ammunition entrances in the rear, and then assault in force.

The 1st and 3rd Battalions advanced against heavy opposition to the northeast. Thrown back from Freudenberg farm by a counter-attack on 13 December, they retook lost ground on the next day, captured the pillboxes which cover the gap between Fort Simserhof and Fort Schiesseck, and pushed up to outflank the eight pillboxes of Simserhof from the east. Here for four days they fought off counterattacks, reconnoitered the pillboxes, and waited for the major attack.




VALLEY LOOKING TOWARDS FORT SIMSERHOF

"... they pushed up to outflank the eight pillboxes of Simserhof from the east ..."

On 17 December the XII Tactical Air Force flew three close-support missions over the fort; and on the following day division artillery, the 156th and 242nd Field Artillery Battalions, pounded it. Prisoners were later to report that these attacks were effective. Three pillboxes

were so badly disabled that they had to be abandoned; several guns were knocked out; one 240mm direct hit drove in the top of a concrete pillbox which was two meters thick. The morale effect was devastating. When the lighting and ventilating systems broke down, as much the result of the assault on the personnel entrance as the effect of the shelling, suffocating and blinding gases from the heavy guns in the fort made further resistance impossible.

The 2nd Battalion of the 71st Infantry and Company C of the 63rd Engineer Battalion had from 14 to 18 December worked on the personnel and ammunition entrances on the southern hill. The am-



AMERICAN SOLDIER EXAMINES INTERIOR OF GERMAN FORT IN THE MAGINOT LINE

"By evening of 17 December they had entered the fort and explored its recesses down 23 flights of stairways ..."

munition entrance was smoked and sealed off. On 14 and 15 December, while riflemen, tank destroyers, and tanks covered them from the fire of both blocks, the engineers cut a path through the two barbed wire



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entanglements which ringed the personnel entrance, blew holes in the turrets with satchel charges, and dropped a bangalore torpedo down one of the holes to destroy the diesel power plant. On the next two days tank destroyers opened larger holes, through which riflemen dropped phosphorous grenades and the engineers dropped charges of TNT. By evening of 17 December they had entered the fort and explored its recesses down 23 flights of stairways, going down to the small-gauge railway at the bottom. On the following day, when the Germans resisted their push through the railway tunnel, they decided to blow the staircase and the ventilation system. This they did by exploding 600 pounds of TNT on the stairway and by covering the block with dirt pushed up by a tank-dozer.

On the morning of 19 December the division jumped off for its general assault on the northern pillboxes of Fort Simserhof. The 114th Infantry, which had relieved the 324th in the northwest, attacked Hottviller, while the 1st and 3rd Battalions of the 71st regiment attacked the eight pillboxes on the northern hill. Neither force met any opposition. At 0400 hours that morning the enemy had withdrawn from the fort and had retreated north of Hottviller. Having seized its objective, the 44th Division held its positions and prepared for an attack north to the Siegfried Line. The 100th Division was still fighting at Fort Schiesseck.

Supported by the fire of Forts Simserhof, Otterbiel, and Grand Hohekirkel, Fort Schiesseck stands astride the large barren hill which commands Bitche from the northwest. Nine of its 11 blocks are on top of the hill; the others surround its base with fields of fire in all directions. One of these to the southwest is called Freudenberg. The pillboxes of Schiesseck were made of stout steel-reinforced concrete, extended three or four stories underground, and were interconnected; each was surrounded by a moat; each was equipped with tubes down which grenades could be rolled against attacking troops. Three of the blocks had disappearing turrets, and all were heavily armed. Artillery from Otterbiel and Grand Hohekirkel could be expected to cover any attack on Schiesseck. The town of Bitche and Camp de Bitche, to the east, could be taken only after Schiesseck had fallen.

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When the 1st Battalion of the 398th Infantry had been pinned down in its experimental attack on 14 December the 100th Division completed plans for a major assault. The plan called for the 398th Regiment on the left to make the main effort, while the 397th on the right was to hold its ground and later to capture Otterbiel and Grand Hohekirkel. The 3rd Battalion was to spearhead the attack of the 398th Infantry against Fort Schiesseck. L Company on the left was to take Freudenberg and blocks 9, 1, 7, 2, and 3; I Company on the right was to take blocks 10, 11, 8, 5, 6, and 4. One platoon was to assault each pillbox. While two squads covered with fire, the third was to advance to button up the apertures. Attached engineers were then to use demolitions, after which tank-dozers were to cover openings and seal off the pillbox. Chemical mortars, 81mm mortars, and tanks were to give maximum support to the attack.

For two days, 15 and 16 December, supporting artillery and the XII Tactical Air Force softened the target. Twenty-seven tons of bombs were dropped on the forts with 32 direct hits. The artillery fired 481 rounds and reported 117 direct hits. All this power, however, had little effect. Although one turret was destroyed, forward observers saw 240mm shells ricochet off the four foot-thick wall of the casements. Even on the second day, when some of the guns moved up to the crest of the protecting hill and fired point blank, the effect was not decisive. The Germans withdrew underground, but they were prepared to come up again when the artillery fire lifted.

The attack began on 17 December. The 397th Infantry had already reached the high ground east of Hottviller to guard the division left flank, alongside the 44th Division forces already there. On the morning of 17 December it launched a diversionary attack on Camp de Bitche. Protected to this extent on their left and right, the two assaulting companies watched an hour-and-a-half air and artillery bombardment, then moved out under a light rolling barrage which lifted as they came up to their targets.

The L Company assault platoon, on the left, found Fort Freudenberg deserted. It was left for a support platoon to secure; and

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the troops moved on to assault block 9, which was taken as planned. The I Company assault platoon took blocks 10 and 11. Number 11 was the personnel entrance, large and strongly defended. Three riflemen rushed the block and dropped grenades into its turret to silence a machine gun. The first squad attempted to rush to the moat, but mortar fire from higher on the hill killed three of them and drove the others back. An engineer crawled across, set a satchel charge against the door, released the detonator, and withdrew with the riflemen who had supported him. When the charge failed to explode, a bazooka team attempted to move up to fire on it; but both its members were killed as they advanced. Another bazooka team came up from one of the squads in the rear, fired in the charge, and exploded it. When the smoke cleared, the point squad again rushed the fort. When engineers came up to blow a fixed inner door and the staircase and when the tank-dozer had covered the fort with dirt, the job was done. Throughout the battle for Fort Schiesseck mortar and artillery fire from the blocks on top of the hill, from the neighboring forts, and from the town of Bitche, did more than frontal fire from the assaulted blocks to harass the attackers.

After taking the first four blocks Companies I and L dug in. During the afternoon the XII Tactical Air Force bombed Fort Otterbiel, which had caused heavy casualties with its artillery; and during the night 100th Division artillery fired on the remaining blocks to clear paths through dense barbed wire. On 18 December the attack was renewed, until only block 2 remained to be taken. The assault troops withdrew from block 3 so that artillery might fire on block 2. The bitter fight for this last position took two days. It fell on the morning of 20 December.

The 100th Division had now reduced Fort Schiesseck, and it planned to clear the town of Bitche and advance to the north to come up to the 44th Division line. Both forces were then to move toward the Siegfried Line. Only after a week of heavy fighting and with a full concentration of power had XV Corps been able to knock out the strongest of the Maginot fortifications, when the Germans chose to defend at the Ensemble de Bitche.

### Attacking the Siegfried Line

While XV Corps was breaching the Maginot Line, VI Corps fought up to and into the Siegfried Line in its zone. Before the VI Corps advance the enemy had withdrawn warily, using his self-propelled and tank guns rather than his artillery "in an apparent effort to keep artillery positions in the Siegfried Line secret as long as possible." Orders were issued by the German Command on 16 December to the delaying troops to retreat to the fortifications along the German border.

As early as 7 December Seventh Army G-2 had spotted the zones of the Siegfried Line where the most intensive preparations for defense were being made. In the Bien Wald little activity was seen, and it appeared likely that here the system for defense relied largely on terrain. In the open country between Steinfeld and Ober-Otterbach men were engaged in laying wire and mines, digging antitank ditches in some places as many as three in depth, and preparing communication trenches between bunkers. Some ten miles behind these primary defenses ran a secondary antitank ditch. In the wooded mountains between Ober-Otterbach and Eppenbrunn the Germans appeared again, as in the Bien Wald, to be depending largely on the terrain. In the western open stretch, which the XV Corps might hit, the preparation appeared as intense as that between Steinfeld and Ober-Otterbach. The line was, of course, studded with pillboxes and bunkers.

By 16 December the enemy had disposed his troops in the Siegfried Line fortifications to oppose the VI Corps advance. In the Bien Wald next to the Rhine and in front of the 79th Division was the German 256th Infantry Division. Guarding the western edges of the forest and holding the forts in the open country between Steinfeld and Ober-Otterbach against the drive of the 14th Armored Division were elements of the 21st Panzer Division. Farther west the German 245th Infantry Division opposed the drive of the 45th and 103rd Divisions near Bobenthal and Bundenthal. Against these forces entrenched in the Siegfried Line the VI Corps probed and prodded and attacked for five days, for the most part ineffectively and, as it turned out, in vain.

On 17 December the two columns of the 79th Division, moving north from Scheibenhart and Lauterbourg, had run into the outer



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
defenses of the Siegfried Line and were stopped by minefields, wire entanglements, pillboxes, and a 12 to 25 foot-wide antitank ditch, which hemmed the main defenses. On 18 December their separate attacks failed. The 314th Infantry, on the left flank below Buchelberg, edged forward and knocked out one pillbox, but its attempts to cut wires and to maneuver its armor were unsuccessful. The 313th Infantry, on the right flank above Berg, managed to get ladders and trees across the antitank ditch; but the troops which scrambled across were quickly pinned down. Just before dark a tank-dozer pushed enough dirt into the ditch to make it passable for tanks.

Division ordered a coordinated attack for the next day; each column would attack, two battalions abreast. The 314th Regiment made practically no headway; its 1st Battalion was shortly pinned down, and its 2nd Battalion was stopped by a strong roadblock after a short advance. While the 3rd Battalion of the 313th Regiment was held up, the 2nd Battalion got a platoon of tanks and two companies of riflemen across the antitank ditch. They moved through wire obstacles, across trenches, and at the cost of two tanks knocked out three pillboxes. Here they repulsed two strong counterattacks. This advance, in the Bien Wald above Berg, marked the farthest penetration of the 79th Division into the Siegfried Line. In the evening of 19 December the division ordered both the 313th and 314th Regiments to remain in place, to dig in, and to maintain contact with the enemy by patrols and demonstrations.

Meanwhile the eastern column of the 14th Armored Division, Combat Command B, above Schleithal and on the left flank of the 315th Infantry, never succeeded in getting more than patrols across the Lauter River into the Bien Wald. Nor did the western column, Combat Command A, actually penetrate the Siegfried Line in the strongly defended open stretch between the Bien Wald and the Hardt Mountains. But it did develop strong outpost lines of antitank ditches, dragon's teeth, roadblocks, and occasional pillboxes; and it absorbed the shock of the enemy's fiercest counterblows. Given no cover, exposed to the sudden thrusts of the armor of the 21st Panzer Division, it withdrew on 17 December from its two advance positions on the roads to Ober-Otterbach and to Steinfeld. The XII Tactical Air Force then flew two medium

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bomber missions of 120 sorties against the fortifications between Ober-Otterbach and Steinfeld. The air attack had only limited success; and when, on 18 December Combat Command A tried once more to advance, it met the same furious opposition. It made some headway towards Ober-Otterbach but was driven back by a counterattack. On the next day all forces adjusted their positions but made no attempt to advance.

On the left flank of the 14th Armored Division the 103rd Infantry Division was advancing, in the meantime, on the VI Corps front. Driving north from the border in two regimental columns, the 409th on the right toward Dorrenbach, the 411th on the left toward Reisdorf, the 103rd Division had made its way to the Siegfried Line. The division had a number of initial successes. It captured pillboxes and bunkers and repulsed several strong counterattacks, but it made no decisive penetration. The 409th Infantry took the hill west of Dorrenbach and, as it continued the advance, ran into three mutually supporting pillboxes. On 19 December it reduced two of them with rifle grenades and satchel charges; on the next day it beat off a tank-supported counterattack and dug in at strong positions. But the 409th Regiment was to go no farther.

The 3rd Battalion of the 411th Infantry tried vainly for five days to get at an undetermined number of pillboxes to the west of Reisdorf. Its efforts to employ tanks against Siegfried Line positions were unrewarding; the 76mm guns had no noticeable effect on the pillboxes. Fire from the pillboxes drove back infantrymen who came within 100 yards of them. The 2nd Battalion of the 411th Infantry, going up the western side of the road from Bobenthal, reached the high ground southwest of Reisdorf and took a large bunker and several pillboxes, holding them against counterattacks. The 1st Battalion, advancing on the eastern side of the road, was topped before a large and intensely defended bunker on high ground southeast of Reisdorf. For three days, from 18 to 20 December, it attempted to take the fort; but each attack was thrown back bitterly. On the night of 20 December neither the 409th nor the 411th Regiment of the 103rd Division was able to move forward.

On the VI Corps left flank the 45th Division had been heavily engaged in Siegfried Line positions and was making the deepest



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penetration of that line to be achieved by the Seventh Army in December. West of Wissembourg the Lauter River bends to the north-west through Bobenthal, Nieder-Schlettenbach, and Bundenthal. It was along this line, in the zone of these three towns, that the 45th Division attacked the Siegfried Line. Having cleared Nothweiler and Bobenthal on 16 December, the 157th Infantry on the division left flank advanced north and prepared to cross the Lauter and attack Bundenthal. On the division right flank the 180th Infantry sent its 1st Battalion up to attack Nieder-Schlettenbach, and its 3rd Battalion prepared to develop the hill that flanks Nieder-Schlettenbach on the east.



KEY HILL SOUTHEAST OF NIEDER-SCHLETTENBACH

the 3rd Battalion prepared to develop the hill that flanks Nieder-Schlettenbach on the east . . .

The 157th Regiment did not take Bundenthal. Early in the morning of 18 December it sent its 1st and 2nd Battalions across the river in an attempt to outflank the town. Pillboxes on high ground north of the Lauter River and intense fire from Bundenthal made the venture

difficult and costly. The 2nd Battalion's assault boats were driven back, and the troops had to wade across through waist-deep icy water. Two platoons from each battalion reached the shelter of the antitank ditch which encircled the town and then entered the town itself. But the rest were thrown back to the shelter of the woods on the south side of the river and were unable to make another crossing in force. For five days patrols tried vainly to reach the four platoons which had been cut off in Bundenthal. On 23 December two members of the lost group escaped back to their own lines to say that 74 of the men were still alive in the town. Under the protection of a heavy artillery barrage, these two men led a strong patrol into the town and succeeded in getting them all, including the wounded back to safety.

The 1st Battalion of the 180th Infantry had cleared Nieder-Schlettenbach on 18 December and held it against a bitter counterattack by two companies of infantry. On the following day it began to attack the pillboxes along the northern side of the road down to Bobenthal. More important to the regimental advance than the town of Nieder-Schlettenbach was Hill 327 (height in meters) east of the town. This was the target of the 3rd Battalion of the 180th Infantry. The fortifications on the southern face of the hill were strong. When the 3rd Battalion was stopped on 16 December by a roadblock north of Bobenthal and at the foot of the hill, it prepared to send one company northeast to pierce the string of pillboxes which protect the left flank of the hill position, then to cut back west to take the southern fortifications of the hill from the rear.

Early in the morning of 17 December K Company, having discovered the locations of the eastern flank pillboxes by patrol, attacked with its third platoon. Coordinated artillery fire had driven Volks-Grenadier troops of the enemy 245th Division out of their trenches and into the pillbox which was the target. The platoon leader climbed to the roof of the pillbox, lifted the concrete ventilator cap, and dropped in a phosphorous grenade. Fifteen minutes later four Germans came out with their hands up and their gas masks on. Before nightfall the next pillbox to the west was taken, and troops had dug in on the hillside facing Hill 327. On the next day L Company and the rest of K Company came

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through the gap that had been broken and secured and swung to the west to reach Hill 327. From their positions here they beat off several counterattacks, captured from the rear the pillboxes around the southern base of the hill, which had held up the battalion advance, and prepared to move down toward Nieder-Schlettenbach there to join the 1st Battalion.

While most of VI Corps was doggedly attempting to push into the Siegfried Line by frontal attacks, these troops of the 180th Infantry had found that pillboxes approached from the rear were "just traps". It had taken them five days to complete this maneuver. Had the attack of the 45th Division been continued, troops might have been able from this wedge above Bobenthal to push north into the Saar. But on 21 December the division received orders to withdraw its forward elements and to dig in defensive positions.

#### The Army Shifts to the Defensive

On the night of 20-21 December Seventh Army seemed to be bracing itself for a thrust into the Saar-Palatinate. XV Corps was now free to move north above the Ensemble de Bitch. VI Corps was ready to continue its prodding of the Siegfried Line and perhaps to exploit the 45th Division salient on its left flank. The Seventh Army drive north into Germany was called off before its culmination. Acting upon orders of Higher Headquarters Seventh Army directed all its divisions to discontinue the attack and to prepare a new line of defense. The 100th Division withdrew to the positions from which it had jumped off on its assault against Fort Schiesseck. The 180th Infantry of the 45th Division withdrew south of the Lauter River. The other divisions dug in where they were. General von Rundstedt's counter-offensive in Belgium and Luxembourg was to make the last ten days of December an anticlimax for Seventh Army. During those ten days there was little activity other than the shifting of positions along the army front, for both American and enemy forces were readjusting their lines.

The German counter-offensive, which had jumped off with 17 divisions on 16 December had in five days driven 35 miles on a 60

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mile front. On 19 December Third Army's XII Corps had taken over the III Corps front so that III Corps could move north to attack the southern flank of Von Rundstedt's Ardennes salient. To relieve Third Army for the maximum effort against the German threat Seventh Army extended its left boundary to St. Avold and prepared defenses on a front which stretched 84 miles westward from the Rhine. The shift took four days and was completed by 26 December.

In accomplishing its part of the shift to the west between 20 and 26 December XV Corps was able to make the adjustment more readily since the 87th Infantry Division of XII Corps, in accordance with oral agreement between the Commanding Generals of the Third and Seventh Armies, was to be attached to XV Corps on 21 December and remain until all reliefs had been effected. The 35th and 80th Divisions of XII Corps made immediate preparations for movement north. After full readjustment had been completed, the 87th Infantry Division was moved to assembly at Dieuze and from there to Rheims, passing from control of XV Corps and Seventh Army at 0001 hours on 28 December.

During this period of the extension of the Seventh Army line, brought about by the Ardennes counter-offensive, elements of the 63rd, 42nd, and 70th Divisions, which had debarked at Marseille and which consisted of the infantry regiments and a provisional staff headed by the assistant commander of each division, were arriving in the army area. None of these units had completed its full training program in the United States, but it was the intention of higher headquarters that they train intensively under Seventh Army supervision until such time as they could be employed in their combat roles. In conjunction with this training, they could become indoctrinated by employment on line of communications duties or in an inactive role such as flank protection along the Rhine.

The small provisional headquarters of each of these divisional groups was somewhat reinforced by signal and other service personnel to enable each to operate on a limited scale. Each group was designated a task force, named after the assistant divisional commander concerned. Elements of the 42nd Infantry Division became Task Force Linden;

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elements of the 63rd Infantry Division became Task Force Harris, and elements of the 70th Infantry Division became Task Force Herren.


At the end of December Seventh Army had reorganized its corps components and held the new front. XV Corps had relieved XII Corps and defended a line from St. Avold to Bitche. It consisted of the 106th Cavalry Group on the left flank, the 103rd Division, which had been transferred from VI Corps, the 44th Division and the 100th Division on the right flank. On 30 December the newly-arrived Task Force Harris was withdrawn from its initial positions along the Rhine and transferred, less one regiment, to XV Corps. Two regiments, the 253rd and 255th Infantry, were attached to the 44th and 100th Divisions for additional strength on the line. The 254th Regiment was at the same time attached to the 3rd Division on the rim of the Colmar Pocket.

VI Corps defended the line between Bitche and the Rhine in slightly less advanced positions than those it had achieved in its northern drive. On the corps left flank in the lower Vosges was a task force which consisted of Combat Command R of the 14th Armored Division less one tank battalion, Company B of the 645th Tank Destroyer Battalion, Company B of the 3rd Chemical Mortar Battalion, and the 117th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron. This force was designated Task Force Hudelson. To the east were the 45th and 79th Divisions. The Rhine flank, extending some 40 miles southward from Lauterbourg, was guarded by Task Force Herren and Task Force Linden. Infantry elements of the 70th and 42nd Infantry Divisions respectively.

Seventh Army readjustment on its extended line was complicated by the necessity of employing new and inexperienced units at the same time that army was required to make additional sacrifices to the exigencies of the situation on the German Ardennes salient. The newly-arrived 63rd, 42nd, and 70th Divisions were required to furnish 219 basics from each regiment, these replacements to be moved north to the Third Army for the counterattack on the Ardennes front. The scarcity of infantry replacements necessitated a program for converting Seventh Army Service troops into infantrymen.

On 15 December a Seventh Army staff memorandum had announced that within a short time the XXI Corps, arriving from the

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United States, would be employed to coordinate the activities of Task Force Linden, Herren, and Harris in protecting a sector of the army right flank along the Rhine. On 25 December an advance part of XXI Corps, commanded by Major General Frank W. Milburn, arrived at the Seventh Army Command Post at Saverne, but in view of developments at the end of December the full right flank protection of Seventh Army was left to VI Corps. On 29 December XXI Corps, consisting of the 36th Infantry Division and the 12th Armored Division, was earmarked as SHAEF reserve.



MAJOR GENERAL  
FRANK W. MILBURN  
Earmarked as SHAEF  
reserve...

The mission of Seventh Army as outlined on 19 December was to be defensive, but the change in mission was to be concealed as much as possible by some continuation of offensive action. For the last ten days of December patrols were active along the front in an effort to impress the fact upon the enemy that, as XV Corps put it, "No Man's Land belongs to the Corps and not to the German forces opposing it..." These orders were issued when it was still thought that the Seventh Army December offensive might soon be continued. As December came to a close, it became apparent that the German Ardennes attack was more serious than had been at first supposed. Seventh Army was prompted to make a more intensive preparation for a campaign that was to be purely defensive.

Enemy patrols, especially on the XV Corps front, became more aggressive. Several small patrols on the VI Corps front crossed the Rhine between Beinheim and Gamsheim. Increased German attempts at espionage and sabotage resulted in the establishment of armored roadblocks throughout the Sixth Army Group sector and the checking of trip tickets and dogtags. The reshuffling and refitting and strengthening of the German forces indicated a build-up for a large attack.

Up until about 25 December it was thought that elements of



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the 11th Panzer Division, the 21st Panzer Division, and the 17th SS Panzer Grenadier Division, which had been identified on the Seventh Army front at various times during the month might have been withdrawn and sent north to join the Ardennes counter-offensive. It seemed possible that the First German Army, opposing Seventh Army, might be deprived of all its mobile units. But by 29 December it was known that the 25th Panzer Grenadier Division was refitting in the Zweibruecken area; and it was believed that two other mobile units, the 17th and the 21st Panzer Divisions, had not moved north but were also refitting preparatory to action on the Seventh Army front. Rail movements, persistent prisoner of war reports, and photo interpretation indicated a build-up of forces in the Saarbruecken area as well as in the Colmar bridgehead and east of the Rhine Valley. Elements of nine divisions of the First German Army were in contact with Seventh Army: the 245th, 256th, 257th, 361st Volksgrenadier Divisions, the 19th, 36th, and 347th Infantry Divisions; and fragmentary elements of the three mobile units which were reforming in the rear. Their total strength of combat effectives was equal to about 16 to 17 battalions of American infantry. Enemy forces across the Rhine were believed equivalent in strength to eight battalions.

On 24 December Seventh Army received a warning from Sixth Army Group:

Excellent agent sources report enemy units building up in the BLACK FOREST area for offensive. Other indications for imminent enemy aggressive action exist. Imperative that all defensive precautions be immediately effective.

The altered tactical situation had already been presented to the Army Commander by his G-2 with remarkable clarity and accuracy. In the middle of December there appeared in the War Room a G-2 map which depicted graphically the enemy's capabilities. In his "Estimate of the Enemy Situation No. 6", dated 29 December 1944, the Army G-2 reached the following conclusions:

**Capabilities —**

1. To attack south from Bitch-Sarreguemines area with five to eight divisions with initial objective of seizing Saverne and Ingwiller Passes.

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2. To attack southwest from the Volklingen — Forbach — Sarreguemines area with five to eight divisions and the mission of capturing Metz and securing the crossings over the Moselle.

3. With forces currently in contact and in immediate reserve, to launch a series of limited objective attacks.

4. Counterattack from Bienwald Forest and Hardt Mountains to seize general line Woerth — Soultz Sous Forets — Seltz.

Capabilities 3 and 1 were favored in that order. G-2 explained his reasoning as follows:

The most logical and economical employment of forces now in contact and known to be in reserve would be in demonstrations, threats, infiltrations and limited objective attacks designed to contain the Seventh Army in its present positions.

Indications of enemy concentrations and build-ups in the Saarbruecken area and in the East Rhine Valley are disturbing, however, and the Nineteenth Army's determination to hold the Colmar bridgehead may shortly assume added significance. Certainly the recovery of Alsace, in addition to its military value, would provide a tremendous uplift to German morale, particularly if the attack in the Eifel area fails to achieve any substantial success.

Additional confirmation of the Saarbruecken and East Rhine Valley area build-ups will tend to favor Capability 1. Conversely, identification of the 21st Pz and/or other mobile units of the First German Army in the Eifel area will be indicative of less ambitious enemy intentions in Alsace.

The current success of the Third U.S. Army's counter-attack from the South, and the enemy's apparent emphasis on operations to the northwest in the Eifel sector, tends to discount Capability 2.

As this picture of enemy intentions grew clearer, Seventh Army preparations for defense were intensified; and the sense of anti-climax gave way to a sense of immediate danger. Sixth Army Group instructions of 21 December had directed Seventh Army to be "prepared to yield ground rather than endanger the integrity of its forces." During the early part of the last ten days of December VI Corps had begun to prepare an alternate main line of resistance in the Maginot Line. Both VI Corps and XV Corps had been preparing counterattacks against possible enemy penetrations as well as consolidating lines of defense. At the end of the year the 2nd French Armored Division, recently attached to XV Corps, was being brought into the corps area prepared

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to counterattack any enemy penetration of the line. In the VI Corps area the 14th Armored Division was strategically located with a similar mission.



LIEUTENANT GENERAL PATCH OFFERING ONE OF HIS MEN A CIGARETTE, DURING HIS VISIT TO XV CORPS COMMAND POST AT FENETRANGE

"... On New Year's Eve General Patch visited the XV Corps Command Post at Fenetrance and there warned both the XV Corps and the VI Corps Commanding Generals that an enemy attack was to be expected during the early hours of New Year's Day ..."

During the last two days of the month these preparations were completed. A radio message from Sixth Army Group, received on 30 December, warned the Seventh Army

that a hostile attack against your flank west of Bitche may force you to give ground from your main position. To meet such a possibility, it is necessary that your west flank be protected by a reserve battle position. With this in mind, reconnaissance and organization of a reserve battle position will be instituted without delay along high ground on the general lines: Hill east of Landroff-Bennestroff-

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Sarre-Union-Ingwiller. One half of each division and attached troops currently earmarked as SHAEF reserve, located in your area, may be employed at any given period of time to assist in organization of ground, provided troops so employed can be reassembled and prepared for movement on eight hour notice . . . . .

These directives were carried out by New Year's Eve. XV Corps prepared its secondary main line of resistance with its western anchor in the Maginot Line. The SHAEF-earmarked 36th Division and 12th Armored Division, as well as the 2nd French Armored Division upon its arrival in the XV Corps zone, were ordered to be ready to counterattack against enemy penetrations. Both corps planned to defend on their forward lines until ordered to withdraw and to fight delaying actions back to the secondary line. The 14th Armored Division, in VI Corps reserve near Bouxwiller, was ordered to prepare for counterattack to the right flank of XV Corps, in the Strasbourg area, or to the south toward Selestat.

On the Seventh Army left flank Third Army was "limiting the enemy offensive and . . . preparing to counterattack." On its right flank the French First Army contained the Colmar Pocket and prepared "defensive positions in depth." On New Year's Eve General Patch visited the XV Corps Command Post at Fenetrance and there warned both the XV Corps and the VI Corps Commanding Generals that an enemy attack was to be expected during the early hours of New Year's Day.

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## CHAPTER XX

### *American Divisions in the Colmar Stalemate*

AT the end of December the Seventh Army was threatened by the possibility of a German counter-offensive not only from the north between Lauterbourg and Saarbruecken but also from the east along the Rhine front north of Strasbourg and from the south where the enemy still held an extensive pocket in and around Colmar. Whether to hold Strasbourg or to relinquish the city to the Germans became an increasingly important question, as this advance Seventh Army position along the Rhine became less tenable for defense. The immediate enemy threat to Strasbourg was eliminated only with the Allied offensive in late January which was to wipe out the Colmar Pocket.

For the first half of December the 3rd Infantry Division as a part of VI Corps held positions in and around Strasbourg and was responsible for its defense. As the VI Corps Rhine flank was extended to the north between 10 and 18 December, the 117th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron patrolled and defended positions between the 3rd and 79th Divisions. When it had been decided by mid-December that the 36th Infantry Division, "desperately in need of relief and rehabilitation", was to be withdrawn from its operations in the Colmar Pocket with the First French Army and was to effect the relief of and be relieved by the 3rd Division in Strasbourg, it was further decided at Seventh Army Headquarters to provide for any emergency that might arise in the temporarily weakened Strasbourg defenses by alerting four battalions of combat engineers for immediate movement to that city

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should the occasion arise. The exchange of positions by the 3rd and 36th Divisions was completed by 21 December.

At the end of the following day the 36th Division and its attached troops passed from the command of VI Corps and reverted to Seventh Army control. During the last days of December there was an almost constant reshuffling and regrouping of forces in and around Strasbourg and north along the Rhine, Task Forces Harris, Herren, and Linden being most importantly involved. By 31 December Strasbourg was being held by Task Force Linden. The 36th Division had by that time been withdrawn to SHAEF reserve. The Seventh Army watch on



INFANTRYMEN TAKE COVER INSIDE A GASOLINE STATION ON THE OUTSKIRTS OF COLMAR. A DEAD GERMAN DEFENDER LIES IN THE SNOW COVERED STREET

Farther south the Colmar front was, during the month of December, far from quiet and caused increasing apprehension.

the Rhine during December had been relatively quiet, although patrol clashes accentuated the growing tension. Farther south the Colmar

front was, during the month of December, far from quiet and caused increasing apprehension.

Not only were Colmar Pocket operations significant for the Seventh Army in so far as that pocket represented a serious threat to the army's rear; but the 36th and 3rd Divisions, although they participated in action on the Colmar front under the operational control of the First French Army, remained a supply and maintenance responsibility of the Commanding General, Seventh Army. These two divisions had been so long a part of the Seventh Army order of battle that their operations, under whatever command, must receive some comment. When they were returned to Seventh Army operational control, they were battle-weary and in need of rehabilitation before being made again the spearhead of an army attack.

### The Stalemate

On 5 December 1944 the boundary between the First French Army and the American VI Corps had been moved to the north, and the operations against the Colmar Pocket became the responsibility of the First French Army alone. The pocket had been formed by the combined operations of the French and VI Corps, advancing on their respective fronts. Elements of the French I Corps had entered Mulhouse in the south on 22 November. French troops reached and held positions along the Rhine River north of Basel. The 2nd French Armored Division, then attached to the American XV Corps, entered Strasbourg on 23 November. A VI Corps offensive, which had begun rolling across the Meurthe River and through the Vosges Mountains on 20 November, closed in from the west and north. The 3rd American Infantry Division moved up to occupy Strasbourg, sealing off the north. As the American sector was brought up to the western edge of the Rhine Plain when the 36th and 103rd Infantry Divisions captured Selestat, the 2nd French Armored Division passed to VI Corps control and moved southward in the Rhine Plain.

The Colmar Pocket, the German "bridgehead" west of the Rhine and south of Strasbourg, extended roughly 50 miles along the Rhine between Rhinau and Kembs, and at its widest, where it contained



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the High Vosges as far west as the upper Thur Valley, it was 30 miles in breadth. The northern slender stretch of the pocket along the Rhine River was flat and open country but replete with waterways and forest



VALLEY OF THE RHINE SOUTH OF STRASBOURG. VOSGES MOUNTAINS IN BACKGROUND

The Colmar Pocket, the German bridgehead west of the Rhine and south of Strasbourg, extended roughly 50 miles along the Rhine between Rhinau and Kembs, and at its widest, where it contained the High Vosges as far west as the upper Thur Valley, it was 30 miles in breadth.

areas. Between Selestat and Mulhouse the pocket bulged westward into the High Vosges Mountains. On 5 December the boundary of the pocket followed the Thur River Valley from Thann northward, passed through the mountains in the vicinity of the Bonhomme Pass, and then cut northeast to enter the Rhine Plain in the Ribeauville-Selestat area. The north line in the plain lay between Ebersheim and Rhinau.

The pocket was divided into French I and II Corps areas. The II Corps, with which the American 36th and later the 3rd Infantry

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Divisions served, had the northern sector, which began at St. Amarin in the Thur Valley, curved north and eastward around the bulge of the pocket, and included the sector in the Rhine Plain below Strasbourg. On 5 December, when both the 36th Division and the French 2nd Armored Division were relieved from attachment to VI Corps and attached for operations to the First French Army, the 36th Division occupied a front which lay between the sectors of the French 2nd Armored Division and the 3rd Algerian Infantry Division. The American division linked up with French armor between Selestat and Ebersheim just inside the edge of the Rhine Plain, and in the mountains to the west patrols of its 36th Reconnaissance Troop connected it with the 3rd Algerian Division.

The German Nineteenth Army on the Colmar front had been cut off from the German First Army to the north by the Allied breakthrough in the Strasbourg area. An Allied report made reference to the German's "hopeless tactical situation south of Strasbourg." But enemy resistance was stiff and remained so. Determined opposition was made to the efforts of Allied troops to carry out the orders General de Lattre gave his command on 2 December; to surround and destroy the German forces in Alsace and the Vosges and make them unavailable for use east of the Rhine. The I and II French Corps were given the general objectives of reaching the Rhine at Brisach as soon as possible. A German document captured early in December stated that German troops west of the Rhine were to be considered expendable and were to hold out as long as possible. By 7 December it was noted that the "Nineteenth Army continued its slow withdrawal out of the Vosges, but it offered strong delaying action from the north and west before Selestat, while maintaining strong pressure in the Mulhouse area."

This theme, with variations, characterized the stalemate phase of Colmar Pocket operations, which was succeeded by the elimination phase only with the onset of Allied attacks late in January. During all phases of the Colmar Pocket engagement one American division, first the 36th and later the 3rd, was conspicuous in the operations of the First French Army. During December any gain on the Colmar front was made at high cost in the face of unfavorable weather and terrain and against ferocious resistance aided by heavy concentrations of artillery;

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and frequently a gain was followed immediately by one or a number of German counterattacks, which were usually repulsed but were always costly and sometimes necessitated withdrawal.

Général De Lattre, commanding the First French Army, made an estimate of the situation on 12 December:

The increased stiffening of enemy resistance following upon the arrival of large reinforcements of fresh troops (infantry and tanks) coming from Germany, the floods covering the Alsatian Plain, and the weariness of our units, lead to the conclusion, at the present time, that it may not be possible to effect immediately the complete reduction of the German bridgehead west of the Rhine.

The General stated, however, that it was his intention to use "all available forces" as soon as possible to accomplish three essential objectives: Move out from the Vosges at all costs in the Alsatian Plain and reach at least the bank of the Ill River; liberate Colmar and Cernay; and, in the event of circumstances being favorable, reach the Rhine at Brisach. The General was not hopeful that his orders of 2 December, that the Rhine be reached at Brisach, could be accomplished soon.

French II Corps was given the mission of proceeding in the direction of Kaysersberg-Colmar-Rouffach, the latter city being the principle army effort. The corps was to take Colmar, outflanking the town widely so as to avoid as far as possible its destruction, and join the I Corps at Rouffach. In the west the corps was to go in the direction of Munster and close the Fecht River Valley. In the east the troops were to advance in the general direction of Marckolsheim and Neuf-Brisach, to continue at least as far as the bank of the Ill between Selestat and Ste. Croix en Plaine east of Colmar. The corps was to be ready "constantly to exploit any favorable opportunity of reaching the Rhine at Brisach." The principle effort in the west was scheduled to start on 15 December, and the covering action in the east was to be launched on 13 December.

The I Corps mission, as outlined in the same directive of 12 December, was to attack in the direction Cernay (Sennheim)-Rouffach, taking Cernay and linking up with II Corps in Rouffach. It was also to attempt to reach the bank of the Ill between Mulhouse and Ste. Croix



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en Plaine. The action against Cernay was to begin on 13 December, and the maximum effort was to be put forth from 15 December onward.

As preparations for attack were being made, SHAEF sent a message to General Devers at Sixth Army Group pointing out, "From all indications the enemy is sending replacement personnel for his divisions in the Colmar bridgehead and intends to hold it. You should regard elimination of this bridgehead, which is now occupying eight of our divisions, of great importance." General Devers informed SHAEF that in order to facilitate operations against the bridgehead he had ordered on 13 December the immediate relief of the 36th Infantry Division by the 3rd Infantry Division. The relief had already been started when the General wrote on 14 December, "The 36th Infantry Division has been constantly in the line since 15 August and in addition has been badly shaken up by heavy German counterattacks during the last three days. This Division's condition has been thoroughly investigated by me and I am convinced that it will not be ready for offensive battle before early January."

It was understood at Sixth Army Group Headquarters that the "virtual stalemate" on the First French Army front was due to factors other than enemy replacements. Contributing also to the difficult situation were the extensive flooded areas and the depletion of the French units. Replacements for the companies, many of which were down to platoon strength, were difficult to obtain. By the end of December conditions in the French forces were still grave. As General Devers wrote General Eisenhower, "The French First Army is short approximately 8,000 Infantry Replacements, is composed largely of colonial troops who present a serious morale problem due to shortage of officers with experience in handling colonial troops, and is badly in need of re-fitting and re-training."

The mid-December attacks were launched by the two French Corps in spite of the difficulties they faced, but they met stubborn resistance and enemy counterattacks. Advances were small or non-existent, and a week after the opening of the attack none of the objectives had been secured. By that time, 22 December, Sixth Army Group, bowing to the pressure being exerted on the Twelfth Army Group in

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the Ardennes sector and elsewhere, officially went on the defensive. As Letter of Instructions No. 6 put it, "Sixth Army Group goes on the defensive and relieves certain elements of the Twelfth Army Group. Subject to securing essential lines of communication, Sixth Army Group will be prepared to yield ground rather than endanger the integrity of its forces. Sixth Army Group will continue the offensive on the south to reduce the Colmar Pocket, destroy the Germans west of the Rhine and defend that line."

In the First French Army orders contained in Letter of Instructions No. 6, there was a blend of offensive and defensive directions. Two main efforts were to be made by the First French Army as soon as possible. One, from the north, was to be directed so as to capture Colmar, thereafter exploiting in the direction of Brisach. The other, from the south, had as its objectives the capture of Cernay, the cutting of the road net in the Guebwiller area, and thereafter exploiting in the direction of Brisach. This plan differed from that of 12 December only in details. But it was accompanied by the following defensive instructions:

All areas in which offensive operations are not being immediately conducted will be completely wired in and protected by mine fields without delay. All avenues of approach in these areas, especially those suitable for armor will be extensively mined. In addition all roads in these areas will be covered by roadblocks. Tactical wire, mine fields (natural and artificial) will be defended by fire.

Two days later Sixth Army Group underlined the defensive character of the situation by sending the following message to the Commanding General, First French Army:

To meet possible enemy capabilities pending your offensive it is essential, that rearward defensive positions be reconnoitered and prepared by your command immediately. These positions must be sited so as to definitely block any enemy thrust through the Belfort Gap, through your center, or through your north flank. These defenses must be in great depth, taking maximum advantages of terrain and natural obstacles.

The attitude and efforts of the Allied forces became progressively more defensive as December came to a close. The French First Army General Order No. 201, issued 30 December, indicated clearly

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that by that time the idea of an Allied offensive in the Colmar Pocket had been temporarily abandoned. The order explained that operations in Belgium and Luxembourg had necessitated a regrouping of forces and the present defensive attitude on the First French Army front. It pointed out that the enemy might take advantage of the facilities offered him by the Black Forest cover and his present bridgehead on the west bank of the Rhine to launch a counter-offensive on the Colmar front which might cut Allied lines of communications between Luxembourg and the Rhine at Basel. The general scheme of defense, in view of these considerations, called for principle efforts to protect the Belfort Gap in the south and Strasbourg and the right flank of the Seventh Army in the north. The army was to be prepared to fight in depth in the Vosges positions lying on each flank but to hold the line of passes in the central Vosges "with no thought of withdrawal." One or two divisions were to be maintained in reserve "for dealing with any eventuality."

The mission of the I Corps was primarily to protect the Belfort Gap and to deny the enemy access to the Vosges passes. Mulhouse was to be "held solidly", and the most important mountain defenses were to be in the Bussang and Schlucht area. In the event of a breakthrough the corps was to "limit and contain the enemy advance by clinging to the various natural terrain openings between the Vosges and the Swiss frontier."

II Corps was to protect Strasbourg and the Seventh Army right flank by opposing enemy crossings of the Rhine between Rhinau and the northern French Army boundary. It was also to deny the enemy access to the Vosges valleys between Selestat and Orbey, making the most important defensive effort along the axis Selestat-Ste. Marie-aux-Mines. "In the event of a breakthrough or of the evacuation of the Strasbourg area by Seventh Army" the corps was to withdraw toward the Vosges in close contact with the right wing of the American army. The final holding line passed through Molsheim and Kayersberg on the east edge of the Vosges, the ridges south of Lapoutroie and the Bonhomme Pass.

Reference has already been made to the need, as seen by General Devers, of the French Army for re-fitting and re-training at the

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end of the month. Because of the rehabilitation the French were undergoing, General Devers found it advisable to continue to "bolster" the French Army with the American 3rd Division, which had replaced the




FRENCH SELF PROPELLED GUN FIRING INTO THE RHINE VALLEY

*II Corps was also to deny the enemy access to the Vosges valleys between Selestat and Orbey, making the most important defensive effort along the axis Selestat-Ste. Marie-aux-Mines.*

36th Division on the Colmar front. On 31 December General Devers wrote General Eisenhower: "When the French Army has completed its program of re-fitting and re-training sufficiently, I hope to be able to withdraw the 3rd Division and return it to Patch, but this will not be possible within the next 6 weeks, in my opinion."

At the end of the year 1944 both the American Seventh and the French First Armies had prepared primary and secondary lines of defense and were ready to counterattack whatever German thrusts might be made. Troops dug in along the front were waiting for the next move

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which the Germans were apparently preparing to make. December had, however, been a month of hard, unrewarding engagements along the rim of the Colmar Pocket, in which engagements both the American 36th and 3rd Divisions had participated.

### 36th Division Operations

On 4 December all regiments of the 36th Division had been heavily engaged in the line between Selestat and the Bonhomme Pass on the VI Corps right flank. On the division left flank the 3rd Battalion of the 142nd Infantry had continued fighting in the city of Selestat, largely against enemy sniper action, while the other two battalions had cleared the towns of Kintzheim and St. Hippolyte southwest of Selestat. On that day the 2nd Battalion of the 143rd Infantry, attached to the 142nd Regiment, also fought in Selestat. The other two battalions of the 143rd Infantry in the division center were engaged in consolidating positions in Ribeauville, which they had recently taken, and held this front against three light counterattacks. On the division right flank two battalions of the 141st Infantry were on 4 December fighting south from Aubure and east from Faurupt, seeking to secure the western entrance to the Kayzersberg Valley, through which the Weiss River flows eastward to the Rhine Plain. At 0001 hours on 5 December the 36th Division, relieved from VI Corps, was attached for operations to the First French Army.

The immediate objective of the 141st Infantry was the town of Lapoutroie between the Bonhomme Pass and Kayzersberg on the main St. Die-Colmar highway. Just northeast of Lapoutroie is the mountain village of Freland. After a morning of converging action the 2nd and 3rd Battalions established contact in Freland at 1320 hours on 5 December, and the town was reported free of the enemy. When a company attempted to move south toward Lapoutroie, it met opposition, which had to be cleared. At 1925 hours the regimental commander ordered a patrol sent to Lapoutroie. If the town was unoccupied, troops were to move in. If Germans still held the town it was to be subjected to an artillery barrage and the job of attacking it turned over to French



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Goumiers, 1,500 of whom had been attached to the 141st Infantry that morning in anticipation of their relieving the regiment.

By 2230 hours Company K had worked a reinforced platoon into Lapoutroie without encountering the enemy. Company L had also pushed a platoon into the town. During the night the battalion was notified that its relief by the Goumiers would begin at 0900 hours on 6 December. The operation was to be speeded as much as possible and not on a man-for-man basis. At 1000 hours on 6 December the elements of Companies K and L in Lapoutroie were counterattacked. Orders were to hold the town and remain in position until the situation cleared up. By 1303 hours, however, the enemy had driven Company K from Lapoutroie and the high ground around it and captured two squads of Company L. The 3rd Battalion Commander was about to commit Company I to regain the lost ground, but the regimental commander ordered the battalion to leave the sector as soon as possible and the French to take over immediately.

The 1st Battalion of the 141st Regiment, which had been in reserve, had already been attached to the 142nd Regimental Combat Team for the purpose of garrisoning Selestat. The 2nd Battalion of the 141st Infantry was to be removed to the vicinity of Bergheim and the 3rd Battalion to St. Hippolyte. Both Battalions, after moving to these positions north of Ribeauville and on the edge of the Rhine Plain, would come into the line between the 142nd and 143rd Regiments.

On 5 December, however, the sector of the 142nd Regiment on the 36th Division left flank linked up with that of the 143rd Infantry on the south at Bergheim, included Selestat, and reached to the north to seal the front by contact with the French 2nd Armored Division. The chief barrier to any advance southeast by the 142nd Infantry was the flooded Ill River. This was the enemy's next line of defense. The next major tactical problem was the crossing of the flooded plain in order to make penetration eastward to the Rhine or to envelop Colmar. Reconnaissance troop elements sent to secure four possible bridging sites failed to do so before the enemy had prepared them for the defense.

Two missions were undertaken on the night of 5-6 December by companies from the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 142nd Infantry.

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Company F was sent south and east from Selestat to secure either of two bridges over the Ill or, if these were not to be had, to seize the town and crossing at Illhaeusern, about 5 miles south of Selestat. Advance patrols found the bridges above Illhaeusern blown. An attack on Illhaeusern was impracticable, because the company found itself surrounded by waist-deep water in the approaches. The company then withdrew to Rerschihr. The other mission was to cross the Ill near a blown bridge at the southeast corner of Selestat. Before dawn the third platoon of Company C made a surprise crossing about 500 yards south of the bridge site. The platoon had a leaky, shell-riddled rubber boat, on which men crossed three at a time, though the last three had to swim when the boat sank. A hard fight ensued when the enemy discovered the crossing, and a second platoon was sent to help. After some delay a footbridge was installed. Before noon on 6 December a firm bridgehead was secured and the enemy driven from the houses in that area. Any additional advance was limited, however, to a single road cut by another bridge 1,000 yards to the south.


Preparations were made on 6 December to push out to the southeast from the Selestat bridgehead. The 2nd Battalion was alerted to follow through if the second bridge could be seized. A platoon of Company C tried to make a crossing similar to the one of the night before. But the Germans were using an underground shelter as a fortified position at the crossing and were extremely alert along the length of the stream. A crossing place could not be found. One platoon of Company A was to make a second attempt before daylight, but heavy enemy shelling turned the platoon back. Unable to overcome the difficulties that faced its offensive action, the 142nd Regiment went on the defensive. The flood condition also existed north of Selestat and blocked the advance of the French 2nd Armored Division, which tied in on the regiment's left.

The 143rd Infantry was in the meantime driving south and east from Ribeauville. It had taken Hunawihr, Riquewihr, Zellenberg, and high ground to the west on 4 December while still a part of VI Corps. On the next day the 3rd Battalion advanced east toward Guemar and Ostheim, outposts on the Rhine Plain and on the Fecht River at the

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northern and southern edges of the Colmar Forest. The attack was carried south of Ribeauville to Beblenheim by the 1st Battalion, a movement designed to clear high ground overlooking Colmar.



#### ARTILLERY PREPARATION

*... the attack was carried south of Ribeauville ... a movement designed to clear high ground overlooking Colmar ...*

Heavy fighting resulted when the enemy resisted stubbornly, holding the three towns against determined attacks. At Guemar the opposition was fanatical. Germans fired at their comrades who tried to surrender, shouted "Heil Hitler", and swore. As darkness came on, one platoon of Company C was entering Beblenheim; Company L had a firm hold on Guemar; and elements had got into the western fringe of Ostheim. Prisoners stated that they had been expecting reinforcements from across the Rhine and had been told that the bridgehead must be held at all costs.

During the night approximately 60 Germans infiltrated on the

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regimental southern flank with bazookas and antitank weapons. The 2nd Battalion was assigned the mission of securing the Riquewihr-Zellenberg ridge against this threat. The enemy had reinforced his positions under attack during darkness, and bitter fighting was general throughout the day. That night, 5-6 December, however, Guemar was cleared; and the half of Ostheim on the west side of the Fecht River was taken. Beblenheim was considered clear by 1900 hours though the enemy made constant attempts to infiltrate into the town. Positions were set up on high ground overlooking Mittelwihr, Sigolsheim, and Bennwihr by regimental troops which withstood enemy attacks in that vicinity.

The night of 6-7 December passed uneventfully for the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 143rd Infantry, though a counterattack was expected. Enemy mortars and artillery were active all night with harassing fire. In the morning Germans were found to have infiltrated regimental positions, and Company L was sent to drive them off.

During the next few days, 7-10 December, action was centered in the cluster of hills within the arc formed by the towns of Kaysersberg, Kientzheim, Sigolsheim, Bennwihr, Mittelwihr, and Beblenheim. Positions changed hands several times, as troops of the 143rd Regiment and the enemy employed attack, counterattack, and infiltration with heavy supporting fire. On 7 December the enemy fired mortars, artillery, machine guns, and antitank weapons against hill positions occupied by the 2nd Battalion. A prisoner captured during the early morning said that about 120 men were to attack two of the hills during the day. The second of two counterattacks launched by the enemy after heavy preparatory fire forced Company F to retire from its positions by 1730 hours. American troops dug in on reverse slopes and held fast. Prisoners captured in Guemar, which was attacked all day by enemy attempting to infiltrate by crossing the Fecht River on boats, indicated that large groups of reinforcements were coming to Colmar to attack and secure all the high ground northwest of Colmar in American hands.

Just before 0800 hours on 8 December Mittelwihr, a strong enemy salient in the division line, was subjected to heavy tank and 4.2 mortar fire. At about 1020 hours the enemy laid down a heavy artillery and mortar concentration on the American lines. Following this ex-

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change of fire the enemy attacked at noon from the direction of Mittelwihr and Bennwihr, driving troops from some high ground positions. Companies E and G were pulled back to reorganize and prepare to retake positions lost. The 1st Battalion attacked Mittelwihr but was halted about 25 yards from the outskirts of the village by an intense enemy artillery barrage, which dispersed troops and caused a number of casualties.

A general attack of the 141st and 143rd Regiments was planned to move off at 0800 hours on 9 December. The 1st Battalion of the 143rd again attacked Mittelwihr with supporting fire from high ground. By



THE SHELL TORN TOWN OF MITTELWIHR WHICH CHANGED HANDS SEVERAL TIMES

*The 1st Battalion of the 143rd again attacked Mittelwihr with supporting fire from high ground. By noon troops and armor were in the town . . .*

noon troops and armor were in the town, clearing Germans out of buildings. Concentrations of artillery and mortar fire were placed on the

advancing troops by the Germans, who were determined not to lose the town; but by mid-afternoon the battalion had cleared Mittelwihr and continued the attack southward toward Bennwihr. Progress was very slow in the face of intense enemy fire of all types. Prisoners of war captured in Mittelwihr reported that Bennwihr had been heavily reinforced by infantry and armor. In view of the coming darkness and the difficulty of control in village fighting at night, the battalion dug in on the outskirts of Mittelwihr and called for heavy harassing artillery fires to be laid on Bennwihr that night. The fire did not begin until 0400 hours of 10 December because of the belief that some of the battalion's men were still in Bennwihr.

Attacking with the 143rd Regiment on 9 December the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 141st Regiment moved out to secure the hills above Kientzheim and Sigolsheim and to take Sigolsheim, the town which dominated the eastern approaches to Kayersberg. The opposition at all points was exceedingly bitter. Some fire was received from friendly tanks and tank destroyers in Zellenberg. Supporting artillery placed heavy concentrations around the edges of Kientzheim to the west, and two companies of the 1st Battalion, against heavy resistance, crawled over high ground and by 1325 hours had some elements in Sigolsheim. These advance troops were receiving heavy shelling, and Germans were reported to have moved in behind them. Supporting infantry and tanks moved to the assistance of the troops in Sigolsheim. By nightfall both battalions of the 141st Infantry were on the hills overlooking Kientzheim and Sigolsheim; the 1st Battalion had one company isolated in Sigolsheim. Two platoons which had proceeded in the direction of Bennwihr were in the process of being called back. The platoons, which had expected to link with elements of the 143rd, had met nothing but Germans, with whom they had had a stiff fight.

Both the 141st and 143rd Regiments received heavy artillery fire and constant harassing attacks on 10 December. All elements had to be constantly alert and active to maintain positions. Enemy fire was so heavy as to preclude anything except limited attacks to keep the enemy from disrupting positions. Most of the company which had been isolated in Sigolsheim remained out of contact.

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The 36th Division had been in combat continuously since 15 August, and the strain was beginning to tell. On 9 December Brigadier General W. W. Hess, Division Artillery Commander, called on General Patch. General Hess requested that Seventh Army attach "one company of Flash and Sound, and also Combat Aviation, to the 36th Division for the present operations." General Hess stated that his artillery was receiving intense artillery fire of all calibers, but that the French could do nothing about it. The matter was referred to the Sixth Army Group.

Early in December Major General John E. Dahlquist, Division Commander, had requested that steps be taken to allow him to reestablish the combat efficiency of his organization. In a note to Sixth Army Group, Seventh Army forwarded the opinion of General Dahlquist that "his troops are being subjected to the most terrific continuous artillery fire they have ever faced with small chance to strike back. He will carry out his orders, but in accomplishing the mission given him, his tired, depleted troops will be dissipated and in a short time cease to exist." On 11 December General Patch sent a letter by special officer courier to the Commanding General, Sixth Army Group, to say that the Commanding General, 36th Division, considered his unit desperately in need of relief and rehabilitation. Accompanying this letter was the letter from General Dahlquist, dated 2 December 1944, and dealing with "Reestablishment of the Combat Efficiency of the 36th Infantry Division." Another inclosure was a map of the Colmar area, to which were affixed notes made by the Chief of Staff, Seventh Army, on his conversation with General Dahlquist. Shortly before midnight on 11 December the officer courier returned to Seventh Army Headquarters with a message from Sixth Army Group, stating that the 36th Division would be relieved by the 3rd Division, then occupying the Strasbourg area, as soon as practicable.

On 11 December the 141st and 143rd Regiments attacked in their sectors, while the 142nd Infantry remained in a defensive position, holding Selestat, where it had been since 7 December. The 3rd Battalion of the 143rd Infantry attacked Bennwihr at 1015 hours. Elements moved quickly into the edge of the town but soon met the direct fire of an enemy tank which dominated the main street. While artillery fire was con-

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centrated on the tank, infantrymen worked slowly through the town and were half-way through it by nightfall. The attack of the 141st Regiment was delayed by enemy infiltration, but at noon the 1st Battalion struck to relieve elements out of contact in Sigolsheim. The enemy threw a heavy smoke screen over the entire valley extending from Sigolsheim to Bennwihr. Stubborn resistance bogged down the advance, and artillery was directed to place defensive and counterbattery fires to assist the battalion in returning to original positions. During the night the 3rd Battalion relieved the 1st Battalion, which then moved to Riquewihr.

The Germans opened a general attack on all sectors of the division front on 12 December. During the night patrols had noticed extensive enemy movement, particularly around Ammerschwihr, Kientzheim, Kaysersberg, and Colmar. By morning the enemy had infiltrated above Ribeauville, into Beblenheim, and between Beblenheim and Mittelwihr. He proceeded to launch strong attacks on Bennwihr and Riquewihr and directed 1,000 men, elements of four regiments, against Selestat.

The enemy made marked initial penetrations into the defended areas around Riquewihr and Selestat. Bitter and exhausting fighting succeeded in erasing most of the German advances by nightfall. As the enemy withdrew, he laid heavy artillery barrages in the area he had vacated. During the succeeding night the enemy infiltrated demolition parties, which tried unsuccessfully to eliminate American artillery positions. Enemy pressure continued to be applied constantly through the division sector.

During the next two days the enemy drive continued. On 13 December another enemy attack on Selestat was broken by artillery, but the enemy focused his attentions on the towns and hills between Sigolsheim and Beblenheim and in the area west of that line. There was hardly a time when groups of enemy were not infiltrating or attacking frontally, and artillery and tank support was much in evidence. The Germans pushed a group of 150 men as far north and west as a point 2,000 yards north of Kaysersberg. The Germans contested every hill and town position in the area held by the two regiments, which were supported

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by the 111th Engineer Combat Battalion. The enemy reoccupied Mittelwihr, on which rallying American forces were advancing on the night of 14 December. The Germans also reoccupied the hills in the arc from Kaysersberg to Beblenheim. At 2000 hours on 14 December the enemy was reported to have broken through north of Mittelwihr. The Americans had been pushed back from the heights overlooking the Kaysersberg Valley.

### The Enemy

Although all factors appeared to be against the enemy in maintaining his positions west of the Rhine and high ground which he still controlled in the Vosges Mountains, there were nevertheless indications that the Germans were planning to withdraw only to a final bridgehead probably in the vicinity of Neuf-Brisach. The Germans could still be counted on to make maximum use of limited resources and to contest the division advance with determination until all hope of maintaining their positions had gone.

When it was relieved from operation in the Colmar Pocket, the 36th Division was well able to testify to the tenacity of the enemy. And yet the enemy had issued on 3 November a withdrawal plan to be used in case of complete Allied occupation of Alsace. Certain precautions in view of this possible occupation by the Allies had already been taken. As late as 10 December it appeared to VI Corps that the German Nineteenth Army was making a withdrawal out of Alsace. Considerable movement was observed in enemy rear areas; and 500 trucks were reported moving east from Colmar and crossing the Rhine River at the Brisach Bridge, which was heavily smoked. Enemy withdrawal appeared slow and methodical, and motor transport movements converging on Colmar were reported continuing east at night.

But a captured Battle News Sheet, apparently issued before Christmas, reveals that the German mission was to continue to hold central Alsace. As it was explained to the German soldier,

Since 16 November 1944 the enemy attack on the Ruhr and Saar area, as well as Alsace, has been proceeding. Already the strengthen-

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ing of the German weapons is effective. We, in Alsace, held up the enemy in the spurs of the Vosges for two full months. His push into Strasbourg and Mulhouse has not given him possession of entire Alsace. He suffered heavy losses and had to employ numerous divisions which he could have used in other sectors. . . . Mail, furloughs, Christmas, all that will come again after the battle has been decided and the enemy beaten. What will not come again is the opportunity of this winter. . . . Let us be watchful, concentrate all our will power, fight. For Whoever Wins This Winter Will Win This War!

The German soldier receiving this explanation was, according to an article in the 15 December issue of *Die Wacht*, the newspaper of the Nineteenth Army, fighting one of the toughest of defensive battles. Between the floridly patriotic lines of the article may be read the situation of the defenders:

Up on the crests of the Vosges, the Western-most positions are covered by the deep snow, enveloped in the bitter cold, and from there, through the lowlands of the Rhine Plain, continues the row of foxholes which for weeks have been filled to the brim with water by the pouring rain.

For days and weeks they have had no rest and they have simply dropped the word "relief" from their vocabulary a long time ago. Their uniforms hardly ever get dry, and they are yellowish from the mud and dirt. Their sleep they have to steal, bit by bit. . . . In every squad there yawns many a painful gap, but the men who survive get together more closely, fight all the more stubbornly against barrages and dive-bombers, against tanks, Shermans, Renaults, Churchills, and against infantry. . . .

In the December days of the sixth year of war a new part of German history and heroism is being written here in Alsace, and sealed with the blood of many German soldiers.

Doubtlessly contributing to the strength of enemy resistance in Alsace is the fact that the Nineteenth Army was subordinate to the overall command of Reichsführer SS, Heinrich Himmler. A personal order issued by teletype on 20 December to the Nineteenth Army and the XIV and XVIII SS Corps reflects his determination to mobilize all possible manpower for the fight for Alsace. Himmler ordered all supply troops and similar rear-echelon units situated on the right bank of the Rhine to vacate their private quarters by 2 January 1945. They were to be placed in defense positions of the West Wall and the Black Forest

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and were to dig their own field fortifications. These were to be incorporated within the regular fortification system. Should the enemy attack, these troops were ordered to fight in their dug-outs and emplacements to the last man.



THESE ELITE TROOPS WERE TO FIGHT TO THE LAST BREATH

*Should the enemy attack, these troops were ordered to fight in their dug-outs and emplacements to the last man.*

A German order issued in the vicinity of Sigolsheim and dated 26 December contained the injunction that Sigolsheim be held and states that this was in accordance with repeated written orders just received from the Commander-in-Chief, Upper Rhine, Reichsfuehrer SS Himmler. Himmler's Bodyguard Battalion was identified in action on the Upper Rhine, and the 3rd Division had many reports that Himmler was present in his special train. German resistance throughout the month of December on the rim of the Colmar Pocket remained at a strength inspired by fanaticism.

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### 3rd Division Enters the Stalemate

During the period 15-21 December when their relief was gradually being accomplished by the 3rd Division, units of the 36th Division continued to battle in the hills north of the Kayzersberg Valley. Heavy enemy activity in this area slowed the process of relief, as unit took the place of unit fighting on the line. The 30th Infantry, which was the first of 3rd Division regiments to move from Strasbourg to the Colmar front, completed its transfer on 14 December and entered the line on the right flank of the 36th Division.

On 15 December, while elements of the 141st and 143rd Regiments were attacking once again south through the hills toward Kintzheim and Sigolsheim, the 30th Regiment made an assault against the higher hills just north of Kayzersberg. In a two day fight troops of the 30th Infantry drove the enemy from these High Vosges positions and prepared to cross the Weiss River northwest of Kayzersberg to seize high ground to the south and to assault the town itself. During the night 16-17 December the 1st Battalion passed through 2nd Battalion positions, at 0625 hours in the morning crossed an engineer-constructed footbridge near the northwestern end of Kayzersberg, and by noon that day had occupied high ground south of Kayzersberg. At 0905 hours that morning the 3rd Battalion entered Kayzersberg and fought toward the southeast, meeting enemy small arms, mortar and artillery fire. Enemy tanks from the southern and eastern end of the town fired into American positions.

On 17 December the enemy counterattacked both in Kayzersberg and against the hill mass across the river. The 1st Battalion south of the town gave ground at first, later regained it, and then consolidated its positions while repeated attacks were smashed by concentrations of fire from artillery, mortars, and automatic weapons. Each time the enemy advanced against the 1st Battalion, he withdrew again with severe losses. The counterattack in Kayzersberg, launched from the direction of Kintzheim, succeeded in retaking a considerable portion of the town. The 3rd Battalion continued its fight to hold Kayzersberg through the afternoon in a house-to-house battle. The enemy reinforced positions

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with armor and infantry from the east, until Kientzheim was taken by French tanks attacking from the north through the 141st Regiment's position. The next morning French armor and infantry jumped off from Kientzheim at 0900 hours, fighting their way into the eastern section of Kayzersberg. American troops of the 30th Infantry and French troops linked at 1150 hours and proceeded to sweep all buildings in the town, which was virtually clear by 1730 hours on 18 December.

With the taking of Kayzersberg, Kientzheim, and the surrounding hills, Allied forces had broken enemy power in the valley. The enemy withdrew south of the Ammerschwihr-Labaroche axis, and French and American forces took Ammerschwihr. On 18 December the 2nd Battalion of the 143rd Infantry had moved into Mittelwihr. The next day elements of the regiment entered Sigolsheim but withdrew because it was not possible to complete the capture of the town before nightfall. The remainder of the period during which gradual relief of the 36th Division was taking place was given over to the mopping up of towns taken and the hill areas adjacent to them. As the period progressed, enemy attacks slackened; and the units spent 20 and 21 December establishing themselves in their new positions, setting up defenses, and patrolling.

When the 3rd Division had completed relief of the 36th Division on 21 December, it had control of the whole Kayzersberg Valley except for Bennwihr and Sigolsheim. The Germans still controlled the exits from the valley to the east. Accordingly, on the morning of 23 December the 15th Infantry started an operation to gain control of these positions, while the 7th and 30th Regiments held the sector taken over from the 36th Division.

Elements of the 1st Battalion, 15th Infantry, attacked Bennwihr, jumping off to the south through Mittelwihr, covered by fire from the 2nd Battalion. The battalion encountered an enemy strongpoint in the convent west of Bennwihr and well-organized heavy resistance from the town. Bitter fighting took elements of two companies into the outskirts of the village; but shortly after dark the enemy counterattacked in strength, supported by tanks, artillery, and mortar fire, causing the battalion to withdraw and reorganize. The next day, 24 December,

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Company I entered Bennwihr against scattered resistance, but in the town it was strongly opposed by infantry and tanks. The school house proved to be the outstanding strongpoint in the town, being captured once, then recaptured by the enemy, and remaining in enemy hands at nightfall. Company I dug in positions on the outskirts of the town and remained in them during the night. Attacking the town from the east, Companies K and L cleared Bennwihr on Christmas Day after house-to-house fighting. Elements of the 1st Battalion then made an unsuccessful attempt to clear the hill northeast of Sigolsheim.

Fighting continued in this sector during Christmas Day and the days following without much gain by either side. As the high ground to the north and east of Sigolsheim was slowly being cleared by troops of the 15th Infantry, the town underwent heavy artillery and aerial bombardment for two days. After six days of bitter fighting Sigolsheim was finally cleared of enemy on 28 December.

During the days that followed, the American 3rd Division remained in the line on the Colmar front without participating in any significant engagements, waiting for the First French Army to complete its rehabilitation and its plans for a new offensive against the Colmar Pocket. As the old year came to a close, the front in Alsace in a long, sweeping, reverse-S curve from French positions on the Rhine near Mulhouse, through the High Vosges and 3rd Division positions in the Kayzersberg Valley, through Strasbourg, and northeast through VI and XV Corps lines to St. Avold became suddenly quiet. The Germans were preparing to launch a counter-offensive, and the Allies were waiting for the first blows. The spirit of the Allied forces, though sober, was none the less confident. In a Christmas and New Year folder prepared at Seventh Army Headquarters for the holiday season a French soldier and an American soldier greet each other with raised glasses. General Patch wishes his men a joyful Christmas, and the text of the folder predicts that this is "the last Christmas on the Berlin road."

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## CHAPTER XXI

### *Support for the Vosges Campaign*

WHEN the Seventh Army early in October arrived in the Epinal-Luneville sector along the Moselle, it was approximately 500 miles from the beaches and its ports of supply in southern France. By D plus 45 the army front was nearly three times the distance from Marseille and Toulon as that contemplated logistically for D plus 60. In addition to the tactical necessity for regrouping its forces before an advance through the Vosges and for giving some rest to tired troops, the Seventh Army was faced with the problem of heavily taxed supply lines. All factors contributed to the development of a static situation on the front. In the Seventh Army advance from the Moselle to the Rhine and the German border during the last three months of 1944 the services of supply were hard pressed to meet army requirements.

#### Personnel

Seventh Army's fighting strength jumped from three divisions on 1 October 1944 to 11 divisions on 31 December 1944. With this increase in troop strength came a corresponding increase in the personnel and replacement problem. Total monthly casualties mounted from 7,508 for October to 12,113 for December. The Vosges Campaign, with its bitter weather conditions, and the winter fight into the Siegfried Line caused heavy sick lists. Trench foot was a matter for considerable concern.

The problem of obtaining infantry and armored replacements during this period was a critical one. Shortly after the German offensive



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struck in the Ardennes, Seventh Army had to turn over to Third Army 260 basics from each infantry regiment of the newly arrived 42nd, 63rd, and 70th Infantry Divisions. Near the end of December Sixth Army Group informed Seventh Army that, because of the recent allocation of replacements by higher headquarters, there would be little if any new manpower available to Seventh Army for several weeks, perhaps a month or more.

Since infantry units in Seventh Army then averaged about ten percent below strength while service units were at full strength, the army organized a short emergency program to convert to infantry ten percent of all units other than infantry, cavalry, combat engineers, chemical mortar battalions, and divisional artillery. The Conversion Center was set up at Thion, France, under supervision of the 2nd Replacement Depot and afforded a means of providing a pool of infantry replacements for use during January. The Seventh Army program was later supplanted by a similar theater-wide conversion program.

Combat officers in junior grades were an equally grave replacement problem. When administrative control of Seventh Army forces was transferred from NATOUSA to ETOUSA on 1 November, a considerable number of junior officers who had been carried with combat units as overstrength had to be returned to replacement depots since ETOUSA replacement policy permitted no temporary duty for training or overstrength. Shortly thereafter combat units of company size were authorized one extra lieutenant. Since the replacement system was unable to furnish sufficient officer personnel in junior grades, Seventh Army gave priority to DRAGOON divisions, because the 3rd, 36th, and 45th Infantry Divisions had been in combat for two years and had virtually exhausted their stocks of officer material from non-commissioned ranks. It was felt that new divisions would be in a better position to fill their quotas by combat appointment.

During the rapid advance through southern France the establishment of rest centers and rotation of troops could receive little consideration. These matters became more pressing, however, when Seventh Army reached the Moselle and began its advance through the Vosges. The G-1 Section set up rest areas where practicable; but

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conditions, notably the pressing need for combat troops and the race against time, made it impossible to give the front-line soldier much relief. For a considerable period even the small quota for rotation to the United States was stopped.

### Logistics and the New Campaign

A build-up of reserves of ammunition, gasoline, rations and other essential supplies to support a sustained attack had not been possible. By the end of the first week of October the Seventh Army supply situation was critical. Rail deliveries were falling below tonnages considered essential to operations. Logistical planning had to be revised. It was the opinion of Sixth Army Group that had sufficient supplies been available the advance of DRAGOON forces could have continued through October, breaching the Vosges barrier with less cost in lives and time, and gaining tactical advantages of great importance. Army planning, however, could not alone correct a deficiency which reached back to the factories in America. Shortages in special supplies needed in the prosecution of the war reflected a critical condition existing in the Zone of Interior in October, since available stocks of certain items plus shipments already enroute comprised the total resources in the theater and also in the United States. Production schedules did not indicate any alleviation of the condition before a minimum of three, and probably six, months had elapsed.


Efforts were immediately concentrated, however, on building up the level of supplies in forward dumps to support the Seventh Army in its coming campaign. Administrative changes were announced in October revising operating agencies in the line of supply. Seventh Army was notified on 19 October that administrative responsibility for DRAGOON forces would be transferred from NATOUSA, which had mounted the operation and supplied it initially, to the European Theater of Operations on 1 November. Supply would remain a NATOUSA responsibility until a transfer day to be announced. Logistical support of the Sixth Army Group became a responsibility of Communications Zone, ETOUSA, on 20 November 1944. To accomplish the mission, the

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Southern Line of Communications (SOLOC) was established within the Communications Zone under command of Major General Thomas B. Larkin, who was designated Deputy Commander, COMZONE. Meanwhile, direct supply of the Seventh Army had changed on 11 October from Delta Base Section to Continental Advance Section (CONAD), operating under the direction of SOLOC.

Addition of new divisions to the Seventh Army complicated the supply problem. Early in October it had planned that the army would embrace two corps with one armored and five infantry divisions in combat and two infantry divisions in rotation, together with attached



AN "I" BEAM IS ABOUT TO BE SET DURING THE RECONSTRUCTION OF A RAILROAD BRIDGE

*Engineer troops were engaged on an extensive program of rehabilitation and maintenance of rail and motor transport lines.*

service troops. These two corps, VI and XV, with a full complement of eight divisions were under Seventh Army command by 2 November.



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Addition on 13 November of another armored division added to the demand on Ordnance for maintenance and parts. A third armored division was added on 5 December. Arrival of elements of three infantry divisions, the 42nd, 63rd, and 70th, in late December contributed to an army troop strength of 294,681 at the end of the year, almost double that of three months earlier.

Seventh Army faced its supply problems during the last months of 1944 under conditions imposed by the developments of its campaign. The transfer from the Mediterranean to the European Theater meant some change in policies and procedure which had to be adopted both in planning and procurement. It was also necessary to exploit to the fullest whatever supply facilities could be found in the Vosges. During the months of October, November, and December both gasoline and ammunition became critical items, and expenditures had to be made under the policy of building up reserves. Engineer troops were engaged on an extensive program of rehabilitation and maintenance of rail and motor transport lines in the army area. Special problems of supply arose from time to time as the Vosges campaign developed. With the coming of winter, procurement and distribution of supplies became focused on the needs of the individual soldier; clothing, food, and heat. Throughout the period it was necessary to give close support to units engaged in the line.

#### Supply Facilities in the Vosges

Transition from a day to day basis of supply during the rapid advance period, in which supply sections followed the army as closely as possible with as much of the necessary supplies as could be brought up with available transportation, to one with reserves was accomplished in the final quarter of 1944. To accomplish the task Seventh Army depended largely on truck transportation and the rapid rehabilitation of rail lines.

At the end of the first week in October opening of a railhead in the Vesoul area enabled the Army, then operating on the Epinal-

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Luneville front, to begin gradual discontinuance of the long truck hauls; but time was required to build up reserves. To hasten the necessary build-up, the corps and divisions were called upon to furnish one truck company each for fast turn-around hauls between Epinal and Marseille until sufficient reserves could be assembled in forward areas to meet emergencies and provide a minimum back-log for future operations.

Inasmuch as rail lines soon would be extended into Epinal, forward supply points were established in that area. Ration and gasoline dumps were located at Luneville, Charmes, Mirecourt, and Epinal by 16 October with rear supply points located at St. Loup and Vesoul. Ammunition supply points were operated in the vicinity of Arbois, Luxeuil, Bayon, and Uzemain, while Quartermaster Class II and IV depots were maintained at Vesoul and Epinal.

As fighting progressed in the Vosges mountain region in November, supply points were pushed up to follow the forward troops as closely as possible. For VI Corps units ration and gasoline installations were opened in Rambervillers and Molsheim, with another gasoline dump operated at Clairefontaine and a ration point in St. Die. In the XV Corps sector ration, gasoline, and ordnance supply points were opened on 24 November near Luneville. Quartermaster Class II and IV installations were maintained at Epinal, Mirecourt, and Sarrebourg. In December ration dumps were advanced to Saverne, Mackwiller, and Schweighausen, while gasoline points were opened in Haguenau and Diemeringen. Main army supply points were located at Bayon and Uzemain during November. More forward points were opened in December at Durstel, Heming, Eschbach, and Dettwiller. The army supply point at Nelling was taken over from the Third Army during the short period when the 87th Infantry Division was under Seventh Army control.

Only by following forward troops as closely as possible could the Seventh Army give maximum supply support to its advancing divisions. The attempt to build up reserves was sometimes disturbed, but its importance cannot easily be overestimated. A fire in the Class I dump at Epinal on the night of 17-18 November resulted in the loss of 200,000 pounds of flour, salt, beans, powdered milk, sugar, and

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accessory packs but did not result in a critical ration shortage in army dumps.

Additional troops and rapid tactical maneuvers on a wide front made Class I supply more difficult during December, especially the task of finding dump locations under cover. Many roads were made impassable by heavy winter rains which limited the location of forward dumps to areas serviced by the few remaining highways. Suitable locations found near the front would often be subjected to enemy artillery fire. By the end of the period it was necessary to reconsolidate supply installations in view of the over-all defensive plan and shifting



TRUCK SPLASHES THROUGH FLOOD WATERS UNDER DESTROYED RAILROAD TRESTLE. FLOOD CONDITIONS HAVE LIMITED TRAFFIC TO TRUCKS ONLY.

*Many roads were made impassable by heavy winter rains which limited the location of forward dumps to areas serviced by the few remaining highways.*

of troops. No material change was made in the main axis of supply through Sarrebourg, Saverne, and Haguenau. On 30 December plans

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for the immediate future placed the bulk of supplies west of the Vosges Mountains with only limited operating levels of ammunition, rations, gasoline, and Engineer Class IV supplies to be maintained east of the Vosges and north of Sarrebourg.

### Gasoline


Although gasoline had been one of the most critical items of supply during the first six weeks of the invasion of southern France, the slowing down of activities in October enabled the army to build up substantial reserves. Utilization of existing facilities was one of the main factors in establishing the reserve. Rehabilitation of storage tanks at Toulon, Marseille, and Port du Bouc had provided approximately 2,000,000 barrels of storage space. In Epinal additional gasoline facilities were exploited. There the Jeanne d'Arc bulk gasoline installations were found practically intact. Two steel storage tanks in good condition were found with a total capacity of approximately 15,000 barrels. A tank car unloading rack was constructed to handle 30 cars simultaneously, and a four-inch pipeline was built 2,340 feet to the storage tanks. An additional 3,040 feet of four-inch pipeline was laid to connect the storage tanks with a tank truck filling point. Gasoline could be pumped directly to tank trucks or storage tanks from tank cars. Average unloading time per tank car was 30 minutes, and the average turn-around time for tank cars from the base area was approximately 17 days.

The first handling of sizeable quantities of gasoline in bulk from rail tank cars began on 2 October at St. Loup, when a daily maximum of 150,000 gallons was unloaded directly to tank trucks and dispensing facilities. As the rail line did not extend to the Epinal region until the third week in October, a convoy refueling point was established at Thaon on the highway between Epinal and Nomexy. The installation consisted of an 8,000 gallon tank serviced by tank trucks.

The German installation at Nomexy, approximately 10 miles north of Epinal, provided considerable storage space together with 52,920 gallons of gasoline and 22,050 gallons of gas-oil mixture. It had apparently been used by the Germans as a canning and distributing

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point and was badly damaged by bomb hits. The existing steel storage tanks were cleaned and repaired for gasoline service. Storage facilities for 270,000 gallons were placed in operation, including one 185,000-



CONVOY REFUELING POINTS KEPT HIGHWAY TRANSPORTATION MOVING. AMPHIBIOUS DUKWS REFUEL FROM AN 8,000 GALLON TANK

"A convoy refueling point was established at Thaon on the highway between Epinal and Nomexy. The installation consisted of an 8,000 gallon tank serviced by tank trucks..."

gallon tank and four 15,500-gallon tanks. Unloading facilities included accommodations for 18 cars, approximately 200 feet from the storage tanks. Five tank-truck loading risers were constructed 2,500 feet from storage tanks and connected by pipeline in such a way that gasoline could be pumped directly to tank trucks from tank cars or from storage tanks. Drum unloading racks were also installed.

Army operation of the La Forge installation at Sarrebourg began on 10 December with the reconditioning of facilities for 1,200,000 gallons. A 30 tank car unloading rack was installed, capable of emptying

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100 cars per day. Facilities to decant 2,000 55-gallon drums daily into bulk storage were prepared here. Toward the end of December time-saving methods were introduced with the utilization of local filling



TANK TRUCKS FILL UP FROM RISERS


Five tank truck loading risers were constructed 2,500 feet from storage tanks and connected by pipeline in such a way that gasoline could be pumped directly to tank trucks from tank cars or from storage tanks.

stations for military vehicle refueling. Operation of these stations considerably reduced the number of five gallon containers necessary for maintenance. A shortage of five gallon cans earlier had forced partial issues to units in 55-gallon drums.

Gasoline stocks within the army area dipped to critically low levels during December, necessitating a rationing program at the close of the month in order that adequate reserves could be developed to meet emergencies that might arise from the changing tactical situation. While a supply of 8.8 days of fuel was on hand on 3 December, transfer of the bulk installations at Nomexy and Jeanne D'Arc reduced the level to

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3.5 days, or 1,010,277 barrels, on 10 December. In the following week the situation further deteriorated as army stocks of gasoline dropped to 237,710 gallons, or eight-tenths of a day of supply. Some improvement



LOCAL FILLING STATIONS WERE UTILIZED FOR LIGHT VEHICLE REFUELING POINTS

Toward the end of December time-saving methods were introduced with the utilization of local filling stations for military vehicle refueling.

was effected during the following week as the level was built up to 1.3 days of supply with 385,711 gallons on hand. The situation was considered sufficiently critical, however, for the Quartermaster to arrange for an emergency truck shipment of 100,000 gallons from the base section depot at Epinal. This supply together with the rationing of units to 75 percent of normal use resulted in a gain in the volume of receipts over issues, and the build-up of 768,684 barrels, or 2.7 days of supply, at the end of the year. Besides requests for additional gasoline it was necessary on 27 December to request an extra 20,000 gallons of medium weight motor oil.

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### Ammunition

A critical ammunition situation developed early in October which recurred periodically throughout the final quarter of 1944. Dwindling stocks in army dumps, as receipts from the base section declined, necessitated rationing of several types of artillery ammunition to the extent that peak efficiency could not be obtained from supporting artillery units. Some commanders felt that the lack of ammunition was lowering the morale of the troops. In VI Corps the dissemination of information on overall allocations of ammunition was prohibited below the level of infantry regiment or division artillery headquarters.

On 6 October the Seventh Army G-4 attributed the critical shortage in ammunition to the failure of the Communications Zone to meet bids for daily rail tonnage. Consumption of ammunition was at the rate of 1,000 tons daily, but on at least two days during the period only 20 tons had been received. Between 1 and 7 October the army had bid for 750 tons daily of ammunition, together with 225 tons of other ordnance items; but Sixth Army Group had allocated only 512 tons for all classes of ordnance supply. Since receipts did not coincide with requests, the acuteness of the ammunition problem increased.

By the end of the first week in October the stock of ammunition for the light artillery piece, 105mm Howitzer M2, had declined to three-tenths of an ETOUSA day of supply (40 rounds per weapon per day) or 5,627 rounds, and six-tenths of a day of supply for the 155mm howitzer (25 rounds per weapon per day). The decline had occurred in spite of rationing which had allocated for the first 25 days of October only 15.22 rounds per piece per day for the 155mm gun, 16 rounds for the 155mm howitzer, and 28.4 rounds for the 105mm howitzer. In the VI Corps a 20 percent reserve of the allocated quantities could be fired by units only on order of the corps commander. There was also a critical shortage of mortar ammunition, and restrictions were imposed for the same period. An average of 7.8 rounds of 60mm high explosive per piece per day, four rounds of 81mm high explosive light, and 3.5 rounds of 81mm high explosive heavy was allowed. Amounts allocated averaged between one-fifth and one-seventh of a unit of fire per day, except for the 155mm howitzer for which the amount was one-third of a unit of fire.

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Uncertainty of receipts from the base section caused the Seventh Army to terminate the allocation system after the first two weeks of October. The army then advised corps of anticipated receipts for the period, quantities being released as available on a daily basis. Inability of ammunition supply points to meet allocations had exerted a limiting factor on artillery expenditure to a greater extent than the restrictions.

The combined effect was a lower tempo of activity, of which the G-4 of the 45th Infantry Division stated:

More attention was paid to the procurement, allocation, distribution and expenditure of ammunition by all echelons of command during October than any previous month in this Division's combat experience. . . . Division artillery is not being used to peak efficiency. . . . The continued difficulty with ammunition supply is one of the factors contributing to the slowdown of the present operations. There is no more important morale factor for combat troops than a good ammunition situation. Continued restrictions, month after month, produce lack of confidence and disgust in a system that is unable to supply at, theoretically, a period of maximum efficiency, sufficient ammunition. . . .

Ammunition worries beset the enemy at the same time. The Seventh Army Artillery Section, reporting on the period 21-28 October, stated that there had been a marked decrease in the number of enemy guns located during the past week. By 27 October the number of guns opposing the Seventh Army front had dropped from 335 to 270. The proportion of medium and heavy guns manned by the enemy likewise dropped. German artillery was experiencing the lack of reserves in both weapons and ammunition. Several dud shells were found to have dates as late as August 1944 stamped on them, and prisoners of war complained of the poor quality of "new guns." Apparently the enemy services of supply were moving guns and ammunition directly from factory to the front lines.

Two weeks later a message from General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, to the Theater Commander disclosed the existence in the Zone of the Interior of serious shortages of certain types of artillery ammunition, replacement cannon, and recoil mechanism. Reserves in the United States had been exhausted, which necessitated the scheduling

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of current shipments direct from loading and production lines to dock sides. The War Department had directed the curtailment of ammunition expenditures. Seventh Army was, therefore, compelled to use its artillery sparingly; and reserve ammunition for a general offensive could be built up only at the expense of current operations.

Development in October of greater rail capacity from Marseille, where there was some ammunition in stock, brought increased receipts to Seventh Army and permitted the beginning of a build-up of needed reserves. Intermittent shortages of certain types of ammunition occurred, however, as a consequence of unexpected demands of unbalanced shipments. Stocks in army supply points reflected a gradually increasing number of days of supply on hand, although periodic recessions occurred. By 28 October a stock of 8.2 days of supply of 105mm howitzer M 2 ammunition had been accumulated, while for 155mm howitzers it was 8.8 days, for 155mm guns, 9.8 days, and for 81mm mortars, 7.4 days. Continued difficulty with 105mm howitzer ammunition was reflected in a decline to 3.8 days of supply on 27 November, while ammunition stocks for 155mm howitzers had risen to 16 days, for 155mm guns, 9.2 days, and for 81mm mortars, 10.3 days. After peaks had been reached in the first and second weeks of December, the army had on hand at the end of the year 8.4 days of 105mm howitzer M 2, 19.9 days of 155mm howitzer, 12.5 days of 155mm gun, and 8.8 days of 81mm mortar ammunition. During this period supplies were being hoarded for the coming drive against Germany.

After the October crisis a gradual build-up was undertaken with firm restrictions on expenditures, which enabled the army to meet demands during offensive periods. Firing reached such a volume by mid-December, however, that issues virtually equalled receipts, which precluded temporarily further development of reserves. Heaviest demand was for 155mm gun, 4.57 inch gun, and 105mm howitzer ammunition. Consumption exceeded the ETOUSA day of supply, but expenditures remained within the accumulated and period allocations.

Maintenance of adequate ammunition stocks in forward supply points within convenient distances to the combat troops had become a

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problem by mid-December, as the advances had placed divisions 80 to 100 miles ahead of the largest army supply point at Bayon. Trucking from the Bayon dump and from the end of the rail line at Sarrebourg was necessary, and it was not possible to meet every demand from the forward points. The use of truck transportation and service troops, however, to move supplies of ammunition forward was kept at a minimum. Only when the rail lines in the Wissembourg-Haguenau area had been opened could stocks be built up in forward dumps. The transfer of a Third Army dump at Insming with 9,000 tons of ammunition to Seventh Army simplified the problem of supplying new organizations which had been transferred to the Seventh Army during the third week of December. Heaviest expenditures continued in 105mm howitzer and 155mm gun ammunition.

A new fuze, called POZIT or Proximity Fuze, was demonstrated to the artillery in November and made available during the latter part of December for use with the 105mm and 155mm weapons. Because of the nature of the explosion, it was to be fired only on corps order and artillery observation planes were to be grounded during the fire period. Artillery of XV Corps fired the POZIT fuze initially as a Christmas mission on German positions, and effective results on personnel targets were reported.

### Rail and Motor Transport

Development of a semi-static tactical situation in early October with an impending attack on enemy lines in the Vosges Mountains made it imperative to rehabilitate railroads rapidly and to establish adequate supply lines to support the coming offensive. A demolished bridge over the Doubs River at Dole denied completion of rail lines into Vesoul until 5 October, placing an excessive burden on truck transportation that was not entirely relieved until November. To provide facilities which could accommodate heavier tonnage, work on double-track line up the Rhone River through Dijon was assigned first priority, although the single track "mountain line" through Grenoble was repaired with almost equal rapidity.

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The Vesoul area was opened for substantial tonnage the first week in October with towns in the vicinity being utilized as supply points. Ammunition was stored at Aillevillers, gasoline at St. Loup, rations at Gonflans, and all other classes of quartermaster supply at Vesoul. More than 1,600 additional freight cars were acquired at Vesoul. A primary traffic control point was established at the Vaivre yards near Vesoul. The Clerval yards near Besancon were assigned to the French when Seventh Army responsibility for supply of the First French Army was terminated.

The disposition of Seventh Army forces dictated that Epinal should be the main supply center. Rail lines into that area were developed to carry the bulk of army supplies. Rail deliveries into Epinal were adequate by the third week of October with tonnage moving from the Marseille port through Dijon and the classification yards of Langres to Epinal, a distance of more than 500 miles. Shipments were irregular, however; and eight to twelve days were required for a turn-around of the freight cars. Tonnage deliveries were built up to 5,000 tons by the third week of October, and additional main supply points were established by the army.

The turn-around time of rolling stock on the long haul with limited equipment available turned attention to the dangers of bottleneck delays, as the flow of supplies was even then barely sufficient to meet army needs. As the time for the round-trip increased, COMZONE contended that the army was consuming too much time in unloading the freight cars. Investigation developed, however, that the delay was not the fault of the Seventh Army, which had a small number of cars under load in the army area. There was a far greater number of cars on sidings in the Communications Zone. Avoidance of car diversions in the COMZONE and careful regulation by CONAD was suggested as the solution to the problem.

Epinal marked the forward railhead until 15 November, when completion of the bridge over the Moselle River at Langley made it possible to extend the line an additional 30 miles to Luneville, including, to a limited extent, the use of the nearby towns of Charmes and Bayon. The rapid advance of its armies made it necessary for Sixth Army Group

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to request SOLOC to have CONAD assume the responsibility for the movement of supplies to new army dumps well forward. It was proposed to move the rear boundary of the combat zone well forward and give top priority to the rehabilitation of railroads in forward areas.

Forward reconnaissance continued after the railhead was established at Luneville. Forward facilities at Avricourt, Sarrebourg, and Reding were investigated. The completion of a canal bridge near Heming on 5 December made it possible to open the rail line to Reding several miles beyond Sarrebourg, where railheads were established. The nearby La Forge bulk-storage plant, became the unloading point for tank cars.

A new system of requisitioning transportation tonnage was put into effect on 2 December by SOLOC. Seventh Army G-4 submitted requisitions for a 10 day period to the Base Section, which estimated tonnage requirements and entered a bid for allocations necessary to move the volume. It was still necessary for Seventh Army to request allocations of tonnage on the railroad to move special supplies and equipment that would not normally be covered by a periodic requisition, such as Bailey bridging, timber, and fortification materials. Daily receipts of all classes of supply averaged approximately 3,200 long tons per day by 2 December, slightly below the minimum requirements for the army. Supply reserves were thus depleted.

Base Section had taken over some army supply installations in the Epinal-Luneville area. Since the Seventh Army had as yet insufficient rail facilities in the Saverne area, it became necessary to unload many of the supplies requisitioned by army in Base Section installations to the rear. There was a period of transition in the moving of major army depots during which the army supply services were, in effect, requisitioning supplies that would be shipped and received by the Base Section. All requisitions at this time by the army represented supplies for current requirements and would be re-routed forward to Sarrebourg and Saverne as rapidly as the rail and truck facilities permitted. The Arzviller tunnel between Reding and Saverne was holding up the extension of rail lines. A Class I dump at Lixheim, north of Re-

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ding, was opened in the middle of December with the completion of track repairs on a small spur line. On the other side of the tunnel the line from Saverne to Haguenau was operational, although the Haguenau yard was badly damaged and a by-pass necessary north to Wissembourg. In Strasbourg 50 serviceable locomotives and considerable rolling stock were captured, alleviating the shortage of locomotives considerably. The rail yards in the Sarrebourg area were capable of handling 3,500 to 4,000 tons daily.

Opening of the Arzviller tunnel on 21 December extended the rail service to Schweighausen. Forward railheads were opened at Hochfelden for ammunition, Saverne for signal supplies, Brumath and Schweighausen for fuel, and Neubourg for engineer property. The line to Molsheim and Haguenau could handle approximately 2,000 long tons per day to either place, which was adequate at that time to carry all Seventh Army supplies consigned to that area. The arrival of additional troops in the Seventh Army in the third week of December and limited receipts from the Base Section resulted in a reduction in army supply reserves. On 23 December 64,883 tons of supply were on hand, divided with approximately two-thirds in the Epinal-Luneville area and one-third in forward army supply installations.

As the tactical situation required the Seventh Army to assume part of the Third Army's right flank positions, it was agreed with Third Army that tonnage for the Seventh Army might be routed via Neufchateau-Toul to railheads on the line from Chateau-Salins to Sarralbe, Hampont, Haboudange, and Insming. A capacity of approximately 3,000 long tons was made available to the Seventh Army to carry supplies to the XV Corps area on the Third Army right flank.

An unexpected interruption in the flow of supplies occurred on 25 December when Seventh Army Quartermaster was advised that Delta Base would require a two-day suspension of supplies. A shortage of rail cars made it necessary for the army to be supplied directly from the stocks of CONAD during the period. By the end of December the rail line was operational up to Sultz, although no forward railheads were established beyond Schweighausen. Actual tonnage was delivered to Seventh Army railheads by a combination of truck and rail during

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October, but during November and December the rail lines transported essential supplies needed for operations.

Bulk movement of supplies over the highways continued during the early part of October, as rail lines were being pushed forward to the dump area in and around Vesoul. Addition of the XV Corps' 50,000 troops to the Seventh Army intensified the task of supply and the effort to build up reserves. The heavy strain placed on motor transportation was met in part by the quality of American equipment, which withstood rigorous, continuous, 1,000 mile round trips to the beach, and in part to the phasing in of mobile supply of major ordnance items and spare parts soon after the southern France assault convoys. Utilization of the replacement reserve of motor transport necessitated the employment of as much as one-half of depot personnel to substitute as truck drivers.

The "Flaming Bomb Express" operated by army ordnance units during the critical transportation period was discontinued on 8 October 1944. The discontinuance of all truck convoys to the ports of Marseille and Toulon, however, was not effected until early November. By mid-October improvement of the rail situation alleviated the problem of transporting full-tracked vehicles, which could not economically move overland under their own power for the long distance required from the beaches to the combat area. Motor truck-trailers had been employed until rail transport was provided.

Truck transportation in early October centered at St. Loup, between the railhead at Vesoul and Seventh Army Headquarters at Epinal. It was the responsibility of trucking units to transfer supplies from rail unloading points and move them forward to depots and dumps. Separate dispatch teams were organized to control army trucks at these points. As rail facilities were extended to the Epinal region, dispatch teams moved forward to the new dumps and army supply points near Epinal.

Although long convoys had largely been discontinued by this time, one additional convoy of 220 trucks was organized on 24 October and was dispatched to Cherbourg, a distance of some 300 miles, to bring 2,500 replacements to the Seventh Army. During the absence of this

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equipment, three new divisions earmarked for the Seventh Army arrived at Marseille. It was necessary to borrow the organic equipment of XV and VI Corps to transport them to the army area.

Plans for a retrograde movement were prepared late in December in accordance with an Army G-2 report that an enemy drive similar to that in the Ardennes sector was expected in the area between Ingwiller Gap and Sarrebourg. The Colmar area was threatened by attack in a possible enemy effort to cut off Strasbourg. To meet such a situation, plans were made to evacuate all troops east of the Vosges Mountains. Six parallel highway networks were to be used for the movement.

The most serious problem that beset the ordnance maintenance section was the lack of parts that made it necessary to deadline vehicles until they could be secured by special shipment. The rapid use of rolling equipment had made it impossible to build up any reserve of spare parts and major assemblies. In some instances, organizations, particularly armored units, newly arrived from the States, had lost some of their organizational equipment, including specialized tank repair tools, since the material had been loaded on a different ship from that carrying the unit.

The receipt of major replacement items was insufficient as late as 25 November, which resulted in the issue of practically all reserve vehicles and an increase in the number of deadlined vehicles. One of the most critically short supplies was truck tires. So acute was the shortage that a shipment from Base Section on 25 November of 3,000 tires for one-quarter ton trucks was classed as only temporary relief of this item. During the campaign in November army ordnance reports indicated that the demands for major replacement items were high and that reserves of most combat vehicles were completely exhausted. At the request of Sixth Army Group to SOLOC, it was suggested that the shop facilities of ETOUSA be called upon to make repairs on the large number of cargo vehicles of Seventh Army deadlined for lack of parts. The ordnance base shop at Dijon was made available to Seventh Army to handle some third and fourth echelon maintenance.

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### Special Support Problems

In the Vosges campaign the services of supply faced and solved several special problems in the support of infantry troops. Rugged terrain and winter weather added to the difficulties of getting supplies to the front line soldier. Adequate communications were maintained only by the full and complementary employment of several methods. At times, when German counterattacks had temporarily isolated units on the line, it was necessary to resort to improvisation in re-supply.

On 2 October the VI Corps Commander had requested that the two pack trains held in Italy for the Seventh Army be shipped to France and upon arrival be attached to the VI Corps. On 23 November the 513th Pack Quartermaster Company was assigned to VI Corps for operations. The company included 300 animals and a veterinary detachment. The animals were requisitioned for use in operations in the Vosges Mountains. Although transported over a long distance by ship and train, they arrived in the corps area in satisfactory condition and were held in the Saverne area in reserve.

The mule trains were divided between the 45th and 103rd Infantry Divisions. An account from the 157th Infantry Regiment of the 45th Division provides the picture of how the animals were employed:

With the companies pushing forward over mountainous terrain inaccessible to vehicles, the regiment for the third time in its combat history began utilization of pack mules, which each night hauled supplies to the troops while under the cover of darkness. Regular army mules handled by experienced negro mule skimmers made up the pack trains, a far cry from those employed by the regiment in Sicily and Italy where all and any available animals were used for supply and "skimmers" were drawn from the line companies.

Forage for the mules was difficult, as there were no adequate facilities for feeding or watering the animals near the front. Most of the supplies carried by the animals were rations and ammunition for infantry rifle or heavy weapons companies. The fact that most of the packing was done at night to escape enemy observation made it necessary that experienced men be used. Little or no difficulty was

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experienced with mines or trip wires, as mule trains carried supplies forward.

Aerial re-supply was necessary in one instance during the winter campaign to subsist and provide ammunition for troops which were isolated, although air transport was employed on other occasions to supplement surface transportation. Air supply of .30 caliber ammunition in early October had relieved a critical shortage in the ammunition supply point at Brote. Airborne troops had relied upon this source for supply during an initial phase of the invasion. On 26 October, however, the first call of the army was made on air transport to re-supply part of a battalion which had been isolated by the enemy.

Elements of the 1st Battalion of the 141st Infantry Regiment near La Houssiere had been out of contact for four days when the 36th Infantry Division called for aerial re-supply. The enemy had cut supply routes. All attempts to establish a line of communication had failed, with the exception of a relatively few rounds of type D rations (chocolate bars) which had been fired into the area by the 131st Field Artillery. Intermittent radio contact was maintained.

Air transport troops met some difficulties in the re-supply endeavor. The first drop was attempted at 1100 hours on 27 October by four planes of the 371st Fighter Bomber Group but was unsuccessful. Bad weather hindered the flight and resulted in the loss of one plane. Weather was still poor on 28 October but after several unsuccessful attempts four planes succeeded in dropping rations and radio batteries within reach of the troops. In the early part of the afternoon one plane was shot down by friendly anti-aircraft fire. The weather on the morning of 29 October had improved considerably, and 15 planes dropped their packets of supply in the battalion area. This drop supplied troops with 155 cases of K rations; 3 medical units including plasma; 1 day supply of .30 caliber, .45 caliber, and carbine ammunition; 50 gallons of water; and one unit of radio batteries. Later the same day four P-47s landed seven packets containing ammunition in the battalion area.

Contact was made with the isolated group shortly after this last drop by the aircraft, and certain facts became available regarding

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the success of the supply effort. Air drops were received in satisfactory condition, but in retrieving the supplies the men were subjected to enemy fire and disclosed their own positions. A message was received via radio from the isolated battalion the day before the 442nd Regimental Combat Team succeeded in breaking through to their positions: "Have supplies for three days. No Halazone. Low on ammunition. How do you treat trenchfoot. Please drop socks, foot powder and Halazone . . ."

Enemy anti-aircraft fire and extremely poor weather over the target, revealed by an air photo showing 10/10 clouds over the drop area, made the flying of this mission hazardous. Of flights scheduled for three consecutive days, only one flight was carried through with sufficient visibility. A drop made over the target area by instrument flying was apparently unsuccessful, since the unit was unable to locate the supplies. On 16 November, when information was received that the 1st Battalion of the 399th Infantry, 100th Division, had been separated from other elements of the unit by enemy action, a new mission for aerial re-supply was originated. All preliminaries had been completed for an attempted drop to this battalion, when contact was reestablished with the regiment.

The Signal Corps met its problems during the fighting in the Vosges by using all available methods of communications. Radio, which had been depended on to such a great extent during the advance through southern France, was largely replaced by wire communications. At army and corps levels radio was used chiefly as an emergency means of communications during October. However, artillery, engineer, tank-destroyer, and infantry units constantly requested additional radios. Teletype service now began to carry the large bulk of army messages. The addition of elements of three new divisions to the Seventh Army in December seriously threatened the efficiency of army communications. The army signal officer stated that "close cooperation of Corps and Division Signal Officers, the employment of the divisions as separate regiments, and good fortune tactically averted serious signal complications." The new units arrived without division signal companies making it necessary to stretch previously committed signal units. Field wire was critically short during this period, requiring a system of rationing instituted on 18 November.

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With the advent of winter came particular problems for supporting arms and services. Weather forced rapid adaptability in the use of equipment. It became necessary, for example, to winterize the water cooling systems of all vehicles. These supplies had been excluded from phased requisitions for the first 60 days in order to meet the limited tonnage available for ordnance Class II and Class IV supplies. Anti-freeze was first ordered by radio as early as 4 September for an emergency air shipment to the 1st Airborne Task Force. Other shipments were expected, but the supply of anti-freeze to the army was insufficient until 30 November.

Other supporting units, in addition to ordnance, were affected by wet, winter weather. Soggy ground required the use of a steel landing mat for air artillery observation planes. The lack of these mats in the first part of November threatened to curtail air liaison observation for the field artillery in forward areas. All traffic, ground as well as air, was affected by increasing snowfall in the Vosges Mountains. The ordnance section of Seventh Army found it necessary to issue administrative instructions on the employment of safe driving methods.

At the direction of Sixth Army Group, SOLOC initiated a study of the overall situation of winter operation in relation to the proper grades of fuel, lubricant, and grease necessary to meet winter driving conditions. A moderation in the weather toward the latter part of November limited the immediate need for winter lubricants, which was very fortunate since none of the winter grades had been made available from Base Section. As a result of the SOLOC survey an estimated 210,000 gallons of winter-grade lubricants would be needed for the period 20 November to 20 December. The shipment of the required lubricants began on 30 November. Units operating under conditions of extreme cold at a time when no winter grade lubricants were available were furnished conversion figures for blending available greases with a percentage of V-80 gasoline to serve until winter supplies were received. It was anticipated that this type of operation would cause an increase in the depreciation of starting batteries and motors and would result in increased maintenance of engines, transmissions, and differentials.

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The engineers reported trouble with the T6E1 mines; they were finding ice and dirt in the fuze cavity. The fuze would not seat properly; and, when the cap was screwed back on, the mine would detonate. To rectify the trouble engineer personnel inspected all of this type of mine in the army supply points, cleaning all fuzes and storing them in a face down position. This additional service prevented future trouble.

Winter fighting through mountainous terrain exacted a heavy toll of material, the replacement of which was difficult, sometimes next to impossible. Losses of armored vehicles and tanks posed problems during the latter portion of the period, as casualties exceeded available reserves. From D-Day through December losses were recorded of 213 medium tanks, 63 light tanks, and 158 armored vehicles, including half-tracks. Army sources were overextended to replace them. In early December the Seventh Army G-4 recommended that replacements for the 2nd French Armored Division be furnished through CONAD and advised that losses of the American 14th Armored Division alone would absorb all reserves if replaced completely. Concurrently, the 15-day reserve of combat vehicles was insufficient to replace losses; and army requested SOLOC for an increased special reserve. Vehicles due out to fill losses generally reflected an upward trend; and by the end of the year units of the army were short 25 light armored cars, M8; 15 3 inch gun motor carriages, M10; three 90mm gun motor carriages, M36; 53 medium tanks, M4, with 75 or 76mm gun; 26 medium tanks, M4 series, with 105mm howitzer; and 72 utility armored vehicles, T41. Replacement of armored combat vehicles was one of the principal problems of supply.

Substantial losses were incurred in passenger and cargo transportation vehicles, including 302 6x6 trucks and 627 one-quarter ton passenger trucks. Unreplaced losses at the end of the year amounted to 115 one-quarter ton trucks, 305 one and one-half ton cargo trucks, and 221 two and one-half ton trucks. Ordnance continued to find maintenance and replacement of passenger and cargo vehicles a serious problem.

Losses in small arms weapons by the end of the year had resulted in a critical shortage of only one type, the .30 caliber machine

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gun, of which 327 were due out with none on hand in army stock. The loss of 278 machine guns of .50 caliber since D-Day had been replaced. Also replaced were 1,824 caliber .45 submachine guns, 2,684 caliber .45 pistols, 4,701 carbines, 585 caliber .30 automatic rifles, and 3,949 caliber .30 M1 rifles.

Losses of artillery pieces, while not great in quantity, were felt keenly because the number of weapons in action was never considered adequate. Replacements were made during the period, so that at the end of the year there was no shortage. Army ordnance had replaced four 155mm guns, ten 105mm howitzers, eleven 155mm howitzers, and five 75mm pack howitzers. In the meantime, the army had destroyed substantially greater numbers of comparable pieces of enemy equipment. In captured material which was serviceable and ready for use when ammunition could be acquired, the army had eight 88mm guns, a half-track vehicle mounting a 75mm gun, and two other 75mm guns. Captured material was channeled by the unit which captured it through army to Base Section for use in equipping the French Forces of the Interior or recruits for the expanding French Army. There were some instances, however, in which American troops used enemy equipment against its makers, such as the automatic 20mm and 88mm dual purpose gun to furnish anti-aircraft protection to advanced landing strips for artillery liaison planes.

Material captured from the retreating enemy in the Vosges was relatively small in quantity, although the seizure of Strasbourg uncovered substantial stores, the handling of which taxed army facilities. Some supplies were found in warehouses and arsenals in the Saverne-Strasbourg-Haguenau area, but many of them possessed little or no military value. Construction supplies captured in German engineer dumps at Obernai and Russ, however, were used to a maximum extent by the army, as were the few serviceable motor transports obtained from time to time.

#### Supply and the Individual Soldier

The advent of cold and inclement weather with the approach of winter imposed additional supply difficulties on a system already

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under the strain of meeting current demands for ammunition, fuel, and rations. The needs of the soldier in the foxhole for adequate protection against the winter focused the attention of supply services on the procurement of individual clothing and equipment.

Although the army quartermaster had phased in supply and maintenance of winter clothing for the troops who had come ashore with the lightest possible combat packs, shipments of clothing and other quartermaster Class II items had been curtailed while gasoline and rations had been given higher priority to support the army during its first month of operations. The sudden approach of wet and cold weather prompted the army G-4 on 12 September to order all units arriving over the beaches to unload organic equipment and haul one load of supplies to forward army dumps, returning to bring their own equipment forward. Of the tonnage thus made available, the quartermaster was allocated 50 percent, of which 40 percent was given over to clothing, blankets, and other Class II items. Expedited movement of winter supplies thus enabled the quartermaster to make an initial issue of woolen underwear on 23 September.

Addition of the XV Corps and supporting troops added to the problem of supplying winter clothing and equipment. During the planning phase of the operation the army quartermaster had requisitioned Class II items based on the DRAGOON troop list and the then anticipated expansion of the army. At the time of the actual receipt of these supplies the army troop strength had so increased that 100 percent issue would be impossible until subsequently requisitioned stocks had been received. Under these conditions the quartermaster determined that issues could be made on a basis of 75 percent of command strength with a priority established to assure that combat troops would be the first to receive winter clothing. Upon combat unit commanders was imposed the responsibility of determining which 25 percent of their command could best operate, based on the nature of their duties, without special winter clothing during the interim.

A trickle of issues during the early part of October developed into a larger volume which, before the end of the month, had provided an overcoat, two sets of woolen underwear, an additional blanket, and

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a pair of woolen gloves per man in combat units. Along with a pair of shoe pacs and three pairs of ski socks, some other items of special winter equipment were made available for the front line infantryman. Late in the month initial issues were made of a new field jacket with high neck sweater to be worn underneath the jacket.

Toward the goal of providing a complete issue to all troops the Seventh Army Quartermaster continued distribution during November on a percentage basis of field jackets and sweaters, shoe pacs or overshoes, sleeping bags with cases, and combat jackets and trousers for the armored elements. By the end of the month the army G-4 reported that divisions had received a full issue of sleeping bags and winter clothing, together with 97 percent of their requirements for shoepacs or arctic overshoes. Issues continued as stocks were made available. In late December the army issued to each of its seven operating divisions 4,000 mountain type sleeping bags, designed for protection against much lower temperatures than the wool bag. To each of five divisions were issued 3,700 pile liners for the field jacket, a warmer item than the sweater. Some issues had already been made of hoods for field jackets and the new style field trousers, which were to be worn over wool trousers. But the slowness of receipts of some special items of winter equipment had delayed issue to troops needing them, resulting in some instances of combat elements being subjected unnecessarily to adverse winter weather without the fullest protection that would have been provided. While maintenance of items introduced as standard issue was satisfactory, there was an apparent delay in introduction of an item for initial use.

Combat troops were sleeping on wet ground in clothes that were soaked with mud. The army quartermaster could provide an original issue of winter clothing; but he could not provide a means for drying it once it became soaked, unless the divisions could pull their combat units back long enough to issue a complete change. The wet, dirty clothes then could be turned in, laundered, and held for the next unit that came back. In this way a small surplus was made to cover a large number of troops.

New issues of winter clothing alleviated to some extent the

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discomforts of the soldier in the line. Overcoats issued to combat troops, however, proved to be too bulky for men at the front. Sleeping bags were accepted with varying degrees of enthusiasm; the main complaint was that it was impossible to keep them clean and difficult to get in and out of the bag. As of 24 December a shortage of shelterhalf tents and raincoats became apparent. This was serious since all army service and combat troops were subject to sleeping in the open and on the ground, during which time the shelterhalf was used to keep the bed-roll or blankets clean as well as to provide insulation between the body and the wet ground.

Whenever possible, a provision was made for the use of stoves. The oil burner for use in tents was issued first to hospitals, which were equipped completely by 1 December. As early as October the demand for all types of fuels for heating purposes had increased with rainy weather and the approach of winter. Units in the field had purchased stoves from civilian sources and improvised others. It was originally planned to issue divisions one pound of coal per man per day, but insufficient quantities were available and this basis was soon changed. Units conserved all combustible materials from waste piles for use as fuel, such as ammunition crates; but sufficient amounts were not available to meet the demand and it was necessary to obtain wood from local sources many times during the month. This was especially necessary to continue in operation shower units, sterilization and bath units, and other personnel health centers. No coal was procured from local sources because of restrictions against purchase or the taking of coal from civilians.

In November the Conservateur de Forets of the French Government directed the release of 9,500 cubic meters of wood to the Seventh Army. Further exploitation of wood supply was made in the Neufchateau area, which yielded 270 truck loads of wood by 28 November. Coal was supplied by CONAD at the rate of 300 tons per day, permitting an increase in the coal allowance to two pounds per man per day in addition to the wood ration. Reconnaissance made of the availability of coal in all forward areas located 40,000 tons near Strasbourg and 600 tons in Bischwiller during the first half of December, but

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much of this fuel was needed by local civilian industries which were employed in the manufacture of sand bags for army use. The majority of coal mines in the area had been flooded beyond immediate rehabilitation, while others were without rail service making a potential source available but not taking care of immediate needs.

As the campaign in Alsace continued through the months of November and December, combat troops were fighting the elements as much as the enemy. Snowfalls and freezing temperatures alternated with thaws and rain. The air was cold and raw. Soldiers of the Seventh Army made the best of a difficult situation, getting their food and warmth and sleep wherever they could find them. The service of supply worked to provide minimum comforts for the soldier and to keep essential military supplies at the front. Throughout the period the Seventh Army had to hold as a primary purpose the building up of reserves for a coming offensive against Germany.



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## CHAPTER XXII

*The Last German Offensive*

The German army struck in the closing hours of the old year with fanatical force. The 17th SS Panzer Grenadier Division spearheaded one attack group, its initial objective being the town of Rohrbach in the



LOOKING SOUTH FROM BITCHE

The enemy struck southward from the Bitche area in the low Vosges Mountains.

eastern Sarre Valley. It was supported by two other divisions, the 19th Infantry Division and 36th Volks Grenadier Divisions on its right. The

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559th, 361st, and 256th Volks Grenadier Divisions comprised another attack group and struck southward from the Bitche area in the Low Vosges Mountains.

Before recounting the German attack in detail, it is perhaps appropriate to recapitulate briefly the situation on Seventh Army's front and to sum up what has been learned subsequently, from captured documents and other sources, of actual German battle plans. It has already been stated that on 29 December Seventh Army G-2 estimated that the Germans would launch a series of limited objective attacks for the purpose of keeping Seventh Army under sufficient pressure to prevent it from sending troops north against the Ardennes salient, or, as the next probability, that they would attack south from the Bitche-Sarreguemines area with from five to eight divisions to seize the Saverne and Ingwiller passes, to fan out to destroy the Seventh Army in the Rhine Valley, and to recapture Alsace. Such a drive, it had been foreseen, might well be coordinated with a drive northward from the Colmar bridgehead and the establishment of a Rhine bridgehead in the Gambsheim area. The Seventh Army preparations for defense had been intensified accordingly. During the early part of the last ten days of December VI Corps had begun to prepare an alternate main line of resistance along the Maginot Line. Both VI Corps and XV Corps had been preparing counterattacks against possible enemy penetrations as well as consolidating lines of defense.

During the last two days of the month these preparations were completed. A radio message from Sixth Army Group received on 30 December warned

that a hostile attack against your flank west of Bitche may force you to give ground from your main position. To meet such a possibility, it is necessary that your west flank be protected by a reserve battle position. With this in mind, reconnaissance and organization of a reserve battle position will be instituted without delay along high ground on the general line: Hill east of Landroff — Benestroff — Sarre-Union — Ingwiller. One half of each division and attached troops currently earmarked as SHAEF reserve, located in your area, may be employed at any given period of time to assist in organization of ground provided that troops so employed can be reassembled and prepared for movement on six hours' notice.



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These directives were carried out by New Year's Eve. XV Corps prepared its secondary main line of resistance with its western part in the Maginot Line. The SHAEF earmarked units, the 36th Division and the 12th Armored Division, plus the 2nd French Armored Division upon its arrival in the Seventh Army area were ordered to be ready to counter-attack against enemy penetrations.

Both corps planned to defend on their forward lines until ordered to withdraw and then to fight delaying actions to the secondary line. The 14th Armored Division in VI Corps reserve was ordered to move to the vicinity of Phalsbourg and to prepare to counterattack to the northwest in the XV Corps sector, or to the southeast toward Selestat. On the Seventh Army's left flank Third Army was "limiting the enemy offensive and . . . preparing to counterattack." On the right the French First Army contained the Colmar Pocket and prepared defensive positions in depth.

On New Year's Eve General Patch visited the XV Corps command post at Fenetrange and there warned both the XV Corps and the VI Corps Commanding Generals that an enemy attack was to be expected during the early hours of New Year's Day. Official holiday celebrations were cancelled. Preparations had already been made to move the Seventh Army command post from Saverne to Luneville, a more central position for the direction of both XV and VI Corps defense. This move was completed on 2 January, after the Germans had launched their initial assault.

#### The German Plan

German documents subsequently captured revealed that the German High Command West apparently had concluded from Allied withdrawal of bridgeheads in the Sarre area that forces on this front south from the Ardennes to the Rhine had been weakened. On 21 December German Army Group G was directed to exploit this situation, specifically through local attacks and preparations for a surprise attack to regain the Saverne Gap. Signal operations instructions issued on 25 December designated the new operation by the code word *Nordwind*.

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The objective of the operation was to gain the Saverne Gap in the Phalsbourg-Saverne sector in order to annihilate Seventh Army forces in northern Alsace and to secure a juncture with the German Nineteenth Army. For this purpose two attack groups were to be readied. The first group was to attack from east of the Blies River toward the south in order to breach the Maginot Line at Rohrbach and there to make a junction with the right flank of the second group for a thrust against Phalsbourg. The second group was to attack from east of Bitche toward the south in several spearheads and then to link up with the first group, after which, depending on the situation, both were to attack either east or west or south toward the Phalsbourg-Saverne line.


On 26 December German High Command West informed Army Group G of the Fuehrer's request that the efforts of the right attack group be undertaken in such a way that with cover for its right flank against the Sarre River and with cover for its left flank against Saverne it could quickly reach the highway leading to the Phalsbourg-Saverne axis. Therefore it was necessary to move the right flank of the XIII SS Army Corps westward to Bliesbruck on the Blies River. From there the attack of Group I could be launched south by way of Woelfling, thence southeast to Rohrbach and the road net south of Rohrbach. The 25th Panzer Grenadier Division and the 21st Panzer Division were designated as reserves. They were to be so situated in the northern area that after the breakthrough they could be shoved rapidly south past Group I, then theoretically at Rohrbach.

As early as 22 December it was proposed to support the operations of Army Group G by employing special forces east of the Rhine which had been brought together under Army Group Oberrhein. The commander of this army group was instructed to support Operation *Nordwind* by shocktroop tactics and to assist in the establishment of bridgeheads north and south of Strasbourg. By 26 December it was decided that the attack over the upper Rhine was not to begin until 48 hours after the initial assault. At the same time a diversionary attack to the north on the Third Army front was called off. On the next day more detailed plans revealed that the Oberrhein command was to be committed only when the armored spearheads of the assault forces



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driving south from Bitche had arrived at the eastern exits of the Vosges in the Ingwiller-Saverne area. After having established its bridgehead across the Rhine north of Strasbourg the Oberrhein Army Group was to aid in the destruction of Seventh Army troops isolated in Alsace by attempting a juncture with Groups I and II which would be turning east from the Vosges Mountains to the Haguenau-Brumath area. The Fuehrer ordered the initial attack for operation Nordwind to start at 2300 hours on 31 December 1944.

### The Initial Blows

On 31 December Seventh Army occupied an 84 mile front from the Rhine to a point a few miles west of Saarbruecken and a flank along the Rhine north and south of Strasbourg. VI Corps held positions on the right from the Rhine River to Bitche with the 79th and 45th Infantry Divisions in the line and the 14th Armored Division less one combat command in reserve. On the VI Corps left flank, holding a front of about ten miles in the Low Vosges, was Task Force Hudelson. On the left flank of Task Force Hudelson XV Corps maintained a line west to within a few miles of Saarbruecken employing the 100th, 44th, and 103rd Infantry Divisions with the 106th Cavalry Group on the left flank. The greater part of the Rhine flank, extending for about 40 miles, was a responsibility of Task Force Herren and Task Force Linden. These task forces were composed of infantry elements of the 70th and 42nd Infantry Divisions respectively, whose supporting troops had not yet arrived in the army area.

The 44th Infantry Division of the American VI Corps deployed between Sarreguemines and Rimling bore the full impetus of the enemy's right flank drive. In the space of a few hours the entire divisional front was engaged. On the left flank between Sarreguemines and Felpersviller the 114th Infantry Regiment with the aid of concentrated artillery fire smothered a determined enemy effort to exploit his Blies River bridgehead at the bend north of the Sarreguemines airport. In the center the enemy attempted three crossings southeast of Habkirchen without success, as the 324th Infantry Regiment held inviolate the line of the Blies River.

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The enemy unleashed the full fury of his attack against the 71st Infantry Regiment which held a line extending from Bliesbruck eastward to Rimling. A five company assault north of Rimling curled



RIMLING AREA

*The enemy unleashed the full fury of his attack against the 71st Infantry Regiment which held a line extending from Bliesbruck eastward to Rimling . . .*

about the right flank of the 2nd Battalion forcing a withdrawal of about 1,000 yards. The 3rd Battalion of the 71st Infantry moved out to help restore the overrun positions. However, three companies of the enemy had driven through the 1st Battalion on the regimental left flank and had penetrated the Bliesbrucken woods 2,000 yards to the rear of the lines. The 3rd Battalion was diverted to meet this penetration and plunged into a pitched battle in the forest. Although assisted by a reserve battalion of the 324th Infantry, troops of the 71st Regiment failed to dislodge the enemy from his positions in the woods; but they contained his penetration and reformed the line along the southern edge of the forest.

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Elements of the 2nd Battalion aided by a platoon of tanks restored "their original positions" by 0600 hours on 1 January only to be dislodged again at 0730 hours. A see-saw battle raged throughout the



GROS REDERCHING

*At the eastern edge of the forest, the line slanted southeast for over two miles to cover the northeastern approaches to Gros Rederching . . .*

day. At nightfall the right flank of the battalion rested on Maronviller farm, which was attacked and set afire in the middle of the night. This action necessitated an additional withdrawal to a north-south line one mile west of Rimling. Here the 2nd Battalion covered the readjustment of the remainder of the regiment before being placed in reserve. After dislodging or destroying isolated enemy groups behind the lines, reorganized troops established a line which ran west-east just below the Bois de Blies Brucken. At the eastern edge of the forest the line slanted southeast for over two miles to cover the northeastern approaches to Gros Rederching. The 3rd Battalion of the 253rd Infantry, which had

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been one unit of the recently disbanded Task Force Harris, was attached to the 71st Infantry and sent into the line on the right; the 1st Battalion of the 71st Regiment was in the center and the 3rd Battalion on the left.

During the night of 1-2 January XV Corps had ordered the 12th Armored Division to establish and maintain a counter-reconnaissance screen west of the Sarre River and south of the Maginot Line to neutralize any infiltration of enemy armor. East of the Sarre River Combat Command A of the 14th Armored Division was given a similar mission which the 2nd French Armored Division was to be prepared to take over on 2 January. This relief was completed, and French armor



MAGINOT LINE SOUTH OF GROS REDERCHING

"... XV Corps ordered the 12th Armored Division to establish and maintain a counter-reconnaissance screen west of the Sarre River and south of the Maginot Line ..."

blocked the western end of the Vosges passages from Meisenthal south to Phalsbourg. The unit also prepared to counterattack either in the direction of Drulingen-Sarre-Union, or along the line Drulingen-Rahling. Armor was poised for an equalizing blow should it be required.

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On 3 January the line of the 71st Regiment was again assailed by enemy tanks and infantry. The 2nd Battalion of the 114th Regiment, now also attached to the 71st Infantry, helped the 3rd Battalion of the 253rd Infantry to stabilize the situation after the latter unit had been pushed back a few miles. Although the 71st Infantry had been able to weld its elements into a line capable of withstanding severe enemy attack, strong enemy groups appeared behind that line. Elements of the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 255th Infantry, the second regiment of Task Force Harris to be attached to XV Corps, supported by Combat Command L of the 2nd French Armored Division, were required to stop the gap and to recapture Aachen which is three miles southwest of Gros Rederching. The appearance of powerful armored reserves at this point of penetration and the severe losses that the enemy had suffered during these attacks may have been factors in the German decision at High Command level to curtail the Sarre offensive.

Remnants of the enemy in the vicinity of Aachen were eliminated on 4 January as the 2nd Battalion of the 71st Infantry made its way south toward the town, while the 2nd Battalion of the 255th Infantry cleared Aachen itself. The enemy in this sector became active again when elements of Combat Command L were driven from Gros Rederching by American tanks manned by Germans. After repelling an effort by the 2nd Battalion of the 71st Infantry to retake Gros Rederching the enemy withdrew. The Sarre pincer of Operation Nordwind had failed in its mission.

#### Drive Southeast of Bitche

Caught between the Sarre drive of German attack Group I and the drive near Bitche of German attack Group II was the 100th Infantry Division, holding the line on New Year's Eve between Rimling and Bitche. The initial German onslaught had swirled about both flanks of the division. A successful prosecution of the enemy plan would have cut the division off. As the situation developed, the 397th Infantry on the left flank was obliged to fight hard to hold Rimling against the assault of Group I. The division's right flank was exposed when the 117th

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Reconnaissance Squadron of Task Force Hudelson was forced back to the line Lemberg-Mouterhouse by the attack of Group II. The 399th Infantry Regiment then had to retire from the high ground south of



KNOCKED OUT GERMAN TANK IN RIMLING AREA

*the 397th Infantry on the left flank was obliged to fight hard to hold Rimling against the assault of Group I*

Bitche which compelled the divisional right flank to bend southward to guard against the enemy threat from the east.

Since this movement greatly extended the flank, the 3rd Battalion of the 255th Infantry was put in to bolster the line. At the end of 1 January the 141st Infantry Regiment of the 36th Division relieved the 399th Regiment and the 3rd Battalion of the 255th Regiment from responsibility for the southern end of the flank and took positions on the line Sarreinsberg-Goetzenbruck-Lemberg. The 100th Division had been forced to form what was in effect a "second front" south to Sarreinsberg at a right angle with the original divisional front which extended from Rimling to the vicinity of Bitche.

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The enemy maintained a constant pressure expressed by countless probing attacks along the "new" front until 5 January. However, the stubborn fighting qualities of the defenders plus the early dispatch



WHITE PHOSPHORUS SHELLS LAND ON ENEMY POSITIONS  
IN EGUELSHARDT

*Task Force Hudelson was holding a line extending from a point just south of Bitche east through Eguelshardt*

of reinforcing elements stabilized the situation. For the remainder of the period the enemy showed little inclination to continue the attack, but reacted fiercely to attempted aggression by our troops against the upper shoulder of the Bitche salient.

On the left flank of VI Corps holding a front of about ten miles in the Low Vosges was a group of miscellaneous units known in the aggregate as Task Force Hudelson. Most important of these units were Combat Command R of the 14th Armored Division less one tank battalion, Company B of the 645th Tank Destroyer Battalion, Company B of the 3rd Chemical Mortar Battalion, and the 117th Cavalry Recon-

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naissance Squadron. Task Force Hudelson was holding a line extending from a point just south of Bitche east through Eguelshardt and Neunhoffer with the 117th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron on the left, the



GERMAN POSITIONS IN THE WOODS NEAR EGUELSHARDT

*Although the terrain was rugged, Task Force Hudelson's lines were "paper thin."*

94th Cavalry Squadron in the center, and 62nd Armored Infantry Battalion on the right.

As the new year began the enemy 256th and 361st Volks Grenadier Divisions moved southeast in a two pronged drive from Bitche without mortar or artillery preparation. The western column constituted the main enemy effort, though constant heavy pressure was maintained in the east and strong enemy infiltrations occurred there. Although the terrain was rugged, Task Force Hudelson's lines were "paper thin." In the center the 94th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron was attacked shortly after midnight, but the enemy withheld his strength until 0530 hours. Troops of the reconnaissance squadron then attempted to establish

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a position along the Mouterhouse-Baerenthal road. However, they found the Mouterhouse-Baerenthal road already cut by the enemy. The American lines had been overwhelmed; the enemy was everywhere; there remained only the expedient of forming small groups to effect an escape by flight.

To the east the forward groups of the 62nd Armored Infantry Battalion withdrew to the Bannstein-Philippsbourg highway to avoid envelopment. The enemy pushed against the lines, and German armor was observed to be approaching Bannstein from the northwest. Half-tracks of the 19th Armored Infantry Battalion, joined by vehicles of the 117th and 94th Cavalry units, moved southeast toward Philippsbourg. Meanwhile, other elements of the 62nd Battalion, their front lines riddled by the enemy, retired to Bannstein where they maintained a perimeter defense until 1130 hours the following morning, 2 January. They then withdrew by infiltration southeast to Baerenthal. By this time the enemy had gained partial control of the Philippsbourg-Bannstein highway and were threatening both Philippsbourg and Baerenthal.

On the left flank of the Hudelson Task Force the bulk of the 117th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron had been hit hard and virtually surrounded at Mouterhouse. The situation here became obscure to task force and corps commanders, as communications with reconnaissance troops were maintained only with the greatest difficulty. The enemy had overrun their forward positions north of Mouterhouse in the early stages of the offensive. Withdrawal from a second defensive line under heavy enemy pressure was accomplished during 1 January. The squadron command post, which had been in Mouterhouse, was reestablished in Wingen; and by the end of the day the 117th Cavalry had drawn back to final defensive positions which were maintained. On the morning of 2 January the 179th Infantry was brought up and disposed along the line already held.

Farther east the task force employed the larger part of its reserves to relieve pressure on the right flank. The 62nd Armored Infantry Battalion had established positions which held Philippsbourg safe until the 275th Infantry of the 70th Division could be moved up to the line to assume control. After the enemy attack near Bannstein which

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ultimately breached positions in this area, the 19th Armored Infantry Battalion and a medium tank company of the 25th Tank Battalion had set up, under task force orders, a perimeter defense around Baerenthal. The Task Force command post pulled back at dusk southwest to Reipertswiller. The enemy continued to pour through; in mid-afternoon a force of perhaps 500 troops was observed two miles west of Baerenthal. Before the end of the day countermeasures were taken. A battalion of the 313th Infantry Regiment of the 79th Division had moved in north of Reipertswiller to check advances in that zone; and a battalion of the 275th Infantry Regiment, which had been attached to the 45th Division, was placed in position southeast of Baerenthal to block that axis.

Still farther to the east the initial enemy thrust of Group II was met by troops of the 45th Division who joined Task Force Hudelson in a defense anchor at Neunhoffen. This attack was contained just west of Neunhoffen by the 157th Infantry Regiment of the 45th Division. Further attempts at infiltration in force between Philippsbourg and Obersteinbach were repulsed with heavy enemy casualties. These actions aided in delimiting what was to be known as the enemy's "Bitche Salient."

During the first few days of the new year the 45th Division was strenuously engaged in regrouping its organic forces and the numerous units which had been recently attached preparatory to taking command of the Low Vosges sector and neutralizing the enemy thrust. To minimize the effects of a possible complete collapse of the Low Vosges front Combat Command B of the 14th Armored Division established a counter-reconnaissance screen studded with roadblocks in the wooded mountain passes along the line Neuwiller-Ingwiller-Rothbach-Zinswiller-Niederbronn which extended along the eastern edge of the Low Vosges Massif.

On 2 January the 179th Infantry Regiment moved by motor to the corps left flank and established itself on a line two miles north of Wingen. On this flank the enemy succeeded in establishing a roadblock on the Meisenthal-Wimmenau road which separated two battalions of the 179th Regiment. A few miles to the east the enemy pushed a two-company attack from the north along the two parallel roads leading into

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Reipertswiller. The attack was stopped by elements of the 313th Regiment. Late in the day a battalion of the 314th Infantry Regiment arrived to bolster the Wildenguth-Reipertswiller line.

On the eastern shoulder of the salient of 2 January the 275th Infantry Regiment held the Baerenthal-Zinswiller and the Bannstein-Niederbronn passes. On the road southeast of Baerenthal two attacks by an estimated 200 to 300 enemy supported by armor were repelled. In the pass to the north the enemy manifested little aggressiveness, thereby enabling troops of the 275th Regiment to establish positions on the road northwest of Philippsbourg. Sarreinsberg on the west, Reipertswiller in the center, and Baerenthal-Philippsbourg on the east shoulder of the salient became the focal points of action as 2 January came to a close. Identification of elements of the 6th SS Mountain Division indicated that the enemy was investing considerable strength in his Low Vosges assault. The prompt appearance of Seventh Army reserves, however, was depriving the situation of its fluidity. The outlines of the salient had been formed and were hardening.

On 3 January the enemy made a determined effort to enlarge his Bitche salient. The counterattack of the 179th Regiment on the left flank was met head on. Heavy inconclusive fighting, in which elements of the 21st Panzer Division were identified, ensued. In the nose of the salient elements of the 361st Volks Grenadier Division attacked Reipertswiller from the north, northwest, and due west. A small group of the enemy managed to infiltrate south of the town, but in general these attacks were contained. On the eastern shoulder the 476th Panzer Grenadier Regiment overran forward positions of the 275th Regiment to reach Philippsbourg.

The enemy's incessant hammering against the walls of the salient drew the 180th and 276th Infantry Regiments to this sector. The 179th Regiment retained its positions on the left flank near Sarreinsberg. South of this point the 276th Infantry Regiment arrived to set up a security line and to clear Wingen of the estimated 200 troops who had infiltrated during the night of 3-4 January. The 276th Regiment fought its way to the outskirts of Wingen by 2130 hours on 4 January.

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The 180th Infantry Regiment was pulled out of the Maginot Line in the east and moved into the Reipertswiller sector to clear the area west and southwest of the town of those enemy elements which had infiltrated through the lines. A line one mile southwest of Reipertswiller was established despite heavy resistance offered by the enemy. Shortly after this attack, and perhaps because of it, pressure decreased in this area; the 313th Infantry was able to reestablish contact with elements cut off in Wildenguth.

On the eastern shoulder of the salient the 275th Infantry re-established on 4 January the positions and communications which had been disorganized by the previous day's fighting. Philippsbourg was made secure, but an effort to extend the line northwest was stopped at the edge of the town. At the southwest end of the 275th's diagonal line fighting in the vicinity of Baerenthal was heavy but inconclusive.

#### The Bitche Salient Formed

On 5 January the 179th Infantry continued to exert steady pressure on the German forces in the Meisenthal-Sarreinsberg area, maintaining roadblocks and throwing back minor enemy attempts at infiltration. On the following day the 179th Regiment cleared the road to a point one mile southeast of Meisenthal in an attack synchronized with efforts by the 180th Infantry and the 313th Infantry. On 5 January the 180th Infantry had attacked north on a one mile front encountering especially heavy resistance on its right flank which neared Wildenguth. The heaviest fighting of all raged at the tip of the salient near Reipertswiller. The slight advances which had been made by the 313th Regiment on 5 January northwest of the town were off set by continued infiltration on the right flank east of Reipertswiller. On the next day the 180th Infantry assumed additional responsibility in the Wildenguth area, thereby releasing elements of the 313th Regiment to deal with the perforation of the right flank. While the right flank problem was being liquidated, elements of all three regiments continued the straight, forward, slugging assault north of Reipertswiller.

To the southeast the 276th Infantry had been handicapped in its attempt to clear Wingen, because the presence of American prisoners

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in the town precluded the use of artillery. On 6 January the tenacious defense offered by the enemy was overcome; the town was cleared. This action marked the elimination of the enemy's deepest penetration in the Low Vosges.

Farther east the 2nd Battalion of the 276th Infantry assisted the coordinated attack of the 179th, 180th, and 313th Regiments by stopping up breaks in the line southeast of Reipertswiller. On 6 January this battalion cleared the town of Lichtenberg of the hostile forces which had infiltrated the previous day. On the following day, in conjunction with elements of the 313th and 274th Regiments the 2nd Battalion of the 276th Infantry continued its attack to the high, wooded ground northeast of Lichtenberg, trapped, and eliminated the remnants of an enemy battalion. All advances were painfully slow on 7 January, and the line was pushed forward only a mile north of the Wildenguth-Reipertswiller road. At last, however, it was apparent that enemy troops were on the defensive and that the force of their attack had spent itself.

On the eastern shoulder of the salient the 275th Infantry with 1st Battalion of the 274th Infantry attached continued to hold a line extending from southwest to northeast in the Dambach area. The enemy had advanced toward Philippsbourg on 5 January but turned back when attacked by planes. On the following day three enemy assaults on Philippsbourg were hurled back; the first was broken by artillery fire; the second disorganized and repulsed by a counterattack; the third was contained after several hours of fierce fighting. These attacks involved an estimated two or three companies. On 7 January hostile activity was negligible.

Before the enemy had launched his January offensive VI Corps had been warned of the impending attack and directed to make ready both defensive positions and countermeasures. This preparedness permitted an acceleration in the process of regrouping to contain the Bitche salient. The VI Corps units, trading blow for blow with the enemy, sapped the strength of the German drive. According to the impressions gained by the German Chief of Staff, who was with his troops on 6 and 7 January, the rugged terrain had imposed an extreme physical strain

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upon the men who were compelled to fight without rest and live in the open. There was a visible abatement in combat strength.

On the other hand, after overcoming the initial shock VI Corps was able to increase the resistance it offered. By skillfully maneuvering shock troops through breaks in the line the American corps threatened German supply routes. One enemy commentary revealed that the situation in the Bitche salient as now constituted required new German forces if further exploitation was to be considered. However, the same terrain which hampered the development of a German breakthrough now served to protect the outlines of the salient which remained a real threat to Seventh Army troops in Alsace.

#### Terrain and Defense

The situation had altered considerably since the enemy had initiated his offensive. Problems of terrain from the point of view of offensive action became somewhat different problems when the Seventh Army turned to defense, although practically the same territory was involved, the Low Vosges or Hardt Mountains running northeast, and on either side the plains of northern Alsace and of the Sarre. The Low Vosges Mountains bisected the army front roughly perpendicular to the main line of resistance. Between the Vosges and the Rhine River is the Alsace Plain. From Neuf-Brisach to Strasbourg the average width of the plain is approximately 13 miles. North of Strasbourg the plain widens to about 28 miles. In the southern sector the Ill River cuts diagonally across the plain from Selestat gradually approaching the Rhine at Strasbourg. The Marne-Rhine Canal runs north from Strasbourg to near Brumath where it cuts west toward Saverne. The plain north of Strasbourg is crossed by several important rivers and tributaries running generally southeast from the Low Vosges to the Rhine, the Moder, the Eberbach, the Sauer, the Seltzbach. The road net is excellent throughout Alsace.

The main wooded areas are the Haguenau Forest and the Bien Wald, covering a total area of some 100 square miles, located north of Bischwiller and Lauterbourg respectively; their eastern edges parallel

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the Rhine about four miles inland. Between the Haguenau Forest and the Low Vosges Mountains to the northwest is a six-mile wide defile with observation dominated by the abrupt rising hills of the range. The foothills of the Low Vosges graduate more gently to the west toward the Sarre River Valley, which was the third major terrain feature in the Seventh Army sector. In general the region about the Sarre Valley is open rolling country only moderately wooded, except for the heavily forested area west of Forbach. The Sarre River runs from south to north and into Germany between Sarreguemines and Saarbruecken. Bridges



AREA BETWEEN WINGEN SUR MODER AND INGWILLER

*There are only a few good roads across the mountains . . . from Wingen Sur Moder to Ingwiller . . .*

over the Sarre were focal points of defense in the maintenance of the army's lateral communications.

Terrain, the framework of the tactical scheme, showed upon analysis a bias in favor of the enemy. Some of the less favorable implications of the Seventh Army's brilliant Strasbourg maneuver now

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became evident. On the Seventh Army's northern front the Low Vosges formed a barrier ten miles wide between our troops to the east and west. There are only a few good roads across the mountains, running east from Phalsbourg to Saverne, from Wingen Sur Moder to Ingwiller, and from Bitche to Niederbronn. Control of these roads was essential to the coordinated command of troops on both sides of the Vosges. These defiles were not appropriate for the facile deployment of large numbers of troops. The rugged character of the terrain offered the enemy a temporarily secure flank for a counterattack in force if he were willing to gamble on holding the main lateral road for a limited time in an effort to split our forces and destroy them in detail. These factors, actual and potential, conferred upon the northern front an aspect of duality which complicated its maintenance.

The broad, swift, north flowing Rhine River formed a continuous right flank for the Seventh Army which was almost as long as the northern front itself. Although not in continuous physical contact with the enemy, the army on this front was vulnerable to infiltration or penetration. The swampy, twisting, wooded river bank afforded the enemy a flank of opportunity which was too long for our forces to hold solidly and which was ideal for continuous harassment by means of large and small patrol infiltration under cover of Siegfried Line fortification on the east bank of the Rhine. In the background there remained always the threat of an enemy attack in force to establish a bridgehead.

Ten miles west of the Low Vosges the Sarre River flows north, its course in general paralleling the outline of the Low Vosges Massif. In the vicinity of Sarrebourg the Sarre River is paralleled about four miles to the west by the canal Houilleres de la Sarre and a series of lakes extending north to Mittersheim. The canal and the Sarre converge on Sarralbe where they meet and follow winding course north to Sarreguemines. Between these waterways and the mountains to the east lies a rolling, lightly wooded plain from 10 to 12 miles in width which extends north from the vicinity of Sarrebourg, Phalsbourg, and the Saverne Gap for approximately 30 miles to the vicinity of Sarreguemines. The river with its parallel canal and lakes invited a sudden thrust by the enemy.

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Aside from problems arising exclusively from terrain there remained in the southern part of the Alsace Plain a large enemy bridgehead in the Colmar Pocket. It was the mission of the First French Army to eliminate this pocket of resistance west of the Rhine, but at the end of December little progress had been made. A survey of the operation of the enemy replacement system indicated part of the difficulty. Over 80 percent of the 10,000 replacements which the enemy poured in against Sixth Army Group during the first half of December went to the Colmar Pocket. The lavish use of man-power in this position measured its importance to the enemy. Enough striking power might be deployed there to attack north to break through the First French Army and to create yet another front for the Seventh Army.

The prospect of offsetting these positional disadvantages by assigning a powerful reserve to Seventh Army was precluded by the Ardennes offensive. On 26 December Seventh Army was instructed to earmark for SHAEF reserve one infantry division, an armored division, and a corps headquarters. Even on 7 January, when the German offensive on the Seventh Army front was in full swing, reinforcements were allocated on a ratio of about eight for Twelfth Army Group to one for Sixth Army Group.

The initiative was now in enemy hands. Lacking the strength to be sufficiently strong everywhere on a static basis, Seventh Army found it necessary to predict and anticipate successive enemy thrusts at various points, blunting them with artillery fire, and moving its scanty reserves into positions where they could limit the area of enemy penetration.

#### Plans for Withdrawal

Recognition of the fundamental flaws in the Seventh Army's position inevitably led to the consideration of a planned withdrawal as a method to cope with the enemy offensive which was to come. Retreat from a potential trap in Alsace appeared to higher headquarters both feasible and desirable. On 28 December Sixth Army Group Letter of Instructions No. 7 was issued to the Commanding General, Seventh

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Army, and to the Commanding General, First French Army. This letter outlined successive defensive positions and envisioned a main defense line along the eastern slopes of the Vosges.

On 2 January 1945 Operations Instructions Number 51, Headquarters Seventh Army, instructed VI Corps to complete its withdrawal to the main Vosges positions by 5 January, delaying on the following general lines: First position on the Maginot Line by daybreak 2 January, second position on the Bitche-Niederbronn-Bischwiller line on order, third position on the Bitche-Ingwiller-Strasbourg line on order, and, finally, the main Vosges position on order. This last position was to be selected so as to keep the enemy beyond medium artillery range of the Saverne and Molsheim passes. Inasmuch as the enemy penetration already achieved by 2 January endangered the projected retreat which was to be pivoted upon Bitche, the VI Corps counterattack already mentioned was ordered to restore positions in the Bitche-Niederbronn area.

Instructions concerning the withdrawal were amplified by General Jacob L. Devers, commanding Sixth Army Group, in a personal message to General Patch. He indicated that on the morning of 2 January General Eisenhower had expressed his concern lest divisions in the Haguenau area be severely handled or cut off in the event of a successful enemy penetration south towards Sarrebourg or north from the Colmar Pocket. The Supreme Commander placed particular emphasis on holding this area thinly and withdrawing the bulk of the VI Corps to the main Vosges positions. He further explained the big picture:

The Ardennes situation is not yet restored, thus making it imperative that a SHAEF reserve be available to move north at an early date. It is essential therefore that you form the local army and army group reserves with a minimum delay. Time is pressing and the necessity for these emergency measures must be realized by all concerned.

Sixth Army Group had been authorized to use the 12th Armored and 36th Infantry Divisions, currently earmarked for SHAEF, to restore any adverse situation in the XV Corps sector pending the creation of local army and army group reserves. This was to be regarded as a temporary emergency measure only, and Seventh Army was to use the 12th Armored and 36th Infantry Divisions only with the specific

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authority of the army group commander. Higher headquarters had directed that Sixth Army Group have the bulk of its command on the main defense position, the Vosges line, by daybreak of 5 January and have it organized and wired in as quickly as possible, regardless of political repercussions and the evacuation of the Strasbourg area. The present front lines were to be held thinly with light, highly mobile forces only, these forces to be withdrawn under pressure. No troops were to be left between covering forces and the main position.

Main defense positions were to be organized rapidly in great depth. Covering forces were to be provided with such transportation as would enable them to withdraw rapidly in the face of strong German offensive action, destroying all crossing sites in the process. These light forces were in no sense to be considered sacrifice troops. Coordination of withdrawal was to be effected with the First French Army, with the main defense hinge between the two armies at Obernai. General Devers summarized the situation, enjoining the Seventh Army to accept the loss of Strasbourg and territory east of the Vosges rather than in any way impair its ability to release SHAEF reserve organizations, to reconstitute army and army group reserves west of the Vosges, and to preserve the integrity of its units in advance of the main position.

On the morning of 3 January letters from General Schwartz, French Military Governor at Strasbourg, and Brigadier General John S. Winn Jr., American Military Representative in the Strasbourg area, arrived at Seventh Army Headquarters. General Schwartz's letter was delivered to General Patch's quarters by a French officer courier shortly after midnight. In an impassioned plea, General Schwartz stated that the departure of Allied Forces from Alsace would result in wholesale massacre of the civilian population. Evacuation of such a large population was out of the question, as there was no motor transportation available and rail transportation was hopelessly inadequate. The letter from General Winn was in substance a report of General Schwartz's reaction.

General Devers arrived at the Seventh Army command post in Luneville on the morning of 3 January. According to the Seventh Army Diary account, "He stated that Strasbourg *would be evacuated* in the course of the above withdrawal and that the Commanding General,

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Seventh Army, would pay no attention to any pressure, political or otherwise, to continue to hold Strasbourg."

Both the Commanding General and Chief of Staff of the Seventh Army called attention to the concern of the French Government expressed through General Schwartz and told General Devers that, if Strasbourg had to be held, the Maginot Line and the Rhine south from its intersection with the Maginot Line would be the logical line to hold. This line was already fortified, and lines to the rear were on terrain of indifferent defensive value. General Devers replied that orders were that Strasbourg would be abandoned.

During 1 and 2 January SHAEF desired that Sixth Army Group withdraw to main positions without regard to the defense of Strasbourg. General De Gaulle, however, wrote to General Eisenhower urging the defense of Strasbourg and as much of Alsace as possible. On 3 January instructions to Sixth Army Group were changed, and it was given the responsibility for the defense of Strasbourg.

While General Devers was still present at the army command post, he received orders from SHAEF that Strasbourg would be held. General White then again suggested the Maginot-Rhine line with organization of suitable successive lines to the rear to meet the contingency of forced withdrawal. General Devers approved this. Orders were issued instructing VI Corps to defend along the Maginot Line in its sector and to hold Strasbourg. Dambach-Bitche positions were to be restored in this sector by continuing counterattacks. XV Corps was to defend on its present positions and be prepared to launch a strong counterattack on army order against enemy penetrations southeast or south west of the Bitche area.

On 2 January VI Corps had undertaken the first of the two major withdrawals it was to execute in January, falling back to Maginot positions from the Low Vosges Mountains to the Rhine. From these positions troops in Alsace could be extricated more readily if unfavorable developments in the German Sarre Valley and Bitche drives required it. Utilizing fixed positions they could also defend more effectively against attacks from the north or from the east across the Rhine.

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On 5 January an enemy battalion succeeded in establishing itself on the west bank of the Rhine in the vicinity of Gamsheim. During succeeding days it was reinforced by additional miscellaneous units which were under the control of the reconstituted 553rd Volks Grenadier Division.

The establishment of the enemy's exploratory and opportunist bridgehead in the Gamsheim area created a front which consisted of two salients: one was the German "Bitche Salient" in the Low Vosges Mountains; the other the Seventh Army salient in the Alsace Plain. Its flanks threatened on the west by the enemy in the Low Vosges Mountains and on the east by the Gamsheim bridgehead.

The German Nineteenth Army was using nine divisions against the First French Army in an effort to develop the Colmar Pocket into an effective threat to Strasbourg from the south, although the enemy did not extend himself until 7 January when an attack forced the French First Army to yield ground in the sector north of Rhinau. Although the Seventh Army had frustrated enemy plans for a quick and single victory the situation remained tense. The enemy retained the initiative thereby continuing to impose upon the Seventh Army the classical problem of the defender who cannot be strong everywhere — where and how to group his striking power.

Letter of Instructions No. 8, Headquarters Sixth Army Group, dated 7 January 1945 directed Seventh Army to continue the defense and to organize a reserve battle position on the general line: Landroff-Benestroff-Sarre-Union-Ingwiller. An alternate position was also to be organized along the general line of the Moder River between Ingwiller and Haguenau. Withdrawal to these positions was only to be made in the face of strong enemy pressure. The boundary between the Seventh Army and the First French Army was moved to the north so that the French acquired responsibility for the Strasbourg area.

On 8 January a Seventh Army directive announced the regrouping of its units into the VI, XV, and XXI Corps, the last of which had recently been released from SHAEF reserve. The XXI Corps, commanded by Major General Frank W. Milburn, was to enter the line on the army left flank, taking over the command of the 103rd Division



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and the 106th Cavalry Group. At 1200 hours on 13 January XXI Corps became operational on the Seventh Army front, continued the organization of defensive positions, and established liaison with the American Third Army on its left. Upon regrouping XV Corps had operational control of the 36th, 44th, and 100th Infantry Divisions, Task Force Harris less one regiment, and the 2nd French Armored Division. At the same time to VI Corps were assigned the 45th and 79th Infantry Divisions, the 12th and 14th Armored Divisions, and Task Forces Herren and Linden.

The modified groupings and boundaries strengthened the shield of the Seventh Army against the continuing threat to the Sarre Valley and the threat from the enemy's Bitche salient. At the same time it provided for the shift of the 12th Armored Division to the Alsace Plain where there appeared a need for it, as the Seventh Army salient, around Haguenau was being subjected to both a frontal attack from Wissembourg and a flank attack from the Rhine. The First French Army now relieved the Seventh Army of 16 miles along the Rhine River flank.

Another factor which enabled the Seventh Army to dispose of its strength more advantageously was the degree of control that it progressively acquired over the 12th Armored and the 36th Infantry Divisions, which had been placed in SHAEF reserve.

Examination of subsequently captured German documents reveals that as early as 3 January planning had begun for a second major operation *Zahnarzt*, in the Sarre Valley west of and in addition to the *Nordwind* attack. However, the first Sarre drive, the "Bitche Salient", and the attack of 7 January in northern Alsace had required so huge an expenditure of energy and resources that Generaloberst Blaskowitz of Army Group G on 8 January admitted that the attack had bogged down and that the Americans might regain the initiative. He recommended that all available forces be committed in an attempt to fulfill the objectives of the *Nordwind* operation, postponing the *Zahnarzt* operation.


The Sarre sector except for an enemy attack at Rimling on 8 January which gained little ground remained quiescent during the remainder of the month. Operation *Zahnarzt* never went beyond the planning phase. However, a French request on 10 January for the 2nd

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French Armored Division for aid to relieve Strasbourg had to be refused. It was essential to keep some armor behind the Sarre River line. Activity flared forth in the Low Vosges around the rim of the Bitche salient, in northern Alsace above Haguenau, in the Rhine bridgehead at Gambsheim, and in the Colmar Pocket.

### The Assault on the Bitche Salient

The Low Vosges campaign was largely a battle for the control of roads and passes; the bulk of the fighting occurred in essentially the



WHITE PHOSPHOROUS SHELLS BLASTING GERMANS OUT OF REIPERTSWILLER

the bulk of the fighting occurred in three key areas: the Sarreinsberg-Althorn area, the Reipertswiller area, and the Philippsbourg-Baerenthal area.

same three key areas: the Sarreinsberg-Althorn area on the west flank of the salient, the Reipertswiller area at the point of the salient, and the Philippsbourg-Baerenthal area on the east shoulder of the salient.

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The effort of the 179th Infantry against the western side of the salient made little headway during the first few days of the period. Elements of the 179th Regiment with the 19th Armored Infantry Battalion mopped up scattered islands of resistance in the Sarreinsberg area and cleared the vital Sarreinsberg-Wingen road. Disposal of these primary obstacles made feasible an attack on Althorn from the north and west which occurred on 10 January. Entry into the town was effected on the same day despite heavy artillery and mortar fire. On the following day Althorn was cleared of the enemy, and high ground to the south was occupied. On 12 January the 179th Infantry jumped off from the Althorn area with three battalions abreast. Troops attacked from a line extending from the road northwest out of Wildenguth to a position a few hundred yards north of Althorn. After three days of futile fighting against a stubborn enemy and over rugged terrain the attack in force was abandoned. The period 15-20 January was marked only by vigorous patrolling and a general strengthening of the line east of Althorn. On 17 January elements of the 179th Infantry still within the XV Corps boundary were relieved finally by the 36th Division. These elements were then free to aid the main body of the regiment in the execution of its mission.

On 8 January the 180th and 313th Infantry Regiments were engaged in heavy, inconclusive fighting at the tip of the salient. The two regiments maintained a line slightly north of Reipertswiller with the 180th Infantry on the left and the 313th on the right. The situation remained static until 10 January when the left column of the 313th Infantry pushed to high ground north of Saegmuhl while the right flank had advanced to high ground one mile northeast of Reipertswiller.

On 11 January the 6th SS Mountain Division unleashed a four battalion attack which pressed the 180th Infantry back to the Wildenguth-Siegmuhl road. The 313th Infantry also yielded ground. The 2nd Battalion of the 157th Infantry appeared in the center of the line to aid in a counterattack. Unremitting attack on the following day effected a partial restoration of the original situation. However, gains registered by either side in this bitter fight could be measured in terms of hundreds

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of yards. The rugged terrain hindered the attack and precluded the attainment of spectacular advances.

The enemy effectively blocked the attack of the 180th Infantry during the next few days. The 1st Battalion of the 314th Regiment appeared briefly to replace the 2nd Battalion of the 157th in this sector. On 14 January the 1st Battalion of the 315th relieved the 313th Regiment in its positions to the right of the 180th Infantry. On 15 January the 180th Infantry relieved the 1st Battalion of the 314th. The period 15-20 January was marked by little activity. Pressure was maintained by employing patrols and light attacks.

The struggle for ascendancy on the eastern shoulder of the salient gave early promise of violent developments. On 8 January there was little evidence of a change in the enemy's dispositions, but intense activity in the area behind the lines suggested an enemy build-up. The 274th, 275th, and 276th Infantry Regiments, units of Task Force Herren, held the eastern side of the salient. These three regiments, the infantry elements of the 70th Division, had been moved progressively into the line on the Philippsbourg front during the first days of January. At the end of December Task Force Herren had occupied Rhine flank defenses together with Task Force Linden. During the early hours of the German counter-offensive, however, as left flank regiments of the 79th Division were attached to the 45th Division in the zone of German advances, regiments of Task Force Herren were attached to the 79th Division and brought up to the rim of the Bitche salient, leaving defense of the Rhine to Task Force Linden. By 8 January the 276th Infantry had completed its mission of maintaining a security line between Lichtenberg and Obermuhlthal and liquidating enemy who had infiltrated to the rear of this line. The 274th and 275th Regiments occupied a front farther to the northeast on both sides of Philippsbourg.

In spite of disquieting portents this sector manned by a number of regiments now under control of the 45th Division remained inactive. On 13 January preparations were initiated to effect the relief of Task Force Herren units by the 103rd Division in accordance with Seventh Army Operations Instructions. On the following day the 157th Infantry,

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which had relieved the 276th Infantry in the territory between Lichtenberg and Obermuhlthal, advanced slowly over the heavily wooded ridges to reach the high ground overlooking the Reipertswiller-Obermuhlthal road. To the right the 36th Combat Engineer Regiment had relieved the 275th Infantry in the Obermuhlthal area.

While the 103rd Infantry Division assumed gradual control of the area east of Baerenthal without serious incident, the 157th Regiment engaged in eight days of bitter fighting between 14 and 21 January in a vain effort to clear the enemy out of the dense, rugged, and snow-covered forest that lies below the Mouterhouse-Baerenthal Valley. It was the mission of the entire 45th Division to attack northward to seize the ridge that overlooks this valley from the south: the 179th Infantry was to attack on the left, in the direction of Mouterhouse; the 180th was to hold in the center; the 157th with the 36th Engineer on its right flank was to attack on the division's right.

On the morning of 14 January the 157th Infantry jumped off from the Reipertswiller-Obermuhlthal road and was immediately pinned down by German artillery, nebelwerfer, and mortar fire, most of which came from the Mouterhouse-Baerenthal Valley. The 276th Infantry, being relieved by the 157th Infantry, had apparently given away its positions and the method of its relief by sending radio messages in the clear. Only one battalion of the 157th was able to make any headway. The 3rd Battalion on the left advanced about 2,000 yards, half way to its objective, and seized the two highest hills in the area. But the 180th Infantry on the left, and the 1st Battalion of the 157th on the right were unable to move up on its flanks. As soon as it had reached these hills, the 3rd Battalion was attacked frontally and threatened with encirclement by troops of the 11th Regiment of the 6th SS Mountain Division. The Battalion could not advance beyond this point, nor could any other elements of the 45th Division.

The remainder of the 157th Infantry fought to bolster the 3rd Battalion's precarious positions, hoping to extricate it from them. On 15 January the 2nd Battalion advanced on the left of the 3rd while the 1st Battalion made a similar effort on the right. The attacks made some

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headway; but only two companies, C and G, managed to make contact with the 3rd Battalion. They had lost contact with the rest of their battalions and now formed part of the advanced and isolated force. The remaining units of the 157th Regiment tried for five days, from 16-20 January to reach these five companies without success. Each attack, each effort to move forward supplies to the isolated companies, was beaten back by the German mountain troops who had encircled them and established heavily armed and expertly camouflaged strongpoints along the trails to their rear. An attempt to resupply them by air had to be abandoned because of snow-filled skies. On 20 January, after the fifth attempt to reach them had failed, the 157th received orders to withdraw, and word was sent to the five companies to make a break for it.

At 1530 hours, 20 January, the rearward forces began to fire rifles and automatic weapons into the air to bewilder the Germans; and the radio from the five companies broadcast "We're coming out. Give us everything you've got." Firing continued for three minutes; smoke rounds were lobbed in to cover the break. But one hour later the radio reported that the enemy cordon could not be broken. Only two men out of the five companies got out. Only some 125 out of the original force of about 750 men remained unwounded; but they had to be abandoned, together with the wounded and the dead. By nightfall they had been engulfed by the enemy. On the following day the 157th Infantry was withdrawn from the line.

During this phase of operations the outlines of the Bitche Salient had been rigidly defined; enemy infiltration had been greatly reduced in both scale and frequency; the initiative had been wrested from the enemy. However, a stubborn German defense preserved intact the great bulk of the salient against heavy attacks by VI Corps troops. In the hands of a potentially resurgent enemy the salient remained a threat to the integrity of the Seventh Army. The 103rd Division had been substituted for the infantry regiments of the 70th Division, Task Force Herren, because on 12 January the VI Corps commander felt that American positions east of the Vosges would be much more secure if an experienced infantry division held the Philippsbourg line. General Patch concurred and the regrouping was effected.

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### The Army Front in January

The initial effort of the German counter-offensive against the Seventh Army in January had been launched in the early hours of New Year's Day in the Sarre Valley and south of Bitche. The Sarre Valley drive was the first to be blunted and then brought to a halt. The enemy's deepest penetration was made southeast of Bitche. During the month of January the German 36th Infantry Division had been shifted from the Sarreguemines area to the east side of the Bitche salient to add to the striking power of the 6th SS Mountain Division and the 256th Volks Grenadier Division. The enemy attempted to burst out of the nose of the salient without success. These major drives of operation *Nordwind* were countered and shattered by the smooth, rapid reshuffling of tactical reserves. On this sector of the Seventh Army front in the Sarre Valley and the Low Vosges the enemy battered himself to exhaustion. By 20 January the situation was stabilized and the threat of any enemy breakthrough reduced if not eliminated.

The enemy, however, had not confined his efforts to these areas. The Oberrhein Army Group had on 5 January established a bridgehead across the Rhine at Gambenheim. The German 553rd Division's miscellaneous battle groups met with some success in the expansion of this bridgehead, whereupon the 10th SS Panzer Division attempted to exploit the German advantage. North and northeast of Haguenau another enemy drive developed. The 21st Panzer Division was successively joined by the refitted 25th Panzer Grenadier Division, the 7th Paratroop Division, and the 47th Volks Grenadier Division to engage in sterile conflict in the Hatten-Rittershoffen area.

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## CHAPTER XXIII

### *German Attacks in the Rhine Valley*

During its December offensive Seventh Army had extended its lines farthest from its base of operations in the sector of Lauterbourg, where the borders of France and Germany meet on the Rhine. In preparation for the blows of the German counter-offensive this point of the VI Corps salient was gradually withdrawn. During the month of January the VI Corps front east of the Low Vosges Mountains remained the most extended sector of the Seventh Army line. Here the army was most sensitive to successive German threats; first, the Bitche drive on the VI Corps left flank which together with an offensive from the Colmar Pocket might have closed at the Saverne Gap and pinched off all Seventh Army troops east of the Vosges; second, the establishment of a German bridgehead north of Strasbourg at the VI Corps right flank which potentially might swing arcs south around Strasbourg or north around Haguenau.

Preparations for defense on the VI Corps Rhine flank had been complicated by changes of policy in regard to the evacuation of or the defense of the city of Strasbourg. On 3 January orders were received that Strasbourg would be held. At that time it was further provided that the boundary between the Seventh Army and the First French Army would be shifted to the north and that the French would assume responsibility for the defense of the city.

At 0800 hours on 5 January Sixth Army Group informed Seventh Army and First French Army that command of the Strasbourg area was to pass to the Commanding General, First French Army, on the relief by the French of the American elements in that area. The relief was to take place by 2400 hours that day. In a message later that

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day to the two armies involved, Sixth Army Group acknowledged that it would take a "tremendous effort" to accomplish the proposed shift in the time allotted. Because of the German attack, which struck early on 5 January, the French did not take control of their sector until 1915 hours on 7 January. Seventh Army units along the Rhine in the Strasbourg area were in the process of reorganization as the enemy launched his assault across the river.

The Rhine sector hit by the German bridgehead operation had since late December been the responsibility of Task Force Linden, the infantry elements of the 42nd Division, under the command of Brigadier General Henning Linden. Farther north the Rhine front was held by Task Force Herren. On 2 January the line held by Task Force Linden extended some 19 miles along the Rhine River from Plobsheim, south of Strasbourg, to Offendorf, roughly ten miles north of Strasbourg. From north to south five battalions were on the line: the 1st and 3rd Battalions of the 232nd Regiment; the 3rd, 1st, and 2nd Battalions of the 222nd Regiment. The 2nd Battalion of the 232nd Infantry was off the line at Hoerdt. The 242nd Regiment was in reserve, prepared to block to the south on corps order to prevent a possible pincer movement from the south. During 2 January the 242nd was ordered to occupy the Vosges positions from Obernai to Molsheim, where it had established itself by 0700 hours on 3 January. The 222nd Infantry was ordered into reserve to take over the blocking mission of the 242nd. The defense of the Task Force Linden sector of the Rhine River front was then entirely in the hands of the 232nd Regiment, the 2nd and 3rd Battalions on line and the 1st Battalion in reserve near Souffelweyersheim.

Task Force Linden had been attached to the 79th Division on the morning of 2 January and ordered to take over the Task Force Herren sector, adjacent to it on the north, on 3 January. Accordingly, the 1st Battalion of the 232nd Infantry was spread out to relieve elements of the 274th Regiment, part of Task Force Herren, and to occupy the towns of Souffelweyersheim, Drusenheim, and Statmmatten with the focal point of battalion strength at Bischwiller. The northern boundary of the 232nd Regiment reached as far as Forstfeld, adjacent to the 314th Regiment of the 79th Division. The 1st Battalion of the 222nd Infantry

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moved by motor to Hoerdt and was attached to the 232nd Regiment as its reserve. The 242nd Regiment was alerted for movement by motor on two hours' notice with 79th Division transportation. The 2nd Battalion



BISCHWILLER — GAMBSHEIM AREA

the 1st Battalion of the 232nd Infantry was spread out to relieve elements of the 274th Regiment with the focal point of battalion strength at Bischwiller

of the 232nd Infantry was attached to the 222nd Infantry, and a boundary between the two regiments was re-established along the canal in Strasbourg. The task force front was then 31 miles long. The 3rd Battalion of the 222nd Infantry was at Entzheim, southwest of Strasbourg, ready for commitment on task force order. On 4 January the 242nd Regiment relieved the 314th Regiment of the 79th Division, placing its 1st and 3rd Battalions on line next to the 1st Battalion of the 232nd and facing north toward Hatten and Rittershoffen. Company G of the 232nd Infantry was relieved from its defense position on the island before Strasbourg by the 2nd Battalion of the 222nd Infantry

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and moved into the Rhine Line of its parent unit in an area including the towns of Offendorf and Herrlisheim. This was the disposition of the elements of Task Force Linden when the attack came.

### The Bridgehead Established

At about 0745 hours on 5 January enemy forces crossed the Rhine following patrols which had been making such crossings during the previous few days, and attacked American positions from Kilstett to Drusenheim. Elements of the 232nd Regiment in charge of two improvised Task Forces, A and B, designed to strike the enemy at Weyersheim and Kilstett, respectively. Because the river line had been lightly held and because a succession of reliefs was in process when the German attack came, the forces immediately thrown against the enemy were of unusual character and under mixed commands.


At 0700 hours on 5 January command of that part of the 314th Regiment, which was south of Hatten had passed to the 242nd Regiment, whose 1st and 3rd Battalions relieved the 314th during the night. When the attack came, the 2nd Battalion of the 242nd Infantry was beginning to move from Brumath. The move northward was canceled and the battalion was attached to the 232nd Infantry for an attack in the Weyersheim vicinity. The 314th Regiment, upon its relief by the 242nd, was on its way to an assembly area when orders from division sent it to Bischwiller to attack southeast toward Rohrwiller. During the day the 1st and 3rd Battalions of the 222nd Infantry were relieving the 315th Regiment north of Haguenau, but the 2nd Battalion of the 222nd was stopped enroute and attached to the 232nd. The 79th Reconnaissance Troop was ordered to move at once to prepare for an attack on Rohrwiller. The rearrangement of army boundaries had put Kilstett in the sector of the First French Army, which was then attempting to carry out the relief scheduled for 5 January. Pending relief of Task Force Linden elements by the French, the 3rd Algerian Infantry Division was attached to the 79th Division.

When it attacked that afternoon, Task Force A consisted of a platoon of Company A of the 781st Tank Battalion, Company E of the

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232nd, Company E of the 222nd, and Companies F and G of the 242nd Regiments. Late that night the remainder of the 242nd Infantry's 2nd Battalion joined the force. Task Force B included one platoon of Company L of the 232nd, Companies F and H of the 232nd, the 2nd Battalion of the 222nd (less Companies E and G), two platoons of Company A of the 781st Tank Battalion, a unit of 50 FFI, and the Cannon Company of the 232nd.

At 1545 hours Task Force A attacked astride the road from Weyersheim to Gamsheim. It was held up by automatic weapons fire at the Landgraben Canal, but troops on the right flank drove through.



WEYERSHEIM — GAMBSHEIM ROAD-BRIDGE ACROSS  
LANDGRABEN CANAL

At 1545 hours Task Force A attacked astride the road from Weyersheim to Gamsheim.

crossed the canal, and reached the Kleingraben Creek, between the canal and the town. Darkness and loss of contact with the left flank element forced a withdrawal to the west bank of the canal for reorganization.

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Elements of the force then advanced in the early morning to reach the railroad tracks west of Gamsheim at approximately 0800 hours on 8 January.

Task Force B had formed at La Wantzenau and moved to Kilstett, reinforcing a platoon there and jumping off at 1545 hours on 5 January toward Gamsheim. Heavy observed artillery fire held up this attack just north of Kilstett. The 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 314th Infantry had been alerted for movement to the bridgehead area about noon. During the remainder of the day they were able to do no more than to reach Bischwiller and to close into positions on the northeast, east, and southeast outskirts of the town. During the night reconnaissance was made preparatory to the contemplated attack on Rohrwiller at 0900 hours the next day.

On learning of the German attack, General Brooks, VI Corps Commander, had telephoned General Wyche, commanding the 79th Division, "Get in there and get it — get it cleaned up — its got to be cleaned up pronto . . . we can't let it get built up there." To aid the 79th Division, which controlled Task Force Linden, the corps issued Operations Instructions No. 5 at 1900 hours on 5 January narrowing the part of the division, which was directed to concentrate its efforts on the destruction of enemy forces on the west bank of the Rhine. The order attached Troop D of the 94th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron and Company B of the 47th Tank Battalion, both of the 14th Armored Division, to the 79th Division. The 45th Division was directed to assemble one infantry regiment of Task Force Herren for movement to the Haguenau area on corps order. By the time that order was issued the Germans were established in a bridgehead five miles long and two miles deep. Circumstances had prevented snuffing out the enemy attack quickly. The enemy had further opportunity to build up his forces during the night.

On the morning of 6 January elements of Task Force A entered Gamsheim and cleared the main part of it by systematically searching houses. House to house fighting lasted from 0930 to 1130 hours, during which time enemy opposition consisted largely of machine gun fire. Then in the face of an enemy counterattack Task Force A withdrew from Gamsheim and back to the canal where a defensive outpost was

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established. Task Force B had also jumped off again in the morning, still attempting to get into Gamsheim from Kilstett; but its elements were out of contact and not mutually supporting. They were withdrawn on line with Kilstett and were ordered to patrol the area northwest of Kilstett to prevent enemy infiltration.

At 0830 hours on 6 January the 2nd Battalion of the 314th Infantry had jumped off from Bischwiller in the attack which had been planned for 0900 hours. The battalion had two companies in Rohrwiller by mid-morning and was accordingly directed by division to move first to Drusenheim and later to Herrlisheim. When a patrol of the 2nd



HERRLISHEIM — OFFENDORF AREA

the 3rd Battalion was ordered . . . to feel out the route to Herrlisheim, later to capture Offendorf

Battalion found the bridge in Drusenheim intact, the 3rd Battalion was ordered by division to move to Rohrwiller and then to feel out the route to Herrlisheim, later to capture Offendorf. These plans did not materialize.

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however, for the 2nd Battalion was able to battle its way only a little beyond the southern edge of Drusenheim before nightfall. The 3rd Battalion stayed in Rohrwiller.

Farther north an enemy patrol had probed Stattmatten early in the day on 6 January, and elements of the 232nd Infantry had been surrounded there. Elements of the 79th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop, with a light tank platoon of the 781st Tank Battalion attached, cleared Sessenheim and recaptured Stattmatten by noon. At the end of the day the 232nd Infantry re-established its lines in this sector.

At this point, as General Wyche reported to his Corps Commander, General Brooks, things were going poorly. "The real trouble is this mushroom organization plus the greenness of troops and lack of communications," he explained. General Wyche expressed his doubt that Task Force Linden could push to Gamsheim. "They've been in and out twice." He called to General Brooks' attention the fact that the Linden force had sustained heavy casualties and referred to "their state of training, organization and operation, etc." It had been known that the 42nd Division had training deficiencies which under normal circumstances should have precluded the employment of the division in combat before additional training could be given. The unit had been placed in a relatively quiet sector along the Rhine flank, but circumstances had made an inactive position the point of bitter fighting. General Wyche ended his report to General Brooks by saying, "I'm very sorry to have to present this situation, but that's the way it is." The most regrettable aspect of the situation was that the more time the enemy had to build up his forces in the bridgehead, the more likelihood there was that he could exploit his foothold into an expanding attack either in the Bischwiller-Haguenau direction or toward Strasbourg.

On 7 January, according to captured documents, the Oberrhein High Command received orders from the Fuehrer to lighten the task of Army Group G, conducting the general assault on Alsace, by exerting steady pressure from the Gamsheim bridgehead and making the most of the success achieved at Rhinau, south of Strasbourg. Accordingly, the enemy continued to build up his forces in the bridgehead, reinforcing those already there with tanks, selfpropelled and antitank guns. The

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enemy's new strength was apparent shortly after the 2nd Battalion of the 314th Infantry attacked to clear the enemy from the southern part of Drusenheim on the morning of 7 January. The enemy counterattacked almost at once with approximately a battalion of infantry and eight or ten tanks. The American battalion was forced back into the northern part of the village, losing five of its supporting tanks. The 3rd Battalion of the 314th Regiment drove off two attacks southeast of Rohrwiller in the same period. Northwest of Gamsheim Task Force Linden had little activity, and the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 232nd Infantry were relieved in the Kilstett sector by elements of the 3rd Algerian Infantry Division, which was carrying out in so far as possible the relief ordered on 5 January. French troops moved north in the afternoon but were forced by enemy counterattacks to withdraw again to positions in Kilstett. On the northern flank of the bridgehead the 79th Reconnaissance Troop interrupted an enemy patrol at Stattmatten.

The phrase "success at Rhinau", used by the Germans in the order of 7 January for continuance of pressure in the Gamsheim bridgehead, referred to an offensive northward out of the Colmar Pocket toward Strasbourg. What has been described by the German Nineteenth Army Chief of Staff as a "limited attack" was launched north along the Rhine-Rhone Canal from a line just south of Rhinau early on 7 January. The attack progressed northward on both sides of the canal and was through Rossfeld and Rhinau on 8 January. In the week that followed, the attack was contained by French armor that came to the aid of the 1st Moroccan Infantry Division, which had been pushed north to positions between Erstein and the Rhine. The enemy never succeeded in getting farther north than these positions nor farther east than the Ill River near Benfeld, except for a small bridgehead directly east of Benfeld. By 16 January there was no longer strong enemy pressure in this area, although Seventh Army had been seriously concerned by this threat behind its lines.

On 7 January Combat Command B of the 12th Armored Division closed in at Hochfelden, between Saverne and Haguenau, on Seventh Army order and was attached to the 79th Division. By noon the next day army had sent the rest of the division to VI Corps. While

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other combat commands were given a reconnaissance mission in corps reserve and held ready to repel possible enemy penetrations from the north or the east, Combat Command B was moved to Bischwiller to attack Herrlisheim.

Task Force Power, composed of the 714th Tank Battalion less one company and to which Company C of the 56th Armored Infantry Battalion had been added, attacked toward Herrlisheim from Rohrwiller on the morning of 8 January but was held up by a blown bridge over the Zorn River north of the town. That night the line was held in the vicinity of Rohrwiller. The next day the 56th Armored Infantry Battalion resumed the attack. Forward elements entered Herrlisheim at 1130 hours and proceeded to consolidate the northern third of the town under heavy enemy fire. At 0330 hours on 10 January the elements in Herrlisheim were cut off by the enemy, but during the succeeding morning tanks of the 714th Battalion cut the ring. Mounting casualties and heavy enemy fire forced American withdrawal from the town; the withdrawal was completed during the night, and the combat command took up defensive positions parallel to the Zorn River east of Rohrwiller.

While the attack of Combat Command B had been going on, there was no other major action on the bridgehead front, the efforts of the 79th Division being expended primarily in the Hatten-Rittershoffen area to the north. Activity was confined to local attacks, counterattacks, and reconnaissance patrols, none of them decisive in character. The enemy had been able to hold his ground in the bridgehead.

#### German Attack from the North

An enemy offensive in the Hatten-Rittershoffen sector toward Haguenau prevented VI Corps from giving its full attention to the Gamsheim threat. At the beginning of the year the 79th Infantry Division had held forward VI Corps positions from Wissembourg east along the France-German border to the Rhine. The first step in the planned Seventh Army withdrawal was smoothly executed by the division in moving back to Maginot line positions during the night 2-3 January. The main line of resistance thus became an arc from Drachen-

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bronn southwest of Wissembourg to an anchor on the Rhine River at Fort Louis. Bridges over the Lauter River had been blown during the course of withdrawal. The enemy followed up these withdrawals only with increased patrols.

During 4 January and the early hours of the establishment of the Gamsheim bridgehead on the following day, enemy activity in front of 79th Division Maginot Line positions was negligible except for occasional patrols. On 6 January, however, there were indications that the enemy was building up his forces south of Wissembourg. On the morning of the following day he supplemented his Rhine bridgehead attack with



ANCIENT FORT LOUIS

The main line of resistance thus became an arc . . . to an anchor on the Rhine River at Fort Louis . . .

a drive in the Aschbach-Stundwiller-Buhl area northeast of Hatten and Rittershoffen. Enemy infantry identified as elements of the 21st Panzer Division supported by armor burst into the three towns. Outposts of the

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313th Infantry Regiment in Aschbach were forced to withdraw to the main line of resistance. At 0900 hours enemy troops dressed in white parkas, took Stundwiller and continued on to occupy the town of Buhl. The divisional main line of resistance, however, remained unbroken against five strong enemy attacks, which were curtailed by mortar and artillery concentrations. On the next day the line of the 313th Infantry was heavily engaged when the enemy launched numerous attacks in two-battalion strength in the vicinity of Aschbach. These attacks were repelled with heavy losses in personnel and tanks. The 222nd and 242nd Infantry Regiments, formerly of Task Force Linden, continued to main-



AREA NORTH OF HATTEN

*the enemy struck in the Stundwiller area and hurled a two-battalion assault supported by seven tanks on Hatten.*

tain their positions in the Maginot Line to the west and east of the 313th Infantry with only light contact during the day.

Early in the morning on 9 January, after completing a rapid reorganization, the enemy struck in the Stundwiller area and hurled a

two-battalion assault supported by seven tanks on Hatten. Elements of the 242nd Infantry were forced to withdraw temporarily from their positions, but by 0940 hours the line had been restored and the attack dispersed except for a few snipers left in the town. Prisoner of war identifications indicated that the 25th Panzer Grenadier Division had joined the 21st Panzer Division in the attack on this sector. At 1300 hours on the same day the enemy returned to Hatten with 25 to 30 tanks spearheading an undetermined number of infantry. Within an hour Hatten was enclosed on three sides, and enemy tanks had by-passed the town to reach the area just south of Rittershoffen. A heavy concentration of artillery and tank destroyer fire broke the momentum of the attack, and a counterattack by the 242nd Infantry at 1500 hours forced the enemy armor to withdraw to the east. In the course of the enemy retreat a small group was left behind in the eastern portion of Hatten. This group received continuous reinforcements and withstood throughout 10 January all efforts to dislodge it. The reinforced 2nd Battalion of the 315th Infantry, which had taken up positions in Rittershoffen was committed on the afternoon of 10 January to help clear Hatten. At the end of the day the unit was heavily engaged in the eastern section of the town.

On 11 January after an enemy artillery barrage had been concentrated in the western half of Hatten, enemy troops cloaked by a curtain of mist and snow, infiltrated to the northern end of Rittershoffen. As the enemy continued to build up his forces there by infiltration, intense close-in fighting developed in Hatten, where reinforced hostile infantrymen were being supported by 15 tanks before noon. The 3rd Battalion of the 315th Infantry contrived to contain the enemy in the north end of Rittershoffen after a day of heavy fighting. However, enemy armored sweeps driving on Hatten from the south and north had in the course of the day succeeded in isolating the 2nd Battalion of the 315th Infantry in the southwest corner of the town. To prevent the situation from further deterioration Combat Command A of the 14th Armored Division drove east from Kuhlendorf in an abortive attempt to clear Rittershoffen and continue on to Hatten. Combat Command A was stopped 400 yards short of Rittershoffen. Both battalions of the 315th



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Infantry were surrounded, as the enemy armored thrusts had by the end of the day enveloped Rittershoffen.

On the following day Combat Command A drove to the northern end of Rittershoffen, which was cleared of the enemy by noon except for a strongpoint held in the cemetery at the southeastern corner of the town. Combat Command B jumped off at 1115 hours to rescue the Hatten garrison but made very little progress. The attack was halted 500 yards west of the town when armored infantry was pinned down by heavy machine gun and small arms fire. Two supporting tanks were knocked out by 88mm fire. Enemy tanks which had taken up positions



CEMETERY IN RITTERSHOFFEN

Combat Command A drove to the northern end of Rittershoffen, which was cleared of the enemy by noon except for a strongpoint held in the cemetery.

on the western fringe of the town prevented the heavy employment of Combat Command B armor. The attenuated 2nd Battalion of the 315th Infantry in heavy contact continued to hold in the southwest corner of Hatten.

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The Hatten-Rittershoffen sector continued to be the center of activity on the VI Corps front throughout 13 January, as repeated assaults by the 14th Armored Division were made in an attempt to restore Maginot line positions of the 79th Division. Combat Command A and the attached 3rd Battalion of the 315th Infantry were compelled to fight bitterly for Rittershoffen. Reinforced enemy troops were supported by flak wagons, flame throwers, and tanks. Toward the close of the day, as the enemy was gradually being squeezed out, a sudden heavy counter-attack which developed from the northeast reversed the trend. The day ended with enemy firmly entrenched in the church and cemetery positions in the southeastern section of Rittershoffen.

Meanwhile to the east Combat Command B after three attempts to outflank Hatten from the northeast was forced to withdraw because of artillery and antitank fire from Buhl. During the day Combat Command R blasted its way into Hatten by means of a frontal assault from the west and established contact with what remained of the 2nd Battalion of the 315th Infantry. Intense house-to-house fighting continued throughout 13 January. By evening tanks of Combat Command R had virtually surrounded the town and just before midnight a considerable number of enemy tanks and infantry withdrew to the northeast.

On the next day the battle in the two towns continued to be waged furiously with neither side able to establish more than a local superiority, which lasted only until the next counterattack restored the balance. The enemy held the northern end of Hatten by virtue of a heavy night attack which cancelled much of the gains made by Combat Command R during the day. Rittershoffen was quiet on 15 January, but the tension increased in Hatten, where after a morning of intermittent localized fighting the enemy struck in the afternoon with a battalion of infantry supported by a few tanks. Enemy troops were reinforced by elements of the 7th German Parachute Division and threatened by 1715 hours to overrun infantry troops of the 315th Regiment and Combat Command R. The 47th Tank Battalion counterattacked and drove through to the almost surrounded infantry within an hour. This was but a prelude to further heavy action. At the end of the day the southern

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and western sections of the town were secured, as enemy resistance slackened.

The German command continued to attach considerable importance to the Hatten-Rittershoffen salient because it was an ideal area of departure for a drive toward Haguenau. It was indicated that the enemy intended to relieve the badly mauled 21st Panzer and 25th Panzer Grenadier Divisions with the 7th Parachute Division. The battle without decision wore on, with the enemy clinging to the church and cemetery in Rittershoffen and the east side of Hatten. On 17 January the 1st Battalion of the 315th Infantry attacked Rittershoffen from the north-



RAILROAD STATION AT THE SOUTHEAST EDGE OF HATTEN

*At the end of the day the southern and western sections of the town were secured, as enemy resistance slackened.*

west. Heavy fighting ensued, but the added strength given by the 1st Battalion did not disturb the deadlock. Combat Command R preserved its position in western Hatten by repelling two attacks each supported by ten tanks.

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On 18 January enemy aggressiveness decreased, and there were indications that his strength was being withdrawn from this sector for displacement to the south to support an attack in the Sessenheim area. Both sides maintained their positions in Hatten and Rittershoffen, as the fighting slackened in intensity. On 19 January, however, the 21st Panzer Division launched a three-pronged attack in Hatten from the northeast, east, and southeast at 0800 hours employing infantry supported by mortar, artillery, and tank fire. This assault and another enemy attack which took place just before noon were contained. These holding attacks concluded serious effort in this area. Though the enemy had suffered severe personnel and materiel losses here, the similarly weakened condition of the 14th Armored Division and the absence of reinforcements forestalled a major attack to restore original Maginot line positions.

#### Attack and Counterattack in the Bridgehead

The sector of the enemy Rhine bridgehead had become quiet after the failure of Combat Command B to take Herrlisheim during the period 8-10 January. The rest of the 12th Armored Division had entered the corps area and maintained a reconnaissance screen along the corps south boundary until 13 January, when orders were received for the division to attack the bridgehead. The 79th Division was to be prepared to relieve the 12th Armored elements along the line of the Rhine River.

In the early hours of 16 January Combat Command B attacked to the east to establish a bridgehead across the Zorn River in the vicinity of Rohrwiler, and Combat Command A moved out to attack enemy positions in the direction of Offendorf. Meeting stiff enemy resistance, both combat commands made only slow progress during the day. They renewed their attacks on the morning of 17 January. Combat Command A attacked Herrlisheim from the south and east with the 17th Armored Infantry Battalion and the 43rd Tank Battalion while Combat Command B attempted to extend its bridgehead east of the Zorn. Though Combat Command B was delayed by heavy artillery, mortar,

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and small arms fire, the 17th Armored Infantry Battalion of Combat Command A succeeded in occupying a third of the southern part of Herrlisheim. During the night, however, the battalion was surrounded by a superior enemy force. Nearly 200 men fell into enemy hands in the town.

On the same day, part of the 43rd Tank Battalion was also lost in Herrlisheim. The 43rd Battalion, which had lost 12 tanks in the attack on Offendorf on 16 January, attacked Herrlisheim from the east as the 17th Armored Infantry Battalion attacked from the south. "Things are pretty hot", the Tank Battalion Commander told his executive in the



ENEMY GUN POSITION WEST OF OFFENDORF. KNOCKED OUT  
AMERICAN TANKS IN BACKGROUND

*The 43rd Battalion . . . lost 12 tanks in the attack on Offendorf on 16 January . . .*

last message received from the Battalion. A later reconnaissance of Herrlisheim revealed that 14 tanks of the 29 that had advanced on Herrlisheim were knocked out on its eastern edge. At daylight on 18

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January a task force composed of Company B of the 66th Armored Infantry Battalion and Company B of the 23rd Tank Battalion launched an attack to relieve the troops thought to be still in Herrlisheim, but the enemy repulsed the attack.

Meanwhile, Combat Command B advanced only slowly against stiffening resistance, which blocked its efforts to reach a rail and highway crossing north and east of Herrlisheim. Finally, the command was forced by heavy artillery and small arms fire to withdraw under cover of darkness. The attack was resumed in the early morning of 18 January but failed to make much headway. During the afternoon all troops west of the Zorn were ordered to occupy defensive positions and reorganize for renewal of the offensive. In the early hours of 19 January the complete withdrawal of troops under cover of darkness to occupy defensive positions along the line west of the Zorn was ordered. As forces were withdrawn during the night of 18-19 January, small enemy counterattacks were repulsed.

After several small-scale attacks in the morning and early afternoon of 19 January had been repulsed, the drive of the 10th SS Panzer Division against 12th Armored Division positions made substantial progress in the late afternoon. At 1630 hours hostile infantry supported by ten tanks secured and crossed the bridge over the Landgraben Canal on the Gamsheim-Weyersheim road. Artillery immediately knocked out eight of the tanks. Fifteen minutes later an estimated 200 infantry supported by 17 tanks crossed the Zorn River at Herrlisheim and attacked northwest toward Rohrwiler, and at 1715 hours another force of 400 infantry and 17 tanks crossed the bridge over the Landgraben Canal. Tank destroyer and artillery fire knocked out 27 of the enemy tanks during the battle, and improved weather conditions made possible a heavy air program. Sixteen missions of 190 sorties dropped more than 100 tons of bombs, primarily on hostile concentrations in the Herrlisheim-Offendorf area. But the enemy's offensive punch was strong enough to force the 12th Armored Division to fall to a general defensive line running roughly between Weyersheim and Rohrwiler.

As early as 17 January General Patch had asked General Brooks if he wanted to use the 36th Division. At 1200 hours on 19

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January VI Corps directed the 36th Division to assemble in reserve prepared to attack on order through positions of the 12th Armored Division to eliminate hostile forces in the Drusenheim-Herrlisheim area. At 1800 hours, after the 10th SS Panzer Division attack was well started, the 36th Division was ordered into the line to relieve the 12th Armored, which was by this time 1,200 understrength in men and had lost 70 vehicles. As the VI Corps G-3 reported to Seventh Army by telephone, "We are moving Dahlquist in to stabilize Weyersheim-Rohrwiller generally." Two regiments of the 36th Division, the 142nd and 143rd, were moved quickly from corps reserve and had assumed command of their assigned sectors at 2100 hours. The 12th Armored moved into corps reserve and on 21 January established a counter-reconnaissance screen along the VI Corps south boundary from Wasselonne to Weyersheim. On 22 January the division went under the operational control of First French Army for employment South of Strasbourg.

#### German Attack South to Sessenheim

It later became known that on 9 January the Führer had issued an order that Haguenau must be taken and all American forces located between the Lower Vosges and the Rhine eliminated. Contact with the Gumbsheim bridgehead was to be established by the 10th SS Panzer Division attacking east of the forest of Haguenau and south along the Rhine. The next objective of Army Group G, under which all forces attacking VI Corps were operating, was still the Saverne Gap. The decision as to whether and when the northern wing of the Nineteenth Army in the Colmar Pocket would be committed against Molsheim west of Strasbourg depended somewhat on the success of the link between the forces of the 10th SS Panzer Division and the 553rd Volks Grenadier Division in the bridgehead.

A supplementary order for the operation against Sessenheim was issued on 12 January. The forces holding positions in the Forstfeld-Beinheim area south of Seltz and facing Task Force Linden and 79th Division elements were to be subordinated to the XXXIX Panzer Corps,

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which was in turn to be under Army Group Oberrhein. The Commander-in-Chief West was to rush as many Jagdtiger (tank destroyers) to the corps as possible and to introduce the 25th Panzer Grenadier and 21st Panzer Division on that front as soon as possible. The attack was to begin only when sufficient forces were available to exploit the breakthrough immediately. It was necessary to progress steadily and to avoid expending the infantry of the attack division in "guerilla warfare." The reason for the change in direction of effort of the XXXIX Corps was that the attack in the Hatten-Rittershoffen area had definitely been stopped by American forces. Accordingly, the German 7th Parachute Division, reinforced by the 667th and 384th Assault Gun Brigades, and the 10th SS Panzer Division were to make the attack from Forstfeld-Beinheim via Roeschwoog in the direction of Sessenheim and Drusenheim. If Drusenheim were reached, the mass of the XXXIX Panzer Corps was to follow. Infiltration across the Rhine assisted the operation.

The enemy force struck in the area of the 232nd Regiment of Task Force Linden. On 16 January a listening post of the 232nd Infantry in Dengolsheim was captured, and enemy estimated to be 60 or 70 in number moved toward Sessenheim. American infantry elements with a platoon of tanks retook Dengolsheim but were not able to eliminate the enemy, as was intended. The enemy built up a concentration in a bridgehead north of Dalhunden and attacked early on 17 January. Roeschwoog was attacked and captured; outposts in Stattmatten and Dengolsheim were driven in; enemy infiltrated around Sessenheim and cut off a company of American infantry. A counterattack cleared Sessenheim of enemy, but the attacking force was strong enough to manage only a demonstration toward Dengolsheim. A projected attack by the 3rd Battalion of the 232nd Infantry and two companies of the 314th Regiment which had been attached failed to materialize. A platoon of light tanks of the 117th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron and the 1st Battalion of the 313th Regiment were attached to Task Force Linden.

Early on 18 January elements of the 232nd Infantry, holding Sessenheim, were attacked and surrounded. Farther north at Kauffenheim one company was attacked by a small patrol but held firm. Other elements withdrew westward from the Bois de Sessenheim to the Bois

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de Soufflenheim at 1430 hours, when a strong attack was launched against it. The 1st Battalion of the 410th Infantry, which arrived in Soufflenheim early that morning, moved into the Bois de Soufflenheim



SOUFFLENHEIM AREA SHOWING HAGUENAU FOREST  
IN THE BACKGROUND

*The 1st Battalion of the 410th Infantry . . . arrived in Soufflenheim early that morning . . . prior to making an attack northeast at 1500 hours . . .*

prior to making an attack northeast at 1500 hours in an attempt to capture Sessenheim. But the American withdrawal from the Bois de Sessenheim gave the enemy ground from which he could bring flanking and enfilade fire on the attack. The direction of attack was then changed, and the battalion jumped off at 1625 hours to the east to clear the woods. The attack was not entirely successful.

On the morning of 19 January the 3rd Battalion of the 411th Regiment attacked with eight tanks of the 781st Tank Battalion to capture Sessenheim. The town was entered about 0800 hours, but heavy enemy fire eliminated all the tanks and forced the battalion to withdraw.

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General Wyche ordered all units to take up defensive positions. The 411th Infantry took up its position along the southern edge of the Bois de Soufflenheim and at 2200 hours was ordered to close the gap to the south between Task Force Linden and the 314th Regiment of the 79th Division. This gap was made when enemy infantry with tanks attacked southwestward from the Bois de Sessenheim and isolated the 2nd Battalion of the 314th Infantry in Drusenheim. The enemy continued to exert pressure on 20 January against elements of the 232nd, 313th, and 314th Regiments and infiltrated through the lines, breaking contact between the 3rd Battalion of the 314th Infantry and the 3rd Battalion of the 411th Infantry.

### The Moder Line

After VI Corps had been ordered to hold in place midway in its projected movement to Vosges positions, plans were still being made for possible further withdrawal. Seventh Army had been directed by Sixth Army Group on 7 January to organize alternate defense lines between positions at Ingwiller and Haguenau along the general line of the Moder River. Withdrawal to these positions was to be made only in the face of strong enemy pressure. On 12 January VI Corps issued a planning document outlining a withdrawal to a new line along the Moder from Wimmenau to Haguenau to Bischwiller. This was to be used if the increasing enemy pressure should necessitate a withdrawal to more favorable defensive positions. A variation of the same plan was issued on 14 January. Though pressure in the Bitche and Hatten sectors was lessening on 19 January, the enemy had made considerable progress in the face of heavy losses in materiel and personnel in the Gamsheim-Herrlisheim-Drusenheim-Sessenheim area. His attack toward Bischwiller and Haguenau had been successful enough to cause VI Corps to issue that day further tentative plans for withdrawal to a line including Wimmenau-Haguenau-Bischwiller-Weyersheim.

It was on the Moder River, which flows out of the Vosges and along the southern edge of the Haguenau Forest to the Rhine, that VI Corps planned to establish most of the new defensive line. The enemy's

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activities in the Gambsheim bridgehead and in the attack from the north had made the stretch of the Moder east of Bischwiller untenable. Accordingly the proposed line curved to the south between Bischwiller and Weyersheim, where the First French Army sector began.

The heavy fighting in Alsace had taken its toll of the American divisions. Combat efficiency reports for the six regular divisions in VI Corps showed on 19 January that only two, the 36th and 103rd, rated even "very satisfactory." The 45th and 79th Infantry Divisions and the 14th Armored Division were listed as "satisfactory" and the 12th



BAILEY BRIDGE ACROSS THE MODER AT BISCHWILLER

*On 12 January VI Corps issued a planning document outlining a withdrawal to a new line along the Moder from Wimmenau to Haguenau to Bischwiller.*

Armored as "unsatisfactory." Task Force Linden and Herren were adjudged "unsatisfactory." Combat fatigue and low or very low infantry strength were plaguing all the divisions. The 12th Armored was sched-

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uled for reorganization after current operations, and Task Force Linden and Herren were to be given "additional unit training." In view of the status of these forces and the fact that it appeared obvious that the enemy was gathering his forces for a renewed attack, General Patch informed General Devers of his inability to hold his front as it existed, and General Devers gave the order to withdraw as planned.

The American withdrawal was a source of considerable embarrassment to the enemy. In addition to wasting much ammunition, he had to follow up, hampered by obstacles and small delaying actions, definitely locate the new line by reconnaissance and probing attacks, and move an adequate supply of ammunition forward. This was a process made slow and laborious by the enemy's limited transportation and the poor road net. The withdrawal saved American troops losses from artillery fire, served to maintain the integrity of units, and afforded a breathing spell. The establishment of the new line was carried on during the night of 20-21 January and completed by morning on schedule, despite the icy condition of roads, which hampered movement of tracked vehicles particularly. Combat Command A of the 14th Armored Division covered the movement of the 79th Division from the critical northeast corner of the VI Corps zone, while the withdrawals from the rest of the front were screened by small infantry units, which completed all demolitions as scheduled. Only small hostile patrols appeared in the vacated areas during the day after contact was broken. By the end of 21 January the VI Corps divisions were well established, and substantial reserves had been assembled to meet the expected continuation of enemy efforts to retake Alsace.

General Patch considered the situation of his own troops and that of the enemy and observed to General Brooks: "I think he (the enemy) is getting a little tired. I think we will be able to hang on all right." The German attack from the north in the general area of Sessenheim and the withdrawal to the Moder line changed the disposition of the American forces considerably. The German bridgehead at Gambsheim was no longer an isolated sector. The VI Corps front lay along a line which passed through Rothbach and Muhlhausen on the Rothbach River and ran along the Rothbach until it joined the Moder at Pfaffen-

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hoffen and Niedermodern. From there the line was on the Moder all the way to Bischwiller. Then the line turned south, passing just east of Kurtzenhausen and Weyersheim to Hoerdt. The French First Army line extended east from Hoerdt through Kilstett to the Rhine.

On the new VI Corps defense line on 21 January were deployed the 45th and 103rd Divisions, the 79th with Task Force Linden attached, and the 36th Divisions. On the west flank of VI Corps the 45th Division held the line northwest of Rothbach in and around Reipertswiller. Just east of the 45th Division the 410th Regiment was in the sector between



NORTH OF MUHLHAUSEN LOOKING TOWARDS ROTHBACH

Just east of the 45th Division the 410th Regiment was in the sector between Rothbach and Muhlhausen.

Rothbach and Muhlhausen and the 409th between Muhlhausen and the vicinity of Niedermodern.

The regiments of the 103rd Division, which had been transferred to VI Corps beginning 13 January after a paper transfer from XV to XXI

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Corps, had entered the VI Corps line on the Philippsbourg front, and had later sent elements to participate in the fighting near Sessenheim. At the time of its transfer to VI Corps, the 103rd Division had announced the assumption of command by Brigadier General A. C. McAuliffe, formerly assistant commander of the 101st Airborne Division. In the 79th Division section of the line were two regiments of Task Force Linden and two of the 79th Division, reaching from Niedermodern through Schweighausen, Kaltenhouse, and Oberhoffen to Bischwiller. The 36th Division held the sector between Bischwiller and Hoerdt, and the 3rd Algerian Division had the line between Hoerdt and the Rhine. Ranging from west to east on the same line, the German



BRIGADIER GENERAL  
ANTHONY C. MCAULIFFE  
transferred to VI Corps

divisions facing the American forces were the 6th SS Mountain, the 36th Volks Grenadier, the 47th Volks Grenadier, 7th Parachute, 10th SS Panzer, and 21st Panzer Divisions. The forces of the 553rd Volks Grenadier Division were still in what had been the bridgehead area.

On 21 January, while the other units were adjusting into the Moder Line, the 36th Division remained in heavy contact as the enemy probed for a weak spot through which to send tanks and infantry. At noon a concentration of 15 enemy tanks put on a demonstration south of Bischwiller between Kurtzenhausen and Herrlisheim; several of the tanks were knocked out by division tank destroyers and artillery and the rest of them driven off to the northeast. At the same time approximately 12 tanks were observed heading northwest from the bridge over the Landgraben Canal on the road between Gambsheim and Weyersheim and were driven off before their artillery could join them. An estimated 100 enemy infantry infiltrated positions near Kurtzenhausen but were surrounded and mopped up.

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The orders German Army Group G received on 22 January were to attack in Lower Alsace in order to gain at least the line Ingwiller-Kilstett and if possible to push forward to Saverne. The attack was to be continued as long as there was any expectation of destroying the enemy north of the Haguenau-Saverne line or of compelling a retreat beyond the Saverne Gap and consequently renewing contact with the Nineteenth Army in the Colmar Pocket. The principle activity of the enemy that day was a rapid and heavy follow-up to the American line. Enemy movements observed during the day appeared to be converging in the area of Zinswiller, northeast of Rothbach, and in the vicinity of Bischwiller-Weyersheim. The rapid follow-up and the apparent areas of concentration indicated the enemy's intention of continuing his offensive action.

Corps Operations Instructions received late in the day on 22 January directed immediate organization for defense by all units in rear of division sectors and continuous security patrols to guard against enemy infiltration or parachute drops. Snow began to fall and in a week's period was a foot deep. The temperature remained below freezing, often as low as ten degrees below zero. As the VI Corps prepared for a new German attack, it ordered the reinforcement of the fires of the 36th Division by the artillery of the 14th Armored Division.

The enemy continued his build-up east of the Zorn River on 23 January, and his patrols probed the entire front for an opening through which to make an armored thrust. Regiments on line repulsed patrols and improved defenses. The enemy air effort for the day was concentrated on a triangle formed by Bischwiller, Brumath, and Weyersheim, where 21 planes bombed and strafed the 36th Division area between 0930 and 1435 hours.

The anticipated attack on the Moder line got under way on the night of 24-25 January as the bulk of six hostile divisions were concentrated in three prongs reaching across the river. The 6th SS Mountain Division broke through positions of the 410th Regiment to take Schillersdorf, while the 36th Volks Grenadier Division put heavy pressure on the rest of the 103rd Division front. Another assault was made on the 222nd Regiment between Neubourg and Schweighausen by the 47th

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Volks Grenadier, 25th Panzer Grenadier, and 7th Parachute Divisions. The third claw of the offensive was thrown across the Moder at Kaltenhouse, against the 242nd Infantry by the 10th SS Panzer Division. A diversionary attack was launched against the 3rd Algerian Division by elements of the 553rd Volks Grenadier Division. While the drives near Schweighausen and at Kaltenhouse were part of a double envelopment to take Haguenau and Brumath, a further objective of this major attack on the Moder front was probably Strasbourg. A prisoner captured during the offensive said Strasbourg "should" be in German hands by 30 January to commemorate the 12th anniversary of the National Socialist Revolution.

The 222nd Regiment occupied a line extending from approximately 1,000 yards west of Neubourg to the east edge of Schweighausen, a distance of approximately five miles. The 3rd Battalion was on the west, the 2nd Battalion on the east, and the 1st Battalion in reserve. At 0800 hours on 23 January the outpost line of resistance of the 222nd Infantry was driven back to the south bank of the Moder. To combat this threat the 1st Battalion was moved out of reserve to Ohlungen just behind the Regiment's Moder line.

On 24 January the enemy began artillery concentration along the entire sector of the 222nd Regiment with particularly heavy shelling on Schweighausen and Neubourg. At 2005 hours enemy infantry launched its attack, which penetrated the Ohlungen Forest. Company E was surrounded but held its ground and continued to fight on the main line of resistance until all ammunition was exhausted. Thirty men and two officers then infiltrated back through the enemy, which held the eastern portion of the Ohlungen Forest and the northern portion of the town of Schweighausen. Company B of the 1st Battalion attacked early on 25 January to meet the enemy advance but was held up by strong infantry resistance. The 1st Battalion did, however, succeed in reaching a position on the enemy's west flank and containing his force in the eastern portion of the wood. Despite heavy infantry attacks, the 2nd Battalion remained in the southern part of Schweighausen, while the 3rd Battalion held its positions.

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Immediately after the attack a special task force which had been used in repelling the Hatten-Rittershoffen attacks, was reorganized, including the 232nd, 222nd, and 314th Regiments and Combat Com-



FROM NEUBOURG LOOKING TOWARDS OHLUNGEN FOREST

*Thirty men and two officers then infiltrated back through the enemy, which held the eastern portion of the Ohlungen Forest.*

mand B of the 14th Armored Division. The 232nd Infantry was moved forward to the 222nd area. The 2nd Battalion sent to Schweighausen attacked the northern part of the town from the east. The 1st Battalion closed in Uhlwiller, slightly to the south and west of Ohlungen Forest, at 1630 hours; and the 3rd Battalion closed in Ohlungen at 1600 hours on the same day, 25 January. Both towns were outposted. At 0730 hours on 26 January the task force launched an attack to clear the enemy from south of the Moder. The Moder line was restored without resistance, for the enemy had withdrawn during the night.

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On the other side of Haguenau the outposts of the 242nd Infantry had been forced back across the river in its sector from the east edge of that city to Kaltenhouse late on 22 January. On 23 January the build-up of the enemy across the river continued. During the period of the initial attack on the Schweighausen area west of Haguenau the 242nd Infantry had received moderate artillery, small arms, and mortar fire. But at 0100 hours on 25 January an estimated two battalions of enemy crossed the Moder River in rubber boats at three points, striking at the east flank between the 2nd and 3rd Battalions. The attack penetrated the line about 400 or 500 yards but was met with stubborn resistance. At 1400 hours the two battalions on line, supported by elements of the 1st Battalion, counterattacked, surrounded several groups of the enemy, and by 1700 hours had driven the others back across the river.

The third of the enemy coordinated attacks against the VI Corps Moder line struck on 25 January in the eastern foothills of the Low Vosges. Throughout 23 January the enemy had continued to move reinforcements into Bitschoffen and Zinswiller, north and east of the 103rd Division sector. The 103rd Reconnaissance Troops engaged a strong enemy force in Bitschoffen and subsequently retired southeast to La Walck, immediately north of Pfaffenhoffen, only to find enemy troops already in that town. Prisoners taken in the action at La Walck constituted the advance elements of a much larger force, whose immediate objective was Pfaffenhoffen. The enemy launched a strong attack against the 2nd Battalion of the 410th Regiment at Rothbach. A company was surrounded and outpost positions became untenable when fighting broke out in Rothbach. The situation was stabilized along the high ground west of Muhlhausen early in the morning, and new positions were coordinated with those of adjacent units.

During the following morning the enemy repeatedly launched tank supported attacks in the sector of the 410th Regiment without penetrating the line. The first attack was repulsed at Bischholz with heavy enemy losses. However, another attack was immediately launched at Muhlhausen, necessitating further readjustment of the outpost line in that zone. Despite heavy losses the enemy continued to bring up

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reserves in the vicinity of Rothbach. Just before noon the enemy made a strong and determined attack against the 3rd Battalion, driving the outpost back to the southeast edge of Muhlhausen. Again the attacks failed to penetrate the main line of resistance, and enemy formations were dispersed with heavy losses in personnel and tanks. Division and corps artillery contributed close and effective support.

Early on 25 January German reinforcements arrived at the front, and the main attack was launched. Groups of two and three enemy, some equipped with skis, were entering Muhlhausen. Attacks against both the 409th and 410th Regiments drove in the outposts. The enemy thrusts were, however, contained; and the line was restored when the enemy was blocked off by the 2nd Battalion of the 411th Regiment. At 0430 hours an enemy force estimated at company strength and supported by tanks unleashed a powerful attack on Kindwiller. At first repulsed, the enemy was able to capture Kindwiller and force the line back to La Walck. In another attack at the same time the enemy forced his way through the lines of the 410th Infantry to Schillersdorf where the attack was contained. Slow progress was made in the face of bitter and fanatical resistance, when the 1st Battalion of the 410th Infantry, called up from reserve, counterattacked to the northeast at 0900 hours and cut the Schillersdorf-Muhlhausen road with two infantry companies and a platoon of tanks.

Early in the afternoon a company entered Schillersdorf and engaged the enemy in a strong fire fight; and another company, with considerable difficulty, liquidated a strongpoint to the north of the town and finally succeeded in partially by-passing the pocket of resistance localized in Schillersdorf. Two companies, one with an open flank on the east, despite heavy and continuous shelling throughout the day, contained the enemy on the outskirts of Schillersdorf. In the zone of the 3rd Battalion of the 410th Regiment one company first blunted the drive and later absorbed it after being forced back to the edge of town.

Early in the morning of 26 January the battalion commander committed his reserve elements, which halted the enemy in the front of the main line of resistance. Prime consideration was given to a gap south of Muhlhausen, through which the Germans were receiving reinforce-

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ments and supplies. With close support and cooperation of the 781st Tank Battalion and heavy support of the division artillery infantry troops were able to cut off the supply route and seal off the enemy in Schillersdorf and Muhlhausen. Mopping-up operations were not completed until the next day, however.

Meanwhile the zone of the 36th Division between Bischwiller and Weyersheim was quiet except for occasional minor patrol clashes and occasional light artillery fire. The enemy attacks on both sides of Haguenau had been successfully repelled, and the line had been restored. The 117th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron continued to screen the corps south boundary and maintain contact with the French II Corps. The enemy never regained the initiative after the final attack against Seventh Army across the Moder on 25 January. Because the forces being used in the effort to crash the Moder line were "needed as reserve behind future defensive efforts", the Führer commanded on 25 January, according to captured documents, that the attack against the Lower Vosges and in Lower Alsace be suspended.

#### All Quiet on the VI Corps Front

The VI Corps sector now became quiet, and activities were routine and almost negligible until the 36th Division launched its attack on Oberhoffen and Drusenheim in the last hours of January. Contact was only scattered, but increased movement in enemy rear areas indicated a reshuffling of divisions. By the end of the month the 25th Panzer Grenadier, the 7th Parachute, and the 21st Panzer Divisions had been redeployed out of the area. The mounting demands for personnel on the eastern front and the losses sustained in the winter campaign in the west had left the German army incapable of further attack in Alsace. Average casualties for the Volks Grenadier divisions for the winter were 3,000 to 4,000 and for the Panzer and Panzer Grenadier divisions 2,000 to 3,000. After bringing up about 500 replacements for each Volks Grenadier division in January, the enemy could assemble only four to five complete Grenadier battalions for each division.

The only action taken by American forces prior to the attack of the 36th Division was the changing of sectors and effecting of reliefs.

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Before the German attacks of 24-25 January, it had been planned to have the 101st Airborne Division relieve the 79th Division. The attacks interrupted that plan, and then it was decided to have the 101st Division relieve Task Force Linden, which had been attached to the 79th Division, instead. As early as 18 January it had been announced to Seventh Army Headquarters that the 101st Airborne Division was to begin movement on the next day from Third Army territory to the Seventh Army. This



MAJOR GENERAL  
MAXWELL D. TAYLOR  
*attached to XV Corps*

division, equipped as an infantry division, was composed of the 502nd and 506th Parachute Infantry Regiments and the 327th Glider Infantry; it was commanded by Major General Maxwell D. Taylor. The 101st Airborne Division upon its arrival had been attached to XV Corps effective 20 January and by 25 January had begun movement to the VI Corps area for the relief of Task Force Linden.

The 222nd and 232nd Regiments moved out of the division and corps area to army reserve on 27 January; but General Brooks gave the 79th Division verbal authority to retain the 242nd Infantry in position so that the 314th Regiment which was to relieve it might have more time to reorganize after its efforts in the Ohlungen Forest. The next day, the 314th Infantry relieved the 242nd going into the line between the other two regiments of the 79th Division. The 101st Airborne Division went into the line between the 103rd and 79th Divisions, occupying the sector between Niedermodern and Schweighausen with the 327th Glider and 501st Parachute Regiments on line.

The next chapter will interrupt the narrative of Seventh Army operations to discuss in some detail the First French Army's successful campaign to eliminate the Colmar pocket. This operation involved many American troops and was, of course, intimately connected with and highly important to the future of Seventh Army.

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## CHAPTER XXIV

### *Elimination of the Colmar Pocket*

Toward the end of January the difficulty of the German situation in the Ardennes, the failure of enemy attacks in Lorraine and northern Alsace, and the success of the Russian winter offensive indicated that the time had come for Allied forces to eliminate the Colmar Pocket, which had been reduced but little since its formation at the beginning of December. At the end of the old year principal efforts of the First French Army, like those of the American Seventh Army, had been directed toward defense against the anticipated German offensive. Even on 7 January Sixth Army Group had still insisted that defensive measures in the Vosges be "pressed forward with all energy." The defense was to be conducted along aggressive lines, characterized by frequent raids on all parts of the front to secure identifications and information and to create doubt as to the situation and intention of Allied forces. It was intended that these activities would facilitate rapid passage to a general offensive on that front.

General preparatory instructions for an attack by the First French Army had been given by Sixth Army Group on 15 January. "... launch without delay and by surprise, with all the means now at your disposal, powerful offensive operations converging in the direction of Brisach and aimed at total reduction of the Alsace bridgehead." At this time, however, the means were not yet sufficient to the end. On 11 January Seventh Army, concerned over the enemy build-up and thrust in the Strasbourg area, had sent an officer to the French II Corps to get first hand information on the situation. The officer sent back an urgent message that the corps had only scanty reserves and that the situation north of Rhinau could be considered serious.

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During the period of defense and patrol activity on the rim of the Colmar Pocket the American 3rd Infantry Division remained in line as a part of II French Corps in the sector just northwest of Colmar. On 19 January the division was relieved from its positions by the American 28th Infantry Division. For the next three days units of the 3rd Division engaged in training preparatory to an attack launched on 22 January.

On 18 January Sixth Army Group had issued instructions to First French Army to attack from the north and south. This double envelopment strategy called for attack by the French I Corps in the south on 20 January and by the French II Corps in the north on 22 January. General Bethouart's I Corps was to direct its main effort so as to cut the road net in the Cernay-Guebwiller area and then to exploit in the direction of the bridges at Brisach. The II Corps, under command of General Goislard de Monsabert, was to attack in the north between Colmar and Selestat, by-passing Colmar to the northeast and east, and also exploiting in the direction of Brisach. These attacks of 20 and 22 January marked the transition from the stalemate to the elimination phase in Colmar Pocket operations.

A previous plan was to begin the offensive in the middle of February, employing the same strategy. But the innumerable streams and small rivers traversing the Alsatian Plain, where most of the fighting would take place, are generally at their lowest stage toward the end of January. Therefore it was imperative to begin operations as soon as possible, before the plain became a vast quagmire.

I Corps in the south by 3 February had overrun the industrial zone in the Mulhouse-Cernay-Ensisheim triangle and had driven as far north as Ensisheim. By 28 January II Corps, including American units, had reached its first objective, the junction of the Rhine-Rhone and Colmar Canals at Artzenheim. The Vosges sector was being held by the French 10th Infantry Division. On 29 January the American XXI Corps, assigned to the First French Army, was given that part of the II Corps mission which called for reaching the Brisach bridges on the Rhine and making a junction with I Corps in the south. Between 29 January and

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1 February II Corps completed its remaining missions, clearing the Rhine Plain between Artzenheim and Erstein and occupying the Rhine in that area. Forces of I and XXI Corps made a junction at Rouffach on 5 February. By 6 February forces of XXI Corps had reached the Brisach objective, and after that until 9 February operations in the pocket were confined to mopping up. By 9 February all German resistance in the area had been liquidated; the First French Army was at the Rhine from Basel to a point north of Strasbourg.

#### Advance of I Corps

The breakthrough operation of I Corps was conceived as a "crushing attack in depth" to be opened on a narrow front by surprise. The 4th Moroccan Mountain Division on the west and the 2nd Moroccan Infantry Division on the east moved out on the axis of advance Cernay-Ensisheim, aimed at securing the crossings of the Ill River north of Ensisheim to enable armor to move toward the Brisach area. Just north and east of Mulhouse the 9th Colonial Infantry Division had the mission of pivoting and protecting the main effort by establishing itself along the Ill between Mulhouse and Ensisheim. All three divisions were reinforced by armor of the 1st Armored Division. The attack was launched as planned just before 0800 hours on 20 January.

After 11 days of fighting in the worst possible weather none of the corps objectives had been attained, although advances had been made. French infantry had "reached the limit of its resistance." Armor was reduced to half its original quantity, and the repair crews were exhausted. It was not possible to declare a total rest period, but no offensive action was undertaken on 31 January, and every opportunity was taken that day to give rest to all possible infantry troops and tank crews and to conserve ammunition.

Slight advances were made on 1 February against troops supported by powerful artillery fire and protected by extensive minefields. The next day, as the advance of the French I Corps continued, the American XXI Corps entered Colmar and Allied infantry reached the vicinity of the Brisach bridges. This made it all the more imperative

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for I Corps to push more rapidly so as to hasten the crumbling of enemy resistance west of the Rhine.

At the end of 3 February I Corps troops had reached the outskirts of Ensisheim, the initial objective. Reconnaissance troops were sent to the Ill and Thur crossings at the outskirts of Ensisheim. The 2nd Moroccan Division eliminated resistance in the Nonnenbruch Woods up to the line of the Thur River. Though neither Cernay nor Ensisheim had been taken, the I Corps now had a base for the drive northward to make a junction with XXI Corps forces at Rouffach.

### II Corps Crosses the Ill River

Three divisions, the American 3rd Infantry, the 5th French Armored, and the 1st Moroccan Infantry took direct part in the assault launched by the II French Corps between the forest south of Selestal and Ostheim north of Colmar on the night of 22-23 January. By 20 January the American 28th Infantry Division had relieved the 3rd




MAJOR GENERAL  
NORMAN D. COTA  
holding the line from  
Sigolsheim to Le Valtin

Division and was holding the line stretching from Sigolsheim southwest to Le Valtin, where it joined the French 10th Infantry Division, which was holding the Central Vosges sector on the I Corps north flank. The 28th Infantry Division, made up of the 109th, 110th, and 112th Infantry Regiments and commanded by Major General Norman D. Cota, had been attached to Seventh Army and placed under the operational control of the First French Army on 16 January. The 28th Division, "exhausted and depleted", had been heavily hit in the Ardennes sector and came to Seventh Army critically under strength. The rehabilitation

of its troops, who began to arrive in the St. Die area by 18 January, remained the responsibility of Twelfth Army Group. Protection to the north and east of II Corps assault divisions was given by the French 2nd Armored Division, holding the Rhine Plain

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above Erstein and having a western boundary lying approximately on the main road running north from Colmar and through Selestat.

Opposing the II Corps the Germans had at their disposal the equivalent of 25 battalions each with a troop strength of about 500 men. These units were of varying character and quality. In general enemy troops were weary from months of severe fighting and partly demoralized by their defeats. But veteran soldiers with longer training maintained an aggressive spirit. The aged or foreign recruits were worth little but were capable of conducting an able defense with the veterans leading them. The only units still aggressive, in addition to companies of the Feldherrnhalle Panzer Brigade, were the training units for non-commissioned officers and the SS.

The mission of II Corps was to break through the enemy lines along the Ill River between Guemar and Ostheim, to reach out to the



MARCKOLSHEIM AREA

The mission of II Corps was to break through enemy lines between Guemar and Ostheim . . . and to advance along the Rhine-Rhone Canal to Marckolsheim . . .



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Colmar Canal, to turn northward at Artzenheim, and to advance along the Rhine-Rhone Canal to Marckolsheim. Masking its west flank by blocking the Fecht River Valley, the corps was then to drive toward Neuf-Brisach and southward to make junctions with I Corps at Rouffach,



INFANTRY TROOPS HEADING FOR NEW POSITIONS ON THE COLMAR FRONT

*During the night of 22-23 January . . . the 1st Moroccan Division and the American 3rd Division . . . jumped off between the Illwald and Ostheim to execute . . . Operation GRANDSLAM . . .*

Ensisheim, and Chalampe. The last step was to be the mopping up of the pocket between Marckolsheim and Erstein.

During the night of 22-23 January and the following morning the 1st Moroccan Division and the American 3rd Division, to which the 254th Infantry of Task Force Harris had been attached for operations throughout the month of January, jumped off between the Illwald and Ostheim to execute what was known to the Americans as Operation *Grandslam*. Between Selestat and Guemar the sector was being held

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only by three low quality enemy battalions. Between 2100 hours on 22 January and 0230 hours on 23 January the 7th and 30th Infantry Regiments crossed the Fecht River on a footbridge at Guemar in a surprise move without supporting fires. The regiments fanned out across the Colmar Forest in order to cover the ground before the Ill and be ready to strike at the river crossings.

The American 7th Infantry, to the southwest, wheeled to the south and moved between the Fecht and the Ill to cover the flank of the 30th Infantry. The 1st Battalion made contact with the enemy at Ostheim, the eastern section of which it was to clear, early in the morning. The 3rd Battalion occupied the Brunnwald as well as the southern edge of the Colmar Forest, with infantry supported by tanks. The 30th Infantry had made its way during the night toward the river, and by morning the 1st Battalion had crossed the Ill and a small stream just to the east of it on improvised footbridges of rubber boats and was proceeding southward toward Maison Rouge. The 3rd Battalion went through the forest to its southeastern edge, adjacent to the Maison Rouge crossing of the Ill. Both regiments encountered scattered strongpoints, mines, and wire obstacles, and small arms, machine gun, mortar, and artillery fire. The advance was made in weather which was quite cold and over terrain covered with snow. While the losses from enemy action were not negligible, the enemy resistance was spotty and caused no great delay in the advance of the regiments.

The rest of the II Corps drive started on the morning of 23 January. Elements of the 1st Moroccan Division reached the Ill at dawn and made crossings between Illhaeusern and the Illwald, to the north of the American crossings. Patrols advanced eastward. They reported numerous plastic mines along the entire strip of occupied terrain, particularly along woods and paths, which were covered with ice and a thick layer of snow. An 18-ton bridge, found intact at Illhaeusern, allowed crossings of infantry combat vehicles. It was not, apparently, until after three days of confused fighting that French troops completely held Illhaeusern.

At 0400 hours on 23 January the 1st Battalion of the American 7th Infantry had received orders to enter the eastern or enemy half of

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Ostheim. After combating enemy tanks with bazookas and being joined by friendly armor and tank destroyers, troops mopped up the remaining resistance. Ostheim was completely in American hands by the end of 23 January. The 2nd Battalion moved to the outskirts of Ostheim and drove the enemy out of the woods near the village.

The 30th Regiment executed a pincer attack on the Maison Rouge crossings over the Ill and a stream about 400 yards east during the morning of 23 January. The 1st Battalion, which completed crossings of both streams about 1,000 yards north of Maison Rouge during the early morning moved toward the south. The 3rd Battalion launched an attack on the Ill crossing after an artillery preparation and occupied it, taking the bridge intact. Both crossings were in American hands by noon. Assuming that supporting armor would soon be able to follow over the Maison Rouge bridges, the regiment deployed all three of its battalions across the river, the 1st Battalion going through Riedwihr Wood for an attack on Riedwihr, the 3rd passing south through Riedwihr Wood, and the 2nd Battalion moving up as reserve.

Against this rapid extension of the bridgehead toward the Colmar Canal the enemy launched a heavy attack with tank-supported infantry striking from the east, south, and north. This tank attack struck at a most unfortunate time. Elements of the 1st Battalion were on the way to Riedwihr, out in the open, in no position for a defensive stand. The 3rd Battalion was entering Hohtzwihr, just beginning to get set up. Troops of the 2nd Battalion had just arrived in Riedwihr Wood, when the full force of the enemy blow was being felt, at about 1800 hours. The bridge over the Ill collapsed under the first tank to attempt to cross, making it impossible to supply the desperate need for armor. The regiment could only withdraw the greater part of its troops from the costly engagements and form defensive lines to the west of the Ill in the Colmar Forest. Meanwhile to the southwest elements of the 254th Infantry attached to the 3rd Division engaged in inconclusive action against the enemy near Sigolsheim just above Colmar.

The next day the drive to establish the Franco-American bridgehead east of the Ill continued. Combat Command V of the 2nd French Armored Division was assigned to the 1st Moroccan Division,

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while the 5th French Armored Division received orders to hold itself in readiness to advance as quickly as possible along an axis from Illhaeusern to Neuf-Brisach. French troops launched an attack in the direction of Elsenheim. Reconnaissance elements of Combat Command V attempted to advance along the Elsenheim road. Immediately the enemy counterattacked and revealed heavy tanks concealed in the southern edge of the Elsenheim Wood. The platoon of armor withdrew.

After the German counterattack broke the advance of the 30th Infantry near Riedwihr, the regiment fell back to Guemar and Ostheim to be refitted and reorganized. Its mission then fell to the 15th Infantry, which had been in reserve in the Colmar Forest. At 2030 hours on 23 January the Division Commander, General O'Daniel, sent the following order to the Regimental Commander:

Make plans to take over 30th Infantry attack with same objectives . . . plan now is to hold bridgehead and line along L'Ille River. We will get bridge that tank fell thru back in, send armor across and attack again.

The 30th Infantry had been able to keep only a portion of one battalion east of the Ill in a command post position north of Maison Rouge. The 15th Regiment sent Companies I and K across the footbridge north of Maison Rouge early in the morning of 24 January. By daylight the two companies had moved into positions including the two stream crossings at Maison Rouge. Company I had encountered remnants of the 1st Battalion of the 30th Infantry on its way into position. Company K had encountered light German resistance, but for the most part the enemy had withdrawn from the crossing sites.

At 0800 hours enemy armor started to roll out of Riedwihr Woods; and another counterattack was on, armor supported by infantry. American armor crossed a Bailey bridge completed at 0730 hours at the footbridge site to the north but did not arrive at Maison Rouge before the German counterattack. Heavy German fire knocked out the American armor, and finally only a handful of men remained in and around the clump of buildings at Maison Rouge. American artillery concentrations were laid down against a series of German counterattacks, all of which were broken. Meanwhile the 7th Infantry, which had cleared Ostheim

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on 23 January, moved directly south along both sides of the main highway to Colmar against heavy enemy resistance and counterattacks. On 25 January the regiment had executed battalion pincer movements and had seized Houssen half way between Ostheim and Colmar. The



KNOCKED OUT AMERICAN TANKS. COLMAR FOREST IN BACKGROUND  
*... Heavy German fire knocked out the American armor, and finally only a handful of men remained in and around Maison Rouge ...*

regiment spent the next day repelling small counterattacks and solidifying the positions in its salient. On the same day the 15th Infantry and French armor pushed forward in the Maison Rouge bridgehead area. The 3rd Battalion moved east from Maison Rouge, while the 1st and 2nd Battalions moved to the south and east in Riedwihr Wood. To the north the French made some progress into the Eisenheim Woods, but French armor was stopped by fire from enemy tanks.

On 26 January the 28th Division zone was extended eastward to the Ill, occupying the area in which the 254th Infantry had been

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fighting. The 254th Infantry had assembled in the Colmar Forest and moved out to attack Jepsheim and then push on to seize the Colmar Canal up to its junction with the Rhine-Rhone Canal. Jepsheim, a strongpoint in the German defense of the Rhine crossings, was strongly



PILLBOX IN JEBSHEIM

*... Jepsheim, a strongpoint in the German defense of the Rhine crossings, was strongly organized for defense and stubbornly defended ...*

organized for defense and stubbornly defended. At 0245 hours on 26 January four battalions of artillery threw preparatory fire on the town, and immediately afterward the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 254th Infantry launched their attack. Resistance was so strong that by 0430 hours both battalions found it necessary to withdraw to defensive positions. Since heavy fire from the Jepsheim Wood had been largely instrumental in repelling the attack, the 3rd Battalion was sent through Riedwihr, which had been taken late the previous day by the 3rd Battalion of the 15th Infantry, to clear out enemy opposition. It took the battalion

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until the night of 27 January to reach its objective. In the meantime the other two battalions returned to the attack on the town. At 2400 hours on 26 January the concentrated fire of eight field artillery battalions had been laid on Jepsheim for 15 minutes. An hour later four companies were in the town, and during the next three days cleared the enemy out of Jepsheim.

On 26 January the 1st Moroccan Division had been given the mission of opening the Illhausern-Jepsheim route without aid from the 5th Armored Division, which was to hold itself ready to strike out in the



COLMAR PLAIN LITTERED WITH ENEMY AND ALLIED ARMOR

*The French forces reorganized during the night, made only slight advances the next day, and stopped a severe counterattack by enemy infantry and tanks.*

direction of Brisach. The Eisenheim road and forest were not cleared until 27 January. That evening tanks and infantry moved down the road toward Jepsheim. At midnight an enemy counterattack was repulsed with heavy losses. The French forces reorganized during the

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night, made only slight advances the next day, and stopped a severe counterattack by enemy infantry and tanks at the exit from Eisenheim by protective fires and by corps artillery. French losses were severe in this action.

On 27 January the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 30th Infantry had passed through positions of the 15th Infantry in the southern part of Riedwihr Woods in attack with a combat command of French armor to get control of the crossings over the Colmar Canal between the Ill River and Muntzenheim. This had been the regimental objective when it first crossed the Ill early on 23 January. By the next morning two small villages between Riedwihr and the Colmar Canal had been cleared and defensive positions at canal crossings south of the towns had been established. At 1620 hours on 27 January Company L moved out to sweep the area north and east of the junction of the Ill River and the Colmar Canal. At 2000 hours the company reached its objective at the junction of the river and canal and then moved back to its battalion blocking position in Riedwihr.

When the American XXI Corps was inserted between I and II French Corps, the II Corps had not quite reached the line of army objective No. 1, which called for clearing the area north of the Colmar Canal, west of the Rhone-Rhine Canal, at least as far north as the line Marckolsheim-Illhausern. But the bridgehead across the Ill was nonetheless substantial. The only difficulty was that it had not been extended eastward beyond the Eisenheim-Jepsheim line.

#### XXI Corps Enters the Pocket

The exhausting and stubborn character of the winter fighting in the Colmar Pocket had caused the infantry strength of the First French Army to run lower and lower. When losses continued high in the fighting of 20-21 January, General de Lattre sent a telegraphic demand to General Devers that he intervene with the Supreme Commander for a supplementary infantry division. On 22 January he gave forceful reiteration to the demand. By 24 January Sixth Army Group estimated that its shortages of infantry riflemen replacements would be 13,320 by

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February SHAEF was requested to reconsider its allocation of replacements. To bolster the troop strength of Sixth Army Group forces for the Colmar offensive SHAEF transferred five American divisions to the Seventh Army and later attached approximately 12,000 service troops for the support of the new divisions.



GENERAL DE LATTRE  
DE TASSIGNY  
commanding First  
French Army


Accordingly, to strengthen the First French Army effort Sixth Army Group informed Seventh Army at 2230 hours on 24 January that XXI Corps would take over a part of the First French Army sector and would command the 3rd, 28th, and 75th American Infantry Divisions, that General Milburn, Commanding XXI Corps, was to report to the Commanding General, First French Army, at 1000 hours, 25 January. The 75th Infantry Division, made up of the 289th, 290th, and 291st Regiments and recently placed under the command of Major General Ray E. Porter, had been ordered from the Ardennes sector, where it had been heavily engaged, to start for the Seventh Army area on 25 January.



MAJOR GENERAL  
RAY E. PORTER  
ordered from the  
Ardennes sector

In a conference held the night of 26 January at 3rd Division Headquarters in Ribeauville, General De Lattre issued instructions to his corps and division commanders; and plans were made and orders issued for the attack in the new XXI Corps zone. The mission of the XXI Corps was to attack in the direction of Brisach, seize Neuf-Brisach and the western approaches to Alt-Brisach across the Rhine, and to maintain contact in the Vosges and contain the enemy there. In case enemy withdrawal in the Vosges area was indicated,

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the corps was to follow closely and mop up the Fecht Valley. Corps had at its disposal the 5th French Armored Division in addition to the three American infantry divisions already mentioned.

The XXI Corps task of exploiting toward Brisach had been the main mission of II French Corps. Under the new orders the scheduled junction with I Corps would be made by XXI Corps. This left II Corps free to continue its attack on the axis from Guemar to Marckolsheim to the Rhine, then to clean up the region between the Ill and the Rhine Rivers and between Erstein and Marckolsheim. The II Corps operation served as cover for the XXI Corps left flank.

In the sector it took over at 2100 hours on 28 January XXI Corps opened the attack toward Neuf-Brisach exactly one day later. The 3rd Division was to continue its drive, crossing the Colmar Canal, which it had just reached. The 28th Division, continuing to hold west of the Ill, was to mount a "strong demonstration" and maintain strong pressure in conjunction with the 3rd Division attack. It was further directed to fix the enemy by small local attacks, aggressive patrolling, and strong raids. Any enemy withdrawal was to be followed up vigorously. The 5th French Armored Division was to attack in multiple columns on corps order. Continuing its movement into position for offensive action, the 75th Division was to have one Regimental Combat Team in a forward assembly area by noon on 30 January and the other two were to be moved up by 0700 hours on 31 January. The XII Tactical Air Command was to give maximum bombing effort on Brisach and the bridges east of Brisach and attack enemy communications, depots, and assembly points east of the Rhine.

Two regiments, the 7th and 15th, attacked abreast when the 3rd Division crossed the Colmar Canal between Colmar and Artzenheim. Both regiments encountered little resistance in the canal crossing, corps artillery laying down a heavy barrage that rolled southward from the canal's southern edge. The 7th Infantry had two battalions, the 1st and 3rd, assembled south of the canal an hour after the jump-off at 2100 hours on 29 January. Because bridging supplies were held up by traffic congestion, the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 15th Infantry did not complete their crossing until 2400 hours. Tank support did not arrive



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for the advance until a Bailey bridge was completed the next morning. The two regiments made good progress south of the canal, smashing one enemy counterattack during the morning of 30 January. The 15th Infantry cleared Muntzenheim during the night, as both regiments drove the enemy out of villages on the Colmar-Muntzenheim highway.

The following night the 289th Infantry Regiment of the 75th Division took over the positions of the 1st and 3rd Battalions of the 7th Infantry. Meanwhile the 2nd Battalion had opened a drive against Horbourg on the outskirts of Colmar and straddling the German escape route from Colmar to Neuf-Brisach. Troops were pinned down by anti-



SMOKE SCREEN BEING LAID IN THE COLMAR AREA

*Both regiments encountered little resistance in the canal crossing, corps artillery laying down a heavy barrage . . .*

tank, machine gun, and small arms fire. German resistance did not break until French tanks pushed through enemy positions. When elements of the 289th Regiment relieved the battalion at 2300 hours on 31 January, the town was clear; but German artillery was still pounding it.

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On the morning of 30 January the 1st Battalion of the 254th Infantry attacked with French armor from Jebnheim toward the junction of the Colmar and Rhine-Rhone Canals. A strong counterattack forced the battalion back to its line of departure. On 1 February the 2nd Battalion passed through 1st Battalion positions and advanced slowly against strong resistance, reaching the Rhine-Rhone Canal north of its junction with the Colmar Canal.

On the extreme west of the corps sector the 28th Division, which had been holding the Vosges line and probing enemy territory with long and aggressive patrols, attacked south at 2100 hours on 1



M-4 TANKS MOUNTING 105MM HOWITZERS BEING USED AS ARTILLERY IN THE COLMAR AREA

*. . . the 109th Infantry, cutting through increasingly strong resistance, had arrived at the entrance to Colmar . . .*

February with the 112th and 109th Infantry Regiments abreast. The zone of the 112th was just west of Colmar, but the city of Colmar lay directly in the path of the 109th. By the next morning the 109th Infan-

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try, cutting through increasingly strong resistance, had arrived at the entrance to Colmar. Here American troops stopped their advance and allowed the tanks of the 5th French Armored Division to have the privilege of being the first to enter the city. After entering the city amid the "delirious enthusiasm" of the Alsatians, the French tanks split into three groups. One went through the city and west to block the valley of the Fecht. Another went on to the south of Colmar without stopping. The third set itself to cleaning out resistance in the city until American infantry moved in and took over the job.

To the east the 75th Division attacked at 0700 hours on 1 February through the positions it had taken over from the 3rd Division. By the end of 2 February the 289th and 291st Infantry Regiments, progressing southward abreast, had taken Andolsheim and moved up on the approaches to Neuf-Brisach. A strong enemy counterattack, supported by armor, halted the advance.

By the evening of 1 February the 15th and 30th Regiments, working with French armor, had pushed south along the west bank of the Rhine-Rhone Canal to a point just north of Neuf-Brisach. The taking of Artzenheim at 1630 hours on 1 February by the French facilitated the progress of the 3rd Division. The 7th Infantry was able to pass through the French troops in Artzenheim and attack southward between the Rhine River and the Rhine-Rhone Canal on 2 February. Having moved rapidly with tank support the 2nd and 3rd Battalions had moved up to attack Biesheim by the next morning. The 3rd Battalion advanced between the canal and the highway and met determined opposition after elements had passed unknowingly through enemy outposts. The 2nd Battalion advanced on Biesheim from east of the highway. In the town Germans defended houses with rifles, machine guns, and bazookas. Troops of the 7th Infantry cleared Biesheim by the end of the day, but enemy entrenched in positions northeast of town were not completely eliminated until the morning of 4 February. With 3rd Division troops in Biesheim northeast of Neuf-Brisach, and the 75th Division approaching from the northwest the stage was set for the last drive on Neuf-Brisach.

After the fall of Colmar to the XXI Corps it was decided to push with all possible speed on the Colmar-Rouffach road to join with

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I Corps. The American 12th Armored Division, which had been attached to II Corps primarily for its use in the Strasbourg area, was brought to the XXI Corps to attack south through the 28th Division, which was continuing the mop-up of Colmar on 3 February. French armor had blocked the Vosges to the west and south of Colmar. Combat Command B of the 12th Armored Division attempted to move southeast from Colmar, along the road to Ensisheim, striking with Task Forces Fields, Norton, and Boone on the morning of 3 February. Task Force Fields was stopped at the edge of Colmar by enemy fire on its first attack at 0930 hours but later both Task Forces Fields and Norton seized bridge-



STE. CROIX EN PLAINE AREA

*Task Forces Fields and Norton seized bridgeheads over the Ill River on the roads to Sundhoffen in the east and Ste. Croix en Plaine in the south.*

heads over the Ill River on the roads to Sundhoffen in the east and Ste. Croix en Plaine in the south. Task Force Boone attempted to push through Task Force Norton toward Sundhoffen but was held about 800 yards beyond the line of departure. The task forces held their positions

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in the woods during the night, screened by reconnaissance elements. During the night 4-5 February these three task forces were relieved by elements of the 109th Infantry and then dissolved.

On 3 February Combat Command R of the 12th Armored had attacked southward astride the Colmar-Rouffach road, while the 17th Armored Infantry Battalion was sent to relieve the French west of the highway. During the morning of 4 February Combat Command R was stopped by antitank fire from a town just northeast of Hattstatt and east of the Colmar-Rouffach road. At 1030 hours infantry troops with artillery support launched an attack but were repulsed. The next day elements of the 17th Armored Infantry Battalion together with the 1st Battalion of the 110th Infantry Regiment and the 23rd Tank Battalion broke down enemy resistance. Meanwhile Combat Command A had driven south through Hattstatt.

Split into two Task Forces, Doc and Scott, Combat Command A with Troop A of the 92nd Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron had seized Hattstatt on 4 February. In accordance with orders issued the night before, Troop A moved out from Hattstatt at 0200 hours on 5 February toward Rouffach. The two task force components of Combat Command A followed closely the cavalry unit. Twice a platoon of the reconnaissance troop detached itself from the advance to contain enemy forces discovered and by-passed on the road to Rouffach.

Numerous enemy horse-drawn transports were destroyed during the movement and enemy resistance overrun. Infantry elements of Task Force Scott passed through roadblocks and entered Rouffach at 0512 hours on 5 February. Other infantry troops moved around the town to seal off the exits and to contact French forces which had reached the town during the night. By 0800 hours French and American leaders had met and coordinated defense plans. The Colmar Pocket had been cut in two.

#### French I and II Corps Continue the Advance

When I Corps had established itself on the southern bank of the Thur River between Ensisheim and Cernay, though not including those two places, it received orders from General de Lattre to move

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northward as soon as possible to make contact with XXI Corps. Accordingly, on 3 February the divisions in the corps were given their directions of operation: the 2nd Moroccan Division to go toward Rouffach and Ste. Croix en Plaine, the 1st French Armored Division to move on the Ensisheim-Ste. Croix en Plaine axis as a unit; and the 4th Mountain Division and the 9th Colonial Division were to capture Cernay and Ensisheim, respectively. It was hoped to cut off the retreat of the enemy from west of the Ill. As early as 31 January enemy displacement in the Vosges had been reported.

On 4 February the French found Cernay abandoned by the enemy and moving northeast along the Rouffach road without serious opposition, occupied Guebwiller west of the highway by the end of the day. Elements of the 4th Moroccan Spahi Regiment, supported by infantry, went on to reach the southern edges of Rouffach during the night. They were stopped by German armor.

When Task Force Scott of Combat Command A of the 12th Armored Division arrived at the north edge of Rouffach the next morning, civilian information indicated that the French were at the south edge of town but not in strong enough force to enter or to stop the enemy from escaping to the east. Liaison was established with the French during the morning. Troops of I Corps had been awaiting the arrival of the Americans. Tanks started through the town, and soon the first link-up between the I Corps and XXI Corps had been made.

On the rest of the I Corps front a general advance had been resumed on the morning of 4 February. The French 1st Armored Division made rapid advances northward during 5 February, sending a small element ahead without opposition into the XXI Corps zone as far as Ste. Croix en Plaine, which was reached at about 1100 hours and found unoccupied. Upon the request of the 12th Armored Division the detachment retired from the village and then took numerous prisoners while patrolling in the woods northeast of Rouffach. Also established along the Ill from Ensisheim north were the 9th Colonial Division and the 2nd Moroccan Division.

When the XXI Corps was inserted between the French I and II Corps, it became the mission of II Corps to push east toward the Rhine-

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Rhone Canal and to clear up the residual pocket from Erstein to Marckolsheim. On 29 January the enemy had launched a counterattack on Elsenheim, which was beaten off. There were also attacks by German planes east and north of Elsenheim. On 30 January the 1st Moroccan Division resumed its forward movement and succeeded in clearing up woodland areas east of Illhaeusern. Everywhere in the sector it appeared that the enemy was withdrawing the main body of his troops, leaving in contact only a system of outposts which were fairly powerful and very active. Since the enemy appeared to be pulling out all along the front, the order was given to maintain contact during the night, pushing forward if necessary.

Operations had begun to take on the character of simple patrolling and terrain occupation by 31 January, when the enemy had given up the hopeless struggle in the II Corps area. Elsenheim and the sector north along the Rhone-Rhine Canal were occupied by evening. In the pocket farther north the 2nd French Armored Division, out of contact with the enemy, was retarded only by snow and mine-clearing, as it reached out east of Selestat during the day.

The II Corps advanced on 1 February to the Rhine, which it occupied along its entire front. The taking of Artzenheim at 1630 hours gave the 7th Infantry a base for its drive southward toward Neuf-Brisach. The northern flank of the XXI Corps had been secured, and the Germans were being driven out of Alsace south of Strasbourg and back to Germany.

#### XXI Corps Finishes its Task

By the time the junction between XXI Corps and I Corps had taken place at Rouffach, resistance in the XXI Corps area had become generally disorganized. It remained only for the 3rd, 28th, and 75th Divisions to push forward in their zones to the Rhine, overcoming isolated pockets of resistance as they went. On 6 February elements of the 12th Armored Division prepared to exploit to the east after bridges had been constructed over the Ill for the crossing by the 28th Division. But resistance was so light that the mission of the 12th Armored Division

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was changed to blocking the Vosges from west of Colmar to Rouffach to keep the enemy from escaping to the east.

The 3rd Division continued its drive southward between the Rhone-Rhine Canal and the Rhine River. As the 7th Infantry cleared



AMERICAN MEDIUM TANK OUTPOSTED ALONG BANKS  
OF THE ILL RIVER

the 12th Armored Division prepared to exploit to the east after bridges had been constructed over the Ill.

Biesheim, the 15th and the 30th Regiments cleared away resistance on its flanks. By the morning of 6 February, the 7th Infantry had completely sealed off Neuf-Brisach, and the 15th Infantry had mopped up along the river to the east. The 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 30th Regiment had attacked south through the 7th during the night of 5-6 February. The 1st Battalion had stayed in a blocking position north of Neuf-Brisach.

Patrols from the 1st Battalion of the 30th Infantry reconnoitered Neuf-Brisach during the night and early morning and en-

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countered only scattered enemy. At about 0930 hours on 6 February a platoon moved south along the Rhine-Rhone Canal. As the platoon neared a railroad bridge, soldiers encountered a civilian, who was persuaded to jump into the dry moat and lead the group through a low ceilinged, 60-foot tunnel into the fortress city. Only 76 enemy were found in the town, which was declared clear at 1115 hours. Prisoners said their officers had exhorted them to resist to the last man on the previous evening. The officers had then departed.

As the 3rd Division completed the occupation of its zone, which extended to a point just south of Neuf-Brisach, the American 28th and 75th Divisions were taking care of the rest of the XXI Corps sector. The 75th Division, moving south and east, was on the line of the Rhone-Rhine Canal on 6 February. The 28th Division, having passed through the 12th Armored Division after its drive to Rouffach and having crossed the Ill with help of the armor, moved directly east and was on the southern flank of the corps boundary on 6 February. The two divisions advanced abreast and were on the Rhine from Balgau northward at the end of 7 February. After scattered mopping-up operations on 8 February the corps had complete control of all the territory assigned to it.

By that time the French I Corps to the south had virtually completed its elimination of German troops remaining in the Colmar Pocket area. In the Vosges the 4th Mountain Division had reduced the last organized enemy resistance by the close of 6 February. During 8 February troops of I Corps, supported by armor and advancing against only "delaying elements" and obstacles, had pushed the few Germans left in southern Alsace into a very small pocket at Chalampe. The next morning the last vestige of enemy strength west of the Rhine was gone. By that time the Germans had blown the Chalampe bridge across the Rhine.

#### Impact on the Enemy

The German withdrawal from the Colmar Pocket had been characterized by early high level indecision and by the ever-present primary mission of tying down as many Allied troops as possible. Documents indicate that the German Commander-in-Chief West had been

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empowered on 27 January "to withdraw the weakly held Ill front to a straight line between the Ill and the Rhine, and beyond the Rhine as soon as defenses had been erected." Ferry service over the Rhine was planned to augment the traffic flowing over the bridge at Brisach. Construction of a cable track was to be considered. The next day it was announced that three heavy and two light cable tracks over the Rhine were available and that additional equipment was allotted. But although the Fuehrer approved the "withdrawal of the right wing of the Nineteenth Army", he directed the Commander-in-Chief West to "examine how far the front of the Nineteenth Army could be bettered by pressing forward the main line of resistance along the axis Selestat-Col du Bonhomme-Le Valtin" and the employment of the 6th SS Mountain Division for that purpose.

On 29 January the Commander-in-Chief West indicated it was impracticable to mount an attack for the purpose of advancing the main line of resistance of the Nineteenth Army. The 6th SS Mountain Division could not be released from the First Army "in view of the large-scale attack expected against the Moselle Gap." It was doubtful whether the 2nd Mountain Division, then in position for the assault, was still capable of attack. It was more important to strengthen the army bridgehead on its present front. To that end an order was issued the following day that it was essential to keep the bridgehead active and "to pin down enemy forces."

Late on 31 January the German Commander described the "tense situation" in the bridgehead, reporting that the enemy was only five miles from the bridge at Brisach and that the maximum width of the bridgehead was less than 25 miles. He inquired whether it was necessary to maintain the bridgehead for a protracted time and whether the Nineteenth Army was not in danger of being cut off. The dilemma facing the German commanders was that both First and Nineteenth Armies were understrength for the tasks facing them. The First was expecting a large-scale American attack on the Moselle front. Since the Nineteenth's bridgehead was nearly wiped out, the Commander-in-Chief West was suggesting that forces be withdrawn altogether from Alsace to help the German First Army ward off the anticipated attack.

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The Fuehrer, after receiving a report from the "Chief of the Army High Command" on 1 February, refused to sanction the evacuation of the bridgehead. Formations still in the pocket were to be deployed against attacks in the Colmar and Cernay-Mulhouse sectors, and the Vosges sector was to be only lightly held. The Fuehrer required a report showing the actual strength of the Nineteenth Army and a map indicating the protecting forces on the east bank of the Rhine.

On the next day, 2 February, while evacuation was being discussed, came the news that the Allies had entered Colmar. High Command West reported that the destruction of its army was inevitable, if it were left west of the Rhine. If this happened, the forces necessary to build an adequate defense line on the east side of the Rhine would be lacking. The Vosges bulge had been weakened to such a degree in favor of the Colmar front that it resembled only an advanced position, which would be crushed by the Allies. A breakthrough at Colmar was considered probable, and there were no available reinforcements. The Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff agreed with this estimate of the situation but declared that in any case the primary army mission was to establish defense at the point of penetration. In answer to a renewed request for an immediate decision on evacuation of the bridgehead, the same operations chief declared that withdrawal of all forces, including artillery, from the Vosges front had already begun anyway.

Finally, on 3 February High Command West was given permission to evacuate the bridgehead. As many of the Allied forces as possible would be tied down west of the Rhine in the process. The flanks were to be strengthened at the expense of the forward bulge; however, the outposts in the Vosges were to leave their positions only in case of enemy attack. The German 708th Infantry Division had already begun to fall back across the river, while the 16th and 189th Volks Grenadier and 198th Infantry Division were beginning to lose organic cohesion. North of Mulhouse the few remaining troops of three divisions were battling to hold the line. On 8 February High Command West reported that the bridgehead "did not hinder enemy operations any longer."

The German Nineteenth Army had consisted of the LXIV Corps and the LXIII Corps. By 10 February over 22,000 permanent

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casualties could be charged against the Nineteenth Army as well as the loss of 55 armored vehicles and 66 artillery pieces. It is estimated that no more than 3,000 to 4,000 combat infantry effectives were successfully



INFANTRY AND TANKS MOVING UP IN THE  
COLMAR — MULHOUSE AREA

*North of Mulhouse the few remaining troops of three enemy divisions were battling to hold the line.*

evacuated and only a slightly higher figure for supporting arms and service troops.

In the German LXIV Corps were the 2nd Mountain Division, the 189th Infantry Division, the 189th, 708th and 16th Volks Grenadier Divisions. The 2nd Mountain Division was hard hit, having lost over 4,700 men in prisoners and over 1,000 other casualties during commitment in the Vosges. Predominantly Austrian personnel gave a poor account of themselves in battle and had a high rate of desertion. Fighting well and engaged heavily to the end, the 198th Infantry Division had 1,000 prisoners taken and may have managed to rescue 500 of its effec-

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tives. Of the three Volks Grenadier divisions the 169th fared the worst. It was mauled badly in the defense of Colmar. A captured order set phases of withdrawal for the period 4-7 February. Attached to the 16th Volks Grenadier Division were assorted regiments and battalions, most of which managed to extricate themselves; but not more than 400 of the organic combat infantry got across the Rhine. The 708th Division was not in contact and was believed to have pulled back across the river on 3 February.

The LXIII Corps had fought in the south sector. Its 338th Infantry Division managed to pull the bulk of its units from the Vosges area. But one regiment suffered heavy casualties south of Colmar and another in the Ill-Thur triangle. The third was mauled during a hasty retreat. Not more than 400 combat men got away, and 1,750 prisoners were taken. The 159th Volks Grenadier Division finally abandoned Cernay after a stubborn fight that cost an estimated 800 killed or permanently disabled and 1,200 prisoners. The 716th Division lost at least 426 dead in its determined defense north of Mulhouse and had 800 prisoners taken.

The German Nineteenth Army was virtually destroyed as an effective fighting force as a result of the elimination of the Colmar Pocket; but the Commander-in-Chief West, desperately in need of men, deployed the main body of the salvaged forces presumably along the east bank of the Rhine opposite the former Colmar Pocket. Other elements were absorbed into divisions needing replacements. The 2nd Mountain Division and the 338th Division were transferred as quickly as possible behind the German First Army to give relief to other divisions facing the Seventh Army on the northern front. Seventh Army was now free to give its full attention to the elimination of German gains in northern Alsace.

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## CHAPTER XXV

### *Transition to Seventh Army Offensive*

After the enemy had failed in his attack across the Moder River on 25 January, Seventh Army regained the initiative and held it throughout the campaign. The Army role during the reduction of the Colmar Pocket had been relatively a static one — that of securing the Sixth Army Group's northern flank. It now remained for Seventh Army to straighten its front and ensure a clean line of departure for future offensive operation.

#### *VI Corps on the Moder River Line*

As January came to an end, the 36th Division was primed for an attack to clear the area south of the line Oberhoffen-Drusenheim and east to the Rhine. Plans were made on the basis of a Corps Operation Instruction issued on 26 January, and the 142nd Regiment was scheduled to open the attack with an assault on Oberhoffen the night of 30-31 January. On the morning of 30 January, however, the launching of the attack was postponed for 24 hours when a sudden thaw made the ground too soft for heavy support. Although it appeared that the attack might be postponed indefinitely, word arrived at noon of 31 January that operations would start that evening. In front of the other two regiments heavy patrols attempted to determine the extent of enemy withdrawal from the Offendorf-Herrlisheim-Rohrwiller-Drusenheim area. Although the enemy had pulled out of Gambenheim, which French forces had entered, patrols just to the north of the town drew heavy small arms fire, and air observation reported a heavy concentration of hostile troops remaining in Offendorf.

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When the 2nd Battalion of the 142nd Regiment attacked at 2100 hours on 31 January, the front of the 36th Division extended from the southern portion of Oberhoffen to Weyersheim. The line was being held, from south to north, by the 142nd and 141st Infantry Regiments and the 117th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron. Attached to the division were the 36th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron and Combat Command B of the 14th Armored Division. The plan of attack was for the 2nd Battalion of the 142nd Infantry to capture Oberhoffen during the night. Then the 1st and 3rd Battalions were to swing simultaneously to the east from Oberhoffen and Bischwiller to take Drusenheim. Elements of Combat Command B were to assume the defense of Oberhoffen and allow the 2nd Battalion to pass into reserve.

The companies of the 2nd Battalion moved across the Moder River, swept wide to the east, and moved into Oberhoffen with surprising ease. At 0330 hours on 1 February the only opposition apparent in the town was an enemy machine gun strongpoint. Just at dawn the enemy counterattacked from the northeast. Bridges for American armor were not complete, and the infantry had to combat enemy armor alone. By afternoon 2nd Battalion forces had withdrawn to the southern part of Oberhoffen to reorganize. During the afternoon a company of Combat Command B's tanks made a diversionary attack on the eastern sector of Oberhoffen. At 1300 hours the 1st Battalion of the 142nd Infantry had been ordered to attack through the 2nd Battalion after dark and continue with the mission of clearing Oberhoffen. This in effect cancelled the anticipated drive of the 1st and 3rd Battalions to the east.

Meanwhile, in the area west of Herrlisheim, the 141st Infantry had established a 28-man strongpoint along the Zorn River. While this group was probing for a bridgehead to the southeast side of the river, elements of the 117th Reconnaissance Squadron, operating from the French II Corps zone, attacked to the north of Gamsheim. These two drives were moving toward each other.

Artillery fire on both sides was limited by the shortage of ammunition. The 36th Division artillery had been limited to 11 rounds per day, and the Commanding General had to request permission for additional expenditures. Documents show that the German forces had

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been informed that the situation on the eastern front made necessary drastic economy in artillery ammunition, and that as an alternative measure, sniper activity was to be increased.

Elements of the 1st Battalion of the 142nd Infantry moved across the Moder and into battle for Oberhoffen at 2200 hours on 1 February. Companies A and C had established an east-west line several hundred yards inside the town a few hours later and held up there until dawn. During the night the Germans drew on forces in Schirrheim and Drusenheim to meet the expected renewal of attack in Oberhoffen. The battle continued throughout 2 February with tanks and infantry em-



DRUSENHEIM WOODS

*... The first objective of the 3rd Battalion of the 142nd Infantry was the Drusenheim woods between Rohrwiller and Drusenheim ...*

ployed by both sides. To speed up the clearing of Oberhoffen General Dahlquist ordered an enveloping attack in the afternoon by two companies of tanks from Combat Command B; but this effort was ineffectual. Houses and small areas exchanged hands several times during the

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afternoon. At darkness the 1st Battalion was still only part way into Oberhoffen.

In spite of the fact that Oberhoffen was not yet clear, four battalions of the division moved out from the existing Bischwiller-Weyersheim line to clear the enemy from the west bank of the Rhine from Drusenheim southward to the French line. The first objective of the 3rd Battalion of the 142nd Infantry was the Drusenheim woods between Rohrwiller and Drusenheim. The 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 143rd Infantry were to seize Rohrwiller and then swing south to Herrlisheim. Attacking to the north of Gamsheim, the 3rd Battalion of the



THE MODER RIVER ROSE RAPIDLY

Four days of extremely mild temperature had melted a foot of snow, flooded the lowlands of the attack route . . .

141st Infantry was to form the second arm of a pincer on Herrlisheim.

Four days of extremely mild temperature had melted a foot of snow, flooded the lowlands of the attack route, and softened up the ground. The Moder River rose rapidly, and the 3rd Battalion of the

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142nd Regiment crossed a treadway bridge through ankle-deep water. Footbridges were washed out completely. During the night troops pushed into the Drusenheim woods, but the Germans still held the wooded section along the Rohrwiller-Drusenheim road. The two battalions of the 143rd Infantry Regiment attacked through water three feet deep to occupy Rohrwiller, where the enemy was taken by surprise but put up stiff resistance. American casualties exceeded the 210 prisoners taken from the 10th SS Panzer Division elements. Tank operations generally were hampered by flood conditions. Troops of the 143rd Infantry elements were kept from gaining control of the territory between Rohrwiller and the Rhine because tanks could not be deployed across the open fields to support the infantry.

The approach march of two companies of the 3rd Battalion of the 141st Infantry, which began at 0300 hours on 3 February, was very difficult. Clouds overcast the sky, and the troops waded through water to their hips. Where the water was not deep the ground was very muddy and slippery. Troops came up to the edge of Herrlisheim without realizing they were so close to it in the darkness. They became involved in a heavy fire fight, which lasted until 0645 hours, when the men saw the houses of the town directly ahead of them and dashed for the cover of the buildings. From then until 1030 hours the 150 to 175 men who had gained shelter in the houses watched for supporting tanks to appear. At 1030 hours German tanks and infantry launched an attack, and American troops started withdrawal to Weyersheim.

During the night of 2 February and into 3 February the see-saw battle in Oberhoffen continued. Elements of the 68th Armored Infantry Battalion of Combat Command B began relief of the 1st Battalion of the 142nd Regiment at noon. The defensive line of the 68th Battalion was set up in Oberhoffen with the northwest portion of the town still in German hands. The following day elements of the 142nd and 143rd Infantry Regiments attacked to clear the remainder of the woods between Rohrwiller and Drusenheim. Neither made notable progress. Terrain conditions still precluded pressing the attack on Herrlisheim.

While the fighting continued in Oberhoffen, on 6 February the 143rd Infantry relieved the 2nd Battalion of the 142nd Infantry in

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Drusenheim Wood and took control of the sector extending generally along the line Drusenheim Wood-Herrlisheim-Offendorf. Passing south with a small force, troops of the 143rd Infantry Regiment entered Herrlisheim without opposition but found buildings heavily mined and booby-trapped. Patrols reached the edge of Drusenheim, which was found to be strongly held. The day before elements of the 141st Regiment had been relieved by the 117th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, which had found Offendorf along the Rhine mined and booby-trapped but apparently without enemy.


After darkness on 5 February the 141st and 142nd Regiments relieved the 314th and 315th Infantry Regiments of the 79th Division as part of a reshuffling of forces on the corps front. The 79th Infantry Division was taken out of the line. After these reliefs the front of the 36th Division extended from the eastern edge of Haguenau to the French line at Gambsheim. Because of the taking of Rohrwiller and the German evacuation of Herrlisheim, the line bulged somewhat eastward from where it had been on 1 February. The 101st Airborne Division held the line west from Haguenau between the 36th and 103rd Divisions. By 3 February Seventh Army Headquarters had received instructions from SHAEF that the 79th Division would move from the army area. Two days later it was learned that the 79th Division, which had served with Seventh Army since 29 September 1944, was to be sent to the Ninth Army and was to start movement on 16 February. Except for the action in the 36th Division sector between Oberhoffen and Gambsheim the VI Corps front west into the Low Vosges remained quiescent.

The main action of the 36th Division during the remainder of its stay in the Rhine sector involved the 142nd Regiment, which cleared Oberhoffen, and the 143rd Regiment, which established Rhine outposts and attacked Drusenheim. When the 142nd Infantry relieved the 68th Armored Infantry Battalion, the battle for Oberhoffen began again. On 11 February the town was finally considered cleared of the enemy although one flare-up action remained to be fought in the railroad station and factory, both in the extreme northwest edge of town.

The 143rd Regiment in the meantime pushed out toward Drusenheim and the Rhine. The flooded condition of the terrain precluded



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the use of armor, so the regiment was able to proceed with its mission only slowly. By the afternoon of 7 February outposts had been established in the woods along the Rhine, and joint outposts were being maintained with the 3rd Algerian Division of the French on the south flank. On the morning of 10 February the Rhine outposts were relieved by elements of the 141st Regiment. Troops of the 143rd Infantry attacking Drusenheim were repulsed after a day-long effort to take the town. On the night of 10-11 February the movement of the regiment into division reserve and its relief by the 141st Infantry began.

Because of a SHAEF request for the withdrawal of the 101st Airborne Division made on 15 February, a series of reliefs was ordered on the VI Corps front. Beginning on 19 February the 14th Armored Division was put into the line. The sector from Bischwiller to the Rhine was taken over by the French. The 36th Division moved farther west to take over the area vacated by the 101st Airborne Division, which had received orders to move out of the army area and revert to the control of the First Allied Airborne Army. Between 21 and 24 February these reliefs were accomplished.

The limited objective attack of the 36th Division to clear the Rhine sector during the early part of February was the only offensive operation of any importance attempted on the Moder River front before the opening of an Allied offensive on the Siegfried Line and the Saar-Palatinate in the middle of March. The divisions on the line limited their activities to heavy patrolling, strengthening defenses, training, and making preparations for the coming attack. After the fighting in Oberhoffen the VI Corps sector of the army front settled down to more than a month of inactivity before the Seventh Army offensive that opened on 15 March. Farther west, from the Low Vosges to St. Avold, the XV and later the XXI Corps were engaging the enemy in a series of actions to prepare for the 15 March assault.

#### XV Corps on the Western Flank

The western flank of Seventh Army, west of the Low Vosges and in the Sarre Valley, had lapsed by the end of January into the quiet of static defense as the enemy began the withdrawal of several of his

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major units for employment elsewhere on the western front and in the east. By 10 February all known German reserves in the Saar-Palatinate had departed for other fronts.

This exodus of units carried away the enemy's striking force. The last days of January saw only about 4,500 German infantry effectives on the line west of the Vosges on the Seventh Army front. Approximately 1,500 of these comprised the 347th Infantry Division, located in the Forbach area; 1,300 were estimated to be with the 19th Infantry Division near Sarreguemines; and the remaining 1,700 formed the elements of the 17th SS Panzer Grenadier Division that held the line in the Rimling sector. The Germans could do little but leave the initiative to the opposing Seventh Army and devote themselves to the construction of defensive positions. Their efforts towards improving their defenses along the line of contact were continuous, and the degree of contact there was determined solely by the action of Seventh Army.

When on 25 January, XXI Corps had been moved into the Colmar Pocket to take over a sector in the First French Army zone, XV Corps had reassumed command of the entire army front in the Sarre Valley. Units of XV Corps now manned a line that was approximately 44 miles in length.

The conformation of the Sarre Valley terrain tended to divide the corps front into three compartments from west to east: the area from the western forests to the Sarre River, which runs north to the German border, where it bends first to the west and then to the north-west; the area between the Sarre River and the Bliesbruck through which flows the Blies River, bending south, then north, then south again to join the Sarre River at Sarreguemines; and the area of the foothills rolling down to the Blies from the Low Vosges.

During the period of the Colmar Drive, units of XV Corps in the west maintained their positions with a program of aggressive patrolling and raids to insure the retention of the initiative in that area by Seventh Army in preparation for the day when the grand offensive would be resumed. The difficulties brought on by January's bitter cold, heavy snow, and frozen ground were matched almost in the extreme by

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February's sudden change in weather. The rains came and with them the disappearance of the snow. The big thaw was on, and in the mud and slush four infantry divisions and a cavalry group manned the XV Corps lines.

### Defense on the Sarre Front

Holding the west flank, southwest of Saarbruecken, was the 106th Cavalry Group. On 11 February these troops were relieved in their defensive positions by the newly-arrived 101st Cavalry Group. To the right of the cavalry and south of Saarbruecken was the 70th Infantry Division. The infantry units of the division, the 274th, 275th, and 276th Regiments, which had been designated as Task Force Herren, had initially entered the Seventh Army line on the Rhine flank late in December, had been transferred by VI Corps to the Philippsbourg arm of the Bitche salient, where they had been relieved by the 103rd Division in mid-January, at which time they had come under the command of the XV Corps and had entered the line on the Sarre front. With the arrival of Major General Allison J. Barnett and his staff on 3 February, the task force was dissolved into the 70th Infantry Division; and the remaining component parts of the division closed in to their respective assembly areas within the next few days.



MAJOR GENERAL ALLISON  
J. BARNETT  
70th Infantry Division

Adjoining the units of the 70th Division was the 63rd Infantry Division in the Sarreguemines area. The 253rd and 255th Infantry Regiments of the division had first occupied these positions while the third regiment of the division, the 254th Infantry, was being employed in the Colmar operations attached to the 3rd Infantry Division. These regiments which had made up Task Force Harris had been first employed by the Seventh Army on the Rhine flank north of Strasbourg. On the

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last day of December two regiments had been transferred to XV Corps to strengthen the lines of the 44th and 100th Divisions on the corps right flank. The third regiment had been attached to the 3rd Infantry Division on the Colmar front. On 1 February Task Force Harris was dissolved with its units reverting to the control of the 63rd Infantry Division, commanded by Major General Louis E. Hibbs. On 6 February the division, which had received its artillery and supporting troops, assumed command of its portion of the line. The 44th Division held the sector in the Gros Rederching area, east of the 63rd Division; and on its right was the 100th Division, covering the east flank of the corps in the area west and southwest of Bitche.



MAJOR GENERAL LOUIS  
E. HIBBS  
63rd Infantry Division



MAJOR GENERAL W. H.  
MORRIS, JR.  
10th Armored Division

A counter-reconnaissance screen was constantly maintained in the corps sector, east and west of the Sarre River and south of the Maginot Line, by armored elements of the corps. In the latter half of January and early February this protection was furnished by units of the 10th Armored Division following their arrival from the Third Army. As a part of the general reshuffling of forces on the western front to meet German offensive thrusts the 10th Armored Division, commanded by Major General W. H. Morris, Jr., had been assigned to Seventh Army to take the place of the 2nd French Armored Division, which was to be passed to the control of the First French Army for Colmar Pocket operations. On 10 February the 12th Armored Division, its work in the Colmar area completed, relieved the 10th Armored in the XV Corps

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sector and continued the mission of counter-reconnaissance. The 10th Armored Division moved out to Metz for return to Third Army control.

In the defensive lull that followed the failure of the German New Year's offensive all these units on the XV Corps front pursued a comparatively uneventful, triple-phased program of improvement of defenses, training, and periodic raids. Into the corps area on 23 January and out again on 28 January the 35th Infantry Division, less one regimental combat team, had been shifted by SHAEF orders; this division had come from Third Army's XX Corps and had remained with Seventh Army for six days only. Unaffected by these movements of troops on high level decision, front line units of XV Corps strengthened their positions by the installation of tactical and protective wire, mines, and overhead cover for foxholes and emplacements. In January, when the thermometer sometimes dropped as low as 1 degree Fahrenheit, the frozen ground made digging of emplacements particularly difficult; and the 44th Division found it necessary to use explosives to break the ground. In that same divisional sector it was found advisable to use concertina wire almost exclusively for wiring-in the front line positions because of the difficulty of driving pickets into the frozen ground. The battles of the early part of the month, and the incidence of trench foot due to severe weather, had reduced some rifle companies to a strength of 50 to 60 men on the line, making it necessary in some instances to send overhead personnel into the lines as riflemen. In the 114th Infantry of the 44th Division it was necessary to commit the antitank company to hold a portion of the line.

There was an influx of reinforcements at this time, and all units conducted intensive programs of training and battle indoctrination for these new men. Even veteran troops in rear areas found it expedient to do range firing and re-zero their weapons. The 70th Division handled their 2,000 reinforcements in typical fashion. Since most of these men had had but a minimum of infantry experience when they arrived, it was urgent that they receive more training than they would ordinarily gain by merely being assigned to the line and working there with experienced men. A rigorous four-day schedule, therefore, was instituted, which included basic weapons, map reading and use of compass, minor tactics,

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and field work. To insure teamwork in battle, operating procedures for squads and platoons in combat situations were emphasized.

In accordance with the policy of retaining the initiative during this calm the constant patrolling that was carried on by all units was frequently featured by well-planned raids, sometimes of company strength. These raids were most often sharp, nocturnal thrusts into the enemy-held towns across the line. In the 70th Division raids that were made on Oeting, Lixing, Grosbliederstroff, and Brandenbusch Woods the mission was constant and concise to capture prisoners and kill as many of the enemy as possible.

Immediately to the right of XV Corps in the Low Vosges Mountains south of Bitche the same conditions of defending, raiding, and intensive training prevailed. This sector was the west flank of VI Corps; but while the energies of most VI Corps units were being expended in the task of reducing the German bridgehead north of Strasbourg, its groups in the Bitche area had the identical mission held by XV Corps defensive line. Until 16 February the 45th Infantry Division maintained



MAJOR GENERAL HARRY  
J. COLLINS  
42nd Infantry Division

this portion of the VI Corps front. On that day the 45th Division was relieved by the 42nd Infantry Division, whose infantry regiments, the 222nd, 232nd and 242nd had originally joined Seventh Army as Task Force Linden for Rhine flank defense. After having absorbed the initial blows of the German Gamsheim bridgehead and after having fought against enemy thrusts in the Hatten-Rittershoffen sector under the command of the 79th Division, these units had been withdrawn from the line by the Seventh Army. An army directive issued on 6 February ordered a comprehensive training program for the 42nd Division, which

was to remain in army reserve, according to plan, until about 16 February. At that time the 42nd Infantry Division, under the command of Major General Harry J. Collins and reunited with its non-infantry components,



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entered the VI Corps line as the 45th Division reverted to army reserve. The 42nd Division continued the defense of the Bitch sector into March.

The period of static defense, the time of holding to positions, emerging from them occasionally to strike violently and fleetingly in a sudden raid, and then returning to the original line, lasted little more than a month. Mid-February came, and the XV Corps was ready to attack once more.

#### Plans for a Limited Offensive

This attack was not to be on a grand scale. It was specifically designated as a limited objective attack, and its purpose was "to rectify and shorten present front lines." Shortening the line would make for economy of force. Fewer men would be required to man its defenses. In addition, the objectives to be gained represented terrain more favorable for the launching of a future great offensive. There were two prominent "sags" in the corps line: at Gros Rederching in the 44th Division sector and in the area of the 63rd Division at Welferding. These were what must be "rectified", and at the same time it would be necessary for the 70th Division on the left to keep abreast by moving its entire front forward.

Following a series of diversionary raids to be carried out by units of the 100th Division on the night of D minus 1, it was planned that the 44th Division would attack on D-Day in conjunction with the right elements of the 63rd Division to eliminate the Gros Rederching "sag". On D plus 2 the left elements of the 63rd Division would attack in conjunction with the 70th Division on their left, wipe out the Welferding "sag", and advance the entire western half of the corps front. It was originally planned that the 101st Cavalry Group would attack on D plus 3 in conjunction with the left elements of the 70th Division, but this last drive in the series of limited objective attacks was later postponed. The entire operation was to be carried out in secrecy in order to confuse the enemy as much as possible. It was felt that knowledge by the enemy that these attacks were being planned for the XV Corps sector only and were only limited in objective would impede the success of the operation.

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and dispel any nervousness on his part over a possible major, coordinated Seventh Army advance.

"To rectify and shorten present front lines" was to mean a slugging offensive, for some a quick raid, and for others a complicated crosswater movement. Each small and sharply limited action was a drive to seize high ground a few miles farther on, to give the Seventh Army a taut line behind which it could build up offensive strength. D-Day was set for 15 February, and H-Hour at 0645 hours.

The initial attack was a problem in planning for the 44th, 63rd, and 100th Divisions. The objective assigned to the 44th Division was a



THE ROLLING COUNTRY AROUND RIMLING

The objective assigned to the 44th Division was . . . between Rimling and Epping-Urbach . . .

general east-west line from a point between Rimling and Epping-Urbach west to the northern fringes of the eastern third of the Bliesbrücken Woods. On the left flank the 255th Infantry of the 63rd Division was

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to attack the middle third of the Bliesbrücken Woods in conjunction with the 44th Division. The western third of the woods, separated from the larger mass by a clearing of about 500 yards in width, was already within the lines of the 63rd Division. On the right of the 44th Division the 100th Division was to move its left flank elements slightly forward to conform to the general advance.

The plan of attack formulated by the 44th Division called for the employment of all three infantry regiments, to be supported by the 749th Tank Battalion. A number of considerations were responsible for such a plan. First, the nature of the terrain made a natural division of the objective into three parts. Secondly, the necessity for withholding a large division reserve was reduced to a minimum since the objective of the attack was limited and detailed knowledge of enemy dispositions gave reasonable assurance that no large enemy force would intervene prior to the seizure of the objective. A suitable division reserve was provided for, therefore, by the requirement that each regiment maintain one battalion in reserve to be committed only on division order. A third reason for the decision to strike with all three regiments on the line was the desire to inflict the maximum damage possible on the enemy. Since the distance to be covered was short, no more than two miles, it was considered advisable to strike with maximum power and speed so as to penetrate the enemy line rapidly and take his positions from the flank and rear. The desirability of maintaining centralized control over the division tanks was influenced by two factors: the poor condition of the ground made it questionable whether tanks would be able to function effectively in all parts of the division zone, and better results were anticipated if the tanks were to be employed in mass for shock action to exploit a penetration anywhere along the front.

The 324th Infantry on the right and the 71st Infantry in the center were to attack at 0545 hours. This was an hour before daylight. The open terrain and the high rolling hills gave the enemy excellent observation. On the left the 114th Infantry and the 255th Infantry Regiment of the 63rd Division were to jump off half an hour later. Contact in their zone was closer, and a good deal of their sector was heavily wooded. At 0645 hour, as soon as visibility would permit coordinated

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action with the infantry, the 749th Tank Battalion was to attack, passing through the infantry regiments to seize regimental objectives and dominate them until they could be consolidated by the infantry units.



MACHINE GUN EMPLACEMENT IN BLIESBRUCKEN WOODS

*Contact in their zone was closer, and a good deal of their sector was heavily wooded.*

Although eight battalions of field artillery were under division command for this operation in addition to the supporting fires of corps artillery, it was decided to attack without an artillery preparation. Because the enemy positions were well dug-in with overhead cover, it was thought that artillery would have little effect. Moreover, it was felt that the surprise gained by attacking without artillery would outweigh the possible destructive effect of a preparatory barrage.

On the right flank of the 44th Division the 324th Infantry had for its objective the Buchenbusch Woods between Rimling and Epping-Urbach and the high ground beyond. The enemy in that area was the

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37th Panzer Grenadier Division, at least two of whose companies had been identified as manning a main line of resistance that ran generally on an east-west line through the woods, which were about 1,300 yards wide. Active patrolling of the past weeks had made the men of the 324th Regiment well acquainted with the terrain and the principal strong points in the enemy's defense. It had been discovered that while the south edge of the woods was heavily mined and wired with many emplacements and machine gun positions, the open slopes east and west of the woods were either unguarded at night or held by only a weak outpost that could be avoided or quickly subdued.

### The Initial Attacks

The attack of the 324th Infantry was a double envelopment. With the 3rd Battalion on the left and the 2nd Battalion on the right, the regiment quickly outflanked the Buchenbusch Woods on both sides. The battalions, moving stealthily through the darkness, achieved complete tactical surprise. They were on either side of the woods before a shot was fired. As dawn broke, they attacked from the flanks and the rear. Enemy survivors of the first assault could either surrender or be driven back onto their own mines and wire; 161 surrendered. In the middle of the division zone the 71st Regiment had attacked against negligible German resistance, had overrun a ridge southwest of Rimling by daylight, and together with tank support from Company A of the 749th Tank Battalion moved on toward Rimling and the high ground northwest of the town. By mid-morning Rimling was taken as tanks, tank-destroyers, artillery, and infantry combined to force the Germans out.

On the division left flank enemy resistance was more severe. The 114th Infantry had moved out at 0615 hours on 15 February toward its objective on high ground two miles ahead. On the left the 1st Battalion made slow, steady progress through the Bliesbrucken woods, and by 1300 hours had reached its objective on the north edge of the woods. Southeast of these woods, however, the 2nd Battalion had immediately encountered the hard core of the German resistance.

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The enemy had created well-fortified strong-points out of two farms, Bellevue and Brandelfingerhoff, both approximately 1,000 yards northeast of the battalion line. Hundreds of rounds of artillery had been



BELLEVUE FARM WITH BLIESBRUCKEN WOODS IN BACKGROUND

*Most of the structure of the buildings had been demolished.*

fired against them. Most of the structure of the buildings had been demolished, but their cellars served as cover for enemy riflemen and machine gun crews and as vantage points for forward observers for artillery, mortar, and nebelwerfer batteries. The companies of the 38th Panzer Grenadier Regiment had entrenched themselves firmly around the farms. Many small mine fields, largely anti-personnel, were scattered along the front. The 2nd Battalion's plan of attack was to by-pass initially these farms and seize its sector of the regimental objective beyond. Then the farms would be taken by an assault from the rear. Only a small combat patrol was to advance directly against Bellevue Farm to divert the attention of the enemy.

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Only the first few minutes went according to plan. The point patrol, moving on Bellevue Farm, was unable to advance far in the face of heavy enemy fire. Company G, attempting a side-slip to the west,



BRANDELFINGERHOF FARM

*At the same time to Company E was assigned the reduction of Brandelfingerhof Farm.*

ran into strong enemy resistance and was stopped. It was now decided that Bellevue and its surrounding area must be cleaned up before the battalion could proceed to its objective. Companies E and G however, moving toward Bellevue, were unable to advance past the southeastern edge of Bliesbrucken Woods. Taking advantage of the concealment afforded there, they spread out in a skirmish line and returned the strong enemy fire that was coming from the farm.

Company F was then ordered to move north against Bellevue Farm under cover of the fire that Company G could deliver from Bliesbrucken Woods. At the same time to Company E was assigned the

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reduction of Brandelfingerhoff Farm. Shortly after noon both farm strongpoints were cleared of the enemy, but the battalion objective had not yet been attained. Meanwhile, the 1st Battalion of the 71st Infantry, which had been in reserve, had been ordered by division to attack westward to seize the right half of the 114th Infantry objective, the high ground beyond the two farms. With this assistance the 114th Regiment came up to the line of its objective. The battle at Bellevue and Brandelfingerhoff had cost the 114th Infantry 154 casualties. However, the enemy had lost more than 100 killed and wounded in this action, and 129 of his troops had been taken prisoner.

During the day on 15 February planes of the XII Tactical Air Force flew 96 sorties along the length of the 44th Division front, supporting the attack with bombs, rockets, and strafing of enemy strongpoints. By 1500 hours all elements of the division had reached their assigned objectives and were digging in. From interrogations it seemed evident that the 2nd Battalion of the 37th Panzer Grenadier Regiment, and the 3rd Battalion of the 38th Panzer Grenadier Regiment had been destroyed. Many of the enemy had fled to the north. This uncontrolled flight was probably the reason for the tardiness and ineffectiveness of the enemy reactions.

The first counterattack did not come until 0320 hours on 16 February. Launched from northeast of the Buchenbusch Woods by an estimated 100 infantry supported by mortars and machine guns, it was broken up by effective artillery fire. At 0530 hours a stronger attack was made farther west in the area northwest of Rimling by an estimated 200 men of the 38th Panzer Grenadier Regiment. Supported by ten armored vehicles, this thrust in the darkness succeeded temporarily in penetrating the positions of the 71st Infantry. The attack was contained after it had driven through the line some 800 yards, and by 0830 hours a counterattack by the 2nd Battalion had restored the regimental positions. The German counterattacks continued into 17 February, but they were all successfully repulsed with heavy enemy losses and the new 44th Division line was securely held.

West of the 44th Division the 255th Infantry of the 63rd Division had a more difficult time as it attacked in the center of the

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Bliesbrücken Woods. The 3rd Battalion, making the main effort, was to seize and organize the high ground in the woods north of the railroad track. Fire of the 1st Battalion from the left was to support the advance. At 0615 hours on 15 February Company I and Company K had moved out toward the objective. In the mist and darkness the troops were able to locate the enemy positions only by the muzzle flashes of hostile guns. Anti-personnel mines, affixed to many of the trees, were frequently detonated by direct or ricocheting enemy small arms fire. The advance through the forest, thick with tangled underbrush, was slow.

Small arms fire and hand grenades had little effect against German dug-in emplacements which had thick walls and roofs covered by split logs. Bazooka fire was hardly better. Infantry troops, pushing through the German fields of fire, encircled these positions and from the rear threw grenades into the tunnel-like entrance to the fortifications. Frequent German counterattacks, made by troops who wore parts of American uniforms, held the advance of Company I platoons to a minimum. By noon, having advanced some 200 to 300 yards past the line of departure, Company I was pinned down.

The attack of Company K on the right had met lighter opposition. Finding paths through the mine fields, the platoons, with a section of M Company machine guns, moved forward slowly and deliberately in the face of the heavy small arms fire. Mortar shells began to drop in their rear. About 1130 hours the company had seized its objective and was well along in the process of organizing new defensive positions and mopping up the scattered and isolated enemy groups that remained.

In the I Company sector Company B, the regimental reserve, was committed to cover the withdrawal of forward elements, as plans were made for a new attack. A flanking assault by Company B at 1925 hours was brought to a stop by a rocket barrage and the machine gun fire from four bunkers. Soon after 1100 hours on the next morning, 16 February, the attack was resumed by Companies B, I, and L. In support of this operation were an 81mm mortar section from Company M and the 863rd Field Artillery Battalion.

The approaches of all three companies paralleled each other, as they turned north against enemy high ground. The strength now

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mustered was sufficient to carry the hill, and by 1330 hours it was taken. The last phase in the elimination of the Gros Rederching "sag" had been completed.

### Return to Germany

The limited objective attacks on the western half of the XV Corps front, to be made by the 253rd Infantry of the 63rd Division and by the 70th Division, followed the initial attacks of the 44th Division and the 255th Infantry by two days. To the 253rd Infantry was given the mission of eliminating the Welferding Salient establishing a main line of resistance on the high ground running from the Sarre River just below Bubingen to the northern edge of the Vorderwald and southeast to the town of Bliesmengen. Welferding is immediately west of Sarreguemines. The sag conformed to the lines of the Blies and Sarre Rivers as they dip south and north through the two towns. To the 70th Division farther west was assigned a separate but coordinated maneuver. Once the troops of the 253rd Infantry had crossed the Sarre and the Blies Rivers, they would be fighting on German soil.

To divert the attention of the enemy from the sector of the attack, the 255th Infantry on the right was directed to carry out two diversionary raids early on the morning of 17 February. The first of these two preliminary operations, raid *Portland*, was carried out by a patrol from Company E. After crossing the Blies River at 0200 hours in rubber assault boats and on a bridge hastily thrown across the stream, the raiding party entered the village of Babkirchen shortly after 0600 hours behind the cover of a barrage of mortars, artillery, and the guns of the regimental cannon company and within less than an hour returned with 11 prisoners. Raid *Seattle*, made by a lieutenant and 17 men of Company B between the hours of 0300 and 0820, was directed against the town of Bliesbruck. The river was crossed quietly in rubber assault boats. Following a two-minute artillery barrage on Bliesbruck by the 863rd Field Artillery Battalion, the patrol entered the town hurling white phosphorous and fragmentation grenades, firing automatic rifles and submachine guns. The patrol killed more than 20 enemy, returned

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to the regimental lines, brought back one prisoner, and had suffered only three wounded casualties.

The main assault of the 253rd Infantry was also to begin in the early hours of 17 February. Facing the regiment was an enemy line that ran down the Sarre from Grosbliederstroff to Sarreguemines and curled northward around the Blies River through the Muhlen Wald from which it ran directly east to Habkirchen. The enemy held his line in depth, although he had concentrated most of his manpower and his field fortifications in the "U" between the Sarre and Blies Rivers north of Sarreguemines. On the line in front of the 253rd Infantry were elements of the 19th Volks Grenadier Division.

The regimental plan of attack called for pushing the 3rd Battalion across the Blies River, through the Muhlen Wald, and straight up to the Vorderwald, where the most advanced point of the new main line of resistance would be established. The 1st Battalion was to liquidate enemy resistance south of the Vorderwald and open supply lines to the new positions above Sarreguemines. The 2nd Battalion, launching the initial assault, was to occupy the sector between the Muhlen Wald and Habkirchen and establish an outpost line between Bliesransbach and Bliesmengen.

At 0200 hours on 17 February the 2nd Battalion on the regimental right flank moved out under artificial moonlight furnished by the 353rd Searchlight Battalion. There was only scattered resistance. By noon, however, the enemy was throwing in heavy and accurate mortar fire. Strengthened by reserve troops the Germans launched a counterattack near Bliesgersviller against the left flank of Company G, which was the advance force of the battalion. At 1700 hours enemy infantry supported by tanks overran the areas of two rifle squads and a section of attached machine guns. Fire of the regimental cannon company was directed against this breakthrough, and the remainder of G Company, reinforced, drove the enemy off with heavy casualties. Early in the afternoon of the next day an assault against Bliesgersviller by Company F, preceded by an artillery barrage, cleared the town of the enemy in an hour and a half.

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The 1st Battalion, meanwhile, on the left flank of the regiment had crossed the Sarre between Welferding and Sarreguemines at 0430 hours on 17 February on a footbridge thrown up by A Company of the 263rd Engineer Battalion. Company B in the lead seized high ground northeast of Auersmacher by 0745 hours to protect and support the advance of the 3rd Battalion to the north. By nightfall Company A had patrols in the town of Auersmacher and occupied high ground to the south. The next day these patrols were driven out as German infantry and self-propelled guns infiltrated into the town, posing a threat to the



SAAR RIVER AT SARREGUEMINES

The left flank of the 253rd Regiment was now secure, and the supply route to the 3rd Battalion was open.

left flank of the 253rd Infantry if they could build themselves up to a sizeable force.

All available artillery was placed on the town to prevent a breakthrough. At the same time the 1st Battalion of the 254th Infantry was attached to the regiment, relieving Company A in positions south of

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Auersmacher. Company A, reinforced by a platoon from Company C, prepared to attack the town at dawn on 19 February. After a ten-minute artillery preparation the attack was launched, and after four hours of fierce house-to-house fighting Auersmacher was taken. The left flank of the 253rd Regiment was now secure, and the supply route to the 3rd Battalion was open.

The 3rd Battalion had reached the Vorderwald two days before. Its crossing of the Blies River had been preceded by a 15 minute barrage by batteries of 155mm howitzers from the 718th and 961st Field Artillery Battalions, designed primarily to cut the enemy's wire and render ineffective his anti-personnel mine fields, in the Muhlen Wald. After crossing the river by means of assault boats and a wooden assault bridge constructed in 45 minutes by the 263rd Engineer Battalion, the 3rd Battalion of the 253rd Infantry advanced swiftly against harassing mortar and small arms fire. By early afternoon, the Vorderwald had been reached and seized. The battalion dug in and prepared to meet enemy counterattacks.

During the night and the next day the Germans launched a series of counterattacks, which were repelled with heavy losses to the enemy. In the evening of 18 February, however, groups of Germans infiltrated into the woods from the west, southwest, and southeast. With the taking of Auersmacher, a mile south of the woods, by the 1st Battalion on the next day this enemy threat was lifted. Once the Vorderwald was secure, the town of Kleinblittersdorf, just across the Sarre from Grosbliederstroff, became the next target. This town was taken by Company B on the afternoon of 19 February after sharp fighting lasting four and a half hours.

The final action in this phase came after a five-day lapse in the consolidation of positions, and in the reorganization, relocation, and resupply of units. The action called for the seizure of the towns of Bubingen and Bliesransbach and the occupation of the high ground running east and southeast between the two communities. On 24 February the 253rd Infantry, supported by Company B of the 254th Infantry, made the final push, all three of its battalions attacking on line. The two towns and the heights between were taken easily, and the

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elimination of the Welferding Salient was complete. The 63rd Division now held the ground that had been designated as its objective in the original plan of attack for XV Corps. The Seventh Army had again crossed the Franco-German line.

#### Approach to the Siegfried Line

West of the 63rd Division and holding a line from Welferding northwest to a point south of Forbach was the 70th Division, which was



DRAGON'S TEETH — PART OF SIEGFRIED DEFENSES

*Through these hills and towns ran the first belt in a series of permanent fortifications guarding the approaches to Germany.*

to take part in the limited offensive of the XV Corps by advancing its line to the north in consonance with the advances of other corps divisions. Settled on the hills and ridges of northern Lorraine the 70th Division faced the outer cordons of the Siegfried Line. In front of the division was a series of hills, unevenly wooded, dominating wide, un-

covered draws. A network of roads followed the valley floor, connecting the many towns and villages along its route with the industrial and mining centers of Forbach, Stiring-Wendel, and Saarbruecken, southern gateway to Germany's Sarre basin and a fortress city of the Siegfried Line. Through these hills and towns ran the first belt in the series of permanent fortifications guarding the approaches to Germany.

More specifically the mission of the 70th Division was the capture of heights along the Sarre River south and southwest of Saarbruecken. The reduction of Saarbruecken would be required for any future Seventh Army drive through the Siegfried Line, and possession of the commanding heights that gave observation of the city's defenses was essential. The plan of attack called for the seizure of high ground on the lines Wehrden-Schoeneck and Stiring-Wendel-Bubingen. The 101st Cavalry Group was to relieve the 70th Division in the Wehrden-Clarenthal area after the objective had been taken. The division attack was to be made with all three regiments on line, the 276th Infantry on the left, the 274th Infantry in the center, and the 275th Infantry on the right.

Continuous patrolling on the breadth of the sector had assisted in the discovery and identification of enemy positions and units. The enemy had constructed multiple belts of entrenchments and bunkers, wide antitank ditches, and other obstacles extending along the southern and southeastern slopes of the ridge system from the forest of Le Klein-waeldchen south of Forbach to Le Pfaffenwald north of Alsting. There were two outpost lines of less formidable entrenchments, the first running west-east from Kerbach to Lixing and the second generally paralleling the Sarre River as it flows north from the area of Rouhling to Saarbruecken. Elements of the German 347th Infantry Division and the 19th Volks Grenadier Division occupied these defenses, while an estimated 800 reserves were spotted in the vicinity of Forbach and Stiring-Wendel.

One minute after midnight on 17 February the 276th Infantry, with the 3rd Battalion on the left and the 1st Battalion on the right, moved out through a heavy fog toward its initial objective, the hills between Oeting and Forbach. The main enemy positions in front of the 276th Infantry ran from Marienau to Forbach, through the southwest



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edge of Le Kleinwaeldchen, and then southeast through Oeting to the heights of Le Kelsberg. Against enemy small arms and antitank mines the 3rd Battalion quickly overran Fahrberg Hill just northwest of Oeting, while the 1st Battalion took Le Kelsberg in the first hours of daylight. Nestled between these two heights and blocking the route of approach to Le Kleinwaeldchen, the village of Oeting was still in German hands. Simultaneous assaults from the east and west were launched upon the village by the two battalions, but the intense fire of four self-propelled 88mm guns hurled them back. Heavily mined roads prevented the arrival of supporting armor, and the 1st and 3rd Battalions withdrew to the two hills and dug in.

In the division center the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 274th Infantry had crossed their line of departure at 0430 hours on 17 February. Their ultimate objective was the clearing of Stiring-Wendel and the occupation of a sector of the heights south of the Sarre River, but first there was a series of hills and ridges and towns to be taken. The initial attack was upon the town of Kerbach and high ground to the northwest. Troops entered Kerbach easily, but further movement through the town was slowed down when the enemy counterattacked with tanks from Etzling and Behren. These attacks were beaten back by the accurate fire of supporting artillery, which scored direct hits upon groups of personnel and some of the tanks. By 1620 hours Kerbach and Behren to the west were cleared of Germans.

The 275th Infantry on the right flank had been ordered to assist the movement of the 274th Regiment by flanking fire and to advance on its own initial objectives, the towns of Lixing and Grosbliederstroff. With 1st, 3rd, and 2nd Battalions abreast from left to right, the 275th Regiment had moved into the attack at 0125 hours. Following the reduction of several strongpoints, the 1st Battalion cleared the high ground before Lixing. The 3rd Battalion advanced against heavy machine gun fire. During the afternoon German artillery found the range and shelled the attacking troops. On the right flank the 2nd Battalion kept pace and advanced to positions west of Grosbliederstroff from which it planned to attack the town. In preparation for the attack the road into Grosbliederstroff was swept of mines during the night.

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At the end of the first day's action the entire division front had moved forward approximately one mile, and 198 prisoners had been taken. The enemy had devoted his main holding efforts to the more important towns and road junctions. Fog and rain had hampered the operations; communications had been limited by muddy roads and fields. Supporting tanks, attempting to move cross-country, had bogged down and several had been abandoned. It seemed apparent now that the enemy's main defense efforts would be centered at Forbach, Stiring-Wendel, and Spichenen in the line of advance of the 274th Infantry.

Early the next morning, 18 February, the attacking battalions of the 274th Infantry moved to the northwest and crossed the Etzling-Behren road. After a sharp fire fight had scattered small enemy groups, the battalions threaded their way uphill into the thick forest of Le Kreutzberg Ridge, just south of Stiring-Wendel. The rugged terrain, covered by stretches of underbrush, was ideal territory for ambush. Time and again enemy patrols were encountered and driven back. The ridge was dotted with a belt of bunkers, solid concrete up to eight feet thick, covered with earth for additional protection, and excellently sited and concealed.

About noon a German counterattack from Etzling was forced back by artillery and the fire of self-propelled guns. Enemy pressure, however, was maintained throughout the afternoon as a force of about 12 tanks repeatedly worked along the road south of Etzling, posing a constant threat to the 2nd Battalion on the regimental right flank, and German artillery, directed from an observation post in Etzling, continued unabated. In the late afternoon the attack of the regiment was halted to reestablish contact between the units that had been separated during the skirmishes. At the same time the threat to the regimental right flank was somewhat lifted as the 3rd Battalion of the 275th Infantry broke through and took Etzling.

Early in the morning the 275th Infantry on the division right flank had pushed the attack. The 1st Battalion had penetrated Lixing and systematically worked through the town house by house until it was cleared. Some of its troops advanced from Lixing toward Etzling, cautiously picking their way through the mine fields. In the center of

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the regiment the 3rd Battalion had moved north of Lixing to approach Etzling from the east shortly after noon. After patrols had reconnoitered the village and its approaches, the battalion attacked. The action lasted just an hour; and 64 prisoners, almost the entire enemy force, were captured. Outposts were hurriedly dug in on the lower slopes of Le Pfaffenberg Hill, north of Etzling, which was the next link in the enemy's chain of defenses.

Farther east the 2nd Battalion had thrust its way into Grosbiederstroff. By mid-morning more than half the town was under control, and the German defense was concentrated in the northern end of the town. Enemy artillery and mortar fire from the east side of the Sarre River hindered but could not halt the battalion assault, and after a sharp fire fight the last German strongpoint in the town was reduced.

On the left flank of the 70th Division the village of Oeting, still in German hands, lay before the 276th Infantry. During the night the road into Oeting had been cleared of mines; and, when the attack was resumed on 18 February, the village was easily taken before mid-day. After repulsing a small infantry-tank counterattack the regiment pivoted to the northwest toward Forbach. Between the troops and Forbach, however, were three hills covered by the thick woods of the Kleinwaeldchen. The westernmost of the three hills rose sharply from this strip of forest, offering a complete view of Forbach and the ground as far south as Oeting. Perched on the rocky summit was an old, red-stone, castle known as the Schlossberg. Behind its ten-foot-thick walls was located an enemy observation post for mortar and artillery. The capture of the Schlossberg was the obvious prerequisite to the taking of Forbach.

By nightfall of 18 February two of the three hills in the Kleinwaeldchen had been overrun. The next morning Company I advanced cautiously to take the Schlossberg. Not a shot was fired on them; and, when the men scaled the outer walls, they found that the Schlossberg was deserted of enemy. Almost immediately heavy artillery and mortar fire began falling in the area. Between barrages the troops dug in around the buildings.

At 1920 hours a battery of 88mm guns began shelling the castle continuously and with great accuracy. Under the cover of the

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shelling enemy patrols crept up to the outer perimeter of the company's defenses, and in the pitch blackness it was a simple matter for them to cut the wire. At 2040 hours the artillery barrage was stepped up to even



SCHLOSSBERG CASTLE

*Perched on the rocky summit was an old, red-stone castle known as the Schlossberg.*

greater fury for a few minutes; and, as the fire lifted, German troops began rushing the castle from all sides, screaming wildly. The riflemen of Company I could not hold them, and the Germans broke through to within yards of the castle. The 81mm mortar fire of Company M and the artillery fire of the 884th Field Artillery Battalion were then signalled down upon the company's own defense area, and the effect of this counter-barrage forced the enemy to withdraw. The Schlossberg remained in possession of Company I, and the next move was the descent upon Forbach.

The assault of Forbach had begun late the same afternoon, 19 February. The plan of attack called for the seizure of the town by the

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276th Infantry, assisted by the 3rd Battalion of the 274th Infantry. The road from Saarbruecken to Forbach was to be bombed and strafed by supporting aircraft in order to deny the enemy its use in bringing up reinforcements and supplies. The initial entry into Forbach was made by the 1st Battalion of the 276th Infantry and elements of the 3rd Battalion, 274th Infantry, as they forced their way into the southeast section of the city. The first two blocks were easily taken before flanking enemy machine gun fire and a heavy volume of artillery opened up and slowed down the progress. The 3rd Battalion of the 276th Infantry, less Company I, descended from the Kleinwaeldchen and joined in house-to-house fighting. The attack continued into the night, but against intense enemy fire and without the support of tanks, which could not maneuver effectively in the dark, operations were brought to a halt.

A fine drizzle and a thick fog persisted as day broke on 20 February. Displacement of artillery became difficult, and tanks were road-bound. The 70th Reconnaissance Troop, patrolling the division flanks, was paying particular attention to the eastern flank, where the attack of the adjacent 63rd Division was not developing sufficiently to bring it abreast of the 70th Division. This flank was moving rapidly as the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 275th Infantry, pushing against light resistance, captured the villages of Zinzing, Hesselung, and Alsting. A small counterattack east of Zinzing was dispersed, and the two battalions fanned out into the woodland north and east. On their left the 3rd Battalion of the regiment had failed in its attempts to drive the Germans off Le Pfaffenberg Hill.

In Forbach the slow, systematic reduction of the city was resumed. Assaulting troops of the 1st and 3rd Battalions, 276th Infantry, advanced through the streets toward the railroad that ran through the northwestern edge of the town. The enemy was forced back house by house and block by block; and, as he yielded each small area, he hit it heavily with mortars and artillery. Simultaneously, units of the 274th Infantry, just east of Forbach, had worked their way to within a short distance of the Forbach-Saarbruecken road, while other troops of the regiment swept northeast to high ground between Spicheren and Stiring-

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Wendel. Spicheren Heights north of the town became the scene of particularly bitter German resistance.

On the morning of 21 February the weather cleared, and the pressure of the 274th Infantry, north and northwest of Spicheren, forced the enemy out of the town. Farther right, the 1st Battalion of the 275th Infantry had pushed north along the Sarre River to take the forested high ground overlooking eastern Saarbruecken. Two strong enemy counterattacks, however, forced forward elements of the battalion back approximately 1,000 yards to the middle of the woods before the massed fire of infantry, artillery, tanks, and tank-destroyers halted the German drive.

Farther west in Forbach the German 347th Infantry Division was receiving local Volkssturm replacements and some 300 infantry troops from the 719th Infantry Division, which was holding the neighboring sector against the Third Army. German defense still relied on the accuracy and volume of mortar and artillery fire. By nightfall, the 276th Infantry held the southeast third of Forbach. The 274th Infantry had established two roadblocks on the Forbach-Saarbruecken highway northeast of town. The 275th Infantry had regrouped its forces southeast of Saarbruecken. More than 249 prisoners had been taken in this day of action, 100 of them in Forbach.

During the night there was no relief from the German shelling in Forbach, mostly from 88mm and 105mm guns. The next day resistance within the city was still composed of scattered strongpoints, mostly in basements that served as pillboxes. The Germans manning these strongpoints seldom surrendered until they were surrounded. Attacking planes of the XII Tactical Air Command blasted enemy positions during the afternoon, assisting the progress of the ground troops; and at the end of the day the 276th Regiment had reached the railroad tracks. There the regiment paused to consolidate positions and reorganize its units.

In the division center the 274th Infantry took the main German defense line of pillboxes and bunkers between Spicheren and Stiring-Wendel and then met the full fury of the enemy on Spicheren Heights. The regiment had to commit all its forces to the attack to take the heights, although German counterattacks persisted for days. Not until 27 Feb-

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ruary was the regiment able to stabilize its positions on the heights, overlooking Saarbruecken to the north and Stiring-Wendel to the west.

On 22 February the 275th Infantry on the division right cleared the eastern two-thirds of its final objective, the woods south and southeast of Saarbruecken, and prepared strong defensive positions along the main line of resistance. That night a German tank attack was thrown back by bazooka and grenade fire. Enemy counterattacks continued during the next two days as elements of three German divisions, the 2nd Mountain and the 559th and 19th Volks Grenadier, took part in futile attempts to dislodge the regiment from these wooded heights looking down on Saarbruecken.

By the end of February the 70th Division had successfully concluded the first phase of its attack in the Sarre Basin. In the 11 days of the attack, its first offensive action as a division, it had penetrated the primary defenses of the enemy in front of the Siegfried Line and had established a foothold on German soil just south of Saarbruecken. More than 1,800 prisoners had been taken; and the division's casualties totaled 1,662, of which 207 had been killed and 231 were missing. XV Corps had thus fulfilled the requirements of the limited offensive on the Seventh Army left flank by bringing up the line to a new point of departure.

#### XXI Corps Re-Enters the Line

After completing its operational mission in the liquidation of the Colmar Pocket under the First French Army XXI Corps had reverted to Seventh Army control at 0800 hours on 16 February. XXI Corps had gradually given up control of the units under its command. On 9 February the 254th Infantry Regiment had reverted to the control of the 63rd Division, which was to take its place in the XV Corps line. Two days later the 75th Division reverted to control of Seventh Army. On 12 February the 2nd French Armored Division, which had for eight days served under XXI Corps in Colmar operations, was transferred to the First French Army. The 28th Infantry Division reverted to Seventh Army control on 14 February. When XXI Corps itself reverted to

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Seventh Army command, it was planned that the 3rd Division would move to the Nancy area, its units on arrival passing into SHAEF reserve, although responsibility for supply, administration, maintenance, and rehabilitation remained a function of Seventh Army. By 15 February the 28th and 75th Divisions were enroute from the Seventh Army area, having been transferred to the Twelfth Army Group.

Arrangements were made for the XXI Corps to set up its installations at Morhange, south of St. Avold. The move was completed on 18 February, and plans were prepared to take over once again the left sector of the Seventh Army front. XXI Corps became operational on the army left flank as of 1200 hours on 28 February, assuming control of the 101st Cavalry Group, the 70th Division, the 63rd Division, the 12th Armored Division, and supporting troops. The plan of attack as previously directed by XV Corps was continued in force. XV Corps, with the 44th and 100th Infantry Divisions in the line and the 106th Cavalry Group in corps reserve, was to continue its policy of aggressive defense within its new boundaries. The last phases of the Seventh Army limited offensive prior to the launching of its major drive on 15 March were continued by the 63rd and 70th Divisions under XXI Corps.

Plans for future operations dictated the necessity of one more jump forward for the 63rd Division, which had reached and held the Bubingen-Bliesransbach line. On 3 March the division thrust forward to seize the Hahnbusch and the adjacent heights to the north. The Hahnbusch is a small forest 2,000 yards northeast of Bubingen and overlooking the town of Gudingon on the Sarre River.

Two diversionary raids, designed to confuse the enemy as to the area of the attack-in-scale, were carried out by units of the 254th and 255th Infantries. Almost six miles southeast of the Hahnbusch the 2nd Battalion of the 255th Infantry crossed the Blies River and raided the village of Babkirchen. A greater show of force was made at the small settlement of Hartungshof just north of Bliesransbach. This operation was carried out by Company C of the 254th Infantry, reinforced by machine gun sections from D and M Companies and a section of 105mm assault guns from the 749th Tank Battalion.

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The plan of attack was to take Hartungshof early in the afternoon, hold it until night, and then withdraw under the cover of darkness. According to aerial reconnaissance reports, German armor was present in the village, so extra bazooka teams were drawn from A and B companies; and plans were made to soften up Hartungshof by serial bombing and strafing. It was believed that there were no more than 60 enemy defending the village.

At 1215 hours on 3 March a flight of P-47's from the XII Tactical Air Command bombarded the village. After a five-minute artillery barrage was fired, Company C left its line of departure and advanced toward Hartungshof through enemy fire. Three pillboxes, one of steel and two of concrete, on the route were reduced, and a German 88mm gun in the woods was knocked out by an attached bazooka team. House-to-house fighting continued all afternoon, with the troops using each building as an improvised fortress as soon as they had driven the enemy from it. At 2000 hours the company withdrawal began. Enemy dead in the raid were estimated at between 30 and 40, and 41 prisoners had been taken. C Company casualties were 27 wounded and 12 missing or dead.

Under the command of the 253rd Infantry, the main effort was being made by Company C, 253rd Infantry, and the 1st Battalion of the 255th Infantry, reinforced by elements of the antitank company, 255th Infantry, and the medium tanks of Company A, 749th Tank Battalion. On the right flank of the advance was C Company, 253rd Infantry, which was to seize the high hill known as the Birnberg, southeast of the Hahnbusch. The Hahnbusch itself was to be assaulted by the 1st Battalion of the 255th Infantry.

At 1405 hours on 3 March the attacking echelons moved out after the 861st Field Artillery Battalion had shelled the Birnberg for five minutes; and Company A, 99th Chemical Battalion, had smoked the Hahnbusch. As supporting tanks emerged into open country, they were fired upon by German antitank guns from the southern fringes of the Hahnbusch and from a stone quarry on the Birnberg. Six tanks were knocked out; and the remainder of the company drew back, reorganized, and moved into new positions to set up a base of fire for the infantry.

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Troops of the 1st Battalion of the 255th Regiment were able to progress no farther than had the tanks, before the concentrated fire of the 88's and supporting automatic weapons forced their withdrawal. Waiting



BIRNBERG, SOUTHEAST OF THE HAHNBUSCH

... the high hill known as the Birnberg ... six tanks were knocked out

until night, Company B made an attempt to reach the Hahnbusch a little before midnight, but it was forced to dig in some 200 or 250 yards south of the woods.

Meanwhile, Company C of the 253rd Infantry had been attempting to clear the stone quarry on the Birnberg, from which intense fire was being delivered on the 1st Battalion of the 255th Infantry. By 2100 hours, when the attack came to a temporary halt, the southern, lower half of the quarry had been taken. When the attack was resumed on the next morning, the quarry was entirely cleared by 1155 hours; and defensive positions were organized from which the attack of the 1st Battalion on the left could be supported by fire.

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In the 1st Battalion sector the attack on the Hahnbusch had been renewed at 0600 hours on 4 March. In the left zone Company A moved through the Hahnbusch and attacked the hill mass just north of the woods. A counterattack by German tanks forced the riflemen to withdraw to the northern edge of the Hahnbusch and dig in. On the right Company B had been unable to seize its half of the Hahnbusch, its strength had been broken and it was consolidated with Company C.

During the night Company B of the 253rd Infantry was brought up, and at daylight on 5 March it launched an attack to clear the right half of the woods. By 1210 hours the enemy had been driven from the right half of the Hahnbusch. Some 50 minutes later Company A reported that it had taken the peak north of the woods. The objective of the 63rd Division had been reached.

Farther west the 70th Infantry Division had also resumed the attack under the direction of XXI Corps on 3 March. The 276th and 274th Infantries were to advance to secure that part of their assigned objective northwest of the Forbach-Saarbruecken road. Combat Command A of the 12th Armored Division was to support the attacks against the cities of Forbach and Stiring-Wendel.

On the morning of 3 March the 276th Infantry, with a company of French and Belgians from the Lorraine Division attached, attacked in Forbach. The effective fire of the 884th Field Artillery Battalion, augmented by the guns of supporting tanks and the 648th Tank Destroyer Battalion, helped greatly in reducing the German resistance in buildings that were blocking the advance. The city was completely cleared that day, and units of Combat Command A pushed northeast of the city to block the road to Stiring-Wendel.

In Stiring-Wendel the attack of the 274th Infantry, also with a company from the French Lorraine Division attached, was progressing favorably. After a ten minute artillery preparation the regiment had launched its assault from the high ground south and southeast of the city with three battalions abreast. Resistance in the woods on the approaches into the city, centered in a few bunkers and other entrenchments, was not too great; but the rate of progress was slowed down by a number of well-placed mine fields. By late afternoon elements of the

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2nd Battalion were fighting in the streets of the city; the 3rd Battalion was moving up on the Forbach-Stiring-Wendel road; and the 1st Battalion was astride the Metz highway northeast of the city. Upon request, a bombing and strafing mission was flown against the enemy entrenched near the railroad northeast of Stiring-Wendel.

When the regiment resumed the attack on the next morning, an increasing number of enemy strongpoints was encountered. Rotating and elevating pillboxes and bunkers, surrounded by belts of mines, became the centers of heavy fighting. German artillery and mortar fire from the direction of Schoeneck north of Stiring-Wendel harassed the operation throughout the day. Counterbattery fire was unable to silence the enemy guns. Air missions against them were requested, but the persistent low ceiling limited the use of planes. Despite this, however, at the end of the day the 1st and 3rd Battalions also entered Stiring-Wendel on its eastern and western outskirts.

The 276th Infantry in the meantime was moving out of Forbach. Heading north, the 2nd Battalion plunged into Forbach Forest, and west of the city Company I drove the enemy from the village of Marienau. On 5 and 6 March the 1st and 2nd Battalions continued the fight in the Forbach Forest, where the Germans were putting up stubborn resistance. At the same time the 3rd Battalion was cleaning out a wooded area northwest of Marienau.

The 274th Infantry had picked up the slow thread of its house-to-house fighting in Stiring-Wendel at 0600 hours on 5 March, when a group of approximately 250 ragged, Allied soldiers, Russians, Poles, French, Czechs, and Yugoslavs, came streaming down the Metz highway. These men had been inmates of a German prisoner of war hospital, north of the city. The 2nd Battalion later occupied the hospital area and liberated a total of 951 men. By the end of the day all of Stiring-Wendel had been taken, and units of the 12th Armored Division's Combat Command A moved in to assist in the mopping-up of small, scattered bits of German opposition that remained. Advance elements of the regiment, probing northward, ran into strong enemy defenses.

Similar reports were made by patrols of the 276th Infantry north of Forbach, and it was realized that the outpost of the Siegfried

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defenses had been reached. Until these fortifications were reduced, a continuation of the attack was not deemed advisable. On 7 March, therefore, it was decided to hold in position pending the results of intensive reconnaissance. Upon orders from XXI Corps the 70th Division reverted to the defensive after 19 days of attack, during which time the division had liberated 18 towns and had taken 2,034 prisoners.

To the northwest the Third Army had already begun its penetration of the Palatinate, increasing the threat to the enemy troops occupying the Siegfried Line in front of the XXI Corps. Daily patrols of the 70th Division and the 101st Cavalry Group on the west flank of the corps front searched for signs of a German withdrawal as a result of this threat. On the morning of 13 March patrols finally noticed a sharp decrease in enemy activity.

Immediately verbal orders were issued to pursue the enemy to the line of the Sarre River between Saarbruecken and Volklingen. The 276th and 274th Infantry Regiments began to advance late in the afternoon. Small enemy delaying forces were found entrenched at roadblocks, but they were quickly captured or routed. The pursuit was maintained through the night and into the following morning when the 101st Cavalry Group on the left joined in the drive. Mine fields, antitank ditches, roadblocks, and wire hindered but did not halt the advance. Resistance remained light, and only sporadic fire was met. By noon the 70th Division had cleared Stiring, Schoeneck, Krughutte, Clarenthal, Furstenhausen, and Petite Rosselle. The 101st Cavalry Group had captured Gieslautern, Wehrden, Hostenbach, and Schaffhausen. Both units were now inside Germany, and their patrols reached to the south bank of the Sarre River.

Just prior to the Seventh Army offensive of 15 March XXI, XV, and VI Corps held a line running from Schaffhausen and Hostenbach on the Sarre River almost directly southeast through Haguenau to Oberhoffen, where it joined the First French Army near the Rhine. The line had been drawn tight by the elimination of sags, and preparations had already been made with the Third Army to clear the enemy from Germany west of the Rhine in the Saar-Palatinate.

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# THE SEVENTH UNITED STATES ARMY

## REPORT OF OPERATIONS

### FROM 15 AUGUST 1944

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REPORT OF OPERATIONS

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THE SEVENTH  
UNITED STATES ARMY

IN FRANCE AND GERMANY  
1944-1945

THREE VOLUMES



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To the Officers and Enlisted Men of the  
Seventh United States Army who gave their  
lives this history is respectfully dedicated

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
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## CHAPTER XXVI

### *The Conquest of the Saar Palatinate*

March was a month of important developments for the western front, ending the winter stalemate. Early in the month, the Ninth Army had closed up to the Rhine near Duisberg. The First Army had taken Cologne and seized the Remagen bridgehead over the Rhine. The primary efforts of the armies under the command of General Eisenhower were being directed against the most important of Germany's industrial regions, the Ruhr. The Third Army had crashed through the Siegfried defenses near Bitburg and had raced to the Rhine above Coblenz.

The Third and Seventh Armies now confronted a triangular island, the Saar-Palatinate, bounded by the Rhine River on the east, the Moselle on the northwest, and the Lauter-Sarre River line on the south and west. This area had four major terrain features: the Rhine Valley, the Hardt Mountains, the Saarbruecken-Kaiserslautern-Worms Corridor, and the Hunsruck Mountains. It was also the second richest industrial region in front of the western Allied armies.

The Rhine Valley is flat bottom land, approximately 15 miles wide west of the river, with numerous east-west streams and wooded areas which could serve as obstacles to northward movement. The main north-south highway from Haguenau through Wissembourg to Landau lies at the foot of the Hardt Mountains which command the valley from heights up to 2,300 feet. The Hardt or Low Vosges Mountains are a northern continuation of the Vosges, a northeast-tending ridge, heavily forested, with steep east-west corridors. Movement north and south in



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this sector is severely restricted by a limited road net, while the wooded nature of the terrain limits observation.

The Saarbruecken-Kaiserslautern-Worms Corridor follows the general northwest shoulder of the mountain chain. It is comparatively



OBER OTTERBACH IN THE HARDT MOUNTAINS

*The Hardt or Low Vosges Mountains are a northern continuation of the Vosges . . . heavily forested, with steep east-west corridors . . .*

flat and moderately wooded. There is but one sizeable stream here, the Blies River. To the northwest the corridor opens on rolling and broken country. Separating this ground from the Hunsruck is the Nahe River, which might serve as a barrier to north-south movement and to lateral communication. The Hunsruck is a fairly high, rugged range of mountains extending northeast almost 60 miles between the Sarre River and the Rhine. It is a desolate region, partly under pasture and forest, but with large tracts of open waste.

The Saar-Palatinate and especially the basin of the Sarre River was of extraordinary economic significance to the enemy. The industrial

region itself stretches west to the French frontier, east to the valley of the Blies River, and on the Sarre River extends roughly from Sarreguemines to Merzig. The Saarland is one of the most highly industrialized sections of Germany, second only to the Ruhr as a center of heavy industry. Its growth is largely based on extensive coal fields and the nearby iron ore of Lorraine. Coal mining and iron and steel work are the main industrial occupations. The loss of this region would deprive Germany of 10 percent of its iron and steel capacity and a coal production of 7,000,000 tons annually. The main coal field, near Saarbruecken, is roughly oval in shape and approximately 25 miles long and 12 miles wide.

The basin of the Sarre River was not the only rich industrial prize in the triangle. Homburg had one of the comparatively few synthetic oil plants still in operation and some of the finest coal for steel making. At Ludwigshafen some 40 to 50 percent of the Reich's entire output of chemicals was centered in the I. G. Farben works. Kaiserslautern, next to Ludwigshafen, was the largest city in the Palatinate. It had considerable industry including several engineering plants and foundries, a number of textile works, and was an important railroad junction. Towns like Speyer and Worms were likewise important economically and were of great historical significance.

To defend the Saar-Palatinate, Germany had been busily engaged since the beginning of the year in making improvements on existing defenses. Enemy defensive preparations in and behind the Siegfried Line consisted of the digging of communication trenches between bunkers, the construction of firing positions adjacent to existing bunkers, the extension of existing antitank ditches and trenches, and the felling of trees to form roadblocks and obstacles. In general the enemy had prepared three phases of defense: first, between the line of contact and the Siegfried Line were roadblocks and trenches; second, the Siegfried Line itself, where communication trenches, firing positions, and obstacles were being added; third, a secondary line of defense behind the Siegfried Line, where field fortifications were hastily installed. Strong points of the enemy line were located at Saarbruecken in the area of the lower Blies River and on the plains of the Rhine Valley north

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of Haguenau. These barriers guarded strategic approaches to the Palatinate.

The enemy confronting Seventh Army in March was not at peak strength. During the month of February the First German Army



#### ANTITANK DEFENSES

*the extension of existing antitank ditches and trenches, and the felling of trees to form roadblocks and obstacles.*

had given up seven divisions to sectors considered more vital, while only two of token strength were received in exchange. This exodus of units from the Saar-Palatinate had taken away the army's striking force, and since the end of January he had displayed a defensive attitude. The enemy's most apparent weakness was a lack of reserves. There were nine divisions of the German First Army from Oberhoffen on the Rhine west to Saarlautern. The equivalent strength of these divisions according to G-2 probably did not exceed 18 to 20 battalions of infantry with some 150 to 160 armored vehicles, mostly self-propelled guns.



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As G-2 remarked on 7 March, the enemy had been presented with one crisis after another, each in turn more critical. Events in the north and on the eastern front directly affected the enemy's ability to fight in the Palatinate. The growing threat to the Ruhr and to Berlin



COMMUNICATION TRENCHES OF SIEGFRIED LINE

*where communication trenches, firing positions, and obstacles were being added . . .*

and the likelihood that the west bank of the Moselle would soon be cleared by the Third Army made it likely that the enemy would be called upon to contribute still more units from the Palatinate defenses opposing Seventh Army. On the other hand, the loss of the Silesian coal and industrial area and the threat to the Ruhr might lend increasing importance to the industrial resources of the Saar-Palatinate. The terrain in the triangle had excellent defensive qualities which might justify an extended stay.

As the month of March progressed, the German situation in the north steadily grew worse. The demands of the Remagen bridgehead

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and the threat to the Ruhr and Westphalia resulted in a situation where Army Group G, defending the Palatinate, became the only higher echelon with units on the west bank of the Rhine. On 10 March, Sixth Army Group predicted that the enemy could only hold temporarily on the Moselle and Siegfried Line because of the absolute dependence of these positions on each other for mutual support. The penetration of the one would leave forces on the other in the immediate danger of attack from the rear, if not of complete encirclement. In such an eventuality, the enemy must consider saving his troops, outweighing even the protection of the Saar-Palatinate. "If he wishes to live to fight another day, the enemy must choose to fight and run away", commented the weekly Intelligence Summary.

#### Plans for the Army Offensive


In the two weeks before the March 15 offensive, Seventh Army was engaged in intensive planning for the coming operation. A tentative plan, *Yorktown*, for an offensive to breach the Siegfried Line had been abandoned by 4 March, when Operation Plan *Cleaver* was published by Seventh Army Headquarters. This plan was based upon the assumption that there would be eleven infantry and three armored divisions under Seventh Army control. At this time there were under Seventh Army command nine infantry and two armored divisions. However, it had already been announced on 2 March that the 71st Infantry Division upon its arrival was to be assigned to the army but employed exclusively in a defensive role to gain combat experience. It was hoped that one additional infantry division and one armored division, both experienced in combat, could be assigned to Seventh Army prior to the offensive. On 6 March Seventh Army's *Cleaver* plan was returned from Sixth Army Group approved. On 8 March the code name *Undertone* was substituted for *Cleaver*. Sixth Army Group was given permission to deal directly with the Third Army regarding coordination of operations south of the Moselle.

By 9 March it was understood that the 4th Infantry Division, and the 6th and 13th Armored Divisions would be added to Seventh Army

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for proposed offensive operations. On 11 March, Field Order No. 10 was issued by Seventh Army Headquarters. At the same time boundaries between Seventh Army and the Third Army on its left and the First French Army on its right were restated. Late in February the First French Army had taken over responsibility for a narrow sector of northern Alsace between a line from Brumath to Oberhoffen to Soufflenheim to Lauterbourg and the Rhine. A new Seventh Army left flank boundary, which ran from Buss, across the Sarre River just north of Schaffhausen, northeast to Nohfelden, would give the army sufficient room to maneuver its forces. As stated in Field Order No. 10, the mission of Seventh Army, supported by the XII Tactical Air Command, was to attack from its present positions, break the Siegfried Line, destroy the enemy in zone, and seize the west bank of the Rhine.

The assault on D-Day would be made with three corps abreast, the main effort assigned to XV Corps along the Rimling-Zweibrücken axis in the center. The VI Corps on the right and the XXI Corps on the left were to assist the main effort. After penetration of the Siegfried Line, outflanking action to the right and left of the breakthrough would be relied upon to reduce German defenses. XV Corps was to continue the impetus of the main effort beyond Zweibrücken to Kaiserslautern and the Worms area, where a river crossing was to be effected. VI Corps was to uncover and penetrate the Siegfried defenses, capture the high ground east and northeast of Pirmasens, and take Landau and Neustadt. XXI Corps was to attack on the axis Sarreguemines-Neunkirchen to outflank the Saarbrücken defenses of the Siegfried Line from the east, exploit to the northeast, maintaining contact with Third Army on the left.

Both an intensive and extensive program of air support was drawn up to neutralize the enemy air effort and destroy enemy communications and supply facilities. Prior to D-Day the 42nd Wing and XII Tactical Air Command would be engaged in an interdiction campaign to block all rail lines leading out of the triangle, to destroy supplies, and to bomb enemy installations. On D-Day the Eighth Air Force would attack industrial and communication installations in Zweibrücken, Kaiserslautern, Homburg, and Neunkirchen. The 9th Bomb Division was to hit installations in Pirmasens, Neustadt, and Landau.

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The 42nd Bombardment Wing would carpet-bomb defenses facing Seventh Army. XII Tactical Air Command, of which Brigadier General Glenn O. Barcus had recently become chief, replacing General Saville, was to render support with armed reconnaissance of the area Saarlautern-Ludwigshafen-Karlsruhe and would attack all known enemy army, corps and division command posts. The full air operation was to be executed without disclosing the assault area.



BRIGADIER GENERAL GLENN  
O. BARCUS  
XII Tactical Air  
Command

The supply build-up played a vital part in planning. From the time *Undertone* plan was conceived until its launching, more than 2,000 tons of ammunition per day and 130,000 troops had to be moved into Seventh Army area. This severely taxed both supply and transportation facilities of the army and the communication zone at its rear. Nevertheless only two minor units failed to close in the assault area in time for the operation.

G-2 sections made a continuous study of terrain and enemy defenses. Mines, roadblocks and demolitions had to be accurately located and the condition of roads, bridges, and streams ascertained. Photo interpretation teams studied current pictures to follow the German build-up of defenses. Interpretative studies pinpointed many gun locations and targets for air and artillery. Prisoners of war were interrogated to obtain a complete picture of the enemy order of battle.

During this defensive period there was constant patrolling activity, which gave new troops confidence to close with the enemy and assisted in the determination of enemy disposition. The accustomed tenseness that usually grips men before the jump-off was not too evident prior to D-Day. Allied successes along the western front lifted morale. The weather had moderated considerably. Points of attack and the routes of assembly were familiar.

### Plans for Crossing the Rhine

Since the expected success of the Saar-Palatinate offensive would close Seventh Army on the Rhine, it was necessary to plan concurrently for an immediate crossing. A Sixth Army Group estimate of the situation on 14 February had announced:

Current strategy will best be enhanced by passing to the offensive between the Moselle and the Rhine on or about 15 March with sufficient strength to close on the Rhine rapidly . . . threaten the German with an advance on Kassel and Munich, draw strength away from the main effort in the north as soon as possible and thus facilitate the capture of the Ruhr.

The Army Group ordered its joint planning staff on 17 February to outline such an offensive, including in its directive that "the plan should be sufficiently flexible to permit an immediate crossing of the Rhine in the Worms area or in the Speyer-Germersheim area." River crossing operations, however, were not to be undertaken against strong opposition until the Saar-Palatinate had been entirely cleared.

It has been mentioned that Seventh Army had made detailed plans and preparations, including the assembling of necessary equipment, for a Rhine crossing during the fall of 1944. When higher headquarters decided in November that Seventh Army would turn north rather than attempt a crossing, all amphibious equipment was numbered by truckload and stored in the Forest of Mondon near Luneville, where it remained until March. Throughout the winter the equipment was serviced and kept ready for instant use. Fortunately the original crossing plans, which involved the Rastatt area, were adaptable with little change for the operation now under contemplation.

Two infantry divisions of long experience in combat and in amphibious technique, the 3rd and the 45th, were selected as assault divisions for the Rhine crossing. On 2 March both divisions received orders to initiate as soon as possible training in river crossing technique. An estimated ten days was available. Proposed mounting schedules, drawn up as a result of experiments at the Seventh Army river crossing schools in October 1944, were sent to both divisions. Both XV and VI



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Corps were given plans, adapted from the October outline, for the two crossing areas originally considered in *Yorktown*.

The selected assault divisions sent tank crews to be trained to operate amphibious DD-Tanks at the amphibious tank school at Camp Valbonne on the Rhone River. On 4 March these crews from the 756th Tank Battalion and the 191st Tank Battalion were ordered to report there to attend a three-day period of instruction on DD tanks. The infantry divisions, meanwhile, were undergoing intensive training in amphibious operations. The 3rd on Lake Parroy and the 45th on Lake Gondrexange, both in the Luneville area, used the amphibious equipment which had been stored since November. Training with the 3rd Division was the 540th Engineer Combat Group, and with the 45th Division the 40th Engineer Combat Group, forming teams that would operate together in the actual crossing.

Both engineer combat groups had taken river crossing training in October. Formerly regiments, they had been redesignated engineer combat groups on 15 February. Infantry assault battalions were divided into five waves to cross in storm and assault boats. Because the landing craft would accommodate no complete infantry tactical unit, mounting schedules were drawn up and boat teams formed. Practice landings were made by daylight, in darkness, and under illumination of anti-aircraft artillery searchlights.

River crossing equipment had been broken down into regimental combat team sets, each capable of crossing one team on a two-battalion front, and the whole capable of crossing a corps on a two-division front. The nucleus of the sets consisted of 96 storm boats with outboard motors, 188 assault boats with outboard motors, six 25-ton ponton rafts, one heavy ponton bridge, and 150 DUKWs.

While in the training area engineers organized upstream patrols to provide protection against floating mines, enemy swimmers, and debris. A patrol assigned to each river crossing group consisted of one platoon of engineers to construct mine barriers, six searchlights, five DUKWs for bridge security, four 40mm anti-aircraft guns, four quadruple 50 caliber machine guns, and two M-4 tanks. An L-5 liaison

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plane was assigned to the patrols and a radio net from plane to tank to DUKW was established. Engineer troops from heavy ponton battalions and camouflage troops were added to division assault teams.

While training continued, plans on a higher echelon were going forward. An air drop to support the operation was discussed with the First Allied Airborne Army on 6 March, but Seventh Army was told that the timing of operations in the north might disrupt plans for a drop in the Seventh Army zone. However, announcing a target date of 1 April, Seventh Army requested on 8 March that one airborne division be designated to plan operations in support of the crossing. On 9 March, XV Corps was designated the assault corps and was given a directive to plan a crossing of the Rhine River in the vicinity of Worms, to be submitted for approval by 14 March. In order to put all river crossing operations under a single command, the 40th and 540th Engineer Combat Groups were attached to XV Corps at 0600 hours on 15 March.

#### D-Day for Operation Undertone

The offensive was launched on schedule on 15 March. The XXI Corps and the 3rd and 45th Divisions of the XV Corps jumped off at 0100 hours. The main body of the VI Corps attacked at 0645 hours and the 3rd Algerian Infantry Division, under the operational command of VI Corps, moved out along the Rhine at 0715 hours. On 11 March the 3rd Algerian Division and selected elements of the 5th French Armored Division had been attached to VI Corps for that part of the Seventh Army drive north which was to develop in the newly assigned sector of the First French Army reaching out to Lauterbourg on the Rhine. By the close of the first day of operation *Undertone* the VI Corps had taken 1,034 prisoners, the XV Corps 628 prisoners, and the XXI Corps 426 prisoners, for a total of 2,088 prisoners.

#### XV Corps Advances the Army Center

The XV Corps was scheduled to play a central position in the Seventh Army assault and to make its main effort along the axis Rimling, Zweibruecken, Homburg, and Kaiserslautern. It also had as a sub-

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sidiary and preliminary mission the capture of the Maginot fortress town of Bitch. The bulk of Seventh Army divisions had been assigned to XV Corps for the main offensive efforts. At the beginning of March XV Corps had had under its command only the 100th and 44th Infantry Divisions, the 106th Cavalry Group, and attached corps troops. By 8 March the advance detachment of the 71st Infantry Division, composed of the 5th, 14th and 66th Infantry Regiments and commanded by Major General Willard G. Wyman, had reported to XV Corps to which the division had been assigned; instructions were received at army headquarters on the same day that restrictions on the employment of this division had been lifted. When the 6th Armored Division, commanded by Major General Robert W. Grow, began to arrive on 9 March it also was attached to XV Corps. On 11 March the attachment of the 3rd and 45th Divisions to XV Corps was announced. The 3rd Division had just been released from SHAEF reserve, and the 45th Division had been released from army reserve.



MAJOR GENERAL WILLARD  
G. WYMAN  
71st Infantry Division



MAJOR GENERAL ROBERT  
W. GROW  
6th Armored Division

improving defenses behind the natural barrier of the Blies River. On D-Day the river was from 75 to 144 feet wide and had a depth of 10 to

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15 feet. Before the assault, heavy bombers of the Royal Air Force had flown missions against Homburg and Zweibruecken. This bombing, together with the shelling of division artillery, disrupted enemy communications and silenced his artillery until after daylight.

Reconnaissance had been made the previous night for suitable footbridge and ferry sites, assault boats had been brought up, and the banks of the Blies had been cleared of mines. By 0235 hours four companies of infantrymen from the 180th Regiment had crossed the river in assault boats. By 0250 hours two footbridges had been completed by the 120th Engineer Battalion. Searchlights were used for illumination in the



OBERGAILBACH AREA

The 45th Division launched its assault between Habkirchen and Obergailbach.

assault. By daylight the 45th Division had penetrated forward positions of the enemy. The crossing of the Blies put the 45th Division once again in Germany. The enemy was apparently unable to recover from the blow dealt him the first day of the attack and withdrew to the concrete

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and steel fortifications of the Siegfried Line. For delaying purposes the enemy employed demolitions, and tank-supported strongpoints. The 180th Infantry on the division left flank drove north along the west bank of the Blies River, and the 157th Infantry pushed forward on the right flank, while the 179th Infantry mopped up by-passed strongpoints. After pushing through mine-fields, road craters, and roadblocks, troops encountered the solid defenses of the Siegfried Line on 17 March near Blieskastel west of Zweibruecken.

To the right of the 45th Division, the 3rd Division had prepared a parallel thrust. In its operation plan, *Earthquake*, the 3rd Division was



HEAVY WEAPONS COMPANY CROSSING THE BLIES RIVER  
crossing the Blies put the 45th Division once again in Germany . . .

to attack at H-Hour passing through elements of the 44th Division to drive to the Siegfried Line south of Zweibruecken, then to drive down the Zweibruecken-Kaiserslautern corridor. General O'Daniel had told his troops, "The attack will be pressed with the ruthless vigor that has

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routed every enemy formation opposing the 3rd Division. All men will be brought to the highest possible offensive spirit prior to the jump-off. Bayonets will be sharpened." Without artillery preparation the 3rd Division launched its attack at 0100 hours on 15 March just south of the German border in the vicinity of Rimling. Within 30 minutes the border had been crossed, and the enemy's forward positions overrun.

Mines disabled several armored vehicles the first day of the assault, but though the mine-fields were dense they did not extend much beyond one mile. Only at Utweiler was there any serious attempt at resistance. Here the 2nd Battalion of the 7th Infantry received a counter-attack by a battalion of infantry supported by armor. It was completely surrounded until the 3rd Battalion attacked and relieved it from encirclement. Four enemy flakwagons and seven tank destroyers were destroyed by this effort. After two and a half days of fighting the 3rd Division succeeded in driving to the Siegfried Line at a point just south of Zweibruecken.

On the right flank of XV Corps the assault of 15 March was launched by the 100th Infantry Division which had held the corps line southwest of Bitche during the period of aggressive defense. The first mission assigned to the 100th Division in the Seventh Army offensive was the capture of the fortress town of Bitche. This division had fought over the same terrain and had besieged the same citadel in December. In the December fighting for Bitche the 3rd Battalion of the 398th Infantry had received recognition for its work in reducing Fort Schiesseck, overlooking Bitche from the north.

At 0500 hours on 15 March the three-regiment offensive of the 100th Division began. The 397th Infantry on the left flank poured out to capture the high ground north of the fortress and by noon had taken Schorbach. The 399th Infantry on the right flank attacked Reysviller Ridge southeast of Bitche. The 398th Infantry in the center made a frontal assault and seized Fort Freudenberg and Fort Schiesseck.

Division engineers had done their demolition work well in December, and only small resistance was encountered near the blasted pillboxes. Mines were present in great numbers, however. A captured engineer map later revealed that there were 3,839 Schuh mines, S mines,

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and antitank mines guarding the southwest approaches to Bitche. Tanks were used to help clear a narrow path through minefields.

On 16 March the 1st Battalion of the 398th Infantry captured Fort Otterbiel north of Bitche against heavy mortar, artillery, and small arms fire. The 2nd Battalion captured the town of Bitche, encountering little resistance, and occupied the northern half. The 3rd Battalion passed through the town to Camp de Bitche to the east and secured the area. Meanwhile, the 399th Infantry was cooperating in this "nutcracker squeeze" by clearing the southern half of Bitche and the College de Bitche. Company B captured 75 prisoners including the commander and staff of the battalion which was charged with defending the town.

The fortress town of Bitche capitulated as a result of the flanking movement executed by the 398th Infantry on the north and the 399th Infantry on the south. General Burreth, commanding the division, was made the first citizen of honor in the town's history. The 100th Division now pushed to the north in an advance to the Siegfried Line, leaving the 71st Division to take over control of the Bitche area.


#### The Clearing of Northern Alsace

On the Seventh Army right flank between XV Corps and the Rhine VI Corps had made preparations for its mission to clear northern Alsace and to drive through the Wissembourg-Bergzabern-Landau-Neustadt Gap along the Rhine Valley. With four infantry divisions abreast, the 42nd, the 103rd, the 36th, and the 3rd Algerian from west to east, the VI Corps attacked early on 15 March across the Rothbach and Moder Rivers. The 14th Armored Division gave the corps its armored support. Prisoner of war statements showed that tactical surprise had been achieved and that enemy communications had been disrupted early. Progress was hampered somewhat by extensive minefields. Corps artillery fired almost at will on enemy vehicles, guns, tanks, and personnel with excellent results.


On the left flank of the VI Corps the 42nd Division had been holding a sector of the line in the Low Vosges. At 0645 hours on 15 March the division attacked from the general line Althorn-Reipertswiller



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and drove into German mountain defenses. All units, moving along the ridges, deliberately avoided the roads which were mined and blocked. Supplies were brought up by pack mules. The 242nd Infantry attacking



#### HIGH GROUND OVERLOOKING BAERENTHAL

The 242nd Infantry attacking on the left reached high ground overlooking Baerenthal and cut the Mouterhouse-Baerenthal road.

on the left reached high ground overlooking Baerenthal and cut the Mouterhouse-Baerenthal road. The 222nd Infantry on the right attacked northeast across the Rothbach River. The 117th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron maintained contact with the 100th Division on the left.

The division continued its attack northeast on 16 March. A breakthrough near Baerenthal lessened organized enemy resistance. Heavily wooded and steeply ridged terrain and abatis over the restricted road net were the chief obstacles. The enemy was constantly upset and forced to change his plans by the speed with which elements of the 42nd Division seized and exploited high ground, forcing German holding forces to pull back to avoid being completely encircled and cut off.

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On 17 March, all regiments advanced up to six miles against little opposition. The 242nd Infantry cleared Bannstein and moved to Sturzelbronn. The 232nd Infantry captured Baerenthal, Philippsbourg, Dambach, and Neunhoffen, while the 222nd Infantry continued on to Niedersteinbach. The 117th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron cleared Mouterhouse. The 42nd Division crossed the border into Germany on 18 March and reached the outer defenses of the Siegfried Line. The 242nd Regiment crossed the border near Ludwigswinkel. The 222nd Regiment advanced to seize high ground northeast of Schoenau against the German defense wall. The 232nd Infantry moved up the center of the division sector and halted at the outer defenses of the Siegfried Line. In three and a half days of assault, the division had advanced over 16 miles of mountainous terrain and was the first VI Corps unit to reenter Germany.

To the right of the 42nd Division, the 410th and 411th Regiments of the 103rd Division had at 0645 hours on 15 March attacked from positions southwest of the Rothbach River. The assault was preceded by artillery preparation; and by 0800 hours three battalions had crossed the river. The 411th Infantry in a two-pronged attack had made good progress. A western column by-passed Rothbach and reached a point south of Zinswiller. An eastern column attacked northeast through a wooded area near Uhrwiller, reaching a long line of well-camouflaged bunkers. On the division right flank the 410th Infantry seized Uttenhoffen but was forced to withdraw under heavy fire. Task Force Cactus, the 3rd Battalion of the 409th Infantry reinforced, prepared to attack toward Climbach and Bobenthal in the event of a breakthrough.

On 16 March the 103rd Division renewed its attack in spite of the determined stand by the enemy from prepared dug-in positions along the Zintzel River and other strongpoints. Zinswiller and Oberbronn were cleared, and the outskirts of Reichshoffen were reached. Only light resistance was encountered on 17 March as the enemy withdrew to the Siegfried Line. Niederbronn, Reichshoffen, and Woerth were taken in the advance. The 103rd Division moved approximately 8 miles northeast on 18 March to cross the German border. The 411th Infantry crossed

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the frontier and seized Bobenthal. Two American-built bridges constructed in mid-December 1944 over the Lauter River at Bobenthal, were captured intact although prepared for demolition. Contact with the enemy was established south of Niederschlettenbach where there were pillboxes and trenches.

Farther east on the VI Corps front the 36th Division had been given the focal mission of forcing the Wissembourg Gap and uncovering the Siegfried Line beyond. The plan was that the 141st Infantry would thrust north from Haguenau on the right, while the 143rd Infantry on the left would make a sweeping end run from the division left to Gunstett, northwest of Haguenau Forest. The 142nd Regiment was to hold a central position and capture the road junction and town of Mertzwiller. The division's main axis of advance would be Haguenau-Soultz-Wissembourg-Bergzabern.

At 0100 hours on 15 March the 143rd and 142nd Regiments had attacked from the La Walck-Ueberach area southwest of Haguenau Forest. Before the enemy could assemble his reserves the 143rd Infantry had penetrated his main line of resistance along the Moder River. Bitschhoffen had been thoroughly prepared for defense with dug-in machine gun positions, prearranged mortar and artillery concentrations, and minefields. Although it was important to the enemy to hold this town, since it controlled a vital communications route, by 1045 hours on D-Day the town had fallen. On 16 March the 1st Battalion of the 143rd Infantry, reinforced, was organized into a motorized column and moved out to break through to Soultz. It was stopped south of Eberbach. The next day these motorized troops found that the enemy had withdrawn, blowing a bridge spanning the Bieberbach River just west of Gunstett. High velocity weapons and machine guns were zeroed in on the crossing site from heights nearby. During the night a bridge was completed and on the next day Dieffenbach was taken. The regiment had now opened a vital communications route for exploitation by armored forces.

The 142nd Infantry had jumped off in the attack to the right of the 143rd Infantry and at the same hour. After crossing the Moder River on two footbridges constructed by the engineers, the 2nd and 3rd Battalions had run into enemy machine gun fire from the bunkers and

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trench positions in the Haguenau Forest. Point blank fire forced the Germans out of dugouts. Prisoners reported that the enemy was attempting to fall back upon a defensive line at the Zintzel River. The 142nd Infantry pointed the attack at Mertzwiler.

On 16 March five battalions of artillery massed for a preparatory fire of 900 rounds in five minutes. At 0430 hours Companies A and B crossed the Zintzel River by ford and rubber boat. A Bailey bridge was completed for the passage of armor. Overrun, the enemy suffered heavy losses. The regiment took 303 prisoners. After Mertzwiler was cleared, the 142nd Infantry was ordered to follow the drive of the 143rd Regiment at the left with a motorized column. It was now evident that the Germans had withdrawn to a considerable distance, probably to the Siegfried Line. Wissembourg was the next objective. A patrol from the 3rd Battalion of the 142nd Infantry going forward from Rott to investigate Wissembourg to the northeast drew machine gun and self-propelled fire.

In the morning of 19 March the 2nd Battalion left its bivouac to pass through the 3rd Battalion and attack Wissembourg. Some resistance was encountered at a road block and 50 prisoners were taken. The 2nd Battalion soon reached Wissembourg at the same time as the 1st Battalion which had advanced on the regimental right flank. The 1st Battalion was ordered on to Bergzabern with a platoon from the 36th Reconnaissance Troop to precede the column. The 1st Battalion moved into Germany and reached Ober Otterbach beyond Wissembourg without contact. But within the next hour German guns pounded the 1st Battalion, shelled Wissembourg, and covered the roads from Wissembourg to Ober Otterbach.

On the right flank of the 36th Division the 141st Infantry had had as a mission the clearance of the main road running northeast through Haguenau Forest to be used as a supply route for VI Corps. Bridges were to be built as quickly as possible across the Moder to support armor and troops. At 0300 hours on 15 March regimental troops had crossed the Moder River, and by 0720 hours had begun to move north on the Haguenau-Surbourg road through the Haguenau Forest. Felled trees and mines slowed progress. On 18 March the 1st Battalion entered Surbourg from the west, and the 3rd Battalion moved into the southern

portion of the town against no active enemy resistance. By 1900 hours on 19 March the 2nd Battalion of the 141st Infantry had reached a line directly east of Ober Otterbach, where troops of the 142nd Regiment had been stopped by enemy artillery. A two-company attack was launched at 2000 hours to see if there were any enemy personnel in the dragon's teeth and pillboxes of the Siegfried Line immediately in front of the 2nd Battalion of the 141st Infantry. Troops were fired on by 15 well-hidden machine guns.

On the VI Corps right flank the 3rd Algerian Infantry Division reinforced by elements of the 5th French Armored Division, having served with the II French Corps but having been attached to VI Corps for the Seventh Army offensive, was to attack along the axis Bischwiller-Lauterbourg, to capture Lauterbourg, and to secure crossings over the Lauter River into Germany. After a 30 minute artillery preparation the main attack had been launched north from Oberhoffen at 0715 hours on 15 March. Its advance towards Camp Oberhoffen was stopped by heavy fire. Farther east from Oberhoffen to the Rhine troops pushed out to the northeast. Under cover of darkness on 16 March the enemy withdrew, and the 3rd Algerian Division followed with gains up to 2 miles. On 18 March division units raced north on the western side of the Rhine to within a mile of the German frontier, as the enemy disengaged.

Original instructions to the 3rd Algerian Division had been that it was to revert to First French Army upon reaching and securing Lauter River crossings. This meant that it would revert at the same time to an inactive, defensive status, guarding the Rhine flank. To enable the French to participate in the offensive beyond the French frontier, these instructions were changed on 18 March to organize from the reinforced Algerian Division a special task force, or groupement, under General Monsabert. Effective 1800 hours on 19 March, Groupement Monsabert was created, and these troops continued to operate under the control of Seventh Army until the task force should reach the Erlen River almost midway between Lauterbourg and Speyer.

On 19 March Algerian infantrymen attacked north over the Lauter River, while French armor took Scheibenhard and Lauterbourg without active opposition. Against stiffening resistance on 20 March

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Groupelement Monsabert pushed additional elements over the Lauter River and gained between one and two miles. An armored column attacked through the Bien Wald to Buechelberg. Infantry troops occupied Berg; and night patrols operated as far as Neuburg, which was found to be flooded. On 20 March firm contact was made with Siegfried positions along the entire front.

The 14th Armored Division, which was to provide the drive for a VI Corps breakthrough, had been instructed to pass through the 36th Division moving from Haguenau and Mertzwiller to seize crossings over the Lauter River and drive north to Landau and Neustadt. Before




COMMUNICATION TRENCHES BEHIND DRAGON'S TEETH  
OF SIEGFRIED LINE

*... advanced to Steinfield and reached the Siegfried Line ...*

daylight on 18 March the 14th Armored Division had moved up to points within sight of the German border without opposition. On 19 March elements of Combat Command A crossed the Lauter River northeast of



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Schleithal against moderate resistance. A bridge over the Lauter River had been found blown, but a nearby ford was located and filled in to allow tanks and infantry to cross. On 20 March elements of the 14th Armored Division found Schweighofen and Kapsweyer clear, advanced to Steinfeld and reached the Siegfried Line.

During the first five days of the Seventh Army March offensive, VI Corps units on the army right flank covered the greatest distance of any army divisions. In this period they moved more than 20 miles from the Moder River line near Haguenau across the Franco-German border against only isolated and ineffective enemy resistance, as German troops withdrew to Siegfried Line fortifications. The Seventh Army line, which on 15 March had run from an area west of Saarbrücken almost directly southeast through Haguenau, was being swung on a pivot near Saarbrücken to a west-east line, as the Seventh Army pushed all its divisions to that part of the German West Wall which was actually a defense against penetration from the south. At the same time that this new west-east line was being formed, divisions on the Seventh Army left flank under XXI and XV Corps were breaking their way through Siegfried defenses. As the line formed, it dissolved; and Seventh Army divisions in the west raced through the Saar-Palatinate to the Rhine.

The first days of the army offensive had meant almost no progress at all in distance for divisions under XXI Corps, which at the opening of the offensive were already at the Siegfried Line. These days had been spent by XXI Corps in forcing an opening through the steel and concrete enemy defenses.

#### The Capture of Saarbrücken

At the opening of the 15 March offensive XXI Corps on the left flank of the Seventh Army had been poised for an assault on the Saarland. Its specific mission was to capture Saarbrücken, Neunkirchen, and St. Wendel, then to advance northeast to the Rhine. The 70th Division had been given the objective Saarbrücken, industrial heart of the Saar region, while the 63rd Division to its right was to penetrate the Siegfried Line.

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At 0100 hours on 15 March the assault began. The 63rd Division jumped off to uncover the Siegfried defenses, while the 12th Armored Division was alerted to pour through any opening and exploit to the north and northeast. On the corps left flank the 70th Division and the 101st Cavalry Group were to hold the enemy in place, patrol across the Sarre River, and cross if possible. The rapid advance of the 63rd Division, when it came after three days of pounding the line, necessitated the use of the cavalry group as flank protection; and the 70th Division took over its sector. The Third Army, meanwhile, was making great progress in its push east. On 17 March the 12th Armored Division was detached from the XXI Corps and was attached to the XX Corps of the Third Army. Two days later Combat Command A of the 6th Armored Division was attached to the 63rd Division to take over the armored mission.

The 70th Division was situated south of Saarbruecken and engaged in preparatory action at the opening of the offensive. German counter attacks delayed the planned assault. At 1510 hours on 15 March five battalions of American artillery began firing a 20 minute preparation. The fire was lifted for ten minutes and another 20 minute preparation was fired. Smoke signals shifted the fire 600 yards to the north and another 20 minute preparation was fired. The 1st Battalion of the 274th Infantry, supported by two platoons of tanks and a platoon of tank destroyers, started an advance at 1610 hours towards fortifications in the area south of Saarbruecken. The terrain offered little cover and concealment. All approaches were covered by interlocking bands of fire from enemy pillboxes and bunkers. After several hundred yards were won, the advance was halted.

For the next few days there was vigorous patrolling of the southern bank of the Sarre. Division artillery and tank destroyers fired hundreds of missions and expended 5,000 rounds neutralizing enemy gun batteries. Bunkers and pillboxes were subjected to intense high-explosive armor-piercing shell fire. On 18 March word was received from XXI Corps Headquarters that Third Army had penetrated far into the rear of the Saar region and was at St. Wendel. The division was put on the alert for an enemy withdrawal.

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The 70th Division was instructed that on 19 March it was to attack and establish a bridgehead over the Sarre River and to be prepared to exploit to the north or to reduce Saarbruecken. For the crossing of the Sarre River all available fire power was brought to bear on the enemy. The 433rd Anti-Aircraft Battalion had 40mm anti-aircraft guns and M51 anti-aircraft machine guns used as ground support weapons which helped to neutralize pillboxes. All visible pillboxes were engaged and buttoned up. The assault met with immediate enemy resistance. Machine guns were fired from the apertures in the pillboxes, and enemy mortars and artillery covered the approaches. However, aerial observers reported that enemy troops and civilians were withdrawing. Large motor convoys moving eastward were observed deep in the Saar region. Bridges were being demolished.

At 2230 hours on 19 March a patrol from the 276th Infantry crossed the Sarre River without opposition in the vicinity of Hostenbach on the extreme army west flank. There were extensive minefields on the opposite bank, and an anti-mine platoon was sent to clear a path. Pillboxes were found empty. At noon on 20 March the 276th Infantry began an advance upon Saarbruecken, the 2nd Battalion moving through St. Arnual, while the 1st and 3rd Battalions moved along the main Forbach-Saarbruecken highway into the city. By 1800 hours the 275th Infantry had established itself on the south bank of the Sarre River and in Saarbruecken. No opposition other than ground obstacles was encountered. The city fell without the loss of one American soldier.

East of Saarbruecken, in the meantime, the 63rd Infantry Division had on D-Day secured advantageous positions for the assault on the Siegfried Line. In the attack which began at 0100 hours on 15 March the 253rd Infantry had seized Fechingen, the 254th Infantry had taken Eschringen and Ensheim. The advance had been made against enemy artillery and mortar fire and anti-personnel mines. The division plan now was to uncover the main Siegfried defenses, to drive for Hassel, and to turn to the left to assist the 70th Division if help was needed in the capture of Saarbruecken. During the next two days, 16 and 17 March, the division maintained pressure against the Siegfried Line in its zone and withstood heavy counterattacks by tank-supported enemy infantry.

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while final preparations were made by division engineer troops to blow apart enemy fortifications. By this time XXI Corps was in the process of completing its mission in the Seventh Army March offensive.




SIEGFRIED LINE NORTH OF ENSHEIM IN THE TOWN OF HECKENDAHLHEIM

*The division plan now was to uncover the main Siegfried defenses . . .*

#### Liaison with the Third Army

A significant problem in the conquest of the Saar-Palatinate was that of liaison between the Seventh and Third Armies. On 14 March at 0200 hours the 5th and 90th Infantry Divisions of the XII Corps, Third Army, had launched an attack southeast to cross the Moselle and enter the Moselle-Rhine-Siegfried triangle. By 17 March XII Corps tanks of the 4th Armored Division had reached and crossed the Nahe River; the XX Corps, attacking east and southeast, had approached Merzig; and near the Rhine the VIII Corps had crossed the Moselle and was advancing on Coblenz.

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GENERAL OF THE ARMY DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER  
*... Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force ...*

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On 17 March General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, arrived at Seventh Army Headquarters in Luneville. Arriving with him by plane was Lieutenant General George S. Patton, Commanding General of the Third Army. They were met at Luneville airport by General Patch and General Devers.

In substance General Eisenhower asked the following question: Did General Patch personally object to Third Army being assigned objectives in the zone of the Seventh Army and attacking perpendicularly to the Seventh Army direction of attack? General Patch replied that "we are all in the same army" and that the objective was to destroy the German army. He said that he felt sure that Seventh Army and Third Army staffs would have no difficulty in coordinating mutual moves. General Eisenhower mentioned instances in the African campaign when faulty liaison between Allied armies allowed the enemy a chance to escape and suggested that Seventh Army and Third Army establish extremely close liaison, even to the point of merging command posts if necessary. General Patch replied he could reach General Patton by phone as easily as he could reach the corps commanders. The Supreme Commander was assured that Third and Seventh Army moves would be closely coordinated.

The overall situation in the Saar-Palatinate at this time was not one to give comfort to the enemy. Sixth Army Group's Weekly Intelligence Summary issued on 17 March pointed out that the time remaining to Army Group G for its tenure in the Saar-Palatinate was rapidly diminishing as a result of deep penetrations southward from the Moselle River by Third Army units. German First Army troops facing Seventh Army made obvious the lack of defense in depth by withdrawing into the Siegfried Line with the mission of maintaining a secure left flank to preserve possible crossing sites for withdrawal over the Rhine. "There is no doubt that the enemy will eventually be forced across the Rhine if only because of his inability to reinforce present positions. General Hausser, Commander of Army Group G, can decide only how many Germans he wishes to leave in our hands west of the Rhine."

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General Hausser himself, in an interview after the war, declared that he recognized the threat of the lower Moselle crossing. The river with its many bends was not adapted to defense. Since there were no rear defenses in the Hunsruck sector, a Third Army thrust via Bad Kreuznach into the Rhine Plain was a probability. Such a thrust would make the defense of the Saar-Palatinate impossible. General Hausser claimed that he had favored a withdrawal of Army Group G so as to take over the defense of the Rhine in full combat strength. But economic considerations such as the coal deposits near Saarbruecken demanded that this area be held as long as possible. Higher headquarters ordered that the sector be held, but with the reservation that encirclement of any large groups be prevented.

The Third Army G-2, in an analysis of the enemy situation, believed on 16 March that the Third Army's sweep across the enemy rear in the Palatinate triangle was creating a situation analagous to the Falaise pocket in northwest France, with the enemy facing envelopment. It was probable that with lines of communication in a turmoil as a result of Allied advances, the Germans did not have a clear picture of the danger of their own troops. The enemy was estimated to have some 36,000 combat effectives in the Palatinate triangle, equivalent to 40 percent of his fighting forces in the west. If he was to make an effective stand east of the Rhine, he would have to extricate the bulk of his army from the Palatinate.

### XXI Corps Breaches the Siegfried Line


At the 17 March meeting in Luneville, General Eisenhower had asked General Patch where and when he expected to achieve a breakthrough of the Siegfried Line. General Patch had replied that he could not state when a breakthrough would occur but that he would rather expect it in the zone of the XV Corps and perhaps to the right of the XXI Corps before the 63rd Infantry Division. It was just three days later, on 20 March, that the full penetration was achieved; and three divisions, the 63rd, the 45th, and the 3rd, each separately succeeded in breaching the Siegfried defenses.

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The Siegfried Line along the Seventh Army front included a belt of dragon's teeth, which were three staggered rows of concrete pyramids about three feet high. Behind this there were usually two antitank ditches, each eight feet deep and 12 feet wide. On every



DRAGON'S TEETH OF SIEGFRIED LINE

*The Siegfried Line ... included a belt of dragon's teeth ...*

knoll and through all paths of the woods were concrete pillboxes so situated that each one was supported by fire from one or more of the others. For every three to six pillboxes, there was a key or central pillbox, which contained a control point for the other casemates. The line itself was about 500 yards in depth, though well camouflaged pillboxes in secondary positions dotted knolls and rises for miles. Most of the fortifications were covered with earth and overgrown with vegetation. Entrances were usually in the rear as much as 150 yards from the pillbox and access was by tunnel. The line, in short, was a "mass of reinforced concrete pillboxes with interlocking fields of fire, wire entangle-

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ments, entrenchments, deep antitank ditches, and heavy dragon's teeth obstacles."

Engineer troops were to play a major part in the 63rd Division assault on the Siegfried Line. One company of the 263rd Combat



EARTH COVERED FORTIFICATIONS

*Most of the fortifications were covered with earth and overgrown with vegetation ...*

Engineer Battalion was placed in direct support of each of the infantry regiments. Fifty tons of explosives were requested from Seventh Army, and engineers began a stockpiling of explosives one mile south of the initial Siegfried positions. Arrangements were made for treadway bridging material to cross antitank ditches and craters. Primacord ropes were prepared to breach a pattern for foot troops through minefields. Infantry assault teams were given pole and satchel charges of TNT to aid in the reduction of bunkers and pillboxes.

A study of aerial photographs indicated that the best location for a breach through the dragon's teeth was 50 yards east of the main

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north and south road north of Ensheim. The road here was blocked by the demolition of a timber bridge over an antitank ditch immediately in the rear of the teeth. In the early morning hours of 18 March, after several attempts, the engineers succeeded in reaching the dragon's teeth just north of Ensheim. The advance to the teeth was over flat and open terrain, which the enemy was covering with fire. At 0130 hours, the gap was blown: 1,500 pounds of TNT carried to the site on packboards had been used.

At 1400 hours on 18 March a provisional task force of five tanks, four tank destroyers, a platoon of infantry, a platoon of engineers, and a tank dozer were moved to the blown gap. The engineer platoon swept a path free of mines, operating from a kneeling position because of intense mortar, artillery, and small arms fire. When the path through the field was swept, a tank dozer was used to fill a crater left by demolition charges.

In the eastern sector of the division area, north of Ommersheim, similar operations were being conducted. After repeated attempts under fire a group of engineer volunteers successfully breached a gap in the dragon's teeth at 2200 hours on 18 March. First a pillbox covering a steel gate-type roadblock in front of the teeth had to be eliminated.

Each day the division increased pressure on the Siegfried Line, methodically eliminating pillboxes. On 19 March 48 pillboxes were eliminated and on the next day complete penetration of the line was effected. The 254th Infantry reached Ober-Wurzbach north of Ommersheim and beyond the Siegfried Line, the first regiment to achieve a breakthrough. The 255th Infantry likewise made a successful penetration near Nieder-Wurzbach and along the road to Hassel. The significance of the penetration was quickly recognized. Several messages of congratulations were received by regimental and division commanders. General Milburn, Commanding XXI Corps, wrote to General Hibbs, commanding the 63rd Division: "It is my desire to commend you and the officers and enlisted men under your command on the proud accomplishment of being the first division of Seventh Army to effect a complete breakthrough of the stubborn defenses of the Siegfried Line."

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To prevent infiltration and reoccupation of the pillboxes by the enemy, these fortifications had to be destroyed immediately. Most of the pillboxes were of the two-story type with a fire room above the living quarters. Engineers used 150 pounds of TNT in the fire room and 250 pounds in the living quarters, fired simultaneously to accomplish demolition. Once penetration of the line had been effected, division elements moved into Hassel and St. Ingbert without pause. A fanning out now took place to the right and left. Combat Command A of the 6th Armored Division, attached to the 63rd Division, poured through the breach and proceeded to Homburg, where it made contact with the XV Corps. A new Task Force Harris, the 3rd Battalion of the 254th Infantry reinforced, was created to seize and hold objectives in the vicinity of Neunkirchen and soon gained contact with elements of the XX Corps, Third Army.

Meanwhile on the corps left flank the 70th Division, having taken Saarbruecken, pushed north and likewise made contact with Third Army units. The 65th Division was met at Holz, the XX Corps at St. Wendel, and the 26th Division near Ottweiler.

On 21 March Task Force Harris, spearheading the advance of the 63rd Division, cleared the Neunkirchen area, taking 1,000 German prisoners and liberating 2,000 Allied prisoners and forced laborers. All organized resistance collapsed. Division elements followed behind the task force to mop up. Combat Command A of the 6th Armored Division continued its rapid advance east. By 1200 hours it had reached Rheindurkheim on the west bank of the Rhine. Patrols entered Worms to meet elements of the Third Army.

On 21 March XXI Corps, in compliance with Operations Instructions No. 99 issued by Seventh Army, relinquished command of the 63rd Infantry Division, which passed to the control of XV Corps and was at that time in an area generally northwest of Homburg. Combat Command A of the 6th Armored Division also passed once again to the command of XV Corps. The 70th Infantry Division reverted to army reserve. XXI Corps had fulfilled its initial mission in the Seventh Army offensive, which had made sufficient progress so that the Seventh Army command post followed up its troops on 21 March, opening at Sarre-

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guemines after having operated at Luneville for almost three months of defensive warfare. On 22 March XXI Corps assumed command of the 71st and 100th Divisions in the Bitche area. These divisions, after release by XV Corps, advanced north through the Siegfried defenses and turned east toward the Rhine. Against light opposition they moved by motor to the Landau-Neustadt-Germersheim area. The new mission of XXI Corps was to cover the right flank of XV Corps in the advance to the Rhine.

#### XV Corps Breaks Through Siegfried Defenses

Along the Blies River Valley the 45th Division was achieving its penetration of the Siegfried Line at the same time that the 63rd Division on its left pushed through to Hassel and St. Ingbert. On 18 March supporting artillery had registered on emplacements lying in front of 45th Division troops. At 1230 hours, artillery began a 30 minute concentration of fire upon the pillboxes. Two hours later, the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 157th Infantry jumped off to begin the initial attack. Advance troops passed through the outer ring of dragon's teeth and, supported by a company of medium tanks, assaulted the pillboxes and bunkers. Tanks moved up to the dragon's teeth and directed fire upon the ports and apertures of the casemates. Infantry and demolition teams from the engineers then blew a path for vehicles to move through. Direct tank fire demolished one pillbox and eight fell to infantry assault teams. The Siegfried drive on the XV Corps left flank was in full progress.

On 19 March the 45th Division captured or destroyed 86 pillboxes and bunkers and took the key towns of Alschbach, Blieskastel, and Webenheim. The enemy made a few last counterattacks to cover his withdrawal. These were easily repulsed. In the rapidity of the advance, a pillbox in which a German switchboard was still in full operation was captured. Two interrogation lieutenants were sent by the S-2 of the 157th Infantry to listen in to conversation. An SS Captain was overheard issuing orders to troops to destroy all telephones in the bunkers and get ready to withdraw to Landstuhl. This was reported to air liaison. Night fighters were sent out and plastered a German convoy of vehicles extending three abreast for miles.

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Original XV Corps orders had given the 45th Division the mission of breaching the Siegfried Line and capturing Homburg. Both missions were accomplished on 20 March. During the night the enemy



TROOPS PASSING THROUGH THE SIEGFRIED LINE

Advanced troops passed through the outer ring of dragon's teeth supported by a company of medium tanks.

had withdrawn the bulk of his troops. Early in the morning the division renewed the attack, brushed aside a delaying force, and pursued the enemy. Large columns of troops and vehicles were caught on the roads leading out of the sector. By nightfall demoralization and complete disorganization prevailed among the enemy forces. German soldiers roamed over the entire area in small groups attempting to escape. Homburg, the divisional objective, was taken by the 179th Infantry which had advanced up the Blies River against weak enemy resistance. The serious plight of enemy communications was evidenced by the panic-stricken troops who attempted to move east through the city after it was captured.

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Troops of the 157th Infantry, moving east of Homburg, found new spirit in a virtually unopposed advance and in the conviction that damage now inflicted "hurt the right people." Hundreds of German prisoners filed back to the rear for processing, some riding in crowded trucks while others walked. They surrendered in groups and in many instances appeared disappointed because advancing troops paid little attention to them. Straggling Germans, still wearing their grey-green uniforms, wandered aimlessly about, watching in dazed amazement the flood of troops, supplies, and equipment sweeping past them toward the west bank of the Rhine River.

On 21 March the 45th Division continued to mop-up the enemy. Elements of the Third Army which had been attacking southeast, cutting across the deep rear of enemy communications, were met. The division took 2,055 prisoners during the day. The 179th Infantry followed the advance of Combat Command A of the 6th Armored Division and reached the high ground north of Kaiserslautern. On the next day the division continued east to the Rhine.

Farther east on the right flank of the 45th Division and on the same day, 20 March, the 3rd Division had broken through the Siegfried Line southeast of Zweibruecken. Careful engineering preparations had been made for the assault. Companies A and B of the 10th Combat Engineer Battalion had been attached respectively to the 7th and 15th Infantry Regiments. Each engineer company was organized so that two platoons would serve as demolition squads and one platoon would be prepared for gapping missions. Company C was to destroy pillboxes that were passed in the advance. A supply of bangalore torpedoes, 40 and 10 pound cone charges, TNT, and mines was accumulated for the assault. At 0545 hours on 18 March, following a 25,000 round artillery preparation, the 7th and 15th Regiments had jumped off in the attack. The 7th Infantry on the left made slow progress against enemy pillboxes and fortifications. The 15th Infantry on the right met furious resistance, as it endeavored to penetrate the dragon's teeth. By noon on 19 March the 2nd Battalion of the 15th Infantry had reached a point 2,000 yards southeast of Contwig. Hundreds of mines hampered the advance. Every bridge in the area had been blown.

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Both the air corps and artillery pounded positions, as various branches of the service assisted the attacking infantrymen. Engineers cleared gaps. Tank destroyers supported the infantry by direct fire.



DESTROYED ENEMY FORTIFICATION

completely destroying many small pillboxes and machine gun emplacements

completely destroying many small pillboxes and machine gun emplacements. To effect penetration of larger pillboxes tank men used 76mm ammunition, alternating high-explosive and armor-piercing at the same point on the box. Fighting continued all night on 19 March, but on the following day the breakthrough was effected. The 30th Infantry passed through the other two regiments to enter the city of Zweibruecken. Bridges over the river flowing through the town were seized intact.

Captured Germans stated that they had little confidence in the Siegfried Line after they had a closeup view of it. Although the mission of the troops manning the pillboxes was to fight from the trenches around the emplacements, the majority withdrew inside at the first opportunity.

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Once inside, they developed claustrophobia. White phosphorous shells fired by American troops were effective against at least one pillbox. One of the Germans had shouted "gas" whereupon the entire crew left the pillbox and surrendered.

In the afternoon of 20 March the 6th Armored Division passed through the 3rd Division to exploit the breakthrough to the Rhine. The 30th Infantry was motorized and left Zweibruecken at 0700 hours on 22 March to follow the armored advance. As the momentum of the offensive increased, the toll of enemy materiel became tremendous. All units overran large quantities of guns, ammunition, explosives, and equipment. By midnight on 23 March the 3rd Division was assembled on the edge of the Rhine Plain south of Worms. XV Corps, with the 45th and 3rd Divisions on the west bank of the river, began to prepare for an immediate crossing of the Rhine.

#### The XV Corps Completes its Drive

On the right flank of the Seventh Army front the enemy held on to Siegfried defenses as long as possible to prevent his escape route across the Rhine from being sealed. The VI Corps, with the 42nd, the 103rd, the 36th Infantry Divisions, and Groupement Monsabert on the line from west to east, and with the 14th Armored Division in support, continued the offensive which had begun on 15 March.

Along the ridge of the Hardt or Low Vosges Mountains and on the corps left flank, the 42nd Division attempted to push through the Siegfried Line from Ludwigswinkel northeast toward Dahn. Attacks on 19 and 20 March made almost no progress under intense fire from Siegfried positions and against two heavy enemy counterattacks. On 20 March plans were drawn up for a new assault on the line.

The attack began at 1900 hours on 21 March when close air support planes dive bombed and strafed fortifications in front of the 222nd Infantry. This was followed by a half hour artillery preparation. The 222nd Infantry moved out against light opposition. Pillboxes on the first line were found to be unoccupied. The 242nd Infantry, attacking farther west, advanced at 0430 hours the next morning. By 1045 hours the regiment had entered the secondary defenses of the Siegfried Line.

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These were likewise found unoccupied. The attack now moved directly northeast, as the regiment reached out to take high ground north of Dahn. Dahn was cleared against light resistance by the 58th Tank Battalion, while the 232nd Infantry came up to take high ground south of the town. It was evident that the enemy had withdrawn in the sector of the 42nd Division. Teams were sent out to blow Siegfried pillboxes and to comb the area for the enemy hiding in the hills.

Clearing the eastern foothills of the Hardt Mountains in the meantime was the 103rd Division, which on 19 March had been in positions northwest of Wissembourg. Heavy fighting took place as the 411th and 409th Infantry Regiments reached out to the approaches to the Siegfried strongholds of Nieder Schlettenbach and Reisdorf. On 20 March, as leading elements began to penetrate defenses, enemy units withdrew in the night to high ground farther north. With air, artillery, and mortar support the 411th Regiment seized Nieder Schlettenbach, as the 409th Infantry continued to fire into the fortifications at Reisdorf. Late in the afternoon of 21 March, Task Force Rhine, formed from the 2nd Battalion of the 409th Infantry and units of the 761st Tank Battalion with the mission of exploiting any breakthrough and advancing in the direction of Landau-Germersheim, succeeded in forcing its way into Reisdorf.

The enemy in front of the 103rd Division began to show signs of disintegration and disorganization on 22 March. Prisoners disclosed that some units had been told to fight a delaying action until dusk and then retire to the Rhine for reorganization. Other units had been told to fight to the last man. Elements of the Third Army, meanwhile, were rapidly outflanking the last remaining Siegfried defenses, the 10th Armored Division driving south to Annweiler and threatening all enemy troops in the Landau sector. At the end of 22 March the 410th Infantry had captured Silz; and Task Force Rhine had reached Klingenmuenster, where contact was established with the 10th Armored Division. Enemy escape routes to Landau and the Rhine had been cut off. American artillery and the air corps pounded enemy columns northeast of Klingenmuenster, destroying hundreds of vehicles and at least 15 artillery pieces and five pieces of armor.

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On 23 March, enemy defenses continued to disintegrate so rapidly that contact was gained only at widely scattered points. By nightfall mass enemy surrender brought 1,321 prisoners to the 103rd Division during the one day. The next day 2,230 prisoners were taken in mopping-up activities. The 409th and 411th Regiments assembled in strategic locations north and south of Klingenmuenster to pick up enemy troops moving to the Rhineland from mountain passes.

Farther to the right on the VI Corps front the 36th Division on 19 March had been in heavy contact with Siegfried Line defenses in the Wissembourg Gap. Attacks launched during the next two days by the



SIEGFRIED LINE NEAR WISSEMBOURG GAP

36th Division had been in heavy contact with the Siegfried Line defenses in the Wissembourg Gap.

141st Infantry on the division right flank north of Kapsweyer were unsuccessful in the face of intense enemy fire. It was evident that the Siegfried Line was heavily concentrated and in great depth in the low flat land between the Bien Wald and the Hardt Mountains.

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Attacking northwest of Ober Otterbach on the division left flank, the 142nd Infantry on 20 March had pushed through the hills and had driven a wedge in the enemy lines. It forced its way on to Dorrenbach in a slugging match against pillboxes. On 21 March eight enemy strongpoints were overrun. All but two of the fortresses buttoned up and refused appeals to surrender that were called to them through open ports and air vents. Hand grenades, bazookas, and burning gasoline had little effect against the fortifications. There was no surrender until engineer and infantry teams detonated special explosive charges known as beehives on roofs, apertures, and at doorways. To add additional weight to the drive of the 142nd Regiment the 1st Battalion of the 143rd Infantry was moved up from its assembly at Wissembourg. Heavy resistance, machine gun fire from well concealed pillboxes, self-propelled fire, and pre-arranged artillery and nebelwerfer concentrations, made the advance slow. The battalion wedged its way forward, by-passing some enemy positions and destroying others which impeded its advance. On the morning of 22 March the battalion came up to the fortifications at Dorrenbach. Meanwhile, the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 143rd Infantry were being brought forward from Wissembourg to aid in the final assault.

At 0900 hours on 22 March the 2nd Battalion of the 143rd Infantry entered Dorrenbach and pushed on to cut the road into Bergzabern and set up ambush stations in the woods. Preceded by a 30 minute artillery preparation firing high explosive and smoke shells against enemy strongpoints, the 3rd Battalion attacked towards Bergzabern. By dusk the entire regiment was closing in on the town. Enemy opposition was stubborn. By the close of the day the division had destroyed some 200 pillboxes.

The outer defenses of Bergzabern crumbled on 23 March, as the 143rd Infantry swept through the town and mopped up at dawn. During the same morning a provisional motorized task force was sent east of Bergzabern toward the Rhine, to trap enemy troops moving north from the French sector and to secure intact all floating equipment located in the 36th Division zone along the river. By the close of the day troops were mopping-up enemy groups in west bank towns on the Rhine. On

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24 March the 2nd Battalion of the 143rd Infantry seized Leimersheim, as the 3rd Battalion secured ferry sites and fanned out to establish outposts along the river. The 36th Division took 2,500 prisoners during the day. Its mission in the VI Corps drive through the Siegfried line had been accomplished.

The 14th Armored Division, which was to exploit any breakthrough in the VI Corps area, had directed its main effort along the Wissembourg-Steinfeld-Kandel highway, while other of its units supported the drives of divisions on the VI Corps left flank. By 20 March, Combat Command A had advanced to Steinfeld where it came up against the main defenses of the Siegfried Line. A 12-foot gap was blown in the dragon's teeth, and a hold was secured on the western portion of Steinfeld. The 68th Armored Infantry Battalion probed the Siegfried Line inside the first band of dragon's teeth. Patrols in the Bien Wald, south of Steinfeld, encountered extensive engineering obstacles on the roads. On 21 March Combat Commands A and R succeeded in taking two thirds of the town and in repelling three enemy counterattacks. On the next day Steinfeld was finally taken by the 68th Armored Infantry Battalion, as the 25th Tank Battalion, attacking northeast from Steinfeld, reached the western outskirts of Schaidt.

Meanwhile other elements of the 14th Armored Division were operating on the corps left flank. The 48th Tank Battalion had been ordered to support the advance of the 42nd Infantry Division between Ludwigswinkel and Dahn. On 22 March Combat Command B had prepared to move via Wissembourg to Klingenmuenster to exploit a breakthrough to the Rhine in the 103rd Division sector, and on the following day it had reached Herxheim east of Klingenmuenster against only scattered resistance. Here it met bunker fire, but by the end of the day elements of its armor had reached out to Germersheim. Also on 23 March Combat Command A, attacking at Schaidt, seized the town and began an exploitation to the east.

On the extreme right flank of VI Corps during the period 20-24 March Groupement Monsabert had been engaged in clearing out the Bien Wald. Its drive north had been impeded by many obstacles. Its main attack against the Siegfried Line on 23 March resulted in some

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advances but severe casualties. By late afternoon the enemy was disengaging. The weight of General Monsabert's tanks, attached from the 5th French Armored Division, followed the American route far on the left flank of the groupement via Steinfeld and Schaidt to Kandel. On 24 March French armor cleared Kandel and the towns of Rheinzabern and Neupfotz on the Erlen River. Late in the afternoon elements of the French armored division moved south along the Bien Wald in coordination with an attack to the north to reduce the enemy bridgehead at Maximiliansau. This was accomplished on 25 March.

By 25 March all three corps of the Seventh Army, in cooperation with the drive of the Third Army from the north, had completely overrun the triangle of the Saar-Palatinate. Not only had Germany lost an industrial region of great importance, but in a ten day campaign German troops which might have been used for defense on the east bank of the Rhine had been decimated. The Saar-Palatinate had been so quickly overrun that the German High Command had been forced to abandon both men and materiel.

#### Aftermath in the Palatinate

Troops penetrating the Palatinate found conditions "chaotic" in most of the cities. In Zweibruecken, taken by the 3rd Division, the entire business district was razed and practically all other parts of the city had suffered severe damage from bombing and artillery. About 5,000 of the normal population of 37,000 remained in the city, and they were hiding in cellars and caves. There was no water and the city was burning. The streets were filled with rubble and craters. All civic officials had fled and there was no government. Thousands of released prisoners and forced workers were streaming into the city.

Homburg, captured by the 45th Division, was in an even worse condition than Zweibruecken. Dead horses and human corpses were common throughout the business district. Fires still raged in the city. Wholesale looting and pillage was being carried on, and there were several minor riots.

Bad Durkheim, overrun by units of the XXI Corps, had been a wine and liquor center; and the problem of drunkenness was added to

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that of pillage and looting. Just prior to the occupation, the town had sustained a severe bombing, and it was estimated that over 400 civilian dead were buried in the town debris. The Bad Durkheim-Kaiserslautern road was littered with hundreds of dead horses.

Under supervision of the Army G-5, Military Government was set up as rapidly as the combat situation would permit. Teams operating at Army and Corps level screened burgomeisters and, if not acceptable due to Nazi affiliations, replaced them. For early control, orders were issued through available channels requiring all civilians to remain indoors, to display white flags, to turn in all weapons, and to report the presence of any soldiers. Anti-aircraft troops were brought in for security purposes and to halt looting. Captured foodstuffs were made available to feed displaced persons. Roadblocks played an important part in keeping military routes clear and in screening personnel. Civilians were organized into working parties to clear debris and dead bodies from the streets.

Now that Seventh Army had entered Germany proper, the responsibility for feeding, transporting and housing large numbers of displaced persons and recovered Allied prisoners of war posed problems which continued throughout the war. It would obviously be no simple matter to organize, properly care for, and eventually to repatriate the hordes of foreign workers brought into Germany by the Nazi State.

German civilians in general were found to be subdued and in a state of terror. It took about two days for them to regain their composure. "It was found", reports the 15th Infantry Journal, "that in towns where artillery has been fired prior to entry, the civilians are more cooperative than in towns which have been entered with no resistance." Another journal remarks that, "it is surprising to see with what willingness and eagerness German policemen strictly enforce American laws."

Throughout the Palatinate large numbers of German soldiers had changed to civilian clothes to avoid capture. To deal with this problem burgomeisters were informed that German soldiers must present themselves at the town hall at a specified time if they expected to be treated as prisoners of war. Others would be considered spies.

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In Volkssturm units few fanatics were found. Except in a few cases the Volkssturm had offered negligible resistance. They had received training during only one day a week, usually Sunday, and during some afternoons and evenings. Volkssturm personnel had been poorly equipped with a miscellany of weapons. Prisoners stated that they had to sign the following order by Hitler, "Any man who is captured without being wounded or having fought to the last, will be disgraced and his family will be cut off from all government support."

Disappointment was often expressed over the Siegfried defenses. Germans had been told that the line was strong enough to hold up any attacking forces. Men who saw the line talked of its poor construction, because of political corruption at the time the line was built. Men did not expect, for example, that machine gun turrets would be vulnerable to tank fire. Some prisoners justified the line's apparent weakness by saying that it had been built in the period 1936 to 1939 and since then assault weapons had improved.

The collapse of the Germans in the Palatinate was so nearly complete that it is significant to seek its causes. For the initial victories of D-Day General Patch emphasized the following factors: Tactical surprise, attack without artillery preparation, launching the attack during the hours of darkness, and withholding information relative to D-Day and H-Hour from division and lower commanders until the last possible moment.

The role of the Third Army in crossing the Moselle and striking the Wehrmacht where its defenses were weakest has already been mentioned. On 18 March the XX Corps driving from the west had reached Birkenfeld, north of St. Wendel. The XII Corps driving from the north had exploited an armored penetration to the south and was mopping up Bad Kreuznach. The VII Corps had captured three-quarters of Coblenz at the northeastern tip of the triangle. By 21 March XX Corps had captured Kaiserslautern and Neustadt and reached the Rhine River in the vicinity of Ludwigshafen. On 22 March Landau was reached by the 10th Armored Division which made contact with the 100th and 103rd Divisions. Speyer fell on 24 March. It is thus apparent that many of the

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original Seventh Army objectives were captured by Third Army, while Seventh Army was engaged in its assault on the Siegfried Line.

Excellent air support by the XII Tactical Air Command played a vital part in the sweeping victory. As the Commanding General of the 45th Division mentioned in a message to General Barcus, Commander of the XII Tactical Air Command:

It is difficult to describe the destruction which . . . fighter bombers have wrought. So intense has been the attack that scarcely a man made thing exists in our wake; it is even difficult to find buildings suitable for CP's; this is the scorched earth . . . The ground forces have come to think of the destruction of towns and the softening up of strong-points by bombing and strafing as a necessary part of any attack.

The German First and Seventh Armies had been defeated before but not quite so badly as in the debacle of the Saar-Palatinate. On 27 March prisoners alone numbered nearly 100,000 and were still coming in. No count was made of enemy losses in materiel, but it was estimated that the majority of his artillery had been left on the west side of the Rhine. Prior to the opening of the offensive, these two German armies controlled 23 divisions. In less than two weeks the enemy lost 75 to 80 percent of his infantry, and the majority of his divisions were left in staff or cadre form only.

Short of manpower, short of materiel, taken by surprise with its rear and right flank fatally exposed, the German First Army facing the American Seventh had but one brief stand to its credit. This was the short but stubborn defense of the Siegfried fortifications in the western Rhine Valley covering the escape routes across the river.

The two German armies liquidated were components of Army Group G. After the end of the war the commander of Army Group G, General Paul Hausser, was questioned by Seventh Army interrogators about his defeat. He blamed the disaster on the policy dictated to him from higher headquarters of holding and fighting to the last man. He said he appreciated the vulnerability of his position and his lack of troops in the Saar-Moselle sector, but his suggestion of shortening the line was rejected by a higher command. When the Remagen bridgehead was established, he recommended withdrawal to the Rhine. Again he was

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refused. In speaking of Hitler, General Hausser expressed the highest esteem for the Führer's abilities as a strategist — except that he was usually too late in ordering withdrawals. On 4 April General Hausser relinquished command of Army Group G. He felt that his release was "caused most likely by differences of opinion concerning the conduct of the defense."

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## CHAPTER XXVII

### *The Rhine Crossing*

The day after Seventh Army launched its offensive against the Siegfried Line a conference at SHAEF announced that plans were being made to drop the 13th Airborne Division just east of the Rhine and northeast of Worms prior to the crossing of the ground forces, with the mission of securing the east bank of the Rhine in the crossing area and protecting the flanks of the bridgehead. On 18 March, however, it was found that the 13th Airborne Division would not be available before 28 March. In a letter to General Haislip, Commanding the XV Corps, General Patch announced that XV Corps would definitely have available only four infantry divisions and one armored division for the bridgehead. Although the crossing site was more or less definitely fixed in the Worms area, to anticipate any contingency XXI Corps and VI Corps were directed to plan for a crossing in the Speyer-Germersheim area as an alternate thrust across the Rhine.

#### **Troops Move Into Position**

On 22 March the 3rd and 45th Infantry Divisions were ordered to halt the bulk of their troops west of the line Alzey-Gruenstadt-Wachenheim and reconnoiter for crossing sites. To prepare for the operation XV Corps was ordered on 23 March to relieve all Third Army units holding the west bank of the Rhine in its zone. This was accomplished by reserve regiments of the 3rd and 45th Infantry Divisions prepared for imminent attack. During the few days available, boat lists were revised and vehicle crossing priority lists prepared. Storm and



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assault boats were not yet available. Training was carried on by outlining the craft on the ground with engineer tape and assigning new men their proper positions in the boats in that manner. As the motor columns of the two engineer river crossing groups, each about 35 miles long, rumbled toward the Worms area, the infantry divisions inched forward toward the Rhine River, making their later moves under the cover of darkness as they approached the west bank.

The 45th Division had been assigned a zone on the left flank of XV Corps and on 23 March had given the 157th Infantry the mission of patrolling the west bank of the river in its zone. The 179th and the 180th Infantries as the assault regiments remained farther to the rear and carried on their training. Farther south the 3rd Division likewise employed the 15th Infantry for patrol activities, while the 7th and 30th Regiments prepared for the attack.

#### The Problem of the Weirs

It has been mentioned that Seventh Army's actual crossing was based on a revision of plans drawn up by Seventh Army in October of 1944. These plans included not only a scheme of maneuver and troop lists applicable in their main characteristics to nearly any portion of the Rhine, but also detailed engineer studies on the physical problems involved. Not the least interesting of these was the German capability of interfering with a crossing effort by tampering with dams upstream.

The power of the Rhine is harnessed by nine dams on the Rhine itself and on its tributaries. A manipulation of the weir gates or the total destruction of the dams would release approximately 6,240 million cubic feet of water to form a powerful German weapon of desperation that would sweep bridges from the Rhine and inundate Swiss, French, and German lowlands.

The possibility of an artificial flood to hamper operations had been first mentioned on 19 September in an engineer study which stated that the opening of the Rhine River power weirs at intervals of four or five hours would cause flood waves and endanger downstream bridges.

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Operation of the weir gates is undoubtedly under agreement between Germany and Switzerland, the engineer study concluded; and a diplomatic approach to Switzerland was therefore suggested by Seventh Army. Sixth Army Group recommended to SHAEF that, if enemy manipulation of the weirs could not be stopped, quick counter-measures by the Swiss could minimize the flood.

The Rhine crossing planning board had also touched on the problem when it reported:

Consideration should be given to the establishment of a flood warning system as far upstream as possible. This will entail coordination with French First Army or with agents in Switzerland. Should flood waves be created artificially the only hope of protecting the floating bridges is by breaking and securing them to the river banks. This would require considerable time.

In response to the Allied request G-2 of Seventh Army on 12 October was informed by the United States Military Attache in Switzerland that "... chances are favorable for positive action." Nevertheless, the problem of millions of tons of water behind German-controlled dams ready to sweep down the Rhine, wash out Seventh Army bridges, and strand assault troops on the far shore continued to cause concern. On 17 November it was suggested that power installations and dams on the Schwarzen River in the Black Forest be destroyed by bombing, unless the Swiss Government guaranteed absolute control of the weir gates to prevent their use to cause flood waves in the Rhine River. No action, however, was taken. At that time G-2 and G-3 were of the opinion that the Germans would not destroy the weirs because of their need for power.

Word was received on 18 November that the matter had been more satisfactorily negotiated through diplomatic channels when Brigadier General B. R. Legge, United States Military Attache, Berne, Switzerland, informed Seventh Army that indications were the Swiss Government would take necessary action to guard the weirs in the Rhine River between Lake Constance and Basel, Switzerland. During the fall of 1944 the dam at Kembs had been bombed by specially trained Royal Air Force crews which earlier had destroyed large dams in the Ruhr. The Kembs Dam had been breached and part of Alsace flooded.

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### Engineer Training for the Rhine Crossing

Because the wide, swift Rhine River presented previously unencountered engineer obstacles for both the assault phase and later bridging operations, the two previously mentioned river crossing schools for Seventh Army units at Dole and Camp De Valbonne had been established on 26 September. One battalion each, from the 40th Engineer Combat Regiment and the 540th Engineer Combat Regiment attended the nine-day course. The schools had trained engineers in the operation of assault and storm boats, the construction and operation of rafts and ferries, and the construction of ponton bridges. Results of their experiments in means of crossing personnel, vehicles, and supplies over a river approximating the conditions to be found at the Rhine River in the Seventh Army projected zone were now available.

The two types of craft to be employed to carry assault waves across the river were the storm boat, the spearhead of the assault because of its high speed, and the assault boat. Two companies of each engineer regiment were trained in storm and assault boat operation and in raft and ferry construction and operation, while a third company was trained in floating bridge construction. Storm and assault boat and ferry operators spent five days at Dole and four days in the swifter current school at Valbonne, and the bridging school was conducted entirely on the swift Rhine River.

Seventy-two two-man crews per battalion were trained in storm boat operation. Boatmen and motor operators received identical instruction, producing a total of 144 trained storm boat operators per battalion; and, in addition, 100 operators of 22-horsepower motors per battalion were trained for work with assault boats. Each motor operator and assistant received approximately 20 hours training in the water. The remaining men in the two companies studied the construction of rafts and worked as cable handlers and boatmen, and floating mine carriers.

When the schools had completed their mission, the Seventh Army had river crossing equipment and trained engineer personnel ready to force the Rhine River.

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### XV Corps Makes Final Preparations

XV Corps Field Order No. 23, issued at 2400 hours on 24-25 March, ordered the attack for which no D-Day or H-Hour had at that time been assigned. The 45th Division was to force a crossing of the Rhine north of Worms while the 3rd Division was to cross south of Worms. The initial objective of the divisions was to cut the Gernsheim-Mannheim railroad line with the Jaegersburger Wald and the Lorsche Wald as the second objective. Both divisions were to attack east into the Odenwald on corps order.

Follow-up troops to cross as soon as practicable after the assault divisions were the 63rd and 44th Infantry Divisions. On the left the 63rd Division was to attack in conjunction with the 45th Division on corps order, and the 44th Division on the right was given the same mission in the zone of the 3rd Division. The 106th Cavalry Group was later attached to the 3rd Division. The proposed air drop east of the Rhine was no longer considered necessary and was cancelled on 24 March.

By this time the Seventh Army zone west of the Rhine had been cleared of enemy except for a small pocket in the southwest portion of Ludwigshafen, which was being taken care of by XXI Corps troops, and isolated resistance in the VI Corps zone. During the night of 24-25 March the assault elements of XV Corps crept toward the Rhine until they were assembled two to three miles from the river. Conditions were such that regimental, and battalion, and many company commanders had been able to reconnoiter thoroughly the crossing sites on the near shore between 23 and 25 March. Liaison planes were employed in shifts allowing commanders of all echelons to view first hand the terrain over which they were to attack, although the enemy was sensitive and retaliated with heavy flak when the craft came within range. Cautiously, the near shore was investigated on foot.

From personal observation and from maps and G-2 data commanders determined that the Rhine in the selected area was approximately 1,000 feet wide, and 17 feet deep, flowing swiftly between revetted banks. The terrain on both shores is flat and sparsely wooded near the river. Therefore all concentration of personnel and equipment

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had to be accomplished during darkness. The Rhine Valley, densely populated, is crosshatched with roads which were thought capable of supporting the operation.

Paralleling the Rhine in the crossing area and some eight miles east of the river are the Odenwald Mountains, roughly 40 miles long and



RHINE RIVER NEAR BOBENHEIM, GERMANY

*approximately 1,000 feet wide, and 17 feet deep, flowing swiftly between  
revetted banks*

32 miles wide, rising sharply out of the Rhine Plain. An exploitation in the Worms area, although not hampered in its initial stages by the Odenwald, was threatened by its presence because the enemy possibly could make a stand there and contain the bridgehead. The Worms area had been selected not because of the advantageous terrain but because operations there and the Third Army bridgehead to the north would be mutually supporting.

No accurate diagnosis of the enemy strength opposing XV Corps on the far bank of the Rhine was possible. The utter confusion in

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which the German First and Seventh Armies of Army Group G had retreated before the west bank assaults of the American Seventh and Third Armies precluded any intelligent surmise of the units to oppose the bridgehead. It was probable that the Germans themselves did not at that time know their own order of battle. Remnants of 22 divisions were believed to have escaped across the river in the XV Corps zone, but the effective strength of the divisions could not be estimated. It was believed, however, that the average strength to oppose the initial assault would not be more than 50 men per river front kilometer. Based on experiences at Strasbourg and Colmar, it was believed that the enemy had no large guns permanently emplaced east of the Rhine and that the only enemy artillery support would come from organic division and corps artillery.

To oppose the Seventh Army bridgehead the enemy would probably make a determined but unsuccessful effort to resist the crossing. His opposition was likely to prove less a hindrance than the current, the river banks, and other technical difficulties. A first hand study of the far shore was made by the battalion commander of the 1st Battalion, 180th Infantry, who with three men paddled across the Rhine in a rubber boat at about 2400 hours on 24-25 March and reconnoitered for nearly half an hour after landing in the Altrhein Canal. The patrol found no mines, no wire, and no emplacements. Although the four men saw several enemy and were positive that they, in turn, were seen, they were not fired upon and returned safely. D-Day was announced as 26 March and H-Hour at 0230 by Operations Instructions No. 111, Seventh Army, on 25 March.

#### The Attack

Under a cloud-obscured moon that did little to relieve the darkness, engineers began preparation of the near shore approaches on the revetted banks of the wide, rapidly flowing Rhine River. Nervously alert, the enemy 1,000 feet across the stream heard activity in the 3rd Division zone; and engineers worked under steady mortar and artillery fire. Perhaps the enemy was especially jumpy because of two feints



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made across the Rhine in the Speyer-Germersheim area earlier in the evening.

Thirty-eight minutes before H-Hour the occasional crunch of an artillery shell deepened into a roar. All guns and howitzers in the 3rd Division zone, where surprise had already been lost to the alertness of the enemy, opened up to saturate the far shore with 12,000 rounds directed on known anti-aircraft artillery emplacements and possible defensive positions. The 45th Division, north of the 3rd Division had received no undue amount of enemy fire; and its guns remained silent to maintain the secrecy of the operation in that zone.

While the artillery preparation continued, the first wave of the five that were to make the assault moved from the assembly areas to the dark river, carrying storm boats or pulling them on small carts. At H-Hour the stillness that followed half an hour of artillery was broken by the roar of nearly 100 fifty-horsepower motors. With storm boats approximately 50 yards apart to allow maneuver room, the initial wave swept across in less than 30 seconds, each of four regiments making a bridgehead along a nine-mile stretch of the Rhine River. The 7th Infantry had jumped the gun, and one of its battalions made the crossing safely four minutes before H-Hour, taking advantage of the heavy artillery fire.

On the left of the bridgehead the 45th Division crossed with the 179th Infantry on the left near Hamm and the 180th Infantry in the vicinity of Rhein Durkheim. Both assault regiments came under flak, small arms, and scattered mortar fire on the water, and met strong initial resistance on the river bank from anti-aircraft guns, machine guns, and small arms fire. The crossing of the 180th Regiment seemed to come as a surprise to the enemy, and the first wave met relatively slight resistance on the water that stiffened as the troops swarmed ashore. The initial shock wore off rapidly, however; and nearly half the assault craft in subsequent waves were sunk in this zone by mortar, flak, and artillery fire.

Once on the river bank the two assault battalions of each regiment battled fiercely for a foothold and then began to fan out. All assault elements of the 179th Infantry were over and moving inland by 0315 hours. Resistance deteriorated rapidly; small towns in the bridgehead

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area offered opposition but were quickly flanked and subdued. The 3rd Battalion of the 180th Infantry met and overcame strong resistance in Biblis in front of the division objective. By 0800 hours the division had



LOADED WITH INFANTRY FIRST WAVE STORM BOATS LEAVE WEST BANK OF RHINE RIVER

With storm boats approximately 50 yards apart to allow maneuver room, the initial wave swept across in less than 30 seconds.

reached the railroad line and had begun its drive through the Jaegersburger Wald to the corps bridgehead line, the autobahn in the eastern edge of the woods. Early in the day the 179th Regiment secured contact with elements of the Third Army on the left, and the 180th Infantry made contact with northern elements of the 3rd Division after some difficulty. The 3rd Division had met stiff resistance before reaching that far inland. Overcoming blocks on the roads in the Jaegersburg Wald, the 45th Division had reached the corps bridgehead line across its entire front by 1720 hours, after the 180th Infantry had called on 24 planes to soften the strongly resisting town of Gros Hausen. At 1100 hours the

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157th Infantry, in reserve, had begun to cross and had closed on the far shore by 2000 hours.

The 3rd Division crossing, on the right of the Seventh Army bridgehead, was made to the shore line against slight opposition, which increased as the troops drove inland. The 30th Infantry on the left crossed near Worms against sporadic machine gun, flak, and mortar fire; and both assault battalions were over by 0300 hours, fanning out to secure the crossing site. Troops met opposition not only from 88mm anti-aircraft guns but from machine guns emplaced in fox-holes, and resistance increased as the division moved eastward. Advancing slowly, the 2nd Battalion on the left attacked Burstadt, where fierce fire from automatic weapons, tanks, and mortars met its assault. While American units were driving inland, enemy leaders had effected a semblance of organization among troops withdrawing from the overrun defenses of the river line. The Germans counterattacked Burstadt with armor and flak wagon support at 1027 hours. With bazookas, rifle grenades, and antitank guns, the 2nd Battalion turned the attack and knocked it out. Farther south at approximately 1200 hours the enemy used the same tactics against the 3rd Battalion as it battled for Lampertheim. The town was cleared after the counterattack was repulsed. During this time the 1st Battalion, in reserve, crossed, cleared snipers from the bridge sites, and took Bobstadt on the regimental left flank by encirclement.

To the right of the 30th Regiment, the 7th Infantry had crossed north of Mannheim against slight initial resistance. By 0340 hours both assault battalions were across; and the 1st Battalion on the right drove into Sandhofen, where it fought from house-to-house the remainder of the day against strong small arms and artillery fire. The 3rd Battalion met only slight resistance as it passed on the left of the regimental line to reach the railroad line. The 2nd Battalion crossed at 1100 hours and was committed to the fight in Sandhofen.

Meanwhile, fire from machine guns and anti-aircraft weapons on the island in the Rhine, midway between the two bridgeheads of the 3rd Division, hindered the work on bridges. Here enemy weapons fired across flat ground directly into both crossing sites. At 0900 hours the 3rd Battalion of the 15th Infantry crossed the Rhine and recrossed to clear

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


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the island by 1200 hours. By this time the remainder of the regiment had crossed the river and attacked in conjunction with the 7th Infantry toward the eastern edge of the Loracher Wald. By midnight of D-Day the 3rd Division was moving rapidly through the woods against slackening resistance toward the corps bridgehead line on the autobahn.

Opposition to the 45th Division operation had been moderately strong on the beach but had proved to be only a hard shell shielding a soft interior. The thrust inland was only lightly opposed once the shell had been pierced. Shortly after the initial penetration was made, guns firing into the crossing area were overrun; and the operation continued




A DD TANK ENTERS THE WATERS OF THE RHINE  
*"... All 14 DD tanks in the 45th Division zone crossed safely ..."*

with a minimum of difficulty. In the zone of the 3rd Division, however, the situation was reversed. Resistance on the banks of the river had been slight, testifying to the efficacy of 12,000 rounds of artillery; but tough pockets developed in the bridgehead area and by-passed enemy continued

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to fight after the division had taken its initial objective. Although smoke was available to both assault teams, only the 3rd Division chose to employ it. The 3rd Division crossing sites and bridges were smoked continuously for three days, beginning the morning of D-Day.

While assault elements were driving east, activity on the river went ahead under artillery fire that at times was intense. All 14 DD tanks in the 45th Division zone crossed safely, although those attached to the 179th Infantry were forced by muddy banks to cross farther south in the divisional zone. Ten of the 14 amphibious tanks assigned to the 3rd Division reached the far shore. No maneuver cable had been



MEN OF THE 540TH ENGINEER COMBAT GROUP BEGIN CONSTRUCTION OF TREADWAY BRIDGE ASSEMBLY

*Engineers in both assault zones began construction of floating bridges as soon as small arms fire ceased to harass the sites . . .*

constructed and the tanks crossed by "free float." Three sank as a result of enemy action in the zone of the 7th Infantry, and one was hit and destroyed on the far shore. Six tanks crossed in the zone of the 30th

Infantry, and one sank. All DD tanks were relieved on 27 March by armor which had crossed on bridges and rafts.

Engineers in both assault zones began construction of floating bridges as soon as small arms fire ceased to harass the sites. Under heavy artillery and mortar fire the 540th Engineer Combat Group supported the advance of the 3rd Division by constructing and operating two heavy ponton rafts and two infantry support rafts. By the end of the day on 26 March, the group had completed a 948 foot treadway bridge and a 1,040 foot heavy ponton bridge. The latter had been constructed in nine hours and 12 minutes. Badly needed transportation rolled across the



DUKW'S — GOING AND COMING

*"... Evacuation was by DUKW and ferry, as all bridges were one way . . ."*

two bridges. Two heavy ponton rafts and two infantry support rafts operated by the 40th Engineer Combat Group had supported the 45th Division. At the end of 26 March a heavy ponton bridge and a floating treadway bridge were nearing completion in that zone.

The first field artillery battalion crossed the river three and



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one half hours after H-Hour, and all artillery normally supporting the four assault regiments was across six hours later. During the first 24 hours of raft operation over 1,000 vehicles were ferried. Evacuation was by DUKW and ferry, as all bridges were one way. By 27 March it was believed that the enemy was making a break for the rear to establish a defensive line on the Main River. Resistance, even in the strongly defended 3rd Division zone, had become negligible except for scattered pockets. Both divisions exploited their successes by mounting troops on tanks and tank destroyers and on trucks to sweep into the Odenwald to overtake the retreating enemy before he had time to consolidate his defense. German trucks, captured the previous day, supplemented American vehicles which were being brought over the newly-built bridges.

The 45th Division continued its attack on 27 March to the northeast with three regiments abreast, one battalion of each in reserve, and moved ahead without significant hindrance. The enemy showed the effects of the mauling he had received, and the best opposition he could offer was mediocre small arms and machine gun fire in two towns. Elsewhere the division met only uncoordinated and disorganized attempts to delay its advance. The 157th Infantry on the left flank shot forward 16 miles and patrolled 11 miles farther to the Main River. The other two regiments made almost equally good progress.

On 27 March the 3rd Division also met sporadic resistance, as it expanded its bridgehead on the army right flank. During the day the enemy broke into by-passed Sandhofen, and the 7th Infantry was relieved here by the 44th Division. The forward elements of the 3rd Division, mounted on armor and trucks, advanced over multiple routes into the Odenwald, striving to catch the retreating enemy before he reached the Main River.

Because of the uncoordinated and rapidly deteriorating opposition, the bridgehead could be considered secure on 27 March, although the army bridgehead line had not been reached at all points. On 26 March 2,462 prisoners of war had been taken, and 1,369 were captured on the following day. Three American infantry divisions, one armored division, and many corps and army troops were safely across the Rhine River. The 44th Division on 27 March had secured without opposition

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the army right flank, and the 12th Armored Division had crossed on the same day.

Although an army bridgehead line had been designated, it proved to be only a mark on a map, for the army did not halt its advance there. Customarily, a unit making an amphibious operation fights to reach a bridgehead line which has been selected to give the greatest protection to the crossing area. Supplies and build-up troops are then crossed until sufficient force is available to launch a break-out attack. But this procedure was not followed in the Rhine operation; the opposition did not warrant a halt in the advance.

To oppose expansion of the bridgehead the Germans had only a miscellany of stop-gap units. Burden for defense fell on elements of more than 40 anti-aircraft battalions, who first used their guns as ground support weapons and then fought as infantry when the guns were destroyed. Service and guard units were also committed to support combat divisions, which were unable to provide more than 15 percent of the combat effectives met during the first few weeks east of the river. Immediately after the bridgehead was launched, the enemy's capabilities were rapidly coming to be based on Allied logistics. It was not believed that the enemy would divert troops from the northern fronts to stop the Seventh Army thrust, because the Ruhr area was so much more valuable to the enemy than the Frankfurt-Mannheim area.

The two remaining corps of Seventh Army crossed the Rhine over bridges in the XV Corps assault zone during the last days of March. The 63rd Infantry Division and the 10th Armored Division of XXI Corps were east of the Rhine by 29 March, and the 4th and 42nd Divisions crossed on the last day of the month. On 30 March VI Corps was ordered to cross the Rhine over the Worms and Mannheim bridges. The corps secured the east bank of the Rhine as far south as the Seventh Army right boundary with little enemy hindrance.

### Bridges and Troops

The long term logistical support of Seventh Army after a successful crossing of the Rhine River was the responsibility of the army engineer insofar as road and rail maintenance was concerned, and

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a long term bridge building plan was necessary. When a crossing of the Rhine had first been contemplated in the fall of 1944, plans for semi-permanent bridges had been drawn and submitted. Procurement of all supplies available locally was begun. Contracts were let to civilian firms for fir piling. Seventh Army engineers also hauled logs from the forest, supervised the operation of the mills, and moved timber from the mills to the railheads. During the six week period required to produce sufficient piling the daily output of the mills was increased approximately 500 percent.

Bridge designs were adapted to utilize prefabricated, drop-center, lattice girders for stringers which were produced in French civilian machine shops according to Seventh Army engineer specifications. Since November, plans, material, equipment, and troops were available to construct semi-permanent bridges across the Rhine.

Alerted on 26 March, the 343rd and 344th Engineer Regiments moved forward to begin construction of semi-permanent bridges. The first highway span, begun on D plus 3, was completed on D plus 13, a total construction time of ten days. It was a 1,043 foot, two-way Class 70, timber pile bent, steel stringer bridge built entirely of materials procured locally. Three hundred and forty piles and 280 lattice girders went into its construction, after materials had been moved from an assembly area 85 miles to the rear. As an interim measure between light floating bridges and fixed, semi-permanent bridges, construction of a Bailey bridge on barges had been approved on 19 March. Orders had been issued by Seventh Army that commanders were to secure intact all floating equipment including barges and tugs which could be found in their respective areas. The necessary craft had been located in aerial photographs. However, by the time the river had been reached and construction of the bridge was considered feasible, it was discovered that many of the barges had been sunk or damaged. It was at that time thought more profitable to utilize the smoldering remains of a German military bridge north of Mannheim. Work was begun on D plus 2 and completed on D plus 13, placing in commission an 820 foot, Bailey bridge built on the wreckage of the enemy span. The first railroad bridge was built at Mannheim, the second completed at Karlsruhe.

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During the period of the river crossing and the consolidation of its territorial gains Seventh Army was making the necessary adjustments in the composition of its corps and supporting troops. The advance had been so rapid since the breakthrough into the Saar-Palatinate that army planning had had to be flexible. On 26 March, as its troops crossed the Rhine, the Seventh Army command post closed at Sarreguemines and reopened at Kaiserslautern in Germany.

As early as 9 March it had been anticipated that the 4th Infantry Division and the 13th Armored Division would be added to Seventh Army troops for offensive operations in Germany. By 19 March the 4th Infantry Division commanded by Brigadier General Harold W. Blakely and composed of the 8th, 12th, and 22nd Infantry Regiments, had been directed to assemble and move to the VI Corps area. On 25 March VI Corps passed the 4th and 42nd Divisions to the control of XXI Corps and assumed control of the 71st and 100th Divisions together with the responsibility for the west bank of the Rhine River. Major General John B. Wogan commanding general of the 13th Armored Division had reported to Seventh Army Headquarters on 17 March. This division upon its arrival in the army area was placed in army reserve. In Operations Instructions No. 107 issued by Seventh Army on 24 March both the 70th Infantry and the 13th Armored Divisions were directed to continue army reserve missions. Two days later both



BRIGADIER GENERAL  
HAROLD W. BLAKELY  
...the 4th Infantry Division...



MAJOR GENERAL JOHN  
B. WOGAN  
...commanding general of the  
13th Armored Division...

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divisions were placed in SHAEF reserve to be employed with limitations by Seventh Army.

On 23 March the 6th Armored Division had been relieved of attachment to XV Corps and Seventh Army and was returned to the Third Army. At the same time the 12th Armored Division, which had served with the XX Corps of Third Army since 16 March, was returned to Seventh Army and attached to XXI Corps. These changes in assignment were restated on the following day to the same purpose. Two days later the 12th Armored Division was transferred from XXI to XV Corps and the 63rd Infantry Division from XV to XXI Corps. On 23 March the 10th Armored Division, which had formerly served with Seventh Army at the end of January and the beginning of February, had been attached to Seventh Army from Third Army for operational purposes only. Six days later XXI Corps had directed the 10th Armored Division to pass through elements of the 3rd and 44th Divisions east of the Rhine prepared to advance on corps order south of the Neckar River.

By the time it had established its bridgehead east of the Rhine Seventh Army had under its control ten infantry divisions, three armored divisions, and two cavalry groups which had been reallocated to the three corps under its command. Two divisions, the 13th Armored and the 70th Infantry, under army command as SHAEF reserve were to be used west of the Rhine on occupational duties. By 28 March XV Corps, with the 3rd, 45th, and 44th Infantry Divisions, with the 12th Armored Division and the 106th Cavalry Group, was advancing into the Odenwald beyond bridgehead lines. The XXI Corps, with the 4th, 42nd, and 63rd Infantry Divisions, with the 10th Armored Division and the 101st Cavalry Group, had started its movement across the Rhine prepared to advance on the right flank of XV Corps. The VI Corps, with the 36th, 71st, 100th, and 103rd Infantry Divisions and the 14th Armored Division, held the west bank of the Rhine and prepared to cross the river to its position on the extreme army right flank.

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## CHAPTER XXVIII

### *The April Offensive*

In the four weeks which followed the establishment of the bridgehead across the Rhine, that is, from 28 March to 23 April, Seventh Army drove rapidly and deeply into southern Germany: 120 miles northeast to clear the Hohe Rhon hill mass, 120 miles east as far as Nuremberg, and 100 miles southeast to the Danube. Most of the time it was a "blitzkrieg." The three corps followed the spearheads of three armored divisions, one of which penetrated so far into the enemy lines that it had to be resupplied by air. Some 20,000 Allied prisoners of war were liberated, as well as many thousands of forced European laborers.

Although the German army rallied from the confusion which the March campaign had created and managed to put up a series of bitter defenses, by the end of the period it was a broken army; and it fled without hope across the Danube toward Austria. During these four weeks it surrendered more than 120,000 men to Seventh Army, which was more than 40 percent of the total number of prisoners taken by Seventh Army in its 34 weeks of operations in France and Germany. By 25 April Seventh Army had taken since the invasion of southern France 291,866 German prisoners, a figure which includes 49,150 taken by the First French Army when it was under Seventh Army command, 3,692 taken by the 1st Airborne Task Force, 379 taken by the 1st Special Service Force prior to 15 September, and 3,765 taken by the 2nd French Armored Division from 29 September to 5 December.

When, on 28 March, the army launched its attack out of the bridgehead, it was opposed by an enemy who showed no signs of being able to brace himself for another stand. He had probably no more than



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6,000 combat effectives on the Seventh Army front and was apparently confused as to the exact location of all his units. It seemed impossible that the enemy could stop a thrust northeast from the bridgehead, for



MASS OF HUMANITY — AERIAL VIEW OF THE PW STOCKADE  
IN WORMS, GERMANY

by 25 April Seventh Army had taken since the invasion of southern France 291,866  
German prisoners . . .

that would mean diverting troops from the Ruhr, which he evidently intended to defend. Yet failure to stop such a thrust would further endanger the Ruhr, and it might lead to a separation of northern and southern Germany.

Facing Seventh Army's advance was the abrupt and heavily wooded western face of the Odenwald hills. The enemy could expect an attack northeast around the Odenwald toward Frankfurt, the Main Valley, and the Fulda Pass; or east through the Odenwald to the Main Plains; or southeast through the 30-mile wide valley, called the Kraichgau Gate, between the Odenwald and the Black Forest. Although during

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the early part of the period Seventh Army made its primary effort on the left through the Odenwald, still it believed that eventually it would find greater resistance and its primary mission to the southeast.



THE MAIN RIVER VALLEY

"... The enemy could expect an attack . . . toward Frankfurt and the Main Valley . . ."

On 25 March G-2 issued a "Study of the German National Redoubt" in which he estimated that the enemy would continue a defense of the area he now held, give ground or counterattack when necessary, and, when forced, abandon northern Germany and the Ruhr to retire to the Alps for a last stand. The enemy must realize, G-2 wrote, that the Alps as a redoubt center "is the only truly defensible area left to him." Troops from the eastern, Italian, and western fronts might find a way back to this most precipitously rugged terrain of all Europe. German communication lines would aid the withdrawal; the road and rail nets of southern Germany run generally north and south and a series of autobahnen or improved speedways run south to the Alps from

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Frankfurt, Heilbronn, and Nuremberg. It might be that the enemy was already preparing elaborate fortifications in the redoubt, storing materials, and coordinating plans for withdrawing some 200,000 to 300,000 loyal Nazi troops, who would fight there under the leadership of Hitler and Himmler, "to the last man."

The study went on to describe the outer defenses of that area presently held by the Germans in which the enemy would probably try to stand before withdrawing to the Alps. The outermost line ran east of the Rhine from the Swiss border up through the Black Forest, across the Kraichgau Valley, and then bent northeast through the hills of the Odenwald, the Spessart Mountains, and the Hohe Rhon. This was the German left flank. The right flank to be held against the Russian armies ran southeast from the meeting point of the Hohe Rhon hill mass and the Thuringer Wald, through the Thuringer Wald and the Franconian Alps. With the exception of the Kraichgau Valley the terrain favored the Germans.

If the left flank of this outer line should fail to hold, G-2 estimated that the enemy could fall back, pivoting on the Black Forest, to the Swabian Alps and the Franconian Heights. Between these first two lines there appeared to be little likelihood of a strong defense. Through the Kraichgau Gate Seventh Army could enter the relatively flat and open Neckar and Main Plains. Once across the Neckar and Main Rivers, it could probably advance rapidly; its chief obstacles would be lesser rivers, the Franconian Heights, and strategic cities.

On 31 March in Paris SHAEF stated that it expected Sixth Army Group to launch a strong offensive on its right toward the Redoubt Center, but only after the Ruhr pocket had been reduced and the German army in western and central Germany had been defeated. In the beginning, when the isolation of the Ruhr was still the main objective of Allied armies, Seventh Army was to make its main effort on the left, to relieve elements of Third Army south of the Main River, and to drive northeast to protect Third Army's right flank as far north as the Hohe Rhon. On 27 March Seventh Army had been warned that it might have to release one or two divisions to Twelfth Army Group, which had priority over Sixth Army Group, on SHAEF orders. From as far back

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as 11 March Seventh Army had expected to make its first main effort across the Rhine to the northeast; and on 29 March it issued its Field Order No. 11, which gave this mission to XV Corps. The Seventh Army direction of advance had swung from the north into the Palatinate, to the east, and again to the northeast. Reflecting changes in high level planning as a result of the siege and capture of the Ruhr farther north, Seventh Army's changes in direction were dictated by higher headquarters and necessitated numerous crossings and recrossings of both the Main and Neckar Rivers as Seventh Army divisions advanced.


#### The Drive to the Northeast

After the Rhine bridgehead had been secured, the XV Corps offensive had jumped off on 28 March. The 3rd and 45th Infantry Divisions attacked northeast toward the Hohe Rhon hill mass, while the 12th Armored Division passed through the right flank of the 3rd Division to clear the Odenwald. The 44th Division attacked south along the Rhine and across the Neckar River toward Mannheim and Heidelberg. On the right of the XV Corps point of advance the 12th Armored Division pushed through roadblocks and lightly defended towns as it advanced through the Odenwald. By 30 March the division had cleared the major portion of the mountains, and on 31 March it passed to the control of XXI Corps.

The 44th Infantry Division, ordered to drive south to expand the bridgehead, advanced on Mannheim from the north and northeast. The city fell easily. The acting burgomeister from a civilian phone called the division at the command post of the attached 937th Field Artillery Battalion during the afternoon of 28 March, saying that all German troops had left and that the city would surrender. Negotiations were carried forward, and a place and time were set for a meeting. But when the assistant commander of the 44th Division arrived on time at the designated place, he was met by a mortar barrage. The burgomeister, to maintain faith with the Americans with whom he still had intentions of dealing, had called a few minutes before time for the meeting with the information that the German soldiers had not left and that they would not let him surrender. The next morning the phone rang again and the

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burgomeister successfully capitulated, the German troops having withdrawn during the night. The city was occupied on 29 March. On 30 March the 44th Division was relieved by the 63rd Division of XXI



AERIAL VIEW OF MANNHEIM AFTER BOMBARDMENT

*"... advance on Mannheim from the north and northeast ..."*

Corps, which passed through it. The 44th Division then moved to the north flank of XV Corps in reserve and later reverted to Seventh Army reserve.

On the XV Corps left flank the 3rd and 45th Divisions advanced swiftly until they reached the Main River on 28-29 March. After clearing Woerth on 29 March the 30th Infantry crossed the Main and held a bridgehead, through which the 7th and 15th Infantries attacked the following day. On the left of the 3rd Division the 45th Division on 28 March reached and crossed the Main River over a railroad bridge which had been captured intact approximately a mile south of Aschaffenburg and plunged northeast into the Spessart Mountains.



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Although the actual crossing had been made by the 157th Infantry against little opposition, trouble developed with the enlargement of the bridgehead on 29 March. All three regiments, advancing



BATTERED RAILROAD YARDS AT ASCHAFFENBURG

Aschaffenburg, east of the Main River ... resisted the attack of the 157th Regiment furiously for six days ...

abreast, with the 157th, 179th and 180th from left to right, met the first genuine German stand east of the Rhine. Resistance, extremely strong on the left flank, tapered off toward the right; and the 180th Infantry was able to advance against only moderate opposition. The 179th Infantry in the center met strong small arms, mortar, and self-propelled artillery fire from dug-in positions generally east of the Main River and was forced to commit all three battalions to the advance. After a day's hard fighting this part of the enemy stand broke, and the regiment moved rapidly on.

On the division left flank the 157th Infantry fought from house-to-house in the vicinity of Aschaffenburg. Aschaffenburg east of the

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Main River between the Odenwald and the Spessart Mountains, resisted the attack of the 157th Regiment furiously for six days, while the other two regiments advanced 25 miles. The commander of the 157th Infantry had originally attempted to by-pass the city and to maneuver a portion of his forces to high ground to the northeast to form a pincers on the city; but fanatical resistance in Schweinheim, a southeastern suburb, frustrated the move temporarily. The regiment, as an alternative, battled into the city frontally. Because civilians without armbands fought as fiercely as did uniformed soldiers, the regiment was compelled to search every house as it advanced. Enemy reinforcements arrived steadily; many of them were 16 and 17 year old Nazis who refused to surrender and had to be killed in their foxholes and trenches.

Against this opposition the regiment kept punching deeper into the city and continued to fight its way to the east through Schweinheim, still intent upon reaching the commanding ground to the northeast of Aschaffenburg. On 30 March Schweinheim was cleared with bayonet and hand grenade, allowing the 1st Battalion to begin anew its drive to reach the hills. Pushing against continued, though weaker, resistance it succeeded in securing the commanding terrain on 1 April and so out-flanked the city.


Air missions in the meantime pounded the city. Supported by intense artillery preparations, the 2nd and 3rd Battalions continued their grim push deep into Aschaffenburg from the south. Heavily supplied with ammunition, the defenders on 31 March dropped between 1,300 and 1,500 mortar rounds on the attackers, in addition to artillery concentrations, shells from flak guns, and nebelwerfer fire. The enemy persistently infiltrated behind the advance, forcing the regiment to re-clear areas many times; counterattacks came daily and were repulsed with stiff fighting.

The 1st Battalion from the high ground in the northeast swung southwest into the city on 2 April and cut the enemy's last escape route. Continuing to inch forward through piles of rubble, the 2nd Battalion called upon self-propelled 155mm guns to batter buildings, and the two elements of the regiment pushed closer to each other. The battle continued intensely on 3 April until 0700 hours, when the commandant

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of the city, who had hanged several German soldiers and civilians for advocating surrender, sent a message that he no longer cared to resist. He surrendered himself at 0900 hours at the 2nd Battalion command post. The final mopping up was completed by 1300 hours.

In his first determined stand east of the Rhine River the enemy had employed elements of the 256th, 36th, and 416th Infantry Divisions, several miscellaneous battle groups, and fanatical civilians under the control of the garrison commander of the town. The defense had cost the enemy innumerable lives and had made a rubble heap of Aschaffenburg.

By nightfall on 3 April, the 157th Infantry had moved by truck from the smoking, battered city, to the east in division reserve. During the battle on its left flank the rest of the corps had continued its north-east drive against occasional roadblocks and had cleared the major portion of the Spessart Mountains. The withdrawing enemy offered only token opposition, and the time was believed to be ripe for an armored thrust to speed the movement into the Hohe Rhon hill mass. The 14th Armored Division, attached to XV Corps on 1 April, had been directed to attack from the vicinity of Darmstadt on the north flank of the corps to the northeast, to cross the Main River, and to advance through the 3rd and 45th Divisions over multiple routes to seize the high ground in the vicinity of Neustadt on the Saale River and Ostheim, then to conduct a reconnaissance to the line Ilmenau-Coburg-Bamberg, prepared to move east or southeast on corps order.

Combat Commands B and R crossed the Main and moved east of Aschaffenburg to take Lohr on the corps right flank on 3 April, while Combat Command A advanced northeast on the corps left flank. Combat Command B continued its advance against slight opposition and reached the western outskirts of Gemuenden on 4 April, where the enemy put up a determined fight. The 2nd Battalion of the 7th Infantry twice recrossed the Main River without enemy interference and on 5 April attacked Gemuenden from the southeast. The two forces, infantry and armor, met in the town and cleared it. By 6 April both Combat Commands B and R had fanned out on the right flank, where they made slow advances on 7 April. Meanwhile Combat Command A continued to advance to the northeast against sporadic resistance and on 7 April

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occupied one of the division objectives, Neustadt, on the Saale River, encountering only sniper fire.

The 45th and 3rd Infantry Divisions had continued to clear their mountainous zones, opposed only by occasional enemy strongpoints.



INFANTRY AWAITING TO ATTACK GEMUENDEN

*... on 5 April attacked Gemuenden from the southeast ...*


They experienced considerable difficulty, however, in moving over a road net limited at best, and now choked with supply trains and maintenance vehicles of the armored division. The terrain, mountainous and cut by steep valleys, was veined with rivers and streams where bridges had been blown by the retreating enemy.

The 14th Armored Division was ordered to clear all roads by 0600 hours on 8 April to allow the 3rd and 45th Divisions to pass through the front lines. With the removal of the armored columns which had monopolized the narrow trails, the infantry divisions surged ahead to reach the central portion of the Hohe Rhon hills, cleared it by 9 April,



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and mopped up by-passed enemy in rear areas. XV Corps had completed its mission. It had cleared the Hohe Rhon hill mass except for the small northeastern tip in the Third Army zone, and it had maneuvered into position to attack to the southeast in a zone assigned to it on 4 April. While waiting for Third Army on the left to push off, the divisions and the corps cavalry reconnoitered to the southeast on 10 April. XV Corps was now poised for an assault toward Nuremberg.

At the same time that XV Corps was attacking northeast through the Spessart Mountains, XXI Corps assumed command of the zone on its right. The 12th Armored Division in the Odenwald, which had passed to XXI Corps on 31 March, attacked to the east, followed by the 42nd Infantry Division on the left and the 4th Infantry Division on the right. The corps objective, as assigned by Seventh Army, was the Wuerzburg-Schweinfurt-Kitzingen area on the great bend of the Main River south of the Hohe Rhon Mountains. To reach this objective the corps moved without much difficulty through the low eastern foothills of the Odenwald. As it approached its objective, opposition stiffened and became consolidated.

The first seriously contested enemy strongpoint to be met by XXI Corps east of the Rhine was Wuerzburg, a large, densely populated, and much bombed city on the northeast bank of the Main. To take this city the 42nd Division crossed the Main River and launched a frontal assault directly into the built-up area. The initial crossing was made by surprise in two canoes the morning of 3 April by elements of the 2nd Battalion, 222nd Infantry, and was immediately followed by the entire battalion in small river craft and assault boats. The battalion hewed out a 42-block bridgehead in the city, which was further exploited by the remainder of the regiment and by the 232nd Infantry.

While the 242nd Infantry patrolled the banks of the Main River ten miles northwest of Wuerzburg, the 222nd and 232nd Infantries methodically wiped out resistance in the city. The 222nd Regiment pushed off to the south from its bridgehead and with excellent artillery support drove the strongly resisting enemy from block to block. The 232nd Infantry pushed north out of the bridgehead, supported by tank

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destroyers on the west bank of the river and by artillery, then turned to the east. Civilians, city police, and firemen joined enemy soldiers in defense of the battered buildings, retreating to tunnels when overrun



INFANTRYMEN MOVING THROUGH RUBBLE OF WUERZBURG

*With excellent artillery support drove the strongly resisting enemy from block to block.*

and reappearing again in the rear of attacking forces, utilizing bomb shattered buildings and rubble piles as defenses.

While the attack was in progress two bridges were thrown across the Main River, and the supporting armor of the 42nd Division crossed to hasten the end of the battle. The final spasm of resistance before all defenders had been killed or captured was a 200-man counter-attack launched the morning of 5 April from the northern section of the city. It reached to within 100 yards of the northern bridge before it was snuffed out by the 232nd Infantry. There was no mass surrender. The city of Wuerzburg fell on 5 April after the last defender had been liquidated.



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Originally the XXI Corps plan had been for the 42nd Division to assume the main effort in the reduction of Schweinfurt, northeast of Wuerzburg, with the assistance of one combat command of the 12th Armored Division; and on 3 April Combat Command A was ordered to attack on the Wuerzburg-Schweinfurt axis with that mission. This plan, however, was changed because of the strong opposition met by the infantry in Wuerzburg and the realization that several days must elapse before the 42nd Division would be in a position to concentrate on Schweinfurt. Accordingly Combat Command A alone was given Schweinfurt as its objective and was ordered to swing southeast of Wuerzburg, by-pass that city, and attack toward Schweinfurt.

Exceedingly strong defenses and delaying actions throughout the area between Wuerzburg and Schweinfurt, however, delayed the swing of armor to the northeast, and the day after the fall of Wuerzburg elements of the 42nd Division overtook the armored attack. With infantry now available, strategy was again changed on 7 April and Combat Command A was attached to the 42nd Division for the attack against Schweinfurt. The ball-bearing manufacturing center of Schweinfurt lies on a bend of the Main River where it begins a long sweep to the southeast before turning north again to Wuerzburg. The strategy of attack called for a bridgehead to be established across the Main below Schweinfurt, and a subsequent advance northeast along both banks of the river. The objective of the attack on the west bank was to secure the dominating ground north of Schweinfurt and the city itself, while the attack on the east bank, when it had reached a position to recross the Main River, was to cut the Bamberg-Schweinfurt highway.

The 222nd Infantry, with some difficulty, established a bridgehead across the Main River some 15 miles south of Schweinfurt on 7 April, while the other two regiments attacked northeast into stiffening resistance. To carry out the maneuver west of the river the 232nd Infantry on the left made a wide sweep into the XV Corps zone and then swung south to take the high ground overlooking Schweinfurt from the north. Meanwhile, the 242nd Infantry attacked along the west bank of the Main, then moved north in a smaller circle inside the large envelopment of the 232nd Infantry. The 222nd Regiment, after its bridge-

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head had been exploited by armor, pulled back and took up the attack on the river's west bank. On 9 April Combat Command A had crossed the Main River at the point of the 222nd Infantry bridgehead to attack northeast to cut the Schweinfurt-Bamberg highway.

As the city had been an important manufacturing center and a target for air raids, it was strongly defended by anti-aircraft guns, which were now turned on the ground attackers. Each small town in the path of the 42nd Division was held as a fortress, and hills and wooded areas were stubbornly defended. Youths not more than 17 years old fanatically contested each inch of ground, as the division moved day and night to positions from which to attack the city.


The push into the city itself, however, was no more strongly contested than had been the moves of the division as it shifted into position. When high ground above the city had been taken, all three regiments on 11 April drove into Schweinfurt from the north and west. On the next day the city fell. It had been pounded day after day by flights of medium bombers and by division artillery and the artillery of two corps, with XV Corps guns and howitzers in the north complementing those of XXI Corps. Farther east, Combat Command A cut the Schweinfurt-Bamberg highway on 12 April, too late effectively to seal it off as an escape route.

The boundary of XXI Corps had been changed on 6 April to bend the attack to the southeast inside the turn made by XV Corps, in accord with the general plan of Seventh Army to attack to the southeast. The corps swung the turn after taking Schweinfurt, generally keeping abreast of the right flank of XV Corps. By 14 April it had advanced to the Aisch River, where a nebulous German line was reported to be developing.

Pulling the pivot of the turn on the XXI Corps right flank was the 4th Infantry Division, which had met stiff opposition as it moved slowly to allow the outer elements of the corps to wheel to the southeast. While the corps main effort was being directed against Wuerzburg and Schweinfurt, the 4th Division and two combat commands of the 12th Armored Division had encountered determined resistance on the corps right flank in the Koenigshofen-Ochsenfurt area. One of the columns



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of Combat Command R met considerable opposition when it bridged the Main River at the bottom of its southern loop at Ochsenfurt on 1 April. Another column was prevented by a counterattack from entering the Tauber River town of Koenigshofen on the corps right rear until 2 April.

The 4th Infantry Division finally cleared Koenigshofen with two regiments on 6 April. The remaining regiment crossed the Main in the Ochsenfurt bridgehead and aided the 12th Armored Division in clearing by-passed enemy from the pocket formed by the loop of the Main River as it swings from Kitzingen to Wuerzburg. On 7 April elements of the 4th Division took Bad Mergentheim. After 7 April the corps right flank moved slowly southeast, marking time to pull the pivot for the remainder of the corps.

#### The Expansion of the Bridgehead in the South

While the XV and XXI Corps attacked northeastward on the army left flank, the VI Corps attacked southeastward on the right through the Krichgau Gate. On the army right flank the First French Army crossed the Rhine near Speyer to attack southward into the Black Forest. SHAEF had ordered Sixth Army Group to make a strong secondary effort on its right for the purpose of protecting the northeast drive of XV and XXI Corps and as a preparation for the eventual blow in force to be struck to the south. Once the Ruhr had been reduced and more forces were available to Seventh Army, it was expected that a powerful blow would be struck by Sixth Army Group to cut off the German Nineteenth Army in the Black Forest and to drive rapidly south toward the Redoubt Center.

On 31 March the 100th Division of VI Corps crossed the Rhine near Mannheim. On 1 April the 10th Armored and 63rd Divisions joined the corps; and the attack jumped off along both sides of the Neckar River, the weight of the attack to the southeast. The city of Heidelberg surrendered without a fight. Spearheaded by the 10th Armored Division, which was followed on the left by the 63rd and on the right by the 100th Division, the corps made rapid progress for three days against only

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isolated and small, although sometimes stubborn, delaying parties. Three combat commands led the advance.

On the corps left flank Combat Command R and reconnaissance troops drove through the hills of the lower Odenwald up the Neckar River Valley to the vicinity of Mosbach some 15 miles above Heilbronn. They then turned southeast and against resistance that grew markedly stiffer approached on 2 and 3 April the Jagst River, which flows into the Neckar from the northeast seven miles north of Heilbronn. They found all bridges blown as they reconnoitered the river from its confluence with the Neckar some 40 miles to the northeast. Part of Combat Command R blocked in the northeast while the cavalry maintained contact with the enemy on the high southern bank by observation.

The 63rd Division had followed Combat Command R. Although it too ran into increasingly stubborn delaying parties as it moved through the Neckar Valley, it cleared them up and spread its three regiments along the north bank of the Jagst. By 4 April it had secured the country north of the river as far as Bad Mergentheim and the bend of the Jagst at Dorzbach. Heilbronn was outflanked on the north, and the forces of XXI Corps battering at the Tauber River defenses were supported on their right. The 63rd Division was ready to attack across the Jagst to the southeast.

While this maneuver on the corps left flank had been progressing, in the corps center, Combat Command A of the 10th Armored Division, followed by elements of the 100th Division, had been driving straight from Heidelberg toward Heilbronn. This force also met increasing resistance on 2 and 3 April, as it once again came up to the Neckar River where it flows from south to north before turning west through the Odenwald. But by the night of 3 April it had cleared enough of the western bank before Heilbronn to plan a crossing to take the city on the following day.

On the corps right flank Combat Command B, followed by the 399th Infantry of the 100th Division, had driven south along the Rhine. As it approached Bruchsal on 2 April, it was heavily counterattacked by infantry and armor. It repelled the enemy, took 300 prisoners, and swung east to come up to the Neckar just south of Heilbronn. On the VI

Corps right flank were elements of the II French Corps. On 5 April one team of Combat Command B made a contact with forward elements of the French near Lauffen, a town on the Neckar five miles south of Heilbronn, where both forces were looking for an intact bridge.

The French had been ordered to send a corps across the Rhine in the Speyer area, to drive south between the Neckar and the Rhine, to seize Karlsruhe, Pforzheim, and Stuttgart. General de Lattre took advantage of the fact that German forces were being pulled out of defensive positions along the Rhine to meet the threat of the imminent VI Corps advance, and crossed on the morning of 31 March to take by surprise what few Germans remained in the area. The main force immediately began the southern drive, while one column drove eastward to the Neckar to protect the VI Corps right flank. Now with forces up against the Neckar and Jagst Rivers at the Heilbronn arc, it was planned that, while the French attacked southward, VI Corps would cross both rivers and drive swiftly southeast.

So far the going had been fast and comparatively easy, similar in pace to the northeast drive of XV Corps. Against delaying parties in towns, and against demolitions, roadblocks, and minefields, VI Corps had moved so fast that the infantry divisions were pressed to keep up with the armored division. All infantry divisions in Seventh Army during the month of April were forced to regard mobility of troops as their major problem. In the 63rd Division, for example, under conditions of rapid advance one battalion from each regiment in contact was motorized and sent forward to maintain the pursuit. The other battalions advanced on foot, mopping-up and consolidating by-passed areas. Motorized battalions were transported not only in organic vehicles but in trucks borrowed from division artillery. Tanks of the attached armored units also carried infantrymen at the head of motorized columns during relatively uncontested advances.

Maintenance of communications was also difficult. Often it was impracticable to lay wire. Consequently most messages were sent by radio, and to handle the increased volume of radio traffic a special priority system was developed. Frequently during the month of April, advancing columns were stopped at rivers where the bridges had been



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blown, and it was necessary to ferry foot troops across in assault boats. They then established a large enough bridgehead to protect the engineers who were putting in bridges, after which armor crossed and the column continued to press forward. Many times the advance was so rapid that lead infantry as well as armored units by-passed enemy strongpoints, leaving them for later elements to mop up. During the first days of April, the Seventh Army front had had a mushroom growth east of the Rhine. On 2 April the army command post opened at Darmstadt east of the river.

### The Enemy Rallies

This rapid advance was, on the VI Corps front, brought to a sudden halt on 4 April. The enemy reformed and built up a strong crescent-shaped defense line, which ran from its anchor at Heilbronn north along the Neckar, then northeast along the Jagst to its southward bend. This the enemy managed to do in spite of the shattered condition of his units, his acute need for more troops, and the diminished power of both artillery and air force.

During the first seven days of the advance from the bridgehead, 28 March to 3 April, the enemy had failed to put up more than isolated delaying actions; and only a few of these had shown signs of strength. His armies were apparently unable to coordinate their forces to establish a line. The German Nineteenth Army in the Siegfried Line along the Rhine and in the Black Forest was threatened with being outflanked by the French and American drive. It had, it was estimated, only 10,500 combat effectives available. The German Seventh Army was falling back in confusion before the attack of the American Third Army and the XV Corps; its combat strength was estimated at only 4,000. Facing VI and XXI Corps was the German First Army with an estimated 7,500 combat effectives. Drastically weakened, each of these armies needed replacements at a time when the highest priority for reserves went to the eastern front, and when it was impossible to extricate divisions from the now practically encircled Ruhr.

The enemy was forced to improvise and make economical use of what divisional strength he had and what replacements were available

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in southern Germany. The replacement and training camps were combed for men, as was every other available source: induction center detachments, barrage balloon battalions, maintenance groups, horse pack companies, air signal regiments, airport general detachments, labor battalions, and the Volkssturm. These men were thrown into already organized divisions or were placed in battle groups, which were given temporary missions, then perhaps to be disbanded. Survivors of one operation might turn up as stragglers at the next point to be defended; there they would be reorganized into a new battle group named after the officer in command. Besides remnants of divisional units and these small battle groups, ranging from company to battalion size, the German army also organized several quickly-formed name divisions: Divisions Alpen, and later, Donau and Bayern. These were simply large battle groups, given names for morale purposes, and as quickly formed and disbanded as their smaller counterparts. With such forces the enemy formed his defense line on the Jagst and Neckar Rivers.

The enemy made as economical a use of his remaining armor and artillery and air power as he did of his manpower. Small groups of tanks appeared at the most heavily defended strongpoints, after the infantry and artillery had checked the American advance. With his artillery the enemy chose to defend only certain sensitive areas. For close-in support he used light pieces, anti-aircraft guns, and nebelwerfers firing on infantry. The Panzerfaust, or German bazooka, was distributed widely and sometimes seemed as common as the machine pistol. During the period from 2 to 8 April the German air effort was "greater than anything that the Army has seen since its entry into France," according to Seventh Army intelligence. Thirty-three missions were flown by German aircraft against carefully selected targets. Possible explanation for this rejuvenation of the Luftwaffe was that the German High Command preferred to expend its planes and its available fuel rather than to have them captured or destroyed. This seemed to be the only alternative.

It had been expected that the German leaders in the last days of the war would resort to terror to keep their war-weary people in line and to harass the advancing Allied forces in the rear. In Lohr on the

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Main River, an area taken over by XXI Corps, SS men hanged six of the town's most influential citizens, whom they suspected of "defeatism." There was, however, some evidence of German opposition to the terrorists. In Ansbach, southeast of Lohr, a copy of the following leaflet was found on a man who had been hanged in the square:

Citizens of Ansbach,

Defense of the city spells your complete destruction. Our city is one of the few places in the Reich which is relatively not destroyed. We want to keep it for ourselves. Resistance cannot halt the Americans; it can bring our doom. Put aside the tank obstacles; hinder the defense. Let us save the city and life for ourselves and Germany.

In many towns the terrorists were able to keep the civilian population under control, but only for short periods of time. On the night of 1 April the German radio had summoned all German men, women, and children to become "Werewolves", to sabotage the Allied armies and murder its soldiers, and to wreak vengeance on defeatist Germans. But except for a few initial acts, the Werewolf threat came to nothing more than propaganda.

In spite of the weakness of its entire defensive structure, the German command during the early days of April was able to establish defensive positions that resembled a coordinated front line. Because the German leaders were especially sensitive to the threat poised against Bavaria and Upper Austria, which now constituted the larger part of the dwindling Reich, it was in the zone of the German First Army that they concentrated their efforts to reform a front. In the XXI Corps zone the formation of a line was slower and less successful than in the VI Corps zone, where the German 246th, 198th, and 553rd Divisions, elements of the 17th SS Division and the 2nd Mountain Division, and numerous miscellaneous battle groups were dug in as early as 4 April. Together they stopped the VI Corps advance for nine days. The defensive positions of these German units did not form a gapless line, but rather a series of coordinated strongpoints that ran from their anchor in the city of Heilbronn north along the Neckar River, then northeast along the high and rugged southern bank of the Jagst River. They extended more than 40



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miles to the bend of the Jagst at Dorzbach and beyond to elements of the German 9th Division which were fighting the 4th Division of XXI Corps at the Tauber River.

On 4 April Sixth Army Group issued a directive which ordered that the main bridgehead forces of its armies were not to advance beyond the line Karlsruhe-Heilbronn-Kitzingen-Schweinfurt-Koenigshofen-Meiningen until such time as those orders might be changed. Beyond this line only ground reconnaissance would be pushed. The directive had this significance: the XV and XXI Corps would advance only in their support of Third Army; and VI Corps, although it would continue to press its immediate attacks, would not as yet make its anticipated assault in force to the south, for adequate forces were not as yet available.

#### The VI Corps Attack at the Neckar and Jagst Rivers

VI Corps had not anticipated a long delay at the Neckar and Jagst Rivers. On 3 April it issued orders for the 10th Armored Division and the 100th Division to seize Heilbronn and continue east. One battalion of the 100th Division, the 3rd Battalion of the 398th Infantry, was temporarily attached to Combat Command A to assist it in the capture of Heilbronn.

Heilbronn lies on the eastern bank of the Neckar, doubly protected by a high ridge of hills on its eastern outskirts and by the river, on which all bridges had been blown. Before daylight on 4 April the 3rd Battalion of the 398th Regiment crossed the river in assault boats, two miles north of Heilbronn, with orders to seize the factory district, which forms the northern half of the city, and the hills in the east. When the bridgehead was large enough, a treadway bridge was to be built over the river for the supporting armor. At first the battalion attack went smoothly, apparently taking the enemy by surprise. But at 0900 hours, when at least a battalion of enemy infantry suddenly counterattacked the 3rd Battalion from the north, the east, and the south, it became sharply clear that the enemy meant to make a strong defense of Heilbronn. The 3rd Battalion was thrown back with heavy losses, and only with great effort managed to attack again to establish a

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line 1,000 yards from the river. Two platoons were cut off and captured in the German counterattack, one in the factory district and one on the hill to the east. The hills remained firmly in German hands.




RESULTS OF AERIAL ATTACK ON HEILBRONN

*Heilbronn lies on the eastern bank of the Neckar*

Now that the strength of the enemy forces was revealed, VI Corps changed its plans. The 100th Division, as a unit, was to take Heilbronn, while the weight of the 10th Armored Division was to swing northeast, pass in the rear of the 63rd Division's Jagst River lines, and then drive southeast 25 miles between the Jagst and Tauber Rivers to Crailsheim. Once Crailsheim had fallen, the 10th Armored Division was to cut back west to deliver a supporting attack at the rear of Heilbronn and to pocket the enemy forces resisting the 63rd Division. Thus VI Corps became engaged in a three-part operation: one infantry division attacking Heilbronn, another hammering at the Jagst line, while the 10th Armored Division made a wide and daring hook to support them both.

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From 4 to 8 April the attack against Heilbronn made slow and bitter progress. Every morning before dawn the Germans counter-attacked the slowly expanding bridgehead of the 100th Division. The



HEILBRONN - AN IMPORTANT RAIL COMMUNICATIONS TOWN

*Two platoons were cut off and captured . . . one in the factory district and one on the hill to the east . . .*

2nd Battalion of the 397th Infantry crossed the Neckar in assault boats on the afternoon of 4 April to attack south into the factory district on the right flank of the 3rd Battalion, 398th Regiment. Its first attack that night was driven back with heavy losses. The following morning division mortar fire drove 37 fourteen to seventeen year old Hitler Jugend soldiers out of the northern edge of the factory district to surrender. They came running and screaming, fired at by their officers, broken in nerve. Throughout the nine days of the bitter house-to-house fighting in Heilbronn, the 100th Division encountered many of the Hitler Jugend, who had been in training in the city and had been organized into battle groups. For a time they fought savagely, then broke under the strain.

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On the afternoon of 5 April, the 3rd Battalion of the 397th Infantry also crossed the river. After a heavy artillery preparation the two battalions of the 397th Infantry attacked the factory district. During the next three days, while the 3rd Battalion of the 398th Regiment held in the north, these two battalions advanced 1,500 yards to the south, crossing railroad yards and open fields to secure buildings which out-flanked enemy strongpoints and then assaulting these strongpoints. After each assault the enemy managed to reform battle groups for renewed defense. The four American companies leading the attack had no heavy direct fire support and no armor, because enemy artillery directed from the hills had prevented the construction of a bridge over the Neckar and had destroyed one completed ferry. Two DD tanks floundered on the river banks as they tried to cross.

On 3 April, it was decided that the current attack would not reduce Heilbronn quickly enough, and a plan was devised to establish a second bridgehead in the southern part of the city, to expand both bridgeheads, and to join them in a pincers. The 1st Battalion of the 397th Infantry crossed the river two miles to the south in assault boats on the night of 5 April and on the following day began to attack north into the heart of the city and east toward the residential section. The enemy defended from cellars of bombed-out houses and piles of rubble. He launched small counterattacks with four heavy tanks, which retreated after each sally. Air-directed artillery knocked out two of them on 6 April. The bridgehead expanded gradually to the east. Company A was harassed by counterattacks and unable to move ahead in its attempt to join the northern bridgehead. Assault troops still had no armored support. On the afternoon of 7 April, German artillery scored a direct hit on the treadway bridge which the 31st Engineer Battalion had almost put over to the southern bridgehead. Enemy replacements came in as fast as prisoners were taken. Against an enemy force which never during the nine days of the battle dropped below about 1,000 men the 100th Division continued the fight with two isolated, slowly expanding bridgeheads.

The supporting operation of the 10th Armored Division made initially much better progress. The area between Bad Mergentheim

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and the Jagst River had been cleared by the 254th Infantry of the 63rd Division and the 90th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron. Two days after leaving the 100th Division near Heilbronn, Combat Command A had passed through this area and had driven, against surprisingly little opposition, 30 miles southeast to Crailsheim, which it entered on 7 April against only scattered and disorganized small arms fire. Combat Command R blocked the shoulder of the thrust in the Mergentheim area, while one task force of Combat Command A held Crailsheim and two others attacked to the west in an attempt to carry out the division mission. On 7 and 8 April these two task forces advanced west of the Jagst River approximately 12 miles to Ilshofen and Kirchberd.

An enemy counterattack, again indicating concern over the threat to southern Germany, struck at the main supply route which ran down from Bad Mergentheim, some 30 miles to Crailsheim, and at Crailsheim itself. The main supply route was a secondary road which ran through the heavily wooded hills of the Franconian Heights. During the night of 6-7 April, strong German patrols infiltrated through the woods on both sides of the road which they cut temporarily at several points. It was necessary the next morning for the commander of Combat Command A to fly to Crailsheim to rejoin his organization. As Combat Command R moved south to Crailsheim, it was attacked at several points by patrols in the woods, firing panzerfaust and machine guns; and it was bombed and strafed by several German planes. On 8 April the corridor was definitely closed when the enemy succeeded in blocking it at two points. German planes and artillery continued to harass the road, and it was impossible to get either support or supplies through to Combat Command A.

On 8 April Combat Command B rejoined the 10th Armored Division from corps reserve. Together with the 90th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron it attempted to reopen the road. Clearing minefields and roadblocks and flushing the woods, it managed to get through to Crailsheim with supplies on the morning of 9 April. The enemy continued to infiltrate, to lay mines, and to harass clearing patrols. The 44th Division, which on 7 April had been transferred from XV Corps reserve to Seventh Army reserve was directed to send the 324th Regimental

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Combat Team to be attached to the 10th Armored Division. After coming into the line the 324th Infantry drove along the main supply route into Crailsheim, clearing the towns and the woods on either side. It engaged in heavy fighting against determined isolated groups of enemy.

By the night of 9 April the road was open but still threatened by ambush and it was necessary to resupply Combat Command A in Crailsheim by air. Sixty C-47's of the 441st Group, 50th Wing, 9th Troop Carrier Command, protected by fighters of the XII Tactical Air Command, landed on the captured airfield at Crailsheim between 1700 and 1900 hours that night delivering supplies and removing a large number of wounded. During the operation enemy planes dove in under the fighter cover to bomb and strafe the field. On the morning of 10 April another resupply mission was flown, and on that day the main supply route was effectively secured.

The enemy had during this time been attacking the town of Crailsheim as well as the main supply route. Early in the morning of 8 April some 400 to 700 SS troops had penetrated the town from three directions. German artillery and aircraft harassed it on the following day. On 10 April some 600 enemy infantry again drove deeply into the heart of the town.

All these efforts of the enemy to squeeze off the Crailsheim salient were overcome, but at a heavy cost in casualties and time. On 8 April the 10th Armored Division had begun to change its plan. The division ordered the two task forces of Combat Command A which had been attacking west from Crailsheim to change their course and, instead of driving west toward the 100th Division at Heilbronn, to move northwest toward the 63rd Division. On 10 April contact with the 63rd Division was established by advance armor. It was then thought that the Crailsheim salient was not worth the effort to hold. The 10th Armored Division was ordered to withdraw to an assembly area behind the lines of the 63rd Division, preparatory to an attack southwest through those lines. The withdrawal was carried out effectively.

The successful evacuation of Crailsheim probably would not have been possible without the air re-supply operation carried out by

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the 441st Group, 50th Wing, 9th Troop Carrier Command. The superb fighter screen maintained by the XII Tactical Air Command was also a decisive factor. For its handling of this mission, the Troop Carrier Group was later awarded a Presidential Unit Citation.

By this time the 63rd Division attack had crossed the Jagst River and had driven some three or four miles south along its 27-mile front. The infantry division was ready with the help of armor to cross the Kocher River which ran south of and parallel to the Jagst. The pressure which the 63rd Division had been exerting on the northern flank of the enemy line had proved effective, but the advance had been



CROSSING THE KOCHER RIVER IN ASSAULT BOATS

The infantry division was ready with the help of armor to cross the Kocher River which ran south of and parallel to the Jagst.

slow. The wooded hills between the Jagst and Kocher Rivers had been bitterly defended in the western zone by troops of the 17th SS Division.

On 4 April it had been discovered that the troops of this German division had moved north to defend the Jagst line, and on 5

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April VI Corps had ordered an attack to the south instead of the advance east. The 63rd Division regrouped its forces for a coordinated attack. The 254th Infantry took the left of the line facing south, the 255th the center, and the 253rd the right; the 100th Division sent the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 398th Infantry to support the attack of the 63rd Division on its right.

The attack of the 254th Infantry on the left jumped off on 6 April from the region adjacent to the shoulder of the Crailsheim salient and reached the northern bank of the Jagst with little difficulty. From 7 to 10 April it drove across the Jagst River on both sides of Dorzbach and advanced six miles south to the Kocher River. The regiment started across the Kocher on 11 April, its progress impeded only by the delaying actions of weakened Volks Grenadier battle groups.

To the west, however, the advance against SS troops, who resisted fiercely, had been slower and more difficult. The westernmost flank of the Jagst River line had been taken over by the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 398th Infantry, whose mission was to attack to join the 3rd Battalion of the same regiment north of Heilbronn. These troops crossed the Jagst in assault boats on 5 and 6 April and advanced southwest. The 2nd Battalion fought bitterly for four days from 6 to 9 April to take Jagstfeld, the town at the junction of the Neckar and the Jagst and the keystone of the Neckar-Jagst defenses. One factory had to be shelled for an hour before it could be taken; upon entering it, troops found the scorched bodies of 58 SS troopers.

On the left flank of the 2nd Battalion, the 1st Battalion fought for five days, from 7 to 11 April, to break the German stand on the hills between the Jagst and Kocher Rivers. The XII Tactical Air Command bombed enemy positions but failed to reduce them. Tanks coming up to support the infantry were driven back by enemy artillery. The 1st Battalion never took these hill positions, for it was moved to another area on 11 April. On 11 April the Germans also withdrew. On the same day the 2nd Battalion of the 398th Infantry crossed the Kocher River; and on the following day it met the 3rd Battalion in the town of Neckarsulm on the Neckar, midway between Jagstfeld and Heilbronn. The SS troops in the Neckar-Jagst corner had fled.

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The routing of the rest of the SS troops in the center positions of the Jagst line required an enveloping maneuver by elements of both the 253rd and 255th Infantry Regiments. The 253rd Regiment, on the flank of the 398th Infantry, sent two of its battalions across the Jagst on 4 April. After crossing, they turned east and attempted to enter the Hardihauser Wald, a large forest seven miles long and four miles wide which rises in the center to form a broken plateau. The forest lies under a sharp northern loop of the Jagst River below the town of Moeckmuehl. The 3rd Battalion fought for two days to drive the enemy out of Moeckmuehl and then joined the other battalions below the river in their fiercely resisted penetration of the forest. The regiment made very slow progress.

Farther east the 255th Infantry had been attacking strongly held towns and hills on the northern bank of the Jagst. On 7 April the regiment crossed the Jagst seven miles east of Moeckmuehl and expanded its bridgeheads to flank the Hardihauser Wald on the east. On 9 April the 3rd Battalion attacked southwest into the forest, while the 253rd Infantry with three battalions abreast moved into the western half of the forest. From the squeeze of this coordinated pincers the enemy fled southward, and forces of the two regiments meeting in the center of the forest turned their attack south toward the Kocher River.

The reduction of the Hardihauser Wald, together with the attacks of the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 398th Infantry to the west, forced the 17th SS Division troops to retreat south of the Kocher River. In the evening of 9 April the 255th Infantry established a bridgehead over the Kocher at Weissbach seven miles east of the Hardihauser Wald. On 11 April, when Combat Command A of the 10th Armored Division passed through the bridgehead to attack southwest toward Heilbronn, the final phase in the reduction of the German Neckar-Jagst line began.

Two task forces of Combat Command A attacked south, seven miles, to the towns of Neuenstein and Ochringen, which fell only after heavy shelling and repeated armored attacks. SS troops infiltrated back into the towns after initial attacks had cleared them, and in Neuenstein they came back in civilian clothes. By the night of 13 April both towns were finally clear. The 63rd Division followed the armor which now

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attacked southeast and southwest and mopped up what little enemy resistance remained. On 14 April elements of the 10th Armored Division driving southwest finally made contact with the 100th Division, as had been planned ten days previously.

Another reason for the disintegration of the German Neckar-Jagst line was the dislodging of its anchor at Heilbronn by the 100th Division. After 8 April the battle for the city went forward more rapidly, even though resistance continued strong up to the fall of the city on 12 April. On the morning of 8 April armored support reached the infantry on the southern bridgehead, over a treadway bridge which



TREADWAY BRIDGE OVER THE NECKAR RIVER AT HEILBRONN

*"... It too was sunk at noon by enemy artillery ..."*

the 31st Engineer Battalion kept in operation throughout the morning. It too was sunk at noon by enemy artillery. The armor that got across enabled Company A of the 397th Infantry to clear a large part of the city's factory district. During the night of 10 April it joined the 2nd



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and 3rd Battalions, which had been trying to cross the railroad tracks that separate the factory district from the city itself. Once the two bridgeheads had been joined, the enemy began his withdrawal from Heilbronn. After seven days of trying to break fanatically-held strong-points 100th Division infantrymen found themselves resisted only by rearguards.

The division forces in the city, now augmented in the south by the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 399th Infantry, regrouped and drove the enemy out of towns north and south of Heilbronn and out of the hills to the east, which had served the Germans as an amphitheater for artillery observation. On 13 April the 3rd Battalion of the 398th Infantry joined the other two battalions of the regiment in Neckarsulm; and on the following day, as the regiment drove east, it met advance elements of the 10th Armored Division. During the battle for Heilbronn the 100th Division had taken over 1,500 prisoners, had suffered relatively light casualties, and had reduced the anchor of the strongest line which the enemy was able to make during the last month of the war.

On 13 April VI Corps was ordered by Seventh Army to attack south into the Lowenstein Hills. It was to maintain contact with the First French Army on the right which was advancing south between the Rhine and the Neckar, and to be prepared to assist the French in the capture of Stuttgart. The 10th Armored Division went into temporary reserve, to regroup and repair equipment. The 63rd Division on the corps left flank and the 100th Division on the right advanced to the south. The VI Corps advance met no such coordinated line of defense as it had at Heilbronn and along the Jagst River, but it was slowed down by mine-fields, roadblocks, steep ascents along narrow roads, and by stubborn delaying parties in towns.

#### Nuremberg

In the period 13 to 20 April the First German Army managed to maintain coordination among the fragmentary units and battle groups which stretched along a line from the Lowenstein Hills to Nuremberg. Piece-meal and fluid as this line was, it was nevertheless the only "front line" remaining on the western front; and it was defended by an

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estimated 15,000 infantry combat effectives, 20 artillery battalions, and 100 tanks or self-propelled guns. On 14 April there was no firm evidence of a thoroughly planned defense in the Redoubt Center, but it was estimated that the Germans were withdrawing slowly to concentrate all their resources in southeastern Germany. It was up to the Seventh Army to pierce the German line and to beat the German Army before it reached the Austrian Alps. By 23 April Seventh Army had struck three crucial blows, which cut the line to shreds and drove what remained of the German army in broken rout to the south. The first blow to fall was the attack on Nuremberg, which the Germans had decided to defend "to the last man", perhaps as much for political as for tactical reasons. It stood as the eastern anchor of the line opposing Seventh Army; it was a communications center through which North-South railways, autobahnen and principal highways pass, especially those from Berlin to Munich; and it was also the shrine of the Nazi Party.

After XV Corps had reached its objective in the Hohe Rhon hill mass, it began to prepare for a drive that would take it to Nuremberg. On 9-10 April it shifted Combat Command A to the corps left flank, leaving Combat Command B on the right to maintain contact with XXI Corps. The 106th Cavalry Group was free to reconnoiter southeast toward Bamberg and toward Coburg. Waiting for orders to continue its attack to the southeast, the XV Corps maintained its positions on the Hohe Rhon Mountains and patrolled vigorously in the direction of its anticipated thrust.

Already reaching far forward with strong patrols, the XV Corps moved out at 1500 hours on 11 April, when it was ordered to advance in conjunction with the right flank of Third Army. The 45th Division on the left and the 3rd Division on the right followed the cavalry. The corps swept rapidly to the south using floodlights to continue the advance at night.

Flights of fighter bombers and tactical reconnaissance aircraft spread searching fingers in front of the advance. P-51's operating in pairs reported by radio to the corps controller who gave them a reconnaissance mission and laid out a route for them to follow. Moving low to the ground, the pilots reported their observations by radio directly to the

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corps controller, who relayed information on roads, bridges, streams, river banks, enemy troop locations, and friendly front lines. P-51 pilots also directed artillery fire, guided flights of fighter-bombers to profitable targets, and, on request, photographed emplacements, troop concentrations, or terrain. The negatives were flown back to the base, processed, and dropped at the corps command post. Reconnaissance aircraft were dispatched to a division controller when their corps mission was completed.

To feel out the advance on the ground, the 106th Cavalry Group on 12 April was ordered to reconnoiter to the Nuremberg-



GERMAN PRISONERS LEAVE ISLAND IN BAMBERG BY FOOT BRIDGE  
Bamberg, lying in the broad valley at the junction of the Regnitz and Main Rivers, was nearly on the boundary between the two divisions.

Bayreuth autobahn. The 3rd and 45th Divisions, at the same time, were ordered to take Bamberg and the high ground on either flank. Bamberg, lying in the broad valley at the junction of the Regnitz and Main Rivers,

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was nearly on the boundary between the two divisions; and a combined attack presented no special problems. The 180th Infantry of the 45th Division on the left drove into Bamberg on 13 April from the north, while on the right the 3rd Division dispatched the 2nd Battalion of the 15th Infantry to clear that portion of the city southwest of the Regnitz River. During the day the 1st and 3rd Battalions of the 180th Infantry attacked abreast and met moderate small arms and self-propelled fire as they cleared the northeast part of the city. The same type of resistance met 3rd Division troops, and by the end of the day the city had been taken except for an island in the center. It was cleared the next day by the 3rd Battalion of the 180th Regiment which crossed on a foot-bridge to dislodge snipers.

While Bamberg was under assault other elements of both divisions pushed 15 miles southeast, and Combat Command B rejoined the 14th Armored Division on the corps left flank. After Bamberg had fallen, XV Corps was to continue south to cut the autobahn between Bayreuth and Nuremberg and to capture Nuremberg. The 14th Armored Division cut the autobahn, while the 45th and 3rd Divisions advanced on a broad front toward Nuremberg.

Nuremberg lies in a broad valley veined with natural and artificial waterways and at the center of a spiderweb of roads and railroads. From Nuremberg north the Regnitz River and Ludwig's Canal flow parallel to each other. Ludwig's Canal extends through Nuremberg to the southeast. The Rednitz River flowing from the south and the Pegnitz River from the east join west of Nuremberg and north of the suburb of Fuerth to form the Regnitz River. A little more than one-third of Nuremberg lies north of the curve formed by the Pegnitz River, which provided an excellent tactical boundary to aid in apportionment of the conquest of the city.

The plan for the taking of Nuremberg was an envelopment. The 3rd Division on the right was ordered to continue southeast to cross the Regnitz River and Ludwig's Canal, then to strike south and clear that portion of Nuremberg north of the Pegnitz River. Meanwhile, the 45th Division advancing farther to the left was directed to continue to the southeast, cross the Rednitz River, and attack the city from the south

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and southeast. Seventh Army stated that elements of XXI Corps on the right of XV Corps were to assist in the capture of Nuremberg. To shield operations in the city, which would engage the full attention of both assaulting divisions, the 14th Armored Division was ordered to maintain its position on the corps left and swing south of Nuremberg to screen the city at a distance of about 15 miles. The 106th Cavalry Group was directed to perform a similar mission to the south and southwest. The XXI Corps advance on the right would provide additional protection on the same flank.

On 15 April the 3rd Division crossed the Regnitz River and Ludwig's Canal some 15 miles north of Nuremberg in position to attack due south into the city. The 30th Infantry on the division right made the crossing after it had advanced southeast during the day against scattered resistance in the small towns that dot the rolling terrain. The crossing was made without opposition by the 3rd Battalion, and immediately the 7th Infantry followed in division reserve. All combat elements of the division were over on the following day, and the troops drove to within five miles of Nuremberg.

On the corps left flank the 45th Division struck south of the Pegnitz River over a bridge captured intact by the 157th Infantry. Opposition on the river line was negligible, but several defended roadblocks were encountered as the troops continued to expand the bridgehead. By 16 April the attacking divisions had formed a two-pronged pincers on Nuremberg, one point having already penetrated the northern outskirts and the other in the southeastern suburbs. The 14th Armored Division and the 106th Cavalry Group encountered but little opposition as they moved to form a protecting screen to the east, south, and southwest.

Nuremberg resisted furiously. Fighting continued day and night, during the nights under artificial moonlight furnished by American anti-aircraft searchlight battalions. The city was surrounded by enemy anti-aircraft positions, armed with 88mm flak guns, which were used against the assaulting infantry with grim effect. As the troops of both divisions broadened their fronts on 17 April and pulled the noose tighter on the city, resistance increased in intensity.



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The 3rd Division attacked south with the 15th Infantry on the left and the 7th Infantry on the right, elements of which reached into the outskirts of Nuremberg on 17 April. Both regiments overran



RESULTS OF ALLIED AIR ATTACK ON NUREMBERG

*Nuremberg resisted furiously*

many anti-aircraft artillery emplacements, but flak guns scattered through the city and manned by determined defenders caused many casualties. Increasingly strong 88mm flak fire met the 45th Division as elements of all three regiments attacked from the south and southeast. Five battalions pushed into the defenses of the city.

XV Corps medium and heavy artillery supplemented the weapons of the divisions by firing into the progressively smaller target area; and air missions throughout daylight hours bombed, strafed, and rocketted the defenders. By midnight of 17 April the attackers had cleared nearly two-thirds of Nuremberg in house-to-house battles, although anti-aircraft artillery batteries, sited in parks and squares farther within the city, continued to blast the infantrymen and tankers.

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The 1st Battalion of the 30th Infantry joined the assault on 18 April. It attacked on the left and advanced the next day to seize the north gate to the medieval walled city in the heart of Nuremberg. This it held as a bridgehead while the 2nd Battalion pushed through and continued the punishing battle to the south. Meanwhile the remainder of the division had crept slowly through smashed and burning buildings toward the Pegnitz River. The enemy resisted from fox-holes in parks, from flak artillery emplacements, and from basements. Unless buildings were cleared room-by-room, there was always the threat of enemy to the rear. The 7th Infantry, on the right of the division assault, reached the inner city on 19 April. The 15th Infantry, after a bloody fight in the division center during which its armor was attacked by civilians as well as by uniformed enemy, moved late in the day to push through the gate captured by the 30th Regiment.

Resistance to the 45th Division assault in the south was at a fever pitch as the division drove deeper into the city; and fanatical small arms, rifle grenade, bazooka, and panzerfaust fire met attackers who cleared five square miles of the city and reached the medieval walls in the heart of Nuremberg on 19 April. The 180th Infantry assaulted the walls and forced an entrance to continue its attack within the ancient bastion. The 179th Regiment, having been pulled out, blocked to the rear and cleared by-passed areas.

West of Nuremberg lies the suburb of Fuerth, which was in the XXI Corps zone until 19 April, when the 42nd Division, already in position to attack the town, was attached to XV Corps. The whole Nuremberg area came under one command. The 42nd Division on 18 April had been ordered by XV Corps to take Fuerth and early the next day jumped off across the Rednitz River and met moderate resistance as it cleared the town.

Hitler's 56th birthday was on 20 April, and the Gauleiter of Nuremberg had sent a "battle vow" to his Fuehrer:

My Fuehrer: The final struggle for the town of the Party rallies has begun. The soldiers are fighting bravely, and the population is proud and strong. I shall remain in this most German of all towns to fight and to die. In these hours my heart beats more than ever in Love

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and Faith for the wonderful German Reich and its people. The National Socialist idea shall win and conquer all diabolic schemes. Greetings from the National Socialists of the Gau Franconia who are faithful to Germany.

KARL HOLZ

The Fuehrer had replied:

I wish to thank you for your exemplary conduct. You are thereby bolstering the spirit not only of the people in your own Gau, to whom you are such a familiar figure, but also of millions of Germans. Now starts that fervent struggle which recalls our original struggle for power. However great the enemy's superiority may be at the present moment, it will still crumble in the end — just as it has done before. I wish to show my appreciation and my sincere gratitude for your heroic actions by awarding you the Golden Cross of the German Order.

ADOLPH HITLER

But on 20 April Nuremberg fell.

As the size of the enemy-held area of Nuremberg decreased, the intense concentrations of anti-aircraft artillery fire slackened because most of the guns had been overrun. The 7th Infantry forced the walls of the inner city in its zone by 1100 hours and attacked south against decreasing opposition. The enemy began to capitulate in large numbers to the 15th Infantry. The 30th Infantry with two battalions abreast drove south and cleared the area north of the Pegnitz by 1400 hours. Stronger opposition met the 45th Division, as it drove up from the south; but by 1600 hours the two assault regiments had eliminated all but 200 defenders in an underground passage, who were finally routed out by 2250 hours. The Gauleiter was found dead in a cellar after the battle. There had been no fight to the last man, for during the five days of the battle more than 17,000 of the defenders had surrendered. On 21 April, the day after Hitler's birthday, XV Corps commemorated its capture of Nuremberg with a ceremony in Adolph Hitler Platz. Representative units of XV Corps, including infantry, artillery, engineers, tanks, and tank destroyers, paraded before General Patch and General Haislip. Fighter-bomber aircraft joined the review by covering the formation from the air.

While the celebration was in progress, XV Corps was regrouping for further attack. Seventh Army Field Order No. 12, which was

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issued on 17 April, had confirmed arrangements that had been in progress to shift the direction of the army attack from southeast to south and had announced that Third Army would relieve XV Corps east of the line Wuerzburg-Ansbach. The consequent regrouping was carried out with little delay to XV Corps advance. Third Army moved in behind the corps; the 3rd Division stayed behind to garrison Nuremberg; the XV Corps advanced south toward Munich. There was only one complication. The 14th Armored Division was engaged on the left, but by mutual agreement it was reassigned on 23 April to Third Army in zone. In its place the 20th Armored Division, commanded by Major General Orlando Ward, was assigned to Seventh Army and sent to the XV Corps. The 20th Armored Division, in the lead, was followed on the left by the 45th Division and on the right by the 42nd Division. It met only scattered opposition in towns and at roadblocks, as the enemy retreated in confusion. The battle of Nuremberg had broken the right of his line.



MAJOR GENERAL ORLANDO  
WARD  
commanding the 20th  
Armored Division

### The Stuttgart Operation

While the battle for Nuremberg was still being waged, another blow was delivered on the enemy left flank. The German 17th SS Division and 2nd Mountain Division had been pulled out of the line and rushed to the Nuremberg front. The 2nd Mountain Division fought near Ansbach southwest of Nuremberg, but the 17th SS troops after racing to Nuremberg got there too late to fight inside the city. Although it fought against the flank of the XV Corps enveloping forces, it could not effectively delay Nuremberg's fall.

Lack of adequate forces and orders to make its main effort on the left in support of Third Army had kept Seventh Army from launching in force its anticipated offensive to the south. Its advance

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during March and early April had been so extended as to necessitate leaving three divisions behind to occupy captured territory: the 44th, the 103rd, and the 36th, the last of which was west of the Rhine. The 103rd and the 36th Divisions had been earmarked as SHAEF reserve on 30 March, since which time they had been used as occupation forces. At the end of March the 70th Infantry Division and the 13th Armored Division, which had been in SHAEF reserve under Seventh Army control, were being prepared for transfer to the Twelfth Army Group. This transfer was effective on 1 and 2 April, and both divisions within a short time were sent to the Third Army zone. By 8 April both the 4th Infantry and 10th Armored Divisions, attached to Seventh Army for operations, were assigned to Seventh Army.

By 17 April SHAEF had lifted some of the restrictions on the use by Seventh Army of its divisions in reserve, the 36th and 103rd, and had responded to General Patch's request that the 36th Division west of the Rhine be presently relieved by units of the Fifteenth Army. Representatives from the Fifteenth and Seventh American Armies had been working together since 3 April in close liaison preparatory to the assumption of occupation duties by Fifteenth Army in the Saar-Palatinate west of the Rhine. Also on 17 April notification was received that the 101st Airborne Division was to return to Seventh Army, replacing the 103rd Division in SHAEF reserve and taking over the Darmstadt-Ansbach-Heilbronn area. Both the 36th Infantry and 101st Airborne Divisions would not be required to perform occupational duties after 21 April.

Now Seventh Army had greater hitting power and greater depth for its offensive. By the middle of April, Third Army had been turned south and the direction of Seventh Army advance was also turned south. The relief of Seventh Army units in the east by elements of Third Army narrowed its prospective front by about 25 percent. It became less of an adjunct to Third Army and freer to strike out independently in its own zone. General Patch's Command Post, which had moved from Darmstadt to Kitzingen on 16 April, was off-center for the new zone, especially when the army's main effort was to be made on the right. Plans were made to move it southwest and on 27 April, after the offen-

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sive had made good progress, the Seventh Army Command Post opened in Schwaebisch Gmuend.

With the Ruhr pocket effectively reduced (it was declared wiped out on 19 April) and with the Third Army drive speeding toward Salzburg, General Eisenhower told General Devers on 15 April that the time had come for the Sixth Army Group to push the offensive to the south. The initial objective of the offensive was the capture of Stuttgart and the cutting off and destruction of the Nineteenth German Army in the Black Forest. VI Corps, coordinating its advance with the First French Army, was to envelop Stuttgart, seize the communications



STUTTGART, GERMANY

seize the communications centers south of Stuttgart

centers south of Stuttgart in the area of Tübingen, Balingen, and Sigmaringen, between Stuttgart and the Swiss border, up to which the corps was then to exploit in order to block the Nineteenth Army in the Black Forest while the French destroyed it.

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An Airborne operation for the planned offensive which had been designated *Effective* was contemplated for the taking of the communications centers south of Stuttgart, an important target also because a number of scientific laboratories and factories were situated there. Plans had been made to use the 13th Airborne Division in this maneuver, but this operation was cancelled on 20 April as being no longer necessary. Sixth Army Group had warned that, in order to prevent the German Nineteenth Army from escaping from the Black Forest southeast into the Swabian Alps, careful timing would be necessary in the French and VI Corps envelopment of Stuttgart. The French were instructed specifically to avoid attacking Stuttgart prematurely.

Since 13 April VI Corps had been pushing south into the Lowenstein Hills, which stretched between Heilbronn and Schwaebisch Gmuend. On 16 April the 10th Armored Division was taken out of reserve and passed through the 63rd Division on the corps left flank. Combat Command B, supported by the 2nd Battalion of the 254th Infantry, fought for two days to take on 18 April the town of Hall on the Kocher River. On the corps right flank the enemy indicated acute sensitivity to the 100th Division approach toward Stuttgart, when he counterattacked fiercely near the town of Beilstein, about 20 miles north and a little east of Stuttgart. The 3rd Battalion of the 399th Infantry approached a hill just north of Beilstein on the morning of 18 April. Forward elements crossed the open draw below the hill, climbed its open northern face, and reached the wooded crest. The rest of the battalion was still climbing out of the draw when German mortars and artillery opened up on them. Seventeen were killed and 101 wounded. When the battalion had once gained the top of the hill, it was counterattacked for an hour by some 60 Germans who climbed the southern slope, heedless of the fire that met them. The rest of the way through the Lowenstein Hills was relatively easy for VI Corps. On 18 April the rapid drive south began, as elements of the 10th Armored Division on the Corps left flank advanced nine miles.

On 19 April the 44th Division, attached to VI Corps two days before, moved through the 63rd Division to follow the advance of the



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10th Armored. The 63rd Division passed to XXI Corps and continued its attack to the southeast. The 103rd Division, attached to VI Corps after its release from SHAEF reserve, was ordered to attack between the 10th Armored and the 100th Division on the right, which was moving slowly because of stiff resistance to its approach to Stuttgart.

During the morning of 19 April the advance of the 10th Armored Division was held up by steep hills and boggy valleys, but in the afternoon it raced ahead for a gain of 17 miles which brought it to the Rems River. Holding in the Lowenstein Hills on the south, Combat Command B seized two bridges intact just west of Schwaebisch Gmuend, which it by-passed, and crossed the river. Farther west Combat Command A, carrying a power saw to clear roadblocks, had been hitting a 40 mile an hour pace. That afternoon it seized another bridge over the Rems intact at Lorch, five miles west of Gmuend. Combat Command A came so suddenly into Lorch that it scared away an enemy plane and an enemy train that were just pulling into town. It took prisoners the astonished Volkssturm who had been left behind as a rearguard. The 44th Division, whose task it was to protect the exposed flanks of the 10th Armored Division as well as to mop up in the rear, reached the Rems the same day and blocked at the bridges to permit the armor to lunge ahead southwest to the Fils River, which runs parallel to the Rems some six miles to the south. Combat Command A captured intact a bridge over the Fils at Faurndau near Goeppingen.

On 20 April, while Combat Command R and the 114th Infantry of the 44th Division mopped up in the by-passed Gmuend area, Combat Commands A and B crossed the Fils River and drove, still southwest, to the town of Kirchheim. The town fell easily to the two enveloping columns. The 114th Infantry blocked on the left of the armored spearhead, while the 324th Infantry blocked on the right. Several energetic enemy attempts near Schwaebisch Gmuend to cut through the main supply route of the extended salient were repulsed. Early in the morning of 21 April, elements of Combat Command R, which had come down to Kirchheim, cut the autobahn just south of the city, reaching the first objective of the division. The enemy had been fleeing from Stuttgart and the Black Forest down the autobahn to the Swabian

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Alps. The XII Tactical Air Command had been bombing and strafing columns for several days. Now the enemy was forced to use secondary roads to the south. On 22 April the 10th Armored Division was ordered to swing southeast to pursue the fleeing enemy to the Danube. The 44th Division was to continue to follow the armor, mopping up and guarding its flanks.

When forces of the 10th Armored Division reached Kirchheim, they had come within 15 miles of French forces which had swept south-east to Reutlingen below the autobahn. Stuttgart was virtually encircled; the corridor of escape was narrowed and attacked on the ground and from the air. The breakthrough of the 10th Armored Division formed the first and outer arm to reach out to pocket the fleeing Nineteenth Army. Meanwhile within that arm the 103rd Division on the right flank of the armored division and the 100th Division along the Neckar, each pressed in on the escape corridor.

After 18 April resistance to the 100th Division advance decreased as the enemy fled from the Stuttgart area. Against minefields, roadblocks, and panzerfaust-armed delaying parties, the division made steady progress. On 22 April it captured 1,000 prisoners in the pocket formed by the Neckar north and east of Stuttgart, and it made contact with the French just across the river from the city. On 23 April the division captured an equal number of prisoners as it drove to the east bend of the Neckar River below Stuttgart where it is joined by the Fils. One battalion of the 397th Infantry moved south of the Neckar River to cut the autobahn below Esslingen.

The 103rd Division, between the 10th Armored and the 100th Divisions, ran into bitter fighting on 23 April as it hit the most sensitive part of the escape corridor below the autobahn. It had joined the VI Corps attack on 20 April, and against only moderate resistance it had swung down through the lanes that tanks had cleared across the Rems and Fils River. On 22 April it drove southwest from Kirchheim, some five miles south of the autobahn, where it threw back a counterattack. The next day its attack was to the south toward the Metzingen-Muensingen road which runs through the Swabian Alps, now the most important remaining escape route for the Nineteenth German Army. In

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the hills that shield the road on its northern side, the 103rd Division met desperate opposition. Here the 2nd Battalion of the 410th Infantry attacked the town of Erkenbrechtsweiler, which lies on top of a broad plateau. After G Company had taken two-thirds of the northern part of the town and had lost 17 men as prisoners, an SS officer marched down the main street carrying a white flag, accompanied by a captured American infantryman. He presented an ultimatum to the company commander: surrender or panzerfausts will wipe you out. At the time, the entire 2nd Battalion, the other elements of which were fighting in the woods outside the town, was believed surrounded by five German infantry regiments and miscellaneous troops. The fighting continued and by evening the town was cleared of the enemy. The next morning the surrounding German troops had disappeared in flight. The 103rd Division pressed on to the Metzingen-Muensingen road and drove to Reutlingen to join up with French Forces.

On 23 April the Stuttgart corridor was closed. On the same day the city of Stuttgart fell to the French. French forces continued to mop up numerous enemy pockets in the Black Forest, and VI Corps turned southeast toward Ulm and the Danube in pursuit of the broken columns of the German Nineteenth Army. On 22 April the main effort of Seventh Army was directed southeast toward Ulm, and a new boundary was set between the French First and American Seventh Armies.

Because the rapid drive of the French below Stuttgart had extended so far east of the Neckar River, which had been the boundary between the armies, and because there was a danger of French and American units becoming entangled, General de Lattre and General Patch had agreed on 21 April on a new boundary between Reutlingen and Sigmaringen. It then was decided by Sixth Army Group that when Stuttgart had fallen and the VI Corps attack had turned southeast, the boundary would run along the Metzingen-Muensingen-Ehingen road. This would leave to the French the area south of Stuttgart to be mopped up and would presumably keep French forces from becoming entangled with the VI Corps attack toward Ulm and the Danube.

This last boundary change also provided that American forces would occupy Stuttgart after the French had taken it. On 26 April the

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100th Division, having been relieved from line duty on 24 April, moved into Stuttgart. The French 3rd Algerian Infantry Division was still there.

When on 27 April General Devers, accompanied by General Patch, visited Stuttgart and ordered that French forces evacuate the city, the local French commander replied that he was under orders to remain. News reports linked the Stuttgart question with the larger question of French participation in the assignment of occupation zones. The matter, which had obviously become one for consideration at a higher level, passed amicably and without incident. On 30 April the 100th Division left the city to the French and moved to another area. It had been determined by this time by Army Group liaison that many reports of disorders by French troops in Stuttgart had been exaggerated and that they could be attributed largely to displaced persons and the "native criminal element", and to the fact that French procedure in occupying a German city is traditionally different from that of American forces.

#### The Breakthrough in the Army Center

Shortly after the enemy right and left flank had given way, his center weakened under the pressure of the XXI Corps attack and was pierced by the breakthrough of the 12th Armored Division in the Franconian Heights. As the XXI Corps had swept southeast from the Main to the Aisch River, it had been deployed across a broad front with the 42nd Division on the left, the 4th Division on the right, and the 12th Armored attacking in columns interspersed across the front.

At the Aisch River the Germans had made only a minor delaying stand. The 42nd Division, in whose zone the major portion of the river line was located, had pushed across the stream at Neustadt on 16 April, after a prior reconnaissance to feel out weak points. The division had continued its rapid advance southeast, veering toward Fuerth, which it had been directed to take to assist in the XV Corps capture of Nuremberg. When it had come into position to attack Fuerth, the 42nd Division had passed to control of XV Corps on 19 April to place the Nuremberg operation under a unified command. At the same

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time, XXI Corps assumed command of the 63rd Division from VI Corps on the right flank of the 45th Division.

The 4th Division, initially on the corps right flank, had driven southeast against only weak delaying actions, and the columns of the 12th Armored Division had met the same type of opposition. The advance surged forward day and night between 18 and 20 April. The 12th Armored Division took Ansbach and Feuchtwangen. The 4th Infantry Division retook Crailsheim, which VI Corps had earlier yielded, against only sporadic resistance. On the new corps right flank, the 63rd Division pushed southeast, reached Schwaebisch Gmuend, and set up roadblocks to protect the corps flank.

XXI Corps was now well within the low hills of the Franconian Heights. Prisoner interrogation revealed that enemy units larger than battalions were the exception. Hastily organized groups of stragglers were thrown into the line to do what they could to delay the advance. XXI Corps was engaged in what SHAEF termed, "the disarming, by battle, of the German armies."

With the passage of the 42nd Division to XV Corps and the taking over of the 63rd Division, the corps left boundary had been shifted to the line Ansbach-Noerdlingen, and XXI Corps attacked directly south toward the Danube river with the mission of crossing it. Meanwhile its positions west of Nuremberg had shielded that city while it was being assaulted by XV Corps. When Nuremberg had been taken, XXI Corps began in earnest its drive south. The 12th Armored Division had been given a zone on the left flank of the corps; and it was here that the greatest advances were made, although the remainder of the front moved rapidly.

The 12th Armored Division launched a spearhead from Feuchtwangen toward the Danube River on 20 April, and in two days it pierced 40 miles to capture and cross the 600-foot bridge over the river at Dillingen. Reinforcements were poured across the river, and the bridgehead was held against only slight opposition. Moving rapidly, the 4th and 63rd Divisions reached the Danube and bridged it on 25 April, the 4th against slight resistance at Laningen and the 63rd with stronger op-



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position at Guenzburg, both west and south of Dillingen. One battalion of the 63rd Division stopped on the way to eliminate a pocket of some 600 SS troops.

With the enemy's last line broken at both flanks and in the center, Seventh Army continued south on its next mission: to block the passes into Austria and to seize the Innsbruck-Brenner Pass area. The Wehrmacht fled without hope before its advance. The German Nineteenth Army was practically destroyed; the First and Seventh German Armies were torn by American armored breakthroughs. Enemy troops in pockets of resistance surrendered in mass; commanders issued discharges to their men by the hundreds. On 21 April word was received at Seventh U.S. Army Headquarters that the German government had agreed to leave in their present camps all Allied prisoners of war and not to try any longer to evacuate them in the retreat. Seventh Army advanced beyond the Danube, to the last natural defense line before the Redoubt Center.

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## CHAPTER XXIX

### *The Myth of the National Redoubt*

The catastrophe which had finally overtaken the German military forces was almost complete. When the city of Nuremberg fell to the Seventh Army on 20 April, it had become clear that the war was entering its last stages. An intelligence report from General Eisenhower's headquarters issued on 15 April stated the case:

From every viewpoint it is only a matter of time before the organized resistance in Hitlerite Germany collapses completely . . . Nothing can alter the inescapable fact the enemy is on the verge of a defeat. Nothing now can rectify the mistakes of Hitler and his staff officers in order to prolong the war or even partially retrieve the situation. Enemy capabilities are in fact nil. No steps he can take with the present means of conducting warfare are such that they will influence and hardly delay the outcome . . .

Nor was the intelligence that the war was lost unavailable to the highest German command. In the early evening of 22 April, according to various accounts of the briefing in the *Fuehrerhauptquartier*, Adolph Hitler became convinced that the end was near and that all hope was to be abandoned. Several diary entries picture the situation:

The Fuehrer has collapsed; he considers further resistance useless, refuses to leave . . . All present (Keitel, Jodl, Bormann, Himmler, Goebbels, and the Grand Admiral over the phone) have tried to sway the Fuehrer . . . Everything was in vain . . . He now speaks of treason from all sides, of failure, corruption, and that the SS is now lying to him . . . the troops are not fighting, the roadblocks are opened and are not being defended . . . soon we will have no ammunition and gasoline . . . The Fuehrer has given no orders, he only said the others should go wherever they please . . .



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
This abdication of the high command in late April coincided with the disintegration of centralized enemy combat leadership. Along the Seventh Army front General Paul Hausser had been relieved from command of German Army Group G, which had been cut and virtually destroyed by General Patch's divisions on both sides of the Rhine. His new assignment was the consolidation of staffs fleeing south, the organization of battle-groups from among surviving remnants. More than a dozen divisions were identified in the sectors of the American VI, XXI, and XV Corps; but their numbers were little more than a bookkeeping convenience. They were wanting in infantry, in artillery, and in armor. They were in receipt of no coordinated orders and were committed to defensive positions which formed no semblance of a front line. Thousands of troops were disappearing, redeploying themselves as self-discharged veterans; and as one German division commander confessed, "everybody was highly sensitive to any report which held any inkling of the words 'clearing out' . . . ."

This battered and hopeless enemy force, consisting of the First and Nineteenth German Armies, withdrew in almost total confusion before the onslaughts of Seventh Army. General Patton's Third Army, which had been driving due east toward Prague and Dresden, had begun to change direction to move down the Danube River for a junction with the Russians. General Patch, accordingly, instituted a general swing of the army toward the heart of Bavaria and the Tyrol. With General Brooks' VI Corps on the right, General Milburn's XXI Corps in the center, and General Haislip's XV Corps on the left, Seventh Army was to strike quickly over the Danube and into the Bavarian foreland making decisive southern thrusts for the Alpine routes into the Inn River Valley and to the Brenner Pass. What little order General Hausser, now operating from Field Marshal Kesselring's headquarters, could fashion from the chaos of the German army was not to be given an opportunity to recover combat efficiency for the defense of mountain positions in the so-called "National Redoubt." The hope was to dissolve the projected ultimate concentration area before it could be used. It was also hoped to uncover quickly the infamous German concentration camps which lay in the path of Seventh Army.

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### The Redoubt: Myth and Mystery

Whether the German High Command or the Fuehrer's inner circle ever believed in the Redoubt Center or in some fortress of the Alps is a question. There appears to be no evidence that any substantial planning or serious preparations were made for an historic last stand. The *Alpenstellung* or *Gebirgstellung*, which in American documents became "redoubt" from the French intelligence about the *reduit*, was less a military stratagem than a piece of political propaganda. It did not revive much hope or morale, but it perhaps gave some geographic point to all the frantic movements of overrun German elements.



BAVARIAN ALPS

"The Alpine high ground loomed as the last battlefield . . ."

During the Rhine-crossing period Seventh Army G-2 had, as aforementioned, issued a long range study of the German National Redoubt, reviewing the factors involved in a formidable defense of

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mountainous pockets in the area of common German, Austrian, and Italian frontiers. The Alpine high ground loomed as the last battlefield. The extreme Bavarian relief, with narrow abrupt valleys and sheer winding roads, was admirable for a determined defense by a minimum force well-armed with modern equipment. It was suspected that considerable stockpiles of arms, munitions, and rations, and even underground industrial facilities, had been prepared; and a new elite force was envisioned, comprising hundreds of thousands of SS and mountain troops, well-equipped, trained for mountain warfare, and thoroughly imbued with the Nazi spirit. At the source of this estimate of enemy capabilities were two reasons: First, that the Nazi elements which controlled Germany had the will and imperative need to continue to resist; second, that the German army and people, incapable of disobedience, would follow Nazi orders.

Happily, the army estimate of the enemy's military and political strength was a cautious one. The three Seventh Army corps were prepared for the worst contingency; but, less than two weeks after the outer ring of the Redoubt had been penetrated at the Danube, the National Socialist regime had been destroyed. The American assault could not be contained or even delayed. The German will to resistance was broken. Flagrant violations of discipline disorganized the military from within, and there were many instances of widespread and extensive civil disobedience.

By 21 April Seventh Army had completed its turning movement for the campaign against the redoubt. Before it was the Danube River, and a long, wide flatland which stretched to the mountains. Within two weeks Seventh Army had driven into the mountains, had broken through the effective wall across southern Germany, and had seized control of the Inn and Salzach Valleys. VI Corps, on the right, held the massive lateral terraces from Innsbruck to the Brenner Pass. XV Corps, on the left, had overrun the Salzburg-Berchtesgaden area. XXI Corps, in the middle, dominated Kufstein and the central Alpine positions. The National Redoubt was no longer a mystery.

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### The Fall of Ulm

The main effort of Seventh Army was to be made on the right. Within 48 hours the breakthrough which VI Corps had achieved near Lorch on the Rems River on 19 April had assumed major proportions. Two combat commands of the 10th Armored Division were "running wild", and at times the armor was hitting a 40-mile-per-hour pace. Behind the tanks moved the infantry of the 44th and 103rd Divisions, straining to keep up with the tempo of the motorized advance, to clear by-passed pockets of resistance, and to prevent infiltration behind the speeding combat commands.

The Stuttgart-Ulm autobahn had already been cut and troops blocking to the west were still picking up miscellaneous groups trying



TANKDOZER GOES TO WORK ON A ROADBLOCK

"... Principal obstacles were engineer-contrived, roadblocks and minefields ..."

to escape the Stuttgart pocket. Opposition along the whole front was spotty and disorganized, although battle groups continued to fight

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moderate delaying actions. Principal obstacles were engineer-contrived, roadblocks and minefields, covered by fire from infantry trying to make strongpoints of towns and favorable terrain. The armor, for the most part, avoided such points. "Keep on going" General Brooks had instructed General Morris, commanding the 10th Armored Division, "don't fight with them as there will be plenty of infantry behind you . . ." The tanks were racing for the Danube and all possible intact crossings between Ehingen and Ulm.

The city of Ulm on the Danube River appeared to be the next concentration point for the haphazard improvised defensive efforts of General Foertsch's First Army. The river line itself was possibly the best available position in the so-called "final defense" area before the redoubt; and, more than that, the Himmler-Keitel-Bormann decree which had dictated the fanatical defense of Nuremberg would probably prompt the same type of resistance in this traditional Danube Valley bastion. The directive from the German High Command had been unequivocal:

Cities are situated at important traffic junctions. Therefore, they must be defended and be held to the utmost, no matter what promises or threats are carried . . . For the execution of this command the Battle Commanders appointed in every town are personally responsible. Should they disobey this soldierly duty and task, they will be sentenced to death like all civilian officials who try to prevent the Battle Commander from doing his duty or even hinder him while fulfilling his tasks . . .

The signature indicated the support of the army, the party, and the Gestapo.

The army decision to attack Ulm involved a complete change in plan on the corps level. VI Corps was now to be turned off to the southeast instead of the southwest, which had been the course dictated by developments in the Stuttgart operation. A considerable portion of the German Nineteenth Army had eluded the Stuttgart trap and had hastily made its escape to the southeast; and Seventh Army troops, forced to move in quickly to stop the Kirchheim corridor, became entangled with the French. Elements of the 100th Division and the 103rd Division were committed in this action. Early on 23 April, as a result of the

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change in VI Corps plans, the 44th Division on the corps left flank was directed to follow the armor to Ehingen and at the same time, "spill over in the direction of Ulm . . ."

On 22 April both Seventh Army and the First French Army had reached the Danube River. The French I Corps made several crossings in zone and took the town of Sigmaringen from the south. Elements of the 10th Armored and 44th Infantry Divisions farther north had established an American bridgehead in the Ehingen area, and by morning armor was across the river moving into Berg.

French advance elements were out of communication with their commanders and were pursuing down all routes. Moreover certain commanders among the French desired the prestige of capturing Ulm because of its Napoleonic tradition. This caused some infiltrations across the Seventh Army boundary, and at Berg the 44th Division became involved with French columns moving northeast from Sigmaringen. A principal factor in the slowdown of advancing forces at this time was the shortage of gasoline, which was coming in almost exclusively by air transport to the nearest available fields.

The boundary difficulties were settled with expedition and affected the progress of the operation very little, if at all. For reasons of prestige, the French were permitted to maintain a guard of honor in Ulm for a period after its capture.

On 24 April Seventh Army troops struck for Ulm. Two regiments of the 44th Division, combined with elements of the 10th Armored Division, moved northeast along the Danube. The 324th Infantry advanced on the north bank; and the 71st Infantry, which had previously made an assault boat crossing and had erected a treadway bridge downstream from Ehingen, moved along the river on the southern or right bank. The troops met moderate to heavy resistance, facing considerable small-arms and sniper fire, artillery, flak, and 88mm shelling. Some infantry made their way riding on tanks and trucks; others dismounted and fought through the streets of Ulm. Between the 71st Regiment and Neu-Ulm ran the swift and not inconsequential Iller River, running north and into the Danube which bisects Ulm. The Germans held the east bank of the Iller from its confluence with the

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Danube south to a small bridgehead held by American armor at Voehringen, then south to another bridgehead held by armor at Illertissen.

By the afternoon of 24 April the American forces, assisted by elements of the First French Armored Division which had appeared, were cleaning out the last remnants of opposition in old Ulm. By evening the 71st Infantry was making its crossings of the Iller for the assault on Neu-Ulm. The current was too swift and boats turned over. One company crossed on cables, hand over hand. Progress by hand-spans continued, while heavy logs were thrown across blown bridges for catwalk crossings. In general, the Germans conducted an organized defense east of the Iller River and a disorganized withdrawal west of the river. Pockets and columns of the enemy were trapped in the rear, and one group even attempted to cross the Iller at one of the 10th Armored Division crossing sites. On 25 April the artillery, mortars, and self-propelled guns were silenced. The city of Ulm had fallen. It was completely desolate; the medieval buildings that once had crowded around the cathedral and stretches of the city beyond them had been bombed to ruins.

The fall of the historic city of Ulm prompted a special message from General De Lattre, Commander of the First French Army.


It is my desire to express to you the joy we feel in returning in brotherly union with your army to Ulm which is so full of historical memories particularly precious to French soldiers. I wish to express my feelings at this moment when armored detachments of First French Army, in liaison with their Seventh Army comrades, are reaching this town. It is my wish to renew the expression of my most friendly and faithful combat comradeship to you.

#### The Danube Front

The Danube River front in the Seventh Army Zone wound its way northeast for some 80 miles from Ehingen to Neuburg, just west of Ingolstadt, which fell to the Third Army's III Corps on 26 April. The break in the Danube line at Ulm was matched by another deep and decisive penetration in the central sector. By 22 April both the 10th and 12th Armored Divisions were at the Danube River. In front of XXI



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Corps, Combat Command "A" of the 12th Armored Division, far in front of the infantry divisions, seized a bridgehead at Dillingen. The day before, 21 April, a long German horse-drawn column had been overrun. As American forces reached the Danube River, bridges were being blown. The 600-foot Dillingen bridge was captured intact at noon on 22 April. Bombs in and around the structure were deactivated; and by early afternoon elements were across the Danube extending the bridgehead to Frisingen, less than 20 miles northwest of Augsburg, against disorganized opposition.

Seventh Army exploitation of the Dillingen bridgehead was rapid and immediate. The 4th and 63rd Infantry Divisions, on the left and right respectively of the armor's shifting advance, were ordered to move with all possible speed to the Danube and secure the river crossing. The 3rd Division, which had been garrisoning Nuremberg, was attached to XXI Corps, ordered to cross at Dillingen through the other two divisions and strike for Augsburg. The rout into which the enemy had been thrown by the advance of armored spearheads was apparent to the infantry moving up behind. Withdrawal everywhere was chaotic, and there was no determined attempt to make a stand. The 3rd Division was involved only in brief fire fights in towns and villages, with only scattered contact elsewhere at roadblocks and with by-passed groups. The difficulties of the 63rd Division amounted to delays of its motorized columns by mines and abatis. The 4th Division ran into snipers but no enemy front lines. On 25 April the 4th Division reached the Danube and caught up to the armor at Gundelfingen five miles southwest of Dillingen. Farther south and west along the river the 63rd Division had moved into the Guenzburg-Leipheim area to establish its own bridgehead.

The desperate character of the First German Army's plight was revealed in its own field order, later captured, which dictated all-out defensive efforts to hold both flanks simultaneously. The right army boundary held by the 17th SS and Division Nibelungen was to be reinforced in the Regensburg zone; at the same time General Foertsch's troops were to "prevent the enemy by repeated attacks of mobile battle groups against his flanks from further penetrations in the Dillingen area." On the nights of 22 and 24 April, out of sight of the Allied air

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force which had long since converted daylight movements into suicide maneuvers, the prospective battle groups scrambled across the Danube. This evacuation from the Heidenheim vicinity was protected somewhat by the block at Neu-Ulm along the Iller line. Division trains made their way across the river, first, according to the German traffic control officer, the 553rd Volks Grenadier Division with 1,500 men, then the Volks Grenadier 19th Division with 1,500 men, the 198th Infantry Division with between 800 and 1,000 men, and the 168th Infantry Division with 1,200 men. The enemy had managed a skillful withdrawal in an apparent effort to delay the American forces at the river and regroup scattered elements for a stand before Augsburg or Munich.

The German reaction to the assault on the Danube was sharpest in the central sector of the Seventh Army advance. The Luftwaffe reappeared on 24 April, and some 15 to 25 planes in eight separate attacks struck at the Dillingen bridge. The mission of the 553rd Volks Grenadier Division, in conjunction with the German aerial blows, was to make flanking attacks from the southwest to push the American forces back to the north bank of the river. At Guenzburg the 63rd Division had found a bridge intact, and one platoon had raced into Leipheim before the bridge was blown. The demolition was incomplete and the advance was continued over boards on the remaining uprights. Most of these elements from the 254th Regiment, however, were caught across the Danube without heavy weapons and were hit by a number of heavy German counterattacks all of which were finally repulsed.

All American bridgeheads expanded rapidly; and the German losses in killed, wounded, and captured mounted. Only the 168th Infantry Division and the 19th Volks Grenadier Division withdrew according to plan to escape encirclement. They were considered by the German command as essential for the defense of Augsburg and Munich. Garrisons stationed at both cities had been seriously depleted. Further defensive efforts could be based only on the strength of troop collecting points and the fanaticism of town commanders who were authorized to gather all stragglers for the formation of alarm defense units. Many of these units were already giving up in surrender to Seventh Army. In several cases commitment became capitulation when it developed that the battle staffs

had withdrawn from their own sacrifice orders. In others, an entire group simply gave itself up in spite of the German secret order that all deserters were to be hanged publicly on all roads leading to the rear.

With the XV Corps turn in the Seventh Army pivot, the 42nd and 45th Divisions, which had moved almost directly south of Ansbach, began their drives southeast to the Danube River on a wide front. The army front was now oriented for the assault of the outer redoubt ring. German resistance was for the most part confined to a passive defense by preparing roadblocks and blowing bridges, but generally the enemy was somewhat less disorganized in this sector than in others. He succeeded at times in controlling sufficient infantry, supported by a limited amount of artillery and antitank guns, to withdraw behind effective delaying actions. The 2nd SS Mountain Division used mines, and defended roadblocks and strongpoints on key terrain features and villages. In places the 45th Division ran into strong and stubborn resistance. In Monheim a quick thrust had intercepted an enemy artillery tank convoy and the Germans were forced to stand and fight. A six-hour battle resulted. In most of the villages, too, there were sharp fights; but these isolated small-unit actions against the overwhelming American force were ineffective. By 25 April the 45th Division, and the 42nd Division on its right, had closed to the north bank of the Danube.

The river line in this sector of the Seventh Army zone constituted an effective barrier only for the briefest period. Donauworth, the river valley's key defensive city since the days of the Roman Empire, proved to be the main delaying obstacle. The bridges across the Danube were blown some five minutes before a column of tanks and infantry of the 42nd Division reached the shore; and the trapped German units fought fanatically in the city, holding up the progress of special task forces by a house-to-house defense. When Donauworth was finally cleared after a six-hour fight only 16 of the 700 defenders had been taken prisoner.

On 26 April two infantry regiments of the 42nd Division crossed to the south banks of the Danube just east of Donauworth. They made the crossing before daylight in assault boats and DUKWs against resistance that varied from moderate to slight, expanded their bridge-



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head, and by the close of the period had crossed the Lech River from west to east. At 0045 hours the 242nd Infantry had moved across at Schaeftall, suffering difficulty only with the swift current. To the east of this crossing the 232nd Infantry pushed out from Altisheim; and with the aid of the 142nd Engineer Combat Battalion, which crossed with the assault waves and constructed an improvised wooden span across the Lech, the regiment continued its progress.

What few heavy weapons the German troops had managed to salvage remained concentrated in front of the 45th Division on the XV Corps left flank. Three regiments abreast had closed to the Danube on 26 April



CROSSING OF THE DANUBE

*Boats were capsized and swept downstream by the swift current . . .*

between the confluence of the Lech and Neuburg Rivers, but throughout the morning and most of the afternoon were held to the northern bank by a combination of obstacles: the unsuspected bridging difficulties; the surprising amount of coordinated fire which included nebelwerfers,

20mm flak guns, and even effective counter-battery; and the confused pockets of stranded enemy units cut off by the demolition of the Neuburg bridge late on the previous day. Boats were capsized and swept downstream by the swift current, floats were damaged and broken, cables snapped. The project for the construction of footbridges was abandoned, but hopes for a treadway bridge were hardly more certain for the current, which was found to be as high as 12 miles per hour, far exceeded what is considered maximum for treadway bridging. Sufficient troops, however, made their way over the Danube between 1500 hours and nightfall to establish and expand bridgeheads across the river from Marxheim. The swift current had caused footbridge equipment to disintegrate even though secured by cable, and made the operation of infantry support raft impracticable and the use of assault boats and DUKWs extremely difficult. The crossing was attended by heavy losses of equipment as well as some loss of personnel; but by midnight, after extensive shuttling with high-powered motor boats, the 45th Division had eight battalions of infantry across and had secured its bridgehead about two miles deep on a 12 mile front.

Seventh Army had now completed its assault of the Danube River; and XV Corps, like XXI and VI Corps on its right, prepared for what was hoped to be the ultimate drive across the Bavarian foreland to the mountains. Armor was to succeed mechanized cavalry patrols in running the gauntlet of medium and long-range sniper fire and setting the pace of the offensive. The 20th Armored Division, which had taken the place of the 14th Armored Division in XV Corps, began its move into the redoubt operation on 23 April, but it was almost a full week before it was in position to be committed in accordance with plans for a coordinated large-scale tank-infantry assault. It had assembly difficulties, aggravated by long marches in the rain and mud over poor road nets. On 27 April XV Corps issued instructions for the entrance of the armor into the thrust for Munich. The 45th and 42nd Divisions were to continue their present missions of clearing routes of advance for the 20th Armored Division. Each division was to be prepared to follow the armor closely with one motorized regimental combat team when passed through. The next day Combat Commands A and B moved over the

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Danube, made their way through elements of the infantry, and were ready for the advance on a broad front generally between the two great autobahns converging on the city of Munich.

### The Road to Austria

Unlike the positional warfare encountered in France, where front lines existed and most of the enemy regarded the issue as not yet settled, the fighting which involved Seventh Army in Bavaria had taken on a new form — that of isolated groups, scattered and without organization, fighting with varying degrees of resistance. Inadequate distribution of what remained of his troops and scarcity of transportation forced the enemy to defend fiercely at points where he could organize, leaving other and sometimes more important points lightly held. The result was armored spearheads slashing deep into the enemy's rear through these lightly-held corridors and the formation of more pincer movements than he could ever conceivably contain. Infantry on tanks and behind tanks and the mopping-up of small by-passed units characterized the advance. As a report of the 10th Armored Division put it,

Consecutive front line overlays . . . had the appearance of an irresistible molten mass spreading southward over the maps. Armored rivulets moved ahead suddenly, were slowed and outdistanced by other rivulets with which they joined. Pockets of resistance were left in the armored wake and overrun . . .

Following receipt of gasoline stocks and the disentanglement of American and French elements at Ulm, there was little delay in bringing the bulk of VI Corps armored and infantry forces across the Danube toward the Tyrolean Alps and the Brenner Pass. From the river line south to the passes into the mountains, tank columns of the 10th Armored Division, followed by the 44th Division on the left and the 103rd Division on the right, roared along, striking at will, breaking up the last cadres of General Brandenburg's Nineteenth Army.

Forward American elements moved out of Ulm quickly, leaving behind wild, disorderly celebrations by Allied prisoners of war and displaced persons, and the usual civilian rumors that the Nazis would

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return to complete the destruction of the area with Luftwaffe and SS troops because the people had displayed white flags. By 26 April, three armored spearheads were making their thrust toward the Memmingen-Mindelheim-Landsberg line. Infantry elements were being motorized and kept moving throughout the night to close up on the armor. As General Brooks, commanding VI Corps, told his division commanders, "push on and push hard, . . . this is a pursuit, not an attack."

At times the pursuit seemed more like a fantasy of violence and speed and extravagant incident. Armored columns were rolling 20 and 30 miles a day. Weakly-manned strong points were destroyed by



GERMAN JET PLANES ALONG AUTOBAHN USED AS AN AIRFIELD  
 " . . . One tank column ran across a large camouflaged airfield and engaged in target practice on jet planes getting ready to take off . . . "

fire and huge enemy groups shipped to the rear in bulk prisoner formations. Task forces wreaked havoc on German vehicles and personnel. One tank column ran across a large camouflaged airfield and engaged

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in target practice on jet planes getting ready to take off. Dug-in enemy infantry offered feeble or no resistance; one patrol of the 103rd Division reported: "they have women with them, evidently in their holes, our machine guns opened up on them and we dropped a little artillery, and they ran from their holes dragging the girls by the hand after them . . ."

The assault sped through little countryside villages which, according to orders, were taken under fire if there were no white flags flying. When evidence was found of civilian sniping and of German soldiers who had changed into civilian clothes, the town was destroyed. The orders had been: "If you run into any resistance in the towns, particularly the big ones, I don't want you to take casualties. Use phosphorous, TDs and everything else and chew them to pieces. . . ." Little resistance was encountered. This was very far from General Jodl's dream of a hinterland possessed with a fanatical will to fight. The troops ran into burning concentration camps, with smouldering corpses, caches of gold dental fillings, a synagogue crowded with airplane motor parts, American secret agents, who a short while before had been parachuted deep into the redoubt lines and now found themselves in prisoner of war cages. An infantry school, which had been training recruits with sticks for rifle drill and water cans to simulate the noise of machine gun fire, was overrun; and the commandant formally surrendered his entire command of 200 students, insisting that his sabre be kept as a token of the surrender. A civilian telephone exchange was captured intact, and a call was put through to Innsbruck offering surrender or destruction.

Armor in multiple columns moved down to dominate the road-nets, with Combat Command B into Memmingen, Combat Command A in the center into Mindelheim, and Combat Command R on the left lunging for Landsberg. Infantrymen followed closely to eliminate small and disorganized pockets and round up hordes of prisoners. In the evening of 26 April the 411th Regiment of the 103rd Division entered Landsberg. Tanks had already passed through the town, but the enemy had not been cleared out and remained entrenched on the east side of the Lech River which divides the city. The bridge crossing had been destroyed, and from the east shore came heavy sniper fire. The next morning 103rd Division troops were across the river and the eastern

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half of Landsberg was cleared. A garrison of Hungarian troops was discovered by one platoon which found the entire command of some 918 officers and men lined up formally. The garrison commander called his troops to attention, did an about-face, and surrendered his men. The garrison, fearful that it might be fired upon, had stacked all weapons prior to the arrival of the American troops.

The fall of Landsberg was not without its larger political significance. It was in the local prison-fortress that Adolph Hitler served his sentence following his failure in the Munich Putsch. American troops moving through added to their collection of war trophies a huge Nazi



LANDSBERG CONCENTRATION CAMP. BURNED WHEN  
NAZIS RETREATED

*It was in the local prison-fortress that Adolf Hitler served his sentence following his failure in the Munich Putsch . . .*

memorial flag and a bronze plaque which read: "Here a system without honor kept Germany's greatest son a prisoner from 11 November 1923 to 20 December 1924. In this cell Adolph Hitler wrote the book of the

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National Socialist Revolution MEIN KAMPF." On the route out of the city a concentration camp was overrun. Some Barracks were on fire and shriveled smoking corpses were lying about. Thousands of prisoners, mostly Jews from various European countries, were found herded in huts, weak and emaciated and in a state of almost complete physical and mental degeneration.

The armored thrust for Memmingen reached south on both sides of the Iller River. The German forces which had been committed to hold some kind of organized line to the west were upset and had to face attacks from three directions. West of the Iller, disorganized, trapped troops were quickly mopped up. On the east bank, the enemy opposed the advance with fire from small arms, antitank weapons, and occasionally some artillery. Each town became briefly a strongpoint, and panzerfaust and artillery fire was taking its toll of the tanks of Combat Command B. More rapid and cheaper successes were achieved by playing for surrender rather than by direct simple assault. Local burgomeisters were dispatched ahead to convey issued ultimata, and leaflets were prepared and dropped. The seizure of Memmingen was practically complete some two hours before the columns rolled through the streets.

The surrender was effected by the chief medical officer of the garrison. The city was clear of German troops, but in the surrounding hills there were troops who had already refused to obey cease-fire orders. The officials of the city requested another hour to permit them to apprehend the fanatics who refused to abide by surrender terms. After some delay the commander of Combat Command B, 10th Armored Division, sent his final message to the mayor of Memmingen through an interpreter. He stated that his troops would march into town immediately, that they would be met by the mayor, that there would be white flags over all the big buildings in town including the church and the city hall, and that there was to be no firing of any kind. In the event of any opposition or fire it was promised that tanks and artillery aided by bombers would destroy the city. There was no resistance in Memmingen. All defending forces had withdrawn.

The assault continued without pause, as Seventh Army columns ranged southward over successive approach lines to the mountain re-

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doubt: Kempten-Kaufbeuren-Schongau, Immenstadt-Fuessen-Oberammergau, and finally Landeck-Imst-Innsbruck. This last line brought army troops up to the Resia, Fern, and Brenner Passes. The armor and the infantry moved down together in the very model of *blitzkrieg* tactics. On 27 April Kempten surrendered without a fight. On 28 April Schongau was taken. The tactical problems involved in the critical bridging of the Lech and Ammer Rivers were solved to the mutual satisfaction of tank and foot soldier. Task forces, made up of about one-half a combat command followed by a battalion of infantry, kept supporting troops together during river crossings. These columns continued to push through a chaos of destroyed German positions, by-passing burning vehicles and scattered pockets of resistance. Troops of the 44th and 103rd Divisions followed in the rain, cold, and snow of late April, sometimes on trucks, more often on foot, flushing the towns, cleaning out the countryside.

On 29 April Seventh Army encountered its first Alpine difficulties. General Patch's instructions had been to take Innsbruck with all possible speed, but speed and even movement became a serious problem. Early that morning the VI Corps Commander discussed the



BRIGADIER GENERAL  
WILLIAM F. DEAN  
new commander of the 44th  
Infantry Division

situation with General Morris, commanding the 10th Armored Division, whose offensive had come to a halt on the approaches to Austria. A blown bridge over a swift-rushing mountain stream was a more serious obstacle than it would have represented on the flatlands of Bavaria. Here the road-net was extremely limited. Enemy troops on top of the hills above the road, although they were few, could hold up an armored advance by well-directed bazooka fire. This they did. It became necessary to wait for sufficient infantry troops coming up behind the armor to clear the Germans from the high ground. Both Generals Dean and McAuliffe, of the 44th and 103rd Divisions, were given instructions to make certain

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that, whenever the movement of armor was checked by enemy from high ground, infantry troops were to move out and clean it up fast. General Brooks had told them, "I want to make speed today. The armor will take care of the roads and you take care of the hills when they are a bother." However, the advance was comparatively slow that day, 29 April, and the next. Elements of the 44th Division ran out of gas. Resistance was organized at strategically centered roadblocks studded along the main road nets. Armored and infantry columns were forced to move along the steep and narrow snow-dotted Alpine passes, constantly coping with craters, minefields, overturned vehicles, blown bridges, and



INFANTRYMEN IN AUSTRIAN MOUNTAINS

"... soon reached terrain which prevented further vehicular advance ..."

at one point a 200-yard man-made avalanche. In the mountainous defiles the tanks became perfect crawling targets. The supporting troops routed the Germans directing protecting fire on the obstacles from the overlooking heights; but the armor, having sped more than 100 miles in less

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than five days, soon reached terrain which prevented further vehicular advance.

Combat Command A, driving east from Partenkirchen, ran into a large crater which completely obstructed the road. The crater was filled in by a tank dozer, and a short distance beyond a 50-foot bridge over a gorge was found blown. This was by-passed by the tanks which then ran into a mine belt protected by sniper fire with more blown bridges ahead. Combat Command B was halted at a hairpin curve where a roadblock, consisting of an avalanche of boulders, gravel, and logs extending for some 200 yards, proved to be a formidable barrier.

At this point Seventh Army forces had already reached into Austria. The 71st Infantry of the 44th Division captured Fuessen on the Lech River where the glacier-fed stream emerges through a gorge from the Austrian Tyrol. Across the river from the lower slopes of the great mountains of the old German border looked down the imposing castles of Bavarian royalty, Neuschwanstein and Hohenschwangau. The blown bridge across the Lech prompted a maneuver to the southwest over steep and densely-wooded terrain to enter Vila in Austria. Then the infantry moved down again to seize the road nets at Reutte and Lermoos.

By 30 April the proportions of the traffic crisis along the winding mountain roads and narrow ravines had become quite clear. The armor had stopped rolling and the infantry was blocked up behind. At noon the 44th Division was calling corps to find out if the 10th Armored Division could not be moved from out in front of its troops. Terrain made the further advance of armor impracticable. By late afternoon, orders were issued to assemble the armor in place. Its mission to clear the Garmisch-Lermoos road was completed, and the division was to move to the Garmisch-Partenkirchen area with the least possible interference with leading advance elements. The end of April saw the dropping of the armor and the entrance of infantry laterals across the Alpine passes into the Inn River Valley from Landeck to Innsbruck.

#### Augsburg and Dachau

The capitulation of Augsburg in the central sector of Seventh Army's final Bavarian operations was one of the strangest stories of the

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advance through Germany. The city was situated directly in the path of General Milburn's XXI Corps assault, and the 3rd Division was specifically committed from Nuremberg via Dillingen for its seizure. It lies at the confluence of the Lech and Wertach Rivers on a broad cultivated valley floor. Its urban pattern is crowded with canal spans and innumerable small bridges the destruction of which would have constituted a considerable barrier. On the whole, however, its importance as a military target was comparatively slight. The large Messerschmitt factories in the southern suburb of Haunstetten had been demolished by Allied air raids. There remained in Augsburg a large number of hospitalized German army troops. Augsburg was saved from the utter devastation which had come to Aschaffenburg, Wuerzburg, Heilbronn, Nuremberg, and Ulm, largely because of a unique subversive movement which facilitated the entrance of American troops.

Seventh Army negotiated the approaches to the Augsburg area without notable difficulty. One night a convoy of trucks took a wrong turn and was demolished at an enemy roadblock; the 12th Armored Division quickly made an attack in this sector to recover what was left. The next morning artillery fire from guns somewhere around the city came into play to support resistance in settlements along the lines of advance. Nevertheless, General O'Daniel of the 3rd Division issued orders to hold up artillery and counter-battery fire: "I don't want you to fire at all into Augsburg unless it is actually observed firing. . . . Keep your eyes open for white flags or other signs of surrender as we have had many indications. . . ." Early on the morning of 27 April the 4th Division had reported that two industrialists had come through to Horgau to make arrangements for capitulation and the sparing of the city. Along the roads and in the fields 88's were found with white handkerchiefs and pillowcases fluttering.

A few German troops who had retreated all the way from the Danube had the mission of holding Augsburg. No orders had been given them to retreat to any other defensive line. However, of an estimated 5,000 enemy soldiers in front of the 3rd Division, about 4,000 of them had been taken prisoner before the division had reached the outskirts of Augsburg.

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Both the Augsburg battle staff and the high command were aware of this critical situation. By 25 April they had seen that no reinforcements were available and understood that a defense with the forces at hand was impossible. Still, planning and preparation for resistance went ahead, based on 350 men of various army units plus 300 to 400 men of the Volkssturm. At this point, pressure from the citizens began to make its disruptive influence felt. With the Americans at Dillingen and already beyond the Danube, alarm spread among the civilian population. Representatives of churches, business, and art all tried to prevail upon General Fehn, who was in command of the Augsburg defenses, to surrender the city. Underground groups began to organize their elements for a military or political coup. On the morning of 28 April, General Fehn, as he himself later confessed, had a force not in excess of 80 men. The German 27th Artillery Replacement Regiment, which was to be committed as infantry, had vanished; other units were out of contact; the roadblocks were not manned; the bridges were only partly prepared for demolition. But General Fehn was an old army man of 41 years service, and he had as yet heard nothing from higher headquarters countermanding his original orders.

The 3rd Division struck at Augsburg in multiple columns. The 30th Infantry moved in from the northwest to the autobahn and across the Lech river in the vicinity of Gersthofen. The 7th Infantry attacked from the west, its battalions deployed south of the autobahn toward Steppach and Kriegshaber in the city's outskirts. Late in the evening of 27 April, Colonel Edson, commanding the 15th Infantry, received word from his 1st Battalion: "Just got a phone call from Augsburg. People called. Call themselves the 'Freedom Party of Augsburg.' Want to surrender the city. City in dissension. . . ." The 1st Battalion proceeded to attack Goeggingen, and the 3rd Battalion was quickly organized as a task force to push through the 7th Infantry in Kriegshaber and sweep into the heart of Augsburg. Tank-infantry teams were moving toward the city in a wide arc, and spearheads were making their appearances in all the suburbs.

Within Augsburg itself, the unrest had come to a focus. Various isolated underground groups discovered each other and joined forces.

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Real military strength was lacking, however. A friendly battalion of troops in the Pfersee Kaserne west of the city had been transferred at the last moment. Revolutionary tactics were improvised. Early on 28 April, agents were dispatched to spread the news that the city had surrendered and that white flags should be flown everywhere. The appeal was circulated from house to house. Patrols were sent out to meet elements of the American assault and guide them quickly into the town. The 3rd Battalion commander was led up Karolinenstrasse to the command post pill-box of General Fehn, who was given five minutes to surrender. General Fehn made an attempt to call for SS reinforcements south of Augsburg. The deputy Gauleiter committed suicide. His telephone and pistol both forcibly removed, the General was escorted out of his pillbox; and he stared with surprise at the dozen-odd men in three jeeps, a tank, and a reconnaissance car. A white flag was flying from the tower of St. Ulrich, the highest point in Augsburg. The city had fallen. Dismounted and motorized security patrols arrived to roam the streets, clear underground shelter tunnels, buildings, and sidealleys. Mop-up details were accompanied by armor and loud-speakers. The people complied with the order to open all windows and to display white flags. American troops then cut away to the east toward the Munich autobahn with orders to "barrel down the big highway."

To the right of the 3rd Division, which was to return as the right flank of XV Corps for the attack on Munich, the 4th Division crossed the Lech River and was making steady progress in its zone. The 36th Division, which was attached to XXI Corps to relieve the 63rd Division, attacked south and southeast from the vicinity of Landsberg, mopping up behind 12th Armored tanks. Task forces were blocking the northern approaches to the Bavarian Alps and cutting the road net extending southeast from Munich. According to Seventh Army intentions, the infantry was to be prepared to move into the Inn River Valley, the armor, with one Combat Command of the 2nd French Armored Division attached, was directed toward the Brenner Pass. VI Corps was striking from Schongau and XXI Corps from Weilheim. It was understood in forward headquarters that the corps which hit the road

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junction at Mittenwald first would drive on through Innsbruck. XXI Corps moved along sweeping the Ammersee-Wuermsee area; there were no enemy front lines with which troops were in contact. The terrain, blown bridges, a few defended roadblocks formed the principal obstacles to progress. The countryside roads were choked with masses of unescorted captured German prisoners and lines of Allied liberated personnel.

North of the Augsburg-Munich autobahn Seventh Army elements were driving for the capital city of Bavaria. In the center of the XV Corps zone, troops of the 42nd and 45th Infantry Divisions moved consistently forward despite enemy delaying actions. Before them lay the 2nd Mountain Division, retreating cleverly, the 17th SS and 25th SS Divisions, always protected by withdrawal orders which guaranteed them security for a day or two. Also in front lay the town of Dachau. In Dachau the Nazi regime had established its first and largest concentration camp; and on Sunday afternoon, 29 April, when the first American soldier broke through the gates there were more than 30,000 prisoners of every nationality, religion, and political allegiance.

Dachau was entered by both the 42nd and 45th Divisions. It was reported that I Company of the 222nd Regiment entered the camp at 1313 hours, and that the 2nd Battalion of the 157th Infantry entered the camp at 1445 hours and cleared it at 1705 hours. The first entry was made by a special forward patrol, led by General Linden, assistant commander of the 42nd Division. It was met only by some SS sniper fire. General Linden reported,

It was unbelievable. Freight cars full of piled cadavers no more than bones covered with skin, bloody heaps at the rail car doors where weakened prisoners, trying to get out, were machine-gunned to death by the SS . . . rooms stacked almost to the ceilings high with tangled human bodies adjoining the cremation furnaces . . . rooms where lay the dying survivors of the horror train, limp under filthy blankets, laying in human excreta, trying to salute our officers with broomstick arms, only to fall back . . .

Some two weeks before, in reply to the Dachau commandant's request that the camp be turned over to the Allies, Heinrich Himmler had

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written that such a procedure was not to be considered. The camp was to be evacuated immediately and no prisoner allowed to fall into Allied hands alive. Himmler, who signed himself as SS Reichsfuehrer, warned that prisoners had behaved barbarously to the civilian population at Buchenwald. In spite of these orders, only one large-scale transport leaving Dachau was organized before American troops overran the area.


According to the account of the 157th Regiment, which was attacking past Dachau on the divisional boundary line, a German woman cycling north on the road was stopped for questioning and revealed that she had just come from Munich, crossing a bridge in the town of Dachau itself. Company L mounted tanks and raced for Dachau. The armored column sped into town. When the lead tank reached a point just 20 yards from the bridge, the structure blew up raining debris on all the riders. Reconnaissance located a nearby footbridge, and the concentration camp was assaulted. The battle was a singular encounter with the SS, who had previously been held as a threat and never committed. Some 300 guards and troops were eliminated after a stiff fire fight.

The prisoners were overcome with joy. Some had rushed the electrically charged wires for their freedom. Many were electrocuted, but others got through to hunt down their wardens and beat them with fists and stones. They even seized weapons and shot many guards to death. Prisoners identified SS men masquerading in prisoners clothing and killed them. Violence threatened to get out of hand, and eventually infantrymen had to fire over inmates' heads to quiet them down. Guarding the typhus-infested camp, became an important military task. But the hysteria soon subsided. Flags and colors, which had been improvised from sheets and scraps of cloth and buried in barracks and rafters, were raised throughout Dachau. Men sang songs of their homelands; others danced; and others wept. A few, whose spirits had been broken by long years of imprisonment, stood petrified and stonefaced. The camp underground, an "International Prisoners' Committee", assisted in the maintenance of order; and the combat troops moved forward to participate in the four-division assault of Munich.

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### The End of Nazi Munich

Seventh Army had its entire left flank in motion for the drive on Munich, Germany's third largest city. With a population of three-quarters of a million, Munich ranked after Berlin and Hamburg; it was also the political, administrative, and cultural center of Bavaria. Armor moved out in front during the night of 27-28 April. All three regiments of the 45th Division were completely motorized in order to follow closely the advances of the 20th Armored Division. The 106th Cavalry Group was attached to give the infantry more mobility and striking power. The 42nd Division, farther west, was closing in behind the armor in its zone.



ST. PAUL'S CHURCH IN MUNICH

... With a population of three-quarters of a million Munich ranked after Berlin and Hamburg ...

Following the capture of Augsburg, the 3rd Division, on the XV Corps right flank, moved out along the autobahn, and Highway 2 south of the autobahn, driving motorized columns through roadblocks and scattered

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German bands. Continuous truck convoys were scarcely enough to keep supplies available for the speeding offensive, and in the next few days an airborne load of some 400,000 gallons of gasoline was landed, and managed to relieve the major shortages.

There was no little rivalry and competition among Seventh Army forces for the prize of the city of Munich. Just east of Augsburg, in Friedberg, which was surrendered by the burgomeister without a fight, General O'Daniel had issued orders to push toward Munich as fast as possible. It was reported that a Freedom Movement had sprung up within the city, and that along the autobahn between Augsburg and



INFANTRYMEN SURROUNDING FRIEDBERG

*Friedberg was surrendered by the burgomeister without a fight.*

Munich there were only a few troops with perhaps roadblocks and blown bridges. When intelligence of the internal dissension in Munich reached headquarters of the 12th Armored Division, a squadron of the 101st

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Cavalry Group was moved around the southern tip of the Ammersee and up Highway 12 to the northeast toward Munich.

General White, Army Chief of Staff, informed the units under army command that Seventh Army had received a delegation from Munich which expressed a desire to have Munich spared in the same way as Augsburg. Three infantry divisions were converging on the city. The 42nd Division was making a relatively slow advance. Blown bridges were in its way, and armor crowded all the roads. Infantry troops were banked up waiting for the traffic confusion ahead to clear, when finally General Collin's request for a clear passage was answered with the removal of all elements of the 20th Armored Division. Late on 28 April, General O'Daniel indicated his concern that some other division might reach Munich first, if his units did not put out the necessary speed. When at long last the city of Munich fell during the next two days, three infantry divisions, two armored divisions, and a cavalry group all claimed the prize and submitted reports of early entries and special agreements with the mayor, the governor, and private revolutionary groups.

Within the city itself there had been a limited civil war. These last days of April were an opportunity for the German underground to express itself in action. The rapid advance of American troops, the helplessness of the German army, and the growing disaffection of whole sections of the civilian population created a revolutionary situation. As Seventh Army approached Munich, plans to strike a blow against the Nazi regime were made by a variety of groups ranging from sincere anti-Nazi underground workers to war-weary burghers and common opportunists. Some of them were coordinated by a centralizing leadership; others worked alone and were caught up in the natural course of the violence which broke out during the night of 27-28 April. The simultaneity of the little revolts and rebellions in the city of Munich and throughout the Bavarian countryside gave a formal appearance of unified direction to what was really a number of disconnected events.

The armed cadre of the Munich Putsch consisted of three platoons of the *Dolmetscher Kompanie* (Interpreter Company) of Wehrkreis VII, commanded by Captain Rupprecht Gerngross. A substantial auxiliary force to this group was supplied by a panzer replacement bat-

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talion stationed at Freising and nearby units with sympathetic infantry personnel. The Putsch had a limited, temporary success. The Nazi Governor of Bavaria, General Ritter von Epp, was taken into custody; and the Munich radio station was seized and converted into an anti-Nazi propaganda agency. But the main assaults proved inadequate, and with the failure to take the offices of the party in the city and the army headquarters at Pullach, the rebellion began to lose ground. Although the word had been spread sufficiently to touch off independent street activity, the signal for the revolt had been issued too soon for it to be effectively coordinated with the American offensive. Nevertheless, when elements of Seventh Army made their way into the city some 48 hours later, they could report that the anti-Nazi underground movement was of considerable help in the taking of Munich and that all bridges were intact.

The half-encirclement of Munich by the 45th Division moving in from the north, the 42nd Division from the northwest, and the 3rd Division along the Isar River from the south was almost complete on 29 April, although it was not until the next day that the city was wholly clear. Some time before noon on 30 April forward troops of the 3rd and 42nd Divisions poured into the metropolitan area, meeting no resistance, only small groups of cheering civilians waving both white and Bavarian flags. The 45th Division met a less friendly reception. Some resistance was contributed by several SS battalions entrenched in prepared defensive positions centered around their college and barracks in the northern outskirts of the city, known in the Hitler era as the *Hauptstadt der Bewegung*.

The 45th Division had been moving forward with three regiments abreast. On 29 April the 180th Infantry, following the armor, had attacked toward Munich at 0630 hours. Enemy fire at the railroad underpass north of Schleissheim stopped the tanks to the immediate front of the infantry. Dismounted troops proceeded to reduce the resistance and cross the Schleissheimer Canal. The 179th Infantry had cut its way to the Ingolstadt-Munich autobahn, but its advance was halted abruptly when strong artillery and small arms fire opened up on Garching. One company was forced to withdraw. Air strikes were requested but denied because of inclement weather and other employ-

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ment. Early plans for a task-force coup, involving a German-American commando seizure of the SS staff, fell through.

Finally, the Division organized its three-pronged assault which carried it into the heart of the city. The 157th Infantry attacked from Dachau at 0700 hours on 30 April, uncovered another concentration camp, and moved through light opposition to reach the Isar River and secure the bridges. The 179th Infantry cleared Garching house by house, and sped down into the city to the river. In the middle, the 180th Regiment still found determined and coordinated resistance on the part of SS troops. Enemy activity was being slowly snuffed out by barrages from 240mm howitzers. Infantry companies, however, were forced to advance under the cover of smoke screens; and one battalion attacked and withdrew three times across open ground burning with intense flak, mortar, and machine gun fire. During the assault, white flags were going up. One command post reported that there was a large white streamer on top of the biggest building in Munich. The SS troops remained to be driven out window by window and wall by wall. The purging of the SS college and barracks was complete by 1500 hours, and before midnight all the battalions had closed to the final phase line along the Isar.

On 1 May, General Eisenhower, in a special order of the day, wrote: "The whole Allied Expeditionary Force congratulates the Seventh Army on the seizure of Munich, the cradle of the Nazi beast." General Patch detailed the 45th Division to garrison the city, which was little more than a massive shell, and instructed XV Corps to prepare for further action after a two-day rest period. VI Corps was faced only with Innsbruck and Landeck, and the Brenner and Resia Passes, deep in Austria. XXI Corps was about to enter the Inn River Valley. The feeling was widespread that the war was almost over, the campaign against Germany drawing to a close. The Seventh Army G-3 noted, "there is a growing need for maps of the Pacific area . . ."

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## CHAPTER XXX

*Last Days*

On 1 May Seventh Army faced an enemy force scattered from Innsbruck to Salzburg in an arc of confusion. General Foertsch's First German Army had no semblance of organization. Some eleven of its divisions, which included six Volks Grenadier, two Infantry, and the 2nd Mountain, had been destroyed, their ranks decimated to less than 500 combat infantry effectives. The SS troops alone were in a position or a condition to hold. The 38th SS Grenadier Division, under LXXXII Corps, was responsible for the right flank, and on the left, under the XIII SS Corps, the 407th Mobilization Division and the 17th SS were making organized withdrawals, still threatening to commit their combat infantry strength which amounted to about 7,000. Farther west new elements, including the 1st Indian Legion, were being absorbed by General Brandenburg's Nineteenth Army. For a long period the Twenty-Fourth German Army had been guarding the Swiss frontier east of Basel against the eventuality of an Allied thrust; but this was only a skeleton force of low-grade miscellaneous outfits, most of which the German Command had always been wary of committing to action. General Brandenburg himself had not a single division capable of effective defensive combat. The total strength of the 47th, 189th, 246th, 257th and 559th Volks Grenadier, plus the 465th Mobilization Division, came to 3,000 men.

The enemy facing Seventh Army had neither an order of battle nor a front line. A top-secret telegram which ordered the assumption of the Befehlshaber Nord command by General Jaschke was the last instance of coordinated defensive instructions. His primary mission, as stated, was to occupy the north front of the Alps fortress and to block the entrance to the mountains as a main effort. Fortification of strong-




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points was to be carried out with the utmost effort using unarmed soldiers of dissolved units. Very few of the commanders and Gauleiters to whom the directive was addressed ever received it. By 2 May the picture of dissolution was clear. At noon on that day the surrender of the German forces in Italy became effective.

### Into the Valley

The Inn Valley is isolated from Bavaria on the north and from Italy on the south by two great ranges of precipitous mountains which



THE INN VALLEY IN THE BAVARIAN ALPS

*The Inn Valley is isolated from Bavaria . . . by two great ranges of precipitous mountains . . .*

constitute the classic Alpine block of difficult military terrain. The parallel ranges run roughly northeast-southwest; and the walls are pierced by a number of roads leading to the water-shed of the Inn River, which flows out of Switzerland through the heart of the Austrian Tyrol

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past Innsbruck, the Tyrolese capital and age-old cross-roads of commerce. These entrances, however, scarcely formed effective avenues of approach, subject as they were to commanding ground on front and flanks.

These almost prohibitive conditions of combat had stopped the 10th Armored Division in its headlong advance; vehicles had been bottlenecked, and the terrain precluded the maneuver necessary for the proper employment of armor. Infantry patrols alone proved able to manage, and the 44th and 103rd Divisions proceeded to push toward VI Corps objectives on the Seventh Army right flank, the passes into and out of Austria. The almost vertical walls of the valleys, rising in forested slopes to the bare, solid rock of the peaks above, crowded invading troops into corridors served only by narrow, twisting roads. The few springlike days of the last week in April had given way to a return of winter. Snow and sleet were falling, while heavy clouds filled the narrow valleys and canyons from wall to wall, "like the ceiling of a room." To the west the First French Army was fighting south into the Austrian province of Vorarlberg. On the VI Corps front the 44th Division reached out toward the Fern and Resia Passes via Imst and Landeck, while farther east the 103rd Division approached the Inn Valley through the Mittenwald Pass in its zone. To the south the Fifth Army was moving up through the Italian Tyrol for a junction of American forces.

For the infantry of the 44th Division the first days of May were a series of engagements for key mountain passes. The tortuous terrain rendered by-passing tactics almost impossible, requiring the search for additional axes along which to press the attack and avoid road-blocked defiles. German resistance centered at the Fern Pass, the better of the two passes in the division zone leading into the Inn watershed. The fire-fight at this point lasted for 48 hours on 1 and 2 May before positions were overpowered by a well-executed envelopment of the rear. The out-flanking movement to the east cut the road behind the Germans and linked up American forces for the final drive on Imst and Landeck.

For a day and a night the 71st Infantry had made no progress against several hundred entrenched enemy employing small arms, machine guns, mortars, and panzerfaust fire to cover the series of road

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craters in the vicinity of Fern. One battalion had fought past a landslide and a road-block to face the last holding force at the pass itself, when another battalion advancing in the rear was approached by a band of mountaineers. This party of five, an officer and four enlisted men of an Austrian partisan organization, offered to guide the Americans over the mountains. There was apparently a little-known route to the east of and around the pass to Fernstein, lying just to the south at a point where a deep gorge was bridged. The offer was accepted, and while the battle to the north continued, Fernstein to the south was secured. Elements moved up the highway to take the defenders from the rear by surprise.

The drive was resumed, but not without further resistance from natural obstacles. Huge snow banks blocked the roads, and troops were



INFANTRYMEN ON ROAD LEADING TO RESIA PASS

*Landcock ahead and the Resia Pass beyond were the final objectives . . .*

exposed to freezing weather. The war, however, was now simply a matter of a few more uncomfortable hours; and when news of the end



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came at 1705 hours on 5 May the keeper of the 71st Regimental Journal scrawled the entry, "all hostilities will cease" and added in the margin, "about time!" On 4 May the 44th Division had cleared Imst and had come into sight of Landeck. The troops moved on toward the little town of Mils where the division fought its last battle.

Landeck ahead and the Resia Pass beyond were the final objectives, and both now were American targets. The town of Mils was left burning; and in the local truce arrangements made with Nineteenth Army commanders, represented by several colonels from the 257th German Infantry Division, a withdrawal to a line south of Landeck was agreed upon. By 1900 hours on 5 May the city of Landeck was occupied by American forces who now awaited news of the larger developments involving surrender and peace.

Farther east on the VI Corps front the 103rd Division had faced the city of Innsbruck, Seventh Army's primary objective in the Tyrol. Operations Instructions to the division had made clear its responsibility for spearheading through the Inn Valley to the Brenner Pass. General Brooks had told General McAuliffe on 1 May:

All my chips are on you now. The other people have run into a 500 foot chunk of blown road on the side of a cliff and it will practically stymie them . . . so we have got to do it with you. So drive hard and toss your blocks out on all these roads that you pass.

By the end of the day one regiment was out beyond Mittenwald and had practically cleared the Scharnitz-Seefeld highway. But it was not before evening on 3 May that troops entered Innsbruck, and only on the next morning that formal surrender of the city was taken.

Moving through Scharnitz, division intelligence discovered that the local commercial telephone exchange still had communications with German-held territories to the south. A call was put through and conversations were begun with the Innsbruck military command, which seemed anxious to negotiate. At some time during the four hours given the Germans to consider the demand for surrender the telephone lines went out. There was, however, every indication that resistance was crumbling and that enemy commanders were in a receptive mood for

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any kind of ultimatum. One commander had come forward under a white flag and proposed an armistice pending the completion of negotiations one way or the other. The American battalion commander



FIRE FIGHT NEAR SCHARNITZ, AUSTRIA

One regiment — had practically cleared the Scharnitz-Seefeld highway . . .

refused the request. His orders had been to continue the attack. Fighting was resumed in the vicinity of Seefeld and Reith.

Further threats to the German command, the immediate aerial and artillery destruction of the city of Innsbruck, brought agreement to capitulation. Papers were prepared for the surrender of the entire Tyrol-Vorarlberg area, and *parliamentaires* were dispatched for American emissaries passing through the lines. Blindfolded, and carrying white flags, the American mission climbed eight miles down the mountain from Reith into the Inn Valley. Members of the surrender party arrived at the headquarters to find themselves prisoners. The German Army negotiator was seized and told that armed Austrians had taken over the town and

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were in control everywhere. That afternoon the underground resistance movement had managed a successful coup.

This new complication proved to be very confusing. There were at that time other resistance groups in the area, as well as groups of fanatical German defenders whose sniper fire from the Alpine heights slowed down the infantry advance. Nevertheless, the issue was only a matter of hours, or a day; and General McAuliffe on his own responsibility called off the scheduled destruction of Innsbruck.

The Tyrolean resistance movement was of the same partisan cut as the forces which had sabotaged the German defense in Augsburg and Munich. Here in Austria there was an additional nationalist factor, and this served further to divide the loyalty of the troops at the disposal of the Gauleiter. Most of the main targets of the partisan putsch had been seized during the afternoon and evening of 2 May. The Gestapo camp and archives, the barracks of an SS Kaserne, the gendarmerie and police barracks, the local concentration camp, and the German Army headquarters were all taken, although not without a number of sharp fire-fights. An American impression of the Innsbruck revolution had

heavily-armed Austrians swarming all over the place, and the whole set-up looked like a Class C Hollywood movie . . . Some were in German uniform, some in civilian clothing, all wearing the white and red arm-band of the resistance movement. They all seemed excited and keyed up . . . Their attitude was very friendly . . . The halls were stacked with cases of MG and SA ammunition, and there were long rows of panzerfaust layed out. The men were loaded with 2 or 3 weapons each and had hand grenades stuck in their belts . . . all seemed excited and apprehensive that SS troops were coming in.

According to information received by 103rd Division intelligence, the partisan chief had about 800 armed men at his disposal, 300 from a battalion of Wehrmacht troops and 500 armed civilians. They had not only taken over most of the military installations but were preparing to take over the city's radio station. Threatened by SS troops east of Innsbruck, they had requested the entry of American troops as soon as possible. Unfortunately resistance forces had no control over the enemy still fighting against the 103rd Division north and west of the city.

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During the morning of 3 May the 409th Regiment continued its attack from Seefeld. One battalion moved out to the west toward Telfs; another advanced to clear Reith and Zirl in the face of some small arms and mortar fire. The intelligence filtered through that Innsbruck was an "open city;" and tank-mounted infantry moved east from Zirl, found the highway clear of all obstacles, and entered the city of Innsbruck late in the afternoon. By 1945 hours Americans had crossed the Inn River bridges and were moving through the Tyrolean capital. The weather was bitter cold with swirling snow; but there were crowds everywhere wildly cheering, waving red and white banners. People clogged the streets and held up military traffic along the Maria-Theresien Strasse.

For the troops, however, there was time for neither politics nor liberation ceremonies. VI Corps, its objective the Brenner Pass, urged the division on. That night Seventh Army's last combat mission on this front was dispatched. The 411th Regiment, motorized, moved



BRENNER PASS

VI Corps, its objective the Brenner Pass, urged the division on . . .

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out to race for the Italian border. With full head-lights shining brilliantly, the column made for the Brenner Pass. The full illumination was to increase the speed of the advance; lessen danger from mines and curving, slippery, mountain roads; and also to disconcert whatever enemy there might be. Peace rumors were abroad everywhere, and the long, lighted, 175-vehicle column might be deceptive. Brenner was taken at 0150 hours on 4 May. Later in the morning, at a point between Colle Isarco and Vipiteno in Italy, advance parties of General Patch's Seventh Army and General Truscott's Fifth Army met and joined. The task forces, which included a handful of jeeps, tanks, and armored cars, were from the 103rd Division's 411th Regiment, and the 88th Division's cavalry reconnaissance. The junction of American forces from Germany and Italy was completed on the highway where Mussolini and Hitler had met in former days.

After futile efforts to arrange some kind of official large-scale surrender, the American mission with its white flags and *parliamentaires* carrying it safely back and forth over friendly, allied, and enemy lines, found its way to Hall, a short distance down the Inn Valley. There Major West, G-2 of the 103rd Division located Gauleiter Hofer, Reichskommissar for the defense of the entire area and governor of Tyrol-Vorarlberg. Whatever hopes there were for a surrender agreement were precluded by the news that Hofer had been stripped of his military responsibilities the day before. A telegraphic message had been received from Kesselring, dated 2 May, specifically excluding Gauleiter interference in the further conduct of the war. This apparently was the Field Marshal's own preparation for surrender maneuvers. Hofer confessed that there were neither organized bodies of Wehrmacht or SS troops in the area, that there were no defenses from Innsbruck to Brenner and to Salzburg, and that the Redoubt or *innerfestung* was a dream. Of his own *Standeschutzen* forces which had numbered 56 battalions, only three were left and he was no longer in touch with them. He denied that he had weapons in his home; a search revealed 3 high-powered rifles with telescopic sights, 3 pistols, a short-wave radio. Gauleiter Hofer was removed as a prisoner, and he bade goodbye to his household with a Nazi salute and a "Heil Hitler!"

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### The Surrender of Tyrol-Vorarlberg

At the conclusion of the Innsbruck incident, the surrender of the German forces facing Seventh Army in west Austria proceeded according to a detailed "scenario." According to a VI Corps memorandum of 4 May on the ceremony for surrender, there was to be a motor escort, a guard with flags and colors, and a time schedule with all participants to be at their posts at 1130 hours on 5 May and the German commander to arrive at 1200 hours. The conference room was to be set up around a long table in accord with an appended diagram, specifying flags and positions of orderlies, interpreters, generals, and the German delegation.

Published plans detailed the development of events from the meeting of the escort with the German commander at the edge of town to the coming to attention of the guards and the dismounting, including the procession to the conference hall. No salutes were to be given or returned. The occasions for standing were listed, as were the order to be seated and the identification procedures. Then there was the reading of the terms of surrender. Germans were permitted to enter a side room for discussion among themselves if they so desired. Then came the signing of the documents; a total of 12 copies, 1 copy each in English, French, and German, distribution to the Sixth Army Group, Seventh Army, the First French Army, and VI Corps. Finally, the German delegation was to leave with no handshaking, no returning of salutes. The guard was to come to attention and present arms to the Commanding General, VI Corps; and finally there was to be the playing of the Marseillaise and the Star Spangled Banner.

There were only insignificant departures from the script. Lieutenant General Erich Brandenburg, Commanding General of the Nineteenth German Army, motored into Innsbruck from the Brenner Pass road, arriving at the Landsrat building in Innsbruck at 1320 hours, a little late. The prepared drafts of unconditional surrender were read. A few problems were raised. Obviously the effective hour of surrender was dependent upon radio communication facilities. The Innsbruck radio was operational; and the scattered remnants of the Nazi army could, thus, be organized. A request was presented to allow the arming of German guards, necessary for the effective protection of dumps and

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other installations. This was granted. A request that the draft of surrender be further modified to allow German general officers to retain their arms was refused. The rest was less significant. The Commanding General of the Nineteenth Army objected to the reference to him in the French translation of the surrender papers as a *Lieutenant General*, asserting that the equivalent in the French Army is *General*. The German emissaries were directed to present themselves without further delay. At 1500 hours General Brandenburg, with aides, returned to the conference hall. Present among others were General Brooks, General McAuliffe, General Morris, and General Dean. The unconditional surrender of the German troops was taken. Hostilities, for the United States VI Corps, and for the First French Army were over.

According to the Innsbruck surrender terms, all forces, including para-military forces would cease unconditionally all acts of



GERMAN NINETEENTH ARMY MEN LAY DOWN THEIR ARMS

... Arms, weapons, ammunition were to be collected at dumps; and all military equipment, telephones, radios, vehicles, and all movable military impedimenta were to be assembled ...

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hostility toward forces of the United Nations not later than 1800 hours, 5 May 1945. The Germans were to disarm themselves and remain in their present areas; the concentration of all equipment and personnel was required. Arms, weapons, and ammunition were to be collected at dumps; and all military equipment, telephones, radios, vehicles, and all movable military impedimenta were to be assembled. A troop list and a detailed catalog of minefield information was to be prepared. Instructions for the surrender of prisoners of war, political prisoners, hostages, and deportees were to be complied with immediately. The display or wearing of Nazi party badges, brassards, flags, and decorations was strictly prohibited. The Waffen SS was segregated from the Wehrmacht.

There was still anxiety over the possibility of a guerrilla resistance. Disorganized bands of enemy, well armed, were still roaming the mountains. Members of Nazi organizations, high and low ranking, were at large. The heights teemed with displaced persons of many nations. Seventh Army units moved out quickly to complete the occupation of assigned areas. Troops moved up the mountain valleys, town by town, village by village, until they reached the mountain walls and glaciers that marked the limits of human habitation. Patrols penetrated even into the snowfields in these fastnesses, seeking the hiders-out in lonely huts of German Alpine clubs. Roadblocks and check stations were set up at strategic points along the roads. VI Corps, which at the end of operations found itself back in Italy where it had fought on the beaches of Anzio some twelve months before, completed the occupation of its zone as far south as the Austro-Swiss and the Austro-Italian frontiers. Contact was maintained with elements of the Fifth United States Army at Brenner Pass and at Resia Pass where American elements met on 7 May. German commanders proceeded with the disarmament and administration of their units, and no incidents were reported during any of the security and police missions.

To the west in Vorarlberg, French and German troops became involved in a new burst of hostilities after the Innsbruck surrender. The difficulty apparently was that General Schmidt, commanding the Twenty-fourth German Army, had originally made contact with the First French Army. A truce had been arranged, but General Schmidt

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never appeared at the French headquarters and the Twenty-Fourth Army had at the last moment been attached to the Nineteenth German Army.

General De Lattre in a message to General Devers objected strongly to the fact that General Schmidt had surrendered his forces to the Americans with those of the Nineteenth German Army. The French commander requested that General Schmidt and his staff be turned over to French authorities for disposition. The request was disapproved by the Sixth Army Group Commander. A new cease fire order was issued on 7 May and fighting ended shortly thereafter.

Officially, however, all resistance along the VI Corps front west of Imst ceased at 1800 hours on 5 May in accordance with the negotiations for unconditional surrender by the Nineteenth German Army. It had been learned that negotiations were in progress with General Foertsch for the surrender of the entire German Army Group G, and that General Patch, concerned to prevent further casualties, had ordered Seventh Army troops frozen in place. Intelligence was immediately dispatched that VI Corps occupational task forces were already moving into their assigned places on the right flank. The Army commander's approval was passed to VI Corps through General White, his Chief of Staff, and the separate arrangements made by VI Corps were credited and approved within the framework of the larger negotiations with Army Group G.

The final touch to the surrender of Tyrol-Vorarlberg was this coordination with the surrender schedule which had been completed by representatives of XV Corps, Seventh Army, and Sixth Army Group in the Salzburg-Munich sector. General Brooks was advised by General Barr, Sixth Army Group Chief of Staff, that the surrender to VI Corps, effective 1800 hours on 5 May, gave an advantage over the army group surrender, effective 1200 hours on 6 May and that he should insist upon compliance with the extra 18-hour deadline. General Barr added: "I think everything is in the bag. General Devers and General Patch were working with XV Corps." By the end of the day there was peace on the Seventh Army front.

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### To Salzburg and Berchtesgaden

Final movements on the Seventh Army center and left flank remain to be considered. The Inn River flows east in the Tyrol and curves gently north to the frontier to emerge out of Austria into Germany. Between the Inn River and the Austro-German border stand great ranges of Alpine mountains which are best approached from the north-east in a southwesterly direction. In the middle of the Seventh Army front General Milburn's XXI Corps was attacking from the northwest in a southeasterly direction. These central forces were thus denied easy access to the Inn Valley by rugged mountains running parallel with the river. The 36th and 4th Infantry Divisions struck directly at the valley objectives; the 12th Armored Division moved east and around to seek natural entrances.

This swinging movement in the center unbalanced the course of the Seventh Army offensive. XXI Corps pushed over on the line of advance of XV Corps, which, on the army left flank, was now no longer facing south but pointed directly at the Salzburg Gap. The city of Salzburg itself was in the zone of the Third Army; and General Patton, because of his long, exposed, lightly-held left flank, was unprepared to advance on the Salzach River corridor until sufficient infantry had been brought up to assist and protect adequately his armor. There was considerable anxiety over the possibility that German troops, fleeing in front of the Third Army, might pour into the Alpine Redoubt area through the Salzburg Pass. The zones were quickly changed. General Patch was to strike for the city of Salzburg. The whole transaction, which involved among others General Devers, General Bradley, and General Eisenhower, was handled over the secret telephone, and some of the final details were expedited by plane. The major decision was cleared within twenty-four hours. In the opinion of Sixth Army Group, the decision which gave the Salzburg area to Seventh Army probably brought about the collapse of forces in South Germany. General Milburn and General Haislip were able to move into the former zone of the Third Army by an open flank and get to Salzburg with no loss of time.

As of 1 May General Patch had halted all units on the left flank for an estimated two-day rest. The 45th Division was left to garrison

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the city of Munich. Cavalry units were ordered to reconnoiter; and elements of the 3rd and 42nd Infantry and 20th Armored Divisions were to do no more than send patrols out to the front and flanks. Troop commanders, however, had difficulty slowing down the combat momentum which the April offensive had accumulated. By noon of 2 May all SHAEF approvals had been received for the drive to Salzburg. In telephone conversations that afternoon General Haislip relayed the information to his commanders.

Seventh Army troops sped for Salzburg and Berchtesgaden with enthusiasm and incidental confusion. One report of a traffic jam had five individual columns trying to get through a single by-pass. Light resistance in wooded areas, mostly from boys, was brushed aside. In the city of Rosenheim a few platoons slipped through some four battalions of enemy and secured a pair of bridges over which both XXI and XV Corps were to pass. The German regiment in Rosenheim, prematurely celebrating the end of the war with the news of Hitler's death, was effectively bluffed; and an American company commander accepted the surrender of the garrison. Counter-bluffs on the part of the enemy failed to bring him any advantage. One German colonel came through under a flag of truce and threatened resistance in his poison-gas dump area, unless he was given 24 hours to evacuate. The advance continued without regard for the threat. In the early evening of 2 May elements of the 106th Cavalry Group took the surrender of General Ferenc-Loskay and some 8,000 men and officers of the Hungarian Army's 9th Infantry Division.

Villages and towns all along the route of the Seventh Army attack were flying white flags; only a few bursts of machine-gun fire were needed to prompt the display. Individual task forces moved with such rapidity that they sometimes found themselves isolated. The 17th Armored Infantry Battalion of Combat Command R, 12th Armored Division, had jumped off from Starnberg on the Wurm See at 0645 hours on 2 May. At 1550 hours the armored infantry, whose half-tracks travelled two abreast down the Salzburg autobahn, halted their column beyond Pfraundorf some 60 miles away. Behind these spearheads of Combat Command R, SS engineers blew up a large autobahn bridge.

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Hour by hour the main roads became increasingly choked by the mass formations of surrendering Germans and their straggling columns of motor and horsedrawn vehicles.

American armor and infantry were striking freely in every sector of the mountain area. The 103rd Division, moving toward Innsbruck and the Brenner Pass, sent another force some 30 miles down the Inn River valley to make contact with XXI Corps, now dominating the Kaiser-Gebirge and the Kitzbuehler Alps. XV Corps, operating with the 20th Armored Division and the 106th Cavalry Group, the 3rd, the 42nd, and the 86th Infantry Divisions, swept through the autobahn area over Wasserburg and Rosenheim around both sides of the Chiem See and toward the Salzach River. The 86th Division, picked up from the Third Army flank, had been attached to Seventh Army effective 1900 hours on 2 May.



MAJOR GENERAL HARRIS  
M. MELASKY  
commanding the 86th  
Infantry Division

The attack on the city of Salzburg was less a combat problem than a motor march. The prize was not only Salzburg but Berchtesgaden, the retreat of Adolph Hitler lying in the shadow of the Obersalzberg mountain. There was virtually no resistance en route; and the long lanes of the autobahn, conceived as great strips for Nazi military maneuver, served the American Army well. The German forces were without transport,

without armor, and, since the loss of the Munich positions, without artillery. A few rounds of small-arms fire defended an occasional road-block. American divisions, which had seized everything on wheels for rapid movement, including all the trucks of the unemployed supporting artillery battalions, rolled out of Bavaria. There were some difficulties in Rosenheim as civilian riots broke out. There was no trouble before Salzburg. The city was being shelled when the garrison commander dispatched a delegation which crossed the space between on foot and offered unconditional surrender to elements of a

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cavalry squadron. General O'Daniel authorized the 106th Cavalry Group to accept the surrender. General Haislip then authorized General O'Daniel, upon his request, to accept the surrender in the name of the 3rd Division. This was on the morning of 4 May; the countryside was being blanketed by a post-seasonal snow, as a cold, damp wind whipped up and across the highways from the Tyrolean Alps. XV Corps troops now hooked back into Germany through the Salzburg pass toward Berchtesgaden, some 10 to 15 miles south and a little west.

General Milburn had already committed elements of both the 101st Airborne Division and General Leclerc's 2nd French Armored Division to a XXI Corps lunge for Berchtesgaden. The 2nd French Armored Division, which had been a part of Seventh Army operations at various times since its first assignment with XV Corps in the Luneville sector, had rejoined the army for its final drive after operations against the Germans' pockets on the French Atlantic coast.

During the night of 3-4 May, however, General Patch, cutting in on the wires of a telephone conversation between Generals Haislip and O'Daniel, found immediate capture of Berchtesgaden as feasible as it was desirable and gave the go-ahead signal to the 3rd Division. The progress toward the "eagle's nest" on Obersalzberg was closely watched from the new Seventh Army Command Post, which had opened in Augsburg at 1200 hours on 3 May, the last of its moves from the beginning of Operation DRAGOON to victory in Europe. Early in the afternoon of 4 May 3rd Division elements were reported about two and a half miles from Berchtesgaden. Plans were made to turn searchlights and headlights on for a night march. The 3rd Division was, of course, entirely out of zone, to which XXI Corps called attention. The reply was that the Army Commander had personally directed the capture of that area and it would be turned over shortly.

The Obersalzberg mountain was still smoking and smouldering from Allied bombing missions of the preceding days and from local fires started by desperate SS guards. The difficulty in closing into Berchtesgaden was due largely to the clogged condition of the roads. As one message reported, "everybody and his brother are trying to get into the town." Motorized task forces entered the mountain hide-out at 1558


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hours on 4 May. During the night the 7th Regiment came, then the rest of the 3rd Division, tank columns of the 2nd French Armored Division, and patrols of the 101st Airborne Division. The next day American troops were tearing down banners and insignia. A ceremony attended the raising of the American flag. Airborne patrols were moving in, trying to establish law and order. The mountain retreat which Adolph Hitler had built was now destroyed.

### The Surrender of Army Group G

After the capitulation in Italy, Field Marshal Kesselring had asked General Wolff, who was in command of the surrendering SS troops in North Italy, to find out with whom he should deal regarding his own capitulation. The information was forwarded. SHAEF informed General Devers of Kesselring's request, and through AFHQ the German High



GERMANS SURRENDER GROUP "G" TO SIXTH ARMY GROUP  
the surrender delegation headed by General Foertsch, First Army Commander, acting for General Schulz of Army Group G . . .

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Command headquarters learned that a conference with Sixth Army Group would be arranged. Instructions were included as to how the enemy representatives were to approach American lines and where they might come through. During the night of 3-4 May drafts of surrender terms were being drawn up in American command posts.

Seventh Army units in the Salzburg sector were alerted for the approach of the Kesselring party. The emissaries were to arrive in a vehicle with a white covering over the hood and a white flag displayed four feet over the frame. During the night of 4-5 May the 3rd Infantry Division made contact with the surrender delegation headed by General Foertsch, First Army Commander, acting for General Schulz of Army Group G. The plenipotentiaries were brought to a large estate near Munich, where on a grey, rainy Saturday in May the terms of unconditional surrender for the German armies on the southern front were dictated.



SURRENDER TERMS

... General Devers waited with General Patch, General Haislip . . .

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The Thorak Estate at Haar was a formidable gray stone structure with granite steps, marble floors, and massive doors and windows. The large rooms of the studio-mansion were crowded with white plaster statues and nude figures on horse-back. On one side the Germans had their own conference room. On the other at the far end of the table and facing the door, General Devers waited with General Patch, General Haislip, and the various staffs. The two parties had met in the courtyard. The Germans came to attention. No salutes were exchanged. Only a small number of details remained to be settled and incorporated in the final draft. At noon, as Lieutenant Colonel Henry Cabot Lodge, of Sixth Army Group, has recorded, General Foertsch

mounted the few polished black marble steps and stood in the open door. He wore the polished black boots and light field grey uniform of the German Army. Around his neck was the Iron Cross. . . . He was followed by the officers of his party, similarly dressed, although with less ornamentation. . . . General Menoher (XV Corps Chief of Staff) presented General Foertsch to General Devers and General Foertsch in turn presented his officers, each of whom stood and bowed when his name was called. . . .

General Foertsch began to speak, taking up the paragraphs of the surrender document one by one. He spoke in a clear deep voice, very slowly and distinctly, so that every word could be understood by anyone having even a smattering of German. He never argued. He knew, of course, that he was beaten. He would often begin his statements with the sentence: "I deem it my duty to point out . . ." and then would show, for example, that the German troops were so scattered that it would take more than the contemplated number of hours to get the news to them. Or else, coming to the dumps of German weapons which were to be established, he asked that they be guarded by armed men, lest disorderly elements in the country steal the weapons and thereby threaten law and order. He hoped that officers and military police could keep sidearms in order to maintain tranquility. His suggestions were all of that type. He stressed the number of refugees and the lack of food in his area.

General Devers would respond, asking questions and giving his views. After brief discussions, each point in turn was taken up. Boundaries were settled, the time schedule was established. General Devers was insistent that there be no misunderstanding on the big points — there was to be no 'armistice' — this was unconditional surrender. . . .

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The point had to be made quite clear. At the will of the Allies all commissioned and enlisted personnel of Army Group G, including General Foertsch and General Schulz, would become prisoners of war. Foertsch sat stiffly at attention. It was a full minute before he said anything. The man was manifestly suffering from the impact of emotion of the most violent character. Finally he bowed his head slightly, flushing a little, and replied, "I understand it. I have no choice. I have no power to do otherwise. . . ."

There was perhaps no choice, but throughout these last days there was another alternative, and the German General Staff was anxious to have the issue settled. "Does the American High Command intend," Foertsch inquired at one stage, "to hand over any prisoners made by the American troops to Soviet Russia?" The answer was noncommittal. The enemy apparently considered the point significant. It had become increasingly clear that the German High Command wished to accomplish the maximum degree of surrender to the western allies before acknowledging the simultaneous victory of the Red Army. The few days' lapse between local surrenders in the west, and the final conclusive capitulation to all the Allies, enabled many German troops to move westward and give themselves up to Britons or Americans rather than to Russians.

The meeting was adjourned at 1430 hours. An hour or so later the surrender document was complete with the signatures of General Devers and General Foertsch, General Patch and General Haislip. Effective at 1200 hours on 6 May 1945 all German military and para-military forces under the command of Army Group G were to cease unconditionally all acts of hostilities toward forces of the United Nations. All enemy elements were to disarm themselves immediately, remain in their present areas, retaining all mess and transportation equipment, food and forage necessary for self-maintenance and subsistence. All equipment and personnel were to be concentrated. The terms, or "specifications" which were found to be semantically preferable since the Germans found an implication of "conditions" in the word "terms", detailed the requirements for such enemy elements as were to remain armed, the technical disposition of weapons and ammunition, the

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character of necessary troop lists, and minefield markings. The German army relinquished nearly 100,000 square miles of territory, south of Allied lines to the Swiss and Italian borders and from the Rhine eastward to about 20 miles beyond Salzburg.

The surrender proceedings at Haar were clipped and systematic, businesslike, and military according to the book but there was little order or arrangement by map on the front lines. Even the formalities of the capitulation were not without their measures of confusion. It has been stated that on 5 May General Brooks of VI Corps was completing negotiations with representatives of the German Nineteenth Army at Innsbruck to accomplish the surrender of the enemy in Tyrol and Vorarlberg. The instrument of surrender of the Nineteenth Army, in fact, was signed after General Foertsch had already surrendered the entire Army Group G to General Devers.

Neither side had been able to maintain full liaison. Communications between the German Group G and its component armies had broken down completely. American commanders, too, in the rapid pace of the final offensive became separated one from the other for short periods of time. In the mountains some Seventh Army divisions became engaged in protracted negotiations with isolated enemy units, and the local proceedings were not without interest. The SS apparently considered itself divorced from any commitments the Wehrmacht command might register, and German surrender delegations found SS troops uncooperative. Representatives of Army Group G passed back through the American lines after the surrender at Haar but could get no German safe conduct. SS patrols blew a crater in front of the delegation, and established two roadblocks behind it. General Foertsch went on ahead alone and managed to get through. The others turned back and found their way to the 3d Division command post some time during the night of 6-7 May.

In the meantime high in the mountains some enemy troops were surrendering, some were fighting on, and in a castle near Woergl a minor civil war broke out. The Itter castle, situated on a high knoll, was the prison of Edouard Daladier and Paul Reynaud, former premiers of France; Generals Maurice Gamelin and Maxim Weygand; a sister of General DeGaulle and a son of Georges Clemenceau. The original capitu-

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lation of the garrison by the German commander was nullified by an unexpected onslaught from SS formations. Within the castle American and German soldiers fought side by side. The SS troops were trapped and the German defenders helped eliminate them. The German garrison commander was killed.

A message from General Patch, as of the afternoon of 5 May, had read: "All troops of German Army Group which oppose the Seventh Army have been ordered by their commander to surrender at 061200B. Forward units of Seventh Army are directed to remain in place and cease further combat at once." Still there was firing in the hills, although American patrols tried the public-address system and a distribution of peace pamphlets. Late at night on 6-7 May three American paratroopers, wandering around their motor pool and barracks area, were seized by German patrols and taken prisoner. In the morning they were dispatched back to Berchtesgaden with the request to return with officer representatives for surrender. SS units were beginning their own series of capitulations.

There was some lingering lower-echelon fanaticism, in one sector two German officers were killed for bringing American emissaries through. But on the instructions of General Telsdorf patrols were escorted through roadblocks, passed mined cliffs, and snipers in position. Arrangements were made for the surrender of the LXXXII SS Corps. Points were designated for the disposition of arms and ammunition, effective the next day, 8 May. That day, too, on the main highway a little south of Markartstein American elements were halted by an SS officer. He bore a flag of truce but insisted that the *Schutz-Staffel* was not under the command of Army Group G and was therefore not bound by the terms of surrender. The intelligence was forwarded that Obergruppenfuehrer and Waffen-SS General Gottlieb Berger, second only to Heinrich Himmler in SS rank, wished to negotiate for the capitulation of his forces. Berger commanded a Battle-Group comprising General Max Simon's XIII SS Corps with remnants of the 17th SS, the 35th SS (Nibelungen), and the 2d Mountain Divisions. General Berger's surrender was accepted by the 101st Airborne Division. The last enemy formation had now disintegrated.

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### Transition

During the last days of the campaign in Europe the attention of Seventh Army was directed both toward mopping-up operations and toward preparations for occupation. The end for the Seventh Army was also a beginning. Detailed planning for occupational duties had been in progress at the headquarters since January, although prior to its execution Operations Plan ECLIPSE went through rather far-reaching modifications. The second draft of plan ECLIPSE, published by Headquarters, Twelfth Army Group on 27 February, had indicated that Seventh Army would initiate the organization, occupation, and military government of the Eastern Military District comprising the state of Bavaria. Elaborate planning and research had been carried through by army on this basis, particularly by the G-2 staff.

On or about 11 April rumors reached the Seventh Army command post that ECLIPSE plans were being changed to give Bavaria to Third Army and Wuerttemberg, or the Western Military District, to Seventh Army. High level occupational planning was being carried on by Twelfth Army Group. Seventh Army pointed out through an intermediary, Sixth Army Group, that the change would involve a loss of three months planning and would entail a complete readjustment. The decision was that Seventh Army would occupy the Western Military District. Hence on 8 May the Army was far to the east of its occupational zone.

Adjustments were being made from the command post at Augsburg during the last days of the war. Of the 14 Divisions under army command at the close of the campaign some had been designated as occupational troops, others were scheduled for immediate or eventual redeployment to the Pacific Theater. The 4th Infantry Division had been sent to Third Army on 4 May in exchange for the 86th Division which had been received. Two divisions, the 63rd and 100th, were garrisoning rear areas in army reserve; and on 3 May the 12th Armored Division had also been ordered to army reserve. The other 11 divisions were in corps areas.

During the eventful period from 5 through 8 May, the attention of units in the line was given not only to their own occupational or

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redeployment problems but to the personalities of World War II who remained in their sectors to be liberated or to be apprehended as prisoners. A dragnet was stretched across southern Germany.

By 8 May Generals von Runstedt, von Leeb, and von List had already been seized by Seventh Army troops; and the French political and military prisoners of prestige, who had been held in the castle near Woergl, had been liberated. On 7 May the 106th Cavalry Group with its command post in Salzburg had sent out reconnaissance to the east. Troops reached the villages of Strobl and St. Wolfgang on the Wolfgang See to discover that King Leopold of Belgium was under guard in a villa near Strobl. Unresisting guards were disarmed by the reconnaissance party; and on the day before victory in Europe Leopold, King of the Belgians, was liberated. The hunt continued, however, for such individuals as Field-Marshal Hermann Goering, and Baron Oshina and his Japanese Embassy staff. There was also a systematic search for the treasures in looted art, jewels, and gold that the Germans had cached away in the Tyrol. SHAEF had cabled questions regarding the Goering collection of emeralds. Some 25 Hungarian freight cars were taken in the Seventh Army area, containing a staggering fortune in oriental and persian rugs, oil paintings, tapestries, and cases of gold and diamond jewelry. The search was persistent.

Cavalry patrols combed the mountains seeking out high-ranking German officers. Field-Marshal Kesselring turned up at the headquarters of the 101st Airborne Division and there, through General Winter, made clear that he could scarcely be expected to hold conferences with some local commander. Through 3rd Division communication facilities he announced himself to the Supreme Allied Commander. "Besides my activity as Commander-in-Chief West I am also, as ranking General, Feldmarschall of the Southern District at the disposal of the High Command of the Wehrmacht which authorized the staff with the command of the Southern District . . ." He was anxious to facilitate an easy settlement of all questions. On 10 May Admiral Doenitz and General Jodl requested an American plane for Kesselring. It was refused. A few hours later he was removed from command of the southern armies. A few days later he was placed under arrest.



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After his capture Goering was under guard of the 36th Division. On the morning of 8 May Colonel von Brauchitsch, his aide de camp, had presented two letters from Goering to the command post in Kufstein. They constituted offers of surrender, and pleas to the Supreme Commander for an interview in which they could talk "as one soldier to another." The letters declared:

I request of you to grant me free passage... and to place my entourage and family under American protection. I make it, remembering the time when the aged Marshal of France, Petain, in a situation equally difficult for his country, asked me for a similar interview which then actually took place.... Your Excellency will understand how I feel in this my most difficult hour, and how much I have suffered through my disability, due to my arrest, to do everything possible a long time ago in order to prevent further bloodshed in a hopeless situation....


The word went out to pick up Goering. He was not in his castle, which was guarded by fully armed SS troops of the "Florian Geyer" Division. Brigadier General R. I. Stack, of the 36th Division, found the whole Goering convoy parked along a road a few miles from Radstadt, Austria. The party proceeded out of the German sector into the American lines. One of the SS officers became unmanageable and had to be shot. Goering was affable.

The war in Europe was over. At 0816 hours on 7 May Seventh Army received the message:

1. A representative of the German High Command signed the unconditional surrender of all German land, sea, and air forces in Europe to the Allied Expeditionary Force and simultaneously to the Soviet High Command at 0141 hours Central European time, 7 May, under which all forces will cease active operations 0001B hours 9 May.
2. Effective immediately all offensive operations by Allied Expeditionary Force will cease and troops will remain in present positions...

Divisions again listed care and cleaning of equipment, calisthenics, and close-order drill in the day's program. The elaborate machinery of simultaneous redeployment and occupation had begun to function before the firing was over. The news of the cessation of hostilities came as no great surprise and consequently was not the occasion for hilarious celebration.

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Officially 8 May was the day of victory in Europe. General Patch issued an order of the day on Thursday, 10 May 1945, in which the Commanding General of Seventh Army expressed his praise and appreciation to the troops under his command:

1. I have just received the following cable from the Secretary of War: "I join a grateful nation in applauding the heroic part you and your men have taken in our triumph. Each soldier of the Seventh Army shares in congratulations for success gained through magnificent courage at the front. You can be proud of a distinguished accomplishment."
2. Observe, you glorious men of the Seventh Army, our efforts and exploits are not unrecognized in our country. To you who have done the fighting I send my deepest and most patriotic thanks.

ALEXANDER M. PATCH  
Lieutenant General  
United States Army  
Commanding



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## CHAPTER XXXI

*Support for the Drive into Germany*

Although this narrative has placed emphasis upon the operations and intelligence sections of the Seventh Army staff, and upon the combat units, it must be borne in mind that the other staff sections and the services of supply had an equally vital role in the success of the campaign.

One of the most important army functions, particularly after the entry into Germany, was the prompt release of combat units from responsibility for newly acquired territory, its administration and its use as a base for operations. The job of infantry and armored divisions and reconnaissance troops was to speed the advance. The job of controlling and managing to the military advantage of the army the territory which had been won was the responsibility of G-5, Civil Affairs and Military Government.

**Civil Affairs**

During the Seventh Army advance through southern and eastern France problems of civil administration were normally controlled by the French themselves. The Civil Affairs Staff was concerned primarily with liaison, with giving aid and supplies to the local governments, and in guaranteeing tight civilian control in the army area for reasons of military security and the expedition of military operations. When the Seventh Army reached the approaches to Germany in Alsace, it was necessary for Civil Affairs to exercise stricter supervision of all civilian activities. There were of course, large numbers of German nationals who had to be interned as a security precaution. Refugees and displaced persons became a problem.

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In the months of readjustment on the Seventh Army's Sarre and northern Alsace front the responsibilities of Civil Affairs increased. It was important that withdrawal and limited advance be made without violating security or precipitating a mass exodus. The strength and deployment of units might have been readily revealed to the enemy by permitting uncontrolled civilian circulation. In January there were 29 Civil Affairs detachments operated by army, more than double the number required in November.

As Seventh Army crossed the German border, Civil Affairs became Military Government. Divisions and corps took the first steps toward setting up military government. Initial proclamations and primary regulations were posted and enforced. Army military government detachments closely followed the tactical units. With the aid of counter-intelligence each detachment sought the immediate removal of Nazis from public office. It concerned itself with the protection and support of Allied nationals and displaced persons, the reestablishment of services and facilities to the extent necessary for Allied forces, the locating and safeguarding of supply stocks and sources, and in general the relief of tactical units from the responsibility for civilian problems. The first step was for the detachment commander to appoint or confirm as burgomeister a non-Nazi. The rest of the administration stemmed from him under the supervision of military government.

One of the major problems was the control, housing, and feeding of large numbers of displaced persons in each area. Health conditions required particular attention. The ideal DP camp organization included a military government detachment, a welfare team of five, a doctor, and a liaison officer of the nationality of the personnel to be handled. Displaced persons were diverted to collecting points and thence to camps, disinfected, given medical attention, and organized for camp administration. The provision of shelter, and a daily ration of 2,000 calories gradually reduced foraging expeditions. Every effort was made to speed repatriation, especially of French and other western Europeans whose homelands were readily accessible.

In all operations military government detachments were handicapped by small size and the lack of functional specialists who were to

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come later with regional groups. The important job of keeping order and guarding installations was done initially by the 36th Division west of the Rhine and by the 103d Division east of the Rhine. In view of the anticipated critical food shortage among civilians, local military governments encouraged farming and made available agricultural machinery.

During the last month of the war military government officers tapped some anti-Nazi sentiment which was of help in administration. In Starnberg a delegation of prominent professors and scientists called on the detachment, denounced the burgomeister, and offered themselves as anti-Nazis willing to help in any way. The government was built around this group. In other areas some 20 Nazi burgomeisters had been replaced in the last days of the war. Resistance leaders in Austria, as representatives of the Free Austria movement, made determined efforts to assist military government officials.

Most of the German civilians were obedient and docile, so well-disciplined and regimented that they responded to orders without question. Publication of sentences to individuals who violated curfew and other restrictions had a salutary effect. Public relations improved as the war came to a close. Civilians, particularly women, became convinced that the war would soon be over, and they did not want their town devastated. No important evidence of subversive or "werewolf" activities came to light.

Tactical units continued a policy of screening the population to uncover German soldiers, suspects, civilians without proper identification papers, and firearms. New police were located, screened, and given armbands. Looting became the chief problem in the preservation of order. Large concentration camps containing political prisoners were uncovered in the army area: Keisheim, Aiebach, Harlaching, Dittersheim and Dachau. These camps had close to 50,000 inmates at the time of liberation.

Only those German industries of primary importance to military and civilian needs were permitted to continue operations. Sabotage of power installations was small, with civilians in some cases refusing to carry out the orders of the retreating German army. Railroad rehabilitation was made difficult by the large numbers of Nazis among

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workers. Stern measures and a strict screening process eliminated subversive employees. The banking situation was satisfactory, records and cash in most buildings intact. All wages and prices were frozen at pre-occupation levels, but a small black market did exist in food and clothing.

Mimeographed news bulletins, improvised loud speakers, newspapers published by Army Group, and radio stations disseminated information on the progress of the war. Clergymen were asked to encourage food production to prevent shortages during the coming winter. The synagogue at Augsburg was reconditioned and services held. Works of art were sought out; important collections found at Heilbronn, Kockendorf, Fuessen, and elsewhere; and military protection given them.

At the close of the war military government turned its attention from the problems of following up the rapid tactical advance. Better integration was secured in the removal of Nazi officials. The surrender of German forces brought a notable release of tension in the relationships between civilians and the American forces.

#### Personnel and Liaison

Other army functions which had become accentuated in the final campaign against Germany were those of personnel and liaison. In January and February the problem of securing infantry replacements or reinforcements was still acute. At least three of the infantry divisions under Seventh Army command, the 42nd, 63rd, and 70th, had been milked of their personnel for infantry replacements to be sent to units on the Ardennes front. Even the acquisition of new men would not solve their personnel problems completely, since team-work has to be built up over a period of time. Messages to higher headquarters emphasized Seventh Army's need in the request to reconsider allocation of reinforcements. One such message stated:

As of 2359 (hours), 10 January, Seventh Army shortages totaled 508 officers and 15,104 enlisted men, of which 343 officers and 12,098 enlisted men are infantry. Battle and non-battle casualties are now running in excess of 1,000 per day. We need help if we are to maintain efficiency of fighting units.

After the crossing of the Rhine the Seventh Army casualty rate dropped considerably, and the need for infantry reinforcements became

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less acute. During the month of April, however, the army was confronted with a shortage of armored replacements. The Seventh Army G-1 was instructed to investigate together with armored divisions and reinforcement depots the possibility of requisitioning men of other military branches for "on the job" training with divisions. Armored Force officers at this time could be secured only by combat appointments.

During the winter and spring months of 1945 it became particularly important to provide rest centers, recreation, and leave for the troops who had been in the line so long that they were close to combat fatigue. Leave quotas to the United Kingdom were secured and administered by G-1. Rest and recreational centers were set up at Grenoble, Lyon, Cannes, Nice, Nancy, and Vittel. Rest Areas were variously assigned to corps, and the opportunity for a "break" in continuous combat became a significant morale factor.

Among the many problems which confronted army administration and personnel policy were those connected with German prisoners of war and the increasingly large number of liberated Allied prisoners. At Homburg, for example, a Russian prisoner of war camp was overrun. Every attempt was made to evacuate and repatriate Allied prisoners as rapidly as possible. As the war in Europe moved into its final stages, redeployment became the most significant and far-reaching problem. By 24 April discussions were under way with War Department G-1 representatives. Closely connected with redeployment were the requirements for adequate occupational personnel.

The efficient functioning of liaison sections within the structure of Seventh Army under G-3 supervision gave added force and coordination to the army's combat operations. The closest communication and representation by qualified liaison personnel was maintained with all units under and adjacent to Seventh Army. Particularly significant in the combined operations of Seventh Army and the First French Army was the early establishment and efficient operating procedure of the French Mission at Seventh Army Headquarters. The French Mission was headed during most of the campaign by Colonel Jean L. Petit, who periodically brought back from First French Army Headquarters last minute information on location of troops and future plans. Liaison

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officers from subordinate and adjacent units briefed the Commanding General at 1800 hours daily during the period of combat operations.

In army support of front line operations one of the most significant functions was bringing up to the line the supplies to be consumed there, the vehicles, the guns to be turned against the enemy. Supply operations fell into these general divisions during the final phase: (1) the retrograde movement, (2) the period of supply build-up, (3) the offensive. The first period was relieved during the last week in January when it became apparent that the German drive had been blunted. The completion of operations in the Colmar pocket area on 9 February marked the beginning of a static period along the army front that lasted until 15 March, when the build-up of supplies was termed adequate to support the offensive operation. The third period that began with the offensive and included the crossing of the Rhine found Seventh Army contending with ever-lengthening supply lines that stretched deep into and across Southern Germany. The final period ended with the cessation of hostilities on the Seventh Army front.

#### Supply During Defensive Operations

In the opening days of 1945 Seventh Army supply installations effected a retrograde movement anticipated in the latter part of December. Personnel had been alerted and dumps prepared for quick evacuation in the event of a strong and successful enemy drive. When the attack broke on the army's northern front on New Year's Eve, a rearward movement of supply positions had already begun. This was to mean an increase in the hauling distance between installations and using troops.

Since the middle of October supply had kept pace with tactical moves, maintaining a minimum distance between divisions on the line and main supply points. Rail transportation had been advanced to points beyond Haguenau and included a line from Saverne through Strasbourg to Molsheim. Third Army rail facilities from Nancy had been coordinated to deliver supplies to the Seventh Army left flank along Chateau-Salins, Hampont, and Haboudange. Main supply routes emanated from Epinal, Luneville, and Sarrebourg and were correlated for a minimum of traffic

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confusion in moving balanced tonnage to division supply dumps in the Vosges Mountains.

Inventories had been reduced in the forward supply dumps to the lowest possible level commensurate with evacuation should the retrograde movement be ordered. A strain was placed on transportation to accomplish the safeguarding movement to the rear. How successful the move was, may be judged by the fact that no supply installations of an echelon higher than division level were lost to enemy action.

In returning the main supply points to the rear Seventh Army was forced to substitute a safety factor for flexibility. Selection of the previously used installations in Epinal and Luneville outweighed the distance factor, since covered storage space was not to be found in other areas. The intermediate points of Sarrebourg and Saverne were utilized as forward supply points with the bulk of forward stocks of food, gasoline, and ammunition carried in the Saverne installations. Bad weather and enemy action made it extremely difficult for the supply services to maintain a balanced flow of supply and equipment. The addition of supporting divisions combined with the high rate of expenditure in Seventh Army defensive action increased the amount of supplies needed and made balanced tonnage essential. However, receipt was not entirely satisfactory. Delay of rail shipments by the weather, unbalanced tonnage from Continental Advance Base Section, and a high rate of attrition of equipment in combat combined to make the supply picture critical during the month of January.

At the division level, the 3rd and 45th Infantry Divisions described the month of January as the most difficult and critical for supply of any they had experienced. Lack of ammunition in the division dumps forced regiments on the line to re-supply from the basic load of the regiment in reserve. Specifically short were mortar and machine gun ammunition. During one period in the early part of January the forward army supply point was without 60 mm mortar and .30 caliber machine gun ammunition for a period of 24 hours, and other small arms ammunition was critically short for a period of four days.

Another major supply shortage occurred during January in gasoline. This was caused by several factors including heavy troop move-

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ment, cold weather, and the fact that available stocks were spread thinly over six main distributing points to cover the wide front. To offset the deficiency, rationing was put into effect on 7 January which limited units to 75 per cent of their drawings of 5 January. Units forward of corps boundaries, however, could exceed this limitation under operational necessity. The reserve supply was considered inadequate to cover any sudden change in the tactical situation, particularly sudden moves of armored divisions. Base Section responded with immediate shipments of gasoline to army and increased daily issues to permit the build-up of a more nearly adequate reserve.

The issue of rations and availability of food stocks appeared satisfactory on paper with better than half the authorized supply in army dumps. But most of this percentage was of the hard ration variety, and the issue was predominantly B rations. Cold weather caused a loss in certain items due to freezing in transit. Shipments of fresh potatoes and fruit became impracticable because shipments had to be made in unprotected boxcars that resulted in a loss as high as 50 percent of perishable items.

Thus the supply services of Seventh Army entered the final phase of the campaign with the three "must" items of rations, gasoline, and ammunition in a status of unpredictable availability. Termed critical by the individual supplying services, shortages did not remain in the acute stage for more than short periods. Necessary expedients were initiated to relieve the most acute conditions, and readjustments were made whenever necessary to insure the flow of supply.

Availability was dependent on Base Section's ability to supply and transportation's ability to deliver. Base Section was responsible for transportation to the rear of army dumps. As a result of a recognized German concentration on the Seventh Army left flank during the latter part of December, a command decision was made involving the shortening of army lines. This necessitated a reversal of the flow of supplies after a virtual three-day cessation in movements. At the time of the expected German attack the reverse flow was already in effect. However, the limitations of rail transport made it necessary to coordinate the withdrawal of supplies from the forward supply points with in-

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coming shipments already consigned to go forward. Supplies coming back and those coming forward congested in the army area. Although the supplies were still needed, there was insufficient storage and manpower to handle the incoming flow of supplies from CONAD and the returning flow of supplies from forward installations that were being closed.

The necessity of using engineer regiments and battalions as combat troops had stopped work on nearly all railway bridge repairs during January. One exception was the bridge south of Saverne, the completion of which opened the route from Saverne to Molsheim on 15 January. This eliminated the necessity of routing trains from Saverne to Molsheim through Strasbourg. The heavy troop movements in the latter part of January, as well as heavy snowfalls, taxed the rail facilities and tied-up equipment that normally would have been used to move supplies. Representatives of all supply services of Seventh Army met on 19 January to devise means of alleviating the situation. Certain remedial efforts were to be put into effect, including a 24-hour unloading limit for cars at railheads, the use of four trains daily split between rations and gasoline, and only one-tenth of the ten-day allocation of ammunition to be moved each day.

Weather created unforeseen delays, stalling trains in deep mountain passes and backing up supplies. Seventh Army and Military Railway Service personnel worked long hours to open the tracks, and railroads were finally able to render some form of normal service. Truck shipments, however, served as the bulk carriers of supply during this period. Within army boundaries it had been necessary on 7 January to establish a reserve pool of 175 trucks near Saverne under the control of VI Corps. At times this left a large number of trucks idle, but it was considered an operational necessity in order to coordinate the tactical movements which depended largely on speed in execution for success. By 23 January it was possible to disband the pool.

To keep motor transportation moving it was necessary to emphasize preventive maintenance. But ordnance units in division and army levels performed more work in January than in any previous period. The scarcity of major assemblies and replacement motors dead-

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lined a large number of vehicles at a time when they were badly needed. In the 3rd Infantry Division during the middle of January the ordnance record showed 120 two and one-half ton trucks deadlined. The supply routes from Epinal and Luneville to Saverne were the main routes travelled by trucks and, added to rail deliveries, supplied ten reinforced divisions. The forward installations in Saverne issued the bulk of supply. Sarrebourg was the forward point for certain quartermaster items and toward the end of January was also a ration and gasoline point.

In the operation to clean out the Colmar Pocket, Divisions from SHAEF reserve were attached to Seventh Army and XXI Corps, which was placed under the operational control of the First French Army. However, the supply of these divisions remained the responsibility of Seventh Army. To decrease the long supply haul between Epinal and Luneville and the new sector of XXI Corps an intermediate installation was put into St. Die for rations and gasoline. Ammunition was still drawn from the army supply point at Bayon with lesser draws from Saverne. Both points involved a 200 mile turn-around for the transporting units.

The shortage of gasoline during most of January was relieved by the return to more normal rail operations. But there were periods during the month when the level of available stocks in army dumps was extremely low.

On 13 January, gasoline on hand in army was totaled at 1.1 days of supply as compared to the authorized level of seven days. During the first two weeks of January issues were consistently greater than the receipts from Base Section. During this time Seventh Army consumed an average daily gallonage of 363,678, but receipts averaged only 335,678 gallons. Heavy troop movements and increased use of armored divisions accounted for army's high rate of consumption and prevented buildup of a reserve. Pipelines were not operational to Sarrebourg during January, although preliminary work had been completed. By 20 February a 2,000,000-gallon storage tank was operational in Sarrebourg. This was part of the pipeline project and materially aided army's attempt to establish a large reserve for future operations.

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Need for winter clothing was intensified by the addition of SHAEF reserve divisions to Seventh Army command and by the loss of considerable organizational equipment in the Bitche sector. Supplies



EMPTYING BULK GASOLINE DRUMS PRIOR TO FILLING 5 GALLON CANS  
Seventh Army consumed an average daily gallonage of 363,678

were short. Temporary relief was obtained from stocks under control of ETOUSA. Local procurement of white cloth was initiated by the quartermaster for use as material for camouflage. Seventh Army received an allocation of 6,000 snow suits which were distributed among front line divisions.

Other shortages were felt during January, particularly in engineer and signal equipment. Plans for defensive positions increased requirements for engineer field fortification material, including wire, pickets, and concertina. By the end of January it was estimated that only 20 percent of the demand was available. Strict rationing of field wire needed by combat units to maintain communications created some difficulty. The ordinary requirements of 250 miles of wire per day for

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each division had to be satisfied by a quota of less than 30 miles per day. Only by rigid economy and recovery of wire were divisions able to maintain their communications.

The shortage of combat radio sets was not relieved until late in January, and tended to reduce the efficiency of special units, such as engineer battalions which had been committed as infantry. The long distance from front lines to the signal depot at Thaon made it advisable to open a forward depot on 27 January in Heming, which facilitated supply to divisions. A critical shortage of signal personnel occurred with the addition of XXI Corps. As a result of the transfer of units, Task Force Herren was at one time temporarily without signal contact with army.

During January approximately 20,000 long tons of supplies were moved in the Seventh Army area each week. With this flow of materiel, normal though it was for the increased size of Seventh Army, the number of supply installations had to be held to an absolute minimum to insure the maximum effective use of available supplies. The coordination of supply services to give the greatest possible support to the divisions fighting under the uncertain conditions of defensive warfare was a Seventh Army responsibility fulfilled by the quartermaster, engineer, signal, medical, and ordnance sections. Increased use of civilian labor facilitated to some extent the work of these special staff sections.

#### Ammunition and Ordnance

The supply of ammunition and maintenance of ordnance strength constituted what was probably the most serious service problem confronted by Seventh Army during January and early February. Bad weather and heavy fighting, together with the closing of forward supply points, complicated both the supply and issue of ordnance materiel. Close coordination between transportation and army and division ammunition officers was necessary to insure that available stocks would be readily accessible to the units. This was essential because of abnormally high expenditures by all troops. For example, expenditures of machine gun ammunition, increased from 200,000 rounds per day to

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approximately 600,000 rounds per day. To take care of immediate needs of Seventh Army, trucks were dispatched to supply points of the First French Army and the Third Army. Inter-army cooperation of this nature relieved shortages until Base Section could make delivery. New allocation systems by SHAEF and Sixth Army Group were developed to cover the deficiencies of Seventh Army ammunition supply.

A specific illustration of ammunition expenditures in Seventh Army may be shown by examination of a VI Corps action. As a result of heavy engagements on this front, more ammunition was expended in January by VI Corps artillery than by either XV or XXI Corps. Expenditure for all weapons was heavy; that for the 105mm howitzer, for example, reached 35 rounds per day, or five rounds over the SHAEF rate. Although there were single periods of action when the rate of expenditure exceeded the allocation, such as one artillery battalion using 18 day's allowance in one 48-hour period, firing was controlled to such an extent that the monthly expenditures did not constitute a dangerous excess. At the end of January Seventh Army was supplying 18 divisions.

Losses in ordnance were heavy during January. Top priority was given to the repair of items in maintenance, both in army and in base section shops. The extent of loss in the first week of January in VI Corps, the army's most active front, was especially heavy: 12 armored reconnaissance vehicles, 35 half-tracks, 68 jeeps, 6 light tanks, 13 trucks, and 38 trailers. Losses in medium tanks for the first 18 days of January in VI Corps were 83 with 22 replacements received. There were 319 operational tanks in the corps as of 18 January, and an additional two days of operations reduced this to 309. By the end of the month, medium tanks operational had dropped to 271.

Army reserve of major items for an authorized 15 day level was based on the total quantity on hand times one-half of the latest War Department monthly replacement factor. Besides losses due to enemy action, the arrival of a number of divisions from SHAEF reserve, plus supporting troops, and the necessary re-equipping of those divisions gravely depleted army reserves. During this period the loss in VI Corps exceeded the War Department replacement factor and theater reserve scale. However, all losses were not attributable to enemy action. The

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79th Infantry Division on 23 January listed losses due to icy conditions of the roads which necessitated the destruction by our own troops of equipment, including small arms, tank destroyers, armored cars, and tracked vehicles, to prevent enemy recovery. Only by the most careful supervision by the Seventh Army Ordnance Officer were the needs of front line divisions in ammunition and weapons met at the end of January and during the following month.

### Build up For the Last Offensive

From the time the Colmar Pocket was declared liquidated on 9 February until 15 March, emphasis was placed on the build-up of supplies to support a major offensive that was aimed to sweep the Germans out of the area west of the Rhine, establish bridgeheads across the Rhine, and exploit any breakthrough that might result after the crossing had been completed. It was this goal that the supply services sought to fulfill in developing a sufficient back-log of materiel; and, with the exception of certain classes of ammunition unavailable in base sections, the goal was reached in time to support the offensive.

Gasoline continued to be a critical item during the first few days of February. However, the necessity for rationing on the 75 percent basis was rescinded on 4 February since receipts were by this time higher than issues. The placing in operation of the pipeline between St. Jean De Losne and the La Forge installation at Sarrebourg during the first week in February realized a potential source of gasoline for army of 180,000 gallons per day. Increased shipments from Base Section during this same time removed gasoline from the short supply column. As shipments increased during late February, it was possible to shift the La Forge bulk storage plant to Base Section control. As a result army supply was held to a desirable level with a substantial supply available in Base Section for emergency needs. Warm weather, an important factor in increasing shipments from Base Section, also served to decrease the demand for diesel fuel and removed this item from the short supply status.

Rations flooded into Army dumps in ever increasing amounts, from five days supply in the last week of January to a surplus during

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the latter part of February of over 16 days on hand in army installations. It became possible to make unrestricted issue of B rations completely balanced through sorting and re-issue. The flow from Base Section was



UNLOADING OF GASOLINE FROM TANK CARS

"... Increased shipments from Base Section during this same time removed gasoline from the short supply column ..."

halted temporarily to bring the supply on hand down to the desired level of seven days. Fresh meat became more readily available, and through newly opened cold storage facilities at Dijon and Epinal front line troops were supplied. The relatively warm weather improved the quality of the bread, and increased issue was possible on full authorized allowances. Fresh fruits and vegetables were once again available to troops, as warmer weather made possible shipment of perishable items into army ration dumps.

As of 5 February ration dumps were operating at Hampont, Mackwiller, Saverne, Luneville, Sarrebourg and St. Die. At the conclusion of activity in the Colmar Pocket it was no longer necessary to

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maintain the installation at St. Die, which was closed on 15 February. To facilitate the handling of supply from Base Section to Nancy a non-issuing installation was maintained at Chateau-Salins. The 3rd Infantry Division while operating as SHAEF reserve drew rations and gasoline directly from base installations at Nancy. To furnish the closest possible support for the 15 March offensive rations dumps were opened in the forward areas of the XXI and XV Corps.

The third of the three "must" classes of supply, ammunition, was the most serious item during the period of build-up. Partially because of the heavy expenditures during January and the continued heavy firing to eliminate the Colmar Pocket, allocations were very limited. This was necessary to achieve reserve stockage for the impending offensive. With the exception of a limited offensive in the Saarbruecken-Forbach area by the XXI Corps expenditures were light. Average daily issues at Army amounted to 39 percent of the receipts, or approximately 534.6 long tons. Compared to the average daily issue of 1,200 long tons during the Colmar Pocket fighting, the decrease in the expenditure may be seen.

An ammunition analysis by Sixth Army Group on 1 February indicated the status of ammunition in relation to anticipated expenditures by Seventh Army and the development of sufficient resources for the future major offensive.

There will be insufficient ammunition available to properly support a major offensive by Seventh Army until at least 30 days after the elimination of the Colmar Pocket. Then the ammunition available in the heavy calibers will be insufficient unless augmented from outside Sixth Army Group. Operations during the saving period must not require ammunition more than one-half of SHAEF's rate.

Seventh Army was issued the SHAEF rate for the period 1 February to 10 March but established its own build-up at army supply points. In compliance with the wishes of the Commanding General, Sixth Army Group, Seventh Army limited its daily expenditure of artillery ammunition to 50 percent of the daily quantity allocated for the period. The limitation did not apply to ammunition for the 3-inch gun, 75mm howitzer, and 75mm tank gun. For the month of February tonnage increased from 26,000 to 48,000 tons as a result of increased

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shipments from Base Section and stringent restrictions on expenditures. With the exercise of great care, Seventh Army finally was able to consider its ammunition supply sufficient for the 15 March offensive.

The physical delivery of materiel, although not as difficult as during January, was impeded by extensive thaws in Seventh Army area which resulted in road deterioration. In January French civilian highway engineers had assured the Seventh Army Engineer that roads in the army area were not subject to thaw damage, and army highway maintenance plans had been based on the necessity only for normal repair. Preliminary information was found to be in error. Rapid disintegration of the road nets required major repairs and the use of all available engineer troops to keep truck supply operative. On 9 February the Army Engineer advised General Patch that it would be some time before appreciable improvement could be expected. Regulations issued by Seventh Army in February eliminated all unnecessary traffic, set the speed limit at 25 miles per hour, reduced the 100 percent overloading of vehicles to the rated capacity, and required a maximum use of rail transportation. These restrictions, which helped bring to a halt road deterioration, were lifted on 26 February.

The burden of carrying the bulk of Seventh Army supply was absorbed by rail as the result of the partial highway breakdown. Steady build-up of supplies in all installations was possible in spite of extremely heavy troop movements that included the return of attached divisions to other armies. Restrictions were placed on movements by infantry divisions, which usually required two trains for vehicles and from four to five trains for personnel and equipment, and by armored divisions which required approximately 12 trains. These inter-army troop movements were scheduled from railheads that would not interfere appreciably with the movement of army maintenance supplies.

Expansion of the rail network was held to a minimum during the build-up period, since most of the available engineer troops were employed on highway repair. Operative lines, however, had not been greatly affected with the retrograde movement in January. The two main rail lines ran from Nancy through Hampont and Haboudange to Sarralbe, and from Lunéville through Sarrebourg to Sarralbe, although

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the latter line was not in operation between Sarrebourg and Sarralbe until 1 March because of damaged bridges and track north of Fenetrangle. Work was then continued on the line from Sarralbe to Sarreguemines, since it was contemplated that the offensive would be in this direction and that the line would be needed to carry the bulk of Seventh Army supply. The proximity of the front line to Sarreguemines did not permit reconnaissance beyond this point.

On 28 January there were 61,995 long tons of all classes of supply on hand in Seventh Army. The highest point for materiel on hand was attained on 24 February when the total amounted to 113,886 long tons. At this time shipments from Base Section of those supplies which army possessed in excess were curtailed to effect a more evenly balanced figure in all classes of supplies. During February rail and truck transport had increased proportionately. Beside the movement of supplies five divisions were moved out of and three divisions into the Seventh Army area during February. There were 187 other units moving to different locations. By 15 March all classes of supply had been brought up to a satisfactory army reserve, although signal and ordnance equipment were the last to be considered adequate. Table of Equipment shortages of medium tanks had been replaced by the middle of February, but accessories had in many cases been lost in transit prior to arrival in the army area. It was at times necessary to cannibalize deadlined tanks to put the new tanks into operation.

Preparation for the Rhine River crossing by DD-tanks created singular problems of supply. Special rubberized canvas shrouds for tanks, manufactured in Paris and delivered to Luneville, were received only a very short time before they were needed. Seventeen DD-tanks were processed for the crossing. Tests were conducted with cargo carrying DUKW's to determine what loads could be safely carried. Preparations were made to supplement the facilities of army depot companies supporting the operation by the addition of Continental Advance Section units should they be required.

The addition in February of five SHAEF divisions had made the problem of service troops very acute. It was necessary to shift available service units to handle urgent requests, until appropriate ser-

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vice troops to support the newly attached divisions were received in the army area. Reshifting was again necessary when these divisions were returned to the Twelfth Army Group and the supporting service troops detached from Seventh Army control. With the addition to Seventh Army of three divisions, prior to the 15 March offensive, the supporting service units were closed in the army area at an earlier date. A number of service units were permanently assigned to Seventh Army during this supply build-up period, and were the culmination of long-standing requests for such units. Ten quartermaster truck companies received during the week the offensive began were needed to facilitate army movement of troops and supplies to support any extended advance. Rear installations were being operated by an increasing number of civilian personnel to free army troops for the operation of supply installations inside Germany.

#### Operation Undertone and Supply Services

Engineer troops with combat divisions played a significant part in breaking through the Siegfried defenses and in the crossing of the Rhine River. The requirements of explosives for breaching the Siegfried Line were calculated in advance by the army engineer, and troops were supplied with the necessary materiel between 15 and 20 March. Preliminary planning for the crossing of the Rhine River had included a long program of training for engineer troops. It was apparent from the speed of the river that mechanical equipment and trained personnel would be needed for the assault crossing. It was also necessary to devise substantial anchors for ponton bridges and some form of mine barrier capable of standing up in a fast current. So well trained were engineer personnel that of the 400 motors in assault craft started simultaneously the morning of the crossing only one known failure occurred. River crossing equipment had been assembled and the assault carried through according to plan.

In order to transport enough pontons for the construction of a heavy ponton bridge which would support medium tanks, a quartermaster truck company equipped with ten-ton trailers was attached to each heavy ponton battalion. In this way 132 pontons were transported

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in one trip. The motor column of each river-crossing group comprised about 600 vehicles, was 35 miles long, and required over nine hours to pass any given point in column.

One part of the over-all engineer plan included the long-term logistical support of the army after the crossing had been completed. To insure the necessary timber needed for bridging and rail reconstruction, procurement plans had been formulated in October, and by the time of the *Undertone* offensive sufficient materiel was on hand. Plans for bridging the Rhine had been carefully laid in advance. First priority was given to the construction of a highway bridge to be started between D plus 4 and D plus 10 and to be completed by D plus 24 or D plus 30. Second priority was given to a railroad bridge to be started upon completion of the highway span and to be finished by D plus 40. Additional structures planned in advance included a second railroad bridge. At a later date another highway bridge, the responsibility of Communications Zone, was to be built. Construction of a Bailey bridge on barges, as an interim measure, was considered feasible and a design approved on 19 March.

In addition to the crossing equipment provided by the two engineer groups, sufficient treadway units were distributed to XV Corps, making the crossing, to permit the construction by corps troops of a treadway bridge behind each assault division.

The crossing of the Rhine on 26 March focused attention on the necessity for a close follow-up of supply installations. Support for army in its rapid forward movement was essential. Adequate supply had been developed within army, and there were no shortages of major items of equipment existing that would hinder the tactical plan. Rations, gasoline, and ammunition were sufficient to support the offensive operation. However, at the end of March the quartermaster Class II and IV dump was still located in Sarrebourg and the engineer Class II and IV dump in Luneville. The long haul between divisions operating east of the Rhine and supply installations heavily burdened transportation units. Motorized movement of troops jeopardized the haul of supplies, since it was necessary to use army transportation as well as corps and division trucks to maintain the pressure on the disorganized German army.

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Once the Rhine was reached the physical crossing became the responsibility of the engineers. The crossing was made on a front of a little over nine miles. Although overall opposition was not strong, at points of concentration it did considerable damage to the storm and assault boats. During one regimental crossing every boat received at least one bullet or shrapnel hole, and another regimental crossing resulted in the loss of two-thirds of the boats involved. In the first 30 minutes of the crossing, eight assault battalions were ferried to the east bank of the Rhine, and the assault regiments were across one hour later. Field artillery battalions crossed the river three and one half hours after H-Hour, and all the artillery of the assault regiments had been crossed by H plus 10 hours. During the first 24 hours after H-Hour rafts transported over 1,000 vehicles across the river, including 50 tanks. The reserve regiment of one division was completely across the river by H plus 11 hours and the reserve regiment of the other division by H plus 15 hours.

The heavy ponton and treadway bridges were constructed in good order, the first being finished by the middle of the afternoon of D-Day, a construction time of nine hours and 12 minutes, believed to be the shortest construction time for any floating bridge ever put across the Rhine River. The first tank crossed the bridge at 1515 hours of D-Day. During the next ten days 38,923 vehicles used the bridge. The two assault divisions were completely across the river by H plus 22 hours. All Seventh Army divisions, excepting those in army reserve, approximately 350,000 men with supporting vehicles, were across the river in less than a week. Army headquarters crossed on D plus 7 days. On 28 March two dummy heavy ponton bridges were constructed at Mannheim over which crossed several divisions of the First French Army. A total of 30,670 vehicles used this bridge the first week it was in operation.

Previous long-term logistical planning for the support of Seventh Army had included two timber highway bridges, a Bailey bridge on barges, and two railroad bridges to be built for the main supply routes. Materials and equipment for the construction of the first four bridges had been assembled as close behind the front lines as

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possible, prior to the assault on the Siegfried Line. The first highway bridge constructed was 1,048 feet long, 30 feet wide, and had a capacity of 70 tons. Work was started on D plus 3 and completed ten days later. Erected from materials procured locally, including 340 piles that had been cut during the winter in the Vosges by Seventh Army personnel, it was a two-way, timber pile-bent, steel stringer bridge. Materials and equipment were transported entirely on engineer organic vehicles 85 miles from the assembly area to the site of the crossing. The heavy equipment, including two 70-ton pile-driving rigs, was routed over backroads so as not to interfere with the essential supply convoys of ammunition, gasoline, and rations.


Opening the rail line to the Rhine was also an engineer function. Two routes were to be finished at the same time the rail bridge across the Rhine was ready for use. The route from Pfaffenhofen, near Haguenau, through Wissembourg to Worms followed the drive of the VI Corps. The second route from Sarreguemines through Kaiserslautern to Worms followed the XV Corps push. Single-track rail facilities were completed on both sections by 3 April. The first rail bridge over the Rhine at Mannheim was completed on 23 April and a second at Karlsruhe on 28 April. Construction was completed in 15 days and 10 days respectively.

In the construction of the Bailey bridge on barges, the engineers took advantage of existing bridge conditions. Immediate reconnaissance had disclosed that many barges near the crossing had been sunk. Plans were then made to utilize the still-smouldering remains of a German military trestle bridge near Frankenthal, three miles north of Ludwigshafen. The German bridge originally consisted of trestle approaches with floating navigation bays totalling approximately 400 feet. Although 300 feet of the superstructure of the trestle bridge had been destroyed, many of the pile-bents were still usable. All navigation bays had been sunk or were missing. By cutting and recapping existing bents and by driving additional bents as required it was possible to erect a continuous double-single Bailey bridge to span the gap. The 820 foot continuous Bailey bridge was started on D plus 2 and completed on D plus 13.

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Transportation continued to be the key to the supply availability for Seventh Army with Base Section resources adequate for army requirements. A short time after the offensive was begun, combat units had progressed so rapidly that existing railheads were no longer far enough forward. Completion of the rail bridge across the Sarre River at Sarralbe made it possible to open a railhead at Sarreguemines. This new railhead with another nearby at Sarreinsming handled 31,024 tons of supplies during the first seven days of operation. Rear installations at Epinal and in the Chateau-Salins sector were turned over to CONAD, permitting the use of army regulating personnel at forward locations and releasing additional service troops for new supply points. Some 125,000 tons of supply were moved into the army area by rail during the period from 15 March to the end of the month.

Although repair of rail facilities was accomplished as rapidly as possible, army was nevertheless forced to depend on truck operations.



NUREMBERG MARSHALLING YARDS AFTER AERIAL BOMBARDMENT

"... repair of rail facilities was accomplished as fast as possible ..."

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as the forward supply installations were extended to the Rhine River. The turn-around time was increased to nearly 24 hours and appreciably decreased the potential lift. To increase the supply haulage capacity six truck companies were attached to Seventh Army, making it possible to use a daily average of 1,253 trucks for over-the-road hauling. Troop movements, which included the additional divisions returned to army control to support the offensive, and small unit moves resulted in a total of 46,168 vehicles moving in convoy over the road network during the month.

### Beyond the Rhine

Once the Rhine had been crossed and the assault divisions had pushed east, distances for supply transportation lengthened accordingly. The consumption of gasoline increased, as three armored divisions spearheaded the advance. A shortage in five-gallon gas containers required conservation measures to insure the availability of packaged gasoline. During the last week in March an average issue of 647,752 gallons of gasoline was made. During the remainder of the campaign daily issues were consistently over the 600,000 gallon mark with a peak average issue being made during the week of 29 April to 5 May of 690,000 gallons. An emergency measure during the first week in April resupplied gasoline by air at Wertheim, 28 miles west of Wuerzburg, for the advance of combat troops. A total of 721,443 gallons was brought in by this method over a four-day period.

Construction of a 10,000 barrel storage tank was completed early in April at Sarreguemines, an extension having been completed of three four-inch lines from the La Forge installations at Sarrebourg. Along the Rhine captured storage facilities at Frankenthal and Ludwigshafen were repaired, with 30,000 barrels capacity at the former and 4,800 tons at the latter. A four-inch pipeline, strung across the Rhine on a Bailey bridge from Frankenthal to Sandhofen, was operating on 12 April with the gasoline feeding into a 5,000 barrel tank. By the end of the month the main pipeline from Sarreguemines was feeding into this same reservoir.

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When the direction of Seventh Army attack was changed to the south toward the Swiss border, operations entered a sector that had not been given a thorough study by the Seventh Army Engineers. A hurried reconnaissance was made of the area, and rail and main supply routes were laid out from whatever information was available. Months of study had been devoted to the routes in what it had been supposed would be the Seventh Army axis of advance. The change of direction placed the engineers at a disadvantage until available maps of the area and other pertinent data could be compiled for supply planning. Rapid determination of the condition of bridges, rail and highway capacity, and alternate routes made it possible to keep the supply flow moving without interruption.

Before the rail line crossed the Rhine on 24 April, army and CONAD vehicles hauled from west of the river to forward areas. CONAD heavy vehicles (10-ton vans) carried supplies to the several



AN ARMY QUARTERMASTER TRANSFER POINT  
... Army vehicles picked up their loads at these points ...

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transfer points which had been set up at Ulm, Munich, and Augsburg. Army vehicles picked up their loads at these points and made redistribution to forward supply dumps. This arrangement materially aided the tonnage allotment of each supply agency through fixed commitments and specialization of cargo runs.

The first rail shipments over the Rhine were made to Heilbronn on 24 April. Forward elements of army, however, were operating in the Munich area by this date and were dependent on truck shipments for supply. A secondary line was placed in operation on 1 May for VI Corps troops from Kleinkotz-Krumbach to Schongau. This line moved approximately 300 to 600 tons daily of Class I and II supplies. Upon completion of the rail bridge at Ulm and the opening of an additional line from Augsburg to Garmisch-Partenkirchen, this secondary line to Schongau was closed.

Troop movements were exceptionally high in the army area during April, 11 divisions being moved, exclusive of the forward progress of units in combat. These 11 moves accounted for 14,906 vehicles on the army road network. In addition, 385 other convoys moved into or within the army area. A scheduled rail movement of the 2nd French Armored Division was cancelled and a recommendation made that the unit not be sent to the Seventh Army until such a time as the supply and transportation situation made it feasible. This recommendation was necessary since the allocation of available rail tonnage for critical Class I, III, and V supplies left only 100 tons per day for combat vehicles, spare parts, bridging, hospital trains, replacements, and other transportable items. Movement of the division would have required about 37 trains of 450 tons each which would have seriously hampered the movement of necessary supplies.

There was one tactical movement that was blunted because the main supply route was not adequately maintained. The breakthrough of the 10th Armored Division in the Crailsheim area left the division stranded in Crailsheim without a flow of supply. The Neckar and Jagst River bridges had been blown and temporary bridges were under enemy fire. Although the airfield was under enemy fire, it was possible to deliver by air 20,000 gallons of gasoline, 7,000 rations, 1,000

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rounds of 105mm and 100,000 rounds of small arms ammunition with the loss of only one C-47, destroyed as a result of a direct hit from enemy artillery. A later breakthrough into this area was maintained through the expedient of motorizing one RCT of the 44th division which kept pace with the armor and guarded the critical points along the main supply route. The fanatical defense in the Heilbronn area during the early part of April also threatened to upset supply delivery. As a result of enemy artillery action, it was impossible to maintain a treadway bridge over the Neckar River at this location; and a general re-routing of supplies was made through Mosbach.

Air re-supply was used again for VI Corps near Goeppingen, which had Class I, III, and V installations. On 26 and 27 April, 400,000 gallons of gasoline and 150,000 rations were delivered by air. Cargo planes, 280 C-47's, were used to make the deliveries. Under the provisional supply set-up, corps quartermaster could deliver only 100,000 gallons of gas by truck, which was approximately 65 percent of corps requirements. The balance was delivered by air shipments until truck transportation was available. Bad weather made uncertain the regularity of air supply, which, however, fulfilled the emergency need.

The issue of rations during the period following the Rhine crossing was relatively good. With the exception of the period 15-21 April, B rations were readily available in army ration dumps. During the above period, however, the on-hand supply dropped to 0.5 days. The feeding of Allied prisoners of war who had been liberated by the army advance, German prisoners, and many displaced persons created new problems for the army. Planning prior to the movement into Germany offered some precedence for the method of handling.

Since the feeding and clothing of displaced persons would normally be taken care of through military government channels, it was difficult to determine how long divisions over-running such camps would need to supply them from division stocks. An unanticipated drain on army and division reserve supply was the result. Vast numbers of German prisoners in army stockades, estimated at 150,000 on 1 May, made the collection and re-distribution of captured enemy food stocks a major problem. Feeding and evacuating prisoners did not reach a

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critical stage until the end of April. Evacuation by supply trucks making the return run to railheads became insufficient because of the large number of prisoners. Special enclosures had to be built and personnel had to be fed, until evacuation could be made.

The seriousness of the food supply within the German Army at the time of its capitulation is illustrated by an analysis contained in a Seventh Army radio message to ETOUSA, dated 11 May, outlining the problem of feeding German prisoners:

It is difficult to comprehend the manner in which the German Army supplied itself from such meager reserves even to the extent of short supplies of grain for bread. In view of the shortages of food supplies the army has initiated action to establish a basic emergency menu built around bacon, bread (German), and fresh potatoes. There is apparently an appreciable quantity of fresh potatoes stored in the ground but they are in small quantities and in isolated places and are difficult to locate.

Air evacuation of Allied prisoners of war was made whenever the health of the soldiers would permit. Displaced persons were segregated and became the responsibility of the G-5 section. Seventh Army continued to supervise and guard the defeated German Army, and through a central collection point all available food supplies were exploited.

Although there were some shortages in food and gasoline during the final phase of the war in Germany, the supply of ammunition was not termed critical at any time following the beginning of the operation on 15 March. Two reasons account for this: the tremendous build-up that had been accomplished prior to the major offensive, and the general disintegration of the German defense. At the beginning of the offensive the daily expenditures were in excess of current allocated daily rates but remained within the overall accumulated credits and savings of the army. Rapid advance by the Seventh Army once the Rhine had been crossed reduced the necessity for heavy expenditures, although individual towns and cities offered resistance and were heavily shelled.

The original plan for ammunition supply points was to establish one near each corps with a main supply point for army in the vicinity of the railhead. When the change in direction of Seventh Army

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attack was made, it was necessary to consolidate all stock in one army supply point from which the three corps had to draw. Ammunition shortage in individual units was usually restricted to the lighter types of shell and did not indicate an army shortage but merely non-availability at forward supply points. Expenditures of 75mm and 76mm tank ammunition were heavy, since tanks were often used as artillery support for infantry troops. The period 8-21 April marked the last major resistance on the part of the German Army and materially increased ammunition expenditures. Shipments in the latter part of April were reduced, and by 1 May only replacement of actual expenditure was being made by Base Section.

Shortages in certain items of ordnance equipment became apparent as the period of army operations drew to a close. Many vehicles were deadlined because of the lack of replacement parts. The replacement of combat vehicles and weapons was temporarily held up, but sufficient shipments were received by the middle of April to make essential replacements. The full-time use made of all general purpose vehicles, however, accelerated the rate of deterioration and continued to deplete the reserve stocks available in army. Shortages of tires and tubes were somewhat relieved by the use of captured German rubber, which was substituted on front wheels and spares.

Signal and medical supplies were adequate during this last phase of operations. Medical organizations had been well-equipped prior to the 15 March offensive and were in a position to maintain operations without resupply for a 10 to 20 day period. Recovery of German medical equipment made it possible to utilize captured supplies for overrun German hospitals and relieve any strain on army reserve.

The problem confronting the service troops assigned to army increased with the lost working time which resulted from the necessity for close follow-up of the rapid advance of the combat units and the consequent loss of time involved in frequent moving. Guarding and handling captured enemy materiel further depleted the available manpower. Some relief of personnel shortages was secured through the hiring of displaced civilians, although the ETOUSA ruling that French civilian labor would not be moved into Germany made

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necessary employment readjustments and the hiring of many Poles, Russians, and Italians.

### Campaign Review

The cessation of hostilities on the Seventh Army front did not eliminate the supply problems that had confronted the army during the final phase of fighting in southern Germany. Of the three critical items, ammunition was the only one that could be removed from the overall picture. Food and gasoline were needed in great quantities. But the transition period from operations to occupation must remain as a separate period of historical interest. Some review of the Seventh Army campaign through France and Germany is more appropriate to a report of operations.

While the German Army still opposed Seventh Army in France and Germany the emphasis of supply was upon the bullets and shells to be directed against the enemy. Statistics of the entire Seventh Army campaign include a total ammunition tonnage issued to combat troops of 233,585.7 long tons. A proper figure for the handling of tonnage would be to multiply this figure by three to include the receipt, issue, and the second unloading within the army area. The tonnage issue figure does not equal the total amount received since this included 12,670.5 tons on hand in army supply points at the end of the fighting and credits available for the army of approximately 90,000 tons from ammunition turned over to Base Section as the army moved forward. During the campaign several new types of ammunition were introduced and employed. All issues to troops were for replacement of basic load ammunition. Seventh Army did not have an established basic load for units but left determination of the amount to unit commanders based on the carrying capacity of available transportation. This proved to be a most satisfactory method, since in many instances it allowed combat units to continue fighting during critical periods without exposing troops making deliveries.

To summarize the participation of supply agencies in the campaign it is necessary to return to the pre-planning days in December of 1943 in Algiers and Oran when operation ANVIL was still a paper

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project awaiting final authorization from higher headquarters. Lack of decision tended to confuse the necessary logistical planning. The actual operation, changed in name to DRAGOON, was a successful Army-Navy landing operation in the harbor areas adjacent to Marseille. German destruction of the harbor of Marseille had made this large port entirely unusable at the date of its capture; however, two months later, berths for 29 Liberty ships were available as well as coaster berths, tanker berths, and LST hards. Coincidental in time, the harbors of Du-Bouc, Toulon, Cannes, and Nice were reopened, each involving clearing of mines, removing wrecked hulks, and rebuilding the extensive facilities. During the last two weeks of the Seventh Army campaign, the port of Marseille was operating at a capacity of 25,000 tons per day. During the entire campaign some 2,500,000 tons of cargo, 180,158 vehicles, and 491,000 personnel had passed through its facilities.

The tremendous problem of transportation was the focal point throughout the Seventh Army's campaign. Directly integrated with all tactical moves, the movement of supply hinged first on Base Section availability and secondly on the rail and truck services delivering the necessary quantities of materiel within the time factor allowed by the operational movement of the army. It was necessary for army to support itself by truck hauls supplemented by air-drops until the capture of Grenoble, 172 miles inland. Rail rehabilitation commenced as soon as the troops moved inland from the beaches with the first locomotive going into operation on 23 August, eight days after the landing. Rail service was opened into Lyon, Dijon, and Besancon by 21 September; and a system of 1,166 miles of line was open for operation by 1 November serving both the First French Army and the Seventh Army at the time the tactical situation had stabilized itself in the Vosges Mountains.

The rapid forward movement of Seventh Army had been retarded in October as the result of three related causes. Transportation was unable to place sufficient supplies in Seventh Army installations to insure a safe margin in the event an offensive operation met expected stiffening resistance. The German retreat had been precipitous but, nevertheless organized, and had placed the enemy in advantageous

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defensive positions. Finally, the condition of men and equipment of the Seventh Army showed the strain of the rapid advance and soon would require rest. The month of October and the first part of No-



RAILROAD USED BY SEVENTH ARMY

*a system of 1,166 miles of line was open for operation by 1 November serving both the French First Army and the Seventh Army . . .*

vember became a period of build-up of all classes of supply to support the November offensive that was aimed at clearing the area west of the Rhine and exploiting a possible Rhine crossing should the opportunity present itself. Transportation facilities met the requirements of the army for the desired level of supply and, subject to physical limitation in Base Sections, had sufficient reserve to maintain the Seventh Army drive.

Winter weather was first experienced in October in the High Vosges where deep snow and damp, cold weather produced a non-combatant casualty loss. The successful penetration through the Vosges in November and to the Alsatian Plain in December was halted by the German counter-offensive against another Allied front. An adjustment

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of fronts was made between the Third and Seventh Armies which enabled Third Army units to be employed in the Ardennes sector. When an expected secondary thrust by the German Army against the Seventh Army front called for defensive measures that included a planned retrograde movement of supply, Luneville and Epinal became the main rear installations and Saverne and Sarrebourg the forward dumps, with St. Die opened for support of troops fighting in the Colmar Pocket area.

The transfer of supply in January from forward points to the rear and from Base Section to rear caused a concentration of materiel within army not readily available to the using troops. As a result of the long distances involved and unsatisfactory road nets a serious condition existed in all classes of supply. Army was able to contain the German thrust with relatively little loss of tactical ground and assumed a static defensive role that included a closely controlled expenditure of ammunition. Future offensive planning required supply to build substantial reserves as well as to fill all Table of Equipment shortages of combat units. On 15 March Seventh Army mounted a major offensive aimed at Germany.

During the first 11 days of the last major offensive up to the Rhine crossing, supply had been able to move forward in relatively close support. Following the crossing, the distances between combat units and supply points became relatively greater. Rail was of practically no assistance within the army area for the movement of supplies from the Rhine eastward until late in April. Trucks of CONAD and army were coordinated to keep the level of supply sufficient to maintain the army drive.

At the end of hostilities on the Seventh Army front on 8 May, a distance of over 1,000 miles had been travelled, that included the opening Rhine Valley push and the closing thrusts into the last points of resistance in the Austrian Alps. Supply had been sufficient to maintain all the operations mounted by army, even though in some cases such operations might have been delayed until a satisfactory supply build-up could be attained. Service troops, from the medical ward attendant in a rear hospital to the signal corps linesman laying wire under shell fire, had supported combat divisions to the full extent of their drives.

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## ANNEXES



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ANNEX A

*D-DAY TROOP LIST*

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## D-DAY TROOP LIST (US)

## VI CORPS

Hq &amp; Hq Co, VI Corps

## DIVISIONS

3rd Infantry Division

45th Infantry Division

36th Infantry Division

## COMBAT COMMAND

Combat Command Sudre lere  
Division BlindéeDet, 661 2 Cie De Reparation  
Engines Blindée

Attached:

66e Cie de Munitions (-)

lere Cie, 9e Regt Chasseurs d'Afrique

Det, 705 Cie de Ravitaillement  
en Essence

## FIELD ARTILLERY

Hq & Hq Btry, VI Corps Arty  
Hq & Hq Btry, 6th FA Gp  
Hq & Hq Btry, 35th FA Gp  
Hq & Hq Btry, 36th FA Gp  
2nd FA Obsn Bn  
36th FA Bn (155 Gun)  
59th FA Bn (105 How SP)  
69th FA Bn (105 How SP)93rd FA Bn (105 How SP)  
141st FA Bn (155 How)  
634th FA Bn (155 How)  
937th FA Bn (155 How)  
938th FA Bn (155 How)  
976th FA Bn (155 Gun)  
977th FA Bn (155 Gun)

## ANTIAIRCRAFT ARTILLERY

Hq & Hq Btry, 35th AAA Brig  
& 35th AAOR  
Hq & Hq Btry, 5th AAA Gp  
Hq & Hq Btry, 68th AAA Gp  
Hq & Hq Btry, 105th AAA Gp  
106th AAA (AW) Bn (SP)  
441st AAA (AW) Bn (SP)  
443rd AAA (AW) Bn (SP)  
107th AAA (AW) Bn (Mbl)  
433rd AAA (AW) Bn (Mbl)  
451st AAA (AW) Bn (Mbl)  
534th AAA (AW) Bn (Mbl)895th AAA (AW) Bn (Mbl)  
68th AAA Gun Bn (Mbl)  
72nd AAA Gun Bn (Mbl)  
108th AAA Gun Bn (Mbl)  
216th AAA Gun Bn (Mbl)  
102nd AAA Barrage Balloon  
Btry (VLA)  
103rd AAA Barrage Balloon  
Btry (VLA)  
104th AAA Barrage Balloon  
Btry (VLA)

## ARMORED FORCE

191st Tank Bn

753rd Tank Bn

756th Tank Bn

## TANK DESTROYER

601st TD Bn

636th TD Bn

645th TD Bn

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## CAVALRY

117th Cav Rcn Sq

## CHEMICAL WARFARE

2nd Cml Bn Mtz (-1 Co) 11th Cml Maint Co  
 3rd Cml Bn Mtz 21st Cml Decon Co (-3 plats)  
 83rd Cml Bn Mtz (-1 Co) (Smoke Troops)  
 6th Cml Dep Co

## ENGINEER

343rd Engr GS Regt 1st Plat 424th Engr DT Co  
 344th Engr GS Regt Contact Plat 469th Engr Maint Co  
 Co C (Bailey Bridge), 378th Engr Survey Plat 661st Engr Topo Co  
 Bn (Sep) 6617th Engr Mine Clearance Co  
 Co D (Treadway Bridge), 378th Engr  
 Bn (Sep)

## MILITARY POLICE

206th MP Co

## MEDICAL

2nd Au Surg Gp 10th Field Hospital & 6703rd Blood  
 14 Gen Surg Teams Transfusion Unit  
 3 Shock Teams (Fwd Disb Sec)  
 1 Gas Team 11th Field Hospital  
 3 Orthopedic Teams 11th Evac Hospital (SM) (400 bed)  
 2 Thoracic Teams 93rd Evac Hospital (SM) (400 bed)  
 2 Neuro Teams 95th Evac Hospital (SM) (400 bed)  
 3 Dental Prosthetic Teams  
 2 Maxial Facial Teams

## ORDNANCE

Hq & Hq Det 43rd Ord Bn 3466th Ord MAM Co  
 (watchd Med) 3408th Ord MAM Co  
 Hq & Hq Det 44th Ord Bn 3432nd Ord MAM Co  
 (watchd Med) 64th Ord Amm Co  
 Hq & Hq Det 45th Ord Bn 66th Ord Amm Co  
 (watchd Med) 680th Ord Amm Co  
 14th Ord MM Co 143rd Ord Bomb Disp Sq  
 45th Ord MM Co 144th Ord Bomb Disp Sq  
 46th Ord MM Co 145th Ord Bomb Disp Sq  
 87th Ord HM Co (FA) 146th Ord Bomb Disp Sq  
 261st Ord MM Co (AA)

## QUARTERMASTER

46th QM GR Co (-1 Plat) Plat 549th QM Laundry Co 3426th QM Truck Co

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## SIGNAL

1st Signal Center Team 3201 SIS Det  
 57th Signal Bn 4 Dets, 163rd Signal Photo Co  
 Det A 117th RI Co

## NAVAL

3 Naval Combat Intel Teams Naval Gunfire Liaison Personnel  
 15 Naval Shore Fire Control Parties

The following listed Regimental Beach Groups with units listed, or similar units, will be attached VI Corps for the assault phase of the Operation ANVIL.

## 3RD INFANTRY DIVISION BEACH GROUP

36th Engr C Regt Det 977th Ord Dep Co  
 1st Naval Beach Bn 3407th Ord Med Auto Maint Co  
 72nd Sig Co (Spec) (DUKW)  
 Det 207 Sig Dep Co plus Det 177th Det 6690th Regulating Co  
 Sig Rep Co Hq & Hq Det 530th QM Bn  
 Hq & Hq Det 52nd Med Bn 4133rd QM Serv Co  
 376th Med Coll Co 4134th QM Serv Co  
 377th Med Coll Co 4135th QM Serv Co  
 378th Med Coll Co 4136th QM Serv Co  
 682nd Med Coll Co 3277th QM Serv Co  
 1st Plat & Hq Det 616th Med Ctr Co 3357th QM Truck Co  
 Det Boat Guards 3634th QM Truck Co  
 157th MP PW Det Hq & Hq Det 52nd QM Bn (Mbl)  
 706th MP PW Det 3333rd QM Truck Co (DUKW)  
 790th MP PW Det 3334th QM Truck Co (DUKW)  
 Det 377th MP Escort Guard Co 3325th QM Truck Co (DUKW)  
 Co A 759th MP Bn 3336th QM Truck Co (DUKW)  
 1st Plat 21st Cml Decon Co 3353rd QM Truck Co (DUKW)  
 (Smoke Troops) 3355th QM Truck Co (DUKW)  
 Det 63rd Cml Dep Co Sec 3856th QM Gas Sup Co  
 3rd Plat 450th Engr Dep Co 1 Plat 93rd QM Rhd Co  
 69th Ord Amm Co 332nd Air Force Beach Detail  
 Det 77th Ord Dep Co 111th Beach Section, RAF

## 45TH INFANTRY DIVISION BEACH GROUP

40th Engr Combat Regt 389th Med Coll Co  
 4th Naval Beach Bn 390th Med Coll Co  
 71st Sig Co (Spec) 514th Med Clearing Co  
 Det 207th Sig Dep Co Det 177th Sig 2nd Plat 616th Clearing Co  
 Rep Co Co B 759th MP Bn  
 Hq & Hq Det 58th Med Bn 1 Sec 377th PW Esct Guard Co  
 388th Med Coll Co Det Boat Guards

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133 Prow PW Det  
175 Prow PW Det  
191 Prow PW Det  
3rd Plat, 21st Cml Decon Co  
(Smoke Troops)  
Det, 63rd Cml Depot Co  
2nd Pat, 450th Engr Dep Co  
682nd Ord Amm Co  
Det, 77th Ord Dep Co  
Det, 977th Ord Dep Co  
3487th Ord M Auto Maint Co (DUKW)  
3633rd QM Truck Co  
3425th QM Truck Co  
Det, 6690th Regulating Co

Hq & Hq Det, 147th QM Bn (Mbl)  
829th Amphibian Truck Co  
830th Amphibian Truck Co  
831st Amphibian Truck Co  
832nd Amphibian Truck Co  
1 Sec, 3894th QM Gas Sup Co  
Hq & Hq Det, 240th QM Bn  
3250th QM Serv Co  
3251st QM Serv Co  
3252nd QM Serv Co  
3253rd QM Serv Co  
4053rd QM Serv Co  
Plat, 94th QM Rhd Co  
Air Force Beach Detail  
110th Beach Section, RAF

## 36TH INFANTRY DIVISION BEACH GROUP

540th Engr C Regt - (48th Engr C Bn)  
8th Naval Beach Bn  
74th Sig Co (Spec)  
Det, 207th Sig Dep Co - 177th Sig  
Rep Co  
Hq & Hq Det, 56th Med Bn  
885th Med Coll Co  
886th Med Coll Co  
887th Med Coll Co  
891st Med Clearing Co  
1st Plat, 638th Clearing Co  
Co C, 759th MP Bn  
1 Sec, 377th PW Esct Guard Co  
Det, Boat Guards  
192 Prov MP PW Det  
601 Prov MP PW Det  
Prov MP PW Det  
3rd Plat, 21st Cml Decon Co  
(Smoke Troops)  
Det, 63rd Cml Depot Co  
1st Plat, 450th Engr Dep Co  
603rd Ord Amm Co  
Det, 77th Ord Dep Co

Det, 977th Ord Dep Co  
3405th Ord M Auto Maint Co (DUKW)  
Det, 6690th Regulating Co  
1 Sec, 3894th QM Gas Sup Co  
2nd Plat, 94th QM Rhd Co  
Hq & Hq Det, 53rd QM Bn (Mbl)  
3337th QM Truck Co (DUKW)  
3338th QM Truck Co (DUKW)  
3339th QM Truck Co (DUKW)  
3340th QM Truck Co (DUKW)  
3354th QM Truck Co (DUKW)  
3356th QM Truck Co (DUKW)  
Hq & Hq Det, 259th QM Bn  
3286th QM Serv Co  
3287th QM Serv Co  
3288th QM Serv Co  
3289th QM Serv Co  
3300th QM Serv Co  
3299th QM Serv Co  
3427th QM Truck Co  
3360th QM Truck Co  
Air Force Beach Detail  
111th Beach Section, RAF

## 7TH ARMY

Det, Army Hq & Hq Co  
& Special Troops

Det, Hq Seventh Army (For Beach  
Control Hq)

## SPECIAL FORCES

1st Airborne Task Force:  
Hq & Hq Co; AB Task Force

2nd British Independent Pchrt  
Brigade (Gp)

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517th Parachute Infantry  
509th Parachute Infantry Battalion  
550th Airborne Infantry Battalion  
1st Battalion, 551st Pchrt Inf  
(Reinforced)  
460th Parachute Field Artillery  
Battalion  
463rd Airborne Field Artillery  
Battalion  
602nd Glider Field Artillery  
Battalion  
596th Airborne Engineer Company  
887th Engineer Company  
512th Airborne Signal Company

Anti-Tank Co, 442nd Infantry  
552nd Infantry Anti-tank Company  
Company "A" 2nd Chemical Battalion  
Company "D" 83rd Chemical Battalion  
172nd D. I. D. British Hvy Aerial  
Resupply Co  
334th Quartermaster Depot Co.  
Aerial Resupply (-)  
3358th Quartermaster Truck  
Company  
Detachment, 3rd Ordnance  
Company (MM)  
Special Service Force (-)  
French Groupe de Commandos (-)

## ENGINEER

Co D (rem Map Plat) 378th Engr  
Bn (Sep)  
697th Engr Pet Dist Co - Mbl Lab.  
701st Engr Pet Dist Co  
Surv Plat, 649th Engr Topo Bn

Co A Engr Cam Bn  
1202nd Engr Fire Fighting Plat  
1204th Engr Fire Fighting Plat  
1711th Engr Map Dep Det

## MILITARY POLICE

204th MP Co  
372nd MP Escort Guard  
377th MP Escort Guard Co (-3 Secs)

504th MP Bn (-2 Cos)  
Hq & Hq Det, 759th MP Bn

## MEDICAL

1st Adv Sec, 7th Med Depot Co

## QUARTERMASTER

94th QM Rhd Co (-2 Plats)  
138th QM Truck Co  
144th QM Truck Co

Det 202nd QM Car Co (-)  
Hq & Hq Det, 528th QM Bn  
3357th QM Truck Co

## SIGNAL

Army Sig Bn  
Det, 163rd Sig Photo Co

226th Sig Opn Co  
982nd Sig Serv Co

## MISCELLANEOUS

Det 72nd Liaison Sqd  
Special Service Staff (Office Strategic  
Services)

11th Postal Regulating Unit  
Twenty-eight Port Cos and Seven Bn  
Hq Dets

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## D-DAY TROOP LIST (FRENCH)

## ARMEE "B"

E-M Armee "B" et Cie QG 162 27 (-)

## 2e CORPS D'ARMEE

QG CA et Cie QG CA 75

## DIVISIONS

1re Division de Marche d'Infanterie	1st Div Blindée (-2 CC)
3eme Division d'Infanterie Algerienne	2e Regt Spehis, Algerienne (Rcn Btn)

## FIELD ARTILLERY

E-M du Groupement d'Artillerie No. 1	Det. 1st FA Obsn Bn (US)
1er Grpe du Regt d'Art Col du Levant	3e Grpe du 65e Regt d'Art

## ANTI-AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY

Det. Hq & Hq Btry. 34th AAA Brig (US)	62nd AAA Gun Bn (US)
Det. Hq & Hq Btry. 80th AAA Gp (US)	893rd AAA (AW) Bn (SM)

## TANK DESTROYER

7e Regt Chasseurs d'Afrique	8e Regt Chasseurs d'Afrique
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## ENGINEER

Cie Topographique du Genie No. 31	1011e Regt du Genie
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## MILITARY POLICE

521e Regulatrice Routiere	2e Cie du 11 Group de la Garde
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## MEDICAL

401e Hopital d'Evacuation	Organe de Reanimation et de Trans-
405e Hopital d'Evacuation	fusion No. 4413
432e Bataillon Medical	4511 Depot Avance
422e Hopital d'Campagne	

## ORDNANCE

E-M du 651e Bon de Reparation	Cie Moyene de Reparation Material
Cie Moyene de Reparation Auto	6521
No. 6513	64e Cie de Munitions
Cie Moyene de Reparation Auto	65e Cie de Munitions
No. 6523	

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## QUARTERMASTER

1er Bon du 8 Regiment de Tirgilleur	Gestion de Subsistance d'Etapes No. 325
Senegalais, Pioniers	Cie Mixte de Ravitaillement en Essence
Gestion de Subsistance d'Etapes No. 323	No. 704 (2 dets)

## SIGNAL

61e Bon de Transmission de CA	6693rd Sig Det (Prov) (US)
3 Dets, 163rd Sig Photo Co (US)	Det. Trans Armee "B"
806 Bataillon de Construction	(Cie d'Exploit 8271)
Det. Parc de Transmission No. 810 &	(Son Ecoutes 828)
Det Cie Technique de Transmission	(Grp Tele Mil 829)
No. 841	

## TRANSPORTATION

11e Cie du Grp de Transport No. 501

The following units will be available to Army "B" on subsequent convoys:

9e Division d'Infanterie Coloniale	2 Groupes de Tabors	Supporting Units.
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By Command of Major General PATCH.

A A WHITE  
Brig. General, G.S.C.  
Chief of Staff

## OFFICIAL:

JOHN S. GUTHRIE  
Colonel, G.S.C.  
A.C. of S. G-3

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ANNEX B

ORDER OF BATTLE

- a) ALLIES
- b) ENEMY

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## SEVENTH ARMY ORDER OF BATTLE

15 August-15 May

## A. VI CORPS, 15 August-15 May

1. Corps Hq & Hq Co	15 August-15 May
2. 3rd Infantry Division	15 August-15 December
3. 36th Infantry Division	15 August-5 December
	21 December-23 December
	19 January-29 March
	11 May-15 May
4. 45th Infantry Division	15 August-9 November
	5 December-18 February
	11 May-15 May
5. Combat Command 1 ("Sudre")	
1st Division Blindee, (French)	15 August-19 August
6. French Naval Assault Force	15 August-19 August
7. Group of Commandoes (French)	15 August-19 August
8. 1st Airborne Task Force	15 August-19 August
9. 100th Infantry Division	2 November-27 November
	25 March-24 April
10. 103rd Infantry Division	2 November-22 December
	17 January-29 March
	29 April-15 May
11. 14th Armored Division CCA only	19 November-22 November
	25 November-5 December
	5 December-29 December
	29 December-2 January
	2 January-1 April
12. 2nd Division Blindee, (French)	27 November-5 December
	11 May-15 May
	5 December-7 February
13. 79th Infantry Division	
14. Task Force Harris (Composed principally of Infantry Regiments of 63rd Infantry Division)	27 December-31 December
15. Task Force Herren (Composed principally of Infantry Regiments of 70th Infantry Division)	
16. Task Force Linden (Composed principally of Infantry Regiments of 42nd Infantry Division)	27 December-17 January
17. 3rd Division Infantry Algerienne	27 December-27 January
	5 January-7 January
18. 12th Armored Division	13 March-19 March
19. 101st Airborne Division	6 January-22 February
	27 January-26 February
	27 April-3 May
20. 42nd Infantry Division	17 February-25 March
21. Groupe Monsabert (incl. 3rd Division Infantry Algerienne)	19 March-26 March



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22. 102nd Cavalry Group 15 March-29 March  
 23. 4th Infantry Division 20 March-25 March  
 24. 71st Infantry Division 25 March-29 March  
 25. 63rd Infantry Division 1 April-19 April  
 26. 10th Armored Division 1 April-15 May  
 27. 44th Infantry Division 17 April-15 May  
 28. 115th Cavalry Group 24 April-15 May

## B. FRENCH ARMY "B", 15 August-15 September

1. Headquarters 15 August-15 September  
 2. II Corps 15 August-15 September  
   a. 1st DIM 15 August-15 September  
   b. 3rd DIA 15 August-1 September  
   c. 9th DIC 15 August-1 September  
   d. 1st DB 19 August-15 September  
   e. 2nd DIM 26 August-1 September  
 3. I Corps 5 September-15 September  
   a. 3rd DIA 5 September-15 September  
   b. 9th DIC 5 September-15 September  
   c. 2nd DIM 5 September-15 September  
 4. Army Troops  
   a. 4th DMM 1 September-15 September  
   b. Groupe de Commandoes 19 August-15 September  
   c. 3rd DIA 1 September-5 September  
   d. 9th DIC 1 September-5 September  
   e. 2nd DIM 1 September-5 September

## C. XV CORPS, 29 September-15 May

1. Corps Hq & Hq Co 29 September-15 May  
 2. 106th Cavalry Group 29 September-13 January  
   25 January-15 May  
 3. 79th Infantry Division 29 September-5 December  
 4. 2nd Division Blindes 29 September-27 November  
   30 December-20 January  
   12 February-5 March  
   17 October-16 March  
 5. 44th Infantry Division 23 March-9 April  
 6. 14th Armored Division CCA only - 22 November-25 November  
   less CCA - 28 November-5 December  
   CCA only - 29 December-2 January  
   complete - 1 April-23 April  
 7. 45th Infantry Division 24 November-5 December  
   12 March-6 May  
 8. 100th Infantry Division 27 November-22 March  
 9. 12th Armored Division 5 December-27 December  
   3 January-6 January  
   10 February-28 February  
   26 March-21 March

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10. 87th Infantry Division 20 December-26 December  
 11. 103rd Infantry Division 22 December-13 January  
 12. Task Force Harris 31 December-1 February  
   63rd Infantry Division 1 February-28 February  
   21 March-26 March  
   3 January-19 January  
 13. 36th Infantry Division 20 January-25 January  
 14. 10th Armored Division CCB only - 25 January-10 February  
   complete - 21 January-26 January  
   11 May-15 May  
 15. 101st Airborne Division 23 January-31 January  
   25 January-3 February  
   3 February-25 February  
   7 February-28 February  
   8 March-23 March  
   9 March-22 March  
   12 March-21 April  
   28 April-6 May  
   8 May-15 May  
   19 April-15 May  
   23 April-15 May  
   2 May-14 May

D. XXI CORPS, 27 December-25 January  
17 February-15 May

1. Corps Hq & Hq Co 27 December-25 January  
 2. 101st Cavalry Group 17 February-15 May  
 3. 12th Armored Division 28 February-15 May  
   27 December-30 December  
   28 February-17 March  
   24 March-26 March  
   31 March-5 May  
   12 May-15 May  
 4. 36th Infantry Division 27 December-30 December  
   27 April-11 May  
 5. 106th Cavalry Group 13 January-25 January  
 6. 103rd Infantry Division 13 January-17 January  
 7. Task Force Herren 17 January-25 January  
 8. 10th Armored Division complete - 17 January-20 January  
   less CCB - 20 January-25 January  
   complete - 23 March-1 April  
 9. 70th Infantry Division 25 February-22 March  
 10. 63rd Infantry Division 28 February-21 March  
   26 March-1 April  
   19 April-30 April  
   12 May-15 May  
   22 March-25 March  
   22 March-25 March  
   12 May-15 May

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13. 4th Infantry Division	25 March-2 May
14. 42nd Infantry Division	25 March-19 April
15. 3rd Infantry Division	23 April-28 April
16. 2nd Division Blindée	1 May-9 May
17. 101st Airborne Division	3 May-11 May

## E. ARMY TROOPS

1. Army Hq & Hq Co	15 August-15 May
2. French Naval Assault Force	15 August (only)
	19 August (only)
3. Groupe of Commandoes (French)	15 August (only)
	19 August (only)
4. 1st Special Service Force	15 August-21 August
5. 1st Airborne Task Force	15 August (only)
(including 1st Special Service Force after 21 August)	
6. 45th Infantry Division	20 August-26 September
	9 November-23 November
	18 February-12 March
	6 May-11 May
7. 14th Armored Division complete less CCA	13 November-19 November
	19 November-28 November
8. 12th Armored Division	2 December-5 December
	30 December-3 January
	22 January (only)
	5 May-12 May
9. Task Force Harris	19 December-27 December
10. 33th Infantry Division	23 December-27 December
	30 December-3 January
	29 March-27 April
11. Task Force Linden	24 December-27 December
42nd Infantry Division	27 January-6 February
	6 February-17 February
12. 101st Cavalry Group	16 January-7 February
13. 79th Infantry Division	7 February-17 February
14. 75th Infantry Division	11 February-16 February
15. 23th Infantry Division	14 February-18 February
16. 3rd Infantry Division	18 February-12 March
	21 April-23 April
	6 May-8 May
17. 101st Airborne Division	26 February-28 February
18. 4th Infantry Division	10 March-20 March
19. 44th Infantry Division	16 March-23 March
	9 April-17 April
20. 13th Armored Division	23 March-8 April
21. 70th Infantry Division	22 March-8 April
22. 71st Infantry Division	29 March (only)
23. 103rd Infantry Division	29 March-20 April
24. 109th Infantry Division	24 April-12 May
25. 63rd Infantry Division	30 April-12 May
26. 2nd Division Blindée	9 May-11 May

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## ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE

Corps	First contact	Last contact	Remarks
LXII	15 August	17 August	Captured
LXXV	21 August		
LXXXV	21 August		
IV GAF	21 August		
LXIV Reserve			
LXVI Reserve			
XLVII Panzer			
LVIII Panzer			
XIII SS			
LXXXIX	29 October		
XIV			
NINETEENTH ARMY			
15 Aug 44—4 Dec 44			
242nd Infantry	15 Aug 44	28 Aug 44	(surrendered at Toulon)
148th Reserve	17 Aug 44	15 Sept 44	
189th Reserve (later 189 Inf)	17 Aug 44	15 Nov 44	
244th Infantry	18 Aug 44	28 Aug 44	(surrendered at Marseille)
198th Infantry	18 Aug 44	4 Dec 44	
336th Infantry	18 Aug 44	Early Nov	
11th Panzer	21 Aug 44	20 Sept 44	
157th Reserve	22 Aug 44	15 Sept 44	
5th Mountain	29 Aug 44	15 Sept 44	(in Italy)
90th Panzer Grenadier	29 Aug 44	15 Sept 44	(in Italy)
716th Infantry	30 Aug 44	4 Dec 44	
1st GAF Training	5 Sept 44	15 Sept 44	
159th Reserve (later 159th VG)	7 Sept 44	15 Sept 44	
16th Infantry (later 16th VG)	7 Sept 44	4 Dec 44	
30th SS Infantry (also called 2nd Russian)	10 Sept 44	15 Sept 44	
	29 Nov 44	4 Dec 44	
34th Infantry	11 Sept 44	15 Sept 44	
708th Volks Grenadier	12 Nov 44	4 Dec 44	

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Divisions	First contact	Last contact	Remarks
269th Infantry	3 Dec 44		
19th Army Training			(no contact in combat)
21st Panzer		12 Nov 44	

FIFTH PANZER ARMY  
29 Sept 44—

15th Panzer Grenadier	29 Sept 44	Late Oct	
21st Panzer	29 Sept 44	Early Nov	
11th Panzer	29 Sept 44	27 Oct 44	
405th Administrative (Inf)			(no contact in combat)

FIRST ARMY

19th Infantry	(a) 23 Oct 44	Early Nov	(1 regt only)
	(b) 25 Dec 44		
553rd Volks Grenadier	16 Oct 44		
361st Volks Grenadier	30 Oct 44		
130th Panzer	23 Nov 44	10 Dec 44	
9th AA	24 Nov 44		
256th Volks Grenadier	25 Nov 44		
25th Panzer Grenadier	26 Nov 44		
245th Infantry	27 Nov 44		
11th Panzer	10 Dec 44	19 Dec 44	
21st Panzer	11 Dec 44	19 Dec 44	
257th Volks Grenadier	19 Dec 44		
17th SS Panzer Grenadier	21 Dec 44		
347th Infantry	28 Dec 44		
36th Infantry (VG)	1 Jan 45		
6th SS Mountain Division	2 Jan 45		
559th Volks Grenadier	1 Jan 45		
7th Parachute	14 Jan 45		

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ANNEX C

*FIELD ORDERS*

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## HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH ARMY

APO 758

FO No. 1 (ANVIL)

29 July 1944

Maps: GSGS 2738 FRANCE 1/250,000, Sheets 37, 38, 42, 43.

## 1. a. Annex No. 2 (Intelligence)

b. (1) Seventh Army, supported by Western Naval Task Force and XII Tactical Air Command, will assault the South coast of FRANCE, secure a beachhead East of TOULON and then assault and capture TOULON.

(2) The Naval Commander, Western Task Force, will command the entire seaborne expedition from the time of sailing until the ground forces are firmly established ashore; thereafter command of ground operations passes to the Commanding General, Seventh Army.

(3) XII Tactical Air Command will support the operation. Additional air support by MATAF will be available to Commanding General, XII Tactical Air Command, on request.

2. a. Seventh Army will make a daylight seaborne and airborne assault on area shown (Annex No. 1) to seize and secure a beachhead for the assault and capture of TOULON.

b. "D" day, "H" hour to be announced later.

c. Troops: See Annex No. 3.

d. Shipping: See Annex No. 4.

## 3. See Annex No. 1 (Operations Overlay).

## a. KODAK FORCE (VI US Corps).

Consisting of: ALPHA FORCE (3rd Inf Div reinf)  
DELTA FORCE (45th Inf Div reinf)  
CAMEL FORCE (36th Inf Div reinf)  
Combat Command SUDRE (1st Fr. Armd Div reinf)

(1) Make a daylight assault at "H" hour on "D" day on beaches between CAPE CAVALAIRE and AGAY.

(2) Destroy enemy beach defenses, advance rapidly inland and contact RUGBY and ROMEO Forces.

(3) RUGBY Force attached KODAK Force when contact is made.

(4) ROMEO Force attached KODAK Force at "H" hour.

(5) Capture LE MUY on "D" day.



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(6) Extend the beachhead rapidly to the Blue Line (Annex No. 1): THEOULE SUR MER — BAGNOLS EN FORET — TRANS EN PROVENCE — LE CANNET DES MAURES — COLLOBRIERES — CAPE DE LEOUBE. After reorganization, continue advance to the West and Northwest.

(7) Secure airfield sites in the ARGENS Valley (See Operations Instructions No. 1), between FREJUS and LE LUC from ground-observed enemy Artillery fire.

(8) Protect the right flank of the Army.

(9) Be prepared to release Combat Command SUDRE (1st French Armd Div), RUGBY Force, and ROMEO Force to Army control on Army order.

(10) After passage of lines by GARBO Force (see para 3 e), continue the advance within zone.

(11) Boundary between KODAK Force and GARBO Force: COLLOBRIERES (to GARBO Force) — CARNOULES (to KODAK Force) — FORCALQUEIRET (to GARBO Force) — TOURVES (to KODAK Force). Road: CARNOULES — ST. ANASTASIE — FORCALQUEIRET — BRIGNOLES, all to KODAK Force.

(12) Beach groups will be released from attachment to VI Corps and will be placed in support of VI Corps at "H" Hour.

b. RUGBY Force (1st Airborne Task Force):

(1) Land in LE MUY area starting about first light, "D" day.

(2) Prevent movement of enemy forces into the assault area from the direction of LE MUY and LE LUC.

(3) Attached to KODAK Force when contacted by KODAK Force.

(4) Assemble glider pilots in vicinity of Force CP for evacuation from assault area. Notify Seventh Army when pilots are assembled.

c. SITKA FORCE (1st Special Service Force):

(1) Assault the Islands of PORT CROS and LEVANT under cover of darkness the night of D-1/D day.

(2) Destroy enemy coastal battery on East end of LEVANT before 0600 "D" day.

(3) Destroy all enemy defenses on the islands prior to "H" hour.

(4) Turn over garrison of the islands to French garrison force on or about D+2, evacuate prisoners to vicinity of Beach 259, and withdraw to the mainland under Army control.

(5) See Annex No. 13. (Special Instructions for SITKA and ROMEO Forces.)

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d. ROMEO FORCE (French Groupe de Commandos):

(1) Land in the vicinity of CAPE NEGRE under cover of darkness on the night of D-1/D day.

(2) Destroy all enemy coastal defenses on CAPE NEGRE.

(3) Block the coastal highway vicinity of CAPE NEGRE.

(4) Seize and hold high ground in vicinity of BISCARRE (3 km North of CAPE NEGRE.)

(5) Attached to KODAK Force at "H" hour.

(6) See Annex No. 13. (Special Instructions for SITKA and ROMEO Forces.)

e. GARBO FORCE (II French Corps):

(1) Debark rapidly over secure beaches in the ST TROPEZ — CAVAILLAIRE area upon arrival in the transport area.

(2) Assemble and organize in the area shown (see Annex No. 1).

(3) Upon Army order, be prepared to pass through elements of the KODAK Force in zone, and attack TOULON.

(4) Maintain contact with KODAK Force on the right.

(5) After capture of TOULON, be prepared to continue the advance in zone to the West and Northwest.

f. ARMY RESERVE:

(1) Following units revert to Army control on Army order:

(a) RUGBY Force.

(b) ROMEO Force.

(c) SITKA Force.

(d) Combat Command SUDRE (1st Fr Armd Div)

g. I FRENCH CORPS:

(1) Be prepared to embark when ordered so as to arrive in the target area on the following schedule:

2nd (Fr) Moroccan Inf Div (2 DIM) (reinf) from NAPLES by D+20.

4th (Fr) Mountain Div (4 DMM) (reinf) from NAPLES by D+30.

5th (Fr) Armored Div (5 DB) (reinf) from ORAN by D+40.

h. ARMY TROOPS:

(1) (Annex No. 3.) Units will land over ALPHA, DELTA, and CAMEL beaches as indicated in Annex No. 4.

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## I. WESTERN NAVAL TASK FORCE:

- (1) Naval Gunfire Support Plan (Annex No. 12).

## J. MEDITERRANEAN ALLIED TACTICAL AIR FORCES:

- (1) D-1 and D day Bombardment (Annex No. 5).

x. (1) A demolition party, French Naval Assault Groupe, will land in the vicinity of POINTE DES TRAYAS on the night of D-1 D day with the mission of executing demolitions on the CANNES-ST RAPHAEL and CANNES-FREJUS roads. This party will then fall back on Army north flank. Further details will be included in operations instructions.

(2) All commanders will insure that prior to "H" hour, "D" day, all troops receive sufficient information of the operation to enable them to execute their duties effectively. The minimum essential instruction only will be issued prior to 4 hours after last touching shore (See Letter, Hq Seventh Army, 15 July 44, "Security of Operation 'ANVIL' (Mounting)").

(3) All watches will be synchronized with ships time prior to debarkation.

(4) All personnel will be cautioned that American and British parachute and glider troops will be operating inland from the beaches. A glider shuttle is scheduled in the area at about 0800 and a subsequent shuttle at 1800 "D" day. All Troop Carrier Aircraft will be painted with BLACK and WHITE stripes on wings and fuselage. Gliders will **not** be painted with these BLACK and WHITE stripes. (See Operations Instructions No. 3.)

(5) Yellow smoke identifies friendly ground troops to friendly aircraft.

(6) Prior to final embarkation for the target area, CG GARBO Force (II French Corps) will establish necessary liaison with CG KODAK Force (VI US Corps) to effect coordination of the landing, assembly, and organization of GARBO Force and passage of VI Corps lines. (See Operations Instructions No. 2.)

4. See Adm Order No. 1.

5. a. Annex No. 3 (Signal).

b. Succession of command: Ashore: Major General A. M. PATCH  
Major General L. K. TRUSCOTT  
Major General J. E. DAHLQUIST

At Sea: In case the USS CATOCTIN is rendered inoperative, command will be assumed by the Deputy Army Commander, Brig. Gen. A. A. WHITE, aboard the SS HENRICO, until command channels with all headquarters are re-established.

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c. Command Posts	Afloat	Ashore	Axis
(1) Seventh Army SS HENRICO		ST TROPEZ	ST TROPEZ - TOULON
(Advance CP) USS CATOCTIN			
(2) KODAK Force USS CATOCTIN		ST MAXIME LE LUC	BRIGNOLES
(Alternate) BARNETT			
(3) GARBO Force BATORY		COGOLIN	LA LONDE - TOULON

PATCH,  
Commanding

WHITE,  
C S

OFFICIAL:

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GUTHRIE,  
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## ANNEXES:

- No. 1 — Operations Overlay
- No. 2 — Intelligence Plan
- No. 3 — Troop List
- No. 4 — Convoy Plan — To be issued separately
- No. 5 — Air Support Plan — To be issued separately
- No. 6 — Signal Orders
- No. 7 — Antiaircraft Plan — Published as Corrected Annex, 25 July, to "ANVIL" Outline Plan, 13 July
- No. 8 — Engineer Plan — Published as Annex No. II to "ANVIL" Outline Plan, 13 July
- No. 9 — Beach Operations Plan
- No. 10 — Chemical Plan — To be issued separately
- No. 11 — Artillery Plan — To be issued separately
- No. 12 — Naval Gunfire Support Plan — To be issued separately
- No. 13 — Special Instructions, SITKA and ROMEO Forces — To be issued separately

FO No. 2 (DRAGOON)

1200B, 19 August 1944

Maps: EUROPE (Air), 1:500,000, Sheets LYON, TORINO, MARSEILLES, NICE.

1. a. See current G-2 Periodic Reports (Intelligence).

2. Seventh Army continues the advance to the West and North, captures and secures TOULON and MARSEILLES. Boundary between VI Corps and II French Corps: Highway No. 7, BRIGNOLES — AIX — SENAS — AVIGNON

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(all to VI Corps). For boundaries, zones of action, and axes of advance, see Annex I (Operations Overlay).

3. a. II Fr Corps:

Attached: French Groupe de Commandos (par 2, x (3))  
 One (1) Hq Hq Btry FA Group (Annex 3)  
 One (1) FA Bn (155 How, M1) (Annex 3)  
 One (1) FA Bn (155 Gun, M1) (Annex 3)

(1) Move attached units arriving over beaches to forward assembly areas without delay.

(2) Relieve VI Corps units in zone along the general line LA ROQUE-BRUSSANE — SOLLIES PONT — LES SALINS D'HYERES (Annex 1) by 1200B, 20 August.

(3) Capture and secure TOULON without delay, capture MARSEILLES, and prepare to continue the advance on Army order.

b. VI Corps:

(1) Reconnoiter in force to DIGNE and CASTELLANE, contact French Forces of the Interior, and continue reconnaissance to the North.

(2) Alert one (1) Infantry division to advance toward GRENOBLE on Army order.

(3) Seize and secure AIX.

(4) Seize SISTERON and crossings over the DURANCE River in zone.

(5) Release CC SUDRE to control II French Corps at MEUNES at 2100B, 19 August.

(6) Prepare to continue the advance on Army order.

c. 1st Airborne Task Force:

Attached: 1st Special Service Force (par 2, x (5))

One (1) TD Company (with Rcn Plat atchd) (Annex 3)  
 One (1) Hq Hq Btry, FA Group (Annex 3)  
 One (1) FA Bn (155 How, M1) (Annex 3)  
 One (1) TD Company (with Rcn Plat atchd) (Annex 3)

(1) Relieve VI Corps units in zone by 2000B, 20 August.

(2) Establish and hold defensive flank along the general line FAYENCE — LA NAPOULE; protect Army right (East) flank.

(3) Reconnoiter to the general line SERANON — GRASSE — CANNES

(4) Prepare to release 2nd (Br) Pchtd Brigade to Army control on Army order.

x. (1) Anti-aircraft — Annex 2.

(2) Artillery — Annex 3.

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(3) Effective at once the French Groupe de Commandos is released from attachment to VI Corps and is attached to II French Corps.

(4) Effective 2400B, 19 August, the 1st Airborne Task Force is released from attachment to VI Corps and reverts to Army control.

(5) Upon arrival in AGAY area 1st SSF is assigned 1st Airborne Task Force.

(6) Upon Army order, 2nd British Pchtd Brigade will assemble for shipment to ITALY.

4. Army assumes supply responsibilities at 2400B, 20 August. See Administrative Order No. 2.

5. a. Command Posts:

Seventh Army — St TROPEZ.  
 VI Corps — To be reported.  
 II Fr Corps — To be reported.  
 1st A B Task Force — St RAPHAEL.

b. Axes of signal communications:

Seventh Army — ST TROPEZ — BRIGNOLES — AIX.  
 II (Fr) Corps — COGOLIN — TOULON — MARSEILLES.  
 VI Corps — BRIGNOLES — AIX.

PATCH,  
 Commanding.  
 WHITE,  
 C.S.

OFFICIAL:

GUTHRIE,  
 G-3.

ANNEXES:

No. 1 — Operations Overlay  
 No. 2 — AAA  
 No. 3 — Artillery

For No. 3 (DRAGOON)

1800B, 25 August 1944

Maps: EUROPE (Air), 1 500,000, Sheets: LYON, TORINO, MARSEILLES, NICE

1. a. See current G-2 Periodic Reports (Intelligence).

2. Seventh Army secures MARSEILLES and TOULON, destroys enemy forces in zone EAST of the RHONE, seizes crossings over the RHONE, and prepares to continue the advance to the North. For boundaries and zones of action see Annex 1 (Operations Overlay).

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## 3. a. Army B:

(1) Secure ports of MARSEILLES and TOULON, and bulk fuel installations at PORT DE BOUC.

(2) Continue the advance, and destroy enemy forces East of the RHONE and South of the DURANCE.

(3) Seize crossings over the RHONE in the vicinity of ARLES and reconnoiter in force to NIMES, REMOULINS and North along the West bank of the RHONE.

(4) Garrison the MARSEILLES — TOULON — PORT DE BOUC area and protect the left (West) flank of the Seventh Army in zone.

(5) Be prepared to move to the North on orders of CG Seventh Army, after accomplishing the above missions (paragraphs 3 a (1), (2), and (4)).

(6) Be prepared to relieve VI Corps units from East to West along the general line LARCHE PASS (exclusive) — BRIANCON — LES ECHELLES — LYON and continue operations to the North.

(7) Upon their arrival in FRANCE, to be prepared to assemble the I French Corps in the TOULON — MARSEILLES area prepared for future operations.

## b. VI Corps

(1) Destroy enemy forces in zone East of the RHONE.

(2) Block the RHONE Valley in the MONTELMAR — LIVRON area.

(3) Seize and hold the line: LARCHE PASS (exclusive), BRIANCON, LES ECHELLES, and LYON until relieved by Army B. (par 3 a (6)).

(4) Reconnoiter on the axes: LYON — ROANNE, and MONTELMAR — LE MUY, and secure the crossings of the RHONE at those points.

## c. 1st A B Task Force:

(1) Seize and hold the West bank of the VAR in zone.

(2) Protect the right (East) flank of Seventh Army along the general line: LARCHE PASS (incl) — TOULON — West bank of the VAR River to its mouth.

(3) Reconnoiter to NICE.

## x. (1) Artillery: Annex 2

(2) CG Army B and CG VI Corps will establish and maintain necessary liaison to effect relief of VI Corps units (par 3 a (6)).

(3) Signal wire installation, radio, and messenger vehicles, designated as such by unit commanders, have priority on all roads.

4. See Administrative Order No. 3.

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## 5. a. Command Posts:

Seventh Army : BRIGNOLES

Army B : AIX

VI Corps : ASPRES

1st A/B Task Force: GRASSE

## b. Axes of Signal Communications:

Seventh Army : BRIGNOLES — ASPREMONT — GRENOBLE

Army B : To be designated later

VI Corps : ASPRES — GRENOBLE

1st A B Task Force: To be designated later.

PATCH,  
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WHITE,  
C/S.

## OFFICIAL:

GUTHRIE,  
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## ANNEXES:

No. 1 — Operations Overlay

No. 2 — Artillery

FO No. 4

1800B, 28 August 1944

Maps: EUROPE, 1:1,000,000.

1. a. See current G-2 Periodic Reports (Intelligence).

2. Seventh Army continues the advance to the North. Boundary: see Annex No. 1 (Overlay).

## 3. a. Army "B":

(1) Send reconnaissance force to MONTPELLIER, NARBONNE, which will advance thereafter rapidly North along the West bank of the RHONE and assist in the capture of LYON. This force will establish and maintain liaison with VI Corps.

(2) Advance to the North on the axis: SISTERON — GRENOBLE — BOURG — BESANCON.

(3) Relieve immediately VI Corps units guarding passes through the ALPS and protect the right (East) flank North of LARCHE (exclusive). Maintain contact with 1st A/B Task Force at LARCHE.

(4) Be prepared to relieve 1st ABTF on Seventh Army order.

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- b. VI Corps
- (1) Advance to the North on the axis: LYON — BEAUNE — DIJON.
  - (2) Destroy enemy forces in zone.
  - (3) Capture LYON.
- c. 1st A/B Task Force:
- (1) Protect the right (East) flank along the general line: LARCHE PASS (incl) TOUDON — West bank of the VAR River to its mouth.
  - (2) Maintain contact with Army "B" at LARCHE after relief of VI Corps units by Army "B".
- x. CG Army "B" and CG VI Corps will establish and maintain liaison to effect the relief of VI Corps units (para. 3 a (3)).
4. See Administrative Order No. 3.
5. a. Command Posts:
- |               |           |
|---------------|-----------|
| Seventh Army: | BRIGNOLES |
| Army "B":     | AIX       |
| VI Corps:     | ASPRES    |
| 1st A/B TF:   | GRASSE    |
- b. Axes of Signal Communications:
- |                    |                                     |
|--------------------|-------------------------------------|
| Seventh Army:      | BRIGNOLES — GRENABLES — LYON.       |
| Seventh Army Rear: | ST TROPEZ — MARSEILLES              |
| Army "B":          | AIX — SISTERON — GRENOBLE.          |
| VI Corps:          | ASPRES — CREST — ROUSSILLON — LYON. |
| 1st A/B TF:        | GRASSE                              |

PATCH,  
CommandingWHITE,  
C. S.

OFFICIAL:

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G-3.

ANNEXES:

No. 1 — Operations Overlay.

FO No. 5

0900B, 14 September 1944

Maps: FRANCE, 1:500,000.

1. a. See current G-2 Periodic Reports (Intelligence).
2. Seventh Army continues the advance to the North and Northeast, at the same time consolidating Army "B" on the right of the VI Corps. Effective at

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once, all existing boundaries and directions of attack heretofore issued are rescinded. Boundary: see Annex No. 1 (Overlay).

## 3. a. Army "B"

- (1) Move elements, now West of the SAONE River, to the BELFORT sector. The following routes are available to Army "B" for this movement:

(a) CHALON (or VILLEFRANCHE) — LONS LE SAUNIER — PONTARLIER — BAUME LES DAMES.

(b) AUXONNE (effective completion of bridge 16 September) — DOLE — BESANCON — BAUME LES DAMES.

(c) PORT SUR SAONE — VESOUL — LURE.

- (2) Relieve the 45th US Division with 1st DMI, completing relief by 17 September.

(3) Capture BELFORT and clear the West bank of the RHINE in zone.

(4) Protect the right (East) flank North of LARCHE Pass (inclusive). Maintain contact with 1st Airborne Task Force at BARCELONETTE.

## b. VI Corps

(1) Advance to the North on the axis: VESOUL — ST DIE — STRASBOURG.

(2) Establish and maintain contact with Third Army on the North.

(3) Capture STRASBOURG.

## c. 1st A/B Task Force:

(1) Protect the right (East) flank along the general line: LARCHE PASS (excl) — SALVATORE — MENTON.

(2) Maintain contact with Army "B" at BARCELONETTE.

x. (1) CG Army "B" and CG VI Corps will establish and maintain liaison to effect the relief of the 45th Div (para 3 a (2)).

(2) This headquarters will coordinate movement of Army "B" units from West of the SAONE to the BELFORT area.

Army Traffic Control Posts: DOLE — AUXONNE — VESOUL — PORT SUR SAONE.

(3) Contact points for contact with Third Army: BAIGNEAUX (N-7491); EPINAL.

(4) From EPINAL to the East, VI Corps is responsible for protection of Seventh Army left flank.

4. Administrative Order to be issued separately.

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## 5. a. Command Posts

Seventh Army: LONS LE SAUNIER  
 Army "B": MACON  
 VI Corps: SORAMES LES BREURY  
 1st A B TF: NICE

## b. Axis of Signal Communication:

Seventh Army: LONS LE SAUNIER — VESOUL  
 Army "B": DIJON — BESANCON  
 VI Corps: VESOUL — LUXEUIL — REMIREMONT

PATCH,  
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 C S

## OFFICIAL:

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 G-3.

## ANNEXES:

No. 1 — Operations Overlay.

FO No. 6

0001A, 29 September 1944

Maps: FRANCE, 1:250,000.

## 1. a. See current G-2 Periodic Reports (Intelligence).

b. First French Army on the right is completing preparations for the assault on BELFORT, and will protect the South flank of and maintain contact with Seventh Army. Twelfth Army Group on left is holding in present positions until the supply situation permits the resumption of the offensive.

## 2. a. Seventh Army:

(1) Continues the offensive to the Northeast, protects the right flank of Twelfth Army Group (Third Army) and destroys enemy forces West of the RHINE in zone.

(2) Captures STRASBOURG (STRASSBURG) in conjunction with First French Army.

(3) Prepares to cross RHINE and breach SIEGFRIED Line.

## b. Boundaries:

(1) Between Sixth Army Group and Twelfth Army Group: CHAUMONT (Z-0749) — DAMELEVIERES (V-0096) — HUDIVILLER (Q-0101) — South

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bank MARNE RHINE Canal — HEMING (Q-4310) — SARREBOURG (SAARBURG) (Q-5015) — LANDAU (R-2866) — HEIDELBERG (R-7090) (All inclusive to Sixth Army Group).

(2) Between XV Corps and VI Corps: EPINAL (V-0453) — RAMBERVILLERS (V-1872) — BACCARAT (V-2683) — BADONVILLER (V-3789) — WANGENBOURG (WANGENBURG) (Q-6802) (All inclusive to VI Corps except WANGENBOURG to XV Corps).

(3) Between Seventh Army and First French Army: LURE (K-1206) — MELISEY (K-1814) — LE THILLOT (K-3129) — (V-6260) (all to First French Army) — ERSTEIN (V-9480) — OFFENBURG (W-1535) (Both to Seventh Army).

## c. Troops:

## VI Corps

3rd Infantry Division (US)

36th Infantry Division (US)

45th Infantry Division (US)

Supporting Troops

XV Corps (to Seventh Army 0001A, 29 September 1944)

2nd Armored Division (DB) (French)

79th Infantry Division (US)

Supporting Troops

## 3. a. VI Corps:

(1) Continue the advance on the axis: ST DIE — MOLSHEIM (V-8293) — STRASBOURG.

(2) Capture STRASBOURG. Be prepared, on Army order, to adjust South boundary to permit First French Army to participate in capture of STRASBOURG.

## b. XV Corps:

(1) Advance to the Northeast in zone protecting right of Third Army by securing in turn, the following objectives: (See Annex No. 1)

(a) AVRICOURT — RECRICOURT (AVRICOURT — RIXINGEN)

(b) HEMING — LORQUIN (HEMING — LORCHINGEN)

(c) SARREBOURG.

(2) Assist VI Corps to capture RAMBERVILLERS (V-1872), BACCARAT (V-2683), and BADONVILLER (V-3789).

## 4. See Administrative Order No. 9.

## 5. a. Command Posts:

Seventh Army: VESOUL

VI Corps: K-0944

XV Corps: CHARMES

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## b. Axes of Signal Communications:

Seventh Army: VESOUL — EPINAL  
 VI Corps : K-0944 — BRUYERES — ST DIE  
 XV Corps : CHARMES — LUNEVILLE — BLAMONT.

PATCH,  
 Commanding  
 WHITE,  
 C S.

## OFFICIAL:

GUTHRIE,  
 G-3.

## ANNEXES:

No. 1 — Operations Overlay.

FO No. 7 1900A, 2 December 1944  
 Maps: France and Germany 1:100,000 (Spelling of place names as shown on this map)

1. a. See current G-2 Periodic Reports (Intelligence).  
 b. Third Army on the left in continuing the attack toward the northeast. First French Army on the right, continues destruction of enemy forces in ALSACE, south of Strasbourg.
2. a. Seventh Army:
  - (1) Captures Selestat and clears area north of that town and west of the Ill River.
  - (2) Attacks to the north in zone, making main effort initially on the left, and assists Third Army in breaching the SIEGFRIED Line.
  - (3) Protects right flank of Third Army.
- b. Boundaries:
  - (1) Between Seventh Army and Third Army no change.
  - (2) Between XV Corps and VI Corps: (effective at a date and hour to be announced): DANNE ET QUATRE VENTS (Q-6818) to XV Corps — ERKARTS-WILLER (Q-7230) to XV Corps — WIMMENAU (Q-7634) to VI Corps — BAERENTHAL (Q-8442) to XV Corps — PHILIPPSBOURG (Q-8742) to VI Corps — NEUNHOFEN (Q-9146) to XV Corps — OBERSTEINBACH (Q-9648) to XV Corps — FISCHBACH (Q-9854) to XV Corps — Hill 514 (R-0153) to VI Corps — DAHN (R-0361) to VI Corps.

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(3) Between Seventh Army and First French Army (effective at a date and hour to be announced): West of Le Clerjus (J-9736) no change — JARMENIL (V-1346) — Bruyeres (V-2457) St Die (V-4265) Grandontaine (V-5788) Obephaslach (V-7094) Molsheim (V-8293) Plobsheim (9985) Offenbourg (W-1585) all to First French Army.

## c. Troops:

## XV Corps:

44th Infantry Division  
 100th Infantry Division  
 12th Armored Division (attached to XV Corps at 0001A, 5 December 1944 in present location)

## VI Corps:

3rd Infantry Division  
 14th Armored Division (with all current attachments) attached to VI Corps effective 1800A, 4 December 1944.  
 45th Infantry Division (with all current attachments) attached to VI Corps effective 1800A, 4 December 1944.  
 79th Infantry Division (with all current attachments) attached to VI Corps effective 1800A, 4 December 1944.  
 103rd Infantry Division.

## 3. a. XV Corps

- (1) Continue the advance North and breach SIEGFRIED line in zone.
- (2) Assist the advance of and protect right flank of Third Army.

## b. VI Corps

- (1) Capture Selestat (V-7962). Clear area north of Selestat and west of Ill River by converging action of 2nd French Armored Division and 36th Infantry Division.
- (2) Continue attack to south with 2nd French Armored Division and 36th Infantry Division (with all its current attachments). Prepare to pass these units to control of First French Army on order from this Headquarters.
- (3) Advance north and breach the Siegfried Line in zone.
- (4) Protect the right (East) flank along the Rhine.

x. (1) 36th Infantry Division and attachments will continue to be supplied and administered by Seventh Army.

(2) Units now in support of, or attached to divisions will remain in that status. Adjustment will be made in order to be published later.

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## 5. a. Command Posts:

Seventh Army: Saverne — opens 7 December.  
 VI Corps : to be reported.  
 XV Corps : Sarrebourg.

## b. Axes of Signal communications: To be reported.

PATCH,  
 Commanding.

WHITE,  
 C/S.

OFFICIAL:

GUTHRIE,  
 G-3.

## ANNEXES:

No. 1 — Operations Overlay.

FO No. 3

2200A, 21 December 1944

Maps: France and Germany. 1:100,000.

1. a. Enemy opposing Seventh Army West of Rhine consists of XIII SS and LXXXIX Corps, comprising elements nine divisions (256, 21 Pz., 245, 361, 25 PGD, 257, 17 SS PGD, 36 and 347 Divs). Equivalent strength is estimated at 18 - 20 battalions infantry and 60 tanks and SP's. In reserve, in addition to Fortress units presumably manning Siegfried positions, there appears to be one unit of divisional size. Strategic reserves available to the enemy appear to be concerned primarily with the situation in the north. The enemy's overall attitude in Seventh Army sector is defensive. Counterattacks have been limited in objective and have not exceeded a battalion in strength. For further details, see current G-2 Reports and G-2 estimate No. 6.

b. Third Army on the left is conducting operations to halt the current enemy offensive. First French Army on the right continues attack on enemy forces in Colmar area.

## 2. a. Seventh Army:

(1) Relieves Third Army elements in that portion of Third Army area enclosed by new boundaries prescribed herein.

(2) Halts present offensive operations at once. Organizes and defends ground now held. (see Engineer Annex).

## b. Boundaries:

(1) Between Seventh Army and Third Army: COMBASLE (U-9803) — CHATEAU SALINS (Q-1025) — BARONVILLE (Q-1733) — FAULQUEMONT

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(Q-1750) ST AVOLD (A-2556) — CARLING (Q-2563) HUSS (SAAR) (Q-3276) (all to Third Army). NEUNKIRCHEN (Q-6083) LANDSTUHL (Q-8790) — KAISERSLAUTERN (R-0293). (All to Seventh Army).

(2) Between Seventh Army and First French Army: No change from FO No. dated 2 December 1944.

(3) Between XV Corps and VI Corps: DANNE et QUATRE VENTS (Q-6818) — WIMMENAU (Q-7734) — LEMBERG (Q-7445) — BITCHE (Q-7850) — WALSCHBRONN (8161) — PIRMASSENS (Q-9066) (all to XV Corps). Limiting Points: Outpost: RJ at (Q-775490). Main Battle Position: Lemberg (Q-7445).

(4) Between VI Corps and XXI Corps: MUNCHHOUSE (R-3035) (to VI Corps) — Seltz (R-2732) — SOUFFLENHEIM (R-1625) road SOUFFLENHEIM to HAGUENAU (R-0424) (all to XXI Corps) Haguenau (to Seventh Army). Limiting Point: Munchhouse.

## c. Troops:

## (1) XV Corps:

87th Infantry Division, with certain attached and supporting troops (See annexes 1 and 2). (To Seventh Army per verbal agreement. CG Third Army).

103rd Infantry Division  
 44th Infantry Division  
 100th Infantry Division  
 12th Armored Division

## (2) VI Corps

45th Infantry Division  
 79th Infantry Division  
 14th Armored Division

## (3) XXI Corps (upon arrival)

Task Force HERREN (Elements of 70th Infantry Division)  
 Task Force HARRIS (Elements of 63th Infantry Division)  
 Task Force LINDEN (Elements of 42nd Infantry Division (To Seventh Army per verbal agreement CG. Third Army)  
 36th Infantry Division (reinforced)

## 3. a. (1) XV Corps:

(a) Relieve 35th Infantry Division in zone by 1800 A. 22 December 1944.

(b) Relieve Task Force Pickett 6th Cav GP (reinf) in zone as soon as possible.

(c) Complete relief of remainders of Third Army units in zone as soon as possible.

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- (d) Organize and defend on ground now held within new boundaries.
- (e) By 1800A, 23 December, establish a Corps reserve of at least one Infantry Division. This division will be committed only by authority of CG Seventh Army.
- (2) VI Corps:
- (a) Relieve units of XV Corps in new VI Corps sector as soon as possible.
- (b) Organize and defend on ground now held, within new boundaries.
- (3) XXI Corps: (becomes operational on order from this headquarters)
- (a) Protect Army right (east) flank along West bank of Rhine, from Munchhouse (R-3035) (exclusive to Army South boundary).
- (b) Maintain contact with First French Army on the right.
- (c) (1) Be prepared to release 36th Infantry Division to Army control upon Army order.
- (2) One RCT (less Arty) from 36th Infantry Division with 1 Bn tanks and 1 Bn TD attached will be prepared to move to Saverne (Q-7215) area on Army order.
- b. Artillery: Following units attached to XV Corps per verbal agreement between CG Seventh Army and CG Third Army
- Hq & Hq Btry, 33 FA Brigade
- 738 FA Bn (8" How)
- 741 FA Bn (8" How)
- 278 FA Bn (240mm How)
- c. Armored:
- 691 Tank Destroyer Bn (Twd)
- 771 Tank Bn.
- d. Engineer: Disposition of bridging material will be such that it can be readily employed in an attack across the Rhine north of Strasbourg. (See annex No. 1).
- e. Antiaircraft: (See Annex No. 2).
- x. (1) Seventh Army and Third Army have joint use of Highway N 74 between Dombasle (U-9803) and Buss Saar (Q-3276).
- (2) Third Army will have joint use of necessary roads in Seventh Army zone until Third Army troops and supply installations have moved out.
- (3) Overlays showing defensive organization down to include Infantry regiments and artillery battalions will be forwarded to this headquarters in duplicate as soon as defensive positions have been established.

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- (4) Pending arrival of XXI Corps Seventh Army will retain command of troops listed above and responsibility for sector assigned above. See pars. 2 b (4), 2 c (3), 3 a (3).

4. Administration: See current Administrative Orders.

5. a. Command Posts:

Seventh Army: Saverne (Q-7215)

XXI Corps: Brumath (Q-9814)

All others to be reported.

b. Axes of Signal communication: to be reported.

PATCH.  
Commanding

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OFFICIAL:

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G-3.

No. 1 — Operations Overlay

FO No. 9

0900A, 30 December 1944

Maps: France and Germany: 1:100,000.

1. a. See current G-2 reports and G-2 estimate No. 6.

b. Third Army on the left is limiting the enemy offensive and is preparing to counterattack. French First Army on the right contains the enemy forces in the Colmar area and prepares defensive positions in depth.

a. Seventh Army:

(1) Continues organization and defense of present positions.

(2) Completes reconnaissance and organization of rearward positions.

See Overlay.

b. Boundaries and Limiting Points:

(1) Between Seventh Army and Third Army: No change from FO No. 8 dated 21 December 1944.

(2) Between Seventh Army and First French Army. West of Jarmenil (V-1446) no change. Jarmenil — Bruyeres (V-2557) Rouges Eaux (V-3163) St Die (V-4266) point (V-5484) Rothau (V-6184) (all to First French Army) — Obernal (V-8184) (to Seventh Army) Plobsheim (V-9986) Offenburg (W-1636), both to First French Army. Limiting Point Obernal (V-8184).

(3) Between XV Corps and VI Corps: See Overlay.

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## c. Troops:

## (1) XV Corps:

103rd Infantry Division  
 44th Infantry Division  
 100th Infantry Division  
 2nd French Armored Division (DB) (upon arrival)  
 Task Force HARRIS (less 1 regiment)

## (2) VI Corps:

45th Infantry Division  
 79th Infantry Division  
 14th Armored Division (less 1 CC)  
 Task Force Herren  
 Task Force Linden

## (3) XXI Corps:

Corps troops upon arrival

## (4) Army Reserve:

36th Infantry Division  
 12th Armored Division

## 3. a. XV Corps:

- (1) Continue improvement of present defensive position.
- (2) Complete reconnaissance and organization of rearward defensive position along the general trace shown on overlay.
- (3) Prepare plans for counterattack, based on following assumptions:
  - (a) Only troops listed in par 2.c (1) available to XV Corps
  - (b) Part or all of the following elements also available to XV Corps:
    - 36th Infantry Division (reinf)
    - 12th Armored Division (reinf)
- (4) Employment of regiments of Task Force Harris to reinforce infantry division in defensive roles is authorized.
- (5) First French Army has been ordered to move 2nd French Armored Division to the Sarrebourg area as follows:
  - (a) One combat command no later than 0700A, 31 Dec
  - (b) Remainder of Division no later than 0700A, 3 Jan

## b. VI Corps:

- (1) Continue improvement of present defensive positions.
- (2) Complete reconnaissance and organization of rearward defensive positions along the general trace shown on overlay.

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(3) Counterattack plans will include a plan for attacking in a North-westerly direction to threaten flank of major enemy attack in XV Corps sector.

(4) Employment of elements of Task Force Herren to reinforce infantry divisions in defensive role is authorized.

## c. XXI Corps:

(1) Complete assembly and organization of Corps troops.

(2) Be prepared on Army order to assume command of 12th Armd Div (reinf) and 36th Inf Div (reinf) and to move on twelve (12) hours notice to a location to be designated.

d. Artillery: Upon arrival in the Seventh Army area from First French Army the following units are attached as indicated.

XV Corps (to arrive vicinity of SARRALBE by 0700A, 31 Dec)  
 Hq and Hq Btry, 17th FA Group  
 975th FA (155mm how)  
 977th FA Bn (155mm gun)  
 VI Corps (to arrive vicinity of SOULTZ by 0700A, 31 Dec.)  
 93rd Armd FA Bn (105mm How) (SP)

## e. Engineer:

(1) All engineer combat and general service units will be prepared for possible use as combat reserves.

(2) Army engineers will assist in defensive preparations on request of Corps.

(3) Plans for the demolition of all installations of possible value to the enemy will be prepared, and necessary work completed to accomplish demolition as required. Highway demolitions will be ordered only by the Corps concerned, but other demolitions will be executed without specific order from this headquarters.

(4) Maximum use will be made of mines to strengthen defensive positions, but minefields will be carefully marked and charted. Areas normally impassable to armor, but which are now frozen, should receive particular attention.

## f. ARMY RESERVE.

36th Infantry Division (reinf)  
 12th Armored Division (reinf)

(1) Maintain liaison with CG XV Corps, and with CG XXI Corps.

(2) Execute planning, reconnaissance, and minor changes of location as directed by CG XV Corps.

(3) Be prepared to move on Army order on twelve (12) hours notice, under CG XXI Corps.

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x. (1) Organization of Maginot Line and Vosges positions have first and equal priority. Intermediate delaying positions, selected by Corps commanders, second priority.

4. Administration: Administrative instructions will be issued separately.

5. a. Command Posts: To be reported.

b. Axes of Signal communications, No change.

PATCH,  
Commanding.

WHITE,  
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OFFICIAL:

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ANNEXES:

No. 1 — Operations Overlay

FO No. 10

1200A, 11 March 1945

Maps: FRANCE and GERMANY, 1:250,000 (Spelling of place names as shown on maps: FRANCE and GERMANY, 1:100,000).

1. a. See G-2 Estimate of Enemy Situation No. 8, dated 7 March 1945.

b. (1) Third Army protects Northwest flank of Seventh Army and assists attack of Seventh Army with an offensive launched Southeast from the MOSELLE.

(2) First French Army defends in sector and protects right flank of Seventh Army.

(3) 1st Tactical Air Force and XII Tactical Air Command support Seventh Army attack with medium and fighter bombers.

2. a. Seventh Army:

(1) Attacks on D Day at H Hour from present positions, destroys enemy in zone and seizes the West bank of the RHINE.

(2) Crosses the RHINE between MANNHEIM and MAINZ and establishes a bridgehead in preparation for a subsequent advance to the Northeast.

b. D Day and H Hour: Later.

c. Boundaries:

(1) Between Seventh Army and Third Army (Sixth Army Group — Twelfth Army Group): CONFLANS (U-6564) (to Seventh Army) — BUSS

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(SAAR) (Q-3175) — LEBACH (Q-4091) — THOLEY (Q-4993) — NOHFELDEN (L-5710) (all to Third Army) — thence along railroad along NAHE River to BINGEN (M-1152) (to Third Army).

(2) Between Seventh Army and First French Army (boundary North of MODER River effective on passage of command to First French Army as directed in para. 3 a (5)): West of OBERHOFFEN-SUR-MODER (R-0920) inclusive, no change. SCHIRRHAIN (R-1222) — SOUFFLENHEIM (R-1625) — KOENIGSBRUCK (R-2029) — Road Junction 126 (R-222303) — NIEDERROEDERN (R-2234) — WINTZENBACH (R-2737) — Road Junction 125 (R-309417) — LAUTERBOURG (R-3242) — LAUTER River to confluence with RHINE River at R-382425 (all to First French Army).

(3) Between XXI Corps and XV Corps: See Overlay.

(4) Between XV Corps and VI Corps: See Overlay.

d. Troops:

VI Corps

36th Infantry Division

42nd Infantry Division

103rd Infantry Division

3rd Algerian Infantry Division (DIA) (reinf)

14th Armored Division

XV Corps:

3rd Infantry Division

44th Infantry Division (to Army Reserve D-1)

45th Infantry Division

71st Infantry Division

100th Infantry Division

6th Armored Division

XXI Corps:

63rd Infantry Division

70th Infantry Division

12th Armored Division

Army Reserve:

4th Infantry Division

44th Infantry Division (on D-1)

13th Armored Division.

3. a. VI Corps:

(1) Attack on D Day at H Hour, seize and secure the BITCHE — HAGUENAU road and the MAGINOT positions in zone.

(2) Continue the attack on the general axis HAGUENAU — PIRMASENS, penetrate the SIEGFRIED Line and capture the high ground East and Northeast of PIRMASENS (see Overlay).

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(3) Assist the advance of XV Corps, capture LANDAU and NEUSTADT, and destroy enemy in zone.

(4) See para. 3 b (5).

(5) Upon closing on the RHINE as far North as the LAUTER River, pass the 3rd Algerian Inf Div (DIA) (reinf) to control of First French Army, at which time the boundary between Seventh Army and First French Army (see Overlay) becomes effective North of the MODER River and responsibility for the sector passes to First French Army.

b. XV Corps

(1) Attack on D Day at H Hour.

(a) Main effort on the axis: RIMLING — ZWEIBRUCKEN, penetrate the SIEGFRIED LINE and capture ZWEIBRUCKEN, HOMBURG and KAISERSLAUTERN (see Overlay).

(b) Capture BITCHE, CAMP DE BITCHE, and secure the BITCHE — HAGUENAU road in zone.

(2) Continue the attack and seize the West bank of the RHINE in zone.

(3) On Army order, cross the RHINE North of MANNHEIM and secure a bridgehead for further operations toward the Northeast.

(4) Release the 44th Inf Div (less Div Arty) to Army Reserve on D-1, and be prepared to release the Div Arty to Army control on six (6) hours notice.

(5) Be prepared on Army order to pass one (1) infantry division to the VI Corps in the vicinity of PIRMASENS.

c. XXI Corps:

(1) Attack on D Day at H Hour. Capture SAARBRUCKEN, NEUNKIRCHEN and ST WENDEL.

(2) Advance to the RHINE in zone and protect the Army left flank.

(3) Maintain contact with Third Army on the left.

(4) Be prepared to employ one (1) infantry division from Army reserve in the NEUNKIRCHEN area (para. 3 d (2)).

d. Army Reserve:

(1) 4th Infantry Division

13th Armored Division

Remain in present areas prepared to move on twenty-four (24) hours notice on Army order. Establish and maintain liaison with this headquarters immediately.

(2) 44th Infantry Division

Upon release by XV Corps, on D-1, assemble in present area, prepared to move on twenty-four (24) hours notice on Army order to XXI

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Corps. Establish and maintain liaison with this headquarters and with XXI Corps upon release by XV Corps.

x. (1) Secure any RHINE bridges found intact.

(2) Commanders will take all possible measures to attain tactical surprise.

(3) Spelling of place names in all orders and reports will conform to spelling on MAP: FRANCE and GERMANY, 1:100,000.

4. Administration: See current Administrative Order.

5. a. Command Posts:

Seventh Army: LUNEVILLE

VI Corps: SAVERNE

XV Corps: FENETRANGE

XXI Corps: MORHANGE

b. Axes of Signal Communication:

Seventh Army: LUNEVILLE — SARRALBE — ZWEIBRUCKEN — KAISERSLAUTERN — WORMS

VI Corps: SAVERNE — NIEDERMODERN — WOERTH — SCHONAU — HINTERWEIDENTHAL — ANNWEILER — LANDAU — SPEYER

XV Corps: FENETRANGE — HERBITZHEIM — HORNBACK — HOMBURG — LANDSTUHL — ENKENBACH — GRUNSTADT — BENSHEIM — FRANKFURT

XXI Corps: MORHANGE — ST AVOLD — FORBACH — SAARBRUCKEN — NEUNKIRCHEN — ST WENDEL — KUSEL

PATCH,  
Commanding

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OFFICIAL:

GUTHRIE,  
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ANNEXES:

No. 1 — Operations Overlay

No. 2 — Artillery

No. 3 — Air Support

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ANNEX D

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS

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## HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH ARMY

APO No. 758

U.S. Army

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 1

24 July 1944.

## AIRFIELD SITES

1. Attached as inclosure No. 1 are overlays showing the proposed locations for airfield sites to be constructed during the early stages of Operation ANVIL. The areas indicated include space required for landing strips, dispersed planes, supply stockpiles, equipment pools, and air corps and aviation engineer unit bivouacs.

2. The importance of the successful prosecution of this construction program, required to furnish adequate air support for the operation, cannot be over emphasized.

3. In order that possible interference be held to a minimum, it will be standard policy within the Army that the areas intended as sites for landing strips as shown in the inclosure be reserved for that purpose except where a tactical necessity rules otherwise. After the terrain has been taken and secured so that engineer units are able to initiate work, these areas will not be occupied by Divisional rear elements, Corps or Army troops, headquarters or supply installations.

4. In the case of sites "B" and "F" one or the other will be used. Ground reconnaissance will be undertaken immediately after the landing, and if site "F" proves to be satisfactory it will be utilized for a landing strip and the restrictions on site "B" removed. If "F" proves to be unsatisfactory, "B" will be used instead. All headquarters will be notified promptly when the decision is made.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL PATCH:

ARTHUR A. WHITE,  
Brigadier General, G.S.C.,  
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

s/John S. Guthrie  
JOHN S. GUTHRIE,  
Colonel, G.S.C.,  
A. C. of S., G-3.

During the period 24 July 1944 to 10 May 1945, 152 additional Operations Instructions were issued, the contents of which are reproduced here:

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OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 2

27 July 1944

TO: Commanding General, French II Corps (thru: Army "B")  
Commanding General, VI (US) Corps.

1. In order to effect the landing of leading elements of French II Corps, as early as possible, and to pass the elements of French II Corps through the VI Corps sector with the least interference with operations, the instructions contained herein will govern.

## 2. Coordinating Agencies:

a. Seventh Army will provide an officer to act as a coordinating agency between French II Corps and VI (US) Corps for the period that elements of French II Corps are passing through the VI Corps zone, and until the relief of VI Corps in the French II Corps sector is complete. This officer will contact both headquarters prior to the launching of the operation in order to become thoroughly familiar with the plans for landing French II Corps units and the relief of VI Corps units.

b. The VI (US) Corps will establish a control point in the vicinity of COGOLIN to serve as an information center to VI Corps and French II Corps units. This control point will be established before the first French II Corps units come ashore and Seventh Army and French II Corps headquarters will be notified of its exact location. The Seventh Army coordinating officer will establish his headquarters at this control point. French II Corps and VI Corps will furnish liaison officers to coordinate with Seventh Army representative at the control point.

## 3. Landing Beaches:

a. French II Corps units will land over beach 259, 260, and 262, starting on D - 1. Beach Group Commanders will notify French II Corps units when to land, and will control the movement over the beaches. Units will land as follows:

1st Fr Inf Div (DMI) over Beaches 259 and 260.  
3rd Algerian Div over South end of Beach 262.  
1st Fr Armored Div (-2 CC) over North end of Beach 262.

This schedule subject to change in accordance with the situation at the time of landing.

b. (1) Commanding General, French II Corps, will issue the necessary orders to insure the efficient and prompt use of landing points as they are made available and to expedite the movement of his forces from the beach area.

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(2) French II Corps will furnish two (2) English-speaking officers for liaison with each of the ALPHA (36th Engr C Regt) and DELTA (40th Engr C Regt) beach groups. These officers will join the beach groups before sailing dates and will remain with the beach groups until French units are no longer scheduled to pass over beaches under control of the beach groups, or until their services are no longer deemed necessary by the Beach Group Commanders.

(3) Commanders of units crossing the beaches will be held responsible for their units clearing the beaches promptly and moving to assembly areas immediately upon coming ashore.

## 4. Assembly Areas (see overlay):

French II Corps units will assemble in the areas as shown on the attached overlays. French MPs to mark areas will accompany assault beach groups.

## 5. Roads:

Use of roads for movement of French units through VI Corps zone will be arranged by the coordinating agency in accordance with the situation existing at the time.

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 3

30 July 1944

1. Optimistic news announcements to assault troops, while aboard ship, with respect to political developments in the target area, have resulted in unfortunate and tragic consequences in past amphibious operations in this theatre.

2. The senior army officer aboard each troop carrying vessel in this operation will prevent the dissemination by any radio, newspaper, bulletin board, or personnel under the jurisdiction of the Army, of any "news" of a German capitulation or reports on the possibility of such a capitulation.

3. The Naval Commander is issuing similar instructions to Naval Commands.

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 4

2 August 1944

## WARNING INSTRUCTIONS — AIRBORNE OPERATION

1. Due to the landing of the 1st Airborne Task Force near LE MUY on D day, it is essential that the following instructions reach all troops taking part in the DRAGOON assault:

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- a. Participating Troop Carrier Planes (C-47s and C-53s) and Horsa and Waco gliders are planned to fly in a corridor approximately five miles wide, and north of a line running through NORTHERN TIP OF ELBA. — AGAY — LES ARCS. After dropping paratroops, planes will execute a right turn and return by a route North of and parallel to the corridor.
  - b. Formation will fly at 2000 feet altitude going in and 3000 feet returning. Formation: In a V of V's (9 airplanes).
  - c. All participating planes will be marked with the national markings for US Army planes. In addition, planes will be marked with prominent Black and White stripes on wings and fuselages. Gliders will not be marked with these stripes.
  - d. Firing at any transport type aircraft in or near the troop carrier corridor is forbidden at any time during D day.
  - e. The following general D day timetable will be followed:
    - (1) First paratroop lift  
360 aircraft in 9 or 10 serials; to arrive in target area between 0400 — 0530 hours.
    - (2) First glider lift  
71 aircraft and 71 gliders; to arrive in target area between 0800 — 0900 hours.
    - (3) Second glider lift  
373 aircraft and 332 gliders; to arrive in target area between 1800 — 1930 hours.
  - f. After D day, supply drops by the same aircraft will be made.
2. a. All troops will be informed and instructed in the general details of the airborne operation. This instruction and briefing will be carried out ONLY aboard ship after dropping the ship's pilot, or, if no pilot is aboard, four hours after sailing. Personnel aboard craft scheduled to stage in CORSICA will not be instructed until after leaving CORSICA.
  - b. After troops are scaled in staging areas, a team of parachutists dressed in British and American jump suits will visit divisions and corps reconnaissance units to familiarize such units with the appearance of parachutists.
  - c. Parachutists will be furnished same countersign as the rest of the assault force.

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OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 5

19 August 1944

## AA DEFENSE OF AIRFIELDS

1. The following airfields will be occupied by XII TAC:

FIELD	COORDINATES	HOUR	DAY	MONTH	TYPE OF PLANES
Ramatuelle	U-505105	1600	20	Aug	Fighter
Frejus	U-506357	1000	23	Aug	Fighter
San Raphael	U-530353	1000	26	Aug	Fighter Bomber
Lehue	U-275287	1000	25	Aug	Fighter Bomber
Crash Strip	U-520343	No AAA required.			

2. AA Defense of each of the above fields will be established not later than the time of occupation by the Air Force.

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 6

22 August 1944

1. Effective 240500B August, the boundary between Army "B" and VI Corps will be as follows:

Highway No. 7, LE LUC to ST MAXIMIN (to VI Corps) — Highway No. 7, ST MAXIMIN to AIX (to Army "B") — LE PUY (T5055) (to Army B) — DURANCE River to CHEVAL BLANC (T1870) (to VI Corps).

2. Army "B" will be responsible for protecting the Seventh Army west (left) flank along the line: CHEVAL BLANC (T1870) — PORT DE BOUC.

3. Units of VI Corps operating in the area south of the boundary described in paragraph 1 will be relieved by Army "B" by 240500B August. Army "B" and VI Corps will effect the necessary coordination to allow Army "B" units to use Highway No. 7 in relieving VI Corps units in Army "B" zone.

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 7

26 August 1944

Company "B", 52nd QM Bn (DUKW) is attached to Army "B" on arrival at SALON, 26 August 1944, for the purpose of moving units across the RHONE. Upon completion of mission, it will revert to Seventh Army control.

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 8

30 August 1944

1. Effective 0001B 31 August the boundary between Army "B" and VI Corps is extended as follows:

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BOURG DE PEAGE — ST NAZAIRE EN ROYANS — ST ROMANS  
— ST QUENTIN SUR ISERE — MOIRANS (All to VI Corps): VOIRON  
— ROUTE N 75 including LES ABRETS — MORESTEL — AMBERIEU  
EN BUGEY — BOURG EN BRESSE (All to Army "B") BAGE LE  
CHATEL — MACON (both to VI Corps) — thereafter SAONE River  
to CHALON.

2. Use of the ASPRES — GRENoble road by VI Corps to clear elements through GRENoble will be coordinated with CG Army "B".
3. Army "B" will provide the necessary road space to expedite the movement of VI Corps units from Army "B" zone.
4. After the capture of LYON, VI Corps will coordinate the movement of the Army "B" Reconnaissance Force (Groupe Du Vigier) through the VI Corps zone to Army "B" zone.
5. CG Army "B" and CG VI Corps will establish and maintain the necessary direct liaison to accomplish the movements listed in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 above.

#### OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS NUMBER 9

1 September 1944

1. Effective 1 September 1944 Commanding General, VI Corps and Commanding General Armee B are relieved from responsibility for the AA Defense of airfields except for Artillery Liaison Aircraft fields.
2. Effective 1 September 1944 Commanding General, 31 AAA Brigade, is charged with the responsibility, within the limits of available AAA, for the AA Defense of all airfields in the area under control of Seventh Army troops. Priorities and dates of occupancy or vacating of airfields will be agreed between Commanding General, MACAF and Commanding General, XII TAC and the Commanding General, 31 AAA Brigade advised as far in advance as operations permit.

#### OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS NUMBER 10

12 September 1944

1. Effective 2400 hours 13 September 1944, the Commanding General 34th AAA Brigade is assigned the AA defense of all airfields in the Seventh Army area north of an East-West line through the VALENCE Airfield (inclusive), vice the Commanding General, 31st AAA Brigade, relieved.
2. The Commanding General, 34th AAA Brigade will maintain Anti-aircraft Artillery Intelligence Service liaison with the Commanding General, 31st AAA Brigade, Commanding General, 35th AAA Brigade, and FTA Officer, Armee "B", and will furnish air warning to the latter whenever practicable.

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#### OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS NUMBER 11

19 September 1944

1. Commanding General, VI Corps will furnish the following FA units to support 1st French Army in the attack on BELFORT GAP:  
One (1) FA Group consisting of:  
One (1) Hq & Hq Battery FA Group  
One (1) Battalion 155 How M-1  
One (1) Battalion 155 Gun M-1  
One (1) Battalion 8" How
2. This group will remain under operational control of 1st French Army until relieved by Seventh Army order.
3. The Group Commander will report to the General Commanding the Artillery of I French Corps at MORTEAU without delay, for assignment of positions and mission.
4. Units will continue to draw ammunition from Seventh Army dumps.

#### OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS NUMBER 12

5 October 1944

1. Artillery Fires will be coordinated between VI Corps and XV Corps by mutual arrangement. Responsibility for artillery liaison, if desired, is from Right to Left.
2. The following information will be exchanged daily or more often when necessary:
  - a. Locations and fire capabilities of Corps Artillery which can affect the action of the adjacent Corps.
  - b. Locations and zones of observation of principal CP's, sound and flash bases which can observe areas from which hostile fires can be delivered against the adjacent Corps.
  - c. Counterbattery information.
  - d. Information of front lines and limiting lines for the protection of friendly troops.

#### OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS NUMBER 13

6 November 1944

1. Confirming verbal agreements between commanders concerned, the boundary between VI and XV Corps in the BACCARAT area is adjusted to current operations in that area.
2. Effective immediately, the boundary between VI and XV Corps is as follows:

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EPINAL  
 RAMBERVILLERS  
 BACCART  
 BACCART — MERVILLER Road  
 MERVILLER — BADONVILLER Railroad  
 WANGENBOURG  
 HAGUENAU  
 KARLSRUHE

To VI Corps  
 To VI Corps  
 To VI Corps  
 To VI Corps  
 To VI Corps  
 To XV Corps  
 To XV Corps  
 To VI Corps

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
 NUMBER 14

15 November 1944

1. The 45th Infantry Division will maintain the following alert status, beginning at 1800A, 16 November:

- One Inf Regt prepared to move on twelve (12) hours notice, on Army order, using divisional transportation to a locality designated by the CG XV Corps.
- The entire 45th Inf Div, with all attached units, prepared to move on twenty four (24) hours notice to an area designated by the CG XV Corps. Transportation for this move to supplement organic vehicles to be furnished by Seventh Army on twelve (12) hours notice from CG XV Corps.

2. CG 45th Inf Div will establish liaison with CG XV Corps immediately in order to effect necessary prior plans to make either or both of the moves in paragraph 1, above.

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
 NUMBER 15

18 November 1944

1. Effective 0600A, 19 November 1944, Combat Command "A", 14th Armored Division, composed of the units listed below, is attached to VI Corps for operations:

Hq & Hq Co CCA, 14th Armd Div  
 25th Tk Bn  
 48th Tk Bn  
 62nd Armd Inf Bn  
 500th Armd FA Bn  
 Troop "B", 94th Cav Rcn Sq (Mecz)  
 Co "C", 125th Armd Engr Bn  
 Co "A", 84th Med Bn, Armd  
 Co "C", 136th Ord Maint Bn  
 Det, MP Platoon, 14th Armd Div  
 Det, 15th Sig Bn, Armd.

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2. Supply and administration of CCA remains the responsibility of CG, 14th Armored Division.

3. Movement of CCA from present location will be coordinated with Transportation Officer, Seventh Army.

4. Commanding Officer, CCA, 14th Armored Division will establish necessary liaison with CG, VI Corps, immediately.

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
 NUMBER 16

19 November 1944

1. Instructions contained in Seventh Army Operations Instructions Number 14, 15 November 1944, are changed as follows:

"1. The 45th Infantry Division will maintain the following alert status, beginning immediately:

- One Inf Regt prepared to move on six (6) hours notice, on Army order, using divisional transportation to a locality designated by the CG XV Corps.
- The entire 45th Inf Div, with all attached units, prepared to move on twelve (12) hours notice to an area designated by the CG XV Corps. Transportation for this move to supplement organic vehicles to be furnished by Seventh Army on twelve (12) hours notice from CG XV Corps."

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
 NUMBER 17

22 November 1944

1. Effective immediately, Combat Command "A", 14th Armored Division, composed of the units listed below, is released from operational attachment to VI Corps, and is attached for operations to XV Corps in present location:

Hq & Hq Co CCA, 14th Armd Div  
 25th Tk Bn  
 48th Tk Bn  
 62nd Armd Inf Bn  
 500th Armd FA Bn  
 Troop "B", 94th Cav Rcn Sq (Mecz)  
 Co "C", 125th Armd Engr Bn  
 Co "A", 84th Med Bn, Armd  
 Co "C", 136th Ord Maint Bn  
 Det, MP Platoon, 14th Armd Div  
 Det, 154th Sig Bn, Armd.

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2. CG, 14th Armored Division, retains responsibility for supply and administration.

3. Commanding Officer, CCA, 14th Armd Div, will establish necessary liaison with CG, XV Corps, immediately.

# OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS NUMBER 18

3 November 1944

## BOUNDARY BETWEEN CORPS

1. Effective immediately, the boundary between VI and XV Corps is extended as follows:

WANGENBOURG	(Q-6302)	To XV Corps
COSSWILLER	(Q-7503)	To XV Corps
MARLENHEIM	(Q-8202)	To XV Corps
ITTENHEIM	(Q-8900)	To XV Corps
WOLFISHEIM	(V-9593)	To VI Corps

# OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS NUMBER 19

24 November 1944

1. Effective 0600A, 25 November 1944, the units listed below will be prepared to move on six (6) hours notice to an area or areas designated by CG VI Corps:

a. 540th Engr Regt (C), with the following attached units:

- 85th Engr Bn (Hvy Ponton)
- 424th Engr Dump Truck Co
- Co "A", 84th Engr Bn (Cam) (- Det)
- 69th Chem Smoke Gen Co

b. 40th Engr Regt (C), with the following attached units:

- 1553rd Engr Bn (Hvy Ponton)
- Co "D", 378th Engr Bn (Sep) (DT)
- 78th Chem Smoke Gen Co
- Det, Co "A", 84th Engr Bn (Cam)

c. Hqs & Hqs Det, 147th QM Bn (Mbl) with the following attached units:

- 829 Amphibious Trk Co
- 830 Amphibious Trk Co
- 831 Amphibious Trk Co
- 832 Amphibious Trk Co
- 3340 QM Trk Co (DUKW)

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2. Movement of all units from Seventh Army area to XV Corps area will be coordinated by Transportation Officer, Seventh Army.

3. Commanders of 540th Engr Regt, 40th Engr Regt, and 147th QM Bn will establish necessary liaison with this headquarters, in order to make the move directed in para. 1, above.

# OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS NUMBER 20

25 November 1944

1. Effective upon contact by elements of VI Corps, Combat Command "A", 14th Armored Division is released from operational attachment to XV Corps and is attached for operations to VI Corps.

2. Operations Instructions No. 19, this Headquarters, dated 24 November 1944, placing the 40th Engr Regt, 540th Engr Regt, 147th QM Bn and all attached units on an alert status is hereby rescinded.

# OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS NUMBER 21

26 November 1944

1. The following units will be relieved and assembled in the RAON L'ETAPE area, and commence movement by motor to XV Corps zone by 0800A 27 November:

100th Infantry Division (with 898 AA AW Bn and 324 TD Bn attached)

2. Above units will move to the SARREBOURG area on 27 November. Three (3) QM Truck Cos now operating under XV Corps will be furnished 100th Infantry Division by 1800A 26 November.

3. Effective upon arrival in the XV Corps zone, all units in para. 1, above, are relieved from attachment to VI Corps and are attached to XV Corps for operations. Commanding General, 100th Infantry Division will establish liaison with CG, XV Corps, by 1800A, 26 November.

4. Movement will be coordinated by Transportation Officer, Seventh Army.

5. Upon arrival in SARREBOURG area, additional transportation furnished for the move (3 QM Truck Cos) will return immediately to parent units. Trucks may be used to evacuate prisoners of war on return trip.

# OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS NUMBER 22

26 November 1944

## BOUNDARY BETWEEN CORPS

1. Effective immediately the boundary between VI Corps and XV Corps is changed as follows:

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WANGENBOURG	(Q6803)	To XV Corps
MARLENHEIM	(Q8202)	To VI Corps
MUNDOLSHEIM	(Q9804)	To XV Corps
LA WANTZENAU	(R0606)	To XV Corps
Point on RHINE		
River at	(R078050)	To XV Corps

# OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS NUMBER 23

26 November 1944

1. Seventh Army transportation furnished to move the 45th Infantry Division (paragraph 1 b, Operations Instruction No. 16, this headquarters, 19 November 1944), less the three (3) QM truck companies furnished to move the 100th Infantry Division, will be returned to parent units on 27 November 1944.

2. The three (3) QM truck companies furnished to move the 100th Inf Div (paragraph 2, Operations Instruction No. 21, this headquarters, 16 November 1944), will be returned to parent unit on 28 November.

3. The above transportation may be used to evacuate prisoners of war on the return trip.

4. XV Corps will report time of departure and ETA to this headquarters, attention: Transportation officer.

# OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS NUMBER 24

27 November 1944

1. a. The following units, presently attached to VI Corps, will move to XV Corps zone:

Hqs & Hqs Btry 405th FA Group  
935th FA Bn (4.5 Gun)  
938th FA Bn (155mm How)  
93rd Armd FA Bn (SP)

b. Effective upon arrival in XV Corps zone, all units in paragraph 1(a), above, are relieved from attachment to VI Corps and are attached to XV Corps for operation. Corps commanders will coordinate details of the move.

c. Any movement through Army area will be coordinated through Transportation Officer, Seventh Army.

2. a. Pursuant to instructions contained in paragraph 3 x (1), Directive, this Headquarters, dated 27 November 1944, the following listed units are relieved from present attachments to XV Corps and are attached to VI Corps for operations:

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59th FA Bn (105mm) (SP)  
250th FA Bn (105mm How)  
975th FA Bn (155mm How)

3. a. Effective upon release from First French Army and arrival in XV Corps zone, the following listed units are attached to XV Corps for operations:

697th FA Bn (240mm How) w Btry "A" 575th FA Bn (8" Gun) attached 2nd Cml Bn (Mtz).

b. Paragraph 3 c (2) Directive, this Headquarters, dated 5 November 1944, pertaining to the attachment of 83rd Cml Bn (less Co "B") to XV Corps after arrival in Corps area of 99th Cml Bn, is rescinded.

c. Effective upon arrival XV Corps area the 99th Cml Bn (Mtz) is attached to XV Corps for operations.

d. Effective upon the arrival of 99th Cml Bn (Mtz) in XV Corps area, Co "B", 83rd Cml Bn (Mtz) is relieved from attachment to XV Corps, is attached to VI Corps for operations and reverts to control of parent unit.

# OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS NUMBER 25

28 November 1944

1. CG VI Corps will designate one (1) infantry battalion and one (1) engineer combat company to relieve the following units of XV Corps presently attached to "T" Force:

1st Bn, 313th Inf Regt  
Co A, 165th Engr Combat Bn

2. Commanders of units designated will report to Lt Col J. W. PUMPELLY, V. Werder Caserne, AM SCHIRMECKER RING, STRASBOURG. Relief will be completed not later than 1800A, 29 November 1944.

3. CG VI Corps will report to this Headquarters date and hour relief is completed, and designation of units making the relief.

4. XV Corps units will return to control of XV Corps upon completion of relief.

# OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS NUMBER 26

2 December 1944

1. Confirming VOGC, Seventh Army, units attached to "T" Force by VI Corps in compliance with Operations Instruction No. 25, Seventh Army, dated 28 November 1944, are relieved from attachment to "T" Force and revert to control of VI Corps effective 1600A, 1 December 1944.

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OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 27

3 December 1944

1. In compliance with Letter of Instructions No. 4, Sixth Army Group, dated 2 December 1944, and as outlined in Seventh Army Field Order No. 7, dated 2 December 1944, the following units will pass to operational control of the CG, First French Army at 0001A, 5 December 1944:

2nd French Armored Division, with the following units attached:

22nd DCA Groupe, 40mm (AAA AW Bn) (French)  
1st RBFM (TD Bn, SP) (French)

36th U.S. Infantry Division, with the following units attached:

753rd Tk Bn  
636th TD Bn (SP)  
83rd Cml Bn  
443rd AAA AW Bn (SP)

2. Boundary between Seventh Army and First French Army, as outlined in Field Order No. 7, Seventh Army, dated 2 December 1944, becomes effective 0001A, 5 December 1944.

3. Field Order No. 7, Seventh Army, dated 2 December 1944, is changed as follows:

"Paragraph 2, c. Troops:

VI Corps:

3rd Infantry Division

14th Armored Division (with all current attachments) attached to VI Corps effective 0001A, 5 December 1944

45th Infantry Division (with all current attachments) attached to VI Corps effective 0001A, 5 December 1944

79th Infantry Division (with all current attachments) attached to VI Corps effective 0001A, 5 December 1944

103rd Infantry Division."

4. Boundary between XV Corps and VI Corps as outlined in Field Order No. 7, Seventh Army, dated 2 December 1944, becomes effective 0001A, 5 December 1944.

5. Effective 0001A, 5 December 1944 the following listed units are relieved from present attachment to XV Corps and are attached to VI Corps; movement to VI Corps Zone will be coordinated between commanders concerned:

463rd AAA AW Bn (Mb1)  
106th AAA AW Bn (SP)  
398th AAA AW Bn (SP)

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191st Tk Bn  
93rd Armd FA Bn (SP)  
17th FA Bn (155mm How)  
938th FA Bn (155mm How)  
935th FA Bn (4.5 Gun)  
976th FA Bn (155mm Gun)  
698th FA Bn (240mm How)  
575th FA Bn (less Btries A & C) (8 Gun)  
Hq & Hq Btry, 405th FA Gp  
645th TD Bn  
813th TD Bn

6. Effective 0001A, 5 December 1944 the following listed units are relieved from present attachment to VI Corps and are attached to VI Corps. Movement to XV Corps Zone will be coordinated between commanders concerned:

781st Tk Bn  
250th FA Bn (105mm How)  
975th FA Bn (155mm How)

7. The 693rd FA Bn (105mm How), currently attached to 45th Inf Div, will remain under attachment to XV Corps upon relief and attachment of units directed in paragraph 3, above.

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 28

4 December 1944

1. The three truck companies having reported to CG, VI Corps 3rd December to move 103rd Infantry Division will be returned to parent unit immediately upon completion of move and not later than 1200A 5 December.

2. VI Corps will report time departure and ETA to this headquarters, attention Transportation Officer.

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 29

5 December 1944

1. Operations Instruction No. 27 this headquarters dated 3 December 1944 is amended to the following extent:

a. Paragraph 1 is rescinded and the following substituted therefore:

1. In compliance with Letter of Instructions No. 4, Sixth Army Group, dated 2 December 1944, and as outlined in Seventh Army Field Order No. 7, dated 2 December 1944, the following units will pass to operational control of the CG, First French Army at 0001A, 5 December 1944:

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2nd French Armored Division, with the following units attached:  
 22nd DCA Groupe, 40mm (AAA AW Bn) (French)  
 1st RBFM (TD Bn, SP) (French)

36th U.S. Infantry Division, with the following units attached:  
 753rd Tk Bn  
 636th TD Bn (SP)  
 83rd Cml Bn  
 443rd AAA AW Bn (SP)  
 Hq & Hq Btry 17th FA Gp  
 977th FA Bn (155 Gun)  
 141st FA Bn (155 How)  
 1st Bn 36th Engr Regt

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
 NUMBER 30

6 December 1944

1. XV Corps: Relieve forward elements of 4th Armored Division in position immediately, with a force of not less than one armored Combat Command or one infantry RCT. Unit will remain under command of CG XV Corps.
2. Direct arrangements between CG XV Corps and CG XII Corps (Third Army) are authorized as necessary.
3. No change in boundary between armies. Force relieving 4th Armd Div will be returned to Seventh Army zone on order of this headquarters.

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
 NUMBER 31

12 December 1944

1. Seventh Army prepares to relieve 36th Infantry Division and certain attached units now under operational control of First French Army.
2. a. VI Corps:
  - (1) Be prepared on Army order to relieve the following units now under operational control of First French Army in the SELESTAT — COLMAR area, with one (1) Inf Div reinforced by one (1) Tk Bn, one (1) TD Bn, one (1) AAA AW Bn:
    - 36th Inf Div
    - 753rd Tk Bn
    - 636th TD Bn (SP)
    - 83rd Cml Bn (Mtz)
    - 443rd AAA AW Bn (SP)
    - 1st Bn, 36th Engr Regt (C).

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- (2) The following units now attached to 36th Inf Div will, upon relief of that division, become attached to the relieving division at the date and hour of relief:
  - Hq & Hq Btry, 17th FA Gp
  - 977th FA Bn (155 Gun)
  - 141st FA Bn (155 How)

- (3) Upon relief, the 36th Inf Div (reinf) (para 1.a.(1)) will pass to control of VI Corps for employment in the STRASBOURG sector. Upon completion of relief, relieving units pass to operational control of First French Army.

- (4) Seventh Army will furnish three (3) truck companies to VI Corps for movement of units outlined in paragraphs 2.a.(1) and 2.a.(3), above.

- b. XV Corps: Be prepared on Army order to relieve the 83rd Cml Bn, now atchd 36th Inf Div, with one (1) Cml Bn (Mtz).
- c. 40th Engr Regt (C): Be prepared, on Army order, to relieve the 1st Bn, 36th Engr Regt (C) now attached 36th Inf Div, with one (1) Engr Bn (C).

3. Necessary liaison between commanders concerned is authorized.

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
 NUMBER 32

13 December 1944

1. a. Relief of units now operating in zone of First French Army as outlined in Operations Instruction No. 31, this Headquarters, dated 12 December 1944, will commence immediately. Upon completion of relief, attachments of units become effective as indicated.
- b. The 3rd Infantry Division is designated as the Infantry Division to relieve the 36th Infantry Division.
2. VI Corps, XV Corps and 40th Engr Regt (C) will each notify this Headquarters, attention A. C. of S., G-3, the unit designation of all relieving units, and time when relief has been completed.
3. Paragraph 2.a.(4), Operations Instruction No. 31 referring to three (3) truck companies to be furnished by Seventh Army is rescinded.

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
 NUMBER 33

14 December 1944

1. The following units will be prepared to assemble on four (4) hours notice on Army order as Army reserve:

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40th Engr Regt (C) (less 1 Bn)  
540th Engr Rgt (C).

2. Commanders will report to this Headquarters, attention A. C. of S. G-3, when this alert status has been effected.

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 34

18 December 1944

1. Effective 0001A, 19 December 1944, 540th Engr Regt (C) is attached to VI Corps for operations, and 48th Engr Bn (C) is relieved from attachment to VI Corps and reverts to control of Seventh Army. Relief of 48th Engr Bn (C) in present operations by 540th Engr Regt (C) will be coordinated by Headquarters VI Corps, and will be completed as soon as possible. CO, 540th Engr Regt (C) will establish liaison with CG, VI Corps, and CO, 48th Engr Bn (C) will establish liaison with CG, Seventh Army immediately.

2. Effective 0001A, 19 December 1944, 540th Engr Regt (C) is relieved from alert status prescribed in Operations Instruction No. 33, Seventh Army, dated 14 December 1944.

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 35

20 December 1944

1. a. Effective 0001A, 23 December 1944, VI Corps is relieved of responsibility for security of the West bank of the RHINE River South of MUNCHHOUSE (R3035). Responsibility for same passes to the units listed below, operating initially under control of Seventh Army.

b. For boundaries effective at 0001A, 23 December 1944, see Overlay attached.

2. a. VI Corps:

(1) Release the following units to Seventh Army control effective 0001A, 23 December 1944:

36th Infantry Division, with attached:

752nd Tank Bn

636th TD Bn (SP)

443rd AAA AW Group

Hq & Hq Btry, 5th AAA Group

Batteries "B" & "D", 62nd AAA Gun Bn

533rd AAA AW Bn (less 2 Batteries).

(2) Maintain contact with Task Force HARRIS on the right.

b. 36th Infantry Division (less one (1) FA Bn, 105 How, and one (1) FA Bn, 155 How):

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(1) Attached troops:

753rd Tank Bn (less 1 Med Tk Co)  
636th TD Bn (SP) (less 1 TD Co, and Plat, Rcn Co)  
443rd AAA AW Bn (SP)  
Hq & Hq Btry, 5th AAA Group  
Batteries "B" & "D", 62nd AAA Gun Bn.

(2) Mission: Protect Army right (east) flank in zone (see Overlay). Maintain contact with First French Army on the right.

c. Task Force HARRIS:

(1) Attached troops:

74th Signal Co (Special)  
533rd AAA AW Bn (less 2 batteries)  
1 FA Bn (105 How) (par. 2, b)  
1 FA Bn (155 How) (par. 2, b)  
1 Med Tk Co, 753rd Tk Bn (par. 2, b, (1))  
1 TD Co (with Plat, Rcn Co atchd), 636th TD Bn (par. 2, b, (1)).

Other supporting troops to be attached upon Army order.

(2) Missions:

Relieve elements of VI Corps in assigned zone (see Overlay) by 0001A, 23 December 1944.

Protect Army right (east) flank along the RHINE River in zone.

Maintain contact with 36th Infantry Division on the right.

Continue training and preparation for early offensive action.

x. (1) Direct liaison between commanders concerned is authorized.

(2) Units listed in paragraphs 2, b and c will be attached to XXI Corps upon its arrival.

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 36

21 December 1944

Operations Instructions Number 36 has been omitted.

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 37

21 December 1944

1. VI Corps will withdraw and assembly one (1) infantry division, prepared for movement to the XV Corps zone on Army order. Details will be published later.

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2. XV Corps: Prepare to release one (1) tank battalion to VI Corps upon Army order. Designated battalion will be prepared to start movement to VI Corps zone on four (4) hours notice after 1800A, 21 December 1944.

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 38

21 December 1944

1. Effective 0800A, 22 December 1944, 40th Engr Regt (C) is relieved from alert status prescribed in Operations Instruction No. 33, Seventh Army, dated 14 December 1944.

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 39

22 December 1944

1. a. Effective 2359A, 24 December 1944, 36th Inf Div is relieved of responsibility of protecting the right (East) flank of Seventh Army in zone assigned by paragraph 2 b. Operations Instruction No. 35, this headquarters, dated 20 December 1944. Responsibility for same passes to the units listed below, operating initially under control of Seventh Army.
- b. For new boundaries effective 2359A, 24 December, see Overlay attached.
2. a. Task Force LINDEN: (see letter, Hq Seventh Army, dated 21 December 1944, ref X-959)
  - (1) Attached troops (par 2 b (2) and 2 c (2)):
    - Hq & Hq Btry, 5th AAA Group
    - 62nd AAA Gun Bn (less Btries "A" and "C")
    - Two (2) Btries, 443rd AAA AW Bn (SP)
    - Hq & Hq Btry, 36th Inf Div Arty
    - One (1) TD Co, and Rcn Co (less 1 Plat), 636 TD Bn
    - One (1) Med Tk Co, 753 Tank Bn
    - Det, 74 Sig Co (Special)
  - (2) Missions: Relieve elements 36th Inf Div (less Div Arty) in assigned zone by 2359A, 24 December.
- Organize and defend the Army right (East) flank along the RHINE River in zone (see Overlay).
- Maintain contact with First French Army on the right.
- Continue training and preparation for early offensive action.
- b. Task Force HARRIS: (see Operations Instruction No. 35)
  - (1) Attached troops:
    - 74th Sig Co (Special) (less Det)

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- 533rd AAA AW Bn (less Btry "A") with Btry C, 431 AAA AW Bn atchd (par 2 d)
- One (1) FA Bn (105 How) 36th Inf Div Arty
- One (1) FA Bn (155 How) 36th Inf Div Arty
- One (1) Med Tk Co, 753 Tk Bn
- One (1) TD Co (with Plat, Rcn Co atchd), 636 TD Bn.
- (2) Release Det, 74 Signal Co (Special) to Task Force LINDEN prior to 2359A, 24 December 1944.
- (3) Missions: Relieve elements of 36th Inf Div (less Div Arty) in assigned zone (see overlay) by 2359A, 24 December 1944.
- Organize and defend the Army right (East) flank along the RHINE River in zone.
- Maintain contact with Task Force LINDEN on the right.
- Continue training and preparation for early offensive action.
- c. 36th Inf Div (less 36 Inf Div Arty):
  - (1) Attached troops:
    - 753rd Tk Bn (less 2 Med Tk Cos)
    - 636th TD Bn (less 2 TD Cos and Rcn Co)
    - 443rd AAA AW Bn (SP) (less 2 Btries)
  - (2) Release the following units to TF LINDEN prior to 2359A, 24 December:
    - Hq & Hq Btry, 5th AAA Group
    - 62nd AAA Gun Bn (less Btries "A" and "C")
    - Two (2) Btries, 443rd AAA AW Bn (SP)
    - Hq & Hq Btry, 36th Inf Div Arty
    - One (1) TD Co, and Rcn Co (less 1 Plat), 636 TD Bn
    - One (1) Med Tk Co, 753rd Tk Bn.
  - (3) Missions: Assemble remainder of 36th Inf Div and attached units (par 2 c (1) above) in area West of STRASBOURG for rest, rehabilitation, and training in preparation for further operations. Prepare for movement to the SAVERNE — SARREBOURG area on Army order.
- d. VI Corps: Release 533rd AAA AW Bn (less Btry "A") with Btry "C", 431 AAA AW Bn atchd, to TF HARRIS prior to 2359A, 24 December.
- x. (1) Responsibility for command of present 36th Inf Div zone remains with CG, 36th Inf Div until all units of the 36th Inf Div (less Div Arty) have been relieved.
- (2) Commanders concerned will establish liaison immediately to effect the above relief.

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OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 40

22 December 1944

1. Operations Instruction Number 39, dated 22 December is amended as follows:
  - a. Change paragraph 1 b to read "Boundaries effective 2359A, 24 December are the same as those prescribed in Operations Instruction Number 35, Seventh Army, dated 20 December 1944." Boundaries indicated on overlay to accompany Operations Instruction Number 39 will be disregarded.
  - b. Change paragraph 2 a (1) by adding "222nd Infantry Regiment" to the list of troops attached to Task Force LINDEN.
  - c. Change paragraph 2 b (3) by deleting "Relieve elements of 36th Inf Div (less Div Arty) in assigned zone (See overlay) by 2359A, 24 December 1944."

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 41

23 December 1944

1. Effective immediately, 69th Armd FA Bn (105mm How) (SP) is relieved from attachment to VI Corps and is attached to Task Force HARRIS in present location.
2. Direct liaison between commanders concerned is authorized.

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 42

26 December 1944

1. Effective 0001A, 28 December 1944, Task Force HERREN assumes responsibility for defense of West bank of RHINE River in sector shown on attached overlay. Direct liaison between TF HERREN, TF HARRIS and TF LINDEN is authorized, beginning immediately, to coordinate relief of those units by Task Force HERREN in its sector.
2. An overlay showing the defensive organization of the sector of Task Force HERREN by regimental sub-sectors, and including artillery battalions, will be forwarded to this headquarters in duplicate as soon as defensive positions have been established.
3. Boundary between VI Corps and Task Force HARRIS as prescribed in Operations Instruction No. 35, dated 20 December 1944, is changed as shown on attached overlay.

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OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 43

27 December 1944

1. Effective 1200A, 27 December 1944, 36th Infantry Division and 12th Armored Division are attached to XXI Corps in present positions.
2. The XXI Corps will:
  - a. Assemble Corps troops in the PHALSBURG — SARREBOURG area as soon as possible, establishing Corps CP in PHALSBURG.
  - b. Be prepared to move on short notice to an area to be designated by higher headquarters.
3. Elements of the following listed units attached to TF HARRIS and TF LINDEN by Operations Instructions Nos. 35 and 39, Seventh Army, and Movement Order, Seventh Army, dated 24 December 1944, will remain on that status and on present missions prepared to rejoin the Division in the SARREBOURG area on six (6) hours notice from CG, 36th Infantry Division:
  - 753rd Tank Bn
  - 636th TD Bn (SP)
  - 443rd AAA AW Bn
  - 36th Infantry Division Artillery.
4. Direct liaison between commanders concerned is authorized.
5. All movements will be coordinated with Transportation Officer, Seventh Army. (Phone Seventh Army Rear 464).

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 44

27 December 1944

1. VI Corps:
  - a. Effective at 1800A, 27 December 1944, TF HARRIS (less one (1) Inf Regt), TF HERREN and TF LINDEN, with attached and supporting troops as listed in Attachment Order, this headquarters, dated 27 December 1944, are attached in present location to VI Corps. Alert status of certain supporting units listed in paragraph 3, Operations Instruction No. 43, this headquarters, dated 27 December 1944, remains in effect.
  - b. Effective 1800A, 27 December 1944, sector occupied by VI Corps is extended to the South to include sectors now occupied by TF HARRIS, TF HERREN and TF LINDEN. (See Operations Instruction No. 42).
  - c. One (1) Inf Regt, TF HARRIS, is attached to the 3rd Inf Div (currently under operational control of First French Army). Direct

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liaison between commanders concerned is authorized. Use of this regiment in defensive role only is authorized except in emergency. Maximum available time for completion of necessary training will be provided.

2. All movements will be coordinated with Transportation Officer, Seventh Army.

#### OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS NUMBER 45

27 December 1944

1. Field Order No. 8, Seventh Army, dated 21 December 1944, is changed as follows:
  - a. Delete paragraph 2 b (4). (See Opns Instr No. 44).
  - b. Delete paragraph 2 a (3). (See Opns Instr No. 43).
  - c. Delete paragraph 3 a (1) (e). (See Movement Orders, 87 Inf Div, dated 26 December 1944).
  - d. Delete paragraph 3 a (3). (See Opns Instr No. 43).
  - e. Change paragraph 2, Annex No. 1 to FO No. 8, Seventh Army, dated 22 December by deleting the portion that reads:
 

"XXI Corps  
40 Engr Combat Regt (less 1 Bn) (Attached upon arrival of XXI Corps)."
  - f. Delete paragraph 5, Annex No. 2 to FO No. 8, Seventh Army, dated 22 December 1944.

#### OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS NUMBER 46

28 December 1944

1. a. VI Corps will move one (1) Combat Command, 14 Armored Division, to XV Corps zone.
- b. Effective upon arrival in XV Corps zone, this Combat Command is relieved from attachment to VI Corps and is attached to XV Corps for operations.
- c. Movement of armored elements will be made under cover of darkness.
2. a. XV Corps will move 436 AAA AW Bn to VI Corps zone.
- b. Effective upon arrival in VI Corps zone 436 AAA AW Bn is relieved from attachment to XV Corps and is attached to VI Corps for operations.

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3. Details of movement will be arranged between commanders concerned. Corps will report completion of movements to this headquarters.

4. All movements will be coordinated with Transportation Officer, Seventh Army.

#### OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS NUMBER 47

30 December 1944

1. Each Corps will submit weekly reports showing progress of defensive organization to this headquarters.
2. Reports to reach this headquarters by 1200A each Sunday, to include work accomplished as of 1200A each Saturday.

#### OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS NUMBER 48

31 December 1944

1. Effective 0001A, 1 January 1945, VI Corps will be prepared to furnish two (2) engineer battalions (either combat or general service), on twelve (12) hours notice, to this headquarters for employment as Army reserve.
2. VI Corps is responsible for all normal engineer function in the Army zone East of the line SAVERNE — OBERNAI both inclusive.

#### OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS NUMBER 49

1 January 1944

1. 141st RCT, 36th Infantry Division attached to XV Corps 1600A, 1 January 1945, in present location.

#### OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS NUMBER 50

1 January 1944

1. The 48th Engineer Battalion (C) is attached to the 68th AAA Group effective 1900A, 1 January 1945.

#### OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS NUMBER 51

2 January 1944

1. VI Corps:
  - a. Complete withdrawal to the Main VOSGES Position, delaying on the following general lines:

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- 1st Position, MAGINOT LINE, by daybreak 2 January  
 2nd Position, BICHE — NIEDERBRONN — BITCHWEILLER, on order  
 3rd Position, BITCHE — DIGWEILLER — STRASBOURG, on order  
 Main VOSGES Position, on order. Main VOSGES Position will be selected so as to keep enemy beyond medium artillery range of SAVERNE and MOLSHEIM Passes.  
 b. Counter-attack to restore position in the BITCHE — NIEDERBRONN sector.  
 c. Target date for completion of withdrawal is 5 January.
2. XV Corps:  
 a. Hold present position and complete organization of MAGINOT LINE, switch position and rearward battle position. (See FO No. 9 and letter, this headquarters, dated 31 December 1944, Subject, "Directive".)

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
 NUMBER 52

4 January 1944

1. Previous instructions contained in Field Order No. 9, Headquarters Seventh Army, dated 30 December 1944, and in Operations, Instruction No. 51 pertaining to withdrawal rear of the MAGINOT Line are rescinded.
2. VI Corps:  
 a. Defend along the MAGINOT Line in sector (Overlay) and hold STRASBOURG.  
 b. Continue counterattack with all available means to restore DAMBACH-BITCHE position in sector (Overlay).  
 c. Continue organization of secondary position (Overlay).
3. XV Corps:  
 a. Defend along present positions in sector as prescribed in paragraph 3 a, Field Order No. 9, Seventh Army, dated 30 December 1944.  
 b. Prepare to launch a strong counterattack on Army order against enemy penetrations Southeast or Southwest from the BITCHE area.  
 c. 36th Infantry Division (less 141 RCT) and 12th Armored Division will not be committed except on Army order.

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
 NUMBER 53

5 January 1944

1. Effective 0001A, 6 January 1945, boundary between Seventh Army and First French Army is changed as follows: West of point V5484, no change —

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GRANDFONTAINE (V5788) — OBERHASLACH (V6995) — MARLENHEIM (Q8202) — TRUCHTERSHEIM (Q9007) — OLWISHEIM (Q9611) — HOERDT (R0311) — GAMBSHEIM (R1110) — ACHERN (R2403) all to First French Army.

2. Details of relief and passage of command in the STRASBOURG sector will be as agreed between CG French II Corps and CG US VI Corps, and will be completed by 0001A, 6 January 1945. Prior to passage of command, elements of 3 DIA arriving in STRASBOURG area will be under operational control of CG VI Corps.

3. Effective 0001A, 6 January 1945, the 935th FA Bn (4.5 Gun) is relieved from attachment to VI Corps and is attached to First French Army for operations only, for the support of the STRASBOURG defensive sector. Supply and administration of this unit remain the responsibility of Seventh Army. Commanding Officer of this unit will report to CG, 3rd DIA at STRASBOURG to coordinate movement.

4. One (1) FA Bn (105mm How) is relieved from attachment to XV Corps and is attached in present location to VI Corps, effective 0001A, 6 January 1945. Details of movement will be coordinated by commanders concerned.

5. VI Corps units and installations will be removed from the new French sector as soon as tactical operations permit.

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
 NUMBER 54

6 January 1945

1. The 12th Armored Division with all present attachments is relieved from attachment to XV Corps and is attached to VI Corps in present location effective 1800A, 6 January 1945.

2. Commanding General, VI Corps, is authorized to move one (1) normal combat command and the 827th TD Bn from present location. Remainder of Division will not be moved except by authority of this Headquarters.

3. Movement will be coordinated with Transportation Officer, Seventh Army.

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
 NUMBER 55

6 January 1945

1. Effective 0001A, 7 January 1945, boundary between VI Corps and XV Corps is extended as follows:

LOHR (Q6328) to XV Corps — BUST (Q6325) — HANGVILLER (Q6223) — BERLING (Q6322) — VILSBERG (Q6420) (all to VI Corps).

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OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 56

7 January 1945

1. Commanding General, VI Corps, is authorized to move the remainder of the 12th Armored Division from present position after 1230A, 7 January 1945.

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 57

8 January 1945

1. To implement the pertinent points of SHAEF Air Defense Instruction No. 5, the following system of code words will be employed in all communications relative to movements of large numbers of friendly aircraft at night.
  - a. AAOR's will be informed of the appearance of the friendly aircraft on the operations board at SOR by receiving the word "Dead Pan" from AALO. At this point IAZ restrictions to flying cease and guns will not fire unless an attack is in progress.
  - b. The above restrictions will remain in effect until the word "Candy" is passed by AALO at which time friendly aircraft will have left the area and normal rules for IAZ will obtain.
2. The restrictions to firing indicated above refer only to movements of heavy bombers in strength at night.

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 58

12 January 1945

1. Precise boundary between XV Corps and VI Corps is as shown on attached overlay.

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 59

13 January 1945

1. Seventh Army regroups as follows:
  - a. One (1) RCT, 36th Inf Div from XV Corps to cover relief of 103rd Inf Div.
  - b. 103rd Inf Div (reinf) from XXI Corps to VI Corps.
  - c. Task Force HERREN (reinf) and one (1) normal armored combat command from VI Corps to XXI Corps.
2. a. XV Corps:
  - (1) Move one (1) RCT, 36th Inf Div to area designated by CG, XXI Corps, so as to close by 1200A, 14 January 1945. Upon closing

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in XXI Corps sector, this RCT is relieved of attachment to XV Corps and is attached to XXI Corps.

- (2) Move one (1) AAA Bn (AW) to area designated by CG, XXI Corps, so as to close by 1200A, 14 January 1945. Upon closing in XXI Corps sector, this Bn is relieved of attachment to XV Corps and is attached to XXI Corps.

## b. XXI Corps:

- (1) Immediately upon arrival of RCT, 36th Inf Div (para. 2 a. above) move the 103rd Inf Div with attached TD Bn and AAA Bn to area designated by CG, VI Corps, in accordance with the following schedule:

- (a) One (1) RCT to close in VI Corps sector by 0001A, 15 January.
- (b) Remainder of 103rd Inf Div (by RCT's) immediately upon relief by elements of Task Force HERREN.

Upon arrival in VI Corps sector, elements of 103rd Inf Div are relieved of attachment to XXI Corps and are attached to VI Corps.

- (2) Hold one (1) RCT, 36th Inf Div, in Corps reserve, to be committed only on Army order. After completion of relief of 103rd Inf Div by Task Force HERREN (reinf), move this RCT to area designated by CG, XV Corps, at which time it is relieved from attachment to XXI Corps and is attached to XV Corps.

## c. VI Corps:

- (1) Move the following units to XXI Corps in accordance with the schedule outlined below:

- (a) One (1) regiment Task Force, HERREN  
One (1) FA Bn (105mm How) (SP)  
upon arrival of one (1) RCT 103rd Inf Div (See para. 2 b (1) (a) above).
- (b) One (1) regiment Task Force HERREN  
One (1) FA Bn (105mm How) (SP)  
One (1) normal armored combat command  
One (1) FA Group Hq or One (1) FA Brig Hq  
upon arrival in VI Corps sector of the second RCT, 103rd Inf Div.

- (c) Remainder of Task Force HERREN upon arrival of remainder of 103rd Inf Div.

- (2) Upon arrival in XXI Corps sector, the units listed in para. 2 c (1) above are relieved from attachment to VI Corps and are attached to XXI Corps.

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- x. (1) Corps commanders will coordinate movements with the Transportation Officer, this Headquarters, and with each other in order to insure rapid reliefs and movement.
- (2) Relief of 103rd Inf Div by Task Force HERREN will be completed not later than 1200A, 17 January 1945.

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 60

16 January 1945

1. XV Corps: Assemble all elements of 2nd French Armored Division (DB) in XV Corps sector. Prepare to move division to the East on twelve (12) hours notice on Army order.
2. XXI Corps: Assemble the 10th Armored Division, upon arrival, in the DIEUZE — BENESTROFF area. Upon arrival, 10th Armored Division is attached to XXI Corps. Hold division in Corps reserve, to be committed only on Army order and prepared for rapid movement to the Northeast, East, or Southeast.

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 61

17 January 1945

1. Confirming VOGG, Seventh Army, the following is made of record:
  - a. VI Corps is authorized to retain until 0900A, 17 January 1945, two (2) batteries of the FA Bn (105mm How) (SP) as scheduled per paragraph 2 c (1) (b), Operations Instruction No. 59, this Headquarters, dated 13 January 1945, to accompany the second regiment of Task Force HERREN to XXI Corps.
  - b. VI Corps is authorized to retain until further notice the one (1) normal armored combat command scheduled per paragraph 2 c (1) (b), Operations Instruction No. 59, this Headquarters, dated 13 January 1945, to accompany the second regiment of Task Force HERREN to XXI Corps.

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 62

17 January 1945

1. a. VI Corps:
  - (1) Confirming VOGG, Seventh Army, VI Corps is authorized to retain the 274th Inf Regt (TF HERREN) until further notice.

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b. XXI Corps:

- (1) Confirming VOGG, Seventh Army, move the 142nd RCT to rejoin its parent unit. Upon arrival, this unit is relieved from attachment to XXI Corps and reverts to 36th Inf Div.
- (2) Deploy one Combat Command of 10th Armored Division (reinf) in the general area vacated by the 142nd RCT upon its movement as directed above.
- (3) Employment of artillery of two combat commands, 10th Armored Division as reinforcing artillery is authorized.

c. XV Corps:

- (1) Confirming VOGG, Seventh Army, move 36th Inf Div - less 36th Rcn Tr, 141st RCT, one (1) Tk Co, one (1) TD Co, one (1) TD Rcn Plat and one (1) AAA AW Btry - with 636th TD Bn (-), 443rd AAA AW Bn (-) and 753rd Tk Bn (-) attached, to VI Corps sector. Bulk of movement will be routed over WINGEN — INGWILLER road.

- x. (1) Upon arrival in VI Corps sector, 36th Inf Div (less units listed in para. 1 c (1) is relieved from present attachment and is attached to VI Corps.
- (2) All movements will be coordinated between commanders concerned and with Transportation Officer, Seventh Army.

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 63

19 January 1945

1. a. XV Corps:

- (1) Upon arrival, the 101st Airborne Division (with 807 TD Bn and 567 AAA Bn attached) is attached to XV Corps.
- (2) Thereafter relieve and move the 141st RCT (reinf) to VI Corps sector to a location designated by CG VI Corps. Upon arrival, this unit is attached to VI Corps.

b. VI Corps:

- (1) Assemble one (1) Armored division by 0700A, 22 January 1945 in the SAVERNE (Q7215) — WASELONE (Q7904) — WALTENHEIM (Q9216) area. This Division reverts to Army control at the above hour and place.

- x. Commanders concerned will coordinate movements directed with Transportation Officer, this Headquarters, and with each other.

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OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 64

20 January 1945

## 1. a. XXI Corps:

- (1) Move one normal combat command, 10th Armored Division, to area designated by Commanding General, XV Corps. Upon arrival in XV Corps sector this unit is relieved from attachment to XXI Corps and is attached to XV Corps.
- (2) Confirming previous telegraphic instructions, move 939th FA Bn (4.5 Gun) to area designated by Commanding General, VI Corps. Upon arrival this unit is relieved from attachment to XXI Corps and is attached to VI Corps.

## b. XV Corps:

- (1) Confirming previous telegraphic instructions, move 693rd FA Bn (105mm How) to area designated by Commanding General, VI Corps. Upon arrival this unit is relieved from attachment to XV Corps and is attached to VI Corps.

- x. Movements directed will be coordinated with Transportation Officer, this Headquarters.

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 65

20 January 1945

1. Confirming VOGC, Seventh Army, this date, VI Corps is authorized to withdraw to the general line: RJ (Q758408) — ROTHBACH (Q8434) — NIEDER-MODERN (Q9127) — HAGUENAU (R0424) — BITCHWILLER (R0918) — WEYERSHEIM (R0513) at the discretion of the Corps commander.

2. Effective immediately, the following point is designated as a limiting point between VI and XV Corps:

Road junction 1 Km Northeast of ALTHORN at Q758408.

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 66

21 January 1945

## 1. XV Corps:

- a. Movement of 141st RCT (reinf) to VI Corps as directed in Operations Instruction No. 63, Headquarters Seventh Army, dated 19 January 1945, will be initiated prior to 0001A, 23 January 1945.

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OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 67

21 January 1945

1. Effective at 0700A, 22 January 1945, the 12th Armored Division reverts to Army reserve in present location.

2. Commanding General, VI Corps, is authorized to employ the organic artillery of the 12th Armored Division, provided such employment does not prevent its assembly and movement on six (6) hours notice from this Headquarters.

## 3. 12th Armored Division will:

- a. Establish and maintain liaison with II French Corps.
- b. Conduct road and terrain reconnaissance of areas to the East, Southeast and South.
- c. Continue present program of rehabilitation and re-training.

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 68

21 January 1945

1. Boundaries shown on attached overlay become effective at 2400A, 22 January 1945. Corps installations will be moved to conform to these boundaries as soon thereafter as practicable.

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 69

23 January 1945

1. a. New boundary between VI and XV Corps as shown on attached overlay is effective 0001A, 25 January 1945.
- b. Relief of VI Corps units in area northwest of new boundary will be coordinated between Corps commanders.
2. a. Effective upon arrival in the XV Corps sector the 35th Infantry Division (less 1 RCT), (with 448th AAA AW Bn (less 1 Btry), and 654th TD Bn (SP) (less 1 Co) attached), are attached to XV Corps for operations.
- b. Unit will maintain radio silence until committed to action.
3. 101st Airborne Division will not be committed except by authority of this Headquarters. CG XV Corps is authorized to employ division artillery and attached TD and AAA Bns, provided that those units are prepared to move on six (6) hours notice.

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OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 70

24 January 1945

## 1. XV Corps:

Commencing 25 January 1945, move the 101st Airborne Division (with 807th TD Bn attached) to an area designated by CG, VI Corps. Upon arrival in VI Corps sector, the 101st Airborne Division and 807th TD Bn are relieved from attachment to XV Corps and are attached to VI Corps.

## 2. VI Corps:

Relieve and move the 79th Infantry Division (with 813th TD Bn and 463rd AAA AW Bn attached) to the CHATEAU SALINS area. Complete relief and move bulk of Division prior to 0001A, 28 January 1945. Upon arrival, the 79th Infantry Division and attached units are relieved from attachment to VI Corps and revert to Army Reserve.

x. Movements directed will be coordinated with Transportation Officer, this Headquarters.

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 71

24 January 1945

1. a. XXI Corps: In accordance with VOGC, Sixth Army Group, the following units are relieved from operational control of Seventh Army and are attached to First French Army for operations only:

Hq & Hq Co, XXI Corps  
Hq & Hq Btry, XXI Corps Arty  
65th Signal Bn  
449th MP Co  
4th Plt, 4223 QM Car Co

- b. XV Corps: Assume responsibility for present XXI Corps sector and command of all troops currently assigned to XXI Corps (with the exception of units listed in paragraph 1 a above) as expeditiously as possible.

x. Actual date and hour of passage of command will be as agreed upon between CG XV Corps and CG XXI Corps.

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 72

26 January 1945

1. Paragraph 2, Operations Instruction No. 70, dated 24 January 1945, is rescinded and the following substituted therefor:

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## "VI Corps:

Relieve and move Task Force LINDEN to the CHATEAU SALINS area prior to 0001A, 28 January 1945. Upon arrival, Task Force LINDEN is relieved from attachment to VI Corps and reverts to Army Reserve."

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 73

29 January 1945

1. New boundary between VI and XV Corps as shown on attached overlay is effective 0600A, 30 January 1945.

## 2. a. VI Corps:

Relieve elements of the 35th Inf Div, within new boundary, by 0600A, 30 January 1945.

## b. XV Corps:

(1) Relieve elements of the 35th Inf Div, within new boundary, by 0600A, 30 January 1945.

(2) Assemble and prepare to move the 35th Inf Div (with 448th AAA AW Bn (-) and 654th TD Bn (-) attached) to destination outside Seventh Army sector. Movement orders later.

- x. (1) Exact time of passage of command and responsibility of extended VI Corps sector will be as agreed between CG XV Corps and CG VI Corps.

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 74

3 February 1945

## VI Corps:

Relieve and move the 79th Infantry Division (with 813th TD Bn and 463 AAA AW Bn attached) to the PONT-A-MOUSSON (U7735) area. Initiate movement of division by 0800A, 6 February 1945. Upon arrival, the 79th Division and attached units are relieved from attachment to VI Corps and revert to Army reserve. Coordinate movement with Transportation Officer, this headquarters.

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 75

6 February 1945

## 1. XV Corps:

- a. Upon arrival in the FAULQUEMONT Area, the 101st Cavalry Group is attached to XV Corps.

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- b. Relieve the 106th Cavalry Group by the 101st Cavalry Group. 106th Cavalry Group reverts to Corps reserve and will be committed only by authority of this Headquarters.

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 76

9 February 1945

1. XV Corps:
  - a. Upon arrival in XV Corps area, the 12th Armored Division (reinf.) is attached to XV Corps.
  - b. Be prepared to move the 10th Armored Division (reinf.) by road to a destination outside the Army area. Movement order later.

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 77

13 February 1945

1. a. 42nd Infantry Division:
  - (1) Move to area designated by CG VI Corps beginning 16 February 1945 and closing by 0001A, 18 February 1945. Division transportation will be supplemented by Army Transportation.
  - (2) Establish liaison with VI Corps immediately.
- b. VI Corps:
  - (1) Relieve the 45th Infantry Division. Be prepared to move Division to Army area to a destination to be announced later, as Army reserve.
  - (2) Instruct the 45th Infantry Division to establish liaison with this Headquarters upon relief.
- x. (1) 42nd Infantry Division is attached to VI Corps upon arrival in the Corps sector.
  - (2) Coordinate movements directed with Transportation Officer this Headquarters (Cadet Rear 467).
  - (3) Radio Silence:
    - 42nd Inf Div: during movement; until released by VI Corps.
    - 45th Inf Div: during movement; until released by Army.

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 78

13 February 1945

1. a. Boundary between First French Army and Seventh Army is changed as follows:

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West of RAON SUR PLAINE (V5291)	No change.
RAON SUR PLAINE	To First French Army.
WASSELONE (Q7804)	To First French Army.
DURNINGEN (Q8709)	To First French Army.
BRUMATH (Q9814)	To Seventh Army.
WEITBRUCH (R0317)	To Seventh Army.
OBERHOFFEN (R0920)	To First French Army.
SOUFFLENHEIM (R1625)	To First French Army.
LAUTERBOURG (R3241)	To First French Army.

- b. New boundary effective on relief of Seventh Army units in new French sector. Relief has been directed by higher headquarters to be completed by 2400A, 20 February 1945.
- c. Limiting points: OBERHOFFEN (R0920) - forward position.  
Canal bridge at (Q965128) - intermediate position.  
WASSELONE (Q7804) - VOSGES position.

Precise limiting points as arranged between Commanding Generals VI Corps and adjacent French Corps.

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 79

15 February 1945

REFERENCE: Operations Instruction No. 77.

1. VI Corps:
  - a. Move the 45th Infantry Division (with 106th AAA AW Bn attached), upon relief, to area shown on overlay.
  - b. Upon arrival in Army area, 45th Infantry Division (reinf.) is relieved from attachment to VI Corps and reverts to Army reserve.
  - c. Coordinate movement directed with Transportation Officer, this Headquarters (Cadet Rear 467).

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 80

18 February 1945

1. Seventh Army continue to defend in present position. Effective at a date and hour to be announced, 7th Army regroups with the XXI Corps on the left, XV Corps in the center, and VI Corps on the right.
2. a. Boundaries and limiting points: See Overlay.
- b. Troops:

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## (1) XXI Corps:

63rd Infantry Division  
70th Infantry Division  
12th Armored Division  
101st Cavalry Group

## (2) XV Corps:

42nd Infantry Division  
44th Infantry Division  
100th Infantry Division  
2nd French Armored Division (DB)  
106th Cavalry Group

## (3) VI Corps:

36th Infantry Division  
103rd Infantry Division  
101st Airborne Division (scheduled for early movement out of Army area)  
14th Armored Division

## (4) Army Reserve:

45th Infantry Division  
3rd Infantry Division (SHAEF Reserve)

## (5) Supporting Troops:

For changes in attachment of supporting troops, see attachment order, this Headquarters, dated 18 February 1945.

## 3. a. XXI Corps:

- (1) Assume command of sector and responsibility for its defense on army order. (See Overlay).
- (2) Coordinate defense with XX Corps, on the left.

## b. XV Corps:

- (1) Assume command of new sector and responsibility for its defense on army order.
- (2) Move 254th Infantry Regiment to location designated by CG XXI Corps.

## c. VI Corps:

- (1) Continue defense of sector.
- (2) Coordinate defense with French II Corps, on the right.

## d. Army Reserve:

- (1) Continue training, rehabilitation and refitting.

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- x. (1) Prior to time new boundaries go into effect, initiate regrouping of supporting and reserve units to conform to new sectors, consistent with operational requirements.
- (2) Complete regrouping of supporting and reserve units as soon as practicable after new boundaries are effective.

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 81

19 February 1945

1. Operations Instruction Number 80, this headquarters, dated 18 February 1945, is revised as follows:

- a. Boundary between VI Corps and XV Corps shown on overlay, Operations Instruction Number 80 will not take effect. Instead, present boundary between VI Corps and XV Corps will remain unchanged.
- b. 42nd Infantry Division will remain attached to VI Corps.

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 82

22 February 1945

## 1. VI Corps:

- a. Confirming VOGC, Seventh Army, relieve and move the 101st Airborne Division to assembly areas vicinity SARREBOURG and SAVERNE. Complete assembly of division by 0600A, 26 February 1945.
- b. Upon closing into assembly areas, the 101st Airborne Division is relieved of attachment to VI Corps and reverts to Army control.

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 83

25 February 1945

## 1. a. XXI Corps:

Assume command of sector, as specified in Operations Instruction No. 80, by 1200A, 28 February 1945.

## b. XV Corps:

Be prepared to move the 2nd French Armored Division (DB) to a destination outside the Army area. Movement order separately. Upon clearing the Army area, the 2nd French Armored Division (DB) is relieved from attachment to XV Corps and Seventh Army.

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- x. (1) Exact time of passage of command of the new XXI Corps sector as agreed between CG XV Corps and CG XXI Corps.
- (2) It is contemplated that the 12th Armored Division will be moved to a control location West of the VOSGES in Army reserve after the departure of the 2nd French Armored Division.

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 84

1 March 1945

1. All orders and instructions, this Headquarters, requiring the organization and construction of defensive positions in rear of present forward positions are rescinded.
2. Weekly defense progress reports are no longer required.

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 85

8 March 1945

1. Effective at 0001A, 12 March 1945, the 3rd Infantry Division (with 601st TD Bn, 441st AAA AW Bn, 756th Tk Bn and Btry B (less 2nd Plat) 353rd AAA S/L Bn attached), and the 45th Infantry Division (with 645th TD Bn, 106th AAA AW Bn, 191st Tk Bn, and 1st Plat, Btry A, 353rd AAA S/L Bn attached) are attached to XV Corps for operations. These divisions will establish and maintain liaison with XV Corps immediately.

2. XV Corps:

- a. Schedule movement of 3rd and 45th Infantry Divisions so as to permit completion of present training programs.
- b. Move Btry B (less 2nd Plat), 353rd AAA S/L Bn (currently attached to 3rd Inf Div) on 14 March 1945 to destination designated by CG, XXI Corps. Upon arrival this unit is relieved of attachment to 3rd Inf Div and XV Corps, and is attached to XXI Corps.
- c. Coordinate movement with Transportation Officer, Seventh Army.
- d. Conduct movements with maximum secrecy.

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 86

9 March 1945

1. The following Signal security measures are in effect for all units, Seventh Army, effective immediately and until removed by orders this headquarters.

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a. Units in reserve or moving in rear areas will:

- (1) Maintain absolute radio silence until committed in the line and released by Corps Commanders.
- (2) Transmit all messages below division level pertaining to troop movements by messenger only.
- (3) Not employ partial measures such as low power or reduced antenna.

b. Units being relieved in the line will:

- (1) Maintain normal radio communication until relieving unit is committed in the line, and at the same time, when considered necessary by Corps Commanders, furnish communication for the unit effecting relief. In either instance, the traffic passed should appear normal in all aspects to enemy intercept.

c. Units effecting relief of other units in the line will:

- (1) Maintain absolute radio silence until committed in the line and until released by Corps Commanders.
- (2) Not employ partial measures such as low power or reduced antenna.
- (3) Site radio nets for future operations without breaking radio silence.

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 87

10 March 1945

Boundary between XV Corps and XXI Corps is changed in accordance with attached overlay, and is effective 0600A, 13 March 1945. Relief of XXI Corps units and passage of command will be as agreed between CG XV Corps and CG XXI Corps.

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 88

11 March 1945

1. Pursuant to instructions from CG, Sixth Army Group, the 3rd Algerian Infantry Division (Fr) (DIA) (with one TD Bn and one AAA AW Bn attached and supported by one combat command of 5th French Armored Division (DB), one Bn of 155mm Hows and one Bn 155mm Guns (M-1)) is attached to Seventh Army for operations only, effective 0600A, 13 March 1945, and is in turn attached to VI Corps for operations in present zone of First French Army only, effective same date and hour.

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OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 89

12 March 1945

1. a. Effective 0600A, 15 March 1945, the 40th Engineer Group (reinf) and the 540th Engineer Group (reinf) are attached to VI Corps for operations.
- b. These groups are attached for the specific purpose of providing the means for crossing the RHINE River and to permit XV Corps to control their training and preparation of equipment for this mission. The 540th Engineer Group has undergone a period of combined training with the 3rd Infantry Division and is trained and equipped for the upstream crossing. The 40th Engineer Group has undergone a period of combined training with the 45th Infantry Division and is trained and equipped for the downstream crossing.
- c. It is the intention of this Headquarters that these groups will remain attached to XV Corps for the purpose of maintaining the lines of communication across the RHINE River until such time as the rear boundary of the Corps passes to the East side of the river.
- d. All moves of these groups will be made with maximum secrecy.

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 90

14 March 1945

1. 4th Infantry Division:
  - a. Be prepared on twenty-four (24) hours notice to move on Army order to any point within the Army area.
  - b. See para 2 b and 3, below.
2. XXI Corps:
  - a. Be prepared to release the 776th TD Bn on twelve (12) hours notice to control of CG 44th Inf Div on Army order.
  - b. After 740th Tk Bn has closed in XXI Corps area, release the 70th Tk Bn to control of CG 4th Inf Div.
3. VI Corps:
 

After 630th TD Bn has closed in VI Corps area, release 610th TD Bn to control of CG 4th Inf Div.

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OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 91

16 March 1945

1. 44th Infantry Division (with 895th AAA AW Bn attached)  
Remain assembled in the WITTRING (Q5650) — HAMBACH (Q4851) — SARRALBE (Q4844) area, prepared to move on twenty-four (24) hours notice on Army order to any point within the Army area.

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 92

16 March 1945

1. XXI Corps:
 

Be prepared on Army order to assemble and release to Army control the 12th Armored Division on twenty-four (24) hours notice. Employment of elements of the division by XXI Corps is authorized, provided such employment permits assembly of the division as specified.

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 93

17 March 1945

Upon arrival, the Division Artillery, 13th Armored Division, is attached to XXI Corps for operations. XXI Corps will be prepared to release this artillery to parent unit on six (6) hours notice from this headquarters.

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 94

18 March 1945

1. Effective 0001A, 19 March 1945, the 72nd AAA Gun Bn and the 108th AAA Gun Bn are relieved from present attachments and revert to operational control of Seventh Army. The Commanding Officers of these units or their representatives will report immediately to this Headquarters for instructions. Until further orders, these units will be employed on Military Police duty.

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 95

19 March 1945

1. XXI Corps:
 

4th Division Artillery is relieved of attachment to XXI Corps and reverts to control of parent unit immediately.

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## 2. 4th Infantry Division:

Assemble the division, (with 610th TD Bn, 377th AAA AW Bn, and 70th Tk Bn attached), and be prepared for movement on twelve (12) hours notice from this Headquarters. Establish liaison with VI Corps immediately.

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 96

19 March 1945

## 1. a. XV Corps:

Move one (1) normal combat command of the 6th Armored Division to area designated by CG, XXI Corps. Upon arrival in XXI Corps zone this combat command is relieved of attachment to XV Corps and is attached to XXI Corps for operations.

## b. XXI Corps:

Be prepared to pass the above combat command to XV Corps in the HOMBURG area on Army order.

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 97

19 March 1945

## 1. Groupement MONSABERT, composed of:

3rd Algerian Inf Div (Fr) (DIA) (reinf with one TD Bn and one AAA AW Bn)

5th French Armd Div (DB) (reinf with one TD Bn and one AAA AW Bn)

One (1) Bn 155mm Hows

One (1) Bn 155mm Guns

Necessary Engineers and supporting troops

is attached to Seventh Army at 1800A, 19 March 1945, and is in turn attached to VI Corps at the same date and hour, for operations only. This attachment continues until Seventh Army advances as far as the ERLIN River, at which time Groupement MONSABERT reverts to control of First French Army, which then assumes responsibility for the defense of the RHINE, South of the ERLIN River.

## 2. VI Corps:

a. Establish liaison with II French Corps immediately to coordinate action directed in paragraph 1 above. Previous attachment orders in conflict with the above are rescinded.

b. VI Corps is responsible for the defense of the RHINE, North of DRUSENHEIM (excl) until Groupement MONSABERT reverts to First French Army (see paragraph 1 above).

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## 3. 44th Infantry Division:

Be prepared to move on twelve (12) hours notice on Army order to any point within the Army area.

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 98

19 March 1945

1. The 4th Infantry Division (with 70th Tk Bn, 610th TD Bn and 377th AAA AW Bn attached) is attached to VI Corps effective 0600A, 20 March 1945. Coordinate movement with Transportation Officer, this Headquarters.

2. XV Corps will not be required to pass one (1) infantry division to VI Corps in the vicinity of PIRMASENS as specified in paragraph 3 b (5), FO No. 10, this Headquarters.

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 99

20 March 1945

## 1. Boundaries:

a. (1) Boundary between Seventh Army and Third Army is changed as follows: West of BUSS (SAAR) (Q3175) no change — BUSS — NEUNKIRCHEN (Q5982) — JAGERSBURG (Q7085) — RAMSTEIN (Q8794) — LANGMEIL (M1007) — WORMS — all to Third Army.

(2) Third Army units operations across new boundary have been instructed to yield priority to Seventh Army units upon contact.

(3) Local commanders will ensure that such Third Army units are permitted road space for withdrawal as early as practicable.

b. Boundary between XXI Corps and XV Corps is changed as follows: South of OMMERSHEIM (Q5869) no change — OMMERSHEIM — KIRKEL (Q6376) — HOMBURG (Q7180) — JAGERSBURG (Q7085) all to XXI Corps. Joint use of roads in HOMBURG to XXI Corps and XV Corps.

## 2. XXI Corps:

a. Destroy enemy in zone and then assemble units prepared for further action on Army order.

b. Confirming VOCC Seventh Army, pass CCA, 6th Armd Div to control of CG XV Corps on contact vicinity HOMBURG.

c. Move the 776th TD Bn to area designated by CG 44th Inf Div. Upon closing in 44th Inf Div area, this Bn is relieved from attachment to XXI Corps and is attached to 44th Inf Div.

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OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 100

20 March 1945

## 13th Armored Division:

Be prepared to move on twenty-four (24) hours notice on Army order to any point within the Army area.

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 101

21 March 1945

1. Boundaries. (See overlay).
2. XXI Corps:
  - a. Pass control of 63rd Inf Div with present attachments to XV Corps.
  - b. Assemble 70th Inf Div with present attachments in SAARBRUCKEN area. Upon assembly 70th Inf Div reverts to Army reserve.
  - c. Assume command of new zone (see overlay) and of 71st and 100th Divs. Capture PIRMASSENS, NEUSTADT, LUDWIGSHAVEN and destroy enemy in zone. Assist to the utmost the advance of VI Corps.
  - d. Establish new CP at BITCHE.
3. XV Corps:
  - a. Pass control of 71st and 100th Inf Divs with present attachments to XXI Corps.
  - b. Assume command of 63rd Inf Div with present attachments.
  - c. Destroy enemy in zone, and seize west bank of RHINE.
4. VI Corps:
  - a. Continue to exert maximum pressure on enemy in zone.
5. Army Reserve:
  - a. 70th Inf Div:
    - (1) Establish immediate liaison with this Headquarters.
    - (2) Continue present mission of mopping up SAARBRUCKEN area.
  - b. 44th Inf Div: Establish and maintain liaison with XV Corps.
  - x. Movement of XXI Corps troops, and supporting units to new Corps zone will be coordinated with CG, XV Corps. XV Corps units have road priority.

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OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 102

22 March 1945

## 1. 70th Infantry Division:

- a. Mop-up in detail and patrol the area: DERLEN (Q3477) — GUCHENBACH (Q4278) — NEUNKIRCHEN (Q5983) — ST ING-BERT (Q5476) — BREBACH (Q4968) — DIFFERTEN (Q3072) — All inclusive.
- b. Be prepared to assemble in the SAARBRUCKEN area on twelve (12) hours notice on Army order for movement to any part of the Army area.

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 103

22 March 1945

1. a. Boundary between XV Corps and XXI Corps is changed as follows: TRIPPSTADT (R0284) — LAMBRECHT (R2486) — DEIDES-HEIM (R3290) — MAUDACH (R4695), all to XXI Corps — RR Junction at (R509983).
- b. Boundary between XXI Corps and VI Corps is changed as follows: SIEBELDINGEN (R2368) — LANDAU (R2766) — SCHWEGEN-HEIM (R4274) — SPEYER (R5180), all to XXI Corps.
2. VI Corps:
 

Commit the 4th Infantry Division only by authority of this head-quarters.
3. XXI Corps:
 

12th Armd Div has been ordered to assemble in the SPEYER area, where it will pass to Seventh Army control, attached to XXI Corps on contact.

x. Commanders will endeavor to secure intact all floating equipment including barges and particularly tugs located in zones.

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 104

23 March 1945

1. Effective 1800A, 23 March 1945, temporary boundary, between Third Army and Seventh Army is changed as follows: SAARBRUCKEN (Q4671) — NEUNKIRCHEN (Q5983) — KUSEL (L7504) — ROCKENHAUSEN (M0614),

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all to Third Army — KIRCHHEIM BOLANDEN (M1918) point use — ALZEY (M2727), to Third Army — GIMBSHEIM (M4531), to Seventh Army.

2. XV Corps:

- a. 6th Armd Div (with 777th AAA AW Bn, 603rd TD Bn SP, 3803rd QM Trk Co, and 642 QM Trk Co attached) is relieved of attachment to XV Corps and Seventh Army, and is attached to Third Army, effective 1800A, 23 March 1945.
- b. 10th Armd Div, assembling in the NEUSTADT area, with one AAA AW Bn, one TD Bn SP, and two QM Trk Cos. attached, is attached to Seventh Army at 1800A, 23 March, and is in turn attached XV Corps effective same date and hour.
- c. Conduct immediate relief of all Third Army units in zone holding west bank of RHINE.

3. XXI Corps:

- a. 12th Armd Div (with current attachments) is attached to Seventh Army in the SPEYER area at 1200A, 24 March, and is in turn attached to XXI Corps same date and hour.

4. VI Corps:

Complete the destruction of the enemy in zone.

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 105

23 March 1945

1. Paragraph 2 b, Operations Instruction No. 104, this headquarters, dated 23 March 1945, is rescinded.

2. XXI Corps:

The 10th Armd Div (with one AAA AW Bn, one TD Bn SP and two QM Truck Companies attached) is attached to Seventh Army at 1800A, 23 March 1945, and is in turn attached to XXI Corps same date and hour.

3. XV Corps:

The 44th Inf Div (895th AAA AW Bn, 776th TD Bn, and 772nd Tk Bn attached) is attached to XV Corps effective 1800A, 23 March 1945.

4. 70th Infantry Division:

Move the 772nd Tk Bn to location designated by CG, 44th Inf Div. Upon arrival this battalion is relieved of attachment to 70th Inf Div and is attached to 44th Inf Div.

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OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 106

24 March 1945

1. 70th Infantry Division

13th Armored Division

- a. Garrison, police and support Military Government in areas in GERMANY as shown on overlay.
- b. Movement to areas will not begin prior to 0001A, 25 March 1945 or later than 1000A, 25 March 1945. Movement will be made on routes other than Main Supply Roads and will be coordinated with the Transportation Officer this Headquarters.
- c. Remain in Army reserve prepared for movement on thirty-six (36) hours notice from this Headquarters.

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 107

24 March 1945

1. Boundaries effective 1200A, 25 March 1945. (See Overlay).
2. VI Corps:

- a. Pass 42nd Inf Div (with present attachments) and 4th Inf Div (with present attachments) to control of XXI Corps effective 1200A, 25 March 1945. Coordinate movements with CG XXI Corps.
- b. Assume control of 71st Inf Div (with present attachments less 749th Tk Bn) and 100th Inf Div (with present attachments) effective 1200A, 25 March 1945 and responsibility for West bank of RHINE in zone as shown on overlay.
- c. Assist RHINE crossing of XV Corps by vigorous patrolling across RHINE in zone, and a feint, supported by artillery and smoke demonstrations in the SPEYER — GERMERSHEIM area in conjunction with XV Corps crossing (see para. 4 below).
- d. Maintain one infantry division in Corps reserve, prepared to move on twenty-four (24) hours notice on Army order.

3. XXI Corps:

- a. See para. 2, a and b, above. Coordinate movements with CG VI Corps.
- b. Be prepared to pass through bridgehead of XV Corps (see para. 4, below) and assist in exploitation of bridgehead on Army order.

4. XV Corps:

- a. Force a crossing of the RHINE in zone under Plan "UNDERTONE PHASE TWO", exclusive of the Airborne phase ("CHOKER TWO"). "D" Day, "H" Hour to be announced.

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- b. Maintain contact with Third Army units West and East of the RHINE.
- b. Be prepared to extend the bridgehead on Army order.
- d. See para. 3, b, above.
- 5. Army Reserve:
  - a. 13th Armored Division:
  - 70th Infantry Division:
  - Continue missions assigned in Operations Instruction No. 106.
- 6. See attachment order, this headquarters, dated 24 March 1945 (attached).

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 108

24 March 1945

1. a. Boundary between Seventh Army and First French Army is changed as follows, and is effective upon passage of command of sector to CG First French Army: West of BRUMATH (excl) no change — BRUMATH (to First French Army) — HAGUENAU — thence along Highway N-63 to SOULTZ (R1137) — thence along railroad from SOULTZ to ALTENSTADT (R1748) — thence along railroad to ERLER River at (R284560) — thence along ERLER River to its junction with the RHINE at (R4658) all to Seventh Army.
- b. First French Army has running rights of not to exceed 200 vehicle trips one-way daily along Highway N-63 between BRUMATH and WISSENBOURG and on the road between WISSENBOURG and the Army boundary at (R244510).
2. VI Corps:
  - a. Pass Groupement MONSABERT and responsibility of First French Army sector North of DRUSENHEIM to First French Army by 1200A, 26 March 1945.
  - b. Exact time of passage of command will be as agreed between CG VI Corps and CG II French Corps.
  - c. Withdraw all VI Corps units and installations from new First French Army sector as soon as practicable.
3. Upon passage of command as directed in para. 2, a, above, Groupement MONSABERT is relieved of attachment to VI Corps and Seventh Army.

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OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 109

25 March 1945

Units will not expend explosives in destroying SIEGFRIED Line fortifications recently passed through or captured, except as necessary to mop up isolated resistance.

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 110

25 March 1945

Temporary boundary between Seventh Army and Third Army is extended as follows, effective 0001A, 26 March 1945: West of GIMBSHEIM (M4631) no change — GIMBSHEIM — ROSSDORF (M7340) — DIEBURG (M7945) — BABENHAUSEN (M8752) — ASCHAFFENBURG (N0154), all to Seventh Army with running rights to Third Army on road ROSSDORF — ASCHAFFENBURG.

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 111

25 March 1945

Reference paragraph 4 a, Operations Instruction No. 107, this headquarters, dated 24 March:

"D Day: 26 March 1945  
H Hour: 0230A."

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 112

26 March 1945

1. Effective immediately the 12th Armored Division (with 572nd AAA AW Bn, 3659th QM Tk Co attached) is relieved of attachment to XXI Corps and is attached to XV Corps.
2. Effective immediately, the 63rd Infantry Division (with 436th AAA AW Bn, 822nd TD Bn, 740th Tk Bn attached) is relieved of attachment to XXI Corps.

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 113

27 March 1945

1. a. Army bridgehead: See overlay.
- b. Future boundary between XV and XXI Corps East of RHINE, effective on Army order: See overlay.

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2. Readjustment of Troops (Effective immediately)
  - a. XV Corps: 3rd, 45th, 44th Inf and 12th Armd Divs.
  - b. XXI Corps: 4th, 42nd, 63rd Inf and 10th Armd Divs.
  - c. VI Corps: 36th, 100th, 103rd Inf and 14th Armd Divs.
  - d. Army Reserve: 70th, 71st Inf and 13th Armd Divs (To pass to SHAEF control).
3. Missions:
  - a. XV Corps:
    - (1) Extend Corps bridgehead to include MANNHEIM and crossings over NECKAR River and advance to Army bridgehead.
    - (2) Exploit on multiple routes toward WURZBURG (N5835) and SCHWEINFURT (N7964).
    - (3) Contact and relieve elements of the Third Army in zone.
  - b. XXI Corps:
    - (1) On Army order assume command of new zone and continue advance to Army bridgehead.
    - (2) Be prepared to exploit with armor South of the NECKAR toward HEILBRONN (S0861) and BRUCHSAL (R6258).
  - c. VI Corps:
    - (1) Continue present mission and support with all available means the attack on MANNHEIM.
    - (2) Orders for future operations East of the RHINE, will be issued later.
  - x. (1) Allocation of supporting troops will be adjusted after XXI Corps becomes operational East of the RHINE.
  - (2) Upon closing of 63rd Inf Div East of the RHINE, Army assumes responsibility for bridge maintenance and traffic control in the crossing area.

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 114

27 March 1945

1. Boundary between Seventh Army and First French Army:  
Boundary between Seventh Army and First French Army, effective 0001A, 30 March 1945, is changed as follows: PHALSBURG — SAVERNE (both to First French Army) — HAGUENAU — thence along highway N-63 from HAGUENAU to SOULTZ — thence along railroad from SOULTZ to WISSENBURG — thence along railroad to LANDAU — thence along railroad to

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EDENKOBEN (R2876) (all to Seventh Army) — GEINSHEIM (3878) — HANHOTEN (R4480) — SPEYER (R5180) — HEILBRONN (S0862) (all to First French Army). Unrestricted running rights to Seventh Army over highway N-4 from PHALSBURG to SAVERNE, over highway N-421 from SAVERNE to BRUMAH and over highway N-63 from BRUMATH to HAGUENAU. Running rights to First French Army over highway N-63 from BRUMATH to its junction with highway N-272 North of LANDAU.

2. XXI Corps:

Move the XXI Corps East of the RHINE in accordance with the following instructions:

a. Order of Movement:

- (1) 10th Armd Div and 63rd Inf Div (in the order listed or simultaneously).
- (2) XXI Corps Headquarters and essential Corps troops.
- (3) 4th Inf Div and 42nd Inf Div (in the order listed or simultaneously).

b. Begin movement as soon as practicable following the 12th Armd Div.

c. Establish liaison with XV Corps immediately to coordinate the movement directed in paragraph 1 a (1) above.

d. Coordinate movements directed in paragraph 1 a (2) and (3) above with Transportation Officer, this Headquarters.

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 115

29 March 1945

1. Boundary between XV Corps and XXI Corps East of the RHINE, as delineated in para. 1, b, Operations Instruction Number 113, this Headquarters, is effective 1200A, 29 March 1945.

2. Effective 1200A, 29 March 1945, Army assumes control of the crossing area and the following units are relieved from attachment to XV Corps and revert to Army control:

44th AA Ops Det  
34th AAA Gp Hqs  
62nd AAA Gun Bn  
214th AAA Gun Bn  
910th AAA AW Bn (less Btry C)  
798th AAA AW Bn  
353rd AAA S/L Bn (less Btry A)  
78th Cml SG Co  
69th Cml SG Co

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3. 44th AAA Brigade:
  - a. Effective 1200A, 29 March 1945, the Antiaircraft and Chemical units listed in para. 2, above, are attached to the 44th AAA Brigade for operations.
  - b. Protect the crossing area against air attack.
  - c. Furnish illumination on request of Engineer unit commanders engaged on bridge and ferry operations.
  - d. Furnish upon request to CO, 540th Engr Gp, necessary AAA weapons for anti-sabotage protection.
  - e. Coordinate the antiaircraft defenses with the ground and anti-sabotage defenses of the crossing area.
4. a. VI Corps:
  - (1) (a) 36th Inf Div (443rd AAA AW Bn (SP) attached) and 103rd Inf Div (534th AAA AW Bn (M) attached) are relieved from attachment to VI Corps effective 1200A, 29 March 1945, and revert to Army control.
  - (b) Units will remain in present areas prepared for movement on Army order on 24 hours notice, and establish liaison with this Headquarters.
  - (c) 103rd Inf Div remain in present mission until relieved by Army order.
- b. XXI Corps:
  - (1) (a) Relieve 44th Inf Div after capture of MANNHEIM and permit movement of unit to area designated by CG XV Corps.
  - (b) Relieve other XV Corps units in zone immediately.
  - (2) Continue exploitation of bridgehead South of the NECKAR River toward HEILBRONN (S0861) and BRUCHSAL (R6258).

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 116

29 March 1945

1. Temporary boundary between Seventh Army and Third Army is changed as follows, effective immediately: West of ALZEY (M2727), no change — ALZEY — OPPENHEIM (M4439) — GROS GERAU (M5347) — MORFELDEN (M5953) — LANGEN (M6754) — DIETZENBACH (M7457) — HAINHAUSEN (M8161) — RR bridge at (M8668) — RR track to GELNHAUSEN (N0479) — (all to Third Army).

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2. XV Corps:

Relieve Third Army units South of new Army temporary boundary as soon as practicable and not later than 1800A, 31 March 1945.

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 117

30 March 1945

1. VI Corps:

3rd Bn, 398th Infantry, is relieved of attachment to Sixth Army Group "T" Force and reverts to control of parent unit effective immediately.

2. a. XXI Corps:

2nd Bn, 254th Inf, is attached, effective immediately, to Sixth Army Group "T" Force for operations in MANNHEIM and HEIDELBERG.

b. 103rd Inf Div:

Deploy one (1) rifle company in LUDWIGSHAFEN in accordance with instructions to be issued by Sixth Army Group "T" Force.

x. Commanding Officers or their representatives will report to Colonel PUMPELLY, Sixth Army Group "T" Force at (M554012), NORTH MANNHEIM immediately.

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 118

30 March 1945

1. XXI Corps:

- a. The 63rd Inf Div (with 436th AAA AW Bn, 822nd TD Bn attached) is designated as the infantry division referred to in paragraph 3, b, (2), FO No. 11, this Headquarters, dated 2200A, 29 March 1945.

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 119

31 March 1945

1. 36th Infantry Division:

Reference: Paragraph 3 d (1) (a), FO No. 11, this Headquarters, dated 2200A, 29 March 1945.

- a. Garrison assigned area as it is vacated by 70th Inf Div and 13th Armcd Div.
- b. Move by organic transportation, on roads West of LANDAU, commencing after the 42nd Inf Div clears LANDAU.

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- e. Direct communication with 70th Inf Div and 13th Armd Div is authorized.
- d. Coordinate movement with Transportation Officer, this Headquarters.
- e. Advance parties, down to include battalion parties, are authorized.

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 120

1 April 1945

103rd Infantry Division:

Garrison area assigned in para. 3 d (1) (a), FO No. 11, this Headquarters, dated 2200A, 29 March 1945, commencing 0600B, 2 April 1945.

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 121

2 April 1945

1. a. Boundary between Seventh Army and First French Army has been changed as follows, effective immediately: West of SPEYER (no change) — SPEYER (to First French Army) — MICHELFELD (R7670) — HILSBACH (R8167) — LAUFFEN (S0354) (all to Seventh Army).
- b. Contact points between Seventh Army and First French Army (VI US Corps and II Fr Corps): Main bridgehead force — HILSBACH Rcn force — LAUFFEN.
2. Correct Operations Instruction Number 200, dated 1 April 1945, to read Number 120.

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 122

4 April 1945

1. a. First French Army on the right secures the line KARLSRUHE — HEILBRONN and reconnoiters to the line LICHTENAU (R2014) — LUDWIGSBURG (S0734).
- b. Third Army on the left continues the advance toward LEIPZIG — DRESDEN.
2. Boundaries:
  - a. Present boundary between Seventh Army and Third Army is extended as follows: West of FULDA (H3819) no change — FULDA (to Seventh Army) — MEININGEN (H9022) — COBURG (O-3089) — BAYREUTH (O-7556) (all to Third Army).

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- b. Boundary between Seventh Army and First French Army, effective immediately: BITCHE (Q7750) — EDENKOBEN (R2876) — SPEYER (R5180) — all to First French Army — MICHELFELD (R7670) — HILSBACH (R8267) — LAUFFEN (S0454) (all to Seventh Army) — thence along NECKAR River to STUTTGART (to First French Army) (see overlay). Unrestricted use of the main railroad from West of the VOSGES running through HAGUENAU and LANDAU to Seventh Army. Unrestricted running rights on the road PHALSBOURG — SAVERNE — BRUMATH — HAGUENAU — WISSEMBOURG — LANDAU — EDENKOBEN to Seventh Army.
- c. Boundary between Corps effective 0001B 6 April 1945:
  - (1) Between XV Corps and XXI Corps: See overlay.
  - (2) Between XXI Corps and VI Corps: See overlay.
3. a. VI Corps:
  - (1) Continue advance and secure objective shown on overlay.
  - (2) Maintain close liaison with First French Army.
- b. XXI Corps:
  - (1) Continue advance and secure objective shown on overlay, prepared for further advance to the Southeast on Army order.
  - (2) Prepare to employ one additional infantry division on Army order.
  - (3) See para. 3 c (1) (a), (b) and (c).
- c. XV Corps:
  - (1) (a) Complete rapidly present mission of clearing enemy from HOHE RHON hill mass, and occupying initial objective.
  - (b) Use of HANAU — FULDA road is authorized.
  - (c) Arrange as necessary with CG XXI Corps for passage of armored elements through zone of XXI Corps.
  - (2) Thereafter, continue advance to the Southeast and secure second objective shown on overlay.
  - (3) Be prepared to release one (1) infantry division to Army control on twenty-four (24) hours notice.
- d. 103rd Infantry Division:
 

Withdraw troops from area South of new Army boundary and continue present mission.
- x. (1) Corps will reconnoiter in strength to Reconnaissance Line (see overlay). Advance beyond line shown, only on authority of this headquarters.

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OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 123

6 April 1945

1. a. 103rd Infantry Division (reinf)
  - (1) Move across the RHINE commencing at 1200B, 7 April 1945.
  - (2) Coordinate movement with Transportation Officer, this Headquarters.
  - (3) Garrison, police and support Military Government in area shown on overlay. No change in alert status.
- b. 36th Infantry Division:
 

Commencing immediately, relieve 103rd Inf Div from garrison duty West of the RHINE River. New area of responsibility shown on overlay.

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 124

7 April 1945

1. XV Corps:
 

Move the 44th Inf Div (with 895th AAA AW Bn, 776th TD Bn, 772nd Tk Bn attached) to an assembly area vicinity GROSSRINDERFELD (N4420), 8 April 1945. Upon arrival in the GROSSRINDERFELD area, the 44th Inf Div (reinf) is relieved from attachment to XV Corps and reverts to Army reserve. Coordinate movement with XXI Corps.

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 125

7 April 1945

1. 44th Infantry Division:
 

Move the 324th RCT (reinf) to VI Corps zone. Effective upon arrival in VI Corps zone, 324th RCT (reinf) is attached to VI Corps for operations.

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 126

8 April 1945

1. 103rd Infantry Division:
  - a. Area assigned in Operations Instruction No. 123, this Headquarters, dated 6 April 1945, is extended as shown on overlay.
  - b. Confirming VOGC Seventh Army, relieve the 44th Inf Div on security targets in the extended area, and relieve Co C, 1269th Engr Bn on security targets in HEIDELBERG (R6890).

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## 2. a. 44th Infantry Division:

- (1) Be prepared to move on twenty-four (24) hours notice on Army order.
- (2) Move two (2) Btrys 895th AAA AW Bn to area designated by CG, XXI Corps. Upon arrival, these Btrys are relieved from attachment to 44th Inf Div and are attached to XXI Corps.

## b. XXI Corps:

- (1) See para. 2, a, (2), above.
- (2) Be prepared to release these units to parent unit on twelve (12) hours notice by this Headquarters.

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 127

9 April 1945

## 1. a. 36th Infantry Division:

- (1) Assume complete responsibility in assigned area for:
  - (a) Insuring the security of Army supply installations by supplementing as necessary the installation guards and coordinating security measures.
  - (b) Insuring the security of the operating railroads, main supply roads and petroleum pipe lines.
  - (c) The control of displaced persons.
  - (d) Disarming and police of the civilian population.
  - (e) Establishing a Prohibited Frontier Zone between FRANCE and GERMANY, and enforcing Military Government Law No. 161.
  - (f) Support of Military Government.
- (2) Relieve Seventh Army Security Command guards now committed in division area.
- (3) Be prepared to initiate movement out of the Army area on twenty-four (24) hours notice by this Headquarters.

## b. Seventh Army Security Command.

Establish liaison immediately with the 36th Infantry Division to coordinate relief of guards currently posted in the division area.

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OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 128

10 April 1945

1. Confirming VOG Seventh Army, the following is made of record:
  - a. Effective 1500B, 10 April 1945, 324th RCT (reinf) is relieved from attachment to VI Corps and is attached to XXI Corps.
  - b. Objective assigned XXI Corps in Operations Instruction No. 122, this Headquarters, dated 4 April 1945, is extended to the following general line: BLAUFELDEN (S6280) — SCHROZBERG (S6385) — MUNSTER (S6696) — CREGLINGEN (S6699) — WALDMANNSHOFEN (N6806) — GEISSLINGEN (N7114) — MARKTSTETT (N7324).
  - c. Major elements VI Corps in advance of general line: KUPFERZELL (S4271) — LANGENBURG (S5475) — BLAUFELDEN (S6280) will be withdrawn.

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 129

11 April 1945

1. Effective immediately, two (2) Rcn Platoons of Hq & Hq Co, 648th TD Bn are attached to the 36th Infantry Division.
2. 36th Infantry Division:
 

Be prepared to release two (2) Rcn Platoons of Hq & Hq Co, 648th TD Bn to parent unit on twenty-four (24) hours notice from this Headquarters.

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 130

11 April 1945

1. 44th Infantry Division:
 

Effective immediately, 44th Inf Div Artillery (less 220th FA Bn) is attached to the XXI Corps.
2. XXI Corps:
  - a. See paragraph 1, above.
  - b. Be prepared to release 44th Inf Div Artillery (less 220th FA Bn) to parent unit on twenty-four (24) hours notice from this Headquarters.

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OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 131

13 April 1945

1. a. Third Army continues to advance on Seventh Army left.
- b. First French Army continues advance toward STUTTGART.
2. a. Seventh Army advance abreast of and protects right flank of Third Army.
- b. Boundaries:
  - (1) Between Armies: No change.
  - (2) Between Corps, effective 0600B, 14 April 1945: See overlay.
3. a. XV Corps:
  - (1) Secure objective line shown on overlay.
  - (2) Maintain contact with and protect right flank of Third Army.
  - (3) Seize AUTOBAHN between BAYREUTH and NURNBERG and capture NURNBERG.
- b. XXI Corps:
  - (1) Secure objective line shown on overlay.
  - (2) Assist XV Corps in capture of NURNBERG.
- c. VI Corps:
  - (1) Secure objective line shown on overlay.
  - (2) Maintain contact with First French Army, and be prepared to assist in the capture of STUTTGART.
- x. (1) After securing objectives, Corps will reconnoiter to line shown on overlay and be prepared for further advance to the Southeast on Army order.

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 132

14 April 1945

1. Third Army on the left is temporarily halted on the general line: ZWICKAU (K3546) — BAYREUTH (O-7556), prepared for further advance.
2. XV Corps:
 

Establish and maintain contact with Third Army (XII Corps) at RJ (O-778526).

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OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 133

16 April 1945

1. Effective immediately, the boundary between Seventh Army and Third Army is changed as follows: Point on FRANCO — GERMAN Border (Q4368) — SAARBRUCKEN (Q4671) — NEUNKIRCHEN (Q5983) — NOHFELDEN (L5710) — thence along the railroad along the NAHE River to OBERSTEIN (L7023) — MEISENHEIM (L9523) — ALZEY (M2727) — OPPENHEIM (M4540) (all to Third Army) — East of OPPENHEIM (M4540) — no change.

2. 36th Infantry Division:  
Extend area of responsibility to boundary between Seventh Army and Third Army as designated in para. 1, above.

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 134

17 April 1945

1. 44th Infantry Division:  
Confirming VOGC Seventh Army, 44th Inf Div with attached units (less 324th RCT) is released from attachment for training to XXI Corps and is attached to VI Corps, effective immediately.

2. XXI Corps:
- a. See paragraph 1, above.
  - b. Effective immediately, 44th Div Artillery (less 220th FA Bn) is released from attachment to XXI Corps and reverts to control of parent unit.
  - c. Release the 324th RCT to VI Corps as soon as practicable.

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 135

18 April 1945

1. 103rd Infantry Division (534th AAA AW Bn, 614th TD Bn attached):
- a. Upon relief from Security duty, move to area designated by CG VI Corps.
  - b. Upon arrival in VI Corps area, 103rd Inf Div (reinf) is attached to VI Corps.
  - c. Establish liaison with VI Corps immediately.
  - d. Coordinate movement with Transportation Officer, this Headquarters (Telephone Cadet Rear 467).
  - e. Additional transportation of two (2) QM Truck Companies (DUKW) will be furnished for movement by this Headquarters.

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OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 136

20 April 1945

## 1. XV Corps:

Upon the capture of NURNBERG, the 3rd Infantry Division (with 601st TD Bn, 756th Tk Bn and 441st AAA AW Bn attached) is relieved from attachment to XV Corps and reverts to Army control.

## 2. 3rd Infantry Division (reinf):

- a. Garrison NURNBERG until relieved by Third Army units.
- b. Be prepared to move to an assembly area in the vicinity of CRAILS-HEIM on Army order.
- c. Establish liaison with this Headquarters.

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 137

21 April 1945

1. Effective immediately, the boundary between Seventh Army and First French Army is changed as follows: North and West of STUTTGART (inclusive) (no change) — thence along the NECKAR River to junction with the FILS River — thence along the NECKAR River to ROTTWEIL (W6652) (exclusive) (all to Seventh Army) — ROTTWEIL — SIGMARINGEN (X1144) (both to First French Army).

## 2. VI Corps:

So much of para. 3 c (1) FO No. 12 as directs an advance beyond the line: ROTTWEIL — SIGMARINGEN, is revoked.

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 138

22 April 1945

1. Boundary between Seventh Army and First French Army is changed as follows, effective immediately: North of STUTTGART (inclusive) no change — thence along the NECKAR River to PLIEZHAUSEN (X0896) — PLIEZHAUSEN — REUTLINGEN (X0989) — ENGSTINGEN (X1477) — GAMMERTINGEN (X1062) — SIGMARINGEN (X1043) — all to First French Army.

2. Boundary between VI Corps and XXI Corps is changed as follows, effective immediately: North of GEISLINGEN, no change — GEISLINGEN (S5505) — WESTERSTETTEN (X6393) — BEIMERSTETTEN (X6689) — RJ (X694868) — PFAFFENHOFEN (X7975) — BIBERACH (X8368) — KRUMBACH (X9564), all to VI Corps.

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OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 139

23 April 1945

## 1. Boundaries:

- a. Between Seventh Army and First French Army (effective at a date and hour to be announced): West of LAUFFEN (S0354) no change — LAUFFEN — railroad to ASPERG (S0235) — Autobahn to junction at (R938211) — Autobahn to RJ at (S0911), (all to Seventh Army) — METZINGEN (X1494) — DETTINGEN (X1993) — MUNSINGEN (X3080) — EHINGEN (X4766) — REINSTETTEN (X6448), (all to First French Army) — KEMPTEN (X9306), (to Seventh Army).

Joint use of the KARLSRUHE — HEILBRONN and KARLSRUHE — STUTTGART railroads and equal running rights on all roads North of the KARLSRUHE — STUTTGART Autobahn inclusive. Equal running rights to First French Army on Autobahn between Autobahn junction West of STUTTGART and BERNHAUSEN.

- b. Between Seventh Army and Third Army: No change.
- c. Between VI Corps and XXI Corps: See overlay.
- d. Between XXI Corps and XV Corps: See overlay.

## 2. a. VI Corps:

- (1) Advance rapidly and seize Corps objective.
- (2) After the capture of STUTTGART, be prepared on Army order to relieve First French Army in the STUTTGART area, employing the 100th Inf Div.

## b. XXI Corps:

- (1) Advance rapidly in zone and capture MUNICH.
- (2) Be prepared on Army order to pass one (1) Inf Div to control of XV Corps in the area West of MUNICH.

## c. XV Corps:

- (1) Advance rapidly in zone and capture MUNICH.
- (2) Employing mobile forces, exploit in the INN River valley with utmost speed (see overlay).
- (3) See para. 2 b (2) above.

- x. Each Corps will prepare plans for the employment of mobile task forces to penetrate rapidly the mountain passes in zone and establish secure routes to the INNSBRUCK — BRENNER area.

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OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 140

23 April 1945

- 1. Upon arrival in the BLAUFELDEN area, the 3rd Inf Div (with 441st AAA AW Bn, 601st TD Bn and 756th TD Bn attached) is attached to XXI Corps.

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 141

23 April 1945

- 1. Confirming verbal agreement between CG Seventh Army and CG Third Army, the following is effective at 1200B, 23 April 1945:

- a. 14th Armd Div (with 398th AAA AW Bn, 4380th QM Trk Co and 395th QM Trk Co attached) is relieved of attachment to Seventh Army and XV Corps and is attached to Third Army.
- b. 20th Armd Div (with 468th AAA AW Bn, 399th QM Trk Co and 666th QM Trk Co attached) is relieved from attachment to Third Army and is attached to Seventh Army and is further attached to XV Corps.

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 142

23 April 1945

- 1. Boundary between Seventh Army and First French Army as delineated in para. 1 a, Operations Instruction No. 139, this Headquarters, dated 23 April 1945, is in effect at 0001B, 25 April 1945.

- 2. The 101st Airborne Division (with 813th TD Bn (SP) attached) is attached to VI Corps, on arrival in the MERCHINGEN (S2890) area.

## 3. XV Corps:

Be prepared, prior to the attack on MUNICH, to furnish three (3) battalions of infantry or engineers and one cavalry troop to Sixth Army Group "T" Force for operations in the MUNICH area. Prior to that time, Commanding Officers of designated units will report to Colonel PUMPELLE, "T" Force, for briefing.

## 4. VI Corps:

Move the 100th Inf Div to STUTTGART, commencing 25 April 1945. Upon closing in STUTTGART, the 100th Inf Div is relieved from attachment to VI Corps and reverts to Army reserve.

## 5. 100th Infantry Division:

- a. Relieve First French Army units in STUTTGART and establish local security in the general area: NECKAR River on the East and the Autobahn to the Northwest and Southwest.
- b. Establish liaison with this Headquarters.

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OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 143

25 April 1945

1. 36th Infantry Division:
  - a. Upon arrival in the KUNZELSAU (S4277) — CRAILSHEIM (S7062) area, the 36th Inf Div (with 443rd AAA AW Bn attached) is attached to XXI Corps.
  - b. Establish liaison with XXI Corps.
2. XXI Corps:
 

Effective 0001B, 28 April 1945, the 63rd Inf Div (with 436th AAA AW Bn attached) is relieved from attachment to XXI Corps and reverts to Army reserve.
3. 63rd Infantry Division:
  - a. Establish liaison with this Headquarters.
  - b. Further orders will be issued separately.
4. 100th Infantry Division:
 

Assemble in the STUTTGART area, prepared for movement on Army order on twenty-four (24) hours notice.

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 144

26 April 1945

- Amend Operations Instruction No. 143, this Headquarters, dtd 25 April 1945, as follows:
- Delete paragraph 2 and substitute therefor:
- "2. XXI Corps:
- Effective 0001B, 30 April 1945, the 63rd Inf Div (with 436th AAA AW Bn attached) is relieved from attachment to XXI Corps and reverts to Army reserve. Release one (1) RCT by 0001B, 28 April 1945."

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 145

28 April 1945

1. Boundary between Seventh Army and Third Army is changed as follows, effective immediately: Northwest of FREISING, no change, FREISING (Y9585) (to Third Army) — EDLING (Z3049) — PRIEN (Z4428) (both to Seventh Army) — ST JOHANN (E5391) — KITZBUHEL (E5182) — BRAMBERG (E4863) — HINTEREGG (rV8726) (all to Third Army).
2. Seventh Army continues the advance into AUSTRIA, captures INNSBRUCK blocks the BRENNER Pass and pushes strong reconnaissance to

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LANDECK (rV3944) and WARTH (C8554) to assist First French Army in blocking RESIA Pass.

## 3. a. VI Corps:

- (1) After securing objective assigned in Operations Instruction No. 139, continue the attack in zone with utmost speed through all possible avenues of approach to INN River valley.
- (2) Capture INNSBRUCK and block the BRENNER Pass (see para. x).
- (3) Extend strong reconnaissance to LANDECK and WARTH (C8554) and assist First French Army to capture these objectives.

## b. XXI Corps:

- (1) Upon securing objectives assigned in Operations Instruction No. 139, continue the attack in zone with utmost speed through all possible avenues of approach to INN River valley.
- (2) Capture INNSBRUCK and block the BRENNER Pass (see para. x).
- (3) Extend strong reconnaissance to the East down the INN River valley to establish contact with XV Corps.
- (4) 2nd French Armored Division attached upon arrival.
- (5) One Division will be attached to XV Corps in MUNICH on Army order.

## c. XV Corps:

- (1) After the isolation of MUNICH, attack with strong mobile forces on the axis ROSENHEIM (Z2827) — WORGL (E2685) — STRASS (E0874), and extend reconnaissance to the East.
- (2) Be prepared to assist Third Army units in their advance towards SALZBURG.
- (3) Garrison MUNICH after its capture.
- x. The Corps first reaching INNSBRUCK will coordinate action with the adjacent Corps in the INNSBRUCK area. Further instructions later.

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 146

28 April 1945

1. Effective immediately the 3rd Inf Div (with 441st AAA AW Bn, 601st TD Bn and 756th Tk Bn attached) is relieved of attachment to XXI Corps and is attached to XV Corps.
2. Effective immediately temporary boundary between XV and XXI Corps is rescinded.

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OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 147

29 April 1945

1. a. Boundary between Seventh Army and First French Army is changed as follows, effective immediately: West of LAUFFEN (S0633) — no change — LAUFFEN — thence along Railroad to LUDWIGSBURG (S0633) and KORNWESTHEIM (S0630) (including LUDWIGSBURG, KORNWESTHEIM and marshalling yards) — MUHLHAUSEN (S0928) — WALBLINGEN (S1526) (all to Seventh Army) — PLOCHINGEN (S2313) (to First French Army) — thence Southwest along NECKAR River to its junction with present boundary at (S125020) — thereafter no change.
- b. Unrestricted running rights to Seventh Army of the following roads and railroads: Autobahn from ASPERG (S0235) to RJ at (R9321) to stream crossing at (S2009). Railroad from KORNWESTHEIM to WALBLINGEN and PLOCHINGEN. Highway number 10 from junction with Autobahn at (S0129) to PLOCHINGEN. Highway number 27 from KORNWESTHEIM to junction with Highway number 10 at (S0526). Highway number 14 from junction with Highway number 10 at (S0824) to WALBLINGEN. Highway East of and parallel to NECKAR River from RJ at (S098240) to PLOCHINGEN.
- c. Seventh Army will retain joint use of Roads and Railroads North of and including Autobahn from KARLSRUHE to STUTTGART.
2. 100th Inf Div (with 898th AAA AW Bn attached)
  - a. Move to the following assembly area: LORCH (S4324) — DONZDORF (S5211) — AUENDORF (S4303) — KIRCHHEIM (S2607) — REICHENBACH (S2714) — SCHORNDORF (S3124) (all inclusive), as soon as practicable.
  - b. Establish command post in GOPPINGEN (S4113) and coordinate movement with Transportation Officer, this Headquarters (Telephone CADET Rear 467).

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 148

1 May 1945

1. a. Boundary changes effective immediately: See overlay.
- b. Boundary between Seventh Army and Fifteenth Army: RHINE River between OFFENHEIM and SPEYER (both exclusive).
2. a. VI Corps:
  - (1) Move the 101st Airborne Division (with 813th TD Bn, 774th Tk Bn, 397th QM Trk Co and 53rd QM Bn (DUKW) attached)

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to area designated by CG XXI Corps by 0001B, 4 May 1945. Upon arrival in XXI Corps zone, the 101st Airborne Division (reinf) is relieved of attachment to VI Corps and is attached to VI Corps and is attached to XXI Corps.

- (2) Capture LANDECK (V3944) and block the RESIA Pass.
- (3) After capturing INNSBRUCK send strong reconnaissance through the BRENNER Pass.
- b. XXI Corps:
  - (1) Mission assigned in para. 3 b, Operations Instruction No. 145, dated 28 April 1945, is rescinded.
  - (2) Enter and clear the INN River Valley in zone and establish contact with VI Corps.
  - (3) Extend strong reconnaissance to ST JOHANN (E5391), KITZBUHEL (E5182) and BRAMBERG (E4863) and be prepared for further advance to the East on Army order.
  - (4) Be prepared to release the 4th Inf Div (reinf), for movement to area of Twelfth Army Group commencing on 4 May 1945.
  - (5) Be prepared after 5 May to release the 12th Armored Division (reinf) to Army control for security duty. Further instructions later.
- c. XV Corps:
  - (1) Mission assigned in para. 3 c (1), Operations Instruction No. 145, dated 28 April 1945, is rescinded.
  - (2) Complete the destruction of the enemy in the MUNICH area.
  - (3) Cross the ISAR River.
  - (4) Thereafter, rest units other than those necessary for security in preparation for further action. It is estimated that a two (2) day rest period will be possible.
- d. 63rd Infantry Division:
 

Extend area of responsibility to include LUDWIGSBURG (S0633), KORNWESTHEIM (S0630) and area West of NECKAR River to Army right (West) boundary as delineated in Operations Instruction No. 147, dated 29 April 1945.

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 149

2 May 1945

1. Boundary changes, effective immediately: See overlay.

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2. a. XV Corps:
  - (1) Capture SALZBURG.
  - (2) Destroy enemy in zone and maintain contact with Third Army on the left.
  - (3) Continue to garrison MUNICH until further orders.
- b. XXI Corps:
  - (1) Advance to the East in zone on all possible routes and capture BERCHTESGADEN.
  - (2) Block the passes South of the BRUCK (E8467) — RADSTADT (A3281) line.
  - (3) Complete the destruction of the enemy in the INN River valley in zone.

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 150

3 May 1945

1. Confirming verbal agreement between CG Seventh Army and CG Third Army, the 86th Inf Div (with 807th TD Bn, 787th TK Bn and 839th AAA AW Bn attached) is attached to Seventh Army for operations effective at 1900B, 2 May 1945, and is further attached to XV Corps for operations at the same date and hour.

2. a. VI Corps:
 

Reconnoiter through BRENNER Pass as far as ITALIAN border to contact units of Fifteenth Army Group.
- b. XXI Corps:
  - (1) Assemble the 4th Inf Div (with 610th TD Bn, 70th TK Bn and 377th AAA AW Bn attached) by 4 May 1945, in preparation for movement to Third Army. Movement order later.
  - (2) Assemble the 12th Armd Div (with 572nd AAA AW Bn (SP), 3659th QM Trk Co and 3359th QM Trk Co attached). Upon assembly, division reverts to Army reserve. Division will establish liaison with this Headquarters immediately.

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 151

5 May 1945

1. Boundary changes, effective immediately: See overlay.
2. a. Effective at 1200B, 6 May 1945, German Army Group "G"

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surrenders. This includes all German forces opposing Seventh Army except for those in the area indicated on overlay.

- b. All forward elements remain in present positions until after 1200B, 6 May 1945.
3. a. XV Corps:
  - (1) Be prepared to enforce terms of surrender as far South as the line of the SALZACH River — ENNS River.
  - (2) Assemble the 3rd Inf Div (with 601st TD Bn, 756th T. Bn and 441st AAA AW Bn (SP) attached) in the SALZBURG area. Upon assembly, division reverts to Army reserve. Division will establish liaison with this Headquarters immediately.
  - (3) 45th Inf Div (with 106th AAA AW Bn, 645th TD Bn and 191st Tk Bn attached) reverts to Army reserve in the MUNICH area at 1800B, 6 May 1945. Division will establish liaison with this Headquarters immediately.
  - (4) Running rights to Third Army on road: BAD ISCHL (V4118) — GOLSERN (V4110) — BAD AUSSEE (V5408).
- b. XXI Corps:
  - (1) Be prepared to enforce terms of surrender as far South as the line of the Salzach River.
  - (2) Assemble 2nd French Armored Division in the DIessen (Y5133) area. Upon assembly Division reverts to Army reserve. Division will establish liaison with this Headquarters immediately.

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 152

8 May 1945

Effective 0900B, 8 May 1945, the 3rd Infantry Division (with 601st TD Bn, 756th Tk Bn and 441st AAA AW Bn (SP) attached) is attached to XV Corps.

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS  
NUMBER 153

10 May 1945

1. Seventh Army regroups and occupies present sector to the line: REZIA PASS — BRENNER PASS — SALZACH River — ENNS River.
2. a. Boundaries: See overlay, effective 1800B, 11 May 1945.
- b. Troops:
 

VI Corps:

  - 36th Inf Div
  - 44th Inf Div

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45th Inf Div  
103rd Inf Div  
10th Armd Div  
2nd French Armd Div (DB)

## XV Corps:

3rd Inf Div  
42nd Inf Div  
86th Inf Div  
101st A/B Div  
20th Armd Div

## XXI Corps:

63rd Inf Div (with 65th Inf (less Cos A and C) attached)  
100th Inf Div  
12th Armd Div.

## 3. a. VI Corps:

- (1) Assume command of sector (see overlay) at 1800B, 11 May 1945.
- (2) Establish Prohibited Frontier Zones along the AUSTRIAN — GERMAN Frontier, AUSTRIAN — SWISS Frontier and AUSTRIAN — ITALIAN Frontier in sector.
- (3) 45th Inf Div (with 645th TD Bn, 106th AAA AW Bn and 191st Tk Bn attached) is attached to VI Corps at 1800B, 11 May 1945.
- (4) 36th Inf Div (with 636th TD Bn, 443rd AAA AW Bn and 753rd Tk Bn attached) is relieved of attachment to XXI Corps and is attached to VI Corps, effective 1800B, 11 May 1945.
- (5) 2nd French Armd Div (DB) (with RBFM (TD Bn) attached) is attached to VI Corps, effective 1800B, 11 May 1945. Hold this division assembled in the DIESSEN area, pending further instructions from this Headquarters.

## b. XV Corps:

- (1) Enforce the terms of surrender and occupy assigned sector (see overlay) as far South as the SALZACH — ENNS River Line.
- (2) Assume command of sector at 1800B, 11 May 1945.
- (3) 101st Airborne Div (with 774th Tk Bn, 813th TD Bn, 397th QM Trk Co and 53rd QM Bn (DUKW) (less 2 Cos) attached) is relieved of attachment to XXI Corps and is attached to XV Corps, effective 1800B, 11 May 1945.
- (4) Establish a Prohibited Frontier Zone along the GERMAN — AUSTRIAN Frontier in sector.
- (5) Be prepared on Army order to occupy the remainder of the sector within the borders of AUSTRIA.

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- (6) Be prepared to move the 86th Inf Div (with 807th TD Bn, 787th Tk Bn and 839th AAA AW Bn attached) to the MANNHEIM area on Army order.

## c. XXI Corps:

- (1) Until 1800B, 11 May 1945, continue to occupy and enforce the terms of surrender in present sector as far South as the SALZACH River line.
  - (2) Upon relief in present sector, assume command of new sector (see overlay).
  - (3) See paragraphs 3 a (4) and 3 b (3).
  - (4) Effective 1800B, 12 May 1945, the following units are attached to XXI Corps:
    - 63rd Inf Div (with 65th Inf (less Cos A and C) attached)
    - 100 th Inf Div (with 898th AAA AW Bn attached)
    - 12th Armd Div (with 572nd AAA AW Bn attached).
  - (5) See paragraph 3 b (6). Upon arrival, hold the 86th Inf Div assembled in the MANNHEIM area pending further instructions from this Headquarters. Unit will not be assigned an occupational mission.
- x. (1) Allocation and adjustment of Corps troops later.
- (2) Coordinate movement of Corps Command Posts with the Signal Officer, this Headquarters.
  - (3) Corps Commanders responsibilities in new sectors will include:
    - (a) Protecting supply installations, supplementing as necessary the installation guards and coordinating security measures.
    - (b) Insuring the security of railroads, main supply roads, petroleum pipe lines, and critical signal installations.
    - (c) Guarding and disposition of captured enemy materiel and supplies as directed by current Administrative Instructions.
    - (d) Disarming and police of the civilian population.
    - (e) Support of the Military Government.
    - (f) Disciplinary control of all troops in the area. This includes members of all Allied Forces whether under command of Seventh Army or not.

Inclosure:

1 — Operations Overlay (5 sheets)

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ANNEX E

CASUALTIES, D-DAY TO V-E DAY

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# CASUALTIES PROCESSED AT SEVENTH ARMY HEADQUARTERS

## SUMMARY BY MONTHS

	KIA & DOW	WOUNDED	CAP & INT	MIA	TOTAL	RTD
August, 1944	123	881	0	192	1196	44
September, 1944	1226	5338	10	980	7554	1188
October, 1944	1254	5634	4	616	7508	2342
November, 1944	1928	7696	2	424	10050	2770
December, 1944	2211	8497	0	1405	12113	3712
January, 1945	1836	8623	31	4785	15275	4483
February, 1945	1587	5254	(8)	1145	7978	4122
March, 1945	1844	7462	2	504	9812	2398
April, 1945	2231	7325	5	275	9836	2296
May, 1945	804	1623	12	(267)	2172	2756
June, 1945	134	7	(1)	(133)	7	2050
July, 1945	93	2	0	(89)	6	366
TOTAL	15271	58342	57	9837	83507	23521

15 August 1944 through 31 August 1944

1st Airborne Task Force	OFF	3	16	0	3	22	0
	EM	20	194	0	75	289	2
3rd Inf. Division	OFF	0	12	0	0	12	0
	EM	34	170	0	14	218	0
45th Inf. Division	OFF	3	10	0	5	18	2
	EM	37	274	0	65	376	8
Army Troops	OFF	2	10	0	0	12	0
	EM	24	195	0	30	249	32
TOTAL		123	881	0	192	1196	44

Figures in parentheses represent deductions.

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Cumulative total  
through 2400 hours  
2 September 1944

	KIA & DOW		WOUNDED	CAP & INT		MIA	TOTAL	RTD
*36th Inf. Division	OFF	0	0	0	1	1	1	0
	EM	0	10	0	5	15	15	1

\* First report of 36th Division casualties was received on 2 September 1944

1 September 1944 through 30 September 1944

1st Airborne Task Force	OFF	10	43	0	(1)	52	17
	EM	113	545	0	(21)	637	245
3rd Inf. Division	EM	31	34	1	12	128	8
	EM	420	1473	1	186	2080	239
36th Inf. Division	OFF	25	110	3	15	153	20
	EM	343	1633	4	258	2238	363
45th Inf. Division	OFF	14	69	0	24	107	9
	EM	222	1162	0	375	1759	204
Army Troops	OFF	8	20	0	12	40	11
	EM	40	199	1	120	360	72
TOTAL		1226	5338	10	980	7554	1188

1 October 1944 through 31 October 1944

1st Airborne Task Force	OFF	4	15	0	(1)	18	27
	EM	54	266	0	(4)	316	311
3rd Inf. Division	OFF	18	65	0	6	89	28
	EM	402	1500	4	121	2027	587

Figures in parentheses represent deductions.

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	KIA & DOW		WOUNDED	CAP & INT		MIA	TOTAL	RTD
36th Inf. Division	OFF	14	69	0	3	86	27	
	EM	361	1690	0	208	2259	679	
45th Inf. Division	OFF	13	73	0	15	101	22	
	EM	265	1385	0	253	1903	535	
Army Troops	OFF	9	42	0	15	66	15	
	EM	114	529	0	0	643	111	
TOTAL		1254	5634	4	616	7508	2342	

1 November 1944 through 30 November 1944

1st Airborne Task Force	OFF	0	17	0	0	17	17
	EM	27	121	0	6	154	202
3rd Inf. Division	OFF	25	87	0	4	116	17
	EM	394	1753	0	97	2244	602
14th Armd. Division	OFF	0	5	0	0	5	0
	EM	17	88	0	2	107	1
36th Inf. Division	OFF	13	51	0	0	64	29
	EM	236	919	0	13	1168	553
44th AAA Brigade	OFF	0	0	0	0	0	2
	EM	4	8	0	(1)	11	21
44th Inf. Division	OFF	15	57	0	5	77	3
	EM	306	949	0	36	1291	130
45th Inf. Division	OFF	21	27	0	(11)	37	19
	EM	287	442	0	(95)	634	356
79th Inf. Division	OFF	14	54	0	3	71	22
	EM	234	909	0	79	1222	530

Figures in parentheses represent deductions.

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		KIA & DOW	WOUNDED	CAP & INT	MIA	TOTAL	RTD
100th Inf. Division	OFF	6	47	0	10	63	1
	EM	81	802	0	197	1080	70
103rd Inf. Division	OFF	3	21	0	5	29	1
	EM	73	528	0	46	647	14
Army Troops	OFF	16	50	2	0	68	13
	EM	156	761	0	28	945	167
TOTAL		1923	7696	2	424	10050	2770

1 December 1944 through 31 December 1944

1st Airborne Task Force	OFF	0	0	0	0	0	1
	EM	1	(1)	0	0	0	11
3rd Inf. Division	OFF	12	33	0	0	45	31
	EM	145	559	0	(10)	694	640
12th Armd. Division	OFF	10	21	0	0	31	0
	EM	53	224	0	4	281	19
14th Armd. Division	OFF	10	13	0	0	23	1
	EM	73	312	0	36	421	50
36th Inf. Division	OFF	13	71	0	18	102	23
	EM	262	1149	0	451	1862	563
44th AAA Brigade	OFF	0	5	0	1	6	12
	EM	6	30	0	1	37	150
44th Inf. Division	OFF	15	51	0	14	80	19
	EM	268	955	0	207	1430	316
45th Inf. Division	OFF	6	65	0	6	77	33
	EM	198	961	0	126	1285	465

Figures in parentheses represent deductions.

1032

		KIA & DOW	WOUNDED	CAP & INT	MIA	TOTAL	RTD
63rd Inf. Division	OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0
	EM	0	7	0	0	7	0
79th Inf. Division	OFF	13	46	0	3	67	31
	EM	299	1261	0	27	1587	608
87th Inf. Division	OFF	2	30	0	5	37	1
	EM	108	397	0	166	671	18
100th Inf. Division	OFF	13	31	0	(2)	42	9
	EM	373	909	0	51	1333	267
103rd Inf. Division	OFF	14	59	0	5	78	17
	EM	230	989	0	286	1505	172
Army Troops	OFF	9	27	0	(1)	35	19
	EM	78	293	0	6	377	236
TOTAL		2211	8497	0	1405	12113	3712

1 January 1945 through 31 January 1945

3rd Inf. Division	OFF	9	65	0	7	81	35
	EM	153	945	(1)	134	1231	667
12th Armd. Division	OFF	9	45	0	29	83	6
	EM	96	688	0	527	1311	132
14th Armd. Division	OFF	3	40	0	12	60	2
	EM	106	703	0	279	1088	135
36th Inf. Division	OFF	6	9	0	0	15	35
	EM	128	292	0	35	455	567
42nd Inf. Division	OFF	3	17	3	38	61	2
	EM	66	477	8	759	1310	20

Figures in parentheses represent deductions.

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		KIA & DOW	WOUNDED	CAP & INT	MIA	TOTAL	RTD
44th AAA Brigade	OFF	1	2	0	0	3	9
	EM	7	45	0	1	53	129
44th Inf. Division	OFF	8	23	0	3	34	22
	EM	120	425	0	153	698	403
45th Inf. Division	OFF	18	46	0	33	97	20
	EM	195	823	0	581	1599	438
63rd Inf. Division	OFF	9	14	0	2	25	2
	EM	64	328	0	91	483	31
70th Inf. Division	OFF	19	41	0	14	74	2
	EM	240	827	12	375	1454	42
79th Inf. Division	OFF	6	45	0	39	90	36
	EM	149	938	0	950	2037	797
100th Inf. Division	OFF	5	18	0	8	31	18
	EM	53	359	0	296	708	349
101st Airborne Division	OFF	12	41	0	0	53	4
	EM	115	497	1	15	628	73
103rd Inf. Division	OFF	5	28	0	6	39	22
	EM	79	420	0	201	700	298
Army Troops	OFF	10	25	0	11	46	16
	EM	137	397	8	186	728	171
TOTAL		1836	8623	31	4785	15275	4483

1 February 1945 through 28 February 1945

3rd Inf. Division	OFF	23	54	1	2	80	31
	EM	396	1055	0	288	1739	598

Figures in parentheses represent deductions.

1034

		KIA & DOW	WOUNDED	CAP & INT	MIA	TOTAL	RTD
12th Armd. Division	OFF	9	6	0	(7)	8	13
	EM	122	196	0	(64)	254	206
14th Armd. Division	OFF	0	5	0	0	5	11
	EM	23	64	0	1	88	201
36th Inf. Division	OFF	4	33	0	10	47	12
	EM	147	571	0	206	924	297
42nd Inf. Division	OFF	8	11	0	20	39	4
	EM	93	276	1	485	855	162
44th AAA Brigade	OFF	3	1	0	0	4	0
	EM	7	24	0	0	31	60
44th Inf. Division	OFF	4	15	0	0	19	9
	EM	95	263	0	(16)	342	247
45th Inf. Division	OFF	0	(1)	5	0	(1)	14
	EM	23	80	0	(19)	84	348
63rd Inf. Division	OFF	9	39	0	10	58	8
	EM	95	655	0	145	895	138
70th Inf. Division	OFF	10	66	0	9	85	6
	EM	205	1028	(12)	115	1336	232
79th Inf. Division	OFF	5	2	0	(2)	5	16
	EM	50	63	0	(44)	69	354
100th Inf. Division	OFF	1	1	0	1	3	11
	EM	36	137	0	3	176	218
101st Airborne Division	OFF	5	11	1	(2)	15	39
	EM	91	219	1	(26)	285	479

Figures in parentheses represent deductions.

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		KIA & DOW		CAP & INT		MIA	TOTAL	RTD
		WOUNDED		WOUNDED				
103rd Inf. Division	OFF	3	14	0	1	18	5	
	EM	42	158	0	30	230	246	
Army Troops	OFF	7	18	0	4	29	16	
	EM	71	190	0	(5)	256	141	
TOTAL		1587	5254	(8)	1145	7978	4122	

1 March 1945 through 31 March 1945

3rd Inf. Division	OFF	13	55	0	9	77	13	
	EM	204	924	1	269	1398	280	
12th Armd. Division	OFF	5	24	0	2	31	4	
	EM	73	311	0	11	395	123	
13th Armd. Division	OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	
	EM	0	0	0	2	2	0	
14th Armd. Division	OFF	6	21	0	0	27	6	
	EM	80	313	0	7	400	129	
36th Inf. Division	OFF	14	56	0	0	70	16	
	EM	232	864	0	55	1151	293	
42nd Inf. Division	OFF	6	21	0	(1)	26	8	
	EM	136	593	(1)	101	829	203	
44th AAA Brigade	OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	
	EM	1	7	0	0	8	15	
44th Inf. Division	OFF	0	10	0	0	10	6	
	EM	28	202	0	(15)	215	91	
45th Inf. Division	OFF	8	43	0	1	52	8	
	EM	120	763	0	34	917	181	

Figures in parentheses represent deductions.

		KIA & DOW		CAP & INT		MIA	TOTAL	RTD
		WOUNDED		WOUNDED				
63rd Inf. Division	OFF	15	61	0	1	77	12	
	EM	215	863	0	17	1095	228	
70th Inf. Division	OFF	19	33	0	(4)	48	16	
	EM	245	630	0	27	902	306	
71st Inf. Division	OFF	4	6	0	0	10	1	
	EM	39	95	0	0	134	1	
100th Inf. Division	OFF	4	19	0	0	23	4	
	EM	75	248	0	(30)	293	123	
101st Airborne Division	OFF	0	0	0	0	0	1	
	EM	2	12	0	(1)	13	10	
103rd Inf. Division	OFF	12	48	0	2	62	12	
	EM	160	766	0	20	946	160	
Army Troops	OFF	15	27	0	0	42	13	
	EM	113	447	2	(3)	559	135	
TOTAL		1844	7462	2	504	9812	2398	

1 April 1945 through 30 April 1945

3rd Inf. Division	OFF	10	28	0	3	41	7	
	EM	199	726	0	18	943	270	
4th Inf. Division	OFF	11	17	0	1	29	8	
	EM	135	372	0	7	514	145	
10th Armd. Division	OFF	10	19	0	1	30	2	
	EM	129	396	0	11	536	65	

Figures in parantheses represent deductions.

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		KIA & DOW	WOUNDED	CAP & INT	MIA	TOTAL	RTD
12th Armd. Division	OFF	20	59	0	7	86	11
	EM	212	741	0	115	1068	150
13th Armd. Division	OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0
	EM	0	4	0	0	4	0
14th Armd. Division	OFF	9	21	3	1	34	7
	EM	93	322	2	13	430	91
36th Inf. Division	OFF	0	3	0	(1)	2	21
	EM	31	8	0	(29)	10	183
42nd Inf. Division	OFF	15	34	0	(5)	44	9
	EM	132	513	0	(22)	623	154
44th Inf. Division	OFF	11	24	0	(1)	34	4
	EM	142	399	0	(3)	538	105
45th Inf. Division	OFF	21	59	0	(2)	78	12
	EM	219	687	0	(18)	888	226
63rd Inf. Division	OFF	29	57	0	(2)	84	22
	EM	450	1208	0	10	1668	249
70th Inf. Division	OFF	0	0	0	0	0	7
	EM	4	5	0	(5)	4	49
71st Inf. Division	OFF	1	8	0	1	10	0
	EM	7	99	0	7	113	2
100th Inf. Division	OFF	8	34	0	9	51	8
	EM	125	823	0	154	1102	169
101st Airborne Division	OFF	1	0	0	(1)	0	2
	EM	2	(1)	0	0	1	21

Figures in parentheses represent deductions.

1038

		KIA & DOW	WOUNDED	CAP & INT	MIA	TOTAL	RTD
103rd Inf. Division	OFF	3	5	1	(1)	8	13
	EM	28	57	0	(23)	62	122
Army Troops	OFF	29	53	(1)	1	82	9
	EM	145	545	0	29	719	153
TOTAL		2231	7325	5	275	9836	2296

1 May 1945 through 31 May 1945

3rd Inf. Division	OFF	3	8	0	(1)	10	22
	EM	62	118	3	(43)	140	250
4th Inf. Division	OFF	1	4	0	(1)	4	4
	EM	16	72	0	(5)	83	32
10th Armd. Division	OFF	4	6	0	(2)	8	31
	EM	53	141	0	(20)	174	236
12th Armd. Division	OFF	2	4	0	0	6	12
	EM	45	63	0	(4)	104	172
20th Armd. Division	OFF	6	5	0	(1)	10	1
	EM	44	111	1	1	157	9
36th Inf. Division	OFF	0	5	0	0	5	6
	EM	28	66	0	(6)	88	135
42nd Inf. Division	OFF	11	18	0	(3)	26	18
	EM	57	182	0	(14)	225	191
44th Inf. Division	OFF	5	13	0	0	18	8
	EM	56	180	0	0	236	126
45th Inf. Division	OFF	6	10	0	0	16	27
	EM	67	154	2	(19)	204	330

Figures in parentheses represent deductions.

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		KIA & DOW	WOUNDED	CAP & INT	MIA	TOTAL	RTD
63rd Inf. Division	OFF	2	(1)	0	(1)	0	26
	EM	34	17	0	(32)	19	407
86th Inf. Division	OFF	1	2	0	0	3	6
	EM	40	65	0	14	119	47
100th Inf. Division	OFF	3	0	0	(8)	0	7
	EM	104	6	0	(103)	7	238
101st Airborne Division	OFF	3	0	1	(3)	1	4
	EM	13	(13)	(1)	13	12	35
103rd Inf. Division	OFF	4	12	0	0	16	16
	EM	65	197	0	(9)	253	189
Army Troops	OFF	5	9	2	(2)	14	13
	EM	59	169	4	(18)	214	152
TOTAL		804	1623	12	(267)	2172	2750

1 June 1945 through 30 June 1945

2nd Armored Division	OFF	0	0	0	0	0	3
	EM	0	0	0	0	0	12
3rd Armd. Division	OFF	1	0	0	(1)	0	5
	EM	5	1	0	(6)	0	110
3rd Inf. Division	OFF	2	0	0	(2)	0	4
	EM	4	(1)	0	(7)	(4)	123
5th Armd. Division	OFF	0	0	0	0	0	2
	EM	6	0	0	(5)	1	16
6th Armd. Division	OFF	0	0	0	0	0	2
	EM	1	0	0	(1)	0	64

Figures in parentheses represent deductions.

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		KIA & DOW	WOUNDED	CAP & INT	MIA	TOTAL	RTD
7th Armd. Division	OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0
	EM	1	0	0	(2)	(1)	52
8th Inf. Division	OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0
	EM	7	0	0	(7)	0	20
10th Armd. Division	OFF	0	0	0	0	0	5
	EM	1	(1)	0	(1)	(1)	87
12th Armd. Division	OFF	1	0	0	(1)	0	3
	EM	6	0	0	(6)	0	133
20th Armd. Division	OFF	0	0	0	0	0	1
	EM	0	0	0	0	0	3
28th Inf. Division	OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0
	EM	0	0	0	0	0	7
29th Inf. Division	OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0
	EM	3	0	0	(3)	0	8
30th Inf. Division	OFF	1	0	0	(1)	0	4
	EM	4	(3)	0	(7)	(6)	65
36th Inf. Division	OFF	1	0	0	(1)	0	6
	EM	11	(2)	0	(11)	(2)	52
42nd Inf. Division	OFF	0	(1)	0	0	(1)	6
	EM	1	1	0	(2)	0	72
44th Inf. Division	OFF	0	0	0	0	0	7
	EM	2	0	0	(1)	1	165
45th Inf. Division	OFF	0	0	0	0	0	5
	EM	1	1	(1)	(1)	0	75
63rd Inf. Division	OFF	1	0	0	(1)	0	5
	EM	12	2	0	(12)	2	213

Figures in parentheses represent deductions.

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		KIA & DOW		CAP & INT		MIA	TOTAL	RTD
		WOUNDED		WOUNDED				
69th Inf. Division	OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	3
	EM	2	0	0	(2)	0	0	63
70th Inf. Division	OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	3
	EM	5	1	0	(5)	1	1	24
75th Inf. Division	OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	EM	0	(1)	0	0	(1)	1	2
76th Inf. Division	OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
	EM	6	1	0	(6)	1	1	54
78th Inf. Division	OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	4
	EM	0	0	0	0	0	0	123
84th Inf. Division	OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
	EM	1	0	0	(1)	0	0	55
86th Inf. Division	OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	EM	0	0	0	0	0	0	11
87th Inf. Division	OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
	EM	12	0	0	(12)	0	0	26
89th Inf. Division	OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
	EM	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
95th Inf. Division	OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	EM	2	0	0	(2)	0	0	0
100th Inf. Division	OFF	1	0	0	(1)	0	0	2
	EM	11	1	0	(7)	5	5	156
101st Airborne Division	OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	EM	4	(1)	0	(3)	0	0	11

Figures in parentheses represent deductions.

		KIA & DOW		CAP & INT		MIA	TOTAL	RTD
		WOUNDED		WOUNDED				
102nd Inf. Division	OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	EM	2	0	0	(1)	1	1	30
103rd Inf. Division	OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
	EM	4	1	0	(3)	2	2	26
104th Inf. Division	OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	EM	1	0	0	(1)	0	0	24
Army Troops	OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	3
	EM	6	8	0	(5)	9	9	84
TOTAL		134	7	(1)	(133)	7	7	2050

1 July 1945 through 31 July 1945

2nd Armd. Division	OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
	EM	4	0	0	(5)	(1)	1	18
3rd Inf. Division	OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
	EM	2	0	0	(2)	0	0	20
3rd Armd. Division	OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
	EM	7	(1)	0	(5)	1	1	77
5th Armd. Division	OFF	1	0	0	(1)	0	0	0
	EM	5	0	0	(5)	0	0	5
6th Armd. Division	OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	EM	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
7th Armd. Division	OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	EM	22	1	0	(22)	1	1	18
12th Armd. Division	OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	EM	3	0	0	(3)	0	0	25

Figures in parentheses represent deductions.

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		KIA & DOW	WOUNDED	CAP & INT	MIA	TOTAL	RTD
29th Inf. Division	OFF	0	0	0	0	0	5
	EM	5	(1)	0	(5)	(1)	11
30th Inf. Division	OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0
	EM	12	0	0	(12)	0	0
35th Inf. Division	OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0
	EM	2	0	0	(3)	(1)	1
36th Inf. Division	OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0
	EM	2	0	0	(2)	0	4
63rd Inf. Division	OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0
	EM	2	0	0	(1)	1	19
69th Inf. Division	OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0
	EM	1	0	0	(1)	1	29
70th Inf. Division	OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0
	EM	1	0	0	1	2	10
76th Inf. Division	OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0
	EM	1	0	0	(1)	0	0
78th Inf. Division	OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0
	EM	3	1	0	(4)	0	9
84th Inf. Division	OFF	0	0	0	0	0	1
	EM	1	0	0	0	1	26
87th Inf. Division	OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0
	EM	0	0	0	0	0	15
100th Inf. Division	OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0
	EM	3	3	0	(3)	3	13

Figures in parentheses represent deductions.

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		KIA & DOW	WOUNDED	CAP & INT	MIA	TOTAL	RTD
102nd Inf. Division	OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0
	EM	0	0	0	0	0	13
106th Inf. Division	OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0
	EM	9	0	10	(9)	0	1
Army Troops	OFF	0	0	0	0	0	2
	EM	7	(1)	0	(6)	0	32
TOTAL		93	2	0	(89)	6	366

Figures in parentheses represent deductions.

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ANNEX F

*D-DAY PERSONNEL,  
SEVENTH ARMY HEADQUARTERS*

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## D-DAY PERSONNEL OF SEVENTH ARMY, HEADQUARTERS

### COMMANDING GENERAL

Lieutenant General Alexander M. Patch

### AIDES-DE-CAMP (CG)

Lt. Col. John M. Warner

Maj. Gordon G. Bartlett Jr.

### CHIEF OF STAFF

Major General Arthur A. White

### AIDE-DE-CAMP

1st Lt. Frederick D. Shepard

### DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF

Col. Leo V. Warner

### SECRETARY GENERAL STAFF

Lt. Col. William K. Wyant, Jr.

Maj. Ridgeway B. Knight

Capt. James M. Benson

Capt. Harry L. Darden

CWO Robert Clark

M/Sgt. Mark L. Heyrend

M/Sgt. Andrew E. Jecker

M/Sgt. Walter E. Sippel

T/Sgt. Arthur B. Langenkamp

T/3 Armand A. Desorcy

T/3 John M. Johnston

S/Sgt. Harry W. Bower

Sgt. Charles N. Boozer

### A. C. OF S., G-1

Colonel William H. Craig

Lt. Col. William M. Fondren

Lt. Col. Harold F. Priester

Lt. Col. Harry Easton (attached)

Major John W. Blackburn

Major Frank S. Givens

Captain Andrew A. Ellenbogen

Captain Warren Akin

1st Lt. George F. Lowman

WOJG Zeffro V. Gianetti

M/Sgt. Charles A. Parker

T/Sgt. Loren E. Jester

T/3 Simon Spira

T/3 Charles E. Welsh

T/4 Louis Conques

T/4 Chester Kowalski

T/5 Cornelius O. Alig

T/5 Robert E. Pope

T/5 Sam Lapin

T/5 Warren Rauch

Pvt. Gordon W. Brown



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## A. C. OF S., G-2

Colonel William W. Quinn	Captain John E. Giles
Lt. Col. Lewis E. Perry	Captain Donald C. Miller
Lt. Col. Raymond G. Osborn	Captain Marc M. Spiegel
Lt. Col. David Radam	Captain Rudolf G. Seelig
Lt. Col. Theodore R. Bruskin	1st Lt. Charles H. Brown
Major Henry V. Graham	1st Lt. Lloyd C. McKean
Major Alfred L. Howes	1st Lt. William Peebles
Major Ralph M. Luman	1st Lt. Carvel Buscy
Major John C. Hindley	1st Lt. Armand F. Reny
Major Frederic J. Ogden	1st Lt. Marcos B. Rocas
Major Marcus M. Staples	1st Lt. John P. Racine
Major Henri de Chizelle (Fr)	F Lt. Richard W. Hey (Br)
Major James H. Quello	2d Lt. Robert E. Hoffacker
Captain Lee Felder	2d Lt. Walter J. Ksycki
Captain Carl D. Schubach	2d Lt. Curtis G. Ward
Captain Donald M. Bussey	2d Lt. William Beel
Captain James Boucher (Br)	2d Lt. John M. Lavigne
Captain George D. Gould	WO (j. g.) Anthony DeParis
M Sgt. John H. Eickemeyer	Cpl. Howard Nicholson
M Sgt. Lawrence H. Wallenburn	Cpl. Robert J. Murphy
T Sgt. Harold E. Skaar	T 5 Earl O. Heverly
T Sgt. John A. Denny	T 5 Bryan J. Lynch
T Sgt. Herbert R. Meyer	T 5 Louis Cardella
T Sgt. Franz J. Bing	T 5 Walter Matzner
S Sgt. Gale E. Smith	T 5 Melvin Gottschalg
S Sgt. Oscar DeWille	T 5 Edward Walz
S Sgt. Raymond O. Paulk	Pfc. John A. Greuling
T 3 Jeremiah C. Shea	Pfc. John J. Meyers
T 3 Robert L. Politzer	Pfc. Roy C. Nelson
T 3 Walter Koch	Pfc. Herber M. Chadderdon
T 3 Joseph S. Lowery	Pfc. John A. Carroll
Sgt. Pierre Journeau (Fr)	Pfc. Clarence Yon
T 4 Robert Q. Allen	Pfc. Daniel Segat
T 4 Charles W. Denny	Pvt. Leonard Katz
T 4 Franklin C. Jewell	Pvt. Jones L. Pruitt
T 4 Fred P. Pignato	Pvt. Berdell A. Beers
T 4 Michael J. Cox	Pvt. Joseph A. Piotrowicz
T 4 Norbert W. Bidwell	

## A. C. OF S., G-3

Colonel John S. Guthrie	Lt. Col. John M. Breit
Col. Clyde E. Steele	Lt. Col. Jean Garond (Fr)
Lt. Col. Jos. F. Surratt	Maj. Harvey S. Browne III
Lt. Col. W. C. Baxter	Maj. Joseph A. Callahan
Lt. Col. John G. Berry	Maj. Daniel M. Lewis, Jr.
Lt. Col. William B. Goddard	Maj. William H. Merrill, Jr.
Lt. Col. Clarence E. Stuart	Maj. Howard C. Parker

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Capt. Charles S. Cherry  
 Capt. Harry E. Dean  
 Capt. Kenneth F. Keller  
 Capt. Robert A. Martin  
 Capt. Walter B. Potter  
 Capt. Albert E. Voelkel  
 Capt. Curtis F. Yarbrough  
 Capt. George D. Carter

M Sgt. Ernest W. Oliver  
 M Sgt. Chester A. Raasch  
 T Sgt. Edmund B. Wiczkowski  
 S Sgt. Vincent J. Sclafani  
 S Sgt. James C. Wadell  
 T 3 George W. Holder  
 Sgt. Elias E. Margoies  
 Sgt. Samuel J. Steinmann, Jr.  
 Sgt. Jacques Colmar (Fr)  
 T 4 Robert H. Bright  
 T 4 Dallas J. Deitz  
 T 4 Charles W. Douglas  
 T 4 Henry K. Ray  
 Cpl. Paul E. Casseb  
 T 5 Robert D. Dawley

Col. John W. Hansborough  
 Maj. George H. Walton  
 Capt. James E. Bryan, Jr.  
 Capt. George J. Kitto  
 Capt. John C. P. Agnew  
 Capt. Henry Hunley  
 Capt. Barry W. League

M Sgt. Herbert J. Nowicki  
 T 4 William A. Crist, Jr.  
 T 4 Charles B. O'Conner  
 Cpl. Horace S. Russell  
 Cpl. Antonio Saenz  
 T 5 Nicholas J. Damiani  
 T 5 Hollis H. Harvell  
 T 5 Charles F. Combs  
 T 5 Will A. Foxell  
 T 5 Paul D. O'Day

Col. Oliver C. Harvey  
 Lt. Col. Robert E. Holman

Capt. Paul B. Sullivan  
 Capt. L. S. Elliott  
 1st Lt. H. S. Dolsey  
 1st Lt. Peter McCadden  
 1st Lt. Charles Stough, Jr.  
 2d Lt. Joseph Barbecot (Fr)  
 WO (jg) Joseph K. Coomes  
 WO Francis F. Falco (Fr)

T 5 Robert Oliver  
 T 5 Robert W. Poole  
 T 5 Eugene D. Pressly  
 T 5 Ernest O. Rudin  
 T 5 Elwood G. Roberts  
 T 5 Ervin Tax  
 Pfc. Alex J. Chavez  
 Pfc. James R. Duffy  
 Pfc. William M. Mus  
 Pvt. Jack Copeland  
 Pvt. Edward O. Hiner  
 Pvt. Wilbur Joy  
 Pvt. Rowland C. Leach  
 Pvt. Homer M. Purvis  
 Pvt. Ralph Schwartz

## A. C. OF S., G-3, AIR

Capt. Kenneth E. Rice  
 Capt. Marvin E. Inge, Jr.  
 Capt. Richard Kureth  
 Capt. Paul Dickson  
 Capt. James Lancaster  
 Capt. Nathan Drier  
 1st Lt. Otwell Brady

T 5 Raymond A. Hovis  
 T 5 George Crossett  
 T 5 William Atchison  
 Pfc. Samuel R. Garcia  
 Pvt. Samuel S. Caldwell  
 Pvt. Archie L. Fisher  
 Pvt. Joseph A. Silovich  
 Pvt. Michael Chornack  
 Pvt. Carl Sampson

## A. C. OF S., G-4

Lt. Col. Eldon H. Larecy  
 Lt. Col. Daniel T. McCarty

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Maj. Robert A. Bieber  
Maj. William J. Chalkley  
Maj. George D. Smith  
Capt. Louis Berger

M Sgt. William G. McGann  
T Sgt. Arthur Holsinger  
S Sgt. Bill J. Walker  
S Sgt. John L. Ferguson  
T 3 Walter Bauer  
T 3 Alfred R. Burrell  
T 3 Samuel Sirdofsky  
Sgt. Ralph J. Buttigig  
Sgt. Alphonse M. Para

Capt. Howard L. Oligher  
Capt. Jesse W. Short  
CWO Edward W. Powell

T 4 Steven J. Boxa  
T 4 Almando D. Levato  
T 4 Joseph L. E. Perron  
T 4 Robert A. Sees  
T 5 Hugo Burdych  
Pfc. Robert N. Bishop  
Pfc. Robert W. Burns  
Pfc. Charles A. Nemes  
Pfc. Francis B. Marlatt (TD fr AFHQ)

## A. C. OF S., G-5

Col. Harvey S. Gerry  
Maj. Shelden D. Elliot

Maj. Robert H. Bennett  
Capt. William L. Batt, Jr.

M Sgt. Harold W. Eells  
T 4 Joseph B. Patti  
Cpl. John P. Mortimer

Pvt. George Gross  
Pvt. Armedor B. L'Heureux  
Pvt. Philip Martin

## ADJUTANT GENERAL'S SECTION

Col. William G. Caldwell  
Lt. Col. Charles Knowlton, Jr.  
Lt. Col. Thomas P. Flynn  
Lt. Col. Edward Fox  
Lt. Col. John E. Pederson  
Lt. Col. R. F. Daubigny (Br)  
Maj. Emanuel Combs  
Maj. Gordon Ewing  
Maj. Cyril Hanahoe  
Maj. Glenn Henry  
Maj. Howard A. Spohr  
Capt. Frederick H. Evans  
Capt. Raymond V. Fontaine  
Capt. Salvatore J. Franco

Capt. William S. Hart  
Capt. T. P. Hughes (Br)  
Capt. John D. Merwin  
Sub. Lt. H. J. Merlier (Fr)  
Aspt J. J. Maxwell (Fr)  
Sub. Lt. Ursula MacKay (Br)  
Aspt Robert Galula (Fr)  
1st Lt. Dan Herbuy  
1st Lt. Edward A. Griffin  
1st Lt. Oscar Paulsen  
2d Lt. J. A. Ducrot (Fr)  
2d Lt. Philip H. Rauch  
2d Lt. Elmer E. Rubac

M Sgt. Russell E. Bert  
M Sgt. Talmadge W. Crook  
M Sgt. Thomas L. Farkas  
M Sgt. Garnett E. McCollim  
M Sgt. Roger M. Mussett  
M Sgt. Ferrell L. Pettyjohn  
M Sgt. Gerald L. Plante  
M Sgt. William Reeves  
M Sgt. Marlow R. Risberg

M Sgt. Jack H. Wolfe  
T Sgt. Jack B. Baker  
T Sgt. James G. Clark  
T Sgt. Tillman J. Danos  
T Sgt. Andrew T. DeHanes  
T Sgt. John Kenwell  
T Sgt. Earl C. Hovden  
T Sgt. Robert Levin  
T Sgt. Donald C. O'Leary

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T Sgt. Edward A. Rogers  
T Sgt. Joseph J. Salach  
T Sgt. Louis J. Skiba  
S Sgt. Harold Avery  
S Sgt. Robert R. Bell  
S Sgt. Henry J. Castello  
S Sgt. Jack Geckelar  
S Sgt. Charles E. Hass  
S Sgt. Frederick Ingraham  
S Sgt. William J. Koltiska  
S Sgt. Theodore J. Letwink  
S Sgt. Seth M. Sterling  
S Sgt. Walter R. Vandaveer  
S Sgt. Raymond Wolverson  
T 3 Orlando C. Ackerman  
T 3 Aloysius G. Behl  
T 3 Leo J. Burke  
T 3 Clifford D. Ferguson  
T 3 Charles Groat  
T 3 Edward R. Hahnfeld  
T 3 Loren D. Hubertz  
T 3 Elton M. Jess  
T 3 Ralph T. Lanum  
T 3 Harry W. Larson  
T 3 Harry A. Malone  
T 3 Hugh V. Perkins  
T 3 Howard W. Semons  
T 3 Henry A. Tarver  
T 3 Jack Toner  
T 3 Robert B. Thomas

Sgt. John A. Smith  
Sgt. Robert L. Yaple  
Sgt. Richard H. Flynt  
Sgt. Grady E. Wehunt  
T 4 Henry Graves  
T 4 Vincent Wheatcraft  
T 4 Albert D. Bradley  
T 4 Lewis A. Pozzini  
T 4 Donald E. Field  
T 4 William H. Griffey  
T 4 Joseph W. Hardy  
T 4 Henry T. Hostler  
T 4 Raymond B. Klimek  
T 4 Robert A. Krieger  
T 4 Sydney R. Melton  
T 4 Robert H. Krapf  
T 5 Charles V. Tavender  
T 5 Harold E. Hager  
T 5 Harry J. Blanchard  
T 5 Donald C. Dedrick  
T 5 John A. Gort  
T 5 Lionel Guignard  
T 5 Irwin Kossay  
T 5 Benjamin F. Smart  
T 5 Glenn E. Speck  
T 5 William J. Macari  
T 5 Robert B. Pryor  
T 5 Leonard A. Watt  
Pfc. Theodore Jannuzzi

## ANTI-AIRCRAFT SECTION

Brig. Gen. Paul B. Kelly  
Col. Merle R. Thompson  
Lt. Col. S. S. Gregory, Jr.  
Maj. James C. Dobbin  
Capt. C. M. Drummond

Capt. Phillip R. Smith  
Capt. Tai Hamilton (TDY)  
1st Lt. Raymond Baer (TDY)  
1st Lt. Brian B. Sullivan (TDY)

M Sgt. Howard J. Butler  
M Sgt. Paul F. Pavlik  
T Sgt. John H. Dixon  
T Sgt. Henry A. Sulzycki  
T Sgt. Thomas J. Sloan  
T 3 John A. Foddrill  
T 3 Hanson S. Holmer

T 4 Albert J. Gaillardet  
T 4 Carl Hyden  
T 5 Leon L. Penrod  
T 5 Elwood W. Koonce  
T 5 Vernon F. Rossol  
Pvt. Ernest Colton

## ARTILLERY SECTION

Brig. Gen. J. F. Brittingham  
Col. Francis T. Dodd

Col. Johnson Hagood, Jr.  
Col. George E. Nichols

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Lt. Col. L. Pennacchioni (Fr)  
 Maj. Thomas G. Carey  
 Maj. Robert E. Coffin  
 Maj. John H. Byrd  
 Maj. Claude L. Shephard, Jr.  
 Maj. Ernest T. Barco  
 Lt. Col. Edward C. Spaulding

Capt. Albert Darrow  
 Capt. Laverne W. Maxwell  
 1st Lt. Eugene W. Lange  
 1st Lt. George M. Repetti  
 1st Lt. Arthur B. White  
 WOJG Albert E. Sutcliffe, Jr.

M Sgt. Frank A. Shum  
 M Sgt. Edwin G. Preehan  
 T Sgt. Frank C. Perry  
 T Sgt. John F. Clements  
 T Sgt. Edgar H. Moore  
 T Sgt. Henry J. Sheehan  
 T Sgt. Andrew J. Duncan  
 T 3 Henry R. Running  
 T 3 John T. Roberts  
 Sgt. Kenneth D. McKenzie, Jr.  
 T 4 Wade R. Gorman  
 T 4 John M. Winders

T 5 Libero Arcieri  
 T 5 Ernest J. Chontos  
 Pfc. Virgil A. Latstetter  
 Pfc. Jack W. Kahle  
 Pfc. John J. Dwyer  
 Pfc. Henry M. Alsaker  
 Pfc. Robert R. Dugas  
 Pfc. John Spraklin (TDY)  
 Pfc. August G. Wagner  
 Pvt. Leon Lery (Fr)  
 Pvt. Green F. Simmons (TDY)

## CHAPLAIN SECTION

Ch. (Col.) Clarence S. Donnelly  
 Ch. (Maj.) Earl S. Stone

Ch. (Capt.) Thomas J. Manley

S Sgt. Ringert E. Jongewaard  
 T 3 Edmond G. St. Laurent

T 5 David H. Huff, Jr.  
 Pfc. Hobert L. Bost

## CHEMICAL WARFARE SECTION

Lt. Col. Bruce T. Humphreville  
 Maj. James J. Heffner  
 Maj. Robert D. Myers  
 Capt. Elliot D. Becken

Capt. Albert Fribourg (Fr)  
 1st Lt. Henry T. Sprinkle  
 WOJG Clifford R. Smith

M Sgt. Charles R. Gregory  
 M Sgt. James L. Smith  
 T Sgt. Harold R. Jewett  
 T Sgt. Paul S. Kennedy  
 T Sgt. Robert B. Neilson

T 4 Lawrence H. Carpenter  
 T 4 John P. Greblunas  
 T 4 James H. Koch  
 T 5 Henry H. Davis

## ENGINEER SECTION

Brig. Gen. Garrison H. Davidson  
 Colonel John A. Chambers  
 Colonel Edwin C. Eller  
 Colonel George V. Gardes  
 Colonel Peter F. Gaynor, Jr.  
 Colonel Ralph D. King  
 Lt. Col. Frank J. Polich

Lt. Col. John E. Trygg  
 Major Howard B. Colman  
 Major Charles B. Gholson  
 Major William E. Harrison  
 Major James D. Hilleke  
 Major Frank P. Lazar  
 Major Bruce G. Packard

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Major Montgomery L. Webster  
 Major Richard L. Williams  
 Captain Robert Blair  
 Captain Bertil V. Carlson  
 Captain Robert A. Rowland, Jr.

Captain Bernard J. Townsend  
 Captain Harold J. Van Aken  
 1st Lt. Troy J. Laswell  
 1st Lt. Elmer L. Olem  
 1st Lt. Herbert S. Robins

M Sgt. James J. Enright  
 M Sgt. Joseph Bauza  
 T Sgt. Carl A. Anderson  
 T Sgt. Felix F. Kiziukiewicz  
 T Sgt. Joseph W. Latour  
 T Sgt. William I. Matotan  
 S Sgt. Hubert E. Birk  
 T 3 Notham F. Johnston  
 T 3 David G. Anderson  
 T 3 Lionel R. Sylvestre  
 T 3 Aldo A. Berti  
 T 3 Charles E. Garrett, Jr.  
 T 3 Jack L. Goodey  
 T 3 Harel E. Schou  
 T 3 James F. Dugan  
 T 4 Henry E. Grzesiak  
 T 4 Robert Martin  
 T 4 Robert H. Imrie  
 T 4 Calvin G. Denesha  
 T 4 John R. Markgraf

T 4 Maurice H. Bushey  
 T 4 Nova H. Wallace  
 T 4 Melvin E. Murphy  
 T 4 Victor E. Jacoby  
 T 4 Robert Frame  
 T 4 Will C. Cox  
 T 5 George A. Gillis, Jr.  
 T 5 Alan A. Andrews  
 T 5 Milan Barancek  
 T 5 Harrison H. Jones  
 T 5 Anthony E. Mandela  
 T 5 Donald R. Edsall  
 T 5 Russell W. Dickenson  
 T 5 John C. Villari  
 T 5 Frank Jakobs  
 Pfc. Casimir J. Krolak  
 Pfc. Charles J. Cole  
 Pvt. James L. Fickinger  
 Pvt. Harry Obernauer  
 Pvt. Lester L. Kinkel

## FINANCE SECTION

Col. J. P. Tillman  
 Lt. Col. E. R. Brock

Capt. J. A. Dell Angelo  
 WOJG F. A. Farmer

M Sgt. Charles A. Wrennick  
 T Sgt. Howard E. Thunberg  
 S Sgt. Frank C. Rutzen  
 T 3 William C. Moorhead  
 T 3 Daniel P. Reimer  
 T 4 Donald J. Kester  
 T 4 Allen T. Roth  
 T 4 Fredrick E. Struke  
 T 4 Tarpe J. Tarpoff  
 T 4 Dean G. Warner

T 4 Lyman H. Whittlesey  
 T 5 Abraham Rothchild  
 Pfc. Markus F. Cord  
 Pfc. Charles T. Dunn  
 Pfc. Raymond J. Gaisser  
 Pfc. Frank C. Ghiotto  
 Pfc. Steven J. Jacobs  
 Pfc. Frank C. Sarabuchello  
 Pfc. Clarence E. Schloemer  
 Pfc. William Sumpf

## HEADQUARTERS COMPANY

Maj. James E. Sawtelle  
 Capt. Emanuel Combs, Jr.  
 Capt. Lawrence J. Rosner  
 Capt. Walter Thompson  
 1st Lt. Dean W. Nida

1st Lt. Vincent A. Suarez  
 2d Lt. Richard O. Ball  
 CWO. Robert E. Gerald  
 WOJG. John R. Patterson  
 WOJG. Reginald C. Rice

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1 Sgt. Nicholas Beversluis, Jr.  
 T Sgt. Joseph J. Albert  
 T Sgt. William J. Blunt  
 T Sgt. Lawrence M. La Fleur  
 T Sgt. Alfred F. Morrocco  
 S Sgt. Henry C. Cardoza  
 S Sgt. Frank A. Cavaini  
 S Sgt. George A. Drakos  
 S Sgt. George Forester  
 S Sgt. Franklin J. Kline  
 S Sgt. Harold M. Leau  
 S Sgt. William G. Reith  
 S Sgt. Marceau Renaud  
 Sgt. Virgil P. Barbre  
 Sgt. Paul M. Burns  
 Sgt. John D. Elder, Jr.  
 Sgt. Ray W. Finch  
 Sgt. Richard H. Flynt  
 Sgt. William P. Gorisek  
 Sgt. Elwood L. Harding  
 Sgt. Charles E. Huff  
 Sgt. Frank M. Jackson  
 Sgt. Paul E. Rabe  
 Sgt. William R. Ruble  
 Sgt. Leo A. Schmelzer  
 Sgt. William B. Simpson  
 Sgt. Lamoine I. Yocum  
 T 4 Harry L. Borst  
 T 4 Leon Bullock  
 T 4 Corbit J. Burgess  
 T 4 Thomas J. Carlin  
 T 4 Gaston S. Enfinger  
 T 4 John J. Giannone  
 T 4 Harry J. Gland  
 T 4 Clarence E. Hall  
 T 4 Everett C. Hall  
 T 4 Chester L. Hardin  
 T 4 William S. Hartley  
 T 4 Kenneth A. Hunkler  
 T 4 Charles H. Kiper  
 T 4 Chester A. Le Zotte  
 T 4 Donald M. Leibundgut  
 T 4 John A. Millington, Jr.  
 T 4 Jessie B. Putman  
 T 4 Paul E. Risch  
 T 4 Howard W. Robbins  
 T 4 Charles H. Skuhr  
 T 4 Robert F. Smith  
 T 4 Edgar D. Stern  
 T 4 Earl W. Storey

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T 4 George C. Venetis  
 T 4 Joseph E. Yunnone  
 Cpl. Cecil L. Clayton  
 Cpl. Jess B. Guy  
 Cpl. Chester Hicks  
 Cpl. Alton L. Howard  
 Cpl. Don A. Hoffman  
 Cpl. John J. Langan  
 Cpl. Merlin E. Moser  
 Cpl. Miller A. Moyer  
 Cpl. Walter A. Nabors  
 Cpl. Orval L. Roden  
 Cpl. James D. Wellons  
 Cpl. George J. Woerth, Jr.  
 Cpl. Frank S. Yinger  
 T 5 William G. Adair, Jr.  
 T 5 Barney F. Adams  
 T 5 Upson A. Andrews  
 T 5 James E. Ashe  
 T 5 Carl W. Bagwell  
 T 5 Edward G. Bostian, Jr.  
 T 5 Vernon L. Brigman  
 T 5 Jack R. Caldwell  
 T 5 George W. Campbell  
 T 5 Albert L. Chitwood  
 T 5 George A. Christmas  
 T 5 Walter Crobans  
 T 5 Arthur J. Covelle  
 T 5 Claude L. Crosson  
 T 5 John G. Delafe  
 T 5 James J. Devlin  
 T 5 Roscoe V. Dorsett, Jr.  
 T 5 William E. Drechsler  
 T 5 Joseph A. L. Duval  
 T 5 Cecil A. Elliot  
 T 5 Claude A. Flippo  
 T 5 Joseph L. Garibaldi  
 T 5 Harry Gasper  
 T 5 William E. Gersemehl  
 T 5 Joseph A. Gobus  
 T 5 Charles H. Hasecuster  
 T 5 Nolan A. Hayes  
 T 5 Robert E. Hill  
 T 5 Donald O. Hubbard  
 T 5 Newbern Jacobs  
 T 5 George E. Jerden  
 T 5 Stephen J. Lupyak, Jr.  
 T 5 William J. Mallory  
 T 5 Oder M. Martin  
 T 5 Clifford L. Mason

T 5 Michael R. Matass  
 T 5 Andy I. Mc Casland  
 T 5 Daniel P. Mc Cloud  
 T 5 Alexander Mc Queston  
 T 5 Carl G. Melaas  
 T 5 Edmond H. Melton  
 T 5 Lawrence Mitchell  
 T 5 Hugh O. Needham  
 T 5 Ralph E. Osmundson  
 T 5 Emanuel Packard  
 T 5 Albert L. Palmer  
 T 5 John E. Parsons  
 T 5 Joseph Povec, Jr.  
 T 5 William C. Sanger  
 T 5 Richard H. Schmidt  
 T 5 Otis E. Seago  
 T 5 William T. Sealy  
 T 5 Michael Soen  
 T 5 Glen F. Speck  
 T 5 Frank V. Stimmler  
 T 5 Franklin H. Todd  
 T 5 Marshall J. Todd  
 T 5 Robert M. Turner  
 T 5 George J. Uchtman, Jr.  
 T 5 Allen C. Ward  
 T 5 Grady E. Whunt  
 T 5 Raymond A. Wiltberger  
 T 5 Sidney Wolfberg  
 Pfc. Roger C. Alcorn  
 Pfc. Marion T. Allids  
 Pfc. Edward M. Andrski  
 Pfc. Daniel J. Baxter  
 Pfc. John M. Brawley  
 Pfc. Charles R. Brock  
 Pfc. Gilberto S. Camacho  
 Pfc. Michel des Caplani  
 Pfc. Edward J. Cassidy  
 Pfc. Paul R. Cawthorn  
 Pfc. Norman J. Coulombe  
 Pfc. Clarence C. Crawford  
 Pfc. Raymond W. Cummings  
 Pfc. Thenomie Davis  
 Pfc. Maurice L. Davis  
 Pfc. Harold E. Dodson  
 Pfc. James W. Donaldson  
 Pfc. Joseph F. Driscoll  
 Pfc. Epifamo C. Durano  
 Pfc. George J. Eberhardt  
 Pfc. Philipps Ellington  
 Pfc. Robert J. Evans

Pfc. Dale E. Forbes  
 Pfc. Benjamin F. Fow, Jr.  
 Pfc. Anthony Francisco  
 Pfc. Florian C. Ga Jeski  
 Pfc. Winthrop Gegenheimer  
 Pfc. Charles Griffith  
 Pfc. Daniel J. Harvey  
 Pfc. Philip J. Higdon  
 Pfc. John U. Hiter  
 Pfc. John W. Holt  
 Pfc. Harry G. Hough, Jr.  
 Pfc. Clyde W. Hughes  
 Pfc. Donald F. Joyce  
 Pfc. Vernon B. Juriga  
 Pfc. Alexander Karrell  
 Pfc. Melvin D. Keller  
 Pfc. Irvin Kossay  
 Pfc. Peter Kostiw  
 Pfc. John Kirzo, Jr.  
 Pfc. Hugh S. Kyle  
 Pfc. Henry J. Lafferty  
 Pfc. Alvin H. Lamb  
 Pfc. Carl W. Larson  
 Pfc. John P. Leach  
 Pfc. Joseph C. Lewis  
 Pfc. Joseph Lipp  
 Pfc. William E. Lawrence  
 Pfc. William J. Macari  
 Pfc. Gene W. Mc Clendon  
 Pfc. Donald B. Metheney  
 Pfc. Ray V. Mitchell  
 Pfc. Anthony J. Morris  
 Pfc. Jack D. Oakes  
 Pfc. Albert Oxford  
 Pfc. Rollin H. Oppel  
 Pfc. James S. Parks  
 Pfc. James H. Pinkston  
 Pfc. James G. Pino  
 Pfc. Earl B. Preston  
 Pfc. Robert B. Pryor  
 Pfc. Gustavo P. Ramos  
 Pfc. Guillermo O. Randes  
 Pfc. Morris Rosen  
 Pfc. John J. Schaeffer  
 Pfc. Norman W. Scherer  
 Pfc. Peter W. Schmidt  
 Pfc. Dietrich H. Schmieder  
 Pfc. Elio Scimimi  
 Pfc. Murray Siedman  
 Pfc. Antone M. Silvia

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Pfc. Howard W. Smith  
Pfc. William L. Stark  
Pfc. Kenneth R. Story  
Pfc. Gilbert C. Tipton  
Pfc. Kenneth L. Ward  
Pfc. Henry J. Wiedmeyer  
Pfc. Franklin B. Yorgey  
Pfc. Charles Yurman  
Pfc. Norman Zaidberg  
Pvt. James E. Abner  
Pvt. Robert P. Akers  
Pvt. Roxie Albano  
Pvt. James E. Albert  
Pvt. George C. Barker  
Pvt. Lonnie T. Beaird  
Pvt. Lawrence D. Blackmore  
Pvt. John D. Boyce  
Pvt. William F. Brooks  
Pvt. Lloyd Buchman  
Pvt. Henry L. Cada  
Pvt. Joseph Cimino  
Pvt. Henry B. Cisneros  
Pvt. Kenyon Clore  
Pvt. Luther B. Coleman  
Pvt. Ernest Colton  
Pvt. George W. Conaway  
Pvt. Avery A. Cook  
Pvt. Frank T. Cooper  
Pvt. Rudolph G. Daniels  
Pvt. Marvin K. Davis  
Pvt. Peter H. De Simone  
Pvt. Nicholas P. Del Campo  
Pvt. Charles T. Dieter  
Pvt. Denzil Dykes  
Pvt. Thomas A. Ferraro  
Pvt. Michael Frangello  
Pvt. Steve W. Gasperosky  
Pvt. Frederick J. Ghelfi  
Pvt. Anthony N. Gulotta  
Pvt. Carl D. Hackett  
Pvt. Schander G. Hassan  
Pvt. Harold A. Heaton  
Pvt. Carl W. Henn, Jr.  
Pvt. Ernest E. Hixenbaugh  
Pvt. Wayne A. Jarvis

Pvt. Albert M. Johansen  
Pvt. Paul H. Kriesak  
Pvt. William Q. H. Lem  
Pvt. William J. Longacre  
Pvt. Noah R. Manning  
Pvt. Orben C. Marple  
Pvt. John F. McCarthy  
Pvt. John F. McLaughlin  
Pvt. Harold L. Mentzer  
Pvt. Robert R. Morris  
Pvt. Fred G. Mucci  
Pvt. Kenneth W. Murphy  
Pvt. Wesley E. Neary  
Pvt. Juan A. Nino  
Pvt. Robert Novgrad  
Pvt. Joseph C. Pelly, Jr.  
Pvt. Richard B. Pendergast  
Pvt. Troy Perkins  
Pvt. Russel J. Petrie  
Pvt. Oran J. Pooty  
Pvt. Jones L. Pruitt  
Pvt. William B. Read, Jr.  
Pvt. Forrest A. Reasoner  
Pvt. James A. Ridenour  
Pvt. Carroll S. Risdal  
Pvt. Howard C. Schmidt  
Pvt. David H. Sharp  
Pvt. David Sherbowski  
Pvt. Stanley Siarkowski  
Pvt. Richard P. Sitcer  
Pvt. Edward T. Slonna  
Pvt. Glenn B. Smith  
Pvt. Roy E. Smith  
Pvt. Isaac H. Smithy  
Pvt. Bruce Specer  
Pvt. Jack W. Stokes  
Pvt. Clayton F. Taylor  
Pvt. George Trent  
Pvt. Ison S. Tyndall, Jr.  
Pvt. Lonnie Upton  
Pvt. Willie M. Urban  
Pvt. Raymond F. Van Dusen  
Pvt. Edward Varga  
Pvt. Joseph Vercellone  
Pvt. George L. Wilson

HISTORICAL SECTION  
Captain John A. Steel

INSPECTOR GENERAL SECTION

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Lt. Col. Daniel M. Muth  
Lt. Col. Joseph M. Whitaker  
Lt. Col. John M. Arnfield  
Maj. James B. Bratton  
Maj. Burney S. Dobbs, Jr.  
CWO. Andrew Weiss

M Sgt. James B. Grist  
T Sgt. Houston D. Jones  
T/3 Leonard Miller  
T/3 Martin E. Gunther  
Sgt. Donald C. Gregg  
T/4 William Jennings  
T/4 Ira L. Whealton  
T/5 George P. Bishop  
T/5 Roy R. Bjorklund

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Col. P. G. McElwee  
Lt. Col. C. A. Luckie  
Maj. G. C. St. Clair  
Maj. L. D. Wallach  
1st Lt. Ben Baimé

M Sgt. Herman Gottfried  
S Sgt. William H. Wildes  
S Sgt. Edward H. Hoy  
T/4 Herman Axelrod  
T/4 Harold R. Latimer  
T/4 John F. Graca  
T/5 Walter P. Mazur

MEDICAL SECTION

Col. Frank B. Berry  
Col. Robert J. Goldson  
Col. Webb B. Gurley  
Col. Norman E. Peatfield  
Col. Joseph Rich  
Col. Albert H. Robinson  
Col. Myron P. Rudolph  
Col. Daniel S. Stevenson  
Lt. Col. Stewart F. Alexander  
Lt. Col. James E. Flinn  
Lt. Col. Guy H. Gowen  
Lt. Col. Charles Raulerson  
Maj. Edith F. Frew  
Maj. Henry C. Goss  
Maj. Alfred O. Ludwig  
Capt. Frank L. Dunsmoor  
Capt. Harry M. Krasnoff  
Capt. Erskine M. Livingstone  
1st Lt. Raymond J. Hoesch  
1st Lt. Harry W. Sorenson  
WOJG. Glen F. Morgan

M Sgt. William F. Cappel  
T Sgt. William S. Brandon  
T Sgt. Joseph A. Cardin  
T Sgt. Joseph Epstein  
T Sgt. Joe A. Petty  
S Sgt. Alfred C. Guimond  
S Sgt. John W. Loy  
S Sgt. James M. McLaughlin  
S Sgt. Robert Stark  
T/3 Henry Jaffe  
T/3 Donald D. McCune  
Sgt. William J. Anderson  
Sgt. George A. Dulya  
Sgt. Robert J. Geller  
Sgt. Paul W. Madden  
T/4 Frank J. Marsala  
T/4 John W. McConnel  
T/5 Helmut Meyerbach  
T/5 Jack Reppert

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## ORDNANCE SECTION

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Col. Harold E. Hopping	Maj. Theodore P. Harper
Col. George L. Artamonoff	Maj. John W. Brown
Col. Charles P. West	Capt. Harold W. Gear
Col. Herbert P. Schowalter	Capt. Robert M. Alfred
Col. Ambrose F. Johnston	Capt. Edward W. Dew
Lt. Col. Charles S. Hedrick	Capt. Joseph Dandreto
Lt. Col. Robert E. Le Roy	Capt. James O. Yates
Maj. Claude A. Loflin, Jr.	1st Lt. Ernest J. Dimick
Maj. Kenneth O. Reed	CWO. William B. Speak
Maj. Robert A. Robinson, Jr.	Maj. Waldo B. Berryman

M Sgt. William D. Beard	T/Sgt. Leslie L. Wells
M Sgt. Francis P. Leonard	T3 Kenneth W. Brueckner
M Sgt. Russel N. MacLaren	T3 Edward F. Jett
M Sgt. John S. Sechrist	T3 Ralph F. Raasch
M Sgt. James S. Stank	T3 Eugene W. Reiter
M Sgt. Arthur W. Whalen	T3 Kennedy G. Ward
T Sgt. Robert D. Burns	T3 Melvin G. Webber
T Sgt. Elmer W. Busick	Sgt. Robert D. Doherty
T Sgt. Robert H. Eisen	T4 Paul F. Deisher
T Sgt. George J. Goff	T4 Tyton R. Key
T Sgt. Donald H. Gurney	T4 William J. Porter
T Sgt. Richard K. Laurino	T5 Edward H. Goodman
T Sgt. Earle D. Lewis	T5 Kurt Weiler
T Sgt. Emile C. Riendeau	T5 John M. Winders
T Sgt. William F. Rowland, Jr.	

## PROVOST MARSHALL SECTION

Lt. Col. R. C. Briggs	Lt. Col. R. J. Hermann
Lt. Col. W. E. Dunn	Lt. Col. R. H. McIntire

M Sgt. R. M. Morris	S Sgt. A. Kingsdorf
T Sgt. H. Hickson	T4 P. Yankitis

## SIGNAL SECTION

Brig. Gen. George F. Wooley, Jr.	Maj. Everett C. Smith
Col. Norman H. Saunders	Capt. Bernard Greenbaum
Col. John L. Leidenheimer	Capt. Richard L. Blosser
Lt. Col. Carl W. Bartling	Capt. Frank W. Daykin
Lt. Col. William H. Waldschmidt	Capt. John L. Seymour
Lt. Col. Edwin O. Earl	Capt. Franklyn K. Smale
Lt. Col. Louis H. Spiegel	Capt. William C. Harrup
Lt. Col. Philip W. Bierman	Capt. Alvin C. Canepa
Maj. Harold C. Waffler	1st Lt. Richard H. Tarpley
Maj. Alanson B. Dunn	1st Lt. Daniel W. Pettengill
Maj. Bertram B. Dales, Jr.	1st Lt. Frank B. Wallis

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M/Sgt. Alvin Carlson  
 M/Sgt. Harold J. Cummings  
 M/Sgt. Theodore M. Meloy  
 M/Sgt. Neil B. Mitchell  
 M/Sgt. Howell H. Neel  
 M/Sgt. Stanley A. Ogden  
 M/Sgt. John H. Schumacher  
 M/Sgt. Edward M. Toth  
 M/Sgt. Earl B. Whitley  
 T Sgt. Emmet W. Berkley  
 T Sgt. Gerald B. Hall  
 T/Sgt. Theodore P. Lange  
 T/Sgt. Max A. Paquet  
 T/Sgt. Abraham A. Shlifer  
 T3 Blanton K. Bagby  
 T3 Joseph A. Binko, Jr.  
 T3 Timothy J. Fitzgerald  
 T3 Robert O. Harmon  
 T3 Stephen H. Juniewicz  
 T3 James D. Kelsh

T3 Lawrence D. Diebel  
 Sgt. Christian A. Walters  
 T4 George F. Bamberger  
 T4 Evan E. Brown  
 T4 Doyle A. Chisnell  
 T4 Raymond W. Deacon  
 T4 John P. Farley  
 T4 Robert H. Gallagher  
 T4 Arthur P. Georgudis  
 T4 Joseph T. Hall  
 T4 Louis B. Piscopo  
 T4 Irving Saldin  
 T4 Stanley E. Spaeth  
 T4 Robert L. Stearns  
 T4 Rudolph Sundquist  
 T4 John J. Taafe  
 T4 Arthur L. Eno, Jr.  
 T4 Robert W. Carbaugh  
 T5 Stewart J. Peacock  
 Pfc. R. Butler

## PUBLIC RELATIONS SECTION

Col. Henry L. Jones II	1st Lt. Logan R. Shaw
Maj. Harold W. Wellinger	

## QUARTERMASTER SECTION

Col. Clyde Massey	Capt. James E. Bowler
Col. James F. Tweedy	Capt. Ernest S. Johnson
Col. John L. Dicks	Capt. Simon E. Stern
Lt. Col. Gordon C. Gill	Capt. Henry R. McKee
Maj. Samuel E. Graham	1st Lt. James Glendinning
Maj. Ronald N. Throop	1st Lt. Henry A. Miller
Maj. Joseph N. Tucker	1st Lt. Brendon T. Jose
Maj. William D. Pratt	1st Lt. Joseph P. Murphy
Capt. Richard L. Nispeil	CWO Adrian N. Winegarden
Capt. Edward F. Braithwaite	WO Ross A. Jamieson
Capt. George H. Garepy	WOJG. Anthony Z. Cromwell
Capt. Frank T. Heinemann	

M Sgt. Russell M. Hostetler  
 M Sgt. Warren C. Fulton  
 M Sgt. Marvin B. Katz  
 T/Sgt. Peter A. Jackson  
 T/Sgt. John R. Lee  
 T/Sgt. Thomas W. Motes  
 T Sgt. Joseph J. Couwlier  
 S/Sgt. Paul Puskar  
 S Sgt. William Dickson

T3 Veryl W. Acker  
 Sgt. James A. Gannon  
 Sgt. Donald W. Smith  
 T4 Joseph C. Borges  
 T4 Leonard A. Peterson  
 T4 Lawrence L. Hurley  
 T4 John J. Galpin  
 T4 Joseph B. Mann  
 Cpl. Richard J. Lutz

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T/5 Leslie R. Shaw  
T/5 Darrel L. Sornson  
T/5 John K. Berglund  
T/5 William D. Meila  
T/5 Stephen Martin  
T/5 August M. Thiede  
T/5 Nick Defino  
T/5 Thomas H. Kline  
T/5 Bernard J. Quinn  
Pfc. Joseph J. Weber  
Pfc. John S. Davenport, Jr.  
Pfc. Ronald W. Anderson

Pfc. Carlisle Brookbank  
Pfc. Patsy DeGiorgio  
Pfc. Lynwood D. Dolan  
Pfc. Banks E. Campbell  
Pfc. Judson Kernan  
Pfc. Owen E. Morrison  
Pfc. Otto W. Neumann  
Pfc. David H. Payne, Jr.  
Pfc. Harold F. Rauze  
Pfc. Fred P. Russo  
Pfc. Heinz H. Shwagerick

# SPECIAL TROOPS SEVENTH ARMY HEADQUARTERS SPECIAL TROOPS

Col. Hugh W. Stevenson  
Maj. James V. Galloway  
Maj. Lloyd P. Lowman  
Maj. William H. Merrill  
Maj. Abraham G. Eisner

Capt. William F. Ort  
1st Lt. Alvin E. Anderson  
2d Lt. Richard J. Danos  
CWO. Robert E. Gerald  
WOJG. Reginald C. Rice

T/Sgt. Druie M. Lee  
T/Sgt. James R. Tallon  
T/Sgt. Jack R. Caldwell  
T/Sgt. Frank A. Matterson  
S Sgt. Henry C. Cardoza  
S Sgt. Harry J. Gland  
S Sgt. John E. Davis  
S Sgt. Edward J. Venavage  
S Sgt. Frank A. Cauaina  
Sgt. John M. Feely  
Sgt. James W. Sunstrom  
Sgt. Glenn R. Ray  
Sgt. Ray Norris  
Sgt. Ray W. Finch  
Sgt. George F. Brown  
Sgt. Paul Rabe  
Sgt. Reino Kahila  
Sgt. Harry O. Barnes  
Sgt. Thomas Cavins  
Sgt. John O. Elder, Jr.  
Sgt. Charles H. Kennedy  
T/4 Charles F. Grover, Jr.  
T/4 Robert F. Smith  
T/4 Earl W. Storey  
T/4 Robert M. Turner

T/4 George J. Worth, Jr.  
T/4 Lawrence C. Marsh  
T/4 John E. Lynch  
T/4 William S. Hartley  
Cpl. Miller A. Moyer  
Cpl. Leonard A. Dyer  
Cpl. Frank S. Yinger  
Cpl. Leo J. Tetrault  
Cpl. Robert H. Midkiff  
Cpl. Frank Feinstein  
T/5 Gene W. Mc Clendon  
T/5 Emanuel Packard  
T/5 Gustavo P. Ramos  
T/5 Joseph P. Driscoll  
T/5 Kenneth J. Goercke  
T/5 Arthur E. Brown  
T/5 Harold E. Farris  
T/5 Artis W. Overton  
T/5 Jose E. Romero  
T/5 James K. Womack  
T/5 Joseph A. Gobus  
T/5 Lynn Lovvorn  
T/5 Stephen J. Lupyak, Jr.  
T/5 Clifford L. Mason  
Pfc. Frank C. Sarabuchello

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Pfc. Frank Condore  
Pfc. James A. Gee  
Pfc. Dewey L. Brown  
Pfc. Onorio Cerino

Pfc. Warren C. Puckett  
Pvt. Chester Hicks  
Pvt. John J. York

# 115TH AGF BAND

WO. Ole G. R. Blomfelt

S Sgt. Graydon R. Crawley  
T/4 Robert H. Abernathy  
T/4 John W. Barber  
T/4 Henry L. Conlin  
T/4 Harry Fleic  
T/4 Ben L. Niles  
T/4 Charles L. Paashauss  
T/4 John A. Reger  
T/5 Joseph K. Handfield  
T/5 John Hauer  
T/5 Robert Keeman  
T/5 Charles H. King  
T/5 Robert B. Stuart  
T/5 John R. Ware  
T/5 Foster L. Wycant  
Pfc. Richard H. Bollinger  
Pfc. Derec Dietterick

Pfc. Robert E. Franzl  
Pfc. Raymond E. Harrington  
Pfc. Stephen Kowalski  
Pfc. Albert Mogul  
Pfc. Donald A. Palmieri  
Pfc. Harold E. Skinner  
Pfc. Russell A. Whalen  
Pfc. William R. Whalen  
Pfc. George Zantuhos  
Pfc. Carl W. Henn, Jr.  
Pvt. Aaron R. Baer  
Pvt. Onorio Cerino  
Pvt. William Hussar  
Pvt. Matthew E. Jones, Jr.  
Pvt. Howard R. Jones  
Pvt. Frank L. Stein  
Pvt. John E. Trimmel

# 114TH AGF BAND

WO. Thomas R. Porter

T/Sgt. Bruno A. Mazur  
S Sgt. Merlin Wilson  
T/4 Vernon F. Donley  
T/4 John F. Homan  
T/4 Jack D. Krusenstjerna  
T/4 Lawrence C. Marsh  
T/4 Mitchell M. Pawloski  
T/4 Dick Vander Molen, Jr.  
T/4 Theodore Vlad  
Cpl. Don A. Hoffman  
T/5 Harold Bialk  
T/5 Leonard R. Davidson  
T/5 George M. Fisk  
T/5 William E. Lamb

T/5 Kenneth Pennycook  
T/5 William S. Purcell, Jr.  
T/5 William P. Sweeney  
Pfc. Watson J. Barber  
Pfc. Peter T. Gallina  
Pfc. Raymond Harrington  
Pfc. Charles Mann  
Pfc. Donald G. Montgomery  
Pfc. William T. Reinecke  
Pfc. Gordon W. Shunk  
Pfc. Richard H. Bollinger  
Pvt. Matthew E. Jones, Jr.  
Pvt. Frank L. Stein  
Pvt. John E. Trimmel

# SPECIAL SERVICE SECTION

Lt. Col. Frederick E. Graef

Capt. Paul A. Twachtman

MSgt. Edward Colonna  
S Sgt. Edward A. Dutton  
S Sgt. Phil Maros

Sgt. Merritt Manahan  
T/4 A. W. Lausier  
T/4 Nicholas Shamas

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## TRANSPORTATION SECTION

Col. Louis G. Zinnecker	Maj. Floyd B. Boyle
Lt. Col. Kirk A. Keegan	Capt. Ralph Chavkin
Lt. Col. Donald I. Pattison	Capt. Colin McRea
Maj. Paul R. Heck	1st Lt. Stanley F. Evans
Maj. Edward Krug	1st Lt. Reuben R. Kasman
Maj. Oscar M. Gunderson	1st Lt. Theodore Loveless

T Sgt. Raymond Hayes	T 5 William A. Matthews
T Sgt. James Stragea	Pfc. Dallas I. Penny
S Sgt. John Dolan	Pvt. Boyce M. Hoffman
T 3 Warren L. Eckstein	Pvt. Dean S. Brady
T 4 Daniel Zeller	Pvt. Louis M. Marks
T 4 Henry Cairo	Pvt. Frank X. Byrns
T 4 Kenneth C. Creswell	Pvt. Hubert Sandlin
T 4 Gershon Hakim	Pvt. Charles W. Dubbs
T 5 Howard Slotkin	

## 307TH CIC DETACHMENT

Maj. Kenneth G. Crowell	Capt. Marion E. Porter
Maj. Lucien L. Picard	Capt. Arthur H. Van Kirk
Capt. Alvie L. McDuff	Capt. John C. L. C. Schwarzwalders

M Sgt. Bertel M. Sparks	S Sgt. Milton W. Lipper
T Sgt. Warren R. Anderson	S Sgt. George T. Moseley
T Sgt. Harold O. Barker, Jr.	S Sgt. Origene J. Paquette
T Sgt. William N. Bower	S Sgt. Peter Regis
T Sgt. Keirn C. Brown	S Sgt. Lewis V. Sevier
T Sgt. Alan F. Dinehart, Jr.	Sgt. Victor C. Bergman, Jr.
T Sgt. Robert G. Caldwell	Sgt. Wells F. Chamberlain
T Sgt. Ashleigh D. McIntosh	Sgt. Perry A. Devers
T Sgt. Charles W. O'Connell	Sgt. Honorat T. Gendron
T Sgt. Edmond J. Tousignant	Sgt. Joseph C. Hutchinson
T Sgt. Francis B. Beaudette	Sgt. William C. Kandt
S Sgt. Emmet R. Blake	Sgt. Herve R. LaChance
S Sgt. Robert Brockmeier	Sgt. Phillipe G. Jacques
S Sgt. Abraham W. Brussell	Sgt. Edward Baraty
S Sgt. Raymond P. Daguerre	Sgt. Scott D. McCoy
S Sgt. Thomas A. Emmet	Sgt. Albert N. Nickson
S Sgt. Woodrow W. French	Sgt. George A. Perper
S Sgt. Marshall Haseltine	Sgt. Francis E. Powell
S Sgt. George A. LeFebvre	Sgt. Robert R. Richards
S Sgt. Philip A. O'Brien	Sgt. Daniel J. Sullivan
S Sgt. Victor S. Guinzbourg	Sgt. Bradley W. Vaughn
S Sgt. David S. Horner	



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


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
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
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
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


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**SEVENTH ARMY  
OPERATIONS  
IN**

**EUROPE**

15 AUGUST 1944 ~ 8 MAY 1945


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OPERATIONS  
IN

**EUROPE**

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Office of the A. C. of S., G-2  
APO 756 US ARMY

10/07

DATE June 1945	RETURN TO: ASST. SEC. STAFF ATTN: ADJUTANT NEWELL H. H. HEDGECOCK
682.01-3 AUG 1944 - MAY 1945	

MEMORANDUM:

TO : All Concerned.

1. This document is a general summary of the activities of the German forces opposing the Seventh US Army during the period indicated.

2. It was prepared by the G-2 Section Seventh Army to relate chronologically, month by month, the enemy's tactics, composition and organization. It is not a history of Seventh Army operations, as such a document is being produced by the Seventh Army Historical Section.

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William A. Smith  
Colonel, AGO  
A C of S, G-2

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**G-2 HISTORY**



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**SEVENTH ARMY**  
OPERATIONS  
IN  
**EUROPE**

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P A R T O N E

15-31 AUGUST 1944

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G-2 HISTORY

OPERATIONS IN EUROPE

Part I

15 - 31 August 1944

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~I. GENERAL.

By the time the German Nineteenth Army recovered from the surprise of the Allied landings on 15 August, it was too late. Although the German High Command had every reason to expect such an Allied operation, and knew in advance, from aerial reconnaissance, that the invasion fleet was underway, it failed disastrously in attempting to deduce the target area of the attack.

There are conflicting versions of just what the enemy did expect. Some prisoners, including Generalmajor PIERINGER, Feldkommandant of the Var Department, stated that the Germans were alerted for an attack in the GENOA area; others say the landings were expected west of TOULON, despite the fact that this area was not fitted for large scale amphibious assault. In any case, the enemy was not prepared in the right area.

The shock and surprise of the assault, and the resulting speed of the advance inland, so disorganized the Nineteenth Army that its commander, General Friedrich WIESE, never succeeded in assembling the bulk of his forces to attempt to contain the beachhead. By the end of August, he had lost four of the nine divisions that had been available to him, in whole or in part, on the 15th; all of the rest had suffered heavy losses in both men and equipment; he had lost the ports of TOULON and MARSEILLES; he had given up nearly 60,000 prisoners, and, faced with the threat of being outflanked and cut off by the simultaneous successes of the United States Seventh and Third Armies, he was hastily withdrawing his battered forces northward and had abandoned all of France south and southwest of LYON.

It would not be correct to say that surprise was the only factor entering into the Nineteenth Army's failure to put up appreciable resistance to the Seventh Army's northward drive. The weakness of the Riviera garrison, which made possible the accomplishment of a decisive breakthrough as early as D+2, was a result of two factors: the enemy's conviction that the attack would come somewhere else; and the fact that his overall strength in Southern France was on the decline at the time of the assault.

In early June, 1944, prior to the OVERLORD assault on NORMANDY, the enemy had disposed sixteen divisions in Southern France (South of the LOIRE) for the defense of both the Mediterranean and Bay of Biscay coasts. These -- three panzer divisions, eight infantry divisions, and five reserve divisions -- comprised Army-Group G, the First and Nineteenth German Armies. The former was responsible for the Atlantic Coast, the latter for the Mediterranean.

However, the OVERLORD operation, and the subsequent breakthrough into BRITTANY, led to a reshuffling of these forces. The Nineteenth Army lost the 9th Panzer Division and the 271st, 272nd, and 277th Infantry Divisions; it gained the 11th Panzer (transferred from First Army), the 193rd Infantry (from RUSSIA, reinforced by BOHEMIAN units), and the 716th Infantry, which had been badly mauled in NORMANDY and sent south for refit. These, together with the divisions it had retained through the shuffle, gave the Nineteenth Army nine divisions at the time of the DRAGOON landing on August 15. Their D-Day dispositions, as shown in Annex I, confirmed advance information in every particular. However, these nine divisions were hardly in such condition as to be available for immediate commitment at their full strength. The only genuinely mobile unit, the 11th Panzer Division, was missing one of its two tank battalions; the rest of the division had been on the verge of moving at the time we struck. The 338th Infantry Division had sent the equivalent of four battalions in answer to the call for reinforcements for the BRITTANY - NORMANDY front; two weak regiments were available to throw against the Seventh Army. The 157th Reserve Division, while substantially intact, had been dissipated in the mountain

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problem of getting them out again at the northern end.

To do so he began on D+10 a three-day series of actions against our forces in the MONTEILMAR - LORIOI sector. During the morning of the 25th, a force of eight tanks and 200 MT, under cover of heavy artillery fire, moved eastward toward CREST against the northern flank of our positions below the RHONE-DROME confluence. The column was dispersed with a loss of three tanks. About noon a concentration of six tanks and 300 infantry was observed northeast of MONTEILMAR itself, on the south side of our position, and during the afternoon the enemy succeeded in making a small penetration onto the high ground in this area. By night of D+10 this penetration was reported "under control."

Traffic moving northward through the RHONE Valley appeared to stop in the MONTEILMAR area, indicating a pile-up of vehicles below our block waiting for enemy attacks on the block to provide them an opportunity to filter through.

The tail of the enemy column, as it withdrew into the valley, appeared to be covered by 326th Regiment of the 198th Division and by the bulk of the 110th Panzer Grenadier Regiment of the 11th Panzer.

Pockets of resistance were still being engaged in both TOULON and MARSEILLES and on the right flank there was only light contact in the GRASSE-CANNES area. On our Alpine flank, BRIANCON was occupied without opposition, but to the southeast of that town, in the vicinity of LARCHE Pass, there were the first of a series of indications of enemy activity which later proved to be the taking up of defensive positions by the LXXV Corps.

26 August - D+11

Continuing his actions of the previous day against our positions dominating his escape route north of MONTEILMAR, the enemy launched a number of attacks, supported by armor, one of which succeeded in breaking our roadblock on the east bank of the RHONE. To the south of our position he took and held BOMLIEU for five hours before being driven out; to the north of the position 20 tanks and 800 infantry were reported below the DROME River between LORIOI and GRANE, and a small enemy force was dispersed north of CREST. Most of the identifications in the battle area were of elements of the 11th Panzer and 198th Infantry Division.

Meanwhile the heaviest motor movements yet reported were observed in the valley, and included, in the area between MONTEILMAR and LORIOI, a large column of tanks, armored vehicles, self-propelled guns and half-tracks. The rear of the enemy force was now above ORANGE, to which our troops penetrated against only light contact.

On the right flank the enemy continued his slow withdrawal to Italy, presenting increasing resistance in the LOUP River area.

27 August - D+12

Prisoners reported that the bulk of the 11th Panzer Division had already succeeded in passing our block, but that another division (known from other identifications to be the 198th) was still to the south. Endeavoring to hold the road and the DROME River crossing open for escape of his last elements, the enemy presented stubborn and successful resistance to our assault on LA COUCOURDE in the morning, and strongly opposed the attacks which drove him out of GRANE and ALLEX in the afternoon.

On the south side of the MONTEILMAR pocket the enemy was withdrawing rapidly, but in good order and continued to put up rear guard resistance whenever contacted by our forward elements. The latter advanced as far northward as the DONZERE-GRIGNAN area.

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On the right coastal flank, there was further evidence of enemy withdrawal toward Italy, but to the north small arms fire was encountered northwest of LARCHE pass.

28 August - D/13

The climax of the fight for the MONTEILMAR pocket was reached as the enemy, taking heavy losses both in battle and in the shooting up of jammed traffic on the road, extracted his surviving elements to the north.

Advance American units moving up on the pocket from below, broke through the DONZERE-GRIGNAN-TAULIGNAN delaying line against very heavy opposition, capturing a double column of vehicles two kilometers in length, and late in the day moving on through MONTEILMAR itself, where, by then, there was little opposition.

Meanwhile, however, the enemy had resisted strongly to the east of MONTEILMAR, had attacked to the north and had forced our units to withdraw slightly in the vicinity of LA COUCOURDE. Despite the toll being taken of his vehicles by artillery and air strafing, he continued to move on the road in daylight in a determined effort to force as much materiel as possible through the hard-won gap.

His next obstacle was the crossing of the DROME River near its junction with the RHONE, and this he negotiated, first, with three fords near LIVRON, then, after floods forced a rise in the river, by a ponton bridge.

Far in the rear, the sacrifice stand of the enemy troops left behind in the ports came to an end with the formal surrender of survivors in MARSEILLES and on ST MANDRIER Peninsula, behind TOULON. Among the MARSEILLES prisoners were Generalmajor BOJE, CG of Feldkommandantur 89h, and General-leutnant SCHAEFFER, CG of 24th Infantry Division. TOULON yielded Admiral RUTHEN, commanding the Maritime Defense of the Riviera.

29 August - D/14

The enemy attacked strongly north of MONTEILMAR in the morning in an effort to break out with the remainder of the 196th Division, but was beaten back and the division commander, Generalmajor OTTO RICHTER, captured.

The MONTEILMAR-LA COUCOURDE pocket then collapsed, with the enemy presenting only scattered resistance to our troops who moved in to mop up. The bulk of the personnel in the trapped units had succeeded in escaping northward, but vast stocks of equipment had to be abandoned in the pocket, including about 2,000 MT, 1000 horses, more than a hundred artillery pieces, among which were six railway guns.

Heavy fighting now developed to the northward, in the vicinity of the DROME crossings, where the enemy continued to push traffic across under our artillery fire. Although we occupied LIVRON without opposition, very heavy resistance was met at LORIOLE which was later successfully counter-attacked by the enemy. Our attempts to penetrate westward of the LIVRON - LORIOLE line were stubbornly resisted.

That the enemy did not intend again to be cut off as he had been above MONTEILMAR was demonstrated on 29 August when defended roadblocks were first developed at BOURG DE PEAGE and BEAUREPAIRE to the east of the LIVRON - VALENCE - VIENNE - LYON line of withdrawal. This policy of screening his future routes against our efforts to outflank them was to be consistently followed until, some two weeks later, he had succeeded in withdrawing into the BELFORT - VOSGES line.

During the battle of the RHONE Valley the enemy had also succeeded in evacuating the area to the west of the Delta. The 716th Infantry Division,

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strongholds of the Maquis. And the 716th Infantry Division was too recently out of the COTENTIN meat grinder to be of any offensive use to General WIESE.

Thus, in addition to the still considerable strength of the 11th Panzer, there were only five reasonably effective divisions available to the Nineteenth Army: 148th, which was cut off and shunted aside early in the operation; 242nd and 244th, which were cut off and destroyed in TOULON and MARSEILLES, respectively; 189th, which was unable to get together more than a battle group, representing only portions of two regiments, for the early phases, and whose remainder was not contacted during this period; and the 198th Infantry Division, which bore the brunt of the delaying action from BRIGNOLES to MONTEILMAR. (See Annex No. II).

The unhappy state of the Nineteenth Army was enhanced by a grave shortage of motor vehicles and fuel, which forced very large elements to rely on horse-drawn transport. Even the 11th Panzer Division, according to a prisoner, had to move some of its grenadiers to the battle area by towing them on their bicycles behind the few available trucks.

Still another factor, difficult to assess accurately at this time, probably contributed to the handicaps of the Nineteenth Army: the poor quality of much of its personnel, including many foreigners and impressed prisoners of war. Once defeat had become inevitable, its materialization was hastened by the low morale of the troops. The effect of the morale factor was heightened by the enemy's fear of the FFI. On many occasions, German troops made the most of an opportunity to surrender to Americans to forestall the possibility of having to give up to the Maquis later.

However, any or all of these debilitating factors might have been countered to some extent had the enemy correctly evaluated Allied intentions and concentrated more of his available forces nearer the assault area. He did not, with the result that he had only the equivalent of two regiments defending an area being assaulted by three divisions. To the failure of his intelligence must be ascribed a large part of his inability to prevent our speedy establishment ashore and immediate breakthrough inland.

## II. CHRONOLOGY.

### 15 August - D-Day

The three preliminary operations launched during the night of 14/15 August in advance of the main assault were successfully carried out against a minimum of opposition. The Special Service Force landing on the islands of LEVANT and PORT CROS had overcome most resistance at both places by the morning of D-Day. LEVANT was completely cleared by the night of D-Day and on PORT CROS only 60-80 enemy were still holding out.

The French Commando beachhead on the left flank of the main assault, in the Cap NEGRE - Cap CAVALAIRE area, received a counterattack during the morning of D-Day, but the enemy was repulsed with the loss of 50 prisoners.

The third pre-H-Hour operation, the airborne drop in the vicinity of LE MUY, also met little opposition.

That the assault area was held only lightly by the enemy was conclusively proved on the morning of D-Day when the main landings also encountered only slight opposition. No fire on ships or craft from coast defense guns was reported, and on the beaches resistance consisted in the main of small arms and mortar fire. Underwater obstacles and land mines were insufficient to delay the landings materially. At only one point, between ST. RAPHAEL and the ARGENS River mouth, was enemy fire of sufficient intensity to force use of an alternate beach.

On the whole, the quality of resistance improved little during the



day. Determined opposition was met only in the FREJUS - ST. RAPHAEL area, where the enemy attempted to deny us access to the ARGENS River valley, and at ST. MAXIME, where pillboxes and street barricades were encountered during the afternoon before the enemy evacuated the town. At the close of the day there was still no clearly defined front. Scattered resistance was being met at the limits of our forward advance, and small pockets were holding out near FREJUS and ST. TROPEZ.

Not until dusk of D-Day did the Luftwaffe put in an appearance. An undetermined number of aircraft released glider bombs at 2120B, sinking one LST.

Identifications among the 2,041 prisoners taken by VI Corps on D-Day confirmed previous estimates that the assault would encounter elements of the 242nd Infantry Division and the 148th Reserve Division. The 765th Infantry Regiment, of the 242nd Division, was spread over the larger part of the assault area from CAVALAIRE to AGAY, with 239th Reserve Grenadier Regiment of 148th Division on its left.

#### 16 August - D+1

On the island of PORT CROS, a garrison of one officer and 47 men was still holding out in FORT DE L'EMINENCE at the end of D plus 1. Two other pockets of resistance had been taken during the day.

On the mainland, enemy opposition stiffened somewhat on both flanks but continued weak and uncoordinated in the center, with the exception of the FREJUS - ST. RAPHAEL area, where the enemy continued his attempt to deny us entrance into the ARGENS River valley from the east. On the right flank, a three-company counterattack was repulsed west of LA NAPOULE, and further eastward advances by our troops met increasing artillery fire. On the left flank, strong opposition was met on the coast at a strong point east of LE LAVANDOU and inland at a point south of CARNOULES.

Again, enemy air made a dusk attack in the vicinity of ST. MAXIME and ST. TROPEZ, dropping anti-personnel bombs in the latter town.

#### 17 August - D+2

With the capture of DRAGUIGNAN by the airborne task force on the morning of D+2, with little opposition, and the penetration of beachhead forces to the same vicinity without contact, it became fully apparent that no enemy front existed in this sector. The troops assigned to defense of the area - elements of the 242nd Infantry Division - had been destroyed by our amphibious forces; and the link between 242nd Division and 148th Division on its left - LXII Corps Headquarters at DRAGUIGNAN - had been first isolated and then captured by the airborne task force, including Gen. d. Inf. (Lt. Gen.) Ferdinand NEULING and Staff.

This breach in the enemy position, and the lack of suitably disposed reserves with which to close it, had two far-reaching results whose effects the enemy continued to feel for many days. First, the 148th Reserve Division was completely cut off from the rest of Nineteenth Army and, for all practical purposes, was lost to General WIESE. It continued to fight delaying actions as it backed up into the mountains on the Franco-Italian border, and aided the Nineteenth Army, incidentally, by forcing us to commit sizeable forces to liberate CANNES and NICE and secure our right flank, but it was never again able to take part in coordinated action with the rest of Nineteenth Army. Its situation was fully appreciated by the enemy command: by the last of August it had ceased, even nominally, to be a part of Nineteenth Army and had instead been assigned to the newly formed LXXV Corps, whose mission was to defend northwest Italy against the Allied threat to KESSELRING's rear.

The second effect of the breakthrough to DRAGUIGNAN was to expose

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the left flank of the remainder of the Nineteenth Army. The enemy was unable to prevent our rapid exploitation northward with its attendant threat to his Rhone Valley supply and escape routes, and was left with no alternative to the line of action then followed: to deny us the ports of TOULON and MARSEILLES by sacrificing the troops then in those cities in a last ditch stand; and to withdraw the balance of his forces up the Rhone as rapidly as possible, fighting only those actions necessary to keep the route open. The development of this plan continued through the balance of the month of August.

At the end of D+2, the enemy had fallen back on our left flank and was covering the eastern and northeastern approaches to TOULON with elements of the 242nd Inf. Division, less the 765th Regiment, whose few remnants were scattered from the area northeast of TOULON to the vicinity of DRAGUIGNAN. In an attempt to reinforce this area northeast of TOULON, the enemy brought in from MONTPELLIER a battle group of the 189th Reserve Division, whose composition had been discovered from a document captured the previous day, and which was contacted on D+2 west of LE LUC.

On the right flank, elements of the two regiments of the 118th Division were in defensive positions in the vicinity of FAYENCE. Heavy artillery fire was being received from the Islands of STE MARGBERITE and ST HONORAT, off CANNES.

The last resistance on the Island of PORT CROS was liquidated.

Enemy air activity continued on a low scale. Six JU 88's approached the beach area at 2050B and dropped anti-personnel bombs near ST RAPHAEL and ST MAXIME.

#### 18 August - D+3

Task Force BUTLER, which had begun late on D+2 to exploit northward through the breach in the enemy position, had reached the line DIERANCE River - VALENSOLE - RIBZ by the evening of D+3.

Meanwhile, the enemy continued his policy of piecemeal commitment of forces to the sector north of TOULON. Elements of the 198th, 244th and 338th Infantry Divisions were identified, as well as additional small elements of the 189th Division battle group. In the sector of these units, as well as to the south where the 242nd Division was defending the approaches to TOULON itself, somewhat stiffer, though still uncoordinated, opposition was met at scattered points. On our right flank, the enemy was withdrawing before the US 36th Division, whose forward elements advanced in the area northwest of CANNES without making contact.

At 2030B, 2 or 3 enemy planes were over BARJOLS, but dropped no bombs.

#### 19 August - D+4

Isolated enemy groups bitterly contested our advance westward along the coast road to TOULON, the BRIGNOLES - AIX road, and the DRAGUIGNAN - VINON road, continuing to hold out after being by-passed by our advance elements. Further elements of the 198th and 244th Infantry Divisions were identified in this sector, and virtually the whole of the second battalion of the 757th Infantry Regiment (338th Division) was encircled and destroyed in BRIGNOLES. However, the enemy was still unable to commit any new divisions as complete units, and the defensive plan appeared to lack centralized direction.

Our exploitation northward continued with little opposition, and resulted in the capture, at DIGNE, of Generalmajor Hans SCHUBERTH, CG of Feldkommandantur 792, together with his staff. On our right, house-to-house fighting was reported at CALLIAN, but again, as on the left, there was no evidence

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of coordinated defense on a broad front.

20 August - D/5

Enemy pockets continued to hold out north and west of BRIGNOLES, but these were by-passed by our forward elements which advanced westward as far as AIX against increasing resistance, consisting of enemy units up to 3/400 in strength with mortars, machine guns, artillery and at least two tanks. On the coast, French elements ran into stiff resistance, supported by heavy artillery fire (probably coastal defense guns firing inland) in the vicinity of HYERES, but slightly to the north were able to by-pass TOULON and enter the outskirts of LE BEAUSSET, northwest of the city.

Northwest of CANNES, the enemy maintained defensive positions and presented strong opposition to our advance, but showed no aggressive tendencies. After a stiff fight at DIGNE, Task Force BUTLER continued its advance to the north.

21 August - D/6

The breakthrough to the north and northwest from the original beachhead continued, with elements of Task Force BUTLER reaching the RHONE River, near the confluences of the DROME, without contact. However, other elements of the Task Force had a stiff fight to capture GAP, and afterward received a counterattack north of the town. Subsequently, elements of the 157th Reserve Division were identified in this area. The division had been engaged in operations against partisans in the Alpine foothills but had not previously been contacted by American troops.

Even now it was not destined to play an important part in Nineteenth Army's plan. For, misconstruing our intentions, the enemy command was showing great concern about security of the Alpine passes, and, like the 118th, the 157th Division was withdrawn eastward to assume a purely defensive role on the border. These two divisions, plus the 5 Mountain Division from ITALY, with the 90th PG Division in mobile reserve, made up the LXXXV Corps.

With his RHONE Valley routes now directly threatened, the enemy was speeding up his plan of withdrawing while there was yet time. A definite pattern of motor movement northeast from the SETE - NARBONNE area, and northward up the RHONE, began to appear in tactical reconnaissance reports. And across our line of advance toward the RHONE Delta, he attempted to cover the lower end of his withdrawal route by somewhat stiffer resistance on a line generally south from PERTUIS. After failing in an attempt to reinforce the estimated two to three battalions defending AIX, he withdrew from the town during the night of 20/21 August. Scattered groups of a few tanks and self-propelled guns were encountered in the general area west of AIX, and a prisoner identified one company of the 110th Panzer Grenadier Regiment (11th Panzer Division) west of PEYROLLES. He stated that his company was an advance guard, and was to fall back on the RHONE on 23 August.

The scheme of maneuver suggested by these reports was confirmed later by the capture of a field order of LXXXV Corps, dated 21 August. Attributing the withdrawal to "the development of the situation in Northwest FRANCE", the order stated that Nineteenth Army would disengage itself from the enemy and join up with the south wing of Army Group "B". TOULON and MARSEILLES were to be defended to the last man, "according to Order of the Fuehrer". IV GAF Corps was to command the sector west of the RHONE, and LXXXV Corps the sector east of the river. (Other orders indicate that IV GAF Corps commanded the 716th and 189th Divisions, LXXXV Corps the 198th and 338th Divisions). 11th Panzer Division, in Army reserve, was to cover LXXXV Corps front, reconnoiter roads leading into the Valley, and be prepared to counterattack enemy pressure.

Batteries in TOULON continued to shell the French advancing toward

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the city from the East who had taken HYERES after a hard fight. To the west of TOULON, the French reached the coast at BANDOL, thus completing the encirclement of the city, to whose defense the remnants of the 242nd Infantry Division had been committed.

On the extreme right flank, the First Airborne Task Force received heavy artillery fire, believed to have originated in the vicinity of CANNES.

22 August - D/7

Stubborn delaying actions on the approaches to the RHONE Delta covered continued enemy withdrawal up the valley. Air reconnaissance picked up heavy daylight movements northward from NIMES toward MONTE LIMAR, with indications that traffic was crossing to the east side of the river at PONT D'ESPRIT.

After a sharp fight at CORPS, elements of the 36th Division, advancing to the north, occupied GRENOBLE against only light opposition. On our right flank, elements of 239th and 8th Reserve Regiments of 148th Reserve Division engaged our forces with small arms and light artillery fire in the GRASSE - FAYENCE area, before evacuating FAYENCE and CALLIAN later in the day.

Remnants of the 242nd Division offered determined resistance before TOULON, supported by coast defense guns on ST MANDRIER Peninsula.

23 August - D/8

242nd Division elements and marines, defending TOULON, resisted stubbornly under gunfire support from coast defense batteries. Although MARSEILLES was reported captured, strong pockets of resistance, representing the 244th Infantry Division and elements of the 338th Division, were still holding out, and continued to do so for five days, meanwhile carrying out extensive demolitions in the harbor.

The enemy withdrawal northward continued, with heavy traffic reported on both sides of the RHONE. In order to keep this route open, the enemy presented strong resistance to our units in the vicinity of MONTE LIMAR and LIVRON.

24 August - D/9

Evidence that the enemy had already withdrawn into the RHONE Valley most of the forces which he intended to evacuate was provided by the fact that our forces penetrated on a broad salient to MARTIGUES - ARLES - ORGON - CAVAILLON without opposition. With the exception of the cities of TOULON and MARSEILLES, where enemy pockets still held out, the scene of the most intensive action had now shifted to the region between MONTE LIMAR and the RHONE-DROME confluence, where Task Force BUTLER and the 36th Division were in position to block the enemy's escape route northward. For the next five days, the enemy's main effort was directed toward keeping this route open, and on D/9 both the BUTLER Force and the 36th engaged enemy forces here. Again heavy traffic, including some horse-drawn vehicles, was observed moving northward through the valley, and the first sign of what was soon to become the MONTE LIMAR death-trap was the claim of 100 MT and two trains destroyed here by our artillery and tanks.

On the right flank, CANNES, ANTIBES, and GRASSE fell to our troops, who advanced against only light opposition.

25 August - D/10

The unopposed occupation of ARLES, TARASCON, AVIGNON and CARPENTRAS indicated that the enemy had completed the withdrawal of his forces into the Southern end of the RHONE Valley, leaving him, however, with the serious

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known to have been in this area at the time of the assault, had never been contacted in battle. However, paybooks confirming the presence of its 736th Regiment in the REMOULINS area had been reported on 28 August; previously, on 26 August, reports had been received of a large body of disorganized enemy in the NIMES-UZES area, but French reconnaissance to the west and northwest of the Delta on 29 August developed no contact. The division had evidently made its way northward on the west side of the RHONE.

On our right flank, the enemy's organization of his Alpine defenses proceeded at an increased pace, and developed into an attack that retook BRIANCON.

30 August - D+15

Moving northward through VALENCE in the direction of LYON, the enemy fought stubborn rear guard actions in the vicinity of LIVRON before breaking contact in the afternoon. He guarded the east flank of his movement by presenting stiff resistance to our attack on BOURG DE PEAGE, and at points southeast of VALENCE and near BEAUREPAIRE.

The straggling rear of the enemy migration was encountered by the French moving north on the west side of the RHONE in the vicinity of BOURG ST ANDEOL; to the west at VALLON a disorganized force of 3,000 enemy were reported raping and pillaging the countryside.

On the east coastal flank the continued withdrawal of the 148th Reserve Division into the mountains permitted our occupation of NICE and LEVENZO. But to the north in the Alpine pass sector, the enemy was again aggressive in his establishment of a firm defensive position. Having taken the COL de LARGHE, BARCELONETTE, BRIANCON and CONDAMINE, he burned the latter two towns, and held the CONDAMINE-ST PAUL road under artillery fire throughout the day.

31 August - D+16


On the last day of the month, the enemy was entering the final stages of his withdrawal from southern and southwestern France to the relative security of the VOSGES. By the end of 31 August all organized resistance had ceased at VALENCE and the Nineteenth Army was falling back rapidly on LYON, the last stronghold in the RHONE Valley and the pre-designated assembly area to which its retreating units had been ordered for the final retreat to the border zone. The route was screened with road-blocks and small forces on all main roads approaching westward from northeast of VALENCE to northeast of LYON.

### III. SUMMARY.

Prisoners taken on the last day of the month brought the total to 57,068 since D-Day. The enemy had also lost an unestimated number of dead and wounded and large quantities of equipment; he had abandoned two divisions to their inevitable fate in TOULON and MARSEILLES, and had lost two others to guard duty on the Italian border.


But by deciding on evacuation early in the battle (the disengagement order had been issued on D+4), then carrying it out boldly despite our efforts to block the route, Nineteenth Army had salvaged a considerable portion of its strength for renewal of the fight on the approaches to the Fatherland. In particular, a large part of the 11th Panzer Division had escaped and was to be met again in subsequent weeks. The chart attached (Annex No. IV) summarizes the organization and effectiveness of the Nineteenth Army during the last two weeks of August.

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ANNEX NO. IIIPRINCIPAL ENEMY COMMANDERS OPPOSING SEVENTH ARMY  
(For Locations See Annex No. I)

## ARMY GROUP G

BLASKOWITZ, Johannes, Generalfeldmarschall.

Began World War I as company commander, ended as Chief of Staff of a Hungarian Division on the Eastern Front. Promoted Major in 1921, he was on the staff of 5th Infantry Division. Commanded an Infantry Regiment in 1925, and was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel in 1926. In 1928, he was Chief of Staff of 5th Infantry Division, and became a full Colonel in 1929. As commander of 11th Infantry Regiment, he was promoted to Generalmajor in 1932. As a Generalleutnant, he was appointed Inspector of Administrative Schools in 1933; and as commander of II Army Corps, was promoted to General (Infantry) in 1936. He assumed command of Third Army Group in November 1938, and commanded during the occupation of BOHEMIA and MORAVIA in March 1939.

At the outbreak of the war he commanded 8 Army in von RUNDSTEDT's Army Group in Poland, and negotiated the surrender of Warsaw in September 1939. He won the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross in Poland, and was promoted to Generaloberst on 1 October. In 1940 he was C-in-C East, with headquarters at SPALA. He commanded First Army in France from 1941 to 1944 when he was promoted to Generalfeldmarschall and commanded Army Group G.

He is reported to have protested against atrocities in Poland and was at one time reputed to be in disfavor with the Nazi Party.

## NINETEENTH ARMY

WIESE, Frederick, General (Infantry).

WIESE served in World War I with 65th Infantry Regiment, and during 1919 was a member of the "Freikorps", composed of the extreme nationalist elements of the German Officer Corps.

He retired with the rank of Lieutenant of the Reserve in September 1919, and joined the police, rejoining the army in 1935 as a Major in 69th Infantry Regiment; promoted Lieutenant Colonel in 1938, commanding second battalion, 116th Infantry Regiment, and full Colonel in 1941. Commanding an Infantry Regiment in 1942 he was awarded the Knight's Cross to the Iron Cross in February, and the German Cross in Gold in March. By October 1943, he had been promoted successively to Generalmajor, Generalleutnant, and General (Infantry). As commander of 35th Army Corps, he was awarded Oak-leaves to the Knight's Cross for fighting at GOMEL and SW of ZHLOBIN, where the Russians accuse him of being responsible for atrocities. Generalmajor BIERINGER, when captured in Southern France described WIESE as a fervent Nazi. WIESE assumed command of Nineteenth Army, replacing General von SODENSTERN, in July.

## IV GAF CORPS

PETERSON, General (Luftwaffe).

No biographical data available.

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## LXII RESERVE CORPS

NEULING, Ferdinand, General (Infantry).

Commissioned in 1906, served during World War I in 139th Infantry Regiment, promoted Captain in 1916. Awarded Iron Cross (first class) and Saxon Decoration. In 11th Infantry Regiment, 1921, and War Department 1925-29. Promoted Major in 1929, and commanded a battalion of 2nd Infantry Regiment 1930-32. Promoted Colonel 1935, commanding 23rd Infantry Regiment in 1937, Generalmajor in 1939. Commanded 239th Infantry Division and promoted to Generalleutnant in 1940. On the Eastern Front in 1942 he was awarded the German Cross in Gold (for operations against KHARKOV) and the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross. Later in the year appointed General Z.B.V. at headquarters of the Commanding General of the General Government and subsequently to command of the LXII Reserve Corps in POLAND. Promoted General (Infantry) in November 1942.

Captured at DRAGUIGNAN, on 18 August, he was highly indignant over the conduct of General BIERINGER, who had tried to induce him to surrender with his entire staff on first contact with American troops. NEULING had orders to fight to the last man and last bullet and claimed that he surrendered only when he found himself in a hopelessly untenable position, cut off from all communication with either higher or lower echelons.

## LXXXIV ARMY CORPS

KNIESS, Baptist, General (Infantry).

Bavarian, entered BAVARIAN Army as Second Lieutenant in 1908. Ended World War I as Captain, with the Iron Cross (first class), Bavarian Military Service Cross (fourth class) and Hessian Bravery Medal. Transferred to Reichswehr after the war. Served in 19 (Bavarian) Infantry Regiment from 1925 to 1927, and on the staff of Borkum Garrison in 1928 and 1929. Promoted to Major in 1928, commanded training battalion of 21 Infantry Regiment 1930-32, promoted Lieutenant Colonel 1933 and Generalmajor in 1938. Early in 1939 he was serving as Landwehr Commander HEILBRONN. Promoted Generalleutnant in 1940 and General (Infantry) in 1942. In March 1943 he was commanding LXVI Reserve Corps in France, and in October 1943 commanded Gruppe KNISS, which later became LXXXV Corps.

## 11 PANZER DIV.

WIETERSHEIM, Wend von, Generalmajor.

Cavalryman, first identified with 11 Panzer Division in RUSSIA, in August 1943. Holds German Cross in Gold, Rittercross (for attack on LUGA position in RUSSIA, February 1942), Oak Leaf, and Oak Leaf with Swords.

## 148 RES. DIV.

FRETTER-PICO, Otto, Generalmajor.

Served in 14 Artillery Regiment during World War I, promoted Lieutenant in October 1918, and was in 5th Artillery Regiment in 1925. Promoted Captain in 1928, Lieutenant Colonel in 1937, Colonel in 1940; during this period he had served in 7th "Medical Unit" and 7th Survey Unit. Promoted to Generalmajor in 1943 and has commanded 148th Reserve Division since January 1944.

## 157 RES. DIV.

PFLAUM, Karl, Generalleutnant.

Second Lieutenant in 8th Bavarian Infantry Regiment in 1912; regimental service during 1914-18; awarded Bavarian Medal for Military Merit. Promoted Captain in October 1918. Serving in 21st Infantry Regiment in 1925 and on staff of 19th Infantry Regiment in 1932. Promoted Colonel in 1937; commanded an officer selection board in 1939. After commanding 19th Infantry Regiment (7th Infantry Division) in 1941, he was promoted to Generalmajor and given temporary command of 258th Infantry Division on the Central RUSSIAN Front. In October 1942 he took command of 157th Reserve Division and was promoted to Generalleutnant in October 1943.

189 RES. DIV.

von SCHWERIN, Bogislav, Graf., Generalmajor.

Second Lieutenant in 2 Guard Regiment during 1914-18; promoted lieutenant in 1921. Served in 9th Infantry Regiment from 1925 to 1932, becoming Captain in 1929. In 1938 he was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel and the following year he was commanding a battalion of the 8th Infantry Regiment. Promoted Colonel at the beginning of 1941 and soon afterward, commanding an infantry regiment, was awarded the Knight's Cross to the Iron Cross for fighting on the RUSSIAN Front. Promoted Generalmajor in October 1943 and since then has been in command of 189th Reserve Division.

198 INF. DIV.

RICHTER, Otto, Generalmajor.

Captured in the MONTELIBAR pocket, RICHTER's paybook showed that he had been with 48th Engineer Battalion from 1937-40, 519th Engineer Regiment Staff 1940-42, the General Staff from 1942, and CG, 198th Infantry Division in 1944. He had been decorated with the Iron Cross (first and second class) and the German Cross in Gold. He showed himself to be aloof, arrogant, and evidently a Nazi sympathizer.

He said that when the withdrawal order was received he divided his division into two parts, sending one part north under a Colonel and himself leading the southernmost portion northward. On 29 August, he personally led the determined enemy effort to break out of the pocket and cross the DROME. When the attack failed he was taken prisoner, while attending to the wounds of another officer.

242 INF. DIV.

BAESSLER, Erich, Generalmajor.

Served in 154 Infantry Division in World War I, retired a Captain in 1919. Colonel in 65 Infantry Regiment in 1938, commanded 399 Infantry Regiment in 1941, and recommended for German Cross in Gold. Promoted Generalmajor in 1942, commanding 377 Infantry Division in KURSK sector. In command of 242 Infantry Division in BELGIUM in August 1943.

Generalmajor RICHTER of the 198th Infantry Division stated after his capture that he had met BAESSLER on the MONTELIBAR-VALENCE road where the latter was on traffic control duty after having been relieved of command of the 242nd Division for prematurely ordering withdrawal. Other PW reports say that BAESSLER was wounded on 21 August.

244 INF. DIV.

SCHAEFFER, Gotthold, Generalleutnant.

Early history confused with that of other officers of the same name.

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In 1938, a Colonel serving in OKW, and in 1939 in Defense Section III, Ministry of War. Commandant of LILLE in 1943 and promoted to Generalmajor. Commanding 24th Infantry Division in May 1944. Captured by French at MARSEILLES.

Following his capture SCHAEFFER said that although his orders had been to hold in MARSEILLES until every man was gone and despite the fact that he had ammunition and supplies for some time to come, the low state of morale compelled him to give up with two thousand men. He criticized the hold to the last man orders given by the High Command and believed that his disobedience of them had finished his military career no matter what might now happen in Germany.

338 INF. DIV.

COURBIERE, Rene de L'HOMME de, Generalleutnant.

Member of an aristocratic family of Huguenot extraction which has provided the Prussian Army with many officers. In the war of 1914-18 he won the Iron Cross (first class), Wound Badge, Bavarian Military Service Cross (fourth class, with swords), Hamburg Hanseatic Cross and Lippe War Service Cross, and was promoted to Captain in 1915. He transferred to the Reichswehr after the war, served as company commander and battalion staff officer in 4th Infantry Regiment until his promotion to Major in 1928. On the staff of 2nd Division 1929-31 and commanded a training battalion of 5th Infantry Regiment in 1932. Promoted to Lieutenant Colonel in 1933, Colonel in 1935, and appointed to command 96th Infantry Regiment. A Generalmajor in 1938, he was appointed LANDWEHR commander, GLOGAN, and the next year took command of 213th Infantry Division near BREST-LITOVSK, continuing with the division after it was downgraded to a Sicherungs Division on L. of C. duties on the Southern Front in RUSSIA. In January 1943, he was given command of 153 Reserve Division, and in January 1944 of 338th Infantry Division. He had been promoted to Generalleutnant in June 1940.

716 INF. DIV.

RICHTER, Otto, Generalmajor.

No biographical data available.

FELDKOMMANDANTUR 800, DRAGUIGNAN.

BIERINGER, Ludwig, Generalmajor.

Feldkommandant for the Department of WAR, BIERINGER is a career officer who has spent most his service in supply, both during the first World War and in the post-war period. He was made Captain in 1926, Major in 1934, Lieutenant Colonel in 1937. In 1935 he organized the first MT Battalion in MUNICH, and in 1937-39 he led in organizing instruction at the Army Supply School in HANNOVER. He published a book on military supply in 1937. He was Supply Chief with REICHENAU's Army in the Polish and French campaigns, and in September 1940 became Supply Chief of LIST's Army with headquarters at BESANCON. He moved with LIST to RUSSIA, and retained his post when LIST was replaced by MANNSTEIN. In March 1943 he was relieved of command of 3 Higher Supply Headquarters and given command of 5 Higher Supply Headquarters near CRACOW. In July 1943 he was promoted to Generalmajor and assigned to work with ROMMEL on organization of supply system in North Italy; relieved in September 1943 because of a dispute with ROMMEL's G-4. In November 1943 he was sent to BESANCON to understudy the feldkommandant and in March 1944 was given his own Feldkommandantur at DRAGUIGNAN, responsible for the coordination of civil affairs with military policy.

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On the day of the invasion BIERINGER and his staff barricaded themselves in a villa and succeeded in holding off the WFI until 16 August. He surrendered to the first American detachment to arrive in town, and then attempted to persuade General NEULING of LXII Corps to follow suit.

FELDKOMMANDANTUR 792, DIGNE.

SCHUBERTH, Hans, Generalmajor.

Formerly Feldkommandant at TOULOUSE, where he is accused of having been responsible for atrocities. He was captured at DIGNE on 19 August the day after he had written a report (also captured) describing the failure of his communications, the lack of information about the situation, and the difficulty of attempting to defend DIGNE.

FELDKOMMANDANTUR 894, MARSEILLES.

BOJE, Generalmajor.

Captured by French at MARSEILLES. No biographical data available.

MARITIME DEFENSE.

RUHFUS, Konteradmiral.

Commanding the Maritime Defense of the French Riviera, RUHFUS was responsible for the sector east of the RHONE, under Vice Admiral WEVER, commanding the South French Coast. He took over the latter command also after WEVER died on 10 August. The order withdrawing the Nineteenth Army from Southern FRANCE charged him with the responsibility of defending TOULON to the last man. He was taken prisoner when the remnants of the garrison surrendered to the French on 29 August.

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ANNEX NO. IVCOMBAT EFFECTIVENESS, NINETEENTH ARMY  
15-31 August 1944

<u>Division</u>	<u>Organization in S FR, 15 Aug.</u>			<u>Overall Effectiveness</u>	
	<u>Tk Bns.</u>	<u>Inf Bns.</u>	<u>Arty Bns.</u>	<u>15 Aug.</u>	<u>31 Aug.</u>
11th Pz.	1	8 (incl 2 Fld Repl)	3	80%	75%
148th Res.		9	4 (incl 1196 Bn atchd)	75%	60% *
157th Res.		7	2	85%	60% *
189th Res.		4	1	80%	70%
198th Inf.		8	4	85%	60%
242nd Inf.		15 (incl 3 Ost & 1 Fld Repl)	3	85%	0 (Elts under 338th control)
244th Inf.		12	3	85%	0 (Elts under 338th control)
338th Inf.		4	3	50%	20%
716th Inf.		7 (incl 2 Ost of 244th Div atchd)	2	75%	75%

NOTE: Infantry Battalion tabulation includes Reconnaissance and Engineer Bns. when employed as Infantry.

\* No longer under command of Nineteenth Army.

Percentage figures are based on effectiveness of division as compared with its own T/O; they are not a basis for comparison between divisions with different T/O's.

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ANNEX NO. VTHE MARCH BACK FROM SOUTHWEST FRANCE

The divisions of the Nineteenth Army which poured out of Southern France through the RHONE Valley were only a part of the larger stream of evacuees swirling through the funnel made by the American Third and Seventh Armies. The enemy was withdrawing from all of Southwestern France, trying to get a vast miscellany of combat troops, administrative, supply, air force and naval personnel back toward the border before they were hopelessly cut off. Estimates of their total number vary, but including the straggling remnants of the Nineteenth Army itself, there were well over 100,000 still moving out of the pocket after the end of this period.

Organization of the move began a few days after DRAGOON D-Day, under control of the LXIV Reserve Corps, later joined by LXVI Reserve Corps. In addition to the 159th Reserve Division from the BORDEAUX area and the 16th Infantry Division from the LOIRE front, some of the miscellaneous units were organized into Battle Groups OTTENBACHER, BRODOWSKI, TARGLISHBECK, and ELSTER. Four major march groups were set up to canalize the movement. As many units as possible were hastily motorized, by requisitioning all available civilian cars and buses; the rest moved themselves and their belongings by whatever means they could find, horse drawn carts, bicycles, pushcarts, or afoot. Columns lived off the land, and usually marched only at night, hiding by day. Despite this precaution, they sustained many losses of men and vehicles through Allied air and Maquis attacks.

Main axis of the movement, as indicated by the successive CP's of the LXIV Corps, was BOURGES - NEVERS - AUTUN - VESOUL. However, it was obviously impossible to maintain firm, centralized control over so many scattered elements, and so it became necessary to issue a blanket order giving assembly points which various types of units were to attempt to reach. This order, issued by C-in-C Northeastern France on 27 August, designated the following points:

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Dispatch To</u>
Entire Units of at least company or battery strength	DIJON. Report to C-in-C Northeast France to request march orders.
Headquarters and staffs from Southern France	BELFORT.
Customs officials, Navy unit stragglers	BESANCON.
Russian units (including entire units)	VESOUL.
Straggler groups from First Army and LXIV Corps, and all other stragglers	LANGRES.
Air Corps units	EPINAL.
Civilians and female army employees	MULHAUSEN, to be routed over the frontier into Germany.

At the end of this period, LXIV Corps Headquarters was at NEVERS, well to the West of the narrowing gap. And large elements of the movement were still farther to the West and Southwest, with one body in the NEVERS - CHATEAUROUX - POITIERS area, and others being harassed by partisans as far south as the TOULOUSE area.

Annex No. V

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# G-2 HISTORY



## SEVENTH ARMY

OPERATIONS

IN

# EUROPE



PART TWO

1-30 SEPTEMBER 1944

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HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH ARMY  
Office of the A. C. of S., G-2  
APO 756 US ARMY

JN/cj

3 June 1945

MEMORANDUM:

TO : All Concerned.

1. This document is a general summary of the activities of the German forces opposing the Seventh US Army during the period indicated.

2. It was prepared by the G-2 Section Seventh Army to relate chronologically, month by month, the enemy's tactics, composition and organization. It is not a history of Seventh Army operations, as such a document is being produced by the Seventh Army Historical Section.

3. THIS DOCUMENT IS RESTRICTED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. Par. 23b, AR 380-5, 15 March 1944.

CLASSIFICATION WAS CHANGED FROM CONFIDENTIAL TO RESTRICTED AUTHORITY CONFIDING GENERAL SEVENTH ARMY, BY W. C. CARMICHAEL, COLONEL, AGO, ON 1 JUNE 1945.

William A. Smith  
Colonel, AGO  
A C of S, G-2

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HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH ARMY  
Office of the A. C. of S., G-2  
APO 758 US ARMY

G-2 HISTORY

OPERATIONS IN EUROPE

Part II

1 - 30 September 1944

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III.	Summary	Page 14

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I.	Enemy Reaction to Seventh Army Operations (Map)
II.	Principal Enemy Commanders Opposing Seventh Army
III.	The March Back from Southwest France
IV.	Counterintelligence Summary 15 August - 31 August.

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C O N F I D E N T I A LI. GENERAL.

The month of September brought a complete reversal in tactics of the Germans facing the Seventh Army. At the beginning they were retreating, as rapidly as inadequate transport permitted; at the end they were defending, stubbornly and on the whole effectively, as their hastily reformed units turned to stand with their backs to the VOSGES, taking fullest advantage both of favorable terrain and of the extreme extension of Allied supply lines.

The transition from flight to defense involved three major phases of operations during the month:

A. RETREAT CONTINUED.

Developments of the first few days of September were merely continuation of the large-scale withdrawal which had been initiated shortly after the Seventh Army landings in Southern France. After passing through the MONTPELLIER trap on 28 August, the battered remnants of the German Nineteenth Army continued their withdrawal up the RHONE Valley through VALENCE to LYON and DIJON, then turned eastward in the direction of BELFORT and the VOSGES. They fought only when forced to, to screen their withdrawal routes from the forward Allied units racing northward and eastward to cut them off. At the same time, the mass of combat, supply, administrative, air force, naval and governmental personnel evacuating Central and Southwestern France was trying to reach some sort of safety in the east before being cut off by the forthcoming junction of the US Seventh and Third Armies.

At the beginning of the month the German forces facing Seventh Army comprised the remnants of the same divisions that had been engaged during the preceding two weeks. Their estimated strength was:

Division	Combat Effectives (All troops capable of employment as Infantry)
11th Panzer	2350 (plus 40 tanks)
139th Reserve	1400
198th Infantry	1380
338th Infantry	3600

In addition it was known that the 716th Infantry Division from Southern France and the 16th Infantry and 159th Reserve Divisions from the Center and Southwest, were also engaged in the retreat; but except for a few stragglers of the 716th, they had not yet been contacted. Also the 148th Reserve Division (strength 2925) and the 157th Reserve Division (1250 men), both of which were retreating toward the Italian border, were still technically opposed to Seventh Army, which did not relinquish responsibility for the Alpine sector until 15 September.

B. REORGANIZATION.

By the end of the first week of September, this wholesale retreat phase of enemy operations had begun to merge with the second, or reorganization phase, during which the enemy succeeded in establishing a front and executing a vast turning movement to bring his forces into line with other German forces to the north. Since the security of the BELFORT Gap was the key to any future defensive line before the VOSGES, the Nineteenth Army's most effective unit, the 11th Panzer Division, was assigned to the

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mission of preventing an Allied breakthrough at BELFORT. The putting into effect of this reorganization plan was signalled on 8 September when the 11th Panzer Division attacked the French in the sector between the DOUBS River and the Swiss border, southwest of MONTBELIARD. The attack brought to a halt the race for BELFORT and made possible the establishment of defensive positions before the gap which still had not been breached at the end of the month.

The Nineteenth Army, with its left flank thus secured, was strung out on an east-west line, generally following the DOUBS River, its amorphous right flank dangling in space far to the west. To its previous order of battle, the 159th Reserve Division had been added on 6 September, when elements of the division were committed to the defense of BESANCON. Its 716th Infantry Division had been committed on 3 September at CHALON, in an effort to hold open a gap for the estimated 100,000 enemy involved in the migration from the west. This retreating mass included, in addition to the 16th Infantry Division, a miscellany of battle groups varying from company to brigade size and constantly changing in composition as the enemy attempted to reorganize his confused, and confusing, order of battle. As many as possible of these were assimilated into the Nineteenth Army; those finally cut off by the junction of the US Third and Seventh Armies on 11 September later capitulated (See Annex No. III).

Simultaneously with the absorption of the refugees from the west, Nineteenth Army executed its turn; pivoting on the anchor position established before the BELFORT Gap, its center and right were withdrawn to the northeast, fighting delaying actions at threatened points. By 18 September, the maneuver had been completed - not, however, without considerable losses, notably the BRODOWSKI Battle Group of 1200-1600 men which had been cut off at FAYS BILLOT - and the Nineteenth Army had taken up a generally north-south line before the VOSGES.

Its order of battle and estimated strength at this time were:

<u>IV GAF Corps</u>	
Unit	Combat Effectives (All troops capable of employment as Infantry)
159th Reserve Division	1200
198th Infantry Division	1100
DEGENER Battle Group	800
SCHRAMM Battle Group	250
GREIF Battle Group	250
LOPAU Battle Group (Remnants 338th Inf. Div.)	400
360th Cossack Regiment	500
<u>LXIV Reserve Corps</u>	
716th Infantry Division	2500
SCHWERIN Battle Group (Remnants of 189th Res. Div.)	1500
<u>LXVI Reserve Corps</u>	
16th Infantry Division	1500

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21st Panzer Division	3500 (plus 80-100 tanks)
111th Panzer Brigade	600-800 (plus 25-30 tanks, 11 assault guns)
112th Panzer Brigade	600-800 (plus 25-30 tanks, 11 assault guns)
OTTENBACHER Battle Group	1800
TAEGLICHBECK Battle Group	?

LXXXV Corps

11th Panzer Division	3200 (plus approx. 35 tanks)
1st Flieger Training Division	1000
30th SS Infantry Division	3000
Sicherungs Div. 19th Army (Ost Troops)	3000
Von OFFEN Battle Group	2500-3000
MENKE Battle Group	400

Of the newcomers to this list, the 21st Panzer Division and the 111th and 112th Panzer Brigades had been contacted by the US Third Army, and were not technically on the Seventh Army front until the US XV Corps was transferred from Third to Seventh Army on 29 September. The 21st Panzer, after its defeat in Northern France, had been refitted in Germany and then recommitted on the Western Front. The 111th and 112th Panzer Brigades were results of the German High Command's efforts quickly to re-establish some kind of mobile counterattacking force for the Battle of Germany, to replace the panzer divisions which had been so roughly handled in the Battle of France.

Most of the other new arrivals were hastily formed battle groups made up of miscellaneous units which had succeeded in escaping from Southwestern France. The 1st Flieger Ausbildungs Division was a staff which had been responsible for the training of a number of GAF regiments in Southern France. It controlled some of the battle groups which, in mid-month, took over from 11th Panzer Division the static defensive duties of the BELFORT Gap. Battle Groups GREIF, SCHRAMM and MENKE also consisted mainly of Luftwaffe ground troops who had taken part in the great evacuation.

Battle Groups DEGENER, OTTENBACHER and TAEGLICHBECK were made up of other evacuees, including Sicherungs troops, from the West. So, too, was the 19th Army Sicherungs Division, never actually contacted as a combat division, but identified by documents which indicated that it was to be formed from the surplus Ost units which succeeded in escaping. The 360th Cossack Regiment was made up of "converted" prisoners of war taken on the Eastern Front.

The 30th SS Infantry Division was also made up of easterners - a miscellany of Poles, White Russians and Ukrainians, many of whom had been on local police and guard duty in occupied territories. They were formed into a division in August and sent to the Franco-Swiss border east of BESANCON. On the few occasions when units were contacted, they distinguished

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themselves by mass desertions, one entire battalion having given up to the F.F.I.

The other addition in the above list, Battle Group Von OPPEN, represented both of the major trends of German order of battle practice during this period; some of its units, notably the 63rd GAF Regiment, were from the abandoned areas of Southern France; others, including the sub-groups ROTH and BOSCH, were from Germany. Predecessors of the Volksgrenadiers of a later period, they were hastily-formed units scraped from the bottom of the barrel (in this case, Wehrkreis V) and thrown into the Western Front to help stem the tide.

C. STABILIZED DEFENSE.

The third, or stabilized phase of September's operations, following the completion of the Nineteenth Army's turning maneuver, was devoted, on the tactical side, to the fighting of stubborn defensive actions against our laborious advance, and on the administrative side, to further efforts to strengthen and clarify the order of battle. The latter process was a long and complex one, and was by no means complete at the end of the month.

It was marked particularly by the acquisition of more of Wehrkreis V's hastily organized reinforcements. Typical was the "Bodensee" Regiment, or Battle Group C-V, made up of convalescents and 17 year old recruits from training units, mainly the 111th Training Battalion at KARLSRUHE and the 380th Training Battalion at HEILBRONN. It was organized early in August at CONSTANZ, but not united until it reached BELFORT early in September with an estimated 1,000 combat effectives. It was first met by the French in the DOUBS River sector on 22 September and was later committed to the defense of the southern VOSGES below LE THILLOT.

Another new addition to the order of battle on the VOSGES front during the last days of September was the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division, which had been withdrawn from the Italian front in August and sent to Northern FRANCE where it was first met on 29 August. It was in the vicinity of BACCARAT on the XV Corps front on 23 September.

Thus, with these additions to the previous order of battle the enemy had an estimated total of 13,000-14,000 combat effectives to oppose the Seventh Army (now including the XV Corps) by the end of September.

Simultaneously with the progressive reorganization of his combat elements, the enemy had also been reshuffling his higher staff and command organization. So far as known, the line-up at the end of the month was as follows: The southern sector of the Western Front, roughly from LUXEMBOURG to the Swiss border, was under command of Army Group G, Generaloberst BLASKOWITZ (himself an evacuee from Southern FRANCE), controlling these armies:

The First Army, which had retreated from the southern portion of the northern French front, and which now faced the US Third Army, consisted of the LXXXII Corps (48, 19 Infantry Divisions, 462 Administrative Division) and XIII SS Corps (17 SS Division, 3 Panzer Grenadier Division, 553 Infantry Division, 559 Infantry Division, 106 Panzer Brigade).

The Nineteenth Army in the South consisted of the LXIV Corps (16, 716, 198 and 189 Infantry Divisions), the IV GAF Corps (338 Infantry Division), the LXXXIV Corps (159 Reserve Division plus the 1st Flieger Ausbildungs Division and most of the miscellaneous battle groups). Unlocated and elusive were the LXVI Corps and the 30th SS and 19th Sicherungs Divisions of the Nineteenth Army reserve.

Sometime during September the Fifth Panzer Army, the ghost of

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

## C O N F I D E N T I A L

Tunisia, had been resurrected and squeezed into the line in Lorraine between the First and Nineteenth. It comprised the XLVII Panzer Corps (15 Panzer Grenadier Division and 21 Panzer Division) and the LVIII Panzer Corps (11 Panzer Division and 405 Administrative Division). The 11th Panzer had been pulled out of the line about 17 September, as soon as it had completed its mission of sealing the BELFORT Gap, had been at least partially refitted in the rear and recommitted 25-28 September in the XV Corps sector. The 405th Administrative Division was never contacted as a combat unit; evidently its mission was the administration of replacements or of troops working on fixed defenses in the rear.

With the offensive power of the Wehrmacht long since dissipated, except for whatever harassing effect V-1 and V-2 might have, and with the quality of his troops declining sharply, the enemy was forced to rely more and more on natural obstacles and prepared defenses to bolster his battle line. As a forward bastion for the Rhine-Siegfried barrier, the VOSGES were an ideal position and as soon as withdrawal to that line became inevitable the enemy began supplementing its slopes and forests with man-made obstacles. Agent reports and photo interpretation revealed an extensive system of works in progress from the Saar to Switzerland.

There were some defensive works west of the VALOGNES - MORTAGNE River Valley from GERARDMER to RAMBERVILLERS, and a heavier continuation of this line from RAMBERVILLERS through BACCARAT and BLAMONT to RECHICOURT. Farther east another general line was prepared along the MEURTHE River from BACCARAT southeast to FRAIZE, with strongpoints at BACCARAT, RAON L'ETAPPE, MOYENMOUTIER, HURBACHE, ST. DIE, STE MARGUERITE and FRAIZE. This line was a series of strongpoints so located that they effectively blocked the east-west entrances into and through the VOSGES Mountains. The strongpoints consisted of anti-tank positions across the corridor, machine gun and anti-tank positions, and numerous fire and communication trenches.

From FRAIZE south through GERARDMER to LE THILLOT, fewer positions were observed, but enough to suggest that they were coordinated with those of the BELFORT corridor for defense of the RHINE Valley. In the BELFORT Corridor there was a general defensive system being organized in the GIROMAGNY - CHAMPAGNY - CHAVANNE - MONTBELIARD - SELONCOURT - DELLE area, consisting of anti-tank ditches, numerous small trenches and strongpoints. The center of this position appeared to run generally from GIROMAGNY south to a point approximately three miles west of BELFORT, thence to MONTBELIARD, thence generally southeast to the Swiss border. Of the 21 French-constructed forts ringing BELFORT, nine, generally east and south of BELFORT, showed major military activity.

Such were the defenses, and the forces to man them, on which, at the end of September, rested the responsibility for executing the Fuehrer's order that the NANCY - BELFORT line must be held at all costs.

II. CHRONOLOGY1 September - D-17

As the month of September opened the enemy was still engaged in his headlong flight from Southern France. Most of what remained of the Nineteenth Army had already passed LYON, and its rear elements were drawing into the city from the south. Our pursuing units advanced rapidly behind them, meeting negligible rear guard opposition until encountering mortar and tank fire late in the afternoon within a few miles of the southeastern outskirts of LYON itself. On the west side of the RHONE, French forces were advancing northward without contact.

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Two routes of further withdrawal were available to the enemy, LYON-CHALON-DIJON and LYON-BOURG EN BRESSE-BESANCON, and he was using both of them, with primary emphasis on the former. Roughly paralleling the latter route, and to the southeast of it, a screen was thrown out to cover the retreating columns. Roadblocks, groups of infantry and armored elements from the 11th Panzer Division were encountered by our forces shortly after crossing the AIN River.

A counterattack drove US reconnaissance elements out of CHALAMONT and the enemy occupied FARAMANS, MONTLEUL and DAGNEUX. Throughout the afternoon, a second counterattack was pressed against MEXIMIEUX, with six to eight tanks supporting the enemy infantry. A prisoner reported that 30 tanks were scheduled to attack MEXIMIEUX, but no such strong attack materialized.

2 September - D/18

LYON was entered by American troops who found the portions of the city south and east of the RHONE River clear; the enemy, however, continued to hold the triangle between the RHONE and the SAONE. Southwest of the city, the French advanced above ST ETIENNE without contact.

The screen covering the enemy withdrawal was shifted somewhat north-eastward as the forces requiring cover were moved farther in that direction. At its lowest point, opposite LYON, the position was abandoned as the enemy broke contact at JANNEYRAIS; but at its other extreme, east of BOURG EN BRESSE, US reconnaissance elements were engaged in a fire fight early in the morning. At the center of the covering line, a road block supported by infantry and tanks was encountered at CHALAMONT and another to the east across the AMBERIEU-BOURG road.

During the morning, four enemy tanks were observed in CHALAMONT and 12 on the road north of the town; during the afternoon an unknown number of them were fired on by our artillery between CHALAMONT and BOURG. However, prisoners from the 209th Engineer Battalion said that the 11th Panzer Division had withdrawn to BELFORT and that the division reconnaissance battalion had been left to fight a rear guard action.

3 September - D/19

During the night and morning, the enemy fought delaying actions, supported by artillery, in the area east and south of BOURG EN BRESSE; and later enemy tanks moving north from BOURG engaged our reconnaissance which had entered MONTREVEL. But by the end of the day, not only BOURG itself, but also LONS LE SAUNIER and CHAMPAGNOLE, far to the northeast, had been occupied without further contact. However, on our extreme right flank, French forces moving northeastwards close to the Swiss border met stiff resistance at MOREZ. On the extreme left, other French forces reached VILLEFRANCHE, northwest of LYON, without contact, and U.S. patrols in LYON found the section between the RHONE and SAONE clear.

Clearing weather made possible observation of the extremely heavy movements taking place on the MACON-CHALON-DIJON axis. A column of 500 horses and carts was attacked north of CHALON by fighter bombers who claimed the destruction of 300 and the damaging of the rest. Other columns of from 40 to 200 vehicles were observed, including at least one large column moving eastward from the vicinity of NEVERS. The large forces in danger of being trapped to the west were still trying to get out before the US Seventh and Third Armies joined (see Annex No. III).

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C O N F I D E N T I A L4 September - D/20

The enemy withdrawal to the north and northeast appeared to be nearing the general line of the DOUBS River; his main body was not contacted by our forces at any point during the day, despite advances on a broad front extending from west of the RHONE River nearly to the Swiss frontier. Agents reported an enemy force of 1200, mostly non-Germans, in PONTARLIER, close to the border. Both air and agents' reports told of heavy movement in the LOUHANS-BESANCON-DIJON triangle, with traffic moving both northward through DIJON and eastward through DOLE to BESANCON.

5 September - D/21

The enemy began to slow down his withdrawal as he neared the positions on which he planned to reform his front. In order to establish a stable line in conjunction with other forces to the north, he had to have a firm anchor position on his left flank, before the BELFORT gap; this began to appear on 5 September in the area between BESANCON and the Swiss frontier.

During the morning French troops were involved in heavy street fighting in PONTARLIER, and engagements continued through the afternoon in the vicinity of LE VALDAHON and L'HOPITAL. At BESANCON itself, US troops met increasing resistance during the day and by nightfall a heavy fire fight was in progress, with the enemy using machine gun, mortar and tank fire to hold the bridges on the southern outskirts of the town. Heavy traffic moved eastward into BESANCON throughout the day, and included sixty tanks.

To the southwest of BESANCON contacts and fire fights were reported, and in the vicinity of the DOUBS-LOUE River junction and the town of DOLE, defensive positions with 1500-2000 enemy were reported.

On the left flank, French armored units occupied CHALON-SUR-SAONE without opposition, but met stiff resistance north of the town.

6 September - D/22

Now that the enemy had reached the general line of the DOUBS River, his plan for the future began to become apparent. His problem was two-fold: to make a stand somewhere before the German border; and to save as many as possible of the troops retreating from the southwest, incorporating them into his defensive position. His solution also had two aspects: to turn the main body, pivoting on the left before BELFORT and bringing the center and right back to the VOSGES Mountains, in line with the German armies in the north; meanwhile to fight a rear guard action with part of the escaping force in the west and feed the balance of it into the main body as rapidly as possible.

The force that was to begin the turning maneuver, with the DOUBS river as the line of departure, consisted of the remnants of the original Nineteenth Army - the 11th Panzer Division in the vital pivot position on the left, the remnants of the 198th Infantry Division, the 716th Infantry Division, and battle groups of the 338th Infantry Division and the 189th Infantry Division. To these were added, on 6 September, elements of the 9th Reserve Regiment of the 159th Reserve Infantry Division, finally at the end of their long trek from the BORDEAUX area; they were immediately thrown into the defense of BESANCON, where the enemy was opposing our entry with small arms, mortar and machine gun fire, supported by a few tanks and self-propelled guns. By the end of the day, however, high ground south of the town had been cleared against heavy resistance.

West of BESANCON, however, the turning movement was already underway and there was no contact with the enemy's withdrawing right flank south of DOLE.

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But meantime the enemy was fighting a stubborn rearguard action northwest of CHALON, protecting the southern flank of the units attempting to squeeze through the closing door before it slammed shut. Here, too, were elements of the 159th Reserve Division still coming in from the west, together with straggling portions of the 189th, 338th and 716th Divisions from the south; within a few days the 16th Infantry Division, from the LOIRE front, was also to be identified in this area.

7 September - D/23

At BAUME, the enemy continued to hold stubbornly; a counterattack supported by six tanks forced our outposts to withdraw. At BESANCON, which was now virtually isolated, small groups of enemy presented scattered but stubborn resistance, particularly at the forts in the city. Along the DOUBS River line to the west the only contacts reported were below DOLE, where reconnaissance units encountered a road block and a force of 75/100 men, supported by an anti-tank gun and an armored car. North of the DOUBS River in this vicinity, Tac/R picked up heavy troop movements northeastward, probably further elements of the 159 Division and other units arriving from the southwest.

South of BEAUNE, enemy flank guards for this evacuation were still putting up strong resistance, and were reported still holding DIGOIN, DOMPIERRE and MOULINS still farther to the west.

8 September - D/24

The enemy left flank had now withdrawn as far as it could safely without uncovering the BELFORT Gap; that it was to be withdrawn no farther was proved on 8 September when a large column including Panther tanks moved south from MONTBELLIARD and attacked the French in the corridor between the DOUBS River and the Swiss border. GLAY, near the frontier, was recaptured, and heavy engagements took place in the vicinity of BLAMONT. Other towns in this area - GLAINANS, PONT DE ROIDE, VANDONCOURT and HERIMONCOURT - were all held strongly.

Establishment of this anchor position on the enemy's left was facilitated by his stubborn defense of BAUME, where he resisted heavily our crossing of the river and later counterattacked to retake the town. BESANCON, however, was captured by American troops after heavy fighting against elements of the 159 Reserve Division, several Sicherungs regiments and miscellaneous Russian units. Further advances to the north and west of BESANCON were contested with small arms, mortar, tank and artillery fire.

Above our extreme left flank it was estimated that there were still 40,000 to 60,000 enemy making their way eastward toward DIJON. Their flank guards continued to oppose the advancing French in the MONTCHANIN-CHAGNY-BEAUNE area, although the latter town was being mopped up on 8 September.

9 September - D/25

On our right flank French units succeeded in recapturing PIERREFONTAINE, BLAMONT and VILLARS LES BLAMONT, but reported that the enemy still held strongly at PONT DE ROIDE and GLAINANS. In the BESANCON-BAUME sector, the last remaining pocket was cleared up in the former town, and some infantry supported by anti-tank guns were in the latter; but at both points US forces advanced on the north side of the DOUBS River, meeting stiff but scattered resistance.

On the left flank, French units, after sustaining a counterattack at

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MEURSAULT and contacting the enemy in the COUCHES - ST GILLES area, penetrated to AUTUN, which they found strongly held.

10 September - D/26

The enemy continued to offer strong resistance southwest of MONTBELIARD, holding stubbornly to the pivot of the turning movement that was now well under way farther to the west. North of the DOUBS River, he was falling back on VILLERSEXEL and VESOUL, but fighting stiff rear guard actions, particularly in the RIOZ-VESOUL area.

In their advance on DIJON, French units reached PERRIGNY, south of the town, but met determined opposition at GENLIS, to the southeast. Southwest of DIJON, they encountered resistance at NUIT and BRAZEY, but pushed on to ARNAY and SAULIEU.

11 September - D/27

Continuing defense southwest of MONTBELIARD was accompanied by a marked increase in artillery fire. Resistance was again met by our forces advancing on VILLERSEXEL and VESOUL, and there were indications in FFI and agent reports that the enemy would make a stand in the VILLERSEXEL area. Only light scattered resistance was offered by the enemy's rapidly withdrawing right flank west of VESOUL and north of DIJON. The latter town was occupied by the French, and the last remaining opposition was mopped up in AUTUN, where 3200 prisoners were reported taken.

Elements of the United States Third Army were contacted by the French 1st Armored Division near SOMBERNON, west of DIJON, during the night 10/11 September. Thus vanished the last hope of escape for the large forces still making their way laboriously eastward from Central and Southwestern France. And even the forces which had escaped - narrowly - could not yet consider themselves completely safe; for their position constituted a deep salient between the Seventh and Third Armies. Still further slices could be cut from the salient, unless it was withdrawn rapidly; this the enemy attempted to do, but without complete success, during the next seven days.

12 September - D/28

Resistance continued strong on the enemy left, diminishing progressively toward the right as the line was swung back farther toward the VOSGES. Counterattacks were launched against the French west of PONT DE ROIDE (where there were indications that the infantry of the 11th Panzer Division was being relieved by elements of the 1st Flieger Ausbildungs Division) and against the Americans in the vicinity of VILLERSEXEL and at PORT SUR SAONE. VESOUL was taken, despite strong resistance and many road blocks on the approaches to the town. Slight contact was made during the afternoon at OYRIERES and CHAMPLITTE, north of GRAY; but no enemy was located by reconnaissance to the northwest of these points at LONGEAU and RECEY.

13 September - D/29

The enemy continued to hold stubbornly to his left flank position blocking the BELFORT Gap, launching numerous local counterattacks supported by artillery. On the north side of the DOUBS River, in the vicinity of L'ISLE, stiff enemy resistance, road blocks and barbed wire defenses were encountered, but farther north VILLERSEXEL was occupied without opposition. Contact was light north and northeast of VESOUL, but to the northwest, in the sector from VILLERS-SUR-PORT to FAYS-BILLOT, the enemy held strongly in an effort to protect his right flank until forces in the salient to the west could be withdrawn. The town of LANGRES was occupied without resistance, but the enemy held out in the citadel until evening, when the

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garrison surrendered.

14 September - D/30

There was no important change in the enemy plan, of holding on his left and withdrawing on the right, except that the withdrawal of the right flank did not proceed rapidly enough to prevent the cutting off of a large body of troops. South of FAYS-BILLOT, the French 1st Armored Division ambushed an enemy column evacuating from the GRANDCHAMP area, killed 200 Germans and took 160 prisoners; liquidation of further elements cut off in this area proceeded for the next three days. Comprising the Battle Group BRODOWSKI, the 1200-1600 troops involved were the second battalion of the 221st Grenadier Regiment (from the 16th Infantry Division); fourth battalion, 200 Sicherungs Regiment; 615th Ost Battalion; 354th Reserve Battalion; elements of the 1316th Artillery Regiment, 1198th Artillery Battalion, 95th Anti-Aircraft Battalion and 157th Antiaircraft Battalion - all part of the evacuating mass from Southwestern FRANCE. Generalleutnant BRODOWSKI himself was captured.

Holding firmly at ECURCEY, south of MONTBELIARD, the enemy proceeded with the withdrawal of the balance of his line while fighting delaying actions. Patrols entering L'ISLE reported no contact in the town, but to the northwest of VILLERSEXEL the enemy offered strong opposition at BOREY, and counterattacked at FLEUREY, northwest of VESOUL. On the western flank, beyond the sector where the BRODOWSKI battle group was being engaged, reconnaissance toward CHATILLON and MONTBARD made no contact.

15 September - D/31

Consolidating his anchor position south of MONTBELIARD, the enemy was reinforcing advance positions and digging in. He counterattacked with tank support in the direction of AUTECHAUX, and used considerable artillery fire against the area VERMONDES - PONT DE ROIDE - BLAMONT - PIERREFONTAINE.

Resistance continued west of MONTBELIARD and north of L'ISLE. Small arms fire was met on the main route LURE-LUXEUIL, and the enemy held at BAUDONCOURT, south of LUXEUIL. In the sector northwest of VESOUL, JUSSEY was reported strongly held by the Germans, and patrol contact was made south of BOURBONNE. During the afternoon French reconnaissance elements pushed forward from LANGRES to CHAUMONT.

16 September - D/32

Local counterattacks southeast of MONTBELIARD again featured the enemy's defense of his anchor position; in the L'ISLE-VILLERSEXEL area artillery was again active and an estimated battalion of infantry, supported by tanks, offered strong resistance in the vicinity of GENEV.

Both LURE and LUXEUIL were occupied, but the forces which passed through LURE met organized resistance three to four kilometers north of the town, and those moving northwest of LUXEUIL were engaged in a fire fight at ST LOUP. Delaying actions were fought at road blocks in the vicinity of FAVERNAY, northwest of VESOUL. The enemy's right flank was fighting only weak rearguard actions at MONTIGNY and BOURBONNE, as the deep westward salient was pulled back toward the MOSELLE. Now deep in our rear, several hundred survivors of the BRODOWSKI Battle Group were still being mopped up at FAYS-BILLOT.

17 September - D/33

On the stabilized front to the right of the Seventh Army, where the French Army had on 15 September come under direct control of Sixth Army

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Group rather than Seventh Army, enemy patrols and infiltration attempts were repulsed.

On the American right flank, in the L'ISLE sector, heavy enemy resistance, including one local counterattack, were encountered in the vicinity of GENEX, north of L'ISLE, decreasing somewhat during the afternoon. North and northwest of LURE stiffening resistance was offered by infantry and considerable artillery fire, in addition to road blocks. On the Seventh Army left flank, the enemy was forced out of ST LOUP but increasing resistance was met to the east in the FOUGEROLLES area. All entries to the latter town were covered by road blocks or artillery fire, and the village of CORBENAY, on the approaches to FOUGEROLLES, was reported to be strongly defended, with bypasses in the vicinity heavily mined and covered by fire. The evident purpose of the pronounced resistance in this area was to prevent our cutting off the enemy's deep westward salient, whose narrowing base was the general line ST LOUP - EPINAL. The latter town had been reached by troops of the United States Third Army.

Southwest of this salient, the last elements of the BRODOWSKI Battle Group were mopped up in the vicinity of FAYS-BILLOT, with the capture of 500 prisoners.

18 September - D/34

No material changes were reported in the French Army sector nor on the right of the US VI Corps, where the enemy limited his activity to patrolling and harassing artillery fire. On the Corps center and left the heavy resistance of the previous day was continued early on 18 September; however, enemy action decreased rapidly during the day and by the end of the period contact had been lost in this sector. Reconnaissance to BAINS LES BAINS and DARNEY without contact indicated that the enemy had completed the withdrawal of his salient in this area and had pulled back to a line roughly paralleling the MOSELLE River below EPINAL.

Thus, just a month after beginning the withdrawal from Southern France, the enemy had finally succeeded in establishing the shortest possible continuous defensive line on the approaches to Germany. The Nineteenth Army, having held its left flank successfully before the BELFORT Gap, had completed its turning maneuver, withdrawing its right flank to join with the newly constituted Fifth Panzer Army to the north.

19 September - D/35

Continuing to hold on his left flank south of MONTBELIARD, the enemy withdrew the rest of his front toward the MOSELLE and the VOSGES, covering the withdrawal with demolitions, mines and roadblocks. He reacted sharply to our patrolling east of LURE, cutting off one patrol in the vicinity of LA COTE and forcing our forward elements out of PROTEY LES LURE. On the approaches to EPINAL a patrol was held up by a roadblock and strong small arms fire.

20 September - D/36

In the sector to the east and northeast of LURE, the enemy resisted strongly with artillery, self-propelled gun, mortar and small arms fire, and stiff opposition was met south of REMIREMONT. However, between this town and EPINAL, to the north, only scattered resistance was encountered as the enemy continued to fall back on the MOSELLE. North of EPINAL, the XV Corps of the US Third Army was advancing on the east side of the MOSELLE.

21 September - D/37

With his back to the VOSGES, where a main line of resistance was al-

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ready in preparation, the enemy was now in a position to abandon his general withdrawal in favor of a more vigorous defense. By the end of 21 September his line in front of Seventh Army ran generally along the MOSELLE from EPINAL to REMIREMONT, thence south to the DOUBS River and southeast to the SWISS border. Aided by the rugged terrain, he was able thenceforth to contest all Allied advances against this position.

Against the French on his left, the enemy threw counterattacks which retook COLOMBIER, VERMONDANS and GRANDBOIS; and to the north he held the roads north and northeast of MELISEY with infantry, artillery and mines. On the right of US VI Corps, the enemy defended stubbornly in the vicinity of MELAY, and launched a series of counterattacks, ranging from platoon to company strength, west of ESMOULIERES; houses along this front were observed being converted into mutually supported strongpoints. Roadblocks and stubborn enemy resistance were encountered on the approaches to REMIREMONT; and north of the town, where units of the US 36th Division had succeeded in crossing the MOSELLE, their bridgehead was brought under heavy artillery fire. A second crossing, just south of EPINAL, encountered enemy patrols, and on the approaches to the town itself the enemy appeared to be strengthening his roadblocks. The fact that three bridges at EPINAL were still intact indicated that a large body of enemy was still on the west side of the river at this point.

22 September - D438

In the French sector at the southern end of the line the enemy was patrolling actively and consolidating his positions in the area east of LURE. Northeast of that town, in the southern portion of the American sector, two platoon strength counterattacks were launched as the enemy further strengthened his position on the approaches to LE THILLOT; a prisoner reported that another line of dug-in positions was being prepared in the rear of the one the enemy was then holding in that area.

After heavy fighting on the southwestern approaches to REMIREMONT, the enemy had been forced out of two-thirds of the town by the end of the period; the bridgehead across the MOSELLE north of REMIREMONT received relatively light enemy pressure, but the second bridgehead, south of EPINAL, was counterattacked strongly but unsuccessfully in the vicinity of ARCHETTES. Strong delaying actions opposed our forces advancing against EPINAL from the west and the north; but heavy traffic indicated that the enemy was evacuating at least that portion of the town on the west side of the MOSELLE, and late in the day the remaining bridges in the town were destroyed.

23 September - D439

While the situation of the enemy's left flank remained unchanged, his center and right were forced back somewhat in the MOSELLE River sector. American troops advanced toward the river between LE THILLOT and REMIREMONT, after overcoming stiff resistance at a fort west of RUPT. REMIREMONT and ELOYES, to the north, were both cleared, as the bridgehead across the MOSELLE in this sector was both broadened and deepened against generally light opposition. In the EPINAL sector, strong opposition faced our units on the east side of the river north and south of the town, and on the west side opposite the town itself.

24 September - D440

Along the DOUBS River, east of L'ISLE, the enemy was forced back somewhat by the French advance through ST MAURICE, but elsewhere along the enemy's left flank no change was reported. At the southern end of the Seventh Army's front, our forces overcame strong delaying actions to penetrate to the MOSELLE at RUPT, where they captured a bridge intact despite

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the fact that it had been prepared for demolition; later in the period they crossed the river at this point, meeting heavy small arms and machine gun fire on the high ground to the east.

Consolidation of other American bridgeheads to the north meant that the enemy had now lost his forward defensive line on the MOSELLE along the entire front north of RUPT. However, he continued to offer stubborn resistance to further eastward advances, particularly in the vicinity of EPINAL, which had been taken against strong opposition early in the day and where snipers were still active after our occupation.

25 September - D441

Some of the previous day's gains in the DOUBS River sector were lost as enemy counterattacks, supported by strong artillery fire, succeeded in retaking COLOMBIER and ST MAURICE. Southeast of LURE advancing French troops forced the strongly resisting enemy out of PALANTE and MAGNY D'ANIGON.

Roadblocks and stubborn delaying actions were encountered on the approaches to LE THILLOT, where further enemy build-up was reported. Farther north, troops advancing eastward from the MOSELLE occupied ST AME after overcoming heavy resistance which included small arms, mortar, self-propelled and some tank fire. Roadblocks established east of the town after its capture were subjected to scattered enemy small arms and mortar fire.

In the area east of EPINAL, heavy opposition was met in the capture of JEUXEY; later, CHARMOIS was taken without contact.

26 September - D442

French forces occupied MELAY, northeast of LURE, against stiff opposition, and reported increasing resistance, including a continuous enemy defensive line, in this sector. Farther north, at the point where the front crossed the MOSELLE, west of LE THILLOT, American troops found principal terrain features strongly defended by infantry with artillery support. Scattered resistance in the vicinity of DOCELLES, east of EPINAL, was insufficient to prevent capture of the town. However, troops attempting to occupy TENDON were strongly opposed.

27 September - D443

On the approaches to the BELFORT Gap, the enemy launched a vigorous counterattack in the vicinity of PONT DE ROIDE and maintained strong defensive positions elsewhere in the southern sector. He continued stubbornly to defend the MOSELLE Valley west of LE THILLOT, and launched three counterattacks in the area south of the river. In the vicinity of TENDON, the strong resistance of the previous day was repeated during the early part of the period, but later slackened and US troops were able to move farther eastward. Resistance was lighter north and northeast of EPINAL, in the direction of RAMBERVILLERS, and GIRECOURT and DOMPIERRE were occupied without resistance; however, opposition stiffened in this sector late in the period and developed into local counterattacks in the vicinity of DESTORD.

28 September - D444

Although relatively light resistance was encountered in the occupation of FERDRUPT, on the MOSELLE below LE THILLOT, opposition was considerably stronger to the north where the enemy was stubbornly blocking the approaches to GERARDMER, in the vicinity of ST AME. A body of 200/300 infantry,

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supported by mortars and self-propelled guns, was contacted north of ST AME.

Heavy resistance from high ground in the vicinity of TENDON, and artillery fire from the area southwest of BRUYERES slowed our advances in the center of the VI Corps front. West of GRANDVILLERS, the enemy's defense against our eastward penetrations included two counterattacks supported by mortar and artillery fire; however, despite strong resistance, we lost ST HELENE, PIERREPONT, and GUGNECOURT. On the extreme north of the Corps front, only light opposition was met southwest of RAMBERVILLERS, which was reported unoccupied.

29 September - D445

Covering the approaches to the VOSGES, west and northwest of BELFORT, the enemy launched several counterattacks, one of which was supported by six tanks and succeeded in taking CHEVESTRAYE. Later, however, he withdrew from the town and the situation was restored.

Farther north, on the east side of the MOSELLE, stiff fighting continued during the early part of the day, but decreased somewhat as the enemy confined himself to defensive operations. A heavy enemy artillery barrage forced a slight withdrawal in the vicinity of TENDON. On the extreme left of US VI Corps, south of RAMBERVILLERS, stubborn resistance was offered; nevertheless the enemy was forced out of AUTREY.

The US XV Corps, which came under command of Seventh Army on 29 September, was at this time engaged in the sector north from RAMBERVILLERS to the MARNE-RHINE Canal, against the left wing of the Fifth Panzer Army. The latter had been wedged into the line between the Nineteenth and First Armies, covering the northern half of the VOSGES. Since the fall of LUNEVILLE, on 20 September, the enemy in this sector had been forced back on a broad salient on both sides of the MEURTHE River southeast of that town and was in contact with the French 2nd Armored Division to the west of the general line RAMBERVILLERS-BACCARAT-MANONVILLER. Northeast of LUNEVILLE, however, he was holding strong positions in the FORET DE PARROY, and on the day it came under Seventh Army control the US 79th Division of XV Corps was already engaged in the bitter battle to dislodge him, which was to extend well into October.

30 September - D446

Stubborn enemy resistance was encountered along almost the entire front and included four counterattacks, one against the French near LARMET northwest of BELFORT, two against the VI Corps south of TENDON and one at AUTREY. Defending the approaches to BROUVILLEURES and BRUYERES, the enemy resorted to street fighting in GRANDVILLERS. However, only light resistance opposed our occupation of RAMBERVILLERS. On the north flank, the defenders of the FORET DE PARROY were forced back about 400 yards from the western edge but continued to offer heavy resistance with small arms, mortar and artillery fire.

### III. SUMMARY

By the end of September the total of prisoners taken by Seventh Army since D-Day, 15 August, was estimated at 88,900, an increase of 31,832 over 31 August. This total included 49,150 taken by First French Army, 3,699 by 1st Airborne Task Force, and 379 by the 1st Special Service Force, while those units were still under Seventh Army command prior to 15 September.

However, despite this loss in prisoners and the unknown attrition in

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

dead and wounded, the enemy at the end of the month had more combat effectives facing Seventh Army alone than he had had against it and the First French Army combined at the beginning of September. Three major factors accounted for this apparent paradox: First, many German units from the West, whose mission at the beginning of the month had been to avoid contact with the Seventh Army, had been committed against it by the end; second, the stream of reinforcements and replacements which was to continue to flow to the front from Germany during subsequent months first came into contact during September; third, the assumption of command over U.S. XV Corps necessarily resulted in Seventh Army's being faced by some enemy units which previously had been in the zone of U.S. Third Army.

In addition to making up his personnel losses during September, the enemy had also traded his exposed position in Southern FRANCE for the ideal defensive terrain of the VOSGES Mountains. He had, further, fallen back to a point where he no longer had to be seriously concerned with defending his rear areas against partisan attacks.

Thus, although he had decisively lost the battle for FRANCE, he could face the coming battle for GERMANY with the assurance that it was not quite lost - yet.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

LXIV CORPS

\* LASCH, General (Infantry).

LXVI CORPS

\* LUCHT, General (Infantry).

LXXXV CORPS

KNIESS, Baptist, General (Infantry).

See G-2 History for August.

1 FLIEGER AUSBILDUNGS DIVISION

Commanding Officer Unknown

11 PANZER DIVISION

WINTERSHEIM, Wend von, Generalmajor.

See G-2 History for August.

16 INFANTRY DIVISION

HAECKEL, Ernst, Generalleutnant.

HAECKEL (54), an infantry officer from Bavaria with seniority from 1 October 1942, has commanded this division (which was the former 158th Reserve Division, upgraded) since it was a depot unit in Germany late in 1942.

15 PANZER GRENADIER DIVISION

RODT, Egerhardt, Generalleutnant.

RODT was born in Munich on 4 December 1895. He served in World War I as a Second Lieutenant in the 2 Bavarian Regiment. Passed through successive stages as a cavalry officer and in 1940, as a Lieutenant Colonel, was in command of 25 Reconnaissance Battalion of 25th Panzer Division, and in June of that year was awarded the Knight's Cross for action in Belgium. On 1 September he was promoted to Colonel, and on 1 March 1943 he became Generalmajor. In March 1943 he commanded a formation in 22 Panzer Division, and in August 43 he was given command of the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division in Sicily (then known as 15th Pz Div). It is believed that his present rank dates from 1 September 1944.

19 SICHERUNGS DIVISION

Commanding Officer Unknown

21 PANZER DIVISION

FEUCHTINGER, Generalleutnant.

Previous to his taking command of the 21 Panzer Division FEUCHTINGER

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C O N F I D E N T I A LANNEX IIPRINCIPAL ENEMY COMMANDERS OPPOSING SEVENTH ARMY

## ARMY GROUP G

BLASKOWITZ, Johannes, Generaloberst.

For detailed biography, see G-2 History for August. Since publication of that history, captured high ranking German officers have reported that BLASKOWITZ had not been promoted to Generalfeldmarschall as previously believed, but remained Generaloberst (literally Colonel General, equivalent to U.S. General). His failure to become a Field Marshal is said to be due to his being in disfavor with the Nazi Party.

## FIFTH PANZER ARMY

MANTAUFFEL, General der Panzer Truppen.

Succeeded GEYR von SCWEPPEBURG as commander of Fifth Panzer Army (then known as Panzer Gruppe West). Previous to this he was reported in command of the "GROSSDUENSTADT" Division, which command he assumed after having gained experience in the African campaign and as CO of the 7th Panzer Division in Russia.

## NINETEENTH ARMY

WIESE, Frederick, General (Infantry).

See G-2 History for August.

## IV GAF CORPS

PETERSON, General (Luftwaffe).

## XLVII PANZER CORPS

von LUTTWITZ, Freiherr, Generalleutnant.

Generalleutnant von LUTTWITZ comes of an old Prussian military family. Was commissioned to the 24 Dragoons as an Ensign in 1914, was wounded three times during World War I. After the war he was transferred to the 7th Cavalry Regiment in the REICHSWEHR. At the outbreak of this war he held a staff appointment, later received the command of the 12th PGR in 4 Panzer Division. He held this command for nearly two years and was cited for exceptional work on the Russian front. In April 42 he was appointed to command 4th Motorized Brigade and on 10 July 1942 to command the 23rd Infantry Division which under him was reorganized as the 26th Panzer Division which fought and is still fighting in ITALY. Was reported late summer 1944 as Commander of the XLVII Panzer Corps. One of the first German soldiers to be awarded the German Cross in Gold, he also has the Ritterkreuz with Oakleaves.

## LVIII PANZER CORPS

\* KRUGER, Generalleutnant.ANNEX II

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was reported as being in command of a "Sonderstab" of Panzer Gruppe West at Rennes in May 1942. Prior to that he was reported as a Colonel commanding the third battalion of 26th Artillery Regiment, 26th Infantry Division.

## 30 SS DIVISION

\* ZIEGLING, Obersturmbahnfuhrer.

## 159 RESERVE DIVISION

DERNEN, Colonel.

Little biographical data available, but he was reported as commander of the 9th Reserve Grenadier Regiment of 159 Reserve Division as early as June 1944. Believed to have assumed command of the division during the middle of September.

## 189 RESERVE DIVISION

DEGENER, Generalmajor.

Little biographical data available. Believed to have taken command of the 7th Sicherungs Brigade after Generalmajor Jesser was reportedly killed late in September 1944. Elements of this Brigade then became known as Battle Group DEGENER. He apparently received command of the 189th Division, succeeding Generalmajor BAUER, during its reorganization into a VOLKSGRENADIER formation. Elements of his former Battle Group were used in the reorganization. (See August History for original commander Generalmajor Graf von Schwerin).

## 198 INFANTRY DIVISION

SCHIMLE, Generalmajor.

A Colonel commanding 326 Grenadier Regiment; assumed command of the 198th Division in September, succeeding RICHTER, who had been captured above MONTELMAR; and promoted Generalmajor late September.

## 338 INFANTRY DIVISION

ASCHMANN, Generalmajor.

Succeeded Generalleutnant L'HOMME de COURBIERE as commander of this division during the middle of September. Was killed 14 November in the vicinity of ONANS while inspecting the troops of his newly reorganized division which was in line in the Belfort Gap area.

## 405 ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION

Commanding Officer Unknown

## 716 INFANTRY DIVISION

\* RICHTER, Otto, Generalmajor.

C O N F I D E N T I A L



C O N F I D E N T I A LMAJOR BATTLE GROUP COMMANDERS

BRODOWSKI, Fritz von, Generalleutnant.

A 57-year old Prussian Junker, BRODOWSKI comes from a family which has furnished German Army officers for 150 years. He volunteered in 6 Kurassier Regiment in 1904, attended the War Academy in 1912-1914, and was a battalion CO during World War I. After the war, served in G-2 and G-3 of the General Staff, and was an advisor on POLAND and RUSSIA to the War Ministry. He commanded 16 Cavalry Regiment in 1931, and in 1934 was Inspector of Army Replacement Forces at ULM, and later at STUTTGART.

In August 1941, he was sent to Russia with a field reserve division, and in October 1942 to a reserve division in DRESDEN. Commanded a training staff in HOLLAND in July 1943 and later that year went to KIEV as Feldkommandant.

After a brief tour in the generals' reserve pool early in 1944, he became Chief of Administrative Headquarters 588 at CLERMONT-FERRAND. On 25 August, during the mass evacuation of Central and Southwest FRANCE, he assumed command of a battle group whose initial mission was to attempt to hold open a gap for the junction of Nineteenth Army coming up the RHONE and the LXIV Corps evacuating from the West. He was captured by the FFI on 19 September after his battle group had been destroyed in the vicinity of FAYS BILLOT 14-17 September. His war diary revealed details of many atrocities committed against both partisans and civilians between February and August 1944. He admits 100% conversion to National Socialism.

OTTENBACHER, Generalleutnant.

Early history unknown, but he commanded a march group or sub-group in the withdrawal from Southwest FRANCE. Later this battle group, which included many miscellaneous security units, was committed against our forces in the EPINAL area, apparently operating under the command of the 16th Infantry Division. Later acted as temporary commander of 189th Infantry Division just prior to DEGENER's assumption of command. Last reported as possible successor to Gen. d. ART. LASCH as commander of the LXIV Corps.

TAEGLICHBECK, Generalleutnant.

Was commander of March Group Middle in the withdrawal from Southern FRANCE. Last reported as STUART (Artillery Staff Officer) for the Westwall Liaison Command of the LXIV Corps.

\* Von OPPEN, Generalmajor.

\* No biographical data available.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

C O N F I D E N T I A LANNEX IIITHE MARCH BACK FROM SOUTHWEST FRANCE

The Seventh Army's invasion of Southern FRANCE on 15 August 1944, coupled with the disastrous defeat being suffered by German arms in Northern FRANCE, led to the enemy High Command's decision to attempt an evacuation of the Central and Southwestern portions of the country. The G-2 History for August discussed some phases of the great March Back, which was well underway by the end of that month, reached its climax during the first two weeks of September and then came to an end as its participants either rejoined their compatriots or surrendered.

A large proportion of the civilian and military personnel involved did succeed in slipping through to the east of the point where the Third and Seventh Armies were to join the night of 11-12 September. Of these the combat units - whose major elements were the 16th Infantry and 159th Reserve Divisions and several large battle groups such as BRODOWSKI and DEGENER - all made their appearance sooner or later in the order of battle of enemy forces opposing the Seventh Army.

However, another very large body of miscellaneous personnel was still floundering in the west when the Seventh and Third Armies joined to close their escape corridor. This was the March Group under command of General-major BOTHO-HENNING ELSTER which, hopelessly cut off, was surrendered on 16 September at BEAUGENCY.

General ELSTER's interrogation, in which he supplemented his memory by reference to personal notes and a file of orders, gives the most complete available story of the March Back. A condensation of his report to his captors follows:

The machinery for the evacuation of Southwest FRANCE was set up 18 August 1944 by an order of the LXIV Corps under the code name "Herbstzeitlose" ("Meadow-Saffron"). The announced objective of the operation was to clear the area TOURS - BOURGES - MONTLUCON - PERIGUEUX of all resistance groups; but the massiveness of the move was obviously disproportionate to such a mission. All troops and all German citizens in the Corps Area were to take part in the expedition except the garrisons of the GIRONDE Ports North and South and the garrisons defending the LA ROCHELLE area. (NOTE: These were still holding out many weeks later.)

The remaining forces were gathered into 3 groups: Group South under the CG of 159th Reserve Division, Generalleutnant NAKE; Group Middle under the District Commander NIORT (651st District Command); and Group North under the CG of 16th Infantry Division. Group South consisted of 159th Reserve Division (less elements attached 16th Infantry Division); all other troops of all three Services present in the Division area, including District Commands BORDEAUX (529), ANGOULEME (887), DAX (541), PAU (732), and PERIGUEUX (730), together with their service units; elements 12th AA Brigade, Fortress troops, customs guards and customs offices at BIARRITZ and LOURDES, Transport Command BORDEAUX, Naval and Air Force Hospital BORDEAUX, and Army Hospital LE LANOT.

Group Middle contained 950th Infantry Regiment (British Indian), 1 Reinforced Battalion of the LA ROCHE garrison, 1 Engineer Company of 16th Infantry Division, 2 AT Companies of 159th Reserve Division; District Commands POITIERS (677), NIORT (651), and LA ROCHE (505), together with their service units; all naval personnel stationed between PORNIC and ROYAN, elements 12th AA Brigade, Railroad Transport Service LA ROCHE, Army Hospital BORDEAUX (situated in POITIERS) and Army Hospital NIORT.

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Group North contained 16th Infantry Division, including Group "Tillenssen" (less 1 Reinforced Battalion of the LA ROCHE garrison), 360th Cossack Regiment; all other troops of all three Services present in the Division area, including District Command BLOIS (641), TOURS (788), ANGERS (595) and NANTES (518), together with their service units; elements 12th AA Brigade, Railroad Transport Service POITIERS and Ost Hospital PARTHENAY.

All civilians employed or stranded in the area were to be attached to the March Groups and evacuated. To provide reconnaissance and flank security for the columns, a "Sperrverband Welsel" was organized under the command of Col. WELSEL. It consisted of staff of Col. WELSEL, with elements of his regiment, 602nd Schnelle Abteilung, 608th Schnelle Abteilung, 1 Battalion of 16th Infantry Division (motorized as much as possible), 1 Battalion of 159th Reserve Division (motorized as much as possible), 1 Artillery Regiment (two mixed battalions; each consisting of two light and one medium Battery), 4 AT Companies, GHQ AT Battalion, and a Mixed AA Group.

Each group was to place itself in march order in the designated area: a reinforced regiment first; the mass of the troops in the center; and a reinforced battalion bringing up the rear. The assembly of the groups and their motorization so far as possible was to be completed by the end of August; but it proved necessary to advance that date considerably. All possible weapons and materiel were to be taken along; everything left behind was to be destroyed.

The 159th Reserve Division immediately issued an order to organize the troops under its command. Effective 20 August, it provided for the formation of three March Groups, under the command of Lt. Col. von der KAMMER (CO, 251 Reserve Grenadier Regiment), Lt. Col. WURZER (CO, 9 Reserve Grenadier Regiment), and Brig. Gen. ELSTER. Each March Group bore the name of its commander.

Each March Group provided itself with a rear guard of reinforced company strength, and motorized or bicycle-equipped. Their chief task was to secure against tank attacks from the left flank, using AA guns for the purpose, as very few AT guns were available. The rear guards were to clear the GARONNE bridge at BORDEAUX (WURZER), the DORDOGNE bridge at LIBOURNE (ELSTER) and the DORDOGNE bridge at ST ANDRE (v.d. KAMMER) by 2000 hours 26 September. At each of the three bridges one platoon of the 15th Engineer Battalion was waiting to blow up the bridge and attach itself to the rear guard. The original time schedule, however, could not be held to because of the unwieldiness of the units involved; and, as a further complication, the miscellaneous Naval personnel of BORDEAUX under command of Rear Admiral WEBER marched out the day after the three March Groups cleared the area, and formed a fourth March Group straggling along behind the others.

The weakness of these forces, the increase of FFI activity, and the rapidly closing escape route, forced the adoption of Draconic measures. While the subgroups of Group North were still on the march to their third assembly area near POITIERS they were ordered to sort out their personnel into three further groupings; a Kampfgruppe (motorized), divided into slow and fast motor vehicles; a Kampfgruppe (bicycle); and a foot column. The two Kampfgruppen were to include all men fit and equipped for combat and were immediately to be organized into companies and battalions. All motor vehicles and bicycles were to be turned over to these new formations without regard to property rights or prestige value. The former owners of the vehicles were to walk; and any excess baggage was to be dumped on the road or destroyed. The horse-drawn transport of the infantry units was to be turned over to the foot columns for the transport of its essential food and ammunition only. The order to this effect was issued 27 August; the reorganization was to be accomplished by 2 September. Despite the

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some of the damage caused by preceding German troops. In the Departement Indre, for example, which had been plundered by the "Freies Indien" Regiment of British Indians, the General turned over the sum of 8 million francs to the local prefect as reparation.

As the surrender march began, elements of the earlier March Groups left behind for one reason or another attached themselves to Gen. ELSTER's group. Immediately after the news of the surrender was announced, a few diehards left their units, put on civilian clothes, and attempted to make their way to GERMANY. Others, the Volksdeutsche, ripped the national insignia from their uniforms, sang the "International", and deserted.

On 16 September, Gen. ELSTER and his staff reached the LOIRE bridge South of BEAUGENCY, and surrendered his command. The news was formally imparted to the troops in a farewell message:

Foot March Group South

Chene Mareau  
near RAMORANTIN  
16 Sept 1944

On the day of surrender to the American Third Army I resign my command of Foot March Group South.

I thank all Officers, Civilian Employees, Non-Commissioned Officers, and Enlisted Men for their exceptional accomplishment and the exemplary discipline maintained on the march.

May the road through captivity to return to our Homeland be short.

Hail the Fuehrer!  
Long live Germany!

CG March Group South

ELSTER  
Brig Gen.

The total number of prisoners admitted to the BEAUGENCY cage was 19,605.

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great difficulty of reorganization while on the march, the subgroups did their best to carry out the order.

The new plan of 28 August called for the abandonment of the three old March Groups. In order to try to salvage what was most worth it and perhaps — as a very long shot — hold an escape route for the whole mass, the combat-worthy, mobile troops already sorted out in each March Group were separated from the immobile, ill-armed, and largely helpless melange of service troops. Generalleutnant NAKE and Col. SEIZ took over the Kampfgruppen (motorized) and (bicycle); Brig. Gen. ELSTER was handed the remainder.

Gen. ELSTER renamed his agglomeration "Foot March Group South" in order to avoid having his name associated with so odd a mixture of troops. On 31 August while the foot elements of the old March Groups were still enroute to the assembly areas, Kampfgruppe NAKE pulled out of the POITIERS area headed E; and on 1 September, Kampfgruppe SEIZ followed suit. Gen. ELSTER wished his friends god-speed, stood watching them roll off with all the heavy weapons and most of the combat troops. Then he returned to the task of bringing his March Group up into the area vacated by the Kampfgruppen before the FFI could possess themselves of it and block his escape route. On 3 September the main elements actually did reach the POITIERS area. The group immediately continued its march with the projected route ISSOUDUN-CHATEAUNEUF-LEVET-DUN-BLET-DECIZE, where it would come under control of March Group Middle. By 5 September it was stretched out between POITIERS and CHATEAURoux.

From that time on the confusion increased; the column began to suffer attacks from the air and the FFI; the assigned march distances were never covered and had to be changed continually. The tenseness of relations with the civilian populace had been increasing all along. To Gen. ELSTER, the handwriting on the wall was plain. He was short of supplies, would run out of gas before reaching the LOIRE, was helpless against air attack, was threatened by increasing FFI activity, was completely out of communication with the preceding Kampfgruppen, and realized that his group would never be able to get through to GERMANY even if the combat troops were able to punch a hole in our line.

With this realization before him, he took advantage of a contact with the 329 I&R Platoon on 7 September, and sent a parlementaire to see what terms he could get if he surrendered. While continuing to issue orders for the prosecution of the march toward GERMANY, he called a special meeting of all the senior officers under his command for 9 September, at CHATEAUNEUF. The hopelessness of the situation was pointed out by Gen. ELSTER, his actions of the past few days detailed, and his recommendation made. There was no immediate unanimity, and a number of opinions were expressed which split the officers into mutually resentful camps. The feelings aroused were so strong as to lead Gen. ELSTER to insist in later negotiations that he and his staff would at all times remain separate from the other officers. In the end, the General's decision prevailed, and (after a conference with an American representative at ISSOUDUN) was published to the troops the next day in a remarkable communication:

Foot March Group South

10 Sept 44

1. The present military situation has resulted in the fact that it is no longer possible for Foot March Group South, abandoned as it is in central FRANCE without communications and without supplies, to reach the German border.

2. Foot March Group South is not a combat unit. It is in no state to force its way back through regular troops by force of arms, equipped as

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it is with inadequate weapons and scanty ammunition. Completely defenseless, it is at the mercy of the enemy's Air Force.

The two short air attacks of 7 Sept caused stunningly high casualties and severe damage to horses, vehicles, trucks, as well as rations, weapons, and ammunition. The remaining rations are enough for only a few days. In brief, the situation can lead only to disintegration and disaster.

3. Being aware of the situation, the Third American Army, in position on the LOIRE, has made the following proposals:

1. All units will halt at the towns reached.
2. Units will march to designated assembly areas with weapons and full equipment.
3. Units will pass in review before an American Infantry Regiment at present arms.
4. German units will be admitted to American occupied territory N of the LOIRE after they have laid down their arms.

The Third American Army has given notice that it has ordered air attacks to be held up for the duration of a short truce to consider these terms. It has also let us know that if the terms are rejected, its Air Force has been ordered to bomb and strafe the column out of existence.

4. Realizing the situation and the clear fact that to march on and join the German troops around BELFORT as reinforcements would merely result in the useless shedding of priceless German blood on the march, out of consideration for each individual under my command and in order to preserve the worth and honor of the German Army, I have been constrained to accept these terms.

5. As Commander of Foot March Group South, I order

1. The suspension of the march
2. The suspension of hostilities against the regularly organized forces of the American, British, and French Army and Air Force.
3. Order, discipline, and especially obedience to all superior officers. The eye of the German Army is upon us all!
4. March orders will follow separately.

ELSTER  
Brig Gen

In accordance with the agreement, the subgroups were turned in the direction of the LOIRE and on 13 September dispatched to their respective crossings: Subgroup Burgert to ORLEANS; Subgroup Lueder/Gebauer to BEAUGENCY; Subgroup Weber to MER. The original schedule called for the subgroups to reach the LOIRE by 16 September, but the hostile and uncooperative attitude of the local inhabitants toward the undertaking slowed the whole process. It was only through energetic efforts on the part of the several liaison officers that the columns were kept in motion. The area to be traversed by the columns had been cleaned out by preceding German forces, and feeling ran rather high as a result. Isolated attacks on the columns after they were set in motion continued until the LOIRE was reached. Major unpleasantness, however, was avoided by strict discipline. In order to relieve the strain as much as possible, Gen. ELSTER tried to make good

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C O N F I D E N T I A LANNEX IVCOUNTERINTELLIGENCE SUMMARY15 - 31 AUGUST 1944

The enemy intelligence had failed to discover Allied intentions for the invasion of Southern FRANCE. Consequently, the disposition of German forces, including their espionage agents was based more on Weltanschauung than on facts discovered by the German Intelligence Services. He had prepared against Allied landings in the vicinity of MARSEILLE and GENOA, and, further relying on guesswork, against an initial landing of French rather than American forces "for psychological reasons."

However, the enemy's planted espionage system, timed for delayed-action effectiveness, was not so quickly disorganized as were his armed forces. The German Intelligence Services (Abwehr and Sicherheitsdienst) had made extensive preparations for a stay-behind espionage net to deal mostly with operational intelligence. These agents had been placed in the areas of MARSEILLE and the main French Riviera cities of CANNES, NICE and MONTE CARLO. The effectiveness of this espionage system depended on its being overrun, which the Allies obliged by doing, albeit too precipitously.

The agents selected for this purpose were of high grade type, trained at espionage schools and equipped with radio transmitters. All but a few were Frenchmen who had received military training in the French Army. They remained inconspicuous, living with their families in comfortable surroundings. They took no part in collaborationist politics, nor were they informers to the Gestapo in the unrelenting German efforts to infiltrate the resistance groups or identify its leaders. They were well paid, and therefore were not under the economic necessity of finding other employment. In one case, where the agent was employed, his occupation was that of commercial radio operator, with the result that his neighbors took for granted his interest in radio. The agents of this type (Abwehr Abteilung I) who were caught confessed that they had accepted their espionage assignments because of the high rate of pay.

The enemy's reliance on the permanence and effectiveness of his stay-behind system was shown by the fact that he had also placed along the Riviera long-range agents who were to be part of the German system even after the war.

During the first two weeks after the landing two espionage agents were arrested. One had applied to the Counterintelligence Officer of Seventh Army for a job as interpreter and informant. After interrogation he admitted that he was an agent employed by Abwehr Einz Luft, and that he had a radio transmitter.

The Germans had also made extensive preparations for sabotage in the rear of Allied armies in EUROPE, having established numerous sabotage dumps in FRANCE. One sabotage school run by the Sonderkommando organization, a Waffen SS unit, was found at AVIGNON. Its students were mostly young Frenchmen recruited, often by press gang methods, from the South of FRANCE. During the period no American installations were sabotaged.

Despite the rapid disorganization of his forces which resulted in the loss of many operational documents, the enemy took better care of his security records and documents. Non-operational intelligence documents were systematically destroyed or removed. At MARSEILLE, for example, the file rooms of the Gestapo Headquarters were found burned.

In summary, the carefully planted espionage net bore little fruit for the Germans during this period. Information gathered by German agents during the first two weeks was of little aid to their employers, who found themselves in no position to take positive action based on this information.

C O N F I D E N T I A LANNEX IV

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# G-2 HISTORY



## SEVENTH ARMY

OPERATIONS

IN

# EUROPE



PART THREE

1-31 OCTOBER 1944

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REPRODUCED BY ENGINEER SECTION SEVENTH ARMY HQ



C O N F I D E N T I A L

HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH ARMY  
Office of the A. C. of S., G-2  
APO 758 US ARMY

G-2 HISTORY

OPERATIONS IN EUROPE

Part III

1 - 31 October 1944

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C O N F I D E N T I A LI. GENERAL

Ensnconced in the hills and forests of the VOSGES foothills, and backed up by the prepared line that extended from the MARNE-RHINE Canal to BELFORT, the Germans demonstrated during October that the Wehrmacht had lost little of its old ability to exploit favorable terrain to the fullest advantage. Mountains and forests went far to make up the enemy's deficiency in men, materiel, and morale.

Holding to a relatively stable front, the German's marked shortage of motor transport was no longer crippling - by the end of the month he was withdrawing what few mobile units he had had at the beginning, and replacing them with horse-supplied infantry. And his troops, who had degenerated well below the standard of the past, nevertheless were capable of proving that even a h-F can fire a gun from a well-sited position.

The two major Seventh Army operations of the month - the clearing of the Forest of PARROY, and the penetration of the hills west of ST DIE - while successful, were not carried through cheaply. With few exceptions, each American advance drew a sharp reaction, the enemy's stubborn defense being supplemented by frequent local counterattacks, sometimes supported by a few tanks or self-propelled guns.

However, taking the Army front as a whole, the month's actions demonstrated a complete lack of initiative on the part of the Germans. When Allied forces pushed forward, heavy fighting usually developed; but in sectors where friendly forces remained quiet (the French Second Armored Division zone west of BACCARAT, for instance) the enemy followed suit. At no time did he launch a large scale attack or display any general purpose other than continued defense. And on one occasion - the extension of our attack on BRUYERES and BROUVELIEURES into a deep and broad penetration beyond those towns - he appeared slow to appreciate the magnitude of the operation and to commit reserves to the sector.

While doing his best to contain Allied penetrations of his position, the enemy at the same time continued his attempts to solve the difficult order of battle problems which had been carried over from the previous month. During the early part of October, he was still absorbing into more substantial formations the battle groups which had been employed as stop-gaps during the September reorganization. The absorption of Battle Group OTTENBACHER by the 16th Infantry Division virtually completed the liquidation on Seventh Army front of the miscellaneous groups which had retreated from Southern France; most of those that remained were on the First French Army front to the south. Most of the panzer brigades which had appeared during September as emergency counter-attacking reserves also disappeared again as they were assimilated into panzer and panzer grenadier divisions.

Thus the enemy order of battle on our front early in October began to have a well-ordered appearance, for the first time since the August landings. From south to north it consisted of: the 338th, 189th, 198th, 716th and 16th Infantry Divisions, the right wing of the German Nineteenth Army; the 21st Panzer, 15th Panzer Grenadier and 11th Panzer Divisions of the Fifth Panzer Army.

Having regularized the divisional structure, the enemy then began to shuffle entire armies. By the end of the month the Fifth Panzer Army had been withdrawn to form a mobile strategic reserve available for commitment anywhere on the Western Front; the Nineteenth and First Armies, be-

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tween which it had been sandwiched, thus again had a common boundary, in the BACCARAT area. First of the Fifth Panzer Army divisions to leave our front was the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division, which went to KARLSRUHE for refit shortly after the Battle of PARROY; it was replaced by the 553rd Infantry Division, moved down from the METZ zone of the U.S. Third Army front. Pending arrival of the 553rd, one regiment of the 19th Infantry Division was moved down from the U.S. XX Corps front to hold a portion of the sector being vacated by the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division. Having accomplished this short term mission, it was again withdrawn. Later in the month, the 11th Panzer Division (most of which, however, had been on the Third rather than Seventh Army front) was also withdrawn, to be replaced by the 361st Infantry Division. The latter had been formed in September, and as part of Himmler's total mobilization program was to have been designated 569th Volksgrenadier Division. However, it was used instead to reconstitute the 361st Infantry Division, which had been virtually destroyed in RUSSIA, and as such was first identified on the Third Army front on 29 October, and on Seventh Army front on 30 October. Thus at the end of October, the only armored unit left to oppose Seventh Army was the 21st Panzer Division. It, too, was to leave during the next month.

The only other divisional change on the VOSGES front during October was the arrival of the 269th Infantry Division. However, it too faced a neighboring army rather than the Seventh, having taken up positions about 25 October in the VENTRON-CORNIMONT sector opposite the First French Army. After taking part in the French campaign of 1940, this division had been in DENMARK, the northern sector of the Russian front, and then in NORWAY before leaving OSLO for the VOSGES on 17 October.

Of the non-divisional units available as stop-gaps and reinforcements on Seventh Army front, two, the 360th Cossack Regiment and the 19th SS Police Regiment, were old acquaintances which had been encountered previously to the west. However, other separate units were available in the German rear to the east, and a number of these were brought into the VOSGES front during October. Included were five Fortress Machine Gun Battalions and one Fortress Infantry Battalion, originally intended as garrisons for the West Wall - their early commitment was evidence of the German intention to hold on the VOSGES, rather than on the Siegfried Line, for as long as possible. Two GHQ Mountain Battalions, 201st and 202nd, organized in the SALZBURG area from convalescent former members of mountain divisions together with some naval and Luftwaffe personnel, were also moved to the front from AUSTRIA. They were committed late in October against our advance west of ST DIE. Two Landeschützen Battalions and two Field Punishment Battalions (291st and 292nd) were also included among the miscellaneous units. All of these units except 360th Cossacks, were subsequently either withdrawn, as in the case of the 19th SS Police Regiment, or absorbed into divisions as part of the general order of battle stabilization.

Simultaneously the Germans returned to a more normal replacement system, attempting to maintain their reconstituted divisions at a relatively constant level. The enemy's evident intention was to maintain the forces facing Seventh Army at a total of 13,000 - 14,000 combat effectives (including infantry and such other units as were available for infantry employment at the front, but excluding artillery and rear area services). To do so despite the attrition of operations required a flow of an estimated 4,600 replacements from GERMANY to the front during the first two weeks of October. A large portion of these, as well as of veteran troops, became casualties in short order; thus, to maintain the level, an even larger flow of replacements was required during the last half of the month, when an estimated 7,300 troops were shipped to the Seventh Army front. The high proportion of older men among these drafts, and the absence of first rate young troops, were especially noticeable - but not until the opening of the Germans' "Christmas Offensive" against the U.S. First Army two months later did the whereabouts of the 1-A's become fully apparent.

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(For enemy dispositions and strength before Seventh Army, see Annexes I and II.)

## II. CHRONOLOGY

### 1 October - D/47

As October opened the enemy in front of the Seventh Army was holding a north-south line from the Forest of PARROY, near the MARNE-RHINE Canal northeast of LUNEVILLE, to the vicinity of LE THOLY, west of GERARDMER. The loss of EFINAL on 24 September had ended his hopes of using the MOSELLE River as a forward position, and he was now backing up, slowly and under pressure, through the VOSGES foothills east of the MOSELLE.

RAMBERVILLERS had fallen on the last day of September. On 1 October the enemy reacted vigorously by reconnaissance in force and by bringing heavy artillery down on the town. There were indications of reinforcements northeast of RAMBERVILLERS. To the south, house to house fighting was in progress in GRANDVILLERS, and to the north the enemy was bitterly resisting efforts to force him from the Forest of PARROY.

### 2 October - D/48

Stubborn enemy resistance continued along the entire Army front. In the north the enemy clung to the Forest of PARROY, although forced back in parts of it. A counterattack for ANGLEMONT northeast of RAMBERVILLERS by an estimated 1,000 men with support of 5 tanks was repulsed, and severe fighting southeast of RAMBERVILLERS also included one local counterattack. Enemy arty was especially active in the XV Corps sector to the north.

### 3 October - D/49

Resistance continued stubborn along the entire Army front, but the German attitude was generally defensive rather than aggressive as during the previous few days. Opposition continued east and southeast of RAMBERVILLERS, but GRANDVILLERS was finally cleared. A weak counterattack took place west of LE THOLY. XV Corps continued to report heavy fighting in the Forest of PARROY, but only light contact south of the Forest.

### 4 October - D/50

The enemy attitude remained defensive except for local counterattacks which bolstered his resistance on the approaches to LE THOLY, southeast of BRUYERES, and east of RAMBERVILLERS. He still defended stubbornly in the Forest of PARROY using mines and road blocks extensively.

Photo reconnaissance indicated that during these stubborn delaying actions the enemy was further developing the main line of resistance in his rear. A network of fire trenches and anti-tank ditches, supplemented by pillboxes, road blocks and strong points, was being constructed from HEMING, in the north, southward through BLAMONT to BACCARAT and thence along the MEURTHE River valley to ST DIE and FRAIZE. The line was designed to cover the main approaches into and through the VOSGES; its greatest density was at STE MARGUERITE, and here covered the trans-VOSGES route through SAALES and SCHIRMECK toward MOLSHEIM and STRASBOURG.

### 5 October - D/51

The enemy attitude remained unchanged. U.S. 3rd Division reported him driven from a quarry to northwest of LE THOLY, where he had held out for several days, and making a local withdrawal in that vicinity. Heavy resistance was encountered in the center of the VI Corps zone, and on the left

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45th Division repulsed two local counterattacks and reported the high ground from FREMIFONTAINE to BRUYERES tenaciously held. In the XV Corps sector contact was light on the right but still heavy in the Forest of PARROY on the left. At one point in the Forest the enemy launched a counterattack supported by four tanks.

6 October - D452

VI Corps encountered stubborn holding actions on its right and center, while on the left, west of BROUVELIEURES the enemy continued to be aggressive, with considerable artillery fire and strong infiltrations supplementing his resistance. XV Corps continued to meet opposition in the Forest of PARROY including a local counterattack. On the Corps' right, however, the enemy was comparatively quiet.

7 October - D453

A strong counterattack by the 111th Panzer Grenadier Regiment (11th Panzer Division) against the U.S. 45th Division, south of FREMIFONTAINE, was supported by heavy artillery fire and six to ten tanks, but was beaten off with heavy losses to the enemy. Prisoners of the 111th Panzer Grenadier Regiment said they had been refitting at SARREBOURG when orders came to move south against the 45th Division's penetration and retake the lost ground, which they were to hold for four days before withdrawing. South of this point the enemy continued to hold at most points, but lost CREMANVILLER and VAGNEY. In the north, the Germans still held the eastern portion of the Forest of PARROY.

8 October - D454

The failure of the attack against 45th Division on 7 October was followed by a marked decrease in activity in this sector, but a corresponding increase in enemy efforts on VI Corps' south flank, where the 3rd Division received a counterattack from the southeast toward VAGNEY. Strong resistance was met in the LE THOLY - HERPELMONT sector. Contact was light in the northern half of the Army front during a brief lull in the battle for the Forest of PARROY.

9 October - D455

VI Corps encountered stubborn resistance at SAPOIS in the 3rd Division sector and in the vicinity of HERPELMONT in the 36th Division sector, where heavy artillery concentrations fell. The 45th and 2nd D.B. fronts were comparatively quiet. However, after renewed attacks by the 79th Division in the Forest of PARROY, the enemy was forced back 1000-1500 yards on the flanks and 3000 yards in the center.

10 October - D456

The previous day's attack had broken enemy resistance in the Forest of PARROY. Patrols on 10 October found that the enemy had withdrawn hastily from the center of the Forest, leaving unburied dead, abandoned equipment and booby traps behind; contact was reestablished only at the eastern edge of the Forest. To the south the enemy was still blocking approaches into the VOSGES, holding strongly along the ridge line before BRUYERES and BROUVELIEURES and to the south as far as LE THOLY and SAPOIS.

11 October - D457

Enemy activity along the entire Army front showed a noticeable decrease, corresponding to the temporary lessening of U.S. pressure against him. VI Corps reported its sector comparatively quiet except for continued stubborn

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resistance south and east of GRANDVILLERS and particular alertness on the part of the enemy to patrol action by the U.S. 45th Division. The XV Corps front was also quiet with only a patrol clash reported in the 2nd DB sector. In the 79th Division sector the enemy was believed to have withdrawn from all but the northeastern section of the Forest of PARROY.

12 October - D/58

The enemy continued to hold strongly before LE THOLY. Farther north he launched a local counterattack in the vicinity of HERPELMONT, and a stronger attack, by two companies of infantry and 2 tanks, northwest of BRUYERES. There was no contact in the BACCARAT sector, and only patrol contacts on the Army left flank, where the enemy was observed digging east of the Forest of PARROY.

13 October - D/59

Only in the area west of BRUYERES and BROUVELIEURES was there any marked activity. Here the probing of friendly patrols drew sharp reactions, and one fire fight developed into a local counterattack. Contact was very light both north and south of this sector.

14 October - D/60

American forces were pushing forward in two sectors - northwest of BRUYERES and east of the Forest of PARROY - and in each case met determined resistance. In the former sector, 45th Division found enemy infantry defending with considerable mortar and artillery support, and U.S. patrols drew anti-tank and tank fire. On the northern portion of the front, the enemy was well dug in on the hill mass east of the Forest. Elsewhere contact was again light.

15 October - D/61

The pattern of enemy operations was unchanged, with his forces defending strongly where threatened by American advances but remaining generally quiet in sectors where friendly troops exerted little pressure. The Germans yielded ground slowly and stubbornly west of BROUVELIEURES and held to strong delaying positions east of the Forest of PARROY. On the right the U.S. 3rd Division encountered only scattered resistance except in the town of LE THOLY where stiff close-in fighting took place. In the 36th Division sector the enemy appeared to have executed several local withdrawals, as two towns were found unoccupied. Light contact again took place in the 2nd DB sector but there was a definite increase in artillery fire in that area.

16 October - D/62

The attack on BRUYERES resulted in a strong enemy reaction. One local counterattack between CHAMPDRAY and REHAUPAL was preceded by intense artillery and mortar preparation, and north of BROUVELIEURES, a two-company counterattack, also preceded by artillery and mortar concentrations, was beaten off. In the immediate vicinity of BRUYERES opposition included fire from all types of weapons, and mined road blocks held up U.S. armor. Later in the day a company-size counterattack was launched west of the town. In the north, U.S. advances east of the Forest of PARROY also met continued resistance, and one counterattack supported by 6-12 tanks.

17 October - D/63

Enemy continued active along the Army front except on the extreme right and in the 2nd DB sector where the situation remained comparatively quiet.

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The 36th Division experienced two counterattacks, each by about 100 men, and subsequent heavy resistance slowed its advance on BRUYERES. The 45th Division also encountered heavy opposition above BROUVELIEURES including considerable barbed wire, covered by small arms fire. On the Army left, 79th Division reported a pre-dawn counterattack and continued resistance on ridge east of the Forest of PARROY.

18 October - D/64

The nature of enemy activity remained much the same as for the past few days. Very light contact was made in the southern sector, and by the end of the period had been lost in that area. Opposite the 36th Division the enemy continued to defend BRUYERES, although losing two hills before the town, and launched a small counterattack east of FREMIFONTAINE in the 45th Division area. Two enemy companies, supported by an estimated five tanks, counterattacked the 79th Division in the north. Only scattered contact was made in the 2nd DB sector.

19 October - D/65

After heavy fighting, BRUYERES was captured. Only sniper fire was then met by U.S. troops advancing to the hills east of the town. To the north, stubborn resistance continued along the line BROUVELIEURES - FREMIFONTAINE, and included a small counterattack. Contact was very light from here north to the MARNE-RHINE Canal.

20 October - D/66

Enemy forces east of BRUYERES stiffened again and put up strong small arms and mortar resistance along the BRUYERES - BELMONT railroad. A counterattack by infantry and seven tanks was attempted from the direction of BELMONT, but was stopped by friendly air attack. A small counterattack was repulsed northwest of BROUVELIEURES, and fierce fighting with automatic weapons and handgrenades took place along the MORTAGNE River from there to FREMIFONTAINE. The northern half of the front was again quiet, although at points opposite the 79th Division the enemy appeared extremely sensitive to friendly patrols.

21 October - D/67

The U.S. 3rd, 36th and 45th Divisions, of VI Corps, were all now devoting their major efforts to exploitation of the potential breakthrough along the BRUYERES - ST DIE axis, opposed principally by the German 16th and 716th Infantry Divisions. The latter, according to prisoners, had been ordered to hold its present positions to the last man, or until defenses then under construction in the VOSGES were completed. However, the enemy's loss of BRUYERES on 19 October was followed, on 21 October, by his being forced from BROUVELIEURES and from VERVEZELLE, despite defense by machine guns, small arms, mortars, self-propelled guns, and a few tanks. In the north, the U.S. 79th Division continued to receive heavy opposition from dug in positions northwest of BELMONT covering the enemy's main defensive line farther east.

22 October - D/68

BELMONT was cleared in the developing salient east of BRUYERES, and it appeared that the enemy defense was becoming disorganized. A few strong points had to be cleared by heavy fighting, but on the whole resistance in this sector was scattered. However, on the northern shoulder of the salient, east of FREMIFONTAINE, the enemy succeeded in making a stand on the MORTAGNE River and repulsed the 45th Division's attempted crossing.

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Farther north, patrols of the 2nd D.B. met resistance west and northwest of BACCARAT. 79th Division patrols also ran into opposition, and the division sector received unusually heavy artillery fire.

23 October - D/69

Further penetration of the forested hills northwest of ST DIE carried the advance to BIFFONTAINE which was mopped up at the end of the day. Along the BRUYERES - ST DIE road, enemy resistance stiffened late in the day in the vicinity of LES ROUGES EAUX, where a company-strength counterattack was launched. East of FREMIFONTAINE, the MORTAGNE River was crossed but small arms, mortar and artillery fire slowed further advances. Resistance was strong in the town of MORTAGNE. On the Army's left, east of the Forest of PARROY, the enemy showed more aggressiveness, counterattacking three times in battalion strength with six tanks in support.

24 October - D/70

In the north, another counterattack in battalion strength, supported by ten tanks, was repulsed. Elsewhere on the front the enemy appeared to be still disorganized by the rapid advance, although he did succeed in launching several small counterattacks against forward elements of the 36th Division near BIFFONTAINE. Only scattered resistance was met by the 3rd Division in the vicinity of LES ROUGES EAUX, and the 45th Division reported finding evidence of a very hasty enemy withdrawal near MORTAGNE.

25 October - D/71

On the south side of the BRUYERES salient, enemy infiltration through the extended U.S. front succeeded in harassing supply lines to our forward units. Along the main road to ST DIE, the village of LES ROUGES EAUX was cleared, despite heavy shelling against 3rd Division troops and one counterattack which had forced a temporary withdrawal. Northward expansion of the salient was slowed by small arms, machine gun, mortar and self propelled artillery fire and by organized dug-in positions near HOUSSEAS. At the northern extremity of the Army front, below the MARNE-RHINE Canal, the enemy continued his counterattacks, one of which succeeded in making a temporary penetration of U.S. lines.

26 October - D/72

Except in the extreme northern sector, the enemy again remained defensive. In the salient east of BRUYERES elements of the 36th Division began to encounter stiffer resistance in the FORET DOMANIALE de CHAMP, north and northeast of BIFFONTAINE. An enemy infiltration cut the road behind one of its forward battalions. The 3rd Division pushed forward without contact to overlook ST. DIE but the enemy remained on both flanks and appeared to be reinforcing LA BOURGONCE, on the north, with tanks. Heavy artillery fire again fell on the Division's forward elements. In the 45th Division zone, the northern shoulder of the salient, enemy resistance appeared decreasing and scattered, and HOUSSEAS was cleared. During the night of 25/26 October a further three counterattacks, supported by tanks, were received in the 4th Division sector on the Army's left.

27 October - D/73

Enemy attitude was again defensive except on south side of BRUYERES - ST. DIE salient, where a local American penetration stirred the enemy into making three counterattacks supported by tanks. The 1st Bn of the 111st Infantry Regiment remained cut off by the enemy who kept the battalion's route of withdrawal under observed fire and maintained a roadblock covered by an estimated 150 men between the battalion and the main body. Despite

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the previous day's indications of reinforcements at LA BOURGANCE, the town was taken without resistance. The 3rd Division experienced one local counterattack but only light resistance elsewhere. At only one point, northeast of MOUSSERAS, did 45th Division meet determined resistance. The enemy appeared to have abandoned his program of counterattacks northwest of BLAMONT and the XV Corps sector again became quiet.

28 October - D-74

South of BRUYERES, operations on the shoulder of the salient resulted in the unopposed occupation of JUSSARUPT, but in the FORET DOMANIALE de CHAMP efforts to relieve the "Lost Battalion" again were prevented by strong enemy resistance. Along the BRUYERES - ST DIE road the enemy had bolstered his defense by the commitment of two separate mountain battalions and by moving up from the south two regiments which had been operating with the 338th Division farther south. Here, strong infiltrations and determined fighting slowed further progress, and one counterattack west of ST DIE was repulsed only after five hours of severe fighting. Scattered but sharp fire fights delayed reduction of the northern shoulder of the salient, east of RAMBERVILLERS. Only patrol activity was reported from the northern portion of the front.

29 October - D-75

Heavy opposition in the FORET DOMANIALE de CHAMP prevented relief of the 1st Battalion, 141st Infantry Regiment. Possible enemy reinforcements were observed moving into the forest from the south. West of ST DIE, the 3rd Division encountered stubborn resistance from scattered groups and a counterattack with heavy artillery fire. East of RAMBERVILLERS, the 45th Division reported possible indications of the enemy's withdrawal northeastward, as BRU and JEANMENIL were occupied without resistance. XV Corps reported the enemy executing local reliefs opposite 2nd DB and strengthening his front lines opposite the 44th Division.

30 October - D-76

The "Lost Battalion" was relieved after strong enemy resistance had been overcome and his roadblock reduced. Heavy fighting continued in the eastern portion of the salient and a two-company counterattack seized a hill near LES JUMEAUX, northwest of ST DIE. The base of the salient was broadened by the capture of LAVELINE, on the south, and ST BENOIT, on the north, after sharp fighting in both cases. A small enemy counterattack in the northern zone was broken up by artillery fire.

31 October - D-77

The enemy appeared to have been taken by surprise by 2nd DB's attack above BACCARAT. Mining was extensive but little artillery or AT fire was received, and by the end of the period MERVILLER, northeast of BACCARAT, had been cleared and forward units had reached the outskirts of BACCARAT itself, although the enemy was still dug in west of the town. In the VOSGES salient VI Corps reported continuing enemy defense of key terrain features west and southwest of ST DIE and determined opposition in the ST BENOIT sector, where strong mortar and artillery fire supported dug-in positions.

### III. SUMMARY

October had been primarily a month of preparation for future actions, both the Allies and the Germans on the Western Front using the period to regroup and resupply for the more decisive battles of November and December.

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The attacks of the Seventh Army in the Forest of PARROY and the Western VOSGES, as well as that against BACCARAT on the last day of the month, fitted into this general scheme, for they had the purpose, and the ultimate effect, of depriving the enemy of his forward defensive positions and pushing him back on his main line of resistance even before the opening of the November offensive.

The attrition of October's limited operations, during which the enemy lost 7,122 prisoners and an unestimated number of dead and wounded, also helped to weaken him in advance of the offensive. In particular, the German 16th and 716th Infantry Divisions, charged with defense of the Central VOSGES, were so reduced that they could hardly hope to hold the VOSGES passes against a determined assault. The 16th was whittled down from a combat effective strength of 3,000 to 900 during October, the 716th from 1600 to 1000, and their replacements and reinforcements were consumed as fast as they were committed. As a result they were unable to prevent the crumbling of the VOSGES "bastion" the following month.

## ANNEX I

## ENEMY FORCES OPPOSING SEVENTH ARMY

## Strength in Combat Effectives


	<u>1 October</u>	<u>11 October</u>	<u>21 October</u>	<u>31 October</u>
11th Panzer Div.	* 4000 (40 tanks)	* 4000 (40 tanks)	* 4000 (40 tanks)	Withdrawn
15th Pz Gren Div.	3500	3000	2800	Withdrawn
16th Inf. Div. (incl. BG OTTEN-BACHER)	3000	2200	2400	900
19th Inf. Div. (One Regt Only)			800	450
21st Panzer Div.	3200 (20-25 tanks)	2800 (20-25 tanks)	2250 (20-25 tanks)	2200 (20-25 tanks)
189th Inf. Div. (incl. BG SCHWERIN)	1100	** 800	** 600	** ?
198th Inf Div. (less one Regt operating w/338th Division)	1000	1000	1300	** 1300
338th Inf Div. (incl BG LOFAU, and one Regt from 198th Div)	600	** 1800	** 1800	1400
361st Inf. Div.				* 3500
553rd Inf Div.			1600	2800
716th Inf Div.	1600	1500	1250	1000
Misc Separate Units	900	900	900	1700
Reserves not in contact:				
30th SS Division	3000	3000	3000	3000
405th Inf. Div.	3500	3500	3500	3500

\* Bulk of unit on U.S. Third Army Front.  
 \*\* Bulk of unit on French First Army Front.

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ANNEX IIIPRINCIPAL ENEMY COMMANDERS OPPOSING SEVENTH ARMYARMY GROUP GBALCK, General der Panzer Truppen.

Son of a Lieutenant General, BALCK saw action as a Lieutenant in World War I on both the Western and Italian fronts. Transferred to the Reichswehr after the war, and had reached the rank of Oberst by September 1940, when he was reported commanding a brigade in France. In August of 1942, shortly after he received command of 11 Panzer Division in Russia, his promotion to Generalmajor was announced, followed, on 1 January 1943, by promotion to Generalleutnant. In June 1943, BALCK was reported commanding Panzer Division GROSSDEUTSCHLAND for a short time, and in March 1944 he commanded XLVIII Panzer Corps at TARNOPOL. In August he was commanding the Fourth Panzer Army in Russia. Subsequently he was known to be on the Western Front, where, according to the German press, he was in command of a Panzer Corps. Reported to be a favorite of Hitler, he is believed to have taken command of Army Group G in October, succeeding BLASKOWITZ.

FIRST ARMYvon KNOBELSDORFF, Otto, General der Panzer Truppen.

Born in 1885 in Berlin, the son of an officer, KNOBELSDORFF was gazetted Leutnant in 1906, and in 1914 was adjutant of the 94th Infantry Regiment. During World War I he served in a regiment of 242 Royal Wurtemberg Division, and later served on the division staff. He received the Iron Cross, First Class, the Wound Badge, the Saxe-Weimar, Saxe-Ernestine, Lippe and Austro-Hungarian decorations. On 31 July 1914 he was promoted to Oberleutnant and became Hauptmann on 22 March 1916.

After the war von KNOBELSDORFF transferred to the Reichswehr and in 1941 was serving on the staff of 6th Division. During 1925-28 he was on the staff of the division artillery commander and later on division staff, 2 Infantry Division. Promoted to Major 1 February 1929, he commanded a troop in 9 Cavalry Regiment. In 1930-32 he was on the staffs of artillery commanders of 3 Infantry Division and 2 Infantry Division. Promoted to Oberst on 1 July 1935, the next month took command of 102 Infantry Regiment and in November 1938 was commanding 101 Infantry Regiment. On 1 January 1939 he was promoted to Generalmajor, in May 1940 was commanding 19 Infantry Division and on 1 December 1940 became Generalleutnant. He continued in command of 19 Division after it was converted to 19 Panzer Division, and in September 1941 was awarded the Knight's cross for action in the central sector of the Russian front.

In June 1942 he commanded XXXIX Panzer Corps on the northern sector of the Russian front, and was promoted to General der Panzer Truppen on 1 August that year. From February to November 1943 he commanded XLVIII Panzer Corps in the DONETZ area and later west of BIELGOROD, where he was awarded Oakleaves for distinguished service. In June 1944 he commanded XL Panzer Corps in the JASSY area, and on 22 September 1944 was awarded Oakleaves with Swords. He assumed command of First Army on the Western Front in October 1944. He is reported to have objected to Nazism in the Army, and to have refused to have officers with Nazi principles in 102 Infantry Regiment before the war.

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ANNEX III



## FIFTH PANZER ARMY

MANTAUFFEL, General der Panzer Truppen.

See G-2 History for September.

## NINETEENTH ARMY

WIESE, Frederick, General der Infanterie

See G-2 History for August.

## IV GAF CORPS

PETERSEN, General der Flieger.

Born about 1891, gazetted Leutnant in 1910, and served during 1914-18 in 163 Infantry Regiment, receiving the Iron Cross, First Class. Transferred to the Reichswehr after the war, and promoted to Hauptmann in 1922. Reported in 6 Infantry Regiment in 1925 and on the staff of 2 Infantry Division in 1932. He next appeared as an Oberstleutnant commanding a battalion of 27 Infantry Regiment, and on 1 January 1938 he was promoted to Oberst in the same regiment. In February 1937, he commanded 125 Infantry Regiment at SAARBRUCKEN.

PETERSEN transferred to the GAF on 1 September 1941 and was promoted Generalmajor a month later. The following February he was promoted commanding 7 Flieger Division which then controlled all parachutist units. During 1942, he was promoted twice, to Generalleutnant on 1 February and to General der Flieger on 1 November. In June 1943, he was reported in command of IV GAF Field Corps in Southern FRANCE. He held this command at the time of the DRAGOON landings, and participated in the retreat to the VOSGES. Although little is known of his party connections, he is said to be a favorite of Hitler. There are reports of dissension between GAF and Army officers in his headquarters during July 1944.

## XLVII PANZER CORPS

von LUTTWITZ, Freiherr, Generalleutnant.

See G-2 History for September.

## LVIII PANZER CORPS

KRUEGER, Eugen Walter, General der Panzer Truppen.

No biographical data available.

## LXIV CORPS

LASCH, Generalleutnant.

As an Oberstleutnant in the pre-war Reichswehr he commanded a battalion of the 3 Infantry Regiment. Promoted Oberst in 1942, Generalmajor late the same year, and Generalleutnant 1 June 1943. German newspapers called him the "Liberator of Riga." Reported commanding 349 Infantry Division in December 1943, and relieved General Sacks as commander of LXIV Corps in October 1944.

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LXXXIX CORPS

von und zu GILSA, Werner Albrecht Freiherr, General der Infanterie.

Born 1889. Commanded 9 Infantry Regiment in Reichswehr and it is believed he commanded this regiment in Poland. Became Generalmajor in February 1941, and commander of 216 Infantry Division in Russia in January 1942. Awarded Knight's Cross in August 1942 and promoted Generalleutnant the next October. Took command of LXXXIX Corps in Belgium in July 1943.

11 PANZER DIVISION

WIETERSHEIM, Wend, Generalmajor.

See G-2 History for August.

15 PANZER GRENADIER DIVISION

SILON, Oberst.

Colonel SILON was commander of 33 Panzer Artillery Regiment, reported by prisoners to be in temporary command of 15 Panzer Grenadier Division.

16 INFANTRY DIVISION

HAECKEL, Ernst, Generalleutnant.

See G-2 History for September.

19 INFANTRY DIVISION (59 Grenadier Regiment)

SILBERNABEL, Oberstleutnant.

Lt. Col. SILBERNABEL commanded the one regiment of the 19 Infantry Division which was on our front briefly during the relief of 15 Panzer Grenadier Division by 553 Infantry Division.

21 PANZER DIVISION

FEUCHTINGER, Generalleutnant.

See G-2 History for September.

189 RESERVE DIVISION

DEGENER, Generalmajor

See G-2 History for September.

198 INFANTRY DIVISION

SCHIELE, Generalmajor.

See G-2 History for September.

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338 INFANTRY DIVISION

ASCHMANN, Generalmajor.

See G-2 History for September.

361 INFANTRY DIVISION

PHILIPPI, Generalmajor.

Was in the Reichswehr before the war, and served in 73 Infantry Regiment and in an unknown capacity on the General Staff. On 25 May 1943 was awarded the Ritterkreuz as commander of 535 Grenadier Regiment. In February 1944 he commanded 210 Coastal Defense Division KIRKENES in Lapland, and in October was identified as commander of 361 Infantry Division on Western Front.

405 ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION

SEEGER, Generalleutnant.

No biographical data available.

553 VOLKSGRENADIER DIVISION

BRUNN, Hans, Generalmajor.

A native of Schleswig-Holstein and a professional soldier who served in World War I and continuously ever since. His entire service, which includes two years on the Russian front, was in artillery, until he assumed command of the 553 Volksgrenadier Division on 24 September. He was captured about 20 November by the 2nd French Armored Division during the breakthrough to Strasbourg.

716 INFANTRY DIVISION


RICHTER, Wilhelm, Generalmajor.

No biographical data available. However, a captured document reveals his first name to be Wilhelm, rather than Otto, as previously reported.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L



## ANNEX NO. IV

THE  
BATTLE  
OF  
PARROY

The Forest of PARROY is a vicious tangle of second growth timber and underbrush, about six miles long and five miles wide, blanketing some low ridges northeast of LUNEVILLE, between the MARNE-RHINE Canal and the VEZOUSE River. It is traversed by an east-west road, generally following the crest of a low ridge, and by a number of tracks and firebreaks, including the abandoned roadbeds of old World War I narrow gauge railways. Here, at the end of September and during early October, the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division attempted to make a stand blocking the eastward advance of the US XV Corps.

The town of LUNEVILLE had fallen to the XV Corps on 20 September, and during the next five days the MEURTHE River to the southeast was crossed, the Forest of MONDON between the MEURTHE and the VEZOUSE, was cleared, and reconnaissance northward toward the latter river entered CHANTEHEUX, CROISMARE and MARAINVILLER.

However, during reconnaissance northeast of LUNEVILLE into the west and southwest edges of the Forest of PARROY, patrols of the US 79th Division drew fire and encountered mines and a roadblock on 25 September. The western extremity of the east-west road that traversed the forest appeared to be held by approximately a company of infantry, well dug in. Meanwhile, reconnaissance by the 106th Cavalry Group (consisting of the 106th and 121st Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadrons) along the MARNE-RHINE Canal west of the north edge of the forest, found all bridges across the canal blown and received fire from the forest.

The general stabilization of the front, in contrast to the highly

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ANNEX IV



C O N F I D E N T I A L

fluid condition of preceding weeks, led to the decision to attack and clean out the forest, preparatory to further advances, rather than to attempt to bypass it. The plan called for a heavy preliminary aerial bombardment of entrances into the woods and of road junctions inside it.

Bad weather delayed the bombing, and therefore the attack, for three days. In the meantime vigorous patrolling was carried out on the western edge of the forest, and drew equally vigorous reactions. A combat patrol of the 315th Infantry Regiment entering the edge of the forest near the main road entrance, on 26 September, was counterattacked by two enemy platoons supported by four tanks. Patrols of the 313th and 314th Infantry Regiments approaching the forest from the southwest, received mortar fire while crossing the open ground between the VEZOUSE River and the woods. On the 27th, patrols to the northwest edge also drew mortar fire. The enemy was keeping the towns of CROISMARE and MARAINVILLER, on the VEZOUSE, under artillery fire.

On 28 September the weather cleared sufficiently to permit the planned bombing attack, which however was not carried out in as great strength as had been hoped and which, according to prisoners, did not have serious effects on the enemy. It did have the result, however, of enabling the attacking infantry to reach the edge of the forest without serious opposition.

The 315th Infantry and 313th Infantry attacked from the west, the former north of the main road, the latter to the south. After entering the woods resistance stiffened; both regiments reported the enemy using tanks in support of his hastily dug in infantry positions. This employment of armor (mostly Mark IV's) despite the difficulties of maneuver in the thickly wooded terrain was to become one of the outstanding features of the enemy's defense of the forest. While the density of cover frequently forced the tanks to keep to roads and firebreaks, full advantage was taken of any opportunity to deploy off the roads wherever a clearing or thinning of growth made it possible. As a rule tanks were kept mobile, but at times a few were spotted and camouflaged, notably at the principal road junction in mid-forest (Point No. 4) where the decisive battle was to take place later.

Advancing slowly against increasing resistance on 29 September, both regiments received counterattacks, one of which forced the 313th to fall back until an additional battalion could be committed to regain the lost ground. Heavy artillery fire was brought down on units in the western edge of the woods throughout the day. The very high proportion of tree bursts throughout the battle in the forest increased greatly the lethal effect of enemy artillery fire, and troops soon learned that foxholes had to be covered to provide overhead protection. Whenever possible logs were laid across the trenches; as enemy positions were over-run it was seen that he was taking the same precaution. In many cases the Germans saved themselves the trouble of digging by utilizing old World War I positions for this purpose, throwing logs and dirt over them to provide personnel shelters.

Resuming the attack on 30 September, both regiments advanced about 1000 yards eastward despite heavy artillery and mortar fire. The thickness of forest cover, by drastically limiting visibility to the flanks as well as to the front, forced attacking units to maintain close physical contact with each other; thus the speed of the advance was generally held down to that of the unit that faced the stiffest resistance. The same condition made it necessary to keep the tail of the advance closed in.

The 314th Infantry Regiment, which had been held at CROISMARE during the beginning of the battle, was committed on 1 October and advanced north-eastward into the forest against dug-in enemy positions on the south edge to a junction with the 313th on its left. During the next two days it was to cross the sector of the 313th, pinching it out and joining with the 315th

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

C O N F I D E N T I A L

along the main east-west road. Again the division advanced about 1000 yards on 1 October, with the 315th reporting heavy mortar and artillery fire but only moderate small arms fire. It appeared that the enemy's tactics here were to keep his main body well back of the nebulous "front", holding only small groups forward where they could hear, if not see, the attackers coming toward them through the woods. These observers could thus bring down accurate fire on the attack without endangering their own MLR. The scattered small arms fire occasionally met was believed to come from these forward observers attempting to escape at the last moment.

In addition to continuing mortar and artillery fire, the next days' advances encountered strong pockets of resistance, held by units of about company strength. One of these, at the clearing (Point 5) covering one of the enemy's supply routes into the forest from the direction of LA NEUVEVILLE, was a strong position, with barbed wire and minefields, most pockets of resistance, however, lacked this degree of development and consisted mainly of infantry foxholes. In addition, the enemy's defensive works included profuse mining of roads and tracks, frequently extending some distance into the woods on either side; all such well-defined avenues of approach were also registered by artillery, which kept them under interdicting fire.

Heavy enemy fire from the strong point in the clearing (Point 5) on 2 October forced the 314th Infantry to withdraw to the west edge of the clearing, from where the 1st and 3rd Battalions of the regiment continued to face the enemy throughout the remainder of the battle for the forest until the position was evacuated on the night of 9/10 October. The 2nd battalion continued northward to pinch out the 313th Infantry and link up with the 315th Infantry on the main east-west road.

Early on 2 October, the 315th had advanced without opposition except for the intense automatic fire met by patrols on its left flank approaching the road junction at Point 1, where they had also drawn fire the previous day. However, in the evening, a strong counterattack in estimated battalion strength was launched against the 315th at a second junction farther eastward (Point 2).

To cover the division's exposed left flank, where the enemy's defense of the road intersections indicated a potential threat of attacks from the north, the 106th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron entered the forest on 2 October preparatory to clearing out these enemy pockets. The 121st Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, meanwhile, was covering the sector between the forest and the MARNE-RHINE Canal and receiving mortar and artillery fire from enemy positions in the northwest corner of the forest.

A further few hundred yards were gained on 3 October against continuing mortar and artillery fire, despite a local counterattack against the 314th in the morning by a company of infantry and two tanks. A road block consisting of a long row of trees felled across the road and covered by machine guns was met at Point 3 to the west of the forest's principal junction. To reduce it, it was necessary for the light tanks attached to the 314th Infantry to cross the road into the 315th sector to outflank the block from the woods.

It was planned that on 4 October both regiments would advance abreast on the enemy's positions in the vicinity of the main junction in the heart of the forest. While the left flank did succeed in advancing to and beyond the north-south road above the junction, the units operating closer to the main axis were stopped short of the objective. The 2nd battalion of the 314th Infantry received a spoiling attack just before the time set for its own attack which therefore had to be postponed. The enemy attack was carried out by a company of infantry supported by six tanks; two of them advanced

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

C O N F I D E N T I A L

against the battalion under supporting fire from the other four which occupied positions in the vicinity of the junction. One of the attacking tanks was knocked out by bazooka fire.

After taking the rest of the morning to reorganize, the 2nd battalion of the 314th was to attempt another attack at 1300; this, too, was forestalled by enemy tank fire down the road accompanied by a strong mortar concentration. A second enemy infantry attack then broke a gap in the battalion position.

Meanwhile during the afternoon of 4 October, the 106th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron had attacked the road junction at Point 1 in the northwest of the forest. Fighting as infantry, with a platoon of light tanks in support, they had outflanked and cut off the enemy holding the road center and clearing, had captured 51 and killed ten at a cost of three casualties.

On 5 October, the 315th Infantry north of the junction, moved its 1st battalion through its left flank and then southeastward across the east-west road in an attempt to cut this road behind the enemy strong point at the junction. Enemy infantry supported by three tanks broke through the battalion on the road; part of it was cut off to the south of the road and the rest was held north of it. The following day this forward battalion northeast of the junction was engaged by elements of the 11th Panzer Reconnaissance Battalion. A strong enemy patrol probing the 1st battalion's defenses was driven off during the morning, and in the afternoon enemy tanks and infantry were engaged. One tank penetrated to the battalion CP before being stopped by bazooka fire. On 6 October the 1st battalion of the 315th was withdrawn from its exposed forward position back across the north-south road and both regiments began conducting vigorous patrolling activity in preparation for the renewed attack which was to come on 9 October. The 106th Cavalry Group, meanwhile, continued its clearing out of the northwest portion of the forest.

Thus the dispositions on the eve of the attack of 9 October were as follows: On the division's right the 1st and 3rd battalions of the 314th Infantry still faced the enemy across the clearing in the southern portion of the forest; to their left was a sizeable gap, beyond which the 2nd battalion held positions before the crucial road junction, with its left flank on the main east-west road; north of the road, the 3rd battalion of the 315th was also closely investing the junction; to its left were the 1st and 2nd battalions.

When the attack was launched, the latter two battalions moved due eastward, the 2nd battalion overcoming strong resistance with the aid of its supporting tanks, and by the end of the day had advanced deep into the eastern portion of the forest without further contact.

The two battalions immediately before the junction, however, faced strong opposition from an estimated two battalions of enemy infantry with tank support. However, the line of an abandoned narrow gauge railway ran southeastward past the flank of the enemy strongpoint and the 314th succeeded in working its supporting medium tanks and tank destroyers down this track and then northward to the main road behind the enemy position. Meanwhile, the enemy tanks at the junction had been neutralized by smoke.

This maneuver broke the enemy position at the road junction and in effect ended the battle for the forest. The 313th Infantry, from division reserve, exploiting toward the southeast through the 314th, reached the south east corner of the forest, delayed only by mines. And that night the sole

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C O N F I D E N T I A L



remaining enemy strongpoint, that facing the 1st and 3rd battalions of the 314th in the clearing on the south side of the forest, was abandoned. The following day patrols to the eastern edge of the forest found it clear.

The enemy had committed an estimated 2,000 men to defense of the forest; on several occasions he brought fresh units in during the night and committed them immediately in the morning. Approximately 650 prisoners were taken by 79th Division. They represented the 104th and the 115th Panzer Grenadier Regiments, 115th Tank Battalion, the 33rd Artillery Regiment, 33rd Signal Battalion, and 33rd Replacement Battalion, all from the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division; the 16th Bicycle Battalion and 16th GAF Engineer Battalion; elements (four tanks) of the 2111th Tank Battalion of the 111th Panzer Brigade; the 11th Panzer Reconnaissance Battalion of the 11th Panzer Division; and the 2113th Panzer Grenadier Regiment of the 113th Panzer Brigade.

Intelligence officers who had taken part in the battle generally agreed afterwards that the bold use of armor in the forest, despite the thick cover, had been the outstanding feature of the enemy's - and later of our own - tactics during the operation. On occasion, tanks had even been used as supply vehicles when the rain-sodden tracks had proved impassable for other types of transport.

They noted, however, that the impossibility of visual observation through the forest cover forced enemy artillery to resort largely to map fires and that armor as well as infantry should therefore make every effort to advance through the woods rather than on mapped roads and tracks. Accurate fires, of either mortar or artillery, could be brought down on sectors off the tracks only by keeping the main body well to the rear of the outposts and bringing the latter back to the MLW just prior to the concentration.

Also pointed out was the necessity for operating on narrow fronts, against limited objectives, to overcome the difficulties of control and orientation in thickly wooded terrain.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

ANNEX VCOUNTERINTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

A. 1 September - 30 September 1944

During this period the German Intelligence Service had to accommodate itself to rapidly varying situations. In the beginning of the month, when the retreat to the North and Northeast was headlong, the enemy had to be content with the agents he had planted along the Riviera and in TOULON and MARSEILLE. It was the mission of these agents to report intelligence by radio. One Abwehr agent, whose mission was to report on ship and troop movements in MARSEILLE, spoke five languages and used this linguistic ability as a wedge to obtain work as an interpreter for the American Army. In a few weeks he had succeeded in having himself employed in a position of considerable trust. He was arrested immediately prior to the arrival of three divisions.

With the retreat at its height in mid-September, the enemy was obliged to teach his old agents some new tricks. A powerful Abwehrstelle (Head Abwehr Office) in DIJON, with a branch in BOURG-EN-BRESSE and strong connections in PARIS and BELFORT, had been at work against the French resistance movements and the police, and had also succeeded in penetrating the British Intelligence in PARIS. These Abwehr agents were given the new role of collecting intelligence on the American Army. Wireless transmitters were installed and hidden, and a letter-drop was established. Many members of the DIJON-BOURG ring moved to Alsace-Lorraine, since a considerable number of the agents were Alsatian by birth or related to Alsatian families by marriage. However, the remnants who were left behind were apprehended with the aid of the agent who had recruited them.

Luring most of the period, proximity to Switzerland increased the enemy's opportunity to infiltrate agents posing as refugees. Conversely, because of Allied use of Switzerland as a point of entry for agents, the Germans tightened up on their screening methods. All Swiss nationals entering Germany were subjected to careful interrogation and observation.

During the retreat the enemy had had to depend for his intelligence on a patchwork stay-behind system composed both of agents trained for this purpose and of those improvised as the German forces withdrew from an area. However, the stabilized situation that developed along the MOSELLE and in the VOSGES near the end of September gave him a chance to fill up the holes in his system caused by the capture of his agents. The first line-crosser was dispatched with the mission of gathering tactical information and then returning across the lines. He was dressed as a priest and had instructions to attempt to ingratiate himself with the Americans by offering them tactical information on the German forces. He was apprehended and executed by the French.

Attempts at subversion in the form of German psychological warfare pamphlets began to show up early in the month. Two examples are notable: The first was a leaflet bearing the counterfeit signature of the Franc-Tireurs et Partisans Français, a Communist-dominated resistance organization. The leaflet foretold a Stalin-dictated France. It asked Frenchmen to oppose the bourgeois Anglo-Americans and to participate in a civil war for the Communization of France. The second was a leaflet containing reproductions of Allied military currency with a text claimed that it was valueless, unredeemable and Jewish-inspired.

Captured agents revealed several outstanding features of the operational procedure of the German Intelligence Service. In recruiting French

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ANNEX V

nationals for espionage or sabotage work, the Germans drew from collaborators, black market dealers, men and women whom they could blackmail, and criminals whom they freed from prison in exchange for their services as agents. In operational missions two standardized methods became apparent: Radio sets were carried in standard-type suitcases; agents were paid with new currency in numerical sequence.

Systematic destruction or removal of non-operational intelligence documents was very efficient. Several days before the Germans left LYON about 300 cases of documents were shipped out of Gestapo headquarters there.

Information from captured agents revealed an increasing use of PARIS as a center for espionage, sabotage and counter-espionage activities. Evidence indicated that the enemy was trying to tie together in the capital the cut strings of his French intelligence net. This was facilitated by the fact, discovered from captured agents, that many of the collaborators who had quit PARIS for Germany had left definite contacts behind.

No sabotage against Allied installations occurred during the month of September.

The scope of the enemy espionage and sabotage effort is indicated by the following tabulation of the 17 enemy agents apprehended during the month:

	<u>French</u>	<u>Luxemburger</u>	<u>Russian</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Espionage	15 (1)	1	1	17
Sabotage	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
TOTAL*	15	1	1	17

(Figure in parentheses indicates number of women included).

\* Ten agents were apprehended with radio transmitters.

#### B. 1 October - 31 October 1944

With the development of a stabilized front which began in late September, German Intelligence Services prepared to increase their espionage and sabotage efforts. The result, however, was that the Germans had to enter on the debit side of the October ledger four major setbacks: (1) the break-up of the DIJON Abwehrstelle (see September history), (2) the cleanup of important stay-behind agents on the Riviera, (3) the apprehension by Seventh Army roadblocks of line-crossing espionage agents, and (4) the arrest at a roadblock of the leading figure in the sabotage squad that had been sent to blow up Allied pipelines.

Of the twenty-five agents captured during the month:

- Eleven belonged to the DIJON Abwehr ring, a part of whose mission was the infiltration of Allied Intelligence Agencies.
- Four were Sicherheitsdienst stay-behind agents in Monaco, including the German vice-consul there.
- Five were Abwehr agents operating radio sets on the Riviera and in MARSEILLE.
- One was a Sicherheitsdienst stay-behind agent in EPINAL, who was awaiting a radio transmitter.
- One was a Swiss journalist working for the Swiss paper "Journal de Geneve" and also the Abwehr.
- One was an Abwehr line-crosser and one a Sicherheitsdienst line-crosser who was dressed as a priest.

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- One was a Sicherheitsdienst Amt VI/S agent who crossed the lines to sabotage Allied pipelines.

The first line-crossers caught had all been instructed to pose as refugees and to contact American Military Police or officers in order to offer tactical information. The mission of these line-crossers was primarily the gathering of operational intelligence. One agent had the additional mission of reporting on FFI developments and on the general economic and political situation in France.

The large subversive organizations, such as the Milice Francaise, the Legion des Volontaires Francais, the Parti Populaire Francais, the Francisme Movement, and numerous smaller collaborationist groups had for some time been streaming across France toward Germany, which, however, was hesitant about admitting them. Many had been put to digging fortifications in the Vosges and Alsace. About 25,000 Miliciens left the Schirmeck and Struthof Camps, stayed briefly in STRASBOURG, and finally arrived in ULM and SIG-MARINGEN. About the middle of October the LVF (Legion des Volontaires Francais) was incorporated into the Waffen SS. No matter what might be the military value to Germany of these traitors, German intelligence found itself with a ready-cut crop of potential agents. Many members of these subversive groups were sent to espionage and sabotage schools. Some of the better-known of these schools were located at WIESBACH, OSNABRUCK, HUIDSBACH, the HUBACKER-HOF in the Black Forest, at FREIBURG-IM-BREISGAU, and in the vicinity of FRANKFURT. The Hubacker-Hof school specialized in training young Frenchmen, mostly Francistes, and included parachute and radio training. The largest school, which was probably for the Milice, was the one at FREIBURG. Many PFF members had assembled in ST. DIE, previous to their retreat to Germany. An agent of the Hubacker-Hof school stated that PFF members had been organized in ST. DIE to cross the lines and act as a chain of agents from the Vosges to PARIS, reporting on Communistic activities and retaliatory measures taken against PFF members and their families.

ST. DIE during October developed as a center for dispatching agents against the Seventh Army. All line-crossers apprehended in this period (and many later) had false papers which were issued there. ST. DIE was the headquarters of an Abwehr III office, staffed by personnel of Frontaufklarungsstrupp 353. Meldekopfs (small Abwehr offices) were also established in various Vosges towns including REMIREMONT and FRAIZE.

Other methods employed by the enemy during the period included freeing imprisoned patriots and mixing agents with them as the patriots attempted to return to the Allied lines; confiscating French passports for use of agents passing through Switzerland; employing the guinea-pig technique of sending low-grade agents through the lines to reconnoiter for future agents; and exploiting minority nationalities to recruit agents. The tried and true methods of recruiting were continued and black market operators and political and criminal prisoners found themselves confronted with a choice of prison or becoming German agents.

The Sicherheitsdienst also decided to go in for sabotage on a large scale. Brigadier General SCHELLENBERGER, chief of Amt VI of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt, ordered the sabotaging of the Allied pipeline crossing France and provided a well-trained agent with one million francs to do it. This agent, a Swiss, recruited two others, Frenchmen, who were to join him in or near PARIS. Hidden sabotage dumps were to be used for the purpose. All three were caught by Seventh Army roadblocks shortly after they had crossed the lines.

Roadblocks also turned up large numbers of Gestapo informers, subversive French nationals, collaborationists and other types of security hazards

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who were trying to circulate within the Seventh Army area.

The Germans, too, increased their travel control systems, and continued to exercise the strictest surveillance over persons crossing into Germany from Switzerland.

Enemy attempts to influence the morale of our troops were confined to leaflet propaganda which compared the lot of the front-line soldier with that of service troops in the rear and 4-Fs in the United States. There was sporadic use of public address systems in which units were addressed by name and various details of their history given as a prelude to exhortations to surrender.

Again the scope of the enemy espionage and sabotage efforts for the period is indicated by the following box score of apprehensions:

	<u>French</u>	<u>German</u>	<u>Danish</u>	<u>Swiss</u>	<u>Dutch</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Espionage	19 (3)	1	2 (1)	1	1	24
Sabotage	<u>0</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>1</u>
TOTAL*	19	2	2	1	1	25

(Figure in parentheses indicates number of women included)

\* Five agents were apprehended with radio transmitters.

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# G-2 HISTORY



## SEVENTH ARMY

OPERATIONS

IN

# EUROPE



PART FOUR

1-30 NOVEMBER 1944

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REPRODUCED BY ENGINEER SECTION - SEVENTH ARMY HQ



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HEAD QUARTERS SEVENTH ARMY  
Office of the A. C. of S., G-2  
APO 750 US ARMY

JP/cy

3 June 1945

## MEMORANDUM:

TO : All Concerned.

1. This document is a general summary of the activities of the German forces opposing the Seventh US Army during the period indicated.

2. It was prepared by the G-2 Section Seventh Army to relate chronologically, month by month, the enemy's tactics, composition and organization. It is not a history of Seventh Army operations, as such a document is being produced by the Seventh Army Historical Section.

3. THIS DOCUMENT IS RESTRICTED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. Per. 23b, AR 380-5, 15 March 1944.

CLASSIFICATION WAS CHANGED FROM CONFIDENTIAL TO RESTRICTED AUTHORITY CONSIDERING GENERAL SEVENTH ARMY, BY W. G. CANNELL, COLONEL, AGO, ON 1 JUNE 1945.

*William A. John*  
William A. John  
Colonel, GSC  
A C of S, G-2

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH ARMY  
Office of the A.C. of S., G-2  
APO 758 US ARMY

G-2 HISTORY

OPERATIONS IN EUROPE

Part IV

1 - 30 November 1944

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# I. GENERAL.

The Seventh Army's breaking of the VOSGES position during November was a demonstration of one of the oldest of military maxims - that there is no such thing as an undefended obstacle.

Historically, the VOSGES Mountains are an "impregnable" position. Supplemented, as they were during September and October, by an extensive system of prepared obstacles and weapon emplacements, they constituted, on paper, an effective barrier before the frontiers of the Reich. But the position was nevertheless broken, in an assault whose decisive phases lasted hardly more than a week.

The explanation for the Germans' failure to hold a line on which such hopes had been pinned, and such labor expended, is not difficult to find: the High Command failed to man the position with enough troops to transform the appearance of strength into reality. Overpowered and outmaneuvered, the enemy found hills and anti-tank ditches no substitutes for manpower and firepower.

When the final Seventh Army attack began, on 13 November, the enemy was attempting to hold the front with six infantry divisions, with a total strength in infantry combat effectives of not more than 10,000 men. Against these were thrown six American infantry divisions, with another in reserve, a reinforced French armored division and a combat command of an American armored division.

There were three principal reasons for the Germans' inability to match Allied strength on the VOSGES front:

First, threats against other sectors had necessitated dispersion of his forces. The best mountain division on the front, 269, on arriving from Norway in October, had been committed at once against the French First Army's penetration of the VOSGES south of GERARDMER, which, if unchecked, threatened to outflank BELFORT from the north. And during November, the French assault of the BELFORT Gap, exposing the southern ALSACE Plain, drew off the 198 Division as well. Its movement to MULHOUSE left the Central VOSGES, before Seventh Army's VI Corps, very thinly held.

In the north, the armored divisions, 11 and 21, covering the approaches toward SARREBOURG and SAVERNE, were drawn off by what the enemy evidently considered the greater threat of a US Third Army attack on the METZ front. When the Third Army attack did materialize, just prior to our own, still another division from Seventh Army front, 553, was ordered north to meet it. It was just beginning its move when it was caught by the Seventh Army attack.

Second, two of the remaining divisions, 16 and 716, attempting to hold the MEURTHE River line before ST. DIE, had been badly cut up in their continuous engagement with the US VI Corps since late September and by the middle of November disposed an infantry combat effective strength of only 600 and 1,000 respectively.

Third, the German High Command was already beginning to plan its December offensive in the Ardennes and its best reserves and reinforcements were earmarked for that build-up. The extremely low level of reinforcements arriving on our front during the first half of November demonstrated that it no longer held a high priority. Of the 5,000 infantry reinforcements who arrived during those two weeks, 3,200 were accounted for by a single division, the 708 Volksgrenadiers, who replaced the departed 21 Panzer and thus made little contribution to a net increase in strength.

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(708 Volksgrenadier Division was a reconstitution of the 708 Infantry Division which had been mauled in the Normandy breakthrough). Despite their anemia, the 16 and 716 Divisions received no transfusions, and no other division received more than 400 reinforcements.

Thus when the assault came, coordinated with attacks the full length of the Western Front, the enemy was in no position to plug all of the gaps which opened simultaneously. The three infantry divisions (elements of 361, 553 and 708) which opposed the US XV Corps in the north were split and scattered. 361, on the enemy right, was forced out of its defensive positions northwest of BLAMONT and squeezed northward into a salient between the US Seventh and Third Armies, from which only remnants escaped. 553, caught unprepared as it was about to leave the sector, was driven eastward before the XV Corps drive, decimated in its attempts to make a stand, and finally virtually liquidated in the envelopment of the SAVERNE Gap. And 708 was shouldered southward into the VOSGES, and into the path of the US VI Corps advance.

The enemy front against VI Corps, also originally held by three divisions (716, 16 and 198), fared no better. 198 was dispatched to MULHOUSE in an attempt to contain the French advance. 716, holding the MEURTHE River line, was outflanked from the north by VI Corps' exploitation of the previously won breakthrough at BACCARAT. Thus exposed in the ST. DIE sector, the weakened 16 Division could not stand up to the frontal assaults across the upper MEURTHE, and fell back to the east, burning the VOSGES towns as it went. In the eastern VOSGES, the remnants of 16 and 716 were joined by 708 and took up positions along the northern sector of the "COLMAR Pocket."

With the breaking of the VOSGES position an accomplished fact, and Allied troops on the RHINE at both STRASBOURG and BASLE, the enemy devoted the balance of November to attempts to prevent further exploitation of the breakthrough. The COLMAR pocket was stubbornly held, denying the Allies access to the central ALSACE Plain, and a new front was hastily built up along the Seventh Army's northern flank to oppose a drive in this direction toward the PALATINATE.

The enemy had short-lived hopes of being able to cut off the forward elements of US XV Corps which were extended through the SAVERNE Gap to STRASBOURG. A battlegroup of the 130 Panzer Division "LEHR" moved in from reserve and accompanied by elements of the 11 Panzer Division and the 25 Panzer Grenadier Division from Third Army front, counterattacked southward toward SARREBOURG on 23 November. The counterattack was forestalled by the intervention of armor from the Third Army and the enemy reverted to the defensive in the face of renewed Seventh Army attacks northward toward the REICH.

## II. CHRONOLOGY.

1 November - D-78

On the last day of October, the French 2nd Armored Division had launched its limited attack to clear BACCARAT preparatory to the full-scale offensive scheduled for mid-November. Simultaneously the US 45th Division was pushing northward and northeastward from ST. BENOIT toward BACCARAT and RAON L'ETAPE. By the following day BACCARAT had been cleared by the French, who advanced farther to BERTRICHAMPS, and contact had been made with the 45th Division on the BACCARAT - MENIL SUR BELVITTE road. In the forested hills west and southwest of ST. DIE, the enemy continued to oppose US advances into the LES ROUGES EAUX valley, and broke up our attack on Hill 616 on LES ROUGES EAUX - ST. DIE road. He withdrew from Hill 526

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from which he had forced US troops two days previously, and where close fighting had been in progress on 31 October.

2 November - D/79

The enemy presented somewhat stronger opposition to further exploitation of the advances of 2nd DP and US 45th Divisions in BACCARAT sector, particularly northeast of BACCARAT, where the French penetration threatened to breach the main enemy defensive position before the VOSGES Mountains. Advances east of VACQUEVILLE and northward toward BLAMONT were strongly opposed and armor was reported in MONTIGNY area. Southeast of BACCARAT, the enemy defended his bridgehead on the west side of the MEURTHE River by resisting our advances on RAUBERVILLERS - ST. MICHEL - RAUBERVILLERS - RAON L'ETAPE and LES ROUGES BAUX - ST. DIE roads. Elements of the 716 Infantry Division (in which were reported incorporated the remnants of 189 Infantry Division) were met in this area, to which the 716 had moved from its previous sector south of ST. DIE.

3 November - D/80

The enemy continued stubbornly to defend the approaches to ST. DIE from the west, and elsewhere in the ST. DIE - BACCARAT sector presented scattered resistance supported by mines and artillery to our advances toward the MEURTHE. To the north he straightened his line west of BLAMONT and appeared to be strengthening his defenses, shelling HERSBIVILLER and concentrating tanks at DOMEVILLE.

4 November - D/81

Despite continuing stubborn resistance on the western approaches to ST. DIE, the enemy lost LE HAUT JACQUES. He fought scattered delaying actions supported by artillery, tank fire and mines against our further advances toward the MEURTHE in the area east and south of RAON L'ETAPE. Only patrol actions and mopping up were reported from the northern portion of the front.

5 November - D/82

Demonstrating growing concern about US advances toward the MEURTHE River south of RAON L'ETAPE, the Germans attempted to bolster the 716 Infantry Division in this sector by the addition of the 951 Infantry Regiment, detached from its parent 361 Infantry Division on the northern flank. The town of THIAVILLE, northwest of RAON L'ETAPE, was strongly defended, as were the southwest approaches to ST. DIE, where the enemy still held Hill 616. Prepared defensive positions were also developed south of BLAMONT.

6 November - D/83

The enemy continued to hold stubbornly to his narrow bridgehead west of MEURTHE River between ST. DIE and BACCARAT. Although he withdrew to the river at the southern end of the bridgehead near ST. MICHEL, he continued to hold out in houses, woods and on favorable terrain from here north to THIAVILLE, launching a counterattack south of RAON L'ETAPE and holding our advance on THIAVILLE with many automatic weapons and considerable artillery (i.e. Southwest of ST. DIE he lost his long defended position on Hill 616 on the LES ROUGES BAUX - ST. DIE road, and despite continued resistance was forced out of other positions in the southeastern portion of the DOMMINE de CHAT.

7 November - D/84

Activity was generally lighter in the FRONT DOMMINE de CHAT except

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at points immediately west of ST. DIE where strong resistance continued. Between ST. DIE and BACCARAT the enemy continued to maintain a defensive position west of MEURTHE River, where his defenses on the approaches to CLAIREFONTAINE were supported by intermittent artillery fire, and northwest of THIAVILLE by nebelwerfer fire. There was no contact on the Army's left.

8 November - D/85

Although the enemy presented resistance at only scattered points along the edge of FORET DOMANIALE de CHAMP west and southwest of ST. DIE, he stubbornly defended his bridgehead before the MEURTHE, northwest of the town. Houses, woods and dug-in positions were used in defense against our advance towards the river, with enemy infantry receiving support of 120 round artillery concentrations in the DEYFOSSE - LE MENIL area. In the northern zone enemy appeared to be strengthening his positions in the BLEMERY area but could not be contacted in the vicinity of LEINTREY.

9 November - D/86

Enemy continued to demonstrate his reluctance to give up the FORET DOMANIALE de CHAMP resisting particularly in the southeast corner where local counterattack was launched. Although he lost LE MENIL and DEYFOSSE he continued to fight delaying actions west of the MEURTHE River in this zone, and strong opposition forced US forward elements to withdraw south of LA FOSSE. On the Army's left his reoccupation of forward defensive positions in the BLEMERY - LEINTREY area was possibly a reaction to US Third Army's offensive, which had begun the previous day.

10 November - D/87

The FORET DOMANIALE de CHAMP was cleared, although the enemy continued to present some resistance east of Forest on approaches to ST. DIE. In CLAIREFONTAINE - RAON L'ETAPE sector, he was withdrawing across the MEURTHE River, giving up LA FOSSE, ETIVAL and PAJAILLE as well as positions on high ground south of RAON L'ETAPE. Contact continued light in the northern part of Army zone.

11 November - D/88

There was only limited contact at scattered points along the Army front. Some opposition developed northwest of GERARDMER and on the western approaches to ST. DIE. Enemy withdrawal beyond MEURTHE River, northwest of ST. DIE, appeared virtually complete.

12 November - D/89

Scattered resistance was offered to advances against principal terrain features on the Army's right flank. The center of VI Corps zone was generally quiet, except for harassing artillery fire, and civilian reports indicated that the enemy withdrawal beyond the MEURTHE River southeast of BACCARAT was complete. North of the river scattered strongpoints and pockets of resistance were met in eastward advance of 100th Division. The 708 Volksgrenadier Division was identified in this area where it had relieved the 21 Panzer Division. There was little ground contact in the XV Corps sector but the enemy attempted to interdict lines of communication eastward from LUNEVILLE toward BADONVILLER and BLAMONT with shell fire, bridge demolition, and bombing, as US troops took up positions for the attack scheduled for the next day. US Third Army reported identification of elements of the 553 Infantry Division, which was thus known to be in process of moving away from the XV Corps sector on the eve of the Corps' attack.

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13 November - D490

XV Corps met strong resistance, mainly small arms and mortar fire, to the attacks by the US 79th Division toward ST. POLY and ANCERVILLER, and by the US 44th Division east and northeast of LEINTZEN. In the latter area the enemy was using some old World War I positions.

An enemy counterattack was launched unsuccessfully in the vicinity of THIAVILLE and some resistance was met west of ST. DIE; there were indications that the enemy was improving defensive positions on the hill mass south of ST. DIE. Unopposed occupation of important terrain features on Seventh Army's right flank, coupled with civilian and PW reports, indicated that the enemy was falling back in the area northwest of GERARDMER.

14 November - D491

Although both US and French patrols reported contact at LE THOLY, the enemy continued to fall back from his salient on Seventh Army's right, northwest of GERARDMER. The only enemy activity reported on ST. DIE front was road movement in area north of city. In the north, the enemy's reaction to breaching of his main defensive positions at ANCERVILLER was surprisingly weak, but he presented very strong resistance along the main LUNEVILLE - SARREBOURG axis.

15 November - D492

For the second successive day the enemy failed to react vigorously to the 79th Division's breakthrough south of BLAMONT, and lost both HALLOVILLE and HANBOUEY. In the north, the defensive positions covering the LUNEVILLE - SARREBOURG axis, which held out stubbornly throughout the previous period, were broken.

After falling back slightly in the woods east of BACCARAT, enemy again presented some opposition in area of the RAON L'ETAPE - NEUFMAISONS road. Very little activity was reported on Army's right where the enemy continued to fall back, conducting only scattered delaying actions along the approaches to GERARDMER.

16 November - D493

In XV Corps sector deep penetrations both north and south of BLAMONT again failed to elicit any enemy reaction other than the withdrawal of his resulting salient along the OGEVILLER - DOMEVRE - BLAMONT road. Lack of opposition to the occupation of THIAVILLE and deep penetration of the woods north of RAON L'ETAPE indicate enemy withdrawal in this sector as well. Although a screening position was met northwest of GERARDMER and stubborn opposition received in hills southwest of ST. DIE, the burning of several villages and portions of ST. DIE itself indicated that the enemy was preparing to fall back on Seventh Army's right when pressed.

17 November - D494

On the Army's right, the hill mass southwest of ST. DIE was occupied against weakening resistance, and further towns were abandoned and burned by the enemy as he continued withdrawing deeper into the VOSGES Mountains. On the Army's left, the 708 Division was forced back to the VOSGES Mountains, losing BADONVILLER and BREMENIL; but attempts to envelop BLAMONT were stubbornly opposed by elements of 553 Division both before the city and at the bridgehead across the VEZOUSE River to the east. Resistance was light northwest of BLAMONT where a local counterattack to reestablish the AVRICOURT - MOUSSEY line failed.

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18 November - D495

Only scattered resistance was met in GERARDMER - ST. DIE sector and only slight enemy activity was observed by US patrols which penetrated close to GERARDMER. At ST. DIE the enemy withdrew from the portion of the town south of the MEURTHE River. Increasing resistance met attempts at further penetration north of RAON L'ETAPE, and an attempted crossing of the PLAINE River was strongly opposed. In the northern zone, the enemy lost PARUX, PETITMONT, FOULCREY, RECHICOURT and MOUSSEY, but resisted stubbornly efforts to expand the 79th Division bridgehead across the VEZOUSE east of BLAMONT.

19 November - D496

In Army's northern zone efforts of 553 and 708 Divisions to organize behind the HEMING - BLAMONT - VEZOUSE River line had apparently collapsed. FREMONVILLE and ST. GEORGES were cleared after heavy fighting. The bridge at CIREY was captured intact. Farther south, elements of 708 and 716 Divisions continued to offer stubborn opposition in heavily wooded area east of RAON L'ETAPE. On the southern flank the advance continued to the east, with no enemy contact reported in the area north of GERARDMER.

20 November - D497

The French 2nd DB, which had been recommitted in XV Corps zone to exploit the enemy collapse, continued its rapid advance to the east against a disorganized enemy; new identifications indicated that enemy service units were being overrun. WALDSHEID and VOYER were cleared after a stiff fight, and the advance continued to the east, reaching DABO and HAZELBOURG unopposed, thus threatening to bypass the prepared defensive position before SAVERNE Gap. Light resistance was being encountered by 44th Division in SARREBOURG and small towns to the north at close of the period. In the center, the enemy remained alert to any threat to the CELLES - LUVIGNY highway from the BADONVILLER region. Farther south, elements of 716 Division did not oppose crossing of MEURTHE River in the ST. MICHEL area, but offered resistance from high ground east of CLAIREFONTAINE and HURBACHE. On the south flank, the US advance continued slowly, following enemy withdrawal.

21 November - D498

Identification of elements of the 16 Division north and south of GERARDMER indicated that this unit had spread out to cover the sector vacated by 198 Division; the latter had moved to the MULHOUSE sector to attempt to contain the First French Army's breakthrough to the RHINE through the BELFORT Gap.

Additional crossings of the MEURTHE River north and south of ST. DIE were only lightly opposed by elements of 16 and 716 Divisions, indicating that the enemy was attempting only to delay in this sector. Advance in broken hills east of HURBACHE met only light scattered resistance from enemy snipers and patrols.

In Army's northern zone, enemy resistance continued scattered and poorly organized. The main portion of the organized SAVERNE Gap position was developed before PHALSBOURG, where enemy showed signs of fighting from behind an extensive AT ditch. To south, however, this position was outflanked as the enemy opposed only lightly the 2nd DB's exit from the VOSGES in the BIRKENWALD area.

22 November - D499

Resistance increased before FRAIZE where elements of 16 Division were defending from well-prepared positions. ST. DIE was cleared and efforts of 716 Division to keep open the STE MARGUERITE - SAALES road came to naught as SAALES was entered. Farther north, elements of 708 Division were

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forced back on the WOSGES from ROYERHOUTEN to ST. QUIN.

In the Army's northern zone remnants of 553 Division stubbornly defended the area north and south of PLEMER. However, the previous day's outflanking of this position was further exploited as SAV. DIV and nearby towns in the enemy rear were taken against negligible opposition. Contact with elements of 11 Panzer Division on the northern flank, in the vicinity of EYILLER, indicated that this division had moved eastward from the US Third Army zone; this was the beginning of enemy armor activity, lasting through the next three days, whose primary purposes appeared to be first to screen the withdrawal of 3-1 Infantry Division from its exposed salient back to the ST. QUIN line, and second to counterattack southward against US XV Corps' extended left flank to cut off the forward elements east of STRASBOURG.

23 November - D/100

In the Army's southern zone elements of 16 and 716 Divisions, after first offering stubborn opposition, showed signs of withdrawing farther into the WOSGES. By the end of the day resistance was reported generally light and scattered. To the north remnants of 553 Division were unable to hold STRASBOURG after being completely surrounded. Concurrent with its fall to US 79th Division, the advance of the French 2nd DB from the SAV. DIV area continued virtually unopposed to STRASBOURG. The enemy was unable to offer any organized opposition in this area, and STRASBOURG was entered. Star fighting for bridges over the RHE River was in progress at the close of the period.

On the northern flank, elements of 130 Panzer Division "LEHR" appeared in the same general area where 11 Panzer had been identified the previous day, and EYILLER and GUNZWILLER were retaken.

24 November - D/101

Events at STRASBOURG had their effect on the 16 and 716 Divisions, who were withdrawing eastward as rapidly as possible. The only serious opposition encountered was at BOUEZ - BRUCHE where a reported 700 enemy reinforcements, concerned over the threat to SELESTAT, attempted unsuccessfully to slow the advance. At STRASBOURG mopping up operations were completed and several thousand PWs taken, although the enemy continued to defend the STRASBOURG - KELL bridge. Reconnaissance was pushed toward HAGUENAU against little or no opposition. In the area north of STRASBOURG the Panzer "LEHR" Division's battle group was very aggressive and forced slight withdrawals of US troops before being met by armor from US Third Army.

25 November - D/102

130 Panzer Division "LEHR" resumed its offensive in the sector north of STRASBOURG, and retook RAUWILLER and JECKERSWILLER, and reached within about five miles of SAUERBOURG before being stopped. Infantry and armor were active in reconnaissance south of HAGUENAU where elements of 256 Volksgrenadier Division were first identified on arrival from HOLLAND, and in STRASBOURG the enemy held stubbornly to his bridgehead west of the RHE bridge. In the southern zone, remnants of 16, 716 and 703 Divisions continued their withdrawal behind scattered delaying groups.

26 November - D/103

With the loss of NUTZIG, ROSHEIM and NOUVEAU, 703 Division had been virtually driven out of the WOSGES, but to its south 16 and 716 Divisions stiffened their resistance on the approaches to SELESTAT, the first indication of what was to become the stubbornly held ALSACE bridgehead. At STRASBOURG, the enemy still held on the west bank, and in the HAGUENAU sector confined himself to patrolling.



North of SARREBOURG the enemy appeared to have lost his enthusiasm for the attack, withdrawing under pressure to the north. Identification of elements of the 25 Panzer Grenadier Division in this area, in conjunction with the reported movement to the southeast of 50 tanks from WINGEN to INGWILLER indicated the shifting of 130 Panzer Division eastward into the INGWILLER - HAGUENAU area.

27 November - D/104

In the southern zone the 16 and 716 Divisions, falling back on COLMAR and SELESTAT, again offered delaying action, but in the center, as the advance broke out into the ALSACE Plain, only scattered contact was reported with remnants of the 708 Division. 256 Infantry Division and elements of 130 Panzer Division remained on the defensive in the HAGUENAU area, as did the elements of 25 Panzer Grenadier Division which were holding strongly on the WOLFSKIRCHEN - OTTWILLER line north of SARREBOURG.

28 November - D/105

The 16 and 716 Divisions resisted along all routes out of the VOSGES into SELESTAT, while efforts of friendly armor to push south in the ALSACE Plain met a strong reaction from remnants of the 708 Division in the BARR - ERSTEIN area. XV Corps' attack northward, between the RHINE and the SARRE, met strong resistance and occasional counterattacks in some sectors, lighter opposition in others. On the eastern half of this front, east of the HARDT Mountains, 245 Infantry Division arrived to join 256 Division in defense of the southern approaches to GERMANY. On the western half, 25 Panzer Grenadier Division appeared to be offering most of the resistance. Elements of 130 Panzer Division "LEHR" were in support on both sides of the HARDT Mountains.

29 November - D/106

US VI Corps' progress out of the VOSGES and south in the ALSACE Plain was slowed as the 16, 716 and 708 Divisions, reinforced with several new miscellaneous units, became more aggressive. Several well-supported counterattacks, aimed at the 2nd French Armored and 103rd Divisions, were beaten off. Stronger opposition continued to develop to XV Corps' attack northward, with enemy infantry being supported by tanks, self-propelled guns and artillery.

30 November - D/107

The enemy continued to contest all advances into the ALSACE Plain throughout the morning, but later in the day there were some indications that he was slowly withdrawing south and east under pressure. Demolitions and flooding hindered the movement of armor south of ERSTEIN. On the north, the enemy displayed a stiffening defensive attitude, defending from well dug-in positions and offering strong resistance in all villages in the path of the advance. Small groups of armor operated along entire front east of the HARDT Mountains.

### III. SUMMARY.

The enemy's vain attempt to hold the VOSGES Mountains - the last barrier between the Seventh Army and Germany - cost him 23,623 prisoners during November. It also cost him the operational unity of Army Group G, which was split apart by the Seventh Army attack and forced to take drastic measures - including the importation of two divisions from as far away as Holland - to reform its front.

As a result, Seventh Army faced an enemy order of battle at the end of November materially different from that which it had faced at the beginning.

The breakthrough by US XV Corps had taken place along the boundary between the German Nineteenth and First Armies. Nineteenth, on the south, was forced eastward and southward through the VOSGES, and taking four of our original six opponents with it (16, 198, 708 and 716 Divisions), holed up in the COLMAR area. There it was bequeathed to the French First Army, by a readjustment of Allied boundaries early in December; although it continued to be a potential threat to Seventh Army's rear it was no longer an immediate tactical problem.

The German First Army, which had held the extreme northern portion of the VOSGES front, had its left flank shattered, losing all of the combat effectives of 553 Division. Out of the debacle it salvaged part of the 361 Division, which at the beginning of the battle had been astride the US Seventh and Third Army boundaries, and by the end of the month had slipped eastward so that its entire bulk opposed the Seventh Army. It was the only one of the six starters still in contact at the end of the month.

To make up the deficiency the enemy committed all or part of four new divisions:

25 Panzer Grenadier Division, originally the 25 Infantry Division, motorized in the fall of 1940 and sent to the central Russian front where it was destroyed. Following reorganization it was first contacted by US Third Army on 12 November and by Seventh Army on 24 November.

130 Panzer Division "LEHR", which had been reforming in Westphalia after suffering heavy casualties in Normandy, where it had been committed in the CAEN sector. Only a token force from each of LEHR's regiments was actually dispatched to the Seventh Army sector in November, to act as a mobile reserve to cover the reorganization of the First Army's front; the bulk of the division remained behind to continue training for its role in the offensive scheduled for 16 December.

245 Infantry Division, which had been stationed at DIEPPE at the time of the NORMANDY landings and then moved to ABBEVILLE; after the BRITTANY break-through it was continuously committed in HOLLAND until mid-November, picking up a few replacements before being moved to the south.

256 Volksgrenadier Division, a reorganization of the 256 Infantry Division, which had been a victim of the operations at SMOLENSK, and had later been committed against the First Canadian Army before being moved southward in November to defend the PALATINATE.

## ANNEX I

## ENEMY FORCES OPPOSING SEVENTH ARMY

Strength in Infantry Combat Effectives

<u>Unit</u>	<u>1 November</u>	<u>14 November</u>	<u>21 November</u>	<u>30 November</u>
16th Inf Div	900-1000	600	600-700	750
19th Inf Div	* 450		Moved to US Third Army Front	
21st Pz Div	2200		Moved to US Third Army Front	
25th PG Div	From US Third Army Front			* 500
30th SS	From French First Army Front			** 600
130th Pz Div	From Reserve Army Group D			2800
198th Inf Div	500-600	1300	Moved to French First Army Front	
245th VG Div	From Holland			1900-2000
256th VG Div	From Holland			• 2200
338th Inf Div	1400	Moved to French First Army Front		
361st VG Div	* 900	* 350	* 300	1050
553rd VG Div	2800	2600	700-800	Destroyed
708th VG Div		3200	1400-1500	500-600
716th Inf Div	1000	1000	600-700	400
360th Cossack Regt	330	375	375	375
Misc Units	2500-3000	1750	2170	2625
Reserves not in contact:	*			
405th Inf Div	3500	3500	3500	3500

\* Remainder of division on US Third Army Front


\*\* Remainder of division on French First Army Front

ANNEX I

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ANNEX III

PRINCIPAL ARMY COMMANDERS OPPOSING SEVENTH ARMY

ARMY GROUP G

WILCK, General der Panzer Truppen.

See G-2 History for October.

FIRST ARMY

VON KROBOLDITZ, etc., General der Panzer Truppen.

See G-2 History for October.

SECOND ARMY

DE ME, Frederick, General der Infanterie.

See G-2 History for August.

III SS CORPS

FAISS, Hermann, SS Gruppenführer and Generalleutnant der Waffen SS.

Now 43 years of age, FAISS formerly commanded the 3rd SS Panzer Division "TOTENKOPF" in RUSSIA and on 2 May 1944, received the Oak Leaf with Swords for his service in the BALTO PROVINCES. He had previously received the Ritterkreuz. Promoted to his present rank on 20 April 1944, he has had command of III SS Corps since September 1944.

IV CORPS

THUM, Helmuth, General der Infanterie.

No biographical data available.

LVII CORPS

BRUNNEN, Walter, Generalleutnant.

No biographical data available.

LXXXI CORPS

VON UND ZU EISEN, Speiberg, General der Infanterie.

See G-2 History for October.

... CORPS (Previously IV GAF CORPS)

PETERSEN, General der Flieger.

See G-2 History for October.

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16 INFANTRY DIVISION

HAACKEL, Ernst, Generalleutnant.

See G-2 History for September.

19 INFANTRY DIVISION (59 Grenadier Regiment)

SILBERMABEL, Oberst.

See G-2 History for October.

21 PANZER DIVISION

MEUCHTINGER, Generalleutnant.

See G-2 History for September.

25 PANZER GRENADIER DIVISION

HAASENBACH, Oberst.

No biographical data available.

130 PANZER DIVISION "LEHR"

BAISCHLEIN, Generalmajor.

No biographical data available.

198 INFANTRY DIVISION

SCHILL, Generalmajor

See G-2 History for September. Correct spelling of this officer's name now believed to be SCHILL rather than SCHIELE.

245 VOLKSGRENADIER DIVISION

KUEHLER, Oberst.

No biographical data available.

256 VOLKSGRENADIER DIVISION

FRANK, Oberst.

No biographical data available.

338 INFANTRY DIVISION

von OPPEN, Oberst.

Commander of a battle group in the withdrawal from Southern FRANCE to the VOGGES, von OPPEN took command of 338 Infantry Division after General-major ASCHMANN was killed on 14 November.

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361 VOLKSGRENADIER DIVISION

PHILIPPI, Oberst.

See G-2 History for October.

405 INFANTRY DIVISION

NEESER, Generalleutnant.

No biographical data available.

553 VOLKSGRENADIER DIVISION

BRUCH, Hans, Generalmajor.

See G-2 History for October.

708 INFANTRY DIVISION

KRIEGER, Generalmajor.

No biographical data available.

716 INFANTRY DIVISION

RICHTER, Wilhelm, Generalmajor.

No biographical data available.

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## ANNEX IV

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

1 November - 30 November 1944

Almost fifty percent of the enemy agents captured by Seventh Army during November had been sent across battle lines on important espionage or sabotage missions. This was the logical and the easiest method for the German Intelligence Services, since, for the major part of the month, the front was a continuation of October's well-defined, almost static lines. Frontaufklaerungstrupp 353 in St. Die was busy preparing the dispatching agents, while Nests/Strasbourg and Cologne occupied themselves with readying stay-behind agents in case of Allied occupation of Alsace and Lorraine. This occupation came near the end of November, with sufficient suddenness to disrupt GIS espionage and sabotage plans. A further result of the abrupt Allied overrunning of the frontier areas was the arrest of the Police President of Strasbourg, SS Oberfuehrer Carl ENGELHARDT, together with most of his staff.

Of the eleven agents captured during the month:

- Two were saboteurs of French nationality working for Amt VI/S as assistants to Ludwig NEBEL (captured on the last day of the preceding month) whose mission was to blow up Allied pipelines crossing France. The trio, after crossing the Allied lines, were to meet in Paris, and, after pooling information and contacting GIS agents there, were to secure their sabotage materiel from hidden dumps in the Paris area.
- One was a French boy, 17 years old, who had crossed the lines on a tactical espionage mission for the Sicherheitsdienst. He had been trained at an espionage school at the Hubacker-Hof in the Black Forest which specialized in the training of young Frenchmen belonging to French Fascist organizations.
- A member of the Legion des Volontaires Francais, who had been a cook in the Hubacker-Hof espionage school and had been dispatched by the SD on a short-range tactical mission.
- An Abwehr agent who had been sent from St. Die and had crossed the lines to accomplish a long-range espionage mission in Paris. He was to discover V-2 damage, logistical data and activities of Communists and Communist-dominated resistance organizations in France.
- An Abwehr III agent, member of Frontaufklaerungstrupp 353 and of the Intelligence Service of the Parti Populaire Francais, who had worked for both the SD and the Abwehr in the St. Die region on counterintelligence missions.
- A French national whom the SD had intended to use as a long-range financial and industrial agent after the war.
- A former delegate of the Vichy Government's Service des Societes Secretes who had worked for the SD.
- A 19-year-old Frenchwoman who had worked for the Legion des Volontaires Francais and as a courier for the Sicherheitspolizei.
- A Frenchman who had performed espionage for the Germans at the beginning of the war, having furnished them with information on airfield activities.

ANNEX IV

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The efficiency of Seventh Army travel control in apprehending German agents resulted in the GIS warning its agents to avoid road blocks in the Seventh Army sector. It is also known that the enemy's discouragement was so great that he had planned on two expedients to infiltrate agents into France: the first was to take advantage of a commercial treaty between Switzerland and Spain whereby food supplies would be exchanged between the two countries. The GIS was planning to install agents as truckers on the Spain-Switzerland run. The second dodge was to fly German agents to Spain by air. This was to be arranged by the retired French Cavalry Captain CAVALLIE, who was the principal recruiter in Strasbourg of agents to be used against Seventh Army. CAVALLIE had worked for the French during the Spanish Civil War and for the Germans in this war in Greece, Bulgaria and Italy.

The Germans continued to train French subversive groups which had escaped from France with the German Army. However, personnel were not selected indiscriminately for training at espionage and sabotage schools. For example, Milice members, by far the largest group, were given a short indoctrination course and then incorporated into the Charlemagne Division. All former members of the Milice Intelligence Service and selected members of other French subversive groups were sent to espionage and sabotage schools. At the beginning of November almost 200 students were assembled at Ulm/Donau for training. This training was conducted by the SD and appears to have been mostly concerned with sabotage and terrorist activities.

The NSDAP was quick to prepare for an evacuation from Alsace of personnel and institutions which would endanger its security in case of Allied occupation. On 3 November the Chief of Civil Government of Alsace issued an order for the gradual evacuation of prisoners of war, foreign workers, Italian internees, persons and institutions previously moved from Germany into Alsace, and Alsatian women and children. In case of a quick occupation of Alsace all Party members or those connected with Party organizations, with their families, were given priority. This evacuation order also included instructions on the destruction of documents and files of value to the Allies, including rosters of inhabitants and records of economic administrations.

Subversive propaganda in the form of leaflets continued to exploit nostalgia of the front-line soldier. There was an increased emphasis on inter-Allied disagreements and the danger of Communism.


The predominance of agents of French nationality employed against Seventh Army since D-Day developed into a monopoly during November as shown in the summary below:

	<u>French</u>	<u>Other</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Espionage	9 (1)	-	9
Sabotage	<u>2</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>2</u>
TOTAL	11	-	11



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**G-2 HISTORY**



**SEVENTH ARMY**  
OPERATIONS  
IN  
**EUROPE**



PART FIVE

1-31 DECEMBER 1944

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HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH ARMY  
Office of the A. C. of S., G-2  
APO 756 US ARMY

AP/cy

3 June 1945

MEMORANDUM:

TO : All Concerned.

1. This document is a general summary of the activities of the German forces opposing the Seventh US Army during the period indicated.
2. It was prepared by the G-2 Section Seventh Army to relate chronologically, month by month, the enemy's tactics, composition and organization. It is not a history of Seventh Army operations, as such a document is being produced by the Seventh Army Historical Section.

3. THIS DOCUMENT IS RESTRICTED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAM. Par. 23b, AR 380-5, 15 March 1944.

CLASSIFICATION WAS CHANGED FROM CONFIDENTIAL TO RESTRICTED  
AUTHORITY COMBANDING GENERAL SEVENTH ARMY, BY W. G. CHADWELL,  
COLONEL, AGO, ON 1 JUNE 1945.

*William A. Smith*  
William A. Smith  
Colonel, AGO  
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HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH ARMY  
Office of the A.C. of S., G-2  
APO 758 US ARMY

G-2 HISTORY

OPERATIONS IN EUROPE

Part V

1 - 31 December 1944

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I.	Enemy Dispositions (Map)
II.	Enemy Strength
III.	Enemy Commanders
IV.	Counterintelligence Summary

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~I. GENERAL

The enemy's operations on the Seventh Army front during December were conditioned by two basic factors: the need to stabilize his front and take up an easily defensible position to prevent northward exploitation of Seventh Army's November breakthrough to the RHINE; and plans for winter offensives, first in the ARDENNES on 16 December, and then against ALSACE on 1 January. These general purposes affected both his tactics and his order of battle.

Tactically, the first half of December was marked by the German First Army's fighting withdrawal to the SIEGFRIED Line. Its broken left flank had been partially reconstituted late in November by the addition of the 245 Infantry and 256 Volksgrenadier Divisions to the surviving 361 Volksgrenadier Division. But these three divisions, even with help from elements of 25 Panzer Grenadier Division and later from elements of 21 Panzer as well, could hardly hope to contain the full weight of a Seventh Army attack and all were ordered to withdraw to the WEST WALL between 13 and 17 December. The 11th Panzer Division, opposing the right flank of U.S. Third Army on our left, was also ordered to withdraw to the Line on 17/18 December.

Fighting against the enemy's delaying actions, which at times were stubborn and effective, especially in MAGINOT Line positions in the HARDT Mountains, Seventh Army troops (45, 103 and 79 Divisions) crossed the German frontier on 15 December. By the 17th, however, they had come against the pillboxes, wire and entrenchments of the SIEGFRIED Line. Thenceforth the enemy offered the stiffest resistance of which he was capable, laid down increasing artillery fire, and launched frequent local counterattacks.

This phase was short-lived, however. For on 16 December the ARDENNES offensive had begun. In order to free U.S. Third Army for its counter-attack, Seventh Army extended westward, taking over a portion of the Third Army sector. Executing only a defensive mission on this longer front, Seventh Army then halted its drive against the SIEGFRIED Line. Contact with the enemy thus decreased sharply during the last week of December, and was limited to patrolling and scattered local attacks. In the last days of the month the enemy was regrouping for his 1 January offensive, and Seventh Army was preparing defensive positions and deploying reserves to meet the attack it knew was coming.

The certainty with which the New Year's offensive was predicted was primarily a result of the close watch that had been kept on the many and extensive changes in the enemy's order of battle on our front during December.

The first was an outgrowth of changes in our own dispositions rather than the enemy's. This was the dropping from contact of the German 16, 30 SS, 198, 708 and 716 Divisions on 5 December when the redrawing of the Army boundary in the STRASBOURG sector gave the entire "COLMAR pocket" to the First French Army. U.S. VI Corps, which had been operating against the northern portion of the pocket since the VOSGES breakthrough, was withdrawn and recommitted on the right of Seventh Army's northern front, facing the PALATINATE. On the SAAR-PALATINATE front at that time were, from the RHINE westward, the 256, 245, 361 Divisions, elements of the 25 Panzer Grenadier Division, and the 11 Panzer Division, most of which faced the U.S. Third Army. The 130 Panzer Division LEHR, part of which had appeared briefly to

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screen the reorganization of the German First Army's left flank, dropped out of contact on 9 December to return to its reserve position in preparation for the ARDENNES offensive. Thus by 11 December, the enemy's strength in combat infantry effectives facing Seventh Army, estimated at 4,650, had dropped to the lowest level it ever reached in FRANCE.

The recovery from this low point began simultaneously with the withdrawal to the SIEGFRIED Line. On 12 December, an old acquaintance, 21 Panzer Division (See G-2 History for September and October), reappeared on our front south of WISSEMBOURG, although it sent only elements eastward, most of it remaining in contact on U.S. Third Army front or in reserve. On 19 December, shortly after the SIEGFRIED Line was reached, the 257 Volksgrenadier Division, arriving from POLAND, replaced 11 Panzer Division, part of which moved to the ARDENNES to take part in the three day old offensive. Two days later, Seventh Army's westward extension brought it into firm contact with those portions of 257 which had previously been west of the Army boundary. By the same shift we also inherited 17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division, 36 Infantry Division and 347 Infantry Division.

This order of battle was not to remain stable for long, however. For with the slowing down of his ARDENNES offensive, the enemy raised the SAAR-PALATINATE sector from lowest to highest priority and began preparing for the campaign to retake ALSACE. One after another, divisions were withdrawn from the line to refit in the rear. First to leave was 559 Volksgrenadier Division, which pulled out of the Third Army front to reform on 19 December. Soon afterward, it appeared that 17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division had only a shell in the line; the bulk of the division was reorganizing and receiving new tanks and assault guns. Its former sector on the line was taken over by 19 Infantry Division. The 21 Panzer Division and 25 Panzer Grenadier Division were maintaining only token forces on the line, and were rebuilding the balance into a mobile reserve for the attack. And on 27 December, 36 Infantry Division also dropped out and fell back for refit.

To the reserve thus being built up was added another formidable asset: 6 SS Mountain Division, with a strength in infantry effectives of 3500 men, was assembling in the PALATINATE at the end of December. Although this was not definitely known at the time, the division was known to be en route to the Western Front from DENMARK, so its subsequent participation in the January attack was not a complete surprise.

Thus the enemy line-up on New Year's Eve was: on the line, from the RHINE westward - 256 Volksgrenadier, 245 Infantry, 361 Volksgrenadier, 257 Volksgrenadier, 19 Infantry and 347 Infantry Divisions; in the rear awaiting the signal to attack - 21 Panzer, 17 SS Panzer Grenadier and 25 Panzer Grenadier, 36 Infantry, 6 SS Mountain, and 559 Volksgrenadier Divisions.

The enemy's recovery from the early December low point was no less marked in terms of combat infantry effectives than it was in terms of available divisions. Counting both the newly arrived divisions and reinforcements for those already present, the enemy brought to this front during the last half of December an estimated total of 25,000-26,000 additional infantry effectives. Since contact was generally light during most of that period, he suffered relatively few casualties, and thus on New Year's Eve had available an estimated total of 31,000 infantrymen. About 13,000 of these comprised the infantry element of the six divisions and additional fortress units holding the line; the remaining 18,000 were waiting to open the New Year with the offensive which aimed to present ALSACE to the Fuehrer by 30 January to mark the anniversary of his coming to power.

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II. CHRONOLOGY1 December - D/108

The enemy continued to offer stubborn resistance throughout the northern front, employing tanks and self-propelled artillery in close support of his infantry. He strongly contested all attempts to penetrate the gap between the HAGUENAU Forest and the HARDT Mountains. At STRASBOURG, he still held stubbornly to a small area covering the western end of the KEHL railroad bridge, and a small force was still holding out in a fort north of MUTZIG. On the southern front resistance was weaker and advances on SELESTAT from the west and north encountered generally scattered, light opposition.

2 December - D/109

All advances northward in the U.S. XV Corps zone again met strong enemy opposition although armored support appeared to be on a reduced scale. Patrols across the MODER River, west of HAGUENAU, encountered small arms and mortar fire. In the ALSACE PLAIN the enemy was fighting a stubborn delaying withdrawal against U.S. VI Corps which met stiffening opposition from enemy armor and was engaged in house-to-house fighting in SELESTAT.

3 December - D/110

Enemy opposition moderated somewhat in the eastern portion of U.S. XV Corps zone, but was stubborn and aggressive farther west. At WINGEN he was attempting to deny access to the INGWILLER Pass and the attack of the U.S. 44th Division on the Army left drew three counterattacks, of which one at DIEMERINGEN succeeded in retaking about half the town. On the southern front, resistance to the VI Corps was particularly strong in the SELESTAT area. A light counterattack with tank support was repulsed west of the town, and the enemy stubbornly blocked southward movement in this region.

4 December - D/111

On the last day of VI Corps' commitment against the enemy's ALSACE bridgehead, SELESTAT was cleared of enemy resistance except for scattered snipers. On the northern front - which henceforth was to be the only Seventh Army front - the enemy continued to contest advances northward between HAGUENAU Forest and the HARDT Mountains. In the mountains, he held no continuous front line, but resisted at strong points and in the towns of WINGEN, MEISENTHAL and SOUCHT and mounted a local counterattack between the latter two towns. He defended stubbornly, but not aggressively farther west, and lost VOLKSBERG and DIEMERINGEN.

5 December - D/112

Marked resistance was developed only in the HAGUENAU - HARDT Mountain sector, where the enemy clung tenaciously to the northeastern portion of MERTZWILLER and fought aggressive delaying actions before NIEDERBRONN. On the western half of the front, U.S. XV Corps overcame delaying action at WINGEN and then lost contact with the enemy as he withdrew rapidly along the entire sector, giving up MEISENTHAL, GOETZENBRUCH, REIPERTSWILLER, BUTTEN and RATZWILLER. Deep in Seventh Army's rear resistance finally ceased in the long-isolated fort north of MUTZIG, where small elements of 708 Volksgrenadier Division had held out ever since the breakthrough to STRASBOURG nearly two weeks before.

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6 December - D/113

Early in the day, enemy opposition was confined almost entirely to artillery activity in the VI Corps zone, with particular attention being paid to the MERTZWILLER area. Later the enemy again offered strong, aggressive resistance throughout the region west of the HAGUENAU Forest, but was generally quiet to the east. On the XV Corps front, contact was again made with the enemy at LEMBERG and near MONTBRONN during the afternoon, and light to moderate resistance was developing at the end of the day.

7 December - D/114

VI Corps' attack against GAMBESHEIM, on the RHINE flank, met heavy small arms and mortar fire. Heavy artillery concentrations were repeated in the MERTZWILLER area during the morning, and a small counterattack was launched before NIEDERBRONN. On the XV Corps front moderate resistance was offered in the ENCHENBERG - LEMBERG - MOUTERHOUSE area as the enemy attempted delaying action on this line. Organized resistance ended in MOUTERHOUSE by the end of the day, but scattered firing continued until the next morning.

8 December - D/115

On the right flank, GAMBESHEIM was cleared by noon, except for scattered snipers. On VI Corps' left, resistance to the 45th Division's attack was mainly mortar and artillery fire, although close fighting developed west of REICHSHOFFEN. Since VI Corps was not exerting pressure in the center, the enemy followed suit, and the HAGUENAU - MERTZWILLER sector was generally quiet.

In the XV Corps zone, the enemy remained on the defensive in the HARDT Mountains and continued his delaying action in the LEMBERG Valley. Mortar and small arms fire continued in MOUTERHOUSE until 1000A. Organized resistance was broken at LEMBERG, although scattered street fighting continued in the afternoon; and the enemy still held most of ENCHENBERG at the end of the day. High ground before ROHRBACH was held by strong infantry forces with mortar and artillery support.

9 December - D/116

The enemy was evidently taken by surprise by the VI Corps attack on BISCHWILLER, for the town was entered against only light opposition and the bridge was seized before the prepared demolition charges could be set off. However, resistance stiffened later in the day and entrenched infantry were delaying the advance on HAGUENAU. On the Corps left only light resistance opposed the clearing of NIEDERBRONN and high ground to the north, but a small counterattack developed in the afternoon. Farther west the enemy continued to hold the ROHRBACH - ENCHENBERG - LEMBERG line against XV Corps although ENCHENBERG itself was taken; and east of LEMBERG staged a two-company counterattack which forced a slight withdrawal of U.S. troops.

10 December - D/117

Advance toward SCHIRRHAIN, on the right, met only light resistance, but house to house fighting developed at HAGUENAU where the Germans held positions east of the railroad tracks. In the MERTZWILLER sector resistance stiffened as the attack developed and late in the day two counterattacks were repulsed southeast of the town. A counterattack was also

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launched northeast of NIEDERBRONN. The ground taken by the enemy was later regained and the advance continued against moderate opposition.

On the XV Corps front, little enemy activity was reported during the advance south of BITCHE and LEMBERG was mopped up. However, defense continued along the railroad between ENCHENBERG and MAIERHOFF during the day, and was particularly strong in the vicinity of HEILGENBRONN. South of GULSING the enemy's main effort was intermittent, accurate artillery fire of light caliber, supplemented by scattered small arms fire from concealed fortifications and pillboxes of the MAGINOT Line. NOHRBACH was taken at 1500 hours against small arms, antiaircraft and artillery fire.

11 December - D/118

The enemy's northward withdrawal on the eastern half of the front was now in progress. He pulled out of his forward positions during the night of 10/11 December and the light resistance met on the 11th was in marked contrast to the stubborn holding of the preceding day. HAGUENAU was occupied without resistance and only scattered contact was reported from the HAGUENAU Forest. The enemy was still holding in the HARDT Mountains, however, occupying positions along the line PHILLIPSBOURG - FOURNEAU-NEUF; and west of the mountains he defended from MAGINOT Line positions.

12 December - D/119

The enemy order of battle changed for the first time with the arrival of the first elements of 21 Panzer Division to bolster the 256 and 245 Divisions on the eastern half of the front. A prisoner said the First Battalion, 192 Panzer Grenadier Regiment, had been trucked to the sector south of LEMBACH with the mission of counterattacking our advance. A counter-attack by an estimated 100 enemy actually did materialize in this area on 12 December.

On the RHINE flank, however, 256 Division continued its withdrawal. After resistance was broken at SOUFFLENHEIM the advance continued against negligible contact until reaching SELTZ, where some opposition was again offered. In the HARDT Mountains enemy resistance remained generally light to moderate with the principal opposition encountered west of BITCHE. There was no contact south of BITCHE at the close of the period, and on the extreme left flank several towns were occupied unopposed except for light artillery and mortar fire.

13 December - D/120

The crossing of the SELTZBACH River was opposed in SELTZ with small arms, mortar and heavy artillery fire, while farther west along the river, crossings at first met generally light resistance near NIEDERROEDERN and SOULTZ. As the day progressed, resistance increased there and in the 21 Panzer sector near LEMBACH, where MAGINOT pillboxes were manned. In the west 361 Division was generally quiet south and east of BITCHE, but north-west of the town strong resistance was encountered throughout day with two small enemy counterattacks repulsed.

14 December - D/121

The withdrawal to GERMANY continued in the eastern sector, covered by rearward actions. The LEMBACH area was again the scene of the stiffest fighting but resistance north of the town had been broken by the end of the day. The western half of the line continued to be held from MAGINOT positions.

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15 December - D/122

Advance to the borders of GERMANY in the RHINE Valley and eastern HARDT Mountains met stiffening resistance as the enemy attempted to stabilize his front and prepare his defense north of the LAUTER River and farther to the north in the SIEGFRIED Line. Advance elements entering GERMANY south of BOBENTHAL met only light small arms resistance. In the HARDT Mountains, farther to the west, the enemy continued to hold MAGINOT Line defenses, with SCHIESSECK and SIMSENHOF Forts contributing strongly to the resistance. With this stubborn opposition, a certain amount of aggressiveness was shown northwest of BITCHE where several small enemy counterattacks supported by some armor were broken up.

16 December - D/123

Resistance in the RHINE Valley and eastern HARDT Mountains continued light and scattered as the enemy withdrew into the SIEGFRIED Line, losing BARG, LAUTERBOURG, WISSEMBOURG, SCHWEIGEN, RECHTENBACH, BOBENTHAL and NOTHWEILER. In the western HARDT Mountains, stubborn resistance continued in the area south and northwest of BITCHE where the enemy offered strong opposition from MAGINOT Forts and strong points.

17 December - D/124

Having reached the SIEGFRIED Line, coincident with the opening of the ARDENNES offensive, the enemy on 17 December halted his withdrawal in the RHINE Valley. Pillboxes, dug-in and wired positions, dragons teeth and heavy fire were met by troops north of the German border. Close contact with the outer defenses of the West Wall also brought down increasing artillery fire on the east flank from positions across the RHINE. In the west the enemy continued his stubborn resistance, although he lost some of his MAGINOT positions, including Fort FREUDENBERG, west of BITCHE.

18 December - D/125

In RHINE Valley, 256 Volksgrenadier and 21 Panzer Divisions offered heavy fire from infantry weapons as SIEGFRIED Line positions were developed. On the eastern slopes of the HARDT Mountains, 215 Infantry Division was unable to prevent entry into the SIEGFRIED positions at BUEIDENTHAL but fought stubbornly there while counterattacking in two-company strength near NIEDERSCHLETTENBACH. Farther west, before BITCHE, resistance offered by 361 Volksgrenadier and 25 Panzer Grenadier Divisions from MAGINOT positions decreased as the enemy was forced out of a number of forts and blockhouses, including most of Fort SCHIESSECK.

19 December - D/126

Strong resistance continued from the SIEGFRIED Line, where advances were contested with small arms, machine gun, mortar and artillery fire. Two armor-supported counterattacks were launched northeast of LAUTERBOURG; two other attacks were repulsed north of BOBENTHAL, and heavy enemy pressure forced forward US elements out of OBERROTTERBACH. On the Army left, the enemy still held Block No. 2 of the SCHIESSECK Forts although during the night of 18/19 December he withdrew from strong points at Fort SIMSENHOF and HOTTVILLER. Later in the day, however, resistance stiffened and the enemy was improving defensive positions in the DOLLWIBACH - URBACH area. On the Seventh Army-Third Army boundary 257 Volksgrenadier Division arrived from POLAND to relieve the 11 Panzer Division for participation in the ARDENNES operation.



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20 December - D/127

The enemy defended aggressively at vital points in the VI Corps zone. Intense mortar fire forced the withdrawal of forward elements before SIEGFRIED positions northeast of WISSEMBOURG, and a tank-supported counterattack by 150 enemy was launched against 103d Division farther west. Attempted crossings of the LAUTER River near BUNDENTHAL failed in the face of heavy fire. The enemy continued improving his positions in the XV Corps zone. Patrols were engaged in skirmishes at Fort SCHIESSECK, where the enemy put down 500 rounds of mortar and light artillery.

21 December - D/128

In the RHINE Valley and Eastern HARDT Mountains on VI Corps front, the enemy continued alert in defense of his SIEGFRIED Line positions. Some aggressiveness was shown west of DORRENBACH, where two enemy counterattacks were repulsed, one of them supported by two tanks and one half-track. Heavy machine gun fire again frustrated attempts to cross the LAUTER River near BUNDENTHAL, and persistent enemy pressure caused the abandonment of NIEDER-SCHLETTENBACH. Farther west in XV Corps zone, the enemy remained on the defensive except north of PHILIPPSBOURG, where an attack in two-platoon strength, supported by artillery, forced a slight withdrawal of friendly troops. Westward extension of the Seventh Army's left flank, to take over the former sector of Third Army's XIII Corps, brought us into contact with the 17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division in the SARREQUEMINES area and the 36th Infantry Division on its right. On the eastern portion of the front, 21 Panzer Division had dropped from contact and was reforming in the rear.

22 December - D/129

The enemy remained on the defensive along the entire front except for two small counterattacks near BALCHEN, east of SARREQUEMINES. Elsewhere action was limited to patrolling and placing artillery and mortar fire on forward troops. As he had for the past three or four days, the enemy put patrols across the RHINE on our right flank to ascertain strength and dispositions.

23 December - D/130

The entire front was generally quiet during the first part of the day, but later patrolling and harassing artillery fire increased somewhat, with one mortar and artillery concentration of 1200 rounds reported near BERG during a two-hour period. Enemy air activity increased, with strafing reported near BITCHE and on roads north of STRASBOURG. Again enemy patrols crossed the RHINE.

24 December - D/131

Local counterattacks and fire fights took place at various points on the front. Two counterattacks each were launched against the 45th Division north of WISSEMBOURG, Task Force HUDELSON in the EGUELSHARDT area and the 14th Division in the vicinity of HARKIRCHEN, the latter supported by tanks and temporarily forcing withdrawal of the friendly outpost line. Elsewhere, the enemy limited his action to patrolling and to firing on friendly patrols. Artillery was generally light, but air was again active with strafing missions being flown over the VI Corps sector. The enemy again demonstrated his interest in the RHINE flank by sending patrols across the river. Another inheritance from the Third Army, 347 Infantry Division, was identified on the left flank.

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25 December - D/132

During the early part of the period the enemy remained generally inactive throughout the entire zone. Later in the day some aggressiveness was shown in the region of ERCHING, where attacks north and northeast of the town were made. One, by an estimated 18 infantry supported by one tank, was repulsed, but another, estimated at two platoons in strength, forced U.S. troops to withdraw, and the enemy occupied ERCHING. In the area south of GERSHEIM a German attack in company strength forced a friendly outpost to retire. Elsewhere patrol clashes were reported and enemy continued to improve his position. No RHINE River patrolling was reported, but enemy air was again active.

26 December - D/133

The enemy continued generally quiet along the entire Army front, with activity confined mostly to improving his defenses and to scattered patrolling to probe our positions. The most aggressive enemy action occurred near RUDLING, where an estimated 100 enemy made a feeble attempt to move toward friendly positions and were dispersed by artillery fire. The RHINE River sector was quiet with only a three-man patrol observed south of ROPPELHEIM and some intermittent small arms, machine gun and mortar fire along the river from the east bank. Enemy aircraft were again active over the Army area.

19th Infantry Division was identified in what had been the 17th SS Panzer Grenadier Division sector. The latter, withdrawn to the rear for refit, was preparing for the 1 January offensive. 25th Panzer Grenadier Division, not satisfactorily contacted for several days, was also regrouping in the rear.

27 December - D/134

Patrol activity and light small arms resistance characterized enemy operations. Close contact was maintained on the western half of the front but there was no aggressive action. The enemy continued to improve his positions before the VI Corps, making use of mines and tree roadblocks. Action in the RHINE sector consisted of sporadic small arms, automatic weapons and mortar fire with one heavy artillery concentration east of BISCHMILLER. Enemy air activity continued at its comparatively high level, with over 30 aircraft over the area during the night of 26-27 December and about 37 planes during the day. 36th Infantry Division now joined the growing reserve refitting for the SAAR offensive.

28 December - D/135

One company-strength counterattack against the 45th Division in the OBERSTEINBACH - SCHONAU sector, and an unsuccessful attempt by two enemy platoons to attack friendly armor near FORBACH were the enemy's only aggressive actions. Elsewhere only patrols and dug-in enemy positions were encountered. XV Corps units heard tracked vehicle movements at various points on the front, and the 44th Division received harassing fire from tanks or TPs. Enemy sensitiveness to observation in this sector was reflected in heavy anti-aircraft fire against artillery observation planes.

29 December - D/136

The enemy was quiet throughout most of the Army front with only minor patrol action being reported. Small attempts at infiltration north of NIEDER-

STEINBACH were repulsed and a friendly observation post southeast of BITCHE, occupied by the enemy during the night, was retaken after a fire fight. Some vehicular movement was reported in the area of BITCHE, NIEDERGAILBACH and REINHEIM during the morning. Harassing fire from a 280-mm railroad gun fell near SARRALBE.

30 December - D-137

The enemy displayed aggressiveness only in the BITCHE area, where several attempts to penetrate our forward positions were repulsed. Only patrol action occurred in the BIENWALD Forest and eastern HARDT Mountains. In the eastern SAAR Valley there was a general increase in patrol activity and vehicular movement, and the enemy was reconstructing bridges over the BLIES River and its tributaries, preparatory to his attack, now only two days away. After lessening the preceding two days, enemy air was again active and included at least 12 F-47s, evidently enemy manned, which bombed and strafed points in both the eastern and western sectors of the front.

31 December - D-138

Although the anticipated strong attack did not materialize until early the following morning, the last day of 1944 was marked by increasing preliminary activity as the day progressed. Strong combat patrols and attempts at infiltration developed in the VI Corps sector and enemy movement was observed all along the front. Movement by a number of small enemy elements and vehicles was seen and heard on XV Corps front. Late in the day patrol fire fights developed and several small attacks were launched on our left flank. The largest of these consisted of 200 enemy and succeeded in reaching high ground south of WEHRDEN.


### III. SUMMARY

The taking of 9,461 German prisoners during December raised to 129,531 the total taken by the Seventh Army and Allied troops under its command since D-Day.

December's operations had seen the achievement of a long-sought goal, the border of the REICH itself. The event did not pass unnoticed, but was overshadowed by the more important fact that despite the loss of FRANCE the enemy was far from ready to admit the loss of the war. One great German counter-offensive had already been opened; a second, to which the minor actions of late December were only a nervous prelude, was soon to come.



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## ANNEX II

## ENEMY FORCES OPPOSING SEVENTH ARMY

Strength in Infantry Combat Effectives

	<u>1 December</u>	<u>11 December</u>	<u>21 December</u>	<u>31 December</u>
6th SS Mtn. Div.				3500
16th Inf. Div.	750	On First French Army front		
17th SS PG Div.		On Third Army front		2200
19th Inf. Div.		On Third Army front		1800
21st Panzer Div.		On Third Army front	* 900	3000
25th PG Div.	* 500	* 600	* 600	2500
30th SS Div.	** 600	On First French Army front		
36th Inf. Div.		On Third Army front		2400
130th Panzer Div.	2800	Reassembling in First U.S. Army sector		
198th Inf. Div.	600	On First French Army front		
245th VG Div.	1900-2000	800-900	600	1400
256th VG Div.	2200	1800	1700	2100
257th VG Div.		Reorganizing in Poland	1500	3000
347th Inf. Div.		On Third Army front		2000
361st VG Div.	1050	450-500	700	2300
559th VG Div.		On Third Army front		1900
708th VG Div.	500-600	On First French Army front		
716th Inf. Div.	400	On First French Army front		
Misc. Units	3000	850	1450	3100
TOTAL :	14,500	4,650	7,450	31,200
Equiv. Bns.:	18	5-6	9	39

\* Elements only in contact (balance on Third Army front or in reserve).

\*\* Elements only in contact (balance on First French Army front).

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ANNEX II

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## ANNEX III

PRINCIPAL ENEMY COMMANDERS OPPOSING SEVENTH ARMY

## ARMY GROUP G

BALCK, General der Panzer Truppen.

See G-2 History for October.

## FIRST ARMY

von KNOBELSDORF, Otto, General der Panzer Truppen.

See G-2 History for October.

## NINETEENTH ARMY

WIESE, Frederick, General der Infanterie.

See G-2 History for August.

RASP, Siegfried, General der Infanterie.

Now 47, General RASP was born in MUNICH on 10 January 1898. Son of a manufacturer, he joined the military early, and in 1916, when 18, became a Lieutenant in 1 (Bavarian) Infantry Regiment and served therein for two years. After the war RASP transferred to the Reichswehr and his career was obscure for several years. In 1925 he is known to have been with 19 Infantry Regiment with the later Genobst SCHOENNER. RASP became Oberleutnant on 1 April 1925. In 1932 he was serving on the staff of the 3 Division.

During the ensuing years of rising Hitlerism RASP, while laying a military foundation, apparently "saw the light" politically and seems to have become a good Nazi. This, plus the fact that both he and HITLER came from MUNICH, may help explain his meteoric rise in the Army. Promoted to Major on 1 April 1936, he was on the staff of the 17 Division two years later. He became Oberst (Colonel) on 1 July 1941. On 1 November 1943, RASP was promoted to Generalmajor (U.S. Brigadier General) and a month later was reported commanding 335 Infantry Division on the southern Russian front. For this he was awarded the German Cross in Gold during February 1944, and by May had also received the Knight's Cross for "distinguished service" on the lower UKRAINIAN BUG River. His promotion to Generalleutnant (U.S. Major General) followed.

General RASP took command of the Nineteenth Army in January 1945, or thereabouts, and his promotion to General der Infanterie must have been very recent. His position is similar to General BALCK's in that he has been elevated over officers far senior to him in rank - and one can conclude only that his hometown friend HITLER must have had a hand in the unusual appointment to the command of an Army of an officer who had not had a Corps.

## XIII SS CORPS

PRIESS, Hermann, SS Gruppenfuhrer and Generalleutnant der Waffen SS.

See G-2 History for November.

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SIMON, Max, SS Obergruppenfuhrer und General der Waffen SS.

This 45-year-old general, who rose from Second Lieutenant to Lieutenant General in ten years, joined the SS in 1933 to organize SS concentration camp guards, and his subsequent activities have resulted in the Russians now listing him as a war criminal for atrocities at KHARKOV.

Born in BRESLAU on 6 January 1899, he fought in MACEDONIA and on the Western Front in World War I. On 9 November 1934, a year after joining the SS, SIMON was appointed SS Untersturmfuhrer (Second Lieutenant); on 30 January 1935, SS Obersturmfuhrer; on 16 February 1935, SS Hauptsturmfuhrer; on 15 September 1935, SS Sturmbahnfuhrer (U.S. Major); on 12 September 1937, SS Obersturmbahnfuhrer; on 11 September 1938, SS Standartenfuhrer (U.S. Colonel).

From 1939 to 1941 he participated in the Polish, Western and Russian campaigns, and on 1 September 1941 became SS Oberfuhrer (British Brigadier). In the spring of 1942 SIMON was made commander of the 3 SS Panzer Division "TOTENKOPF" but was soon relieved because of ill health. In the fall of 1943 he reappeared in ITALY as commander of the 16 SS Panzer Grenadier Division "REICHSFUHRER", having been promoted sometime earlier to SS Brigadefuhrer (U.S. Brigadier General). He retained this command until October 1944, meantime being elevated to SS Gruppenfuhrer (U.S. Major General) on 19 April 1944. In November 1944 he appeared as commander of the XIII SS Corps and is reported to have been since raised to the rank equivalent of U.S. Lieutenant General. On 17 October 1944 General SIMON was awarded the German Cross in Gold, and is reported to have received the Oak Leaves to the Knight's Cross.

LXIV CORPS

THUMM, Helmuth, General der Infanterie.

No biographical data available.

LXXXII CORPS

HOERNLEIN, Walter, Generalleutnant.

A general for three years, the 52-year-old HOERNLEIN is typical of the younger German officer set who managed to be loyal to two German gods at once. While there is little or nothing to identify General HOERNLEIN as a prominent Nazi, the fact that he has remained in command of "GROSS DEUTSCHLAND" Division for over two crucial years suggests that his party affiliations have been helpful behind the scenes.

Native of KARSTEDT, PRUSSIA, he was born 2 January 1893, and on 27 January 1912 entered 140 Infantry Regiment as an officer cadet. His blossoming military career was nipped during the first war when the French took him prisoner and held him until 1918. On 20 June 1918 he was promoted to Oberleutnant. It is known that he served in 1925 with the 4 Infantry Regiment, and became a Hauptmann on 1 February 1927. As a battalion C.O. in the 20 Motorized Division, he was promoted to Major on 7 April 1936, to Lieutenant Colonel on 1 April 1937 and, continuing his steady rise, to Colonel in April 1940 while commanding the 69 Infantry Regiment.

For action as commander of the 80 Infantry Regiment east of BREST-LITOVSK, he was awarded the Knight's Cross in 1941, and that September was made

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commander of an infantry regiment of the "GROSS DEUTSCHLAND" Division which operated on the central Russian front. He was promoted to Generalmajor on 2 April 1942 and to Generalleutnant on 1 January 1943. For commanding this division west of BYELGOROD, HOERNLEIN was further honored with the Oak Leaves on 17 March 1943. He helped command the division until 1943, and in October 1944 appeared in command of the LXXXII Corps on the Western Front, replacing General der Artillerie SINNHUBER.

## LXXXIX CORPS

HOENE, Gustav, General der Infanterie.

Now 51, General HOENE was born 17 May 1893 near KRUSCHWITZ, POSEN. Commissioned a Second Lieutenant in 1912, he served with distinction in World War I, winning the Iron Cross I, the Hohenzollern Order with Swords, and the Hanseatic Cross, all while serving with the 150 Infantry Regiment.

He became a Captain 1 May 1922, and it is known that he served in 1925 with the 2 Infantry Regiment and in 1932 with the 6 Infantry Regiment. In October 1937 he was a Lieutenant Colonel commanding the 3rd Battalion, 90 Infantry. On 1 May 1938 he became Colonel, and in November 1938 was given command of the 28 Infantry Regiment (8 Infantry Division), which command he retained into 1940, during which time his regiment took part in the French campaign.

HOENE was elevated to Generalmajor 1 August 1940, and as commander of the 8 Light Infantry Division won the Knight's Cross in July 1941, for storming GRODNO on the central Russian front. On 1 August 1942 he was promoted to Generalleutnant and in November of the same year was given command of a battle group holding the land link to the fortress at DENJANSK. He was raised to his present rank 1 May 1943, and as commander of a Corps on the northern Russian front was awarded the Oak Leaves. It is known that in January 1944 he commanded the LIV Corps and in the summer of 1944 the VIII Corps. HOENE succeeded General der Infanterie von und zu GILSA as commander of the LXXXIX Corps in December 1944.

## II PANZER DIVISION

von WIETERSHEIM, Wend, Generalleutnant.

No biographical data available.

## 17 SS PANZER GRENADIER DIVISION

OSTENDORFF, Werner, SS Brigadeführer und Generalmajor der Waffen SS.

Native of KONIGSBERG, this 42-year-old general is reportedly a good friend of HIMMLER. He originally joined the Luftwaffe but later transferred to the Waffen SS. In 1935 OSTENDORFF was an SS "OCS" instructor at BAD TOELZ.

As G-3 and Chief of Staff of the 2 SS Panzer Division he was awarded the Ritterkreuz in 1941. From February to November 1943 he was G-3 and Chief of Staff of II SS Panzer Corps and in April 1944 was promoted to his present rank. Wounded in NORMANDY in June 1944, he was hospitalized but returned again in October 1944 to command the 17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division, which had been his command from April 1944 until he was wounded. In December he was returned to BERLIN for a new assignment, and his job was tossed in quick succession to three others. SS Standartenführer MÜLLER succeeded him as commander of the 17th for one day, being replaced by SS Standartenführer Hans LINGNER (see below), who was to keep the job rotating by being captured 2-3 January.

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LINGNER, Hans, SS Standartenfuhrer.

Only 29, this former commander of the 17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division "GOETZ VON BERLICHINGEN" was captured 2-3 January 1945. LINGNER joined an SS regiment in 1934 and attended "OCS" in DRESDEN two years later. At the outbreak of war he held SS rank equivalent to Captain. In 1940 and 1941 he participated in the Western, BALKAN and RUSSIAN campaigns. He was assigned to the General Staff of Division "DAS REICH" in February 1942 and later, from June to December 1943, attended the G.S.C. "KRIEGSAKADEMIE", being promoted to Major after graduation. He then returned to his division as G-4 and later became the G-2 and Chief of Staff.

Serving in NORMANDY in 1944 with the 10 SS Panzer Division "FRIEDRICH-BERG", he was wounded for the fourth time. In September 1944 LINGNER became a regimental commander in the "GOETZ VON BERLICHINGEN" Division and later the G-3 and Chief of Staff. After the recent departure of SS Brigadefuhrer OSTENDORF, the division's commander, for a new assignment, LINGNER became acting division commander. He reached his present grade 30 November 1944.

LINGNER was replaced temporarily by SS Obersturmfuhrer (Lieutenant Colonel) FICK, who in turn was replaced soon by Standartenfuhrer (Colonel) KLINGENBERG.

#### 19 VOLKSGRENADIER DIVISION

BRITZELMAYR, Karl, Generalmajor.

Originally commissioned some time after 1914, BRITZELMAYR saw service in World War I with the 16 Infantry Regiment (Bavaria) and retired afterward, with the rank of lieutenant. Nothing is known of his earlier background, or, presently, of his personal characteristics or associations with the Nazis.

He apparently returned to the Army about 1929-30, since he is known to have been promoted to Major 1 August 1937. The following year he served on the staff of 62 Infantry Division, and on 1 December 1940 he was made Oberstleutnant. On 28 October 1941, he was appointed commander of the 217 Infantry Regiment on the southern RUSSIAN front, and on 1 March 1942 he was promoted to Oberst. Two weeks later his award of the Ritterkreuz was announced. In February 1943 he was awarded the German Cross in Gold.

BRITZELMAYR (then Oberst) succeeded Generalleutnant WISSMATH as commander of the 19 Infantry Division in October 1944, which position he still holds. PWs stated he was promoted to Generalmajor in December 1944.

#### 21 PANZER DIVISION

FEUCHTINGER, Generalleutnant.

See G-2 History for September.

#### 25 PANZER GRENADIER DIVISION

MAASENBACH, Oberst.

No biographical data available.



## 36 VOLKSGRENADIER DIVISION

WELLM, Generalmajor.

Nothing is known of the early history of General WELLM except that he may have been in the Police and transferred to the Army with the rank of Hauptmann. In 1938 he was reported serving at Headquarters of the Troop Manoeuvre Area Wahn (Wkr. VI), after having previously served in the 37 Infantry Regiment.

Neither is much known of the general's activities in the present war. However, there is the following record of three promotions: To Major 1 March 1940, to Oberstleutnant 1 April 1942 and to Oberst 1 December 1942. When he was first reported as commander of the 36 Division he was called Oberst, but since November 1944 he has been definitely referred to as a Generalmajor. Nothing is known of his personal characteristics or of any connections with the Nazi Party.

## 130 PANZER LEHR DIVISION

BAKHELEIN, Generalmajor.

No biographical data available.

## 245 VOLKSGRENADIER DIVISION

KEGLER, Generalmajor.

No biographical data available.

## 256 VOLKSGRENADIER DIVISION

FRANZ, Generalmajor.

No biographical data available.

## 257 VOLKSGRENADIER DIVISION

SEIDEL, Oberst.

Holder of Knight's Cross. No biographical data available.

## 347 VOLKSGRENADIER DIVISION

TRIERENBERG, Generalleutnant.

No biographical data available.

## 361 VOLKSGRENADIER DIVISION

PHILLIPPI, Generalmajor.

See G-2 History for October.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

## 405 INFANTRY DIVISION

SEEGER, Generalleutnant.

No biographical data available.

## 553 VOLKSGRENADIER DIVISION

HUBER, Generalmajor.

No biographical data available. However, he replaced BRUHN, who was captured near FALAUBOURG in the November breakthrough, and was charged with rebuilding the division east of the RHINE.

## 559 VOLKSGRENADIER DIVISION

von der MUEHLEN, Freiherr, Generalmajor.

This 40-year-old veteran of service on the RUSSIAN front was born 22 January 1905 at ULM, WUERTEMBERG, the son of an officer, and was commissioned a lieutenant 1 February 1927, and assigned to the 13 Infantry Regiment, where the late General ROMMEL was then a Hauptmann. von MUEHLEN was made an Oberleutnant 1 April 1930 and two years later was still serving in 13 Infantry Regiment. On 1 August 1935 he was promoted to Hauptmann.

Freiherr von MUEHLEN served in 75 Infantry Regiment some time in 1938-1939, and on 1 February 1942 was promoted to Oberstleutnant. In November 1942 he was awarded the Knight's Cross for action south of LAKE ILMEN (RUSSIA) while commanding a regiment of the 5 Light Division. He became Oberst 1 March 1943. During the first half of 1944 von MUEHLEN faded from the limelight and nothing was heard of him until he appeared on the western front commanding 559 Volksgrenadier Division. He may have been convalescing from the effects of his service in RUSSIA. In November 1944 he was first referred to as Generalmajor, and on 9 January 1945 he was awarded the Oak Leaves for action southeast of METZ as commander of 559.

Nothing is known of his personal characteristics or of his connections with the Nazi party.

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## ANNEX IV

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

1 December - 31 December 1944

The apprehension by Seventh Army of nine sabotage and twenty-one espionage agents during the month of December indicated the scope of the efforts made by the German Intelligence and Sabotage Services operating against Seventh Army. Subsequently espionage and sabotage efforts dwindled and not until Seventh Army troops were across the Rhine did the German Intelligence Service reappear in its last desperate attempts. The missions of agents captured by Seventh Army in December evidenced the enemy's desire to retake Alsace. Half the agents apprehended were Alsations. Espionage missions were predominately tactical and coincided with the areas against which the Germans were massing their troops for the subsequent attack.

The Allied occupation of Alsace had been foreseen and prepared against by the German Intelligence Services as early as the summer of 1944. A Sonderfuehrer in Frontaufklaerungstrupp 251 recruited Alsation railway workers to plant explosive coal in coal piles used by the Allies, principally in those piles used for stoking locomotives. This explosive coal was in large lumps, consisting of a plastic explosive coated with black lacquer and a camouflaged detonator inserted into the explosive. The coal was to be planted simultaneously, after the Allies were operating the Alsation railway system.

The nine sabotage agents apprehended were:

The organizer of the explosive coal ring, a German Sonderfuehrer of Frontaufklaerungstrupp 251, who was authorized to recruit agents on the spot.

Six Frenchmen from Alsace, and the wife of one of them. The men were all railway workers who had accepted varying amounts of the explosive coal and 10,000 francs each in the late summer and early fall of 1944. None of them had used the coal for sabotage, either through fear or lack of instructions from their recruiter.

One Alsation member of the German Army, working for Abwehr II, apprehended at a roadblock. He divulged the location of delayed action demolitions in ST. DIE.

The twenty-one espionage agents apprehended included:

A ring of three wireless transmitter operators of Ast/Strasbourg whose mission was to transmit tactical intelligence on radios installed in Strasbourg. The leader was an Alsation woman who was also to recruit informers. She had carried a transmitter for the second member of the ring, who belonged to Frontaufklaerungstrupps 120 and 123, but had abandoned it before she entered our lines. The third member was captured while attempting to enter our lines with his radio.

An agent of Abwehr III H, Nest/Lille, arrested at a roadblock after he had volunteered to supply information about the enemy. He requested to be returned to Germany with a radio in order to furnish the Allies with intelligence. He had been engaged in espionage against the French in 1939, had been a penetration agent in Belgium against an Allied escape organization and had caused the arrest of two British aviators.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

ANNEX IV



An agent of Abwehr III, member of Frontaufklarungstrupp 360, French national and Nazi Party member, who had crossed the Rhine on a tactical espionage mission. He was also to find out why Frenchmen preferred to join the American Army rather than the FFI. He was posing as an escaped French worker and tried the standard unsuccessful dodge of offering free information on German troops.

Two Abwehr espionage agents whose operations were frustrated by the rapid taking of Strasbourg by the Allies. The first, a French PPF member, had worked against the French Resistance. He was to have accomplished an espionage mission in Belfort. The second, posing as an escaped French worker, had already left for Metz on a tactical and "popular attitude" mission, but returned to Strasbourg and enlisted in the FFI.

One German regular army Colonel assigned to the Abwehr since 1929, Chief of Ast/Strasbourg, who claimed to have worked primarily in Abwehr III R (Security of Heavy Equipment).

An official of Abwehr III of Ast/Dijon and Frontaufklarungstrupp 353. A Swiss national, he had worked for the French and Polish Intelligence Services against the Germans, then for the Gestapo and Abwehr. As chief of the Abwehr Meldekopf in Remiremont he had dispatched several agents into Seventh Army territory, including the three whose mission had been to blow up the pipelines.

A French espionage agent who had crossed the lines with the three-day mission of proceeding to Strasbourg and gathering information on civilian attitude, Allied policy and proclamations and reporting on identities and dispositions of Allied units.

A member of the Legion des Volontaires Francais who had crossed the Rhine to report Allied troop movements and in particular Engineer stockpiling and preparations for a crossing of the Rhine by Seventh Army. Also apprehended was his contact man in Strasbourg in whose home a telephone was to be installed for transmitting intelligence to the enemy across the Rhine River.

An Amt VI espionage agent whose mission was to set up a radio-equipped espionage net in the Paris area, to prepare for receiving parachuted agents and materiel, to infiltrate radio technician agents, particularly PPF members, into Allied radio installations and to contact a French Captain regarding microfilmed plans of a new anti-aircraft device.

An SD espionage agent, arrested at a roadblock after crossing Allied lines on a tactical mission.

A member of SD Amt III A at Strasbourg and graduate of an espionage-sabotage school near Frankfurt, captured at a roadblock when trying to escape from Strasbourg.

A French member of the Waffen SS, 15 years old and a Franciste, who was on a tactical espionage mission against French forces and had been instructed to enlist in the French Army if necessary to his mission.

An LVF member whose mission was to cross the lines near Haguenau and bring back tactical information on American troops. He had been trained in espionage at Wiesbach.

A Canadian, naturalized German and Nazi Party member who had accepted a political espionage mission for the SD in Iran and had been involved in foreign espionage for the Abwehr.

An espionage agent who had worked as an interpreter for the Gestapo and had attended a radio espionage school in Brussels.

A French espionage agent with a previous history of border-smuggling and opium-trafficking. He had been jailed in unoccupied France in 1942 on charges of working for the SD, and subsequently was released by the Germans.

The wife of the chief agent of Nest/Cologne, who had left her in Strasbourg after carrying away all incriminating evidence. She was familiar with her husband's acquaintances, movements and had accompanied him on several official trips.

A letter found among mail impounded at Schirmeck Concentration Camp disclosed the probable presence in France of an assassination organization composed of members of the Jeunesse Populaire Francaise and directed against French Government officials and Communists. The letter also disclosed an intensified drive by Jacques DORIOT to propagandize the two million Frenchmen and Frenchwomen in Germany and revealed that the Legion des Volontaires Francais was now incorporated into the Waffen SS.

German attempts to secure tactical intelligence of Seventh Army dispositions did not appear to have had detailed success judging from a captured operations map of LXIV Corps Headquarters in Strasbourg. The map, which had been kept up to date until seized by Seventh Army troops, disclosed that the Germans were unaware of one newly arrived infantry division of which major elements were in the line, an armored division which was in assembly areas immediately behind the line and correct locations of command posts of corps and higher headquarters. Since their espionage efforts had not been successful the Germans, according to a prisoner interrogated at the Seventh Army Detailed Interrogation Center, obtained most of their information by monitoring Allied radio communications. This prisoner stated that his Division Ic was in possession of almost all codes used by the Allies. A group of Seventh and Third Army officers and enlisted men, liberated prisoners, revealed that German interrogation Essential Elements of Information during the period had indicated sabotage intentions. The specific location of a gasoline pipeline from the South of France and means of troops transportation were stressed in interrogation.

There was no successful sabotage act accomplished against Seventh Army during the period. An attempt was made to demolish the two-kilometer railway at Arzwiller on 26 December. Three American 81-mm mortar shells were found fastened to the railroad track so as to be detonated by the wheel flange of a passing train.

Attempts to influence the morale or cause the surrender of Allied troops through the use of propaganda leaflets followed familiar lines: mainly those contrasting the lot of the front line soldier with rear echelon troops and with troops and civilians in the United States.

In summary, the extent and character of the German Intelligence Services' effort during December can be seen from the table:

	<u>French</u>	<u>German</u>	<u>Swiss</u>	<u>Canadian</u>	<u>Total</u>
Espionage	17(2)*	2	1	1	21*
Sabotage	8(1)	1			9
Total	25(3)	3	1	1	30

(Figures in parentheses indicate number of women)

\* Including 2 W/T agents.

Total number of agents apprehended by Seventh Army between 15 August and 31 December 1944:


Espionage	73
Sabotage	12
Total	85

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# G-2 HISTORY



## SEVENTH ARMY OPERATIONS IN EUROPE



PART SIX

1-31 JANUARY 1945

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HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH ARMY  
Office of the A. C. of S., G-2  
APO 758 US ARMY

100/cy

3 June 1945

MEMORANDUM:

TO : All Concerned.

1. This document is a general summary of the activities of the German forces opposing the Seventh US Army during the period indicated.

2. It was prepared by the G-2 Section Seventh Army to relate chronologically, month by month, the enemy's tactics, composition and organization. It is not a history of Seventh Army operations, as such a document is being produced by the Seventh Army Historical Section.

3. THIS DOCUMENT IS RESTRICTED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. Par. 23b, AR 380-5, 15 March 1944.

CLASSIFICATION WAS CHANGED FROM CONFIDENTIAL TO RESTRICTED AUTHORITY COMBINING GENERAL SEVENTH ARMY, BY A. C. CHANDLER, COLONEL, AGO, ON 1 JUNE 1945.

*William A. Smith*  
William A. Smith  
Colonel, AGO  
A C of S, G-2

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INTRODUCTION

The German attempt to recover ALSACE in January, in addition to its immediate tactical significance, provided the best possible "laboratory test" of the accuracy and completeness of the intelligence available to American troops and commanders from all sources - front line units, prisoner interrogations, captured documents, visual and photographic air reconnaissance, and clandestine agencies. Therefore this report on the enemy offensive contains several features not normally included in this series of G-2 monthly histories.

Shortly after the ARDENNES offensive began on 16 December 1944, the Seventh Army G-2 Section began studying the possibility of a second major German attack, directed at ALSACE. During approximately ten days of checking all available information, G-2 concluded that such an attack was highly probable, and published its opinion as G-2 Estimate of the Enemy Situation No. 6, 29 December 1944. This estimate is reproduced verbatim as Annex III. On 20 December 1944 a rough work map had been prepared to highlight the probable lines of action and objectives of the enemy in ALSACE; it is reproduced herein as Annex IV, together with a map showing in schematic form the actual development of the German offensive.

Following the end of hostilities, an enemy historical report on the ALSACE venture became available, and is reproduced as "The German Version", Annex V. The Seventh Army G-2 History of the operation, based on information which became available during and immediately following the offensive, had already been drafted when the German report was received; it has not been revised in the light of the later knowledge and is printed in its original version in Sections I, II and III, and Annexes I and II. Thus, when read in conjunction with "The German Version", it provides an interesting comparison between our own and the enemy's evaluation of the operation. It may be pointed out that the two reports agree on all major points, both as to enemy intentions and as to the German divisions involved.

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HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH ARMY  
Office of the A.C. of S., G-2  
APO 758 US ARMY

G-2 HISTORY

OPERATIONS IN EUROPE

Part VI

1 - 31 January 1945

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# I. GENERAL

The last German offensive effort on the Western Front in World War II was that against the Seventh Army in January. When it failed, as the ARDENNES offensive had failed before it, the enemy had no recourse but to revert to a desperate defensive.

There are many ways to gauge the importance attached to the January attacks by the German High Command: The pledge to present ALSACE, or at least STRASBOURG, to the Fuehrer to mark his 30 January anniversary; the presence of the infamous Heinrich HIMMLER himself on the Alsatian front as Commander of Army Group Upper Rhine; the loudspeaker addresses to the populace of STRASBOURG advising them to prepare for the Wehrmacht's return; the code name for the operation, "10 May 1940", commemorating HITLER's victorious crossing of the French frontier. But the best indication of the operation's importance is the size and quality of forces employed. In all, 16 different German divisions were employed by the German First Army between SAARBRUCKEN and the RHINE during January; three of them were SS divisions; the total included two panzer, two panzer grenadier, a parachute and a crack mountain division, in addition to ten run-of-the-mine infantry and volksgrenadier divisions.

At the same time the German Nineteenth Army was using nine divisions against the First French Army in an effort to develop the COLMAR bridgehead into an effective threat to STRASBOURG from the south.

The First Army's operations on the SAAR - RHINE front fell into four major phases during a month of probing for a breakthrough:

## THE SAAR

Hoping to be able to slice off all of Northern Alsace and destroy all Seventh Army forces between the SAAR and the RHINE, the enemy attacked first against the western half of the Seventh Army's front. 17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division spearheaded the attack, its initial objective the town of ROHRBACH in the eastern SAAR valley. It was supported by five other divisions, 36 and 19 on its right, 559, 361 and 256 on its left. The mission of the latter three divisions was to penetrate the HAARDT Mountains\* and protect the left flank of the attack by sealing the HAARDT passes. If 17 SS Panzer Grenadier succeeded in breaking through, additional mobile divisions, 21 Panzer, 25 Panzer Grenadier or both would doubtless have been committed to exploit, but 17 SS did not succeed. Stopped by the U S 44th and 100th Divisions, and jolted by the belated discovery that the French 2d Armored Division was in position to counterattack, 17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division never went beyond ACHEN and GROS REDERCHING. Together with its right flank companions, 36 and 19, it suffered heavy losses and the offensive in the SAAR valley was abandoned.

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\* The term HAARDT Mountains is used here to describe the extension of the VOSGES north of the SAVERNE Gap. That portion south of the French-German border is often referred to as the LOW or LITTLE VOSGES, that north of the border as the HAARDT. To avoid confusion, the latter name is here applied to the entire chain.

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However, the three divisions on the left (256, 361 and 559) fared better, achieving substantial penetration through the HAARDT Mountains southeast of BITCHE. The enemy promptly began to exploit this gain.

#### THE BITCHE SALIENT

Reinforcement of the salient in the HAARDT Mountains began immediately after the penetration first developed. On 2 January, the 257 Volksgrenadier Division was committed to the attack and the first elements of 6 SS Mountain Division were identified. On 4 January the nose of the salient had been pushed as far south as REIPERTSWILLER and WINGEN, cutting one of the main trans-HAARDT passes. But although the enemy was unable to penetrate beyond this point, he fought stubbornly and effectively against U S efforts to straighten the front and clear the pass.

Success of the initial attack in the SAAR Valley or further extension of the BITCHE salient toward the SAVERNE Gap would have endangered the position of the entire U S VI Corps east of the HAARDT Mountains, a danger increased greatly by the possibility of attacks across the RHINE against the Corps' right flank. Therefore on 2 January, VI Corps had undertaken the first of the two major withdrawals it was to execute in January, falling back to MAGINOT Line positions from the HAARDT Mountains to the RHINE.

The enemy was quick to follow up with a determined effort to turn the withdrawal into a retreat. Thus the third phase began, and although operations continued in the HAARDT salient, they became merely a part of a much larger operation.

#### THE ALSACE PLAIN

On 5 January an enemy battalion succeeded in establishing itself on the west bank of the RHINE in the vicinity of GAMESHEIM. During succeeding days it was reinforced by additional miscellaneous units, all of whom turned out to be under the control of a reconstituted 553 Volksgrenadier Division, whose original combat elements had been destroyed before the SAVERNE Gap in November.

Thus, in effect, the front now consisted of two salients: One was the German-held one in the HAARDT Mountains; the other our own in the ALSACE Plain, its flanks threatened on the west by the enemy in the HAARDT Mountains and on the east by the GAMESHEIM bridgehead. The enemy attempted to liquidate the VI Corps salient by exerting relentless pressure against the flanks and simultaneously attacking strongly against the nose. On 7 January, the 21 Panzer Division was identified attacking the U S 79th Division. Two days later, 25 Panzer Grenadier Division was also identified, apparently operating under command of 21 Panzer in operation "Feuchtinger", an attempt to break through in the HATTEN-RITTERSHOFFEN sector to join forces with German troops pushing out from the HAARDT and from GAMESHEIM.

Desperate fighting continued in these sectors until 20 January. On 15 January, 7 Parachute Division from HOLLAND joined 21 Panzer and 25 Panzer Grenadier in the attack on the nose of the salient. On the 19th, 10 SS Panzer Division appeared in the GAMESHEIM bridgehead. It had been destined for the SAAR front but the enemy's early failure there had led to its being switched to the more successful RHINE Valley front. The bridgehead and the main

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Alsation front linked up on the 19th as a result of the attack on DRUSENHEIM. Meanwhile, the effort against VI Corps' left had been strengthened by a reshuffling of divisions in the HAARDT salient whose final result, by 20 January, had been the relief of the weakened 361 Division and the switching from west to east of 6 SS Mountain Division.

Efforts to dislodge the stubborn enemy were unavailing. A battalion of U S 45 Division attacking on the left was cut off; a battalion of the 79 Division was surrounded in DRUSENHEIM; a tank battalion of the 12 Armored Division was lost somewhere near HERRLISHEIM.

On 20 January, VI Corps withdrew to the MODER River.

#### THE MODER

The withdrawal left seven German divisions out of contact on the right half of the Seventh Army front. As they moved forward to regain contact they were reshuffled to bring the main weight to bear on the HAGUENAU sector, and were joined by a newcomer, 47 Volksgrenadier Division, from COLOGNE. 245 Division remained behind. Coming up to the MODER River they lined up, with the 553 Division still on their left, in this order: 21 Panzer, 10 SS Panzer, 7 Parachute, 25 Panzer Grenadier, 47 Volksgrenadier, 36 Volksgrenadier, 6 SS Mountain.

The night of 24/25 January, they attacked across the MODER in the last phase of the January offensive, and the last serious German attack of the war. In all, three bridgeheads were established, one east of HAGUENAU, by 10 SS Panzer, one west of HAGUENAU by 7 Parachute, 25 Panzer Grenadier and 47 Volksgrenadier, and one at MULHAUSEN by 6 SS Mountain. All were contained the first day of the attack and liquidated the next.

Meanwhile, 12/14 January, the massive winter offensive of the Red Army had begun. By the time of the failure of the MODER River attack on the 25th, the need for reserves for the eastern front had become so great that it seemed highly unlikely that the enemy would again take the offensive against the Seventh Army. And indeed, the withdrawal of forces for the east began very soon. By the end of the month, 7 Parachute, 25 Panzer Grenadier Division and 21 Panzer Division were all out of contact; the first went to HOLLAND, from where it had come, the other two to the eastern front, where both were identified by the Russians during February.

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About midnight the enemy opened a large-scale attack in the HAARDT Mountains and SAAR Valley, along the general line NEUNHOFFEN - BANNSTEIN - BITCHE - SARREGUEMINES. Six divisions took part - from east to west, the 256 Volksgrenadier, 361 Infantry, 559 Volksgrenadier, 17 SS Panzer Grenadier, 36 Infantry and 19 Infantry. The 347 Infantry Division put in a holding attack in the vicinity of LUDWEILER, west of SAARBRUCKEN, but took no major part in the operation.

In the mountain sector, a breakthrough was developing by afternoon with enemy troops infiltrating DAMBACH and fighting in progress at BAERENTHAL. Farther west enemy troops occupied the College de BITCHE. The 17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division was attacking in the vicinity of ERCHING and RIMLING, with 40 to 60 tanks reported active. RIMLING was taken, but the enemy here was mopped up at mid-day. Repeated attempts to force a crossing of the ELIES River northeast of SARREGUEMINES succeeded in getting one company across by midnight.

2 January - D/140

257 Volksgrenadier Division and elements of 6 SS Mountain Division were identified in the HAARDT Mountain sector, bringing to eight the total of divisions being employed by the enemy. Penetration southward through the mountains continued to meet substantial success and forward enemy elements driving toward the INGWILLER Pass were engaged at REIPERTSWILLER, with fighting also in progress near WILDENGUTH and SARREINSBERG.

In the LEMBERG - BITCHE area, enemy attacks made initial gains but were later contained. Enemy pressure continued in the ERCHING - RIMLING area, where several infantry attacks, each supported by armor, were repulsed. The company which had crossed the ELIES River about midnight was forced back a few hours later.

3 January - D/141

256 Division continued its strong pressure in the PHILIPPSBOURG - BAERENTHAL area, while the 361 Division in the REIPERTSWILLER - WILDENGUTH area was consolidating its positions after its attacks on REIPERTSWILLER were repulsed. 257 Division offered strong resistance to a counterattack by U S troops at SARREINSBERG and did some unsuccessful attacking itself at GOETZENBRUCH. 559 Division in BITCHE area was not very aggressive.

17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division continued its attacks and two battalions, supported by tanks, self-propelled guns and flame throwers, succeeded in reaching ACHEN and GROS REDERCHING. However, they were counterattacked and forced to withdraw from both towns by dark. 36 and 19 Divisions, which had suffered heavy casualties during the previous two days, remained comparatively quiet, and 347 Division on the west flank displayed only slight activity.

4 January - D/142

Enemy pressure continued heavy in the HAARDT Mountains and forward elements infiltrated into WINGEN in estimated strength of 200, thus cutting the INGWILLER Pass. Other groups of similar strength reached this general area but concentrated attacks had diminished in number and intensity by the end of the day.

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However, increasing pressure and strong patrol activity was reported in the BAERENTHAL - PHILIPPSBOURG - DAMBACH sector. Although scattered groups still on the north outskirts of ACHEN and GROS REDERCHING were cleared by late afternoon, enemy troops continued to hold positions northeast and northwest of GROS REDERCHING. Between there and SARREGUEMINES an enemy attempt to infiltrate was repulsed.

5 January - D/143

The quiet period on the RHINE River front came to an end with the crossing of an estimated battalion of the reconstituted 553 Volksgrenadier Division in the GAMESHEIM - OFFENDORF area, with further small elements continuing to cross during the day. Our counterattack at GAMESHEIM was meeting small arms and automatic weapons fire at the end of the day. Additional enemy troops were observed on the east bank of the river.

In the HAARDT Mountain sector the enemy continued to offer strong resistance on the southern portion of the salient and at WINGEN, where enemy troops who cut the INGWILLER Pass road were isolated but resisting stubbornly. An enemy attack northwest of GROS REDERCHING was repulsed.

6 January - D/144

On the RHINE River front the enemy became more active and his attacks forced U S troops to withdraw west of GAMESHEIM. He also held OFFENDORF and HERRLISHEIM, although ROHRWILLER, SESSENHEIM and STATTMATTEN were reported clear. It was now obvious that the enemy had shifted his main effort to the ALSACE plain, for the 21 Panzer Division, which had been awaiting an opportune moment to attack, was identified in the vicinity of INGOLSHEIM, south of WISSEMBOURG.

In the HAARDT Mountains, the enemy showed some aggressiveness with three small attacks launched near PHILIPPSBOURG. Strong resistance continued north of INGWILLER Pass. Stiff opposition was offered by infiltrated groups south and east of REIPERTSWILLER and by the two battalions of 6 SS Mountain Division who were in WINGEN. North of GROS REDERCHING in the BELLEVUE Farms area the enemy resisted strongly early in the day, offering intense small arms and automatic weapons fire and employing some armor. In the afternoon he reacted aggressively, launching three counterattacks supported by armor, and our forces were compelled to withdraw from BELLEVUE Farms and BRANDELFINGERHOF Farm.

7 January - D/145

553 Division reinforced its RHINE River bridgehead with armor and continued its aggressive action. A tank and infantry attack was launched against DRUSENHEIM and ROHRWILLER in the morning, and late in the day the southern part of DRUSENHEIM was being held by an infantry battalion, with 8 to 10 tanks or self-propelled guns in support. 21 Panzer Division engaged in vigorous patrolling and delivered five tank-supported attacks near STUNDWILLER. WINGEN was cleared as isolated German groups attempted to pass through U S lines to rejoin the main enemy positions to the north. Strong resistance was offered to U S attacks against these positions.

8 January - D/146

Strong resistance met VI Corps' attack in the DRUSENHEIM area, where attempts to establish a bridgehead over the MODER River south of the town failed in the face of heavy enemy fire. However, the enemy's attempts to cross the river near ROHRWILLER also failed. To the northwest, in the ASCHBACH area, 21 Panzer Division made several unsuccessful and costly attacks,

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later withdrawing to OERSEEBACH for reorganization. In the HAARDT Mountains the enemy was now well-supported by artillery, and provided strong opposition to friendly attacks along the southern bulge of the salient. In the SAAR Valley, 17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division reassumed the offensive but was contained after effecting slight penetrations of forward positions near RIMLING.

9 January - D/147

25 Panzer Grenadier Division joined in the attacks against the U S front north of HAGUENAU Forest and the ten-day battle for HATTEN and RITTERSHOFFEN began. The first attack was dispersed after forcing a temporary withdrawal; but a second attempt succeeded in surrounding HATTEN and reaching a point south of RITTERSHOFFEN. An American counterattack had retaken half of HATTEN by the end of the day. Of 15-20 enemy tanks supporting the offensive, 12 were destroyed. Our attack on the enemy bridgehead west of the RHINE met strong resistance at HERRLESHEIM but succeeded in retaking a large part of the town. The enemy continued to offer stubborn resistance from dug-in positions on the southern tip of his HAARDT Mountain salient. In the eastern SAAR Valley, the attack on RIMLING was renewed and heavy fighting was in progress at the end of the day.

10 January - D/148

The enemy continued to offer strong resistance in the bridgehead area southeast of BISCHWILLER and attacked with infantry supported by two self-propelled guns southeast of ROHRWILLER early in the day. A U S battalion surrounded in HERRLESHEIM in the morning was contacted by friendly troops, but bitter fighting for the town continued throughout the day. Stiff resistance continued in HATTEN with infantry supported by armor. In the HAARDT Mountains, strong resistance continued on the outskirts of ALTHORN and along the high ground north of REIPERTSWILLER. Northwest of ALTHORN the enemy harassed our forward elements with small-scale attacks and artillery fire. In the RIMLING area he reverted to the defensive, apparently busy consolidating his gains. A limited-objective attack by American troops south of FOREBACH met generally light resistance, and a counterattack in estimated platoon strength was repulsed late in the day.

11 January - D/149

As U S troops evacuated HERRLESHEIM, the RHINE bridgehead lapsed into comparative quiet and 553 Division remained inactive. Farther north, 25 Panzer Grenadier Division, which had failed to break through two days before, resumed the offensive in the same area, this time with more success. Attacking with intense artillery and mortar support, infantry and tanks reached the eastern portion of RITTERSHOFFEN. Identifications late in the day indicated that 21 Panzer Division had also rejoined the battle in this sector.

6 SS Mountain Division, in the HAARDT Mountains, also renewed its offensive, launching two attacks in the REIPERTSWILLER area, one of which succeeded in cutting the WILDENGUTH - ROTHBACH road. Farther west the enemy was forced out of ALTHORN, despite strong resistance and an unsuccessful counterattack.

12 January - D/150

The RHINE bridgehead area continued quiet. To the north, intense artillery fire, tank and infantry action characterized heavy fighting as the enemy renewed his attacks in the HATTEN - RITTERSHOFFEN area. German tanks and infantry succeeded in occupying most of HATTEN and surrounding some U S 79 Division troops in the town; the enemy also continued to hold the eastern portion of

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RITTERSHOFFEN. Much of the ground taken by the enemy in the REIPERTSWILLER sector the previous day was recovered during the morning, but resistance stiffened later in the day and heavy fire and local counterattacks were met near ALTHORN and WILDENGUTH.

13 January - D/151

The RHINE bridgehead was generally quiet, although an enemy attack south-east of DRUSENHEIM forced withdrawal of friendly outposts. Heavy fighting continued at both RITTERSHOFFEN and HATTEN, where the enemy resisted stubbornly with infantry supported by tanks and flame throwers. Contact was made with U S elements cut off in HATTEN, but the enemy continued to reinforce the town from the east; the 7 Parachute Division was beginning to arrive here from HOLLAND. In the HAARDT Mountain salient, the enemy again resisted strongly our efforts to force him back toward the north. The hard-used 361 Division was being withdrawn here, to be replaced by 256 Division from farther east. 36 Division, which had moved into the mountains from the SAAR front, was taking over the 256 sector.

14 January - D/152

Heavy fighting continued in HATTEN and RITTERSHOFFEN with the enemy offering stubborn opposition and launching several attacks supported by tanks, self-propelled guns and flame throwers. After dark, tanks and an unestimated number of infantry forced forward elements to withdraw at HATTEN. In the HAARDT Mountain salient, our advance continued to encounter strong opposition and small counterattacks northwest of REIPERTSWILLER.

15 January - D/153

21 Panzer, 25 Panzer Grenadier and 7 Parachute Divisions made continuous and strenuous efforts to penetrate the main battle position. Repeated attacks led to bitter fighting in HATTEN, which was still in progress at dark. In the HAARDT Mountains, close contact was maintained and several counterattacks, including one strong one north of REIPERTSWILLER, were beaten off.

16 January - D/154

The U S 12 Armored Division, attacking the RHINE bridgehead, met very determined resistance and was forced to withdraw west of the ZORN River. The HATTEN - RITTERSHOFFEN sector was again the scene of heavy fighting, and another enemy attack forced a slight withdrawal in HATTEN. Northeast of REIPERTSWILLER the enemy showed further aggressiveness, launching an attack during the afternoon which achieved a slight penetration.

17 January - D/155

Beginning his attempt to establish a firm link between the RHINE bridgehead and the main front to the north, the enemy shifted elements of the 7 Parachute Division southward and committed them to an attack on SESSENHEIM, which was seized together with the neighboring towns of STATTMATTEN and DENGOLSHEIM. SESSENHEIM was recovered in the afternoon but heavy fighting continued in the vicinity. South of this sector, 553 Division again put up strong resistance at HERRLISHEIM; and to the north street fighting was in progress at RITTERSHOFFEN and HATTEN, where two more tank-supported infantry attacks were launched during the morning. In the HAARDT Mountain salient, the enemy's strong resistance in the area north of REIPERTSWILLER was accompanied by further attempts at infiltration.

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Strong pressure by enemy infantry and armor continued in the SESSENHEIM and HERRLISHEIM areas, and the 43d Tank Battalion of the U S 12 Armored Division was lost in fighting in this sector. SESSENHEIM was retaken by the enemy. Barge movements indicated that enemy reinforcements were crossing the RHINE - probably elements of 10 SS Panzer Division, which was identified here the following day.

Fighting continued at HATTEN and RITTERSHOFFEN and northeast of REIPERTSWILLER, where the enemy was holding an organized defensive line.

19 January - D/157

Major elements of 10 SS Panzer Division were now identified in the HERRLISHEIM area in a large-scale attack whose apparent preliminary objective was BISCHWILLER. The ZORN Canal, west and southwest of HERRLISHEIM, was crossed in strength by enemy infantry and tanks - of which 28 of an estimated 50 employed were destroyed; these included two U S Shermans which probably were relics of the lost tank battalion.

An attack on ROHRWILLER was repulsed, but in the evening DRUSENHEIM was attacked and surrounded, resulting in the isolation of the 2d Battalion, 314 Infantry, U S 79 Division. Farther north in the SESSENHEIM area, elements of the 7 Parachute Division offered strong opposition to a counterattack by friendly troops. In the HATTEN - RITTERSHOFFEN area elements of the 21 Panzer and 25 Panzer Grenadier Divisions were still in action and two attacks on HATTEN were repulsed. In the HAARDT Mountains, 256 and 6 SS Mountain Divisions, heavily supported by artillery, were again aggressive. Two attacks, each in two-company strength, were beaten off north of REIPERTSWILLER, while enemy infiltration behind the 3d Battalion, 157 Infantry, U S 45 Division, cut it off from friendly forces.

20 January - D/158

An enemy attack west of HERRLISHEIM was repulsed early in the morning, but in general there was a marked lessening of enemy activity which may have been due either to the extremely bad weather or to regrouping for a resumption of the offensive. However, efforts to relieve the battalions cut off at DRUSENHEIM and northeast of REIPERTSWILLER were unsuccessful, and VI Corps began its withdrawal to the MODER River line.

21 January - D/159

VI Corps' withdrawal between REIPERTSWILLER and BISCHWILLER left most of the German divisions in this sector out of contact, except on the two flanks. Enemy probing in the east led to a fire fight near WEYERSHEIM, and armor was active near OBERHOFEN and BISCHWILLER, with one tank or self-propelled gun firing into the latter town. The enemy reacted to our patrol activity in the HAARDT Mountains, and several fire fights developed.

West of the mountains the enemy in the SAAR Valley was generally quiet, as he had been ever since 17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division's last attack on RIMLING on 9/10 January.

22 January - D/160

Except for considerable observed movement and occasional patrol action, contact with the enemy was negligible as he followed up our withdrawal and regrouped his forces for a resumption of the offensive.

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23 January - D/161

The enemy continued his regrouping and reinforcement against our MODER River line. Although his new order of battle was not yet completely clear, a few patrol actions and minor attacks yielded preliminary identifications. 10 SS Panzer Division sent out combat patrols in the BISCHWILLER area. West of HAGUENAU the 47 Volksgrenadier Division appeared. It had come from DUREN and according to prisoners had taken part in the HATTEN - RITTERSHOFFEN battle on 16 January but had not then been identified by U S forces.

In the OFFWILLER sector 36 Volksgrenadier Division was active, infiltrating behind the town to capture it, and attacking unsuccessfully in battalion strength southeast of the town. ROTHBACH was occupied by the 6 SS Mountain Division, and 256 Volksgrenadier Division was reidentified in the REIPERTSWILLER area. The western half of the front remained quiet, with enemy dispositions unchanged.

24 January - D/162

Identification on this and the following day finally revealed the complete dispositions of the enemy divisions which had followed up our withdrawal: 553 Division remained on the GAMESHEIM flank; 21 Panzer Division came in next to it, in the BISCHWILLER area, displacing 10 SS Panzer Division westward into the BISCHWILLER - HAGUENAU sector; west of HAGUENAU, 7 Parachute, 25 Panzer Grenadier and 47 Volksgrenadier Divisions held a narrow sector; 36 Volksgrenadier, 6 SS Mountain and 256 Volksgrenadier Divisions held the rest of the front to REIPERTSWILLER.

On the 24th, they were preparing for their last offensive. Probing action increased, and in some instances patrol activities developed into platoon- and company-strength attacks at BISCHOLTZ, MULHAUSEN and in the woods southwest of MERZWILLER. Late in the evening enemy troops crossed the canal southeast of MERZWILLER after a short artillery preparation but were driven back after a fire fight; remaining elements were still being mopped up during the night. Patrols of 15 to 25 men were active in the HAARDT Mountain area and enemy artillery increased slightly late in the day as WILDENGUTH was subjected to heavy-caliber harassing fire.

25 January - D/163

During the night 24/25 January, the front again burst into activity. Elements of 10 SS Panzer Division attacked across the MODER just east of HAGUENAU; they established a bridgehead which lasted until afternoon when they were forced back, leaving over 100 prisoners behind. Elements of 7 Parachute, 25 Panzer Grenadier and 47 Volksgrenadier Divisions, operating in very narrow and virtually indistinguishable sectors west of HAGUENAU, were repulsed at two points but succeeded in crossing at a third, penetrating into OHLUNGEN Wood and SCHWEIGHAUSEN. Heavy fighting continued throughout the day but by evening the Germans were falling back in the woods and SCHWEIGHAUSEN was reported clear. Elements of 36 Volksgrenadier Division attacked at NIEFFERN unsuccessfully; however, small arms fire continued to be received from the two or three strong points in the town until it was destroyed by our artillery in the afternoon.

At MULHAUSEN, 6 SS Mountain Division put in a strong attack early in the morning and succeeded in reaching SCHILLERSDORF. There the enemy's forward elements were cut off and were being mopped up at the end of the day, although strong resistance continued at MULHAUSEN.

On the west flank of this last offensive, 50-75 infantrymen from 256 Volksgrenadier Division forced our outposts to withdraw near REIPERTSWILLER. The nearby town of SAEGMUHL was entered by our troops without opposition, but a subsequent enemy attack forced them to withdraw.

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Again only minor activity took place on the western half of the Army front.

26 January - D/164

The enemy failed to follow up his aggressiveness of the previous day. 10 SS Panzer Division, after its unsuccessful attempt to establish a bridgehead across the MODER River east of HAGUENAU, was completely quiet. West of HAGUENAU our lines were reestablished between SCHWEIGHAUSEN and NEUBOURG without contact, as elements of the 25 Panzer Grenadier, 7 Parachute and 47 Volksgrenadier Divisions retired to the north bank of the MODER. Farther west, small arms fire was exchanged with elements of 36 Volksgrenadier Division in the MULHAUSEN - NIEFFERN area, while elements of 6 SS Mountain Division were cleared from SCHILLERSDORF.

27 January - D/165

Activity was negligible except for an exchange of small arms fire near MULHAUSEN and a fire fight at ROTHBACH in the VI Corps zone, and a 17-man attack south of HIESERUCKEN in the XV Corps zone. Although there was as yet no proof of enemy withdrawals from our front, the lack of activity here and the seriousness of the situation in POLAND made it appear likely that the enemy was preparing to move some of his divisions eastward.

28 January - D/166

The Army front was generally quiet with only minor contact, patrol activity and very light artillery fire reported. 21 Panzer Division was out of contact and was never again met by Seventh Army; it was enroute to the east, where it was later contacted by the Russians.

29 January - D/167

Enemy activity was again slight. Scattered small groups were observed and occasional patrol contacts reported, with artillery fire generally light. Both ground and air sources reported considerable movement behind the front facing VI Corps as the enemy continued his preparations for withdrawal of major elements.

30 January - D/168

Enemy activity continued slight throughout the entire front. Scattered small groups were again observed and friendly patrols made occasional contacts. Although 25 Panzer Grenadier Division still furnished an identification west of HAGUENAU, it was following 21 Panzer out of the line, as was 7 Parachute Division. 245 Infantry Division arrived on the line, taking up a sector between 47 and 36 Volksgrenadier Divisions. This division had remained quiet in the eastern HAARDT Mountains throughout the January offensives and had not even followed up the VI Corps withdrawal on 20 January. Apparently it was to be given a sector on the now inactive front to release stronger divisions for more urgent tasks.

31 January - D/169

Enemy activity continued negligible along the entire front throughout the day. Friendly patrols made occasional contacts.

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III. SUMMARY

The enemy had opened the January offensive with a total strength in infantry combat effectives of some 31,000 in the German First Army (see G-2 History for December 1944, page 2, and Annex II). During the operation he brought into the Seventh Army sector reinforcements totalling about 20,500, including both miscellaneous replacements and the infantry elements of four new divisions (7 Parachute, 10 SS Panzer, 47 Volksgrenadier, and the reconstituted 553 Volksgrenadier). Comparison of these totals with combat effectives in contact at the end of the month revealed that the enemy lost an estimated 17,000 killed and wounded during the month in addition to the 5,985 processed through the Seventh Army prisoner of war cage. In his persistent armored attacks he lost at least 176 tanks and self-propelled guns.

For his pains and losses he gained a small portion of northern ALSACE, whose villagers themselves expressed the best evaluation of the offensive when they called it "the last spasm".

## ANNEX I

## - ENEMY FORCES OPPOSING SEVENTH ARMY -


	<u>Infantry</u> <u>Strength in Combat Effectives</u>					
	<u>1 Jan</u>	<u>7 Jan</u>	<u>13 Jan</u>	<u>19 Jan</u>	<u>25 Jan</u>	<u>31 Jan</u>
6 SS Mtn Div.	3500	3400	2500	2200	2000	1700
	(In Reserve)					
7 Para Div.	HOLLAND			3700	3500	0 of C
10 SS Pz Div.	DUREN AREA			4000	3300	2650
17 SS PG Div.	2200	1800	1800	1550	1600	1650
19 Inf Div.	1800	1500	1050	1050	1050	1300
21 Pz Div.	3000	2500	1600	1600	1400	0 of C
25 PG Div.	2500	1500	1300	1050	1000	0 of C
36 VG Div.	2400	1300	1500	1300	1300	1150
47 VG Div.	REFITTING IN GERMANY				2000	1650
245 Inf Div.	1400	1400	2800	2800	2800	2000
256 VG Div.	2100	1500	1150	1100	950	1450
257 VG Div.	3000	1600	1300	1300	1300	1450
347 Inf Div.	2000	1700	1500	1500	1500	1500
361 VG Div.	2300	750	500	400*	400*	HOLLAND
559 VG Div.	1900	1600	1200	0 of C	0 of C	
Misc Units - u/c				1300	1300	1250
653 VG Div.	--	--	--	2500	2500	2000
Misc Units	<u>3100</u>	<u>4500</u>	<u>4200</u>	<u>2600</u>	<u>2850</u>	<u>2400</u>
TOTALS	<u>31300</u>	<u>25050</u>	<u>22400</u>	<u>29950</u>	<u>30750</u>	<u>22150</u>

\* 361 VG Division staff and cadre were enroute to HOLLAND. However, the few surviving organic troops remained behind to become replacements for other divisions; in the last column they are included in their new units, of which the chief one was 256 VG Division.

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ANNEX I

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RESTRICTEDANNEX IIIG-2 ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION NO. 6

Ref. No. X-1134

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Hq. Seventh Army  
In the Field  
29 December 1944I. SUMMARY OF ENEMY SITUATION.A. Enemy Activities and Units in Contact.

The enemy's overall attitude has been defensive. Counterattacks have been based on limited objectives only and have not exceeded battalion strength.

In the RHINE Valley, the 256th, 21st Pz, and 245th Divisions delayed weakly back to the SIEGFRIED Line. There, reinforced and in strongly prepared positions, they offered considerable resistance. In the HARDT Mountains, the 361st and 25th P.C. Divisions were forced back on a series of strong MAGNOT Forts before BITCHE, where the enemy's determined resistance and good use of his positions and excellent observation, resulted in severe fighting. On the western slopes of the HARDT, the 257th Division, a new arrival, has not been active, probably due to the long sector it is manning. The 17th SS PG Division, along the LA ELIES River, before being withdrawn, showed aggressiveness in small counterattacks and was quick to occupy ground vacated by our troops. South of the SAAR, the 36th and 347th Divisions have been generally inactive.

Meanwhile, there have been indications of an enemy build-up in two areas: Agent reports, rail movement and PW statements indicate that one build-up area is in the East RHINE Valley and the COLMAR bridgehead. Rail movement, persistent PW statements, and photo interpretation indicates that an additional build-up is in progress in the SAARBRUCKEN area.

B. Strength of Units in Contact and Strategic Reserves.1. Strength of Units in Contact.

There are at present writing elements of nine divisions of the First German Army in contact with the forces of the Seventh U.S. Army west of the RHINE. The equivalent combat effective strength of these nine divisions, namely the 245th, 256th, 257th and 361st VGD's, the 19th, 36th and 347th Inf Divs, the 17th SS and 25th PGD's, and the 21st Pz Div, is believed not to exceed 16 - 17 battalions of American infantry. An estimated 120-130 tanks and SP's are believed to be in the area at the present time.

East of the RHINE River in the immediate sector of the Seventh Army, enemy forces are estimated at a combat effective strength not to exceed the equivalent of 8 battalions.

Contact with the mobile units of the German First Army, i.e., the 17th SS, 25th PGD and 21st Pz Div is very light and it is believed that they are undergoing reformation.

2. Strategic Reserves.

The current large scale offensive has resulted in the identification of all units of the Sixth SS Panzer Army and many other units of the enemy's carefully and cleverly husbanded strategic reserves. All mobile formations known to be in the west are now at least partially committed, but, with the "shuttle system" of the enemy in mind, it is to be expected that some of these mobile divisions will be made available if another offensive were attempted.

RESTRICTEDANNEX III

Known to be out of line at the present time and reported to be reforming in GERMANY are the 331st, 344th, 346th, 48th, 59th and 89th Divisions.

Reported moving from the north into GERMANY are the 2nd Mtn, 6th Ss Mtn and 710th Infantry Divisions. All at present are unlocated. In addition, the 559th VGD, which was reinforced by absorbing the remnants of the 48th Inf Division, has been out of contact since 16 December, and may be moving into a position of reserve.

East of the RHINE, the 553rd VGD, reported as both reforming and manning defenses in the KARLSRUHE area, is now believed to have been relieved of some of its defensive duties and may possibly be ready for commitment in the Seventh Army area.

The 216th Infantry Division is reportedly in the KARLSRUHE area, possibly responsible for a sector of the SIEGFRIED Line.

The 405th and 415th Infantry Divisions are believed to be located at OBERKIRCH and LUDWIGSBURG, respectively, and are believed to be administrative staffs controlling numerous miscellaneous units within their areas. These units appear capable of a defensive action only.

In addition to the above enumerated units, the enemy probably has at least five unidentified divisions in the process of reformation and capable of early commitment on the Western front.

#### C. Movements.

##### 1. Movements.

General: During the first half of month of December only 75 missions flown, many under poor conditions of visibility with 7 days of no missions flown. Area covered included from line SARREGUEMINES (Q-5157) - ZWEIERBRUCKEN (Q-7372) - KAISERSLAUTERN (R-0294) - MANNHEIM (M-5400) east and south to HEILBRONN (S-0862) - STUTTGART (S-0722) - FREUDENSTADT (W-5085) - OFFENBURG (W-1686).

M/T movement was very scant and no significant pattern was developed. Rail movement was generally heavy but few trains of conventional troop size were reported. Very few carried M/T or armor and traffic did not indicate a troop or armored build-up in any specific area on Seventh Army front.

16 Dec - 26 Dec: Area coverage was increased, with change in Army boundaries to include the following area: SAARLAUTERN (Q-2980) - NORDFELD (L-5710) - KIRN (L-8032) - BAD KREUZNACH (M-0938) - EINGEN (M-1252) - FRANKFORT (M-6870) - DARMSTADT (M-6542) - HEIDELBERG (R-7090) and then as before.

Major movements reported included 4 columns M/T (N/F's 16 Dec.) approximately 17 miles in length from vic ST WENDELL (Q-5997) toward NEUNKIRCHEN (Q-5953). On 17 Dec. about 1,000 RR cars were reported idle on line from L-9700 - L-9018. No locomotives or unusual activity in area.

23 Dec. - 26 Dec: F/B's and Tac/R reported heavy rail activity in ZWEIERBRUCKEN - HOMBURG - NEUNKIRCHEN - ST INGBERT (Q-5576) area with HOMBURG center of activity. Considerable two-way traffic HOMBURG - KAISERSLAUTERN to WORMS (M-4515).

On 26 Dec. 20 plus tanks reported by Tac/R scattered in field vic Q-4898. Heavy flak. Both Tac/R and F/B's report notable increase in flak in this general area in past 4 days.

Over Army front as whole rail traffic has been heavy with more than 60 trains noted each day for 24-25-26 Dec., with definitely increased activity in the HOMBURG area.

Main Routes: East of the RHINE the main N-S routes would appear to be the line HEIDELBERG - BRUCHSAL (R-6369) - DURLACH (R-5445) and south thru RASTATT (R-3259), though relatively little traffic runs below DURLACH; HEIDELBERG - HEILBRONN (via NECKAR River line) - STUTTGART and thence SW via

BOHLINGEN (R-9510) and HORB (W-7284). Main E-W routes are those running thru either BRUCHSAL, or PFORZHEIM (R-7033).

The rail bridges below MANNHEIM appear to carry traffic intended mostly for the area east of the HARDT Mtns, with relatively little traffic crossing thru the mountains south of KAISERSLAUTERN. Most of the traffic from the east of the RHINE, intended for the area to the west of the HARDT Mtns, on our front, appears to cross at or in the vicinity of MANNHEIM, especially at WORMS and in most cases to funnel thru the WORMS marshalling yards.

West of the RHINE, the net connecting LANDAU (R-2766) - NEUSTADT (R-3084) - SCHIFFERSTADT (R-4688) - SPEYER (R-5180) - GERMERSHEIM (R-4669) carries most of the traffic in this area. West of the HARDT Mtns, the major part of the traffic appears to be along the lines from WORMS to KAISERSLAUTERN and thence to the HOMBURG area, though there is also some traffic from farther north, which is not routed thru WORMS but comes down the lines from BAD KREUZNACH (M-0927).

Capabilities: There are four serviceable rail bridges over the RHINE, from MANNHEIM to KARLSRUHE (MANNHEIM, SPEYER, GERMERSHEIM, MAXIMILIANSAU), with an adequate railnet on either side of the river. It is believed, therefore, that the enemy will be able to supply the front opposite VI Corps, even though most of these bridges are destroyed. Similarly the MANNHEIM and WORMS bridges can perform the same service for traffic destined for the HOMBURG area, as well as the bridges farther north at KASTEL (M-3758) and HINGEN (M-1152). Destruction of all of these bridges would seriously affect the enemy's supply system and destruction of some of them, particularly those to the south, would help to canalize much of the traffic and make it a far better target for our fighter bombers than it now presents.

There are constant reports of a lack of locomotives, lubricants and personnel to keep them running, but there has been no apparent abatement of the enemy's ability to carry on the majority of his supply by rail. It is unlikely that much of this task could be taken over by motor transport, which has been placed on an almost exclusively operational basis, if the very small numbers observed in both rear and forward areas are any criterion.

#### D. Component Elements.

##### 1. Artillery.

Closer contact with the SIEGFRIED and MAGINOT defenses has encountered increased enemy artillery activity. Improved visibility and general stabilization of the front has made it possible to determine many new enemy gun locations from the photo coverage of the past week.

Disregarding located AA guns, tanks and SP's, it appears that the reduced amount of divisional artillery has been reinforced by an equal amount of HQ reserve artillery. Enemy artillery is well dispersed across the front with the largest concentrations in two areas: one northeast of WISSEMBOURG (R-1548), and the other northeast of SARREGUEMINES (Q-5157). Northeast of WISSEMBOURG more than 80 gun locations have been reported in an area 5,000 meters square. Of the 581 gun locations opposite Seventh Army (22 Dec.), 89 are identified as Antiaircraft Artillery, 163 as light, 66 as medium, with 263 unidentified. A few scattered reports of heavy artillery activity have been received but no heavy gun locations have been determined.

The enemy can be expected to continue to place the bulk of his artillery fire on forward elements, especially during periods of aggressive action. In sectors of little activity, more artillery fire can be expected on our roadnets, villages and communications centers.

##### 2. Air. (By A-2, XII T.A.C.)

Although the revitalized G.A.F., greatly reinforced in the West,



has assumed large scale operations in direct support of the present German offensive, it is estimated that the S/E day fighter strength normally opposing Seventh Army has remained at the figure of a month ago, i.e., some 100 aircraft. This force is capable of flying a maximum of 100-125 sorties for any given daylight period.

It is necessary, however, to take a broad perspective of the enemy's capabilities, especially in view of the very high degree of excellence attained by the German Air Staff in the planning of air support for the present offensive in the West, and the enterprise and initiative with which it has been carried out. The following extract from IX Tactical Air Command's periodic report clearly shows that the G.A.F. is still capable of striking rather heavy blows of a tactical nature in direct support of ground units:

"A sustained air offensive on the First U.S. Army front began on the evening of 16 December at about 2030 hours. By morning the G.A.F. had flown over 200 sorties in the area, using a great variety of aircraft including FW 190's, JU 88's, HE 111's, ME 210's, DO 217's, JU 87's and JU 52's. Strafing and bombing attacks were carried on throughout the night. Towards dawn a large but undetermined number of paratroopers were dropped to disorganize communications....and the air effort did not dissipate during the day of 17 December." (It is now known that the G.A.F. flew an estimated 550-600 sorties on the 17th, the biggest day of German air activity since D-day in Normandy).

It is estimated that at present there are around 1,000 S/E day fighters on the Western front divided into five main areas dictated by the general layout of the airfields. Zone 1: TWENTE-ENSCHEDÉ/PLANTLUENNE with the groups of associated airfields; Zone 2: BOENNINGHARDT/KIRCHHELLEN; Zone 3: OSTHEIM/WAHN/EUDENBACH/BONN; Zone 4: RHEIN-MAIN/ESCHBORN/NIDDA/LANGENDIEBACH, and Zone 5: STUTTGART. While the STUTTGART area is the only portion of the G.A.F. directly opposing the Seventh Army (approximately 100 aircraft), it must be appreciated that around 400-450 S/E day fighters in Zone 4 are within operational radius of the Seventh Army front and must therefore be considered a potential supplement to any G.A.F. force operating against an appreciated ground threat from this end.

At present juncture of military developments and the obvious intention of the G.A.F. to give all possible support to the breakthrough in the West, it is not thought probable that any reinforcement in this area is likely. The fact remains, however, that the enemy has the capability of flying some 300-350 day fighter sorties against the Seventh Army according to the dictates of the ground situation. In accordance with present G.A.F. policy of "round the clock" close support operations, it must also be expected that night ground attack will penetrate into Seventh Army's sector. This effort probably will not exceed 20-25 sorties, as the main effort, both day and night, remains in the northern area.

#### E. Terrain and Weather as they Affect the Enemy.

##### 1. Terrain.

Terrain on the Seventh Army front favors the enemy. Three major features contribute to this condition:

a. The RHINE River. This broad, swift, north-flowing river forms a continuous right flank which is almost as long as the front itself. Although not in continuous physical contact with the enemy, this front is vulnerable to infiltration or penetration. Extensive patrol activity and the dissipation of considerable strength is required to keep it secure.

The swampy, twisting river bank with its numerous islands affords the enemy a flank of opportunity which is too long for our forces to hold solidly and which is ideal for continuous harassment and irritation by means of large and small patrol infiltration activity, always holding in the background the threat of an attack in force and the establishment of a bridgehead if a weak spot can be found.

b. The Low VOSGES and HARDT Mountains. These comparatively low, rugged, heavily wooded mountains lie in a northeasterly direction along the axis of our advance and approximately in the center of our front, where they form a strong barrier to our troops to the east and west. There are few good roads across this feature. The main ones being PHALSBURG - SAVERNE, INGWILLER - WINGEN sur MODER, NIEDERBRONN les BAINS - HICHE. Control of these roads is imperative to the coordinated command of troops on both sides of this range.

This feature provides the enemy with a natural defensive position across the center of our front which has been well improved with portions of the SIEGFRIED Line. So long as he holds this high commanding ground our advances on the low ground, east and west, must go through heavy belts of prepared positions and be subjected to flank attacks. The positions across the range allow him to hold this ground with a minimum number of men and thus allows him to release and thin out units for counterattacks without jeopardizing his line. The rugged character of the terrain running the length of the entire feature offers him a temporarily secure flank for a counterattack in force if he is willing to gamble on holding the main, cross mountain roads for a limited time, in an effort to split our forces and destroy or disperse them in detail.

c. The SAAR River. This north flowing river lies about 10 miles west of and parallel to the Low VOSGES. In the vicinity of SAARBURG the SAAR River is paralleled (about 4 miles to the west) by the Canal HOULLERE de la SARRE and a series of lakes extending north to MITTERSHEIM. The canal and the SAAR converge on SALTZBRONN where they meet and follow a winding course north to SARREGUEMINES. Between these waterways and the mountains to the east lies a rolling, lightly wooded plain from 10 - 12 miles in width which extends south from the vicinity of SARREGUEMINES for approximately 30 miles to the vicinity of SAARBURG, PHALSBOURG and the strategic SAVERNE Gap.

This river, with its parallel canal and lakes, favors the enemy, particularly if he elects to make a sudden thrust on a comparatively narrow front for a limited objective. Should he elect to drive down the valley between the mountains and the SAAR, the river forms a natural right flank and the lakes and swampy woodland south of MITTERSHEIM afford excellent protection, particularly during the early stages of a rapid penetration. Should he elect to drive south from SARREGUEMINES and exploit to the southwest and west, the river affords him a good left flank line from which he could make reinforcement from east to west extremely difficult.

## 2. Weather.

Weather in general favors the enemy. Rain, mist and cloudy weather have continually reduced the effectiveness of our air superiority and have often seriously interfered with "Cub" flights and air OPs.

There can be little doubt that the enemy has taken full advantage of the opportunities afforded him by bad weather to move needed supplies to the front and to advanced supply depots. In clear weather our air superiority restricts his movement to night almost exclusively. In bad weather he can often move troops and equipment in large quantities without interference or observation.

A decrease is expected shortly in rain and clouds although cloudy conditions, adverse for air observation, will remain high with about 70% of the days favoring the enemy. A brief "good weather" cycle is now closing and will shortly be followed by at least two weeks of poor to bad weather.

Weather is expected to favor enemy operations (in regard to blinding our Air Corps) until about 10 February. The remainder of February, however, will favor Allied air operations with a preponderance of clear, cold days, followed by two months during which poor weather and rain will predominate.

## II. CONCLUSIONS.

### A. Capabilities.

1. To attack south from BITCHE - SARREGUEMINES area with 5 to 8 divisions with initial objective of seizing SAVERNE and INGWILLER Passes.

#### Discussion.

Objective of this attack would be to clear the RHINE Valley, capture or destroy the bulk of the Seventh Army, and indirectly to relieve pressure of Third U.S. Army against German forces in the EIFEL area.

This attack would probably be coordinated with a drive northward by the Nineteenth Army from the COLMAR Bridgehead and the establishment of a bridgehead in the GAMBESHEIM area (R-1010).

Terrain features favor the attack south from SARREGUEMINES area. The west flank can be rested on the SARRE River - HOUILLERES Canal line. The HARDT Mountains afford excellent east flank protection based on the blocking of the main East-West passes. Rolling, lightly wooded terrain lying between the HARDTS and the SARRE is favorable for armored exploitation to the south, where the seizure of the north bank of the RHINE-MARNE Canal between HERTZING (R-4009) and LUTZELBOURG (Q-6415) will secure the southern flank and the initial objective, as well as disrupting communications between the two Corps of Seventh Army. Holding attacks in the HARDT Mountains and the HENWALD (WISSEMBOURG - LAUTERBOURG area) would exert pressure to hold Seventh Army units in place. The establishment of a bridgehead in the GAMBESHEIM area, and a drive north from COLMAR Bridgehead with two to three divisions, coordinated with the forces driving east from SAVERNE and INGWILLER, would, if successful, isolate STRASBOURG, cut the communications of all units in line, and complete the encirclement of Seventh Army forces east of HARDT Mountains.

The employment of parachutists, agents and saboteurs to seize key communications centers, accomplish destruction, demolitions and spread panic, must be expected.

2. To attack southwest from the VOLKINGEN - FORBACH - SARREGUEMINES area with 5 to 8 divisions and the mission of capturing METZ and securing the crossings over the MOSELLE.

#### Discussion.

The objective of this attack would be to split the Seventh and Third Armies, to drive north from METZ toward LUXEMBOURG in conjunction with a coordinated southward drive by German forces in the EIFEL area. Here again, terrain favors the enemy. The SARRE River and HOUILLERES Canal would provide East flank protection, while the SELLE River and swamp area south and east of DIEUZE present obstacles which could be economically defended in holding the southern flank. Terrain along the SARREGUEMINES - MORHANGE (Q-2037) - METZ axis is comparatively favorable for armored operations.

3. With forces currently in contact and in immediate reserve, launch a series of limited objective attacks.

#### Discussion.

The purpose of such attacks would be to keep Seventh Army units under sufficient pressure to prevent dispatch of troops to EIFEL area. Demonstrations, real and dummy para-drops, flare activity, infiltration, and other tactics designed to create apprehension, nervousness, and cause dispersion of forces in extensive patrolling, can be expected in conjunction with efforts to maintain pressure on Seventh Army units.



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4. Counterattack from RIENWALD Forest and HARDT Mountains to seize general line WOERTH - SOULTZ SOUS FORETS - SELTZ.

Discussion.

The main objective of this attack would be to retake the high ground west and northwest of WISSEMBOURG. Should this attack meet with initial success, a continuation of the attack toward HAGUENAU is a reasonable expectation. The successful accomplishment of this offensive would enable the enemy to reestablish himself on the MAGINOT Line from BITCHE Eastward. It would relieve him of the responsibility of manning 15 miles of vulnerable river line, and would further eliminate artillery fire on KARLSRUHE.

B. Favored Capabilities.

Capabilities 3 and 1 are favored in that order.

The most logical and economical employment of forces now in contact and known to be in reserve would be in demonstrations, threats, infiltrations and limited objective attacks designed to contain the Seventh Army in its present positions.

Indications of enemy concentrations and build-ups in the SAARERUCKEN area and in the East RHINE Valley are disturbing, however, and the Nineteenth Army's determination to hold the COLMAR bridgehead may shortly assume added significance. Certainly the recovery of ALSACE, in addition to its military value, would provide a tremendous uplift to German morale, particularly if the attack in the EIFEL area fails to achieve any substantial success.

Additional confirmation of the SAARERUCKEN and East RHINE Valley area build-ups will tend to favor Capability 1. Conversely, identification of the 21st Pz and/or other mobile units of the First German Army in the EIFEL area will be indicative of less ambitious enemy intentions in ALSACE.

The current success of the Third U.S. Army's counterattack from the South, and the enemy's apparent emphasis on operations to the northwest in the EIFEL sector, tends to discount Capability 2.

/s/ William W. Quinn  
/t/ WILLIAM W. QUINN,  
Colonel, G. S. C.,  
A. C. of S., G-2.


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(NOTE: Reproduced verbatim below is a translation of a German historical report, obtained from an officer who was an editor of War Diaries at OKW).

- - -

The "Northwind" (Nordwind)<sup>1</sup> Operation.

(The Liberation of Northern ALSACE)

(21 December 1944 - 13 January 1945)

The withdrawal of enemy bridgeheads on the SAAR led to the conclusion that the enemy had withdrawn additional forces from this sector and would probably continue to withdraw forces. On 21 December, therefore, High Command West directed Army Group G to exploit this situation, specifically through local attacks and preparations of a surprise attack to regain the SAVERNE Gap. The utmost secrecy was ordered; the preparations were to represent the imminent evacuation of Army Group D.<sup>2</sup>

On 22 December, the Fuehrer ordered two armored and three infantry divisions to attack, if possible, to the south with the object of attacking American units in the WISSEMBOURG area from the rear. The Fuehrer expected better results from this action than from an attack from the VOSGES bridgehead<sup>3</sup> which would require first the bringing up of the requisite forces. Everything was to be done to deceive and tie down the enemy along the entire front.

Instructions were given accordingly to High Command West on 22 December, which therefore rescinded its previous order of 21 December. In addition, orders were given to investigate whether with local forces the front could be shifted forward from the ORSCHOLZRIEGEL<sup>4</sup> if the left flank of the Third Army advanced. At present, 4 infantry divisions and 3 mobile task forces were provided for the initial attack against the SAVERNE Gap. The Commander of Oberrhein<sup>5</sup> was informed thereof, and asked to support this attack by shock troop operations, and to assist in the establishment of bridgeheads north and south of STRASBOURG.

A conference with Army Group G was held on 24 December.

The signal operations instructions issued on 25 December designated the new operation with the code word "Nordwind." The report of Army Group G announced that the objective of the operation was to gain the SAVERNE Gap in the PHALSBOURG - SAVERNE sector, in order to then annihilate the enemy in North ALSACE and to secure a juncture with the Nineteenth Army. For this purpose, two attack groups were to be readied.

1st Group to attack from east of the ELIES toward the south, in order to breach the MAGNOT Line at ROHRBACH and there to make a juncture with the right flank of the 2d Group for a thrust against PHALSBOURG.

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2d Group to attack east of BITCHE in several spearheads and reach the line ENCKENBERG - (in pencil; SARREINSBERG ? WIMMENAU ?) and there link up with the 1st Group, then, depending on the situation, to attack either east or west to PHALSBURG - SAVERNE. For this operation, the 21 Panzer Division was to be prepared east of BITCHE, and committed according to the way the situation developed; the 25 Panzer Grenadier Division was to be in reserve southeast of ZWEIERUCKEN so that it could be committed to either the 1st or the 2d Attack Group. To deceive the enemy an attack was ordered in the ORSCHOLZRIEGEL sector for 30 December.

On 26 December, High Command West informed Army Group G of the Fuehrer's request that the attack of the right attack group be undertaken in such a way that with cover against the SAAR, as well as against SAVERNE, it could quickly reach the highway to PHALSBURG - SAVERNE. Therefore it was necessary to move the right flank of the XIII SS Army Corps westward to the ELIES at ELIESBRUCKEN, and from there, by way of WOELFING, to take quickly the highway running south from ROHRBACH. For this purpose, the 25 Panzer Grenadier Division, as well as the 21 Panzer Division were designated as reserves. They were to be so situated in the northern area that after the breakthrough, they could be rapidly shoved south, past the ROHRBACH West Group. On orders of the Fuehrer, the attack over the upper RHINE was not to begin until 48 hours after the initial attack, and the attack at ORSCHOLZRIEGEL, which had been intended to deceive the enemy, was called off.

Since the opponent withdrew further forces, the Fuehrer, on 27 December, ordered the start of the attack for 2300 hours on 31 December. The Oberrhein Army Group was to be committed only when our own<sup>6</sup> armored spearheads had reached the east exits of the VOSGES in the INGWILLER - SAVERNE area. Its mission was to penetrate the enemy front along the RHINE north of STRASBOURG and to attempt a juncture with our own forces which would be turning east from the VOSGES mountains to the HAGUENAU - BRUMATH area.

On the same day, the Oberrhein Army Group announced its intentions; namely the preparation of a further bridgehead on both sides of GAMBESHEIM by the 553 Volksgrenadier Division with limited, local attacks on the north front of the Nineteenth Army, and an attack by a battalion on the south front to tie down the enemy. An attack with further objectives on the Army's northwest front would only be possible after 3 January, since another infantry division would have to be released for this operation.

On 3 January, the Joint Operation Staff made plans for an additional operation in conjunction with the "Nordwind" operation, (the smashing of 4-5 American divisions between FORBACH and PHALSBURG).<sup>7</sup>

On 4 January, the Oberrhein High Command received (it had been warned on 1350, 2 January) the order to attack on the night of 5-6 January, or even on 5 January if the situation warranted. It was further instructed to make immediate preparations to enable the commitment of all available forces of the Nineteenth Army in an attack to the north and northwest in order to effect a juncture with the First Army.

On 6 January, the Chief of Staff who had been driven to Army Group G, reported that our own infantry forces were partly exhausted, and that superiority over the enemy was only slowly being accomplished. The enemy, apparently, intended to keep lower ALSACE to support the MAGINOT Line. It was, therefore, impossible to have an offensive push from lower ALSACE without the addition of new forces. The result, therefore, depended on the success of the thrust by the XXXIX Panzer Corps.<sup>8</sup> In case this unit could not break through, consideration would have to be given to the desirability of seeking a decision with all the available forces in the HAGUENAU area.

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On 7 January, the Oberrhein High Command received the order from the Fuehrer to lighten the task of Army Group G by exerting steady pressure from the GAMBESHEIM bridgehead, and making the most of the success achieved at RHEINAU, in the meantime the 269 Infantry Division would be brought up and committed against MOLSHEIM.

7 January: Received notice of the arrival of large units at Army Group G if transportation situation remains unchanged:

- 10 SS Panzer Division by 13-14 January.
- 7 Parachute Division by 12-13 January.
- 47 Volksgrenadier Division (not ordered yet; possibly by 15 January).
- Reinforced artillery by 8-9 January.
- 11 Panzer Division alerted for march, therefore ready immediately.
- 2 Mountain Division: first regimental group by 12 January.

According to the impressions gained by the Chief of Staff who was with the troops on 6 and 7 January, the morale and behavior of the troops was altogether blameless, despite the extreme physical strain and the material superiority of the enemy. After overcoming the initial shock, the enemy's planning capabilities and resistance increased. By skillfully maneuvering shock troops through the breaches, the enemy threatened our own supply routes. Because he was able to relieve troops, the enemy was always able to use fresh troops, whereas our own had to fight without rest. The terrain was not favorable for rapid advances because of the limitations of vision. The battling for heights and localities wasted our strength, which was already extended to the last measure by the necessity of living out in the open. The visible abatement of combat strength could be explained by the short and insufficient training given by the Reserve Army (Ersatzheer), by the dearth of old and proven non-commissioned officers, and able battalion and company commanders. One battalion of the 362<sup>nd</sup> Infantry Division had only 15 men, another had only 60 men.

Attacks were made irregularly due to the lack of troops, and in such a way that the sectors were broadening. The intervening ground could not be cleared out so that advanced forces had to be recalled. A preliminary condition for new attacks was the availability of replacements. Even our own artillery was insufficient; advanced observation posts and radio apparatus were lacking. Supplies were available, but their distribution was difficult. The armored forces lacked spare parts; the orders for these required a considerable time.

The order by the Fuehrer on the morning of 8 January to continue the battle again repeated that the Army Group G was to contact the strongest enemy forces in the lower VOSGES (mountains) and northwest thereof, and to force a breakthrough south of WISSEMBOURG. The objective was unchanged: to gain the SAVERNE Gap and annihilate the enemy forces between the lower VOSGES and the RHINE.

On 9 January, the Fuehrer issued a new order to the High Command West, the High Command Oberrhein, and to the Air Forces Hq. stating that it was necessary for the next operation to finish successfully the battle for HAGUENAU and to annihilate the forces located between the lower VOSGES and the RHINE. For this purpose, all forces within the sector of Army Group G, with the exception of the 11 Panzer Division, were to be used. The aim was to complete the collapse of the enemy front north of HAGUENAU by a fast attack by the XXXIX Panzer Corps by way of SULZ on MERWEILER, and through a simultaneous attack by the 256 Infantry Division in the direction of ZINSWEILER. The 7 Parachute Division was to be used either behind the XXXIX Panzer Corps or next to the 256 in order to open the south-east exits of the lower VOSGES. The decision for this action was to depend on the activities of the following day.



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As soon as possible, contact with the bridgehead of the XIV SS Army Corps was to be established by the advance of the 10 SS Panzer Division east of the Forest of HAGUENAU. The next objective of the mobile forces of Army Group G was still the SAVERNE Gap. To attain the western exits of the lower VOSGES, it would be necessary to employ the 2d Mountain Division and the 6 SS Mountain Division. The decision as to whether and when the northern wing of the Nineteenth Army could be committed against MOLSHEIM depended upon the forthcoming situation.

On 9 January, a message was received by the Operational Staff, Hq. West, from the Commander of Army Group G, Generaloberst BLASKOWITZ. It stated that the "Nordwind" operation had become static after initial successes due to the lack of infantry troops, despite the fact that other sectors had been stripped of troops. There were insufficient infantry troops to mop up the conquered territory, nor were there enough to furnish the necessary replacements to the attacking units. The enemy had to flee as long as we had the initiative. However, his superior mobility, forces, and equipment, and his mastery of the air, would enable the enemy to reconsolidate his lines, after recovering from the initial surprise. It was, likewise, possible for the enemy to seize the initiative at a propitious opportunity.

The solution required by the situation, that of launching the XXXIX Panzer Corps through the WISSEMBOURG depression, had not had the desired results. The depletion of other fronts could only be continued as long as the enemy continued to divert additional forces from the Army Group B front, and Army Group G retained the initiative. That could only be accomplished by the employment of all available forces, within a limited area, so that tactical success would be certain. Further operational requirements could only be derived from this success.

The moment that this situation should change, the enemy would be in a favorable position to attack. Such action could have dire consequences. The Army Group, therefore advanced the thesis that the "Zahnarzt" operation could be placed on a sound basis, both operationally and tactically, only after the battle for HAGUENAU had been fought. It, therefore, considered it necessary to take the risk in the TRIER - HITCHER sector and after thorough preparation to commit all infantry forces in the VOSGES and force the exits between INGWILLER and NIEDERBRONN in order to attack the BRUMATH - HAGUENAU line. The XIV SS Corps would, likewise, have to advance against this line from the OSSENDORF bridgehead.

In order to permit no respite for the enemy, a continuation of the attack by the XXXIX Panzer Corps along the northwest edge of the HAGUENAU Forest would have to be considered, in order to divert enemy forces to this area. Then, an unrelenting attack by the 256 Volksgrenadier Division, the 47 Volksgrenadier Division, the 7 Parachute Division, the 6 SS Mountain Division, and the Combat Group of the 2 Mountain Division could take the mentioned VOSGES passages, and the 10 and 11 SS Panzer Divisions could attack HAGUENAU from the VOSGES mountains. If enough bridging, etc. material were at hand, the XXXIX Panzer Corps could be sent via SELTZ - SOUFFLENHEIM against HAGUENAU.

If the battle of HAGUENAU were over, all further operative possibilities would be on a sound basis; an attack east of the VOSGES in the direction of MOLSHEIM - SAVERNE, or an attack west of the VOSGES for the "Zahnarzt" operation. The Army Group G, therefore, asked for a consideration of the proposal that these forces be used, first, for the completion of the "Nordwind" operation, and then after being regrouped, for the "Zahnarzt" operation.

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In the event that it should be committed independently of the "Nordwind" operation, the attack against SAARALBEN - SAARUNION would require at least 4 fresh infantry divisions, and one additional division to furnish flank protection, along with the exhausted 361 and 257 Divisions. The attack would, further, require the support of 100 assault guns and tanks, since it would have to be made against 2 French Armored Division, and Army armored units of the 45 and 36 American divisions. The northern attack of the "Zahnarzt" operation from the area south of SAARBRUCKEN would require at least 2-3 armored and 2 infantry divisions, one of which divisions, together with 347 and 19 Volksgrenadier Divisions, would have to provide flank protection.

Thus, a demand for 3 infantry and 2-3 armored divisions resulted. At disposal were the following units, with full combat strength: 10 SS Panzer Division, 11 Panzer Division, 7 Parachute Division; other battle-fatigued units: 6 SS Mountain Division, 21 Panzer Division, 25 Panzer Grenadier Division and the 2 SS Mountain Division. Thus, 4-5 units were lacking.

The Commander-in-Chief noted in this connection that the decisive thrust would be conducted from the VOSGES against the SAAR and the secondary thrust from the area south of SAARBRUCKEN in a southeasterly direction. This would be ineffectual without the success of the eastern pincer. For that reason, the forces cited above had to endeavor to join the pincers from SAARALBEN. If these were not available, there remained the possibility of conducting the main thrust from SAARBRUCKEN against the line SAARALBEN - WITTRING with strong points at the right, and of forming a small counterpincers from the ELIESBRUCKEN - RIMLING sector against the ZETTING - WITTRING sector. Perhaps then the possibility of pushing forward with the eastern group eastward to RALLING and the VOSGES would arise. At the same time the eastern group would have to break through the MAGINOT Line at WITTRING in order to bring about the connection.

The Commander of the western fortifications made a concurring observation.

Order of the Fuehrer of 11 January (effective 12 January, 0145). The attack of the XXXIX Panzer Corps at RITTERSHOFFEN had bogged down, and the enemy had shifted his main effort there. For that reason, it was ordered that the 7 Parachute Division, reinforced by the 667 and 384 Assault Gun Brigades and the 10 SS Panzer Division should launch an attack as soon as possible from the area of FORSTFELD - BIENHEIM via ROESCHWOOG in the direction of DRUSENHEIM, in order to make contact with the 503<sup>rd</sup> Infantry Division. The goal of this attack was to push through the HAGUENAU Forest southwards, shifting via BISCHWILLER to the west and, in conjunction with the attack of the First Army (6 SS Mountain Division and 256 Infantry Division) in the direction of ZINSWEILER and NIEDERHORN, to destroy the enemy located north of the HAGUENAU Forest. If the counterattack in the direction of DRUSENHEIM succeeded, the mass of the XXXIX Panzer Corps was also to follow. Until then, the Corps was to simulate the continuation of the attack against EITSCHDORF by artillery and assault detachments. The weaker parts of the 7 Parachute Division could also be thus employed, but in such a way that they remained available for the main attack from BIENHEIM to the south.

This order was supplemented on 12 January. The forces which took up positions in the area FORSTFELD - BIENHEIM were to be subordinated to the XXXIX Panzer Corps, which in turn was to come under the command of the Commander-in-Chief Oberrhein. The Commander-in-Chief West was to rush as many Jagdtiger to the Corps as possible and - as soon as it was possible to bring them up - was to introduce the 25 Panzer Grenadier Division or the 21 Panzer Division. The attack was to commence only when sufficient forces were there to be able to exploit the breakthrough immediately. It was necessary that the attack go forward steadily. The expenditure of the infantry of the attack divisions in guerrilla battles would have to be prevented.

The Passing of the Initiative in the Attack-areas to the enemy: 14-28 January.

On 8 January the Fuehrer had given the instruction to pull out the 6 Panzer Army in order to be able to meet an enemy counterattack and to take our own MLR back to the line DONCHAMPS - LONGCHAMPS (NW of BASTOGNE). On 14 February the Fuehrer consented to the Commander-in-Chief West's withdrawal of the bulge in the front to the line CHERAIN - directly east of HOUFFALIZE (which was to remain under fire of our own artillery) - BOURZY - old MLR south of LONGVILLY, and this was to be done promptly so that no further heavy casualties would occur in Army Group B.

On 15 January it was ordered that the I and II SS Panzer Corps were to be rested for a limited time during the period between 20 - 30 January in the area of the Commander-in-Chief West.

On 17 January it was ordered that Army Command 19 was also to be subordinated on 19 January to the Oberrhein Commander for duty. On 19 January the Fuehrer ordered the Commander-in-Chief West to assemble at the Fuehrer's disposal in the shortest possible time Panzer Army Command 6 and the Fuehrer-Grenadiers and the Fuehrer-Escort Brigade in the area EUSKIRCHEN - PRUEM - HITBURG - ADNEAU, where upon arrival these formations would become Army High Command Reserve. The rest ordered on 15 January was to be effected there. The 11 Panzer Division was to be assembled south of SAARBURG after completing its mission.

On 20 January (0205) the Commander-in-Chief West was informed that it appeared that the whole Sixth Panzer Army with the 4 SS Panzer Division and both Fuehrer Brigades would be required on the eastern front. The decision would be given in the afternoon.

On 20 January (1855) the quickest possible shipment of the I SS Panzer Corps, with the 1 and 12 SS Panzer Divisions as well as the Corps troops, to the east via BERLIN was ordered.

On the same day (20 January) the Abt. Fremde Heere West submitted a study concerning the possible planning of the Western Powers up to 1 May.

1. Enemy situation: The enemy's intentions of attacking east of AACHEN and between LUXEMBOURG and the RHINE over the HAUFÉ were thwarted by our own attack in the ARDENNES. Next the enemy would attempt to recreate the old front, in order to prevent the flanking of the AACHEN area. A thrust into the EIFEL, which is an unsuitable area for attack, was not to be reckoned with. A cleaning-up of the SAAR - PFALZ foreplain and the elimination of the RHINE bridgeheads were possibilities. Then the preparation for an attack to seek a decision will begin. Flying weather and the condition of the terrain would decide the beginning; consequently the attack should occur about May. The British had at their disposal more than 22 major units, in May would have well over 25, if not more; the Americans more than 51, on 1 May over 69 - 75 divisions approximately; the French more than 8, on 1 May over 14; a total of more than 108 - 113, instead of the presently available 79. Indications of the hidden aims were not yet available; they could only be established as hypotheses.

On 21 January SS Oberstgruppenfuehrer HAUSSEER was entrusted with the provisional command of Army Group Oberrhein, since the Reichsfuehrer of the SS had taken over the new Army Group WEICHSEL.

On 22 January a new instruction was given. The British attack south of ROERMOND, the American attack in the ARDENNES bulge, the bitter actions in



lower ALSACE and the French attack in the upper VOSGES showed the intention of the enemy: to hinder the German command in disposing its reserves and thereby to extend the successes of the Russians until the collapse of the Reich's defenses. In order to counteract this, the Fuehrer decided to create the prerequisites for stopping the Russians and to go over to the counter-attack. For that reason the shipment of Panzer Army Command 6, both Fuehrer-Brigades, 1 Infantry Division or Volksgrenadier Division, two Volks Artillerie Korps and several bridge trains was ordered. The Fuehrer intended to disband High Command Oberrhein and to subordinate its units again to Army Group G; the Commander-in-Chief West was to announce the suitable time.

The Commander-in-Chief West received the command to regroup his forces in the center and in the north of the western front in accordance with the enemy's intentions, which were aiming at the RUHR territory and later at HOLLAND. The high land west of the OURE would be given up only step by step and under pressure. If the enemy pulled still stronger forces out of the ARDENNES to the north, Panzer Army Command 5 would have to be taken out of the front so that it could be put in again at the point of main effort.

In the lower VOSGES and on the upper RHINE the attack - with the objective previously indicated in mind - was to be continued as long as there was any expectation of destroying the enemy north of the HAGUENAU - SAVERNE line or of compelling a retreat beyond the SAVERNE Gap, and consequently renewing contact with the Nineteenth Army on the VOSGES crest.

The Luftwaffe received the mission of supporting the Commander-in-Chief West by using late-model aircraft to bomb the enemy territory, with the main effort at ANTWERP. The Army was to be supported directly only by units which were not suitable for ANTWERP, and this only within the framework of the operational situation. The fighter units were supposed to protect rear-front communications. Three fighter groups were to be shifted to the east.

Elements of the III Flak Corps were to protect the loadings of the Sixth Panzer Army and were to be shifted with it to the east. The enemy had to be kept in the dark as long as possible concerning the changed intentions. Each day was a gain. The impression had to be created by deception that the departing forces were to be employed in HOLLAND and in ALSACE."

On 23 January (1230) the Commander-in-Chief West announced this instruction:

An attack against the Twenty-fifth Army still appeared to be improbable at that time; on the other hand, the enemy would shortly resume the attack against COLOGNE which had been interrupted in December, this time with the participation of Second British Army, and consequently also against the western front of Army Group H. The enemy could employ for this purpose about 24 formations with about 2500 tanks. In addition, an attack against the MOSELLE Gate with 5-6 units was possible, but not until the first half of February.

In lower ALSACE the enemy would hold first in the northern part, perhaps even on the line SAVERNE Gap - RHINE north of STRASBOURG. But there was no operational necessity to do this, if he did not want to save forces for another position, somewhere around SAARERUCKEN.

## 2. Our own measures:

a) Army Group H: Reinforced by the 361 Volksgrenadier Division, to be rested at ZWOLLE; one Panzer Grenadier Division to be transferred from Army Group B and Heavy Heeres-Panzer Jager Abteilung 655; in addition if possible, by an Infantry Division or Volksgrenadier Division from ALSACE (all behind the front of the Fortress Army.)

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b) Army Group B: After withdrawal of all units and vehicles, defense of the line: ROER to WEIDEN - KESTERNICH - west from (illegible) - west from SCHOENBERG - OURE sector - Westwall; shifting the forces released thereby (about 3 Volksgrenadier Divisions, 3 mobile formations, the bulk of the Volks Artillerie Korps and the Volkswerfer Brigades) to the AACHEN area. For this the following organizations of command:

Panzer Army Command 5 as Group ROER from the right Army Group boundary to DUREN exclusive; behind it the XXXVII Panzer Corps with three mobile formations as Army Group Reserve.

Army Command 15 as Group EIFEL - north from DUREN to BURG REULAND (exclusive) with main effort at DUREN.

Army Command 7 as Group EIFEL south - from BURG REULAND to the left Army Group boundary with main effort at TRIER (2 Panzer Division as Army Group Reserve there).

c) Army Group G: First, continuation of the attack in lower ALSACE, in order to gain at least the line INGWILLER - KILLSTEDT; if possible, to press forward to SAVERNE. The forces would not be strong enough to make the desired junction with the Nineteenth Army. After termination of the attack, pulling out of 2 mobile formations as reserves in the SAARBRUCKEN area; in addition, retaining of one mobile formation between TRIER and ORSCHOLZ.

d) Army Group Oberrhein: Coordination of actions in progress with the advance of Army Group G; assumption of command by Army Group G after the above-mentioned line is reached.

3) Successful defense in the 4th battle of AACHEN would depend upon the accelerated shifting of mobile formations there; this could be carried out, however, because of the fuel shortage, only after arrival of the eastern units in the loading areas. Difficulties were multiplied by the snow-drifts and the necessity of traveling at night, so that a delay of the Sixth Panzer Army as well as of the shift was to be feared.

4) Supply and replacement situation: Ammunition to 3 February, only 8 rounds per day per piece for light field howitzers and 5 rounds for heavy field howitzers. That is in the next battle of AACHEN only one-third of the amount used in December, when the use of artillery had been decisive, but still could not prevent considerable loss of ground. Fuel consumption for the eastern units, about 4500 cubic meters; the shift in the west, 1000 additional cubic meters; the battle in ALSACE and resulting regrouping, at least 1500 cubic meters. Therefore, in addition to the requirements for the last ten days of January (2000 cubic meters) 1000 cubic meters "Otto" fuel.

The personnel replacements were insufficient and led to a dangerous decrease of combat strength. Local replacement was effected by the taking over of Sicherheits Battalions from the EIFEL. The lack of replacements had become a problem of life or death for all divisions. Replacement of tanks and S.P. guns was vital in view of the enemy's 2500 tanks. If remedies and the timely shift of forces failed, a breakthrough to the RHINE was to be feared.

5) Transfers to the east: Except for the 9 SS Panzer Division, all units had already been relieved. Headquarters XXXIX Panzer Corps was indispensable until further notice; Headquarters LVIII Panzer Corps was available. The 11 Panzer Division was likewise indispensable. The Commander-in-Chief suggested that the Panzer Lehr Division and the 25 Panzer Grenadier Division be transferred. He

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mentioned the 189 Infantry Division (likewise after the termination of the action). He wanted to report about the Volks Artillerie Korps later. Of the 10 bridge trains, 5½ had already been transferred.

6) The Commander-in-Chief announced details concerning the deception measures.

7) Following the transfer of three groups, the Luftwaffe was still less than before in a position to protect the rear areas. The result was to be a further destruction of supply lines and thereby an increased consumption of fuel.

In closing, the Commander-in-Chief requested an immediate decision.

On 23 January the Commander-in-Chief received the answer to his report of 22 January. Organization of the command was approved, the only requirement being that the boundary between the ROER and EIFEL-North groups, which apparently would lie in the focal point of the defense, was to be shifted to the south. Also, the establishment of reserves was approved. The sector of the MOSELLE Gate and the ORSCHOLZ key positions were to be strengthened by more infantry, to be accomplished by shifts within Army Group G. Because of the decline of production ammunition could not be increased. Reserves had to be built up by rigorous economy in the quiet sectors. The requirement of 4500 cubic meters appeared very high for the eastern units; this use had to be lowered by improvisation (trailers, use of horse-drawn detachments, etc.); the same thing held true for the shifts in the west. A new requirement was to be submitted. The preferred transfers to the east were approved except for the 189 Infantry Division. The necessary infantry divisions had to be taken from the forces of the First Army.

On 24 January the Fuehrer issued a new command. The elimination of the German bridgeheads over the ROER was assumed to be a prerequisite of the enemy offensive against COLOGNE and the RUHR territory. The right wing of Army Group B therefore was to defend the area forward of the ROER as long as possible. The enemy was to be compelled to make renewed regroupings and attacks by our use of small bridgeheads. Each day of delay was a gain.

It was further ordered that on the evening of 24 January, the I SS Panzer Corps was to be transferred to the VIENNA area as Army High Command Reserve; assembly in the area VIENNA - WIENER NEUSTADT - ODENBURG - PRESSBURG.

On 25 January reply to the proposal of the Commander-in-Chief West of 24 January. The possibility of supplying ammunition and fuel was examined. There was to be no immediate transfer of an infantry division from Army Group G. In addition, the Fuehrer ordered that the suggested line be taken up only under enemy pressure.

Since a new defensive front had been built up by the enemy on the MODER and ROTH and forces were tied down by the continuation of our attack at a time when they were needed as reserves behind future defensive main efforts, the Fuehrer commanded on 25 January that the attack against the lower VOSGES and in lower ALSACE be suspended. According to the command given to the Commander-in-Chief West, the necessary regrouping should be carried out immediately. The transfer of the 25 Panzer Grenadier Division to the east was imperative. The 6 SS Mountain Division was to be deployed in the mountains.



On 26 January directive was to be transmitted to Panzer Army Command 1<sup>13</sup> to accelerate the disengagement of units, which was going on too slowly. However, it was not signed.

On the afternoon of 27 January, the answer of the Commander-in-Chief West to the situation reports arrived. The winter campaign had caused average casualties of 3-4000 to the Volksgrenadier Divisions and 2-3000 to the Panzer Grenadier and Panzer Divisions and the Infantry forces had been especially heavily diminished. After the bringing up of about 500 replacements to each Volksgrenadier Division in January, only 4-5 complete Grenadier Battalions could be reconstituted for each division. It could be calculated in regard to several divisions that with further losses they would be reduced to a few hundred men. They had, nevertheless, complete artillery, which by and large remained intact, and complete supply troops. Decisive reorganization measures were imperative. Supply of reinforcements remained the most pressing necessity in spite of combing out and shifting. The limit of physical endurance had been reached in the ARDENNES; all measures had been taken to provide for brief rehabilitation periods. The lowered standards of training were counteracted by additional courses and schools. The need for small arms, automatic assault weapons and heavy anti-aircraft weapons was mounting. The delivery of replacement parts was imperative following the cutting off of the supply of tanks and assault guns from the east. The condition of the horses had suffered, even though there was sufficient raw feed. The clothing situation had become strained.

On 27 January the order was given for the shipment of the 25 Panzer Grenadier Division as well as both Fuehrer-Brigaden to the KOTTHUS - FRANKFURT an der ODER area, and the 27 and 28 SS Volunteer Grenadier Divisions to the Protectorate (in this order).

The Commander-in-Chief West was empowered to withdraw the weakly held ILL front to a straight line between the ILL and the RHINE, and beyond the RHINE as soon as defenses had been erected. In addition to the BREISACH bridge ferry service was to be established. The construction of a cable track was to be examined.

These formations were subordinated to the Army General Staff by an additional order; nevertheless, the Fuehrer reserved to himself the determination of grouping and employment.

On the same day (27 January) the consent of the Fuehrer was transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief West that Army Group G should take over the command of the sector of Army Group Oberrhein. The staff was to be transferred expeditiously to Army Group WEICHSEL. In addition, the Fuehrer had approved the requested withdrawal of the right wing of the Nineteenth Army; nevertheless, the Commander-in-Chief West was to examine how far the front of the Nineteenth Army could be bettered by pressing forward the MLR on the line SCHLETTSTADT - MARKIRCH - COL DU BONHOMME - LE VALTIN (employment of the 6 SS Mountain Division for that purpose).

The Commander-in-Chief announced, therefore, on 28 January, that 3 heavy and 2 light cable tracks over the RHINE were available and additional equipment was allotted. Report concerning the shipment of motorized units: movement order on 20 January for the 1, 12 and 2 SS Panzer Divisions which were already relieved and in large part east of the OURE. Because of the lack of fuel, air attacks, and difficulties with the weather and roads, the march was delayed. The principal cause, however, was the short recuperation period. Only the 25 Panzer Grenadier Division marched rapidly. The loss of time had to be made up by eliminating the recuperation period after detraining.

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FOOTNOTES

- (1) Evidently the codeword "10 May 1940", revealed by a Prisoner of War, was used by a lower echelon than Army Group G.
- (2) The German report at hand is evidently a rough draft. It carries some pencil notations and includes some typographical errors. This is doubtless an error for Army Group G.
- (3) "VOSGES bridgehead" refers to the so-called "COLMAR pocket" which the German Nineteenth Army was holding against the First French Army.
- (4) ORSCHOLZRIEGEL is apparently the high ground between the SAAR and MOSELLE Rivers, south of their junction. On 22 December the Germans were evidently still unaware that Third U S Army's left flank had been shifted far to the northwest to counterattack the ARDENNES salient.
- (5) Army Group Upper Rhine, which under the command of Heinrich HIMMLER controlled XIV SS Corps and later also XXXIX Panzer Corps and Nineteenth Army.
- (6) "Our own" refers to Army Group G; evidently the initial draft of this report was written at that headquarters or at its subordinate First Army.
- (7) Doubtless the "Zahnarzt" operation referred to later in the narrative.
- (8) This was the frontal attack south of WISSEMBURG which developed into the HATTEN - RITTERSHOFFEN battle.
- (9) An error in the original; 361 Division must be meant.
- (10) An error for 553.
- (11) 4 SS Panzer Division was not on the western front.
- (12) A captured document dated 21 January indicated that Sixth Panzer Army was to be split, I SS Panzer Corps going to HOLLAND, II SS Panzer Corps to the SAAR PALATINATE front. At the time, the document was suspected of being a "plant"; this passage proves that it was.
- (13) Doubtless an error for either Panzer Army Command 6 or Panzer Army Corps I, probably the latter.

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## ANNEX VI

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

1 January - 31 January 1945

German Intelligence Service espionage and sabotage efforts against Seventh Army during the month of January were almost exclusively undertaken to forward the German offensive whose mission was to retake ALSACE. Fourteen agents were apprehended, including three saboteurs and five women. The espionage agents generally had short-term missions involving discovery of identifications and strength of Allied units. They were of poor-grade, frequently recruited on the spot; some had only a brief last-minute lecture as "training". Three agents were HITLER Jugend members whose motive was patriotism. Even a dog which may have been a courier was captured going through the lines with a too-innocent note attached to its collar.

Indicative of the increased German emphasis on sabotage, the three saboteurs arrested were, unlike the espionage agents, intensively trained. The first two were Alsatian members of SKORZENY's newly-formed Jagdverbände (companies of saboteurs and terrorists). They were members of the 6th or "North" Company who were on reconnaissance to locate sabotage targets, pathfind routes for future sabotage parties and sound out civilian attitudes in ALSACE. They were both members of French subversive organizations. They entered our lines in Waffen SS uniforms, over which they wore uniforms closely resembling those worn by American armored units. They carried the new German submachine gun, which did not look German. They admitted that their appearance was an intended deception, although a "legal" one. The Company's headquarters had been established in December 1944 near HERSBACH in the WESTERWALD. The Company was subdivided into three groups, A, B and C, each group with a strength of from 30 to 40 men. Group A was probably committed near COLMAR in the beginning of December. Group B had assembled in WALDKIRCH, northeast of FREIBURG in December 1944 for employment against Seventh Army. Its cover name was Group "EDITH". When the two members of Group B were caught, Group C was still in training at SCHOERN, near NASSAU.

The 6th Company recruited most of its members from non-Germans. Group B was 90% French, with the remainder Dutch and Polish. Frenchmen were mostly members of DORIOT's Parti Populaire Français. They were extensively trained in patrolling, use of compass and map and had field problems in penetration and sabotage reconnaissance. The two apprehended saboteurs declared that they were to be followed by a group of 30 men, most of whom would be in civilian dress. Evidence that a small party of Group "EDITH" had attempted to infiltrate our lines unsuccessfully was found in a message taken from a carrier pigeon which disclosed that at least one of the party, apparently in uniform, had been wounded.

The third saboteur arrested was a French member of Frontaufklärungstrupp 251, trained at two sabotage schools. He was arrested after he had crossed the RHINE with four others. He was carrying explosives which were to be placed under a tank, and in addition was to discover the size and intentions of armored units in the HAGUENAU area. His cover story was that he was an escaping Todt worker.

The 11 espionage agents included:

A French Army Reserve Lieutenant, arrested attempting to enter our lines on a tactical mission. He had been arrested by the Gestapo for his FFI activities after the Germans had re-

R E S T R I C T E D

ANNEX VI



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captured BITCHE, and had been forced to accept an espionage mission.

Three HITLER Jugend members, all Alsations, arrested while trying to cross the lines on tactical espionage missions. Two of them had had no training, while one had been given a half-hour briefing on identification by shoulder patch and vehicle marking. The cover story all three were told to use was that they were escaping from the enforced labor of digging fortifications.

A 16-year-old French agent working for Abwehr I W1 (Economic espionage), arrested in STRASBOURG. His mission was tactical, but also included gathering intelligence on activities of Allied security agencies, civilian circulation regulations and treatment of collaborators by the Allies. He was another graduate of the very active SCHMIDT - CAVALLIE recruiting team in STRASBOURG, which drafted agents by combing Gestapo blacklists.

A native Luxembourger woman, German by marriage and a longtime Nazi Party member, who was apprehended at a roadblock after she had crossed the RHINE to accomplish a three-day tactical espionage mission. If unable to remember what she had observed she was instructed to prick the letters of a book on different pages so that the message could be read when held up to the light.

A French woman, Abwehr agent and PFF member, who was left behind in STRASBOURG, where she was to await the arrival of Allied troops, then proceed to the interior of FRANCE to find out landing points and damage caused by V-1 and V-2 and return across the lines. She was also recruited by SCHMIDT and CAVALLIE.

An Italian woman, 23 years old, arrested at a roadblock on her way to accomplish a round-trip tactical espionage mission which was to last three days. Her cover story was that she was a refugee.

A Russian woman, 20 years old, arrested at a roadblock. Her mission, which was to last three days, was primarily tactical, but also included reporting on American treatment of Alsations. She had been an internee at SCHIRMECK Concentration Camp and had been given her freedom upon acceptance of her espionage mission.

A French (Alsation) woman, 49 years old, member of the Franciste organization. She had no mission against Seventh Army, but had worked for the Germans in the early part of the war, had stolen plans of the MAGNOT Line, had been discovered and imprisoned by the French.

An agent of the Sicherheitsdienst Amt VI, alleged deserter from the German Army. He had no present mission, but had done extensive espionage in SWITZERLAND, with two short missions in SPAIN and TURKEY. In SWITZERLAND, to which he had gained entrance by faking tuberculosis, his duties involved espionage on the OXFORD Movement, the Swiss correspondent for Pravda and Izvestia, an explosives specialist, Swiss factories working for GERMANY and disposition of American planes landing in SWITZERLAND.

The increasing use of HITLER Jugend boys as agents constituted a serious security threat. Balancing or even outweighing their intelligence abilities and training were their fanaticism, their excellent knowledge of local conditions

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and the large numbers available.

The immigration of French political refugees into GERMANY was beginning to be an encumbrance to the Germans. Their number had reached 50,000, and now the Germans apparently decided to get rid of them, and at the same time use them to maximum advantage. Some were to be used on intelligence missions, but the greater number would be parachuted or infiltrated into FRANCE as insurrectionists, propagandists and terrorists working among the approximately 300,000 collaborationists who were still left in FRANCE.

SS Standartenfuehrer LINGNER, the commander of the 17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division, was captured and, upon interrogation, revealed that American soldiers captured by his division had disclosed their units to interrogators, but practically nothing else.

Despite German preparations, once again there was no case of successful sabotage in Seventh Army area. Several cases of wire cutting occurred in divisional areas, but no willful sabotage could be determined.

The variety of espionage and sabotage agents apprehended by Seventh Army during the period is shown in the tabulation below:

	<u>French</u>	<u>German</u>	<u>Italian</u>	<u>Russian</u>	<u>Luxembourger</u>	<u>Total</u>
Espionage	7(2)	1	1(1)	1(1)	1(1)	11(5)
Sabotage	<u>3</u>					<u>3</u>
TOTALS	10(2)	1	1(1)	1(1)	1(1)	14(5)

(Figures in parentheses indicate number of women)

Total number of agents apprehended by Seventh Army between 15 August 1944 and 31 January 1945:

Espionage	84
Sabotage	<u>15</u>
TOTAL	99

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## ANNEX VII

PRINCIPAL ENEMY COMMANDERS OPPOSING SEVENTH ARMY

## ARMY GROUP UPPER RHINE

HIMMLER, Heinrich, SS Reichsfuehrer.

The seriousness and dangers facing the Germans along the western front after the unsuccessful December gambles received emphasis early in the new year when HIMMLER himself assumed command over Army Group UPPER RHINE for a number of weeks.

Young in years (44) but an old-timer in the execution of Nazidom's interlocking government-party-army schemes, HIMMLER was born in 1900 and served in the last war. Later he studied agriculture, economics, chicken farming and sundry subjects without notable success, and the HITLER Putsch of 1923 found him in a prominent role. Since then his career has been a succession of rising responsibilities under his Fuehrer: 1928, Reich Leader SS; 1933, Police President and Commander of Political Police Units outside PRUSSIA; 1934, head of the Prussian Police; 1936, Chief of the German Police; 1939, Reich Commissioner for the Consolidation of German Nationhood; also, Reich and Prussian Minister of the Interior, Plenipotentiary-General for Administration, member of the War Cabinet, and military trouble-shooter.

Von MAUR, SS Obergruppenfuehrer and General der Waffen SS.

No conclusive evidence has been found for the von MAUR associated with Army Group UPPER RHINE, but available evidence indicates that an SS Obergruppenfuehrer Dr. Heinrich von MAUR, age 81, is connected with the Army Group UPPER RHINE which was commanded by HIMMLER for a time.

Von MAUR might hold an administrative position, possibly over troops in reserve or training. Dr. Heinrich von MAUR commanded the 27 WURTEMBERG Division in World War I and was later retired. Presumably recalled to active duty, he was in 1938 an SS Colonel on the staff of the Superior Regional Command Southwest, was promoted in 1939 to Oberfuehrer (British Brigadier), later to Brigadefuehrer and in November 1942 to SS Gruppenfuehrer (U S Major General). Circumstances of his most recent rank are unknown, but his SS background indicates his eligibility for a trusted SS position.

## ARMY GROUP G

HLASKOWITZ, Generaloberst.

See G-2 Histories for August and September 1944.

## FIRST ARMY

OBSTFELDER, General der Infanterie.

General OBSTFELDER was born 6 September 1886, son of a clergyman in STEINBACH-HALLEMBERG. After attending junior college at EISENACH he entered the 2 Thuringian Infantry Regiment in 1905 as a cadet. He has remained with the army since, being selected in 1913 to attend the War College and serving later in World War I. After the war he served as General Staff officer of the "Grenzschutz" at DANZIG. He was transferred to the Reichswehr Brigade 11 in

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ANNEX VII

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KASSEL in 1919, and in 1922 was called to the Ministry of War as a General Staff officer. He had routine assignments during the peace years, a term as commandant of the fortress city of BRESLAU from 1934 to 1936 while he was a colonel.

In this war he has been active in POLAND and FRANCE under von BUSCH's VIII Corps. He became commanding general of XXIX Corps in June 1940 and remained in this capacity until the assault on RUSSIA broke loose. A command in the west followed in August 1943, and he was named commanding general of LXXXVI Corps, then under First German Army. General OBSTFELDER went to the CAEN sector on 15 June 1944, later retreating across BELGIUM and across the SCHELDT River at FLUSHING and being put into line again in the ROERMOND-VENLO area. As a reward he received the Swords to the Oak Leaves to the Knight's Cross. OBSTFELDER took over the First German Army on 1 December 1944.

OBSTFELDER in 1912 married the daughter of a SCHMALKALDEN lawyer, Gerda BUENER. She is believed still at SCHMALKALDEN with the only surviving daughter, who is married to Colonel Freiherr von USLAR, artillery officer on the staff of Army Group G. OBSTFELDER is a vain and proud man, and his lack of moral responsibility reportedly runs to the extreme in ruthlessness.

#### NINETEENTH ARMY

RASP, Siegfried, General der Infanterie.

See G-2 History for December 1944.

#### XIII SS CORPS

SIMON, Max, SS Obergruppenfuehrer and General der Waffen SS.

See G-2 History for December 1944.

#### XIV SS CORPS

Von dem BACH-ZELEWSKI, Erich, SS Obergruppenfuehrer.

His military record equalled or surpassed by a reputation for atrocities, von dem BACH-ZELEWSKI is an East Prussian, born 1 March 1899 and in uniform almost constantly since his youth. He volunteered for duty in the first World War, emerging as a company commander. Later he joined the frontier guards (Grenzschutz), and was an active officer in 1924 and onwards. In 1931 he became an SS Untersturmfuehrer (lieutenant). The following year he was chosen to membership in the Reichstag.

In 1938 von dem BACH-ZELEWSKI was appointed commander of SS OBERSS-SCHNITT SUEB OST, and three years later was named Hoehrer SS und Polizei-fuehrer in central RUSSIA. He was promoted to SS Obergruppenfuehrer and General der Polizei on 1 September 1941. It was after this that he was chiefly employed in anti-guerrilla work.

During the winter of 1941 he was reported at the front with SS and police units, and held the same position until April 1943, when he was appointed chief of all anti-guerrilla operations. He covered all eastern areas where unrest cropped up and is responsible for many massacres in RUSSIA - in fact, he reputedly took part personally in many shootings. When he was in charge of operations against WARSAW in the fall of 1944, the most indescribable cruelties were attributed to him in the suppression of the resistance movement. For all this, HITLER rewarded him with the Knight's Cross. (It is interesting to note that SS Oberfuehrer DIRLEWANGER, commander of SS Beawehrungs Brigade DIRLEWANGER, which specializes in mass murder, also was decorated with this same order).

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Von dem BACH-ZELENSKI was reported as having set up his headquarters in BADEN-BADEN in December 1944. It was also reported that he was to be put in charge of the postwar underground movement. On 7 January 1945 his command at BADEN-BADEN was identified as XIV SS Corps.

## XXXIX PANZER CORPS

KIRCHENPAUER von KIRCHDORF, Wilhelm, Generalleutnant.

No biographical data available.

## LXXXII CORPS

HOERNLEIN, Walter, Generalleutnant.

See G-2 History for December 1944.

## LXXXIX CORPS

HOEHNE, Gustav, General der Infanterie.

See G-2 History for December 1944.

## XC CORPS (FORMERLY IV GAF CORPS)

PETERSEN, General der Flieger.

See G-2 History for October 1944.

## 6 SS MOUNTAIN DIVISION

BRENNER, SS Gruppenfuehrer and Generalleutnant der Waffen SS.

General BRENNER, 49, began his military career during the first World War as an artillery officer in 5 Bavarian Infantry Regiment, ULM. After the war he joined the police, first being with the BADEN police force, later a member of the Prussian police. His services continued, still in police capacity, with the German Reich police in 1933. When the present war started he was entrusted with the command of the artillery regiment of the new SS Division POLIZEI. He led this regiment in FRANCE during 1940 and later in the eastern campaign during the battle for LENINGRAD. He contracted a severe case of rheumatism, was hospitalized for a time and after his dismissal from the hospital was given command over the ORPO (regular police) in CARINTHIA. He remained at this post until September 1944, when he was given command of 6 SS Mountain Division NORD.

Described as an all-around soldier, General BRENNER is known for his daring, tempered by sound tactical understanding. Well-liked by his officers, despite occasional spurts of anger, he has won a reputation of good German army "politics" and an ability to secure advantages for himself and his men.

While a Nazi Party member through his affiliation with the SS (which he joined when the police came under SS control), he has no reputation as a radical. He was frankly critical of the more extreme SS leaders and their measures. He still anticipated a German victory while his division was still soundly committed well inside FRANCE, but once he had joined in the general retreat toward the Fatherland he told his staff frequently that the war was lost for GERMANY, mainly because of her ever-decreasing economic potential.

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## 7 PARACHUTE DIVISION

ERDMANN, Generalleutnant (GAF).

Awarded the Knight's Cross for distinguished service on the western front. No biographical data available.

## 10 SS PANZER DIVISION

HARMEL, Heinz, Brigadefuehrer and Generalmajor der Waffen SS.

HARMEL was born in METZ 29 June 1906. After completing his studies in agriculture he joined the Reichswehr in 1923, and after a period in the SA, joined the Waffen SS in 1935.

As Hauptsturmfuehrer and company commander, he took part in the western campaigns, and by March 1943 had risen to regimental commander and had been awarded the Iron Cross, First and Second Class, and the Knight's Cross, to which he received the Oak Leaves in September 1943 and the Swords in January 1945. As commander of 10 SS Panzer Division FRUNDSBERG, he was praised for the manner in which he extricated his forces from the FALAISE Gap, keeping them in such good order that they were able, a few weeks later, to oppose the Allied attacks at NIJMEGEN.

## 17 SS PANZER GRENADIER DIVISION

KLINGENBERG, SS Standartenfuehrer.

Colonel KLINGENBERG, who succeeded Colonel LINGNER (captured 10 January), was once adjutant to SS Oberstgruppenfuehrer HAUSSEER when the latter was Inspector of the Waffen SS prior to the war. Described by those who know him as efficient and courageous, he has the fault of occasional arrogance, but this is said outweighed by his superior leadership.

## 19 INFANTRY DIVISION

BRITZELMAYR, Karl, Generalmajor.

See G-2 History for December 1944.

## 21 PANZER DIVISION

FEUCHTINGER, Generalleutnant.

See G-2 History for September 1944.

## 25 PANZER GRENADIER DIVISION

BURMEISTER, Generalmajor.

No biographical data available.

## 36 VOLKSGRENADIER DIVISION

WELLE, Generalmajor.

See G-2 History for December 1944.

## 47 VOLKSGRENADIER DIVISION

BORK, Generalleutnant.

No biographical data available.



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## 245 INFANTRY DIVISION

WAGNER, Oberst.

Acting commanding officer. No biographical data available.

## 256 VOLKSGRENADIER DIVISION

FRANZ, Generalmajor.

A professional soldier from BOBECK, THURINGIA, General FRANZ is described as definitely no friend of the Nazi regime, but uncompromising in obedience to orders given him. The 43-year-old FRANZ, who organized the 256 Division in HOLLAND in September 1944, has a record for military coups, but by late in January he saw his outfit badly ripped apart by the U S 45 Division in the REIPERTSWILLER - LICHTENBERG sector of ALSACE. (NOTE: Later, General FRANZ was to be forced to give himself up while attempting a last-ditch stand during the final month of the war with 100 dazed men, sole remnants of his scattered division).

General FRANZ entered the Wehrmacht in 1919 at the age of 17. In the winter of 1942, after receiving his full Colonelcy, he was appointed Chief of Staff of the Africa Corps. January 1943 saw him on the Russian front, acting as Corps Chief of Staff in the LAKE CHEWINOWSKY sector. It is claimed that in this sector, after having been surrounded by three Russian armies, he was successful in withdrawing 36,000 troops through a six-kilometer gap. He received the German Cross in Gold for outstanding bravery in the fighting at CHERKASSY. Later he was sent to HOLLAND, where in September 1944 he organized his present division.

## 257 VOLKSGRENADIER DIVISION

SEIDEL, Oberst.

Holder of the Knight's Cross. No biographical data available.

## 347 INFANTRY DIVISION

TRIERENBERG, Generalleutnant.

No biographical data available.

## 361 VOLKSGRENADIER DIVISION

PHILLIPI, Generalmajor.

See G-2 History for October 1944.

## 553 VOLKSGRENADIER DIVISION

HUETHER, Generalmajor.

See G-2 History for December 1944.

## 559 VOLKSGRENADIER DIVISION

Von MUEHLEN, Kurt, Freiherr, Generalmajor.


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**G-2 HISTORY**



**SEVENTH ARMY**  
OPERATIONS  
IN  
**EUROPE**



**PART SEVEN**

**1-28 FEBRUARY 1945**

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HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH ARMY  
Office of the A. C. of S., G-2  
APO 758 US ARMY

17/cv

3 June 1945

MEMORANDUM:

TO : All Concerned.

1. This document is a general summary of the activities of the German forces opposing the Seventh US Army during the period indicated.

2. It was prepared by the G-2 Section Seventh Army to relate chronologically, month by month, the enemy's tactics, composition and organization. It is not a history of Seventh Army operations, as such a document is being produced by the Seventh Army Historical Section.

3. THIS DOCUMENT IS RESTRICTED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. Par. 23b, AR 300-5, 15 March 1944.

CLASSIFICATION WAS CHANGED FROM CONFIDENTIAL TO RESTRICTED AUTHORITY COMMANDING GENERAL SEVENTH ARMY, BY W. C. QUADRELL, COLONEL, AGO, ON 1 JUNE 1945.

William A. Quinn  
Colonel, AGO  
A C of S, G-2

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HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH ARMY  
Office of the A.C. of S., G-2  
APO 758 US ARMY

G-2 HISTORY

OPERATIONS IN EUROPE

Part VII

1 - 28 February 1945

\* \* \*

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II.	Enemy Dispositions on Seventh Army Front (Map)
III.	Principal Enemy Commanders Opposing Seventh Army
IV.	Counterintelligence Summary 1 February - 28 February

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The German First Army never regained the initiative after the failure of its January attacks against the Seventh Army. Immediately after the final attacks across the MODER River on 25 January, the enemy reverted to the defensive and began withdrawing his more efficient divisions for employment elsewhere. This process continued into February until the enemy strength in combat effectives facing us dropped from about 22,150 at the beginning of the month to an average level of 13,000 - 14,000 which was maintained throughout the latter half of the month.

21 Panzer Division had left the Seventh Army front late in January. It was followed closely by 25 Panzer Grenadier and 7 Parachute, both of which had been out of contact the last few days of January and had definitely left the area by 1 February. 21 Panzer and 25 Panzer Grenadier both went to the Eastern Front; 7 Parachute went to HOLLAND. On 2 February, 256 Volksgrenadier Division dropped out of contact in the HAARDT Mountains, relinquishing its sector to 6 SS Mountain Division, and ultimately reappearing on the MOSELLE front of U S Third Army.

On 6 February, 257 Volksgrenadier Division, also from the HAARDT sector, turned up in the RHINE Valley during the fighting for OBERHOFFEN, where it took over from 10 SS Panzer Division which returned to BERLIN to face the Red Army. And 245 Infantry Division, which had been noted for its inactivity even during the January offensive, disappeared from view; eventually its staff returned to HOLLAND and its relatively few combat troops were absorbed into other divisions as replacements.

The 553 Volksgrenadier Division staff also returned to GERMANY, leaving behind most of the miscellaneous units it had controlled in the GAMBESHEIM bridgehead, who then came under the control of its successor, 905 Mobilization Division. The readjustment of Allied boundaries on 22 February gave this sector to the First French Army, thus further reducing the enemy strength opposing Seventh Army.

As XV Corps' attacks south of SAARBRUCKEN developed during the second half of the month, 559 Volksgrenadier Division was moved there from the BITCHE sector to bolster the defense. In its place in the western HAARDT Mountains appeared the 2 Mountain Division, a relic of the German Nineteenth Army's disastrous stand in the COLMAR pocket. However, 2 Mountain lasted only a week, then was shunted on to the MOSELLE front against U S Third Army. For a while, the BITCHE sector then fell to 6 SS Mountain Division. However, its days were numbered, too; also destined for the MOSELLE, on the last day of February it began yielding its sector to the 16 Volksgrenadier Division, another remnant from COLMAR. An old acquaintance in its previous incarnation, 16 Division had faced Seventh Army troops on the VOSGES front during the fall of 1944.

In the circumstances to which his order of battle was being reduced, the enemy could do little but leave the initiative to the Americans. Thus the degree of contact during February was determined solely by our own attacks, all of which were comparatively small scale, limited-objective operations. Where they could, the Germans defended stubbornly, notably at OBERHOFFEN and FORBACH; and they never abandoned their traditional and tested technique of defending by counterattack. But at no time did they mount an operation whose mission was any greater than to recover a bit of useful terrain lost to the Americans a day or two previously.

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II. CHRONOLOGY1 February - D/170

The Army front remained generally quiet, as the enemy had reverted to the defensive and our own action was confined to a limited-objective attack on the east flank. There the enemy offered considerable resistance near OBERHOFFEN and later counterattacked with tank-supported infantry. The Army west flank was comparatively inactive with the main activity a company-strength counterattack launched to restore enemy defensive positions southeast of SARREGUEMINES.

2 February - D/171

There was little activity on the Army front except at OBERHOFFEN, where elements of 10 SS Panzer Division fought stubbornly throughout the day with infantry supported by a few tanks. The enemy was alert to U S patrols in the HAARDT Mountains, where contact with 257 Volksgrenadier Division was reestablished. The withdrawal of 256 Volksgrenadier Division from this sector was indicated by the westward shift of 6 SS Mountain Division. The Luftwaffe reappeared, with 16 enemy aircraft reported, most of them on reconnaissance missions.

3 February - D/172

Along the RHINE River, elements of 553 Division aided by flooded terrain provided strong resistance before HERRLISHEIM. Our attack in the ROHRWILLER area met stiffening opposition from elements of 10 SS Panzer Division, which also continued its stubborn opposition in the northern portion of OBERHOFFEN. In the HAARDT Mountains new dispositions of the 6 SS Mountain Division and the 257 Volksgrenadier Division confirmed the suspected withdrawal of the 256 Volksgrenadier Division from the WILDENGUTH sector.

4 February - D/173

German infantry, with armor support, continued to hold out in the northern portion of OBERHOFFEN. Elsewhere, active patrolling and raiding by U S troops inspired sharp local reactions. A fire fight developed at ROTHBACH before the town was cleared, and American raids at HITSCHHOFFEN and KINDWILLER were stopped.

5 February - D/174

Enemy activity was negligible along the entire front except in the HIRSCHWILLER area, where several heavy artillery concentrations were received. In the HAARDT Mountains, identification of elements of the 6 SS Mountain Division in the 257 Division sector, together with prisoner of war statements, suggested that 257 Division was dropping out of contact. However, it was to reappear the following day on our eastern flank.

6 February - D/175

In the RHINE Valley, HERRLISHEIM and OFFENDORF were found unoccupied as the 553 Division withdrew. In the OBERHOFFEN area, 10 SS Panzer Division was being relieved by the 257 Volksgrenadier Division, which arrived from the HAARDT Mountain sector. The front was generally quiet, except south of SAARBRUCKEN, where elements of the 347 Infantry Division offered spotty resistance to our limited-objective attack at GROSS HITTERSDORF and LIXING. OETING was being used as an enemy strongpoint. The attack in this sector had caused a sharp increase in artillery fire.

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Again the only notable activity was at the two extremes of the Army front. On the east flank, fighting continued in OBERHOFFEN, where elements of the 257 Division provided stubborn opposition. On the west flank elements of the 347 Division made a limited attack to retake the high ground south and west of OETTING, which had been lost the previous day.

8 February - D/177

House-to-house fighting continued in OBERHOFFEN, and late in the day elements of the 257 Division made a small counterattack there. U S patrols were fired on near HERRLISHEIM and DRUSENHEIM, and a raid on KIMWILLER drew heavy fire. A captured code list dated 1 February revealed that the newly-formed 905 Mobilization Division had assumed control of the miscellaneous units previously under 553 Volksgrenadier Division, which were holding the RHINE River flank.

9 February - D/178

House-to-house fighting at OBERHOFFEN marked a day which was otherwise quiet except for patrol action. The enemy was cleared from all but eight houses in the northern part of OBERHOFFEN.

10 February - D/179

Continuing its limited operations to straighten the right flank, VI Corps attacked DRUSENHEIM against strong German opposition. Elements of the U S 36 Division succeeded in penetrating into the town but were forced to withdraw under heavy pressure, with enemy infantry being supported by some tanks or self-propelled guns. Isolated pockets of resistance held out near OBERHOFFEN, and heavy small arms and artillery fire was received from north and northeast of the town. In the HAARDT Mountains the enemy outpost line was thinly held, permitting U S patrols to make deep penetrations; the enemy appeared to be concerned over this and attempted to advance his outpost line to high ground north of ROTEBACH.

11 February - D/180

In the DRUSENHEIM area the enemy offered determined resistance to all attempts to dislodge him from strong positions south and west of the town. He showed aggressiveness in the OBERHOFFEN area, where an attack in at least company strength from the woods east of town succeeded initially in penetrating American lines. Our counterattack later restored the situation with considerable loss to the enemy in prisoners of war. In the HAARDT Mountains, a broadcast by a Psychological Warfare Branch mobile unit caused the enemy to send up many flares, apparently to discourage desertion attempts. A U S raid north of GROS REIDERSCHING drew heavy fire.

12 February - D/181

The enemy continued to offer stubborn resistance at OBERHOFFEN, with a factory in the northwest edge of town changing hands several times, but by night the enemy had been driven from this area. Patrols in the DRUSENHEIM area again drew machine gun and small arms fire from an alert enemy. In the HAARDT Mountains strong resistance and close contact developed during a raid northwest of WILDENGUTH.

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13 February - D/182

The previous night's raid northwest of WILDENGUTH failed in the face of heavy opposition from strongly-emplaced German troops. Other patrols met alert enemy forces and drew fire in the DRUSENHEIM, HITSCHHOFFEN and REIPERTS-WILLER areas. After the preceding day's fighting, the OBERHOFFEN area remained quiet throughout the day.

14 February - D/183

The enemy continued to demonstrate a purely defensive attitude. However, late in the day he staged a demonstration between SCHWEIGHAUSEN and NEUBOURG, consisting of an increase in small arms, mortar and artillery fire, whose apparent purpose was to provoke our troops into disclosing their positions. Shortly afterwards, a 30-man enemy patrol attempted to cross the MODER River west of SCHWEIGHAUSEN but was driven off.

15 February - D/184

In the RHINE Valley and eastern HAARDT Mountains the enemy remained inactive and quieted down in the SCHWEIGHAUSEN - NEUBOURG area after his demonstration the night before. XV Corps' attack in the RIMLING area encountered spotty resistance weakly supported by artillery. RIMLING was cleared during the morning, and strong resistance at ELIESERUCKEN Woods was broken shortly after noon. While considerable enemy armor was observed in the area north of RIMLING, no aggressive action developed. SAVERNE was the target for 12 rounds from a 380-mm railroad gun. A V-1 flying bomb, the only one ever reported in the Seventh Army area, fell southeast of METZ in the morning.

16 February - D/185

In the RIMLING area the enemy reacted to our advances of the previous day, attempting to restore his positions through two early morning counterattacks. The first, east of RIMLING, was broken up by artillery fire, but the second, northwest of the town, succeeded in making a one-kilometer penetration toward MORONVILLE Farm. Our lines were later restored, with the enemy suffering heavily in personnel and losing three tanks or self-propelled guns. Fifteen to 20 bunkers, manned by four or five men each, were still holding out with small arms fire in ELIESERUCKEN Woods. Near SARREGUEMINES, an enemy strongpoint at HANWEILER was reduced.

17 February - D/186

The 17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division, in the RIMLING sector, got some ineffective assistance when its neighboring 559 Volksgrenadier Division put in an unsuccessful battalion-strength attack southeast of EPPING - URBACH. Farther west, 19 and 347 Infantry Divisions, defending the approaches to SAARBRUCKEN, put up generally strong opposition.

U S troops pushing northward in the bend of the ELIES River north of SARREGUEMINES reached and cleared the VORDERWALD against the 19 Infantry Division, which gave up 250-300 prisoners. At dark a German counterattack in this area was repulsed with heavy losses. LIXING, KERBACH and BEHREN were taken from the 347 Infantry Division, with the enemy resisting at towns and critical road junctions and holding out at GROSS ELITTERSDORF and OETING.

18 February - D/187

In the SAAR - ELIES sector the 19 Infantry Division continued its strenuous effort to eliminate the XV Corps' VORDERWALD salient. Repeated

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infiltrations and several tank-supported counterattacks made some penetrations. West of the SAAR River, the 347 Infantry Division showed signs of being thinly spread as the high ground southeast of FORBACH was captured. Although two counterattacks, both with armor support, were mounted, they failed to prevent the loss of GROSS ELITTERSDORF, ETZLING and OETING.

19 February - D-188

The 19 Infantry Division, damaged by recent fighting, did not renew its attempts to eliminate the VORDERWALD salient. Its previous day's infiltration into AUERSMACHER was liquidated, and it was unable to prevent the loss of KLEIN ELITTERSDORF. West of the SAAR River, the 347 Division was also unable to hold a firm line. The high ground overlooking STIRING - WENDEL was captured without much opposition, and our forward troops reached the outskirts of FORBACH against small arms and mortar fire.

20 February - D-189

East of the SAAR River the enemy remained quiet while improving his defensive positions. West of the river the 347 Division got some increase in artillery support and offered somewhat stronger opposition. ZINZING, HESSELING and ALSTING were cleared against considerable resistance, but the attack on SPICHEREN met heavy opposition. Increased fire was met east of STIRING - WENDEL and in the morning a small enemy counterattack was repulsed in this area. Progress in FORBACH was very slow, with the advance into the center of town meeting heavy machine gun, mortar and artillery fire.

21 February - D-190

The U S 70 Division, attacking south of SAARBRUCKEN, continued to be heavily engaged. The German 347 Infantry Division got some much-needed help in the form of a battalion of infantry from the 719 Infantry Division holding the adjacent sector against U S Third Army. The Volkssturm, although not well organized, provided considerable trouble in house-to-house fighting in FORBACH. Strong opposition before SPICHEREN finally collapsed and the town was taken. Further advance to seize the high ground overlooking SAARBRUCKEN produced a strong reaction from the enemy, who counterattacked in sufficient strength to cause our forward elements to effect a 1000-yard withdrawal.

22 February - D-191

U S troops again reached the high ground overlooking SAARBRUCKEN, but the 347 Division still fought hard here and made two unsuccessful counterattacks during the day, attempting to recover the lost terrain. At FORBACH, the railroad in the center of town was reached, but the enemy continued to present stubborn opposition in house-to-house fighting.

23 February - D-192

Despite the arrival of the 2 Mountain Division in the line northwest of BITCHE, coming from the Upper RHINE sector, no appreciable change in the enemy's attitude here was noted. The reconnaissance battalion of 2 Mountain Division proceeded on to the SAARBRUCKEN front, where elements of 19 Infantry and 559 Volksgrenadier Divisions also appeared to bolster the defense. Enemy counterattacks, with tank support, at ST. ARNUAL Woods and the GEFERTWALD failed to retake this commanding terrain. The Germans still held STIRING - WENDEL and the portion of FORBACH west of the railroad.

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24 February - D/193

Further advance in the ELIESRANSBACH - BUBINGEN areas encountered light to moderately strong resistance from elements of the 19 Infantry Division supported by some armor, but both towns were cleared of the enemy. Three counterattacks east of BUBINGEN were repulsed during the afternoon. South of SAARBRUCKEN the enemy continued his unsuccessful attempts to drive U S troops from the high ground with two attacks being reported during the morning. One attack supported by armor made a slight gain on the east side of ST. ARNUAL Woods but our lines were later restored. Considerable small arms and automatic weapons fire was received in this area in the latter half of the day. In the FORBACH area the 347 Infantry Division received further aid as additional elements of the 559 Volksgrenadier Division were identified, and the enemy continued to hold the ground west of the tracks.

25 February - D/194

With our own attack in the SAARBRUCKEN sector now come to an end, the enemy remained generally quiet across the entire front. Attempts to drive our troops from the high ground south and southeast of SAARBRUCKEN were not renewed, with the enemy apparently awaiting our next move. Throughout this ten-day period of XV Corps attacks on the Army left, the enemy on VI Corps front had remained inactive with only patrol contacts reported. Several rounds from heavy-caliber railway guns were placed on SAVERNE and ST. AVOLD in the early morning.

26 February - D/195

The only significant activity was at STIRING - WENDEL, where elements of the 559 Division showed some aggressiveness by launching two small, ineffective counterattacks in the morning. Repeated infiltration attempts continued throughout the day in the wooded area on high ground east of town.

For three successive nights late in February, ground troops of the U S 70 Division had observed over FORBACH, and south of the town, a blimp-like object described as being about 100 feet long, silvery gray in color, and propelled by a very quiet, smooth motor. Its appearances usually occurred between 2000A and 0300A and were accompanied by bright flashes similar to photographic flares.

Antiaircraft personnel made thorough investigations after each report. They stated that at no time had radar plots been made, although radar was working the area, and that antiaircraft batteries in the vicinity had neither seen nor heard the object. On the night of 26 - 27 February, when the "Monster of FORBACH" was again reported, radar units on the alert directed their instruments to the suspected area and still made no plots.

Speculations, based solely on hearsay evidence, identified the object variously as an observation blimp, a new "v" weapon, a cloud formation, a figment of the imagination, and the Luftwaffe's Hermann GOERING on personal reconnaissance. For lack of positive evidence, any and all of these interpretations still stand.

27 February - D/196

The front remained generally quiet except at HINTERWALD Woods southeast of SAARBRUCKEN, where the enemy made an unsuccessful attack supported by three self-propelled guns. 2 Mountain Division ended its brief sojourn on our front and was identified by the U S Third Army in the SAARBURG sector. 6 SS Mountain

Division spread northward to cover 2 Mountain's sector, leaving the HAARDT Mountain front very thinly held.

28 February - D-197

The first elements of the 16 Volksgrenadier Division were identified in the HAARDT Mountains, helping 6 SS Mountain cover the sector. Like 2 Mountain before it, 16 Division was a relic from the battle for the "COLMAR pocket". Activity was negligible throughout the front.

### III. SUMMARY

The delicate state of the enemy's situation late in February was eloquently emphasized both by the employment of Volksturm at FORBACH and by a captured German officer who expressed surprise that we undertook only a limited-objective attack. He said that the SIEGFRIED Line in the MITTELBACH - ZWEIBRUCKEN sector was completely unmanned and that there was nothing there to stop an all-out offensive. This statement was supported by other prisoner statements that all WESTWALL Fortress battalions had had to be committed as infantry.

The vulnerability of the German line was already being tested on other sectors of the Western Front, where the drive to the RHINE was well under way. The test was soon to come in our sector as well.

Meanwhile, even the small-scale preparatory attacks were taking their toll. With little armor left to lose, the Germans gave up only 23 tanks and self-propelled guns during February. But out of the ranks of foot soldiers, they lost 4,431 prisoners and an estimated 5,500 - 6,000 killed and wounded.

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ANNEX I

## ENEMY FORCES OPPOSING SEVENTH ARMY


Infantry Strength in Combat Effectives

	<u>1 Feb</u>	<u>10 Feb</u>	<u>19 Feb</u>	<u>28 Feb</u>
6 SS Mtn Div.	1700	2000	2250	3100 *
10 SS Pz Div.	2650	TO BERLIN AREA		
16 VG Div.	COLMAR POCKET			600 (Elmts Only)
17 SS PG Div.	1650	2050	1650	1500
19 Inf Div.	1300	1250	1050	900
36 VG Div.	1150	900	900	1600
47 VG Div.	1650	1600	1600	1600
245 Inf Div.	2000	2000	STAFF TO HOLLAND; TROOPS REDEPLOYED	
256 VG Div.	1450	TO THIRD US ARMY FRONT		
257 VG Div.	1450	1300	1350	1350 (Elements to First French Army Sector)
347 Inf Div.	1500	1750	1400	1250
559 VG Div.	1250	1350	1600	1500
905 Mob Div.	(Misc Units former- ly u/c 553 VG Div)	1600	1500 (Elmts E of RHINE)	First French Army Sector
Misc Units	2400	1050	850	1500
Misc Units (u/c of 553 VG Div.)	2000	REFORMING IN PFORZHEIM AREA		
TOTALS	22100	16850	14150	14900

\* Being shifted to U S Third Army front.



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## ANNEX III

PRINCIPAL ENEMY COMMANDERS OPPOSING SEVENTH ARMYARMY GROUP UPPER RHINE  
ARMY GROUP G

NOTE: Heinrich HIMMLER, who had injected himself into the management of Army Group UPPER RHINE in January, departed later in the month to take over the new Army Group WEICHEL. On 21 January Oberstgruppenfuehrer Paul HAUSSER was entrusted with the provisional command of UPPER RHINE. A week later Generaloberst ELASKOWITZ' Army Group G expanded to take over UPPER RHINE's sector; in the shuffle, General HAUSSER assumed the merged command, while ELASKOWITZ went to HOLLAND to a new group.

HAUSSER, Paul, SS Oberstgruppenfuehrer.

Member of an old Prussian family and a firm believer in Hitlerism, the 64-year-old General HAUSSER has an extensive military background, having attended military cadet school and the Kriegsakademie and being in active service before World War I. In 1913, as a Captain, he was on the General Staff and during 1914-18 he served as a staff officer in various appointments, including an Army Corps Staff. In 1918, as a Major, HAUSSER had become a battalion commander in the 4 Infantry Regiment. By 1927 HAUSSER had become a Colonel and regimental commanding officer, and in 1930 he was an infantry commander in Wehrkreis IV. As a Generalleutnant, he was forced to resign from the Reichswehr in 1932 and was given the honorary rank of Lieutenant General. He became an active member of the SS and SA in 1934 and by 1936 was Inspector General of the SS General Service Troops. In 1940-41 he organized the SS Verfuegungs Division and led it in the western campaign. When this division split up with the expansion of the Waffen SS, he took over command of the new SS Division DAS REICH and commanded it in the BALKANS and in RUSSIA. As Commanding General I SS Corps (now II SS Corps) HAUSSER fought in RUSSIA and ITALY.

While commanding the I SS Corps in RUSSIA, HAUSSER took part in the first attempt to take KHARKOV. However, the Russian counterattack forced him to withdraw. His second attempt to take KHARKOV in March 1943 succeeded and was considered an important achievement. Late in 1943, I SS Corps went to ITALY to reinforce that front while at the same time refitting, demobilizing the Italian Army and fighting guerrillas around TRIESTE. Early in 1944 HAUSSER was reported commanding Seventh German Army, General DOLLMAN having been killed. HAUSSER was wounded in August 1944 in the NORMANDY campaign and disappeared from the western front until recently, when he showed up in his present capacity.

## FIRST ARMY

OBSTFELDER, General der Infanterie.

See G-2 History for January.

## NINETEENTH ARMY

RASP, Siegfried, General der Infanterie.

See G-2 History for December 1944.

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ANNEX III

XIII SS CORPS

SIMON, Max, SS Obergruppenfuehrer and General der Waffen SS.

See G-2 History for December 1944.

XIV SS CORPS

Von dem BACH-ZELEWSKI, Erich, SS Obergruppenfuehrer.

See G-2 History for January.

LXXXII CORPS

HAHM, Walter, General der Infanterie.

His age estimated at from 48 to 55. General HAHM assumed command in mid-December 1944, coming from FINLAND. His home reportedly is in central GERMANY. He is described as ruthless, selfish and willing to sacrifice any number of men. No other biographical data available.

LXXXV CORPS

KNISS, Baptist, General der Infanterie.

General KNISS, 59, is a General of long standing, having served in the old 100,000 Army. In pre-war days, as a Generalleutnant, he was Landwehr commander at HEILBRONN-NECKAR. He participated in the French campaign in 1940 and probably was in RUSSIA in 1941. By mid-1943 he was commanding LXVI Reserve Corps at ROYAT, near CLERMONT-FERRAND and remained in this capacity until early 1944, when he organized LXII Reserve Corps at DRAGUIGNAN. Later he left to organize LXXXV Corps, variously reported at TAILLADES and CAVAILLON. It is said that General KNISS drags one leg as a result of wounds received in the first World War. (Also, see G-2 History for August 1944).

LXXXIX CORPS

HOEHNE, Gustav, General der Infanterie.

See G-2 History for December 1944.

XC CORPS (FORMERLY IV GAF CORPS)

PETERSEN, General der Flieger.

See G-2 History for October 1944.

2 MOUNTAIN DIVISION

UTZ, Willibald, Generalleutnant.

Born about 1890 in BAVARIA, Generalleutnant UTZ saw service in the first World War in the 13 Bavarian Infantry Regiment. After the war he transferred to the Reichswehr. He had become a Leutnant on 18 April 1916.

During the period 1925-32 UTZ served in 19 Infantry Regiment and progressed to Hauptmann late in 1926. He became Oberstleutnant in 1937 and during the years 1938-39 commanded a battalion of 100 Mountain Regiment. On 1 January 1940 he was promoted to Oberst. During June 1941 UTZ was identified



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as commanding 100 Mountain Regiment (5 Mountain Division) in the CRETE operations, and in 1942 he commanded this same regiment in north RUSSIA. UTZ became Generalmajor on 1 August 1943 and the following month took command of 100 Light Division in the BALKANS, holding this particular command until October 1944. He was promoted to his present rank on 1 February 1944. He succeeded Generalmajor DEGEN (reported wounded) as leader of 2 Mountain Division. UTZ is believed to be a bachelor. He is well-liked by the men under his command, who respect him as a natural leader.

## 6 SS MOUNTAIN DIVISION

BRENNER, SS Gruppenfuehrer and Generalleutnant der Waffen SS.

See G-2 History for January.

## 10 SS PANZER DIVISION

HARMEL, Heinz, Brigadefuehrer and Generalmajor der Waffen SS.

See G-2 History for January.

## 17 SS PANZER GRENADIER DIVISION

KLINGENBERG, SS Standartenfuehrer.

See G-2 History for January.

## 19 INFANTRY DIVISION

BRITZELMAYR, Karl, Generalmajor.

See G-2 History for December 1944.

## 36 VOLKSGRENADIER DIVISION

WELLM, Generalmajor.

See G-2 History for December 1944.

## 47 VOLKSGRENADIER DIVISION

BORK, Generalleutnant.

No biographical data available.

## 245 INFANTRY DIVISION

WAGNER, Oberst.

Acting commanding officer. No biographical data available.

## 257 VOLKSGRENADIER DIVISION

SEIDEL, Generalmajor.

Elevated from Oberst during month. Holder of Knight's Cross. No biographical data available.

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347 INFANTRY DIVISION

TRIERENBERG, Generalleutnant.

No biographical data available.

553 VOLKSGRENADIER DIVISION

HUETHER, Generalmajor.

See G-2 History for December 1944.

559 VOLKSGRENADIER DIVISION

Von MUEHLEN, Kurt, Freiherr, Generalmajor.

See G-2 History for December 1944.

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## ANNEX IV

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

1 February - 28 February 1945

After the collapse of the enemy's attempts to retake ALSACE, the transition to more strategic espionage began and the tactical espionage agent temporarily disappeared along with the immediate need for him. Although three agents were captured during the period, only one was on a mission against the Seventh Army. Line-crossing undoubtedly continued, but the agents dispatched were either of a high grade, had plausible cover stories or our own travel control system had been compromised. Strategical elements of information, such as the use being made of the four American divisions which participated in the successful closing of the COLMAR pocket and other long-range intelligence were not the dish of 16-year-old HITLER Jugend boys, no matter how great their love for the Fuehrer.

A possible change in method of passing line-crossers was indicated by reports from interrogation of German prisoners of war that agents were being escorted through the lines by enemy patrols. Some of these agents wore U S Army uniforms, while others wore German army uniforms which may later have been discarded. It is probable that some of these groups were disbanded and nullified by our combat troops, as happened when a divisional patrol ambushed a group of three persons attempting to enter our lines, using a horse-drawn cart as subterfuge. One was leading, one riding and the third man walking behind the cart. The last man was shot and killed, while the other two escaped back to enemy lines. The dead man was found to be wearing a U S combat jacket and camouflage pants. No identification papers were found. A U S soldier, captured near BISCHWILLER on about 21 January and escaped on 31 January, stated that while a prisoner in OBERHOFFEN he had observed many enemy dressed in U S Army officers' and enlisted men's uniforms. A German prisoner captured on 1 February stated that his NCO had ordered him not to fire on four men who were passed through German outposts toward U S lines. The four men were dressed in white camouflage suits and were believed to be wearing civilian clothes underneath. The personnel involved in these three incidents could have been groups of the 6th Jagdverband Company, which began operating against the Seventh Army in January. Two members of this company arrested the previous month had stated that various groups were about to be dispatched either in uniform or civilian clothes. Indications from other Army fronts were that SKORZENY's preference for parachuting agents had finally won out, and the German Intelligence Service was increasingly using that method of passing agents. Of the three agents captured during the period, the only one with a mission against the Seventh Army had been parachuted.

This espionage agent was a Frenchman, a Franciste member, who was parachuted from an enemy-operated B-17 into the vicinity of LUNEVILLE with two wireless-telephone sets in a separate parachute. His mission was to report troop dispositions and movements in the LUNEVILLE area, as well as intelligence on travel control, new cartes d'identite, laissez-passer, etc. He was to contact Franciste members in LUNEVILLE for use as informants and set up his transmitter in the house of one of these contacts. He had no identity papers, which he attributed to the German belief (mistaken) that new French identity cards had been issued on the first of the year. He had retreated with the Milice into GERMANY in the fall of 1944 and had been recruited for his mission by the Franciste chief, Marcel EUCARD. He was trained at a radio-espionage school in BADEN-BADEN for nine weeks along with members of other French subversive organizations.

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ANNEX IV



The second espionage agent apprehended was a French national who had worked for Abwehr III KGF (Security in Prisoner of War Camps) in the Chief Abwehr Office of Wehrkreis XII (WEISBADEN). He was arrested at a roadblock. He had no present mission but his previous missions had been of three types: intelligence on persons suspected of aiding prisoners to escape into FRANCE, agent provocateur and counter-subversive work.

One probable saboteur was shot and killed by an American guard at a railway bridge in the vicinity of NANCY. The man had been lurking under the bridge carrying a bundle. When challenged, he jettisoned the package into the river and ran. He was wearing a U S Army uniform, but a German identity tag showed his unit as that of a reinforcement company which had been contacted by the Seventh Army on the breakthrough to STRASBOURG. The package was not retrieved.

The enemy's lack of intelligence on our tactical rear areas, indicated in former periods by captured maps, was further demonstrated by the poor briefing given to the apprehended agent who was parachuted with the mission of espionage in LUNEVILLE. This agent could not identify a Seventh Army Headquarters insignia and had no intimation of the location of any headquarters in LUNEVILLE or vicinity. One instance of wire-tapping on a line between a divisional field artillery battery and fire direction center occurred. On the same day an unknown radio station answered calls for two field artillery battalions in the divisional artillery radio command net.

An almost successful sabotage attempt was thwarted by the discovery of two British Mark I grenades which had been planted in the HAINVILLE railroad yard, one in the coal box of a stationary loading crane, the other in the tender of a U S Army locomotive. The grenades were of a type parachuted to resistance groups in FRANCE.

Minor sabotage efforts increased during the month. Ten cases of wire cutting occurred, of which all except one could be attributed to deliberate attempts to disrupt U S Army communications.

The agents encountered during February are summarized below:

	<u>French</u>	<u>German</u>	<u>Total</u>
Espionage	2*		2*
Sabotage		1	1
TOTALS	2	1	3

\* Including 1 wireless-telephone agent.

Total number of agents apprehended by the Seventh Army between 15 August 1944 and 28 February 1945:

Espionage	86
Sabotage	16
	<u>102</u>

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# G-2 HISTORY



## SEVENTH ARMY

OPERATIONS

IN

# EUROPE



PART EIGHT

1 - 31 MARCH 1945

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HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH ARMY  
Office of the A. C. of S., G-2  
APO 758 US ARMY

15/cy

3 June 1945

MEMORANDUM:

TO : All Concerned.

1. This document is a general summary of the activities of the German forces opposing the Seventh US Army during the period indicated.

2. It was prepared by the G-2 Section Seventh Army to relate chronologically, month by month, the enemy's tactics, composition and organization. It is not a history of Seventh Army operations, as such a document is being produced by the Seventh Army Historical Section.

3. THIS DOCUMENT IS RESTRICTED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. Par. 23b, AR 300-5, 15 March 1944.

CLASSIFICATION CHANGED FROM CONFIDENTIAL TO RESTRICTED AUTHORITY COMENDING GENERAL SEVENTH ARMY, BY W. C. CARDWELL, COLONEL, AGO, ON 1 JUNE 1945.

WILLIAM A. JOHNSON  
Colonel, AGO  
A C of S, G-2

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HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH ARMY  
Office of the A.C. of S., G-2  
APO 758 US ARMY

G-2 HISTORY

OPERATIONS IN EUROPE

Part VIII

1 - 31 March 1945

\* \* \*

C O N T E N T S

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A N N E X E S

I.	Enemy Dispositions on Seventh Army Front (Map)
II.	Principal Enemy Commanders Opposing Seventh Army
III.	Counterintelligence Summary 1 March - 31 March

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~~RESTRICTED~~I. GENERAL

No crystal ball is needed to guess what happened to the enemy on the Seventh Army front during March, nor why: he collapsed, because he lacked the strength to do otherwise.

Short of manpower, short of materiel, taken by surprise at a time when the other German armies in the west were already being thoroughly beaten, and its rear and right flank thus fatally exposed, the German First Army survived the debacle in name only and with only one brief stand to its credit. This was the brief but stubborn defense of the SIEGFRIED fortifications in the western RHINE Valley, covering the escape routes across the river. By the end of the month the RHINE line, too, had been cut and Seventh Army was slicing into the heart of GERMANY.

It is unnecessary to detail the progress of the entire Allied Western Front offensive, beyond fixing several dates for reference. The Germans in the COLOGNE Plain had collapsed during the first week in March, and on 7 March troops of the U S First Army had seized intact the railroad bridge over the RHINE at REMAGEN. By 9 March troops of the U S Third Army had also reached the RHINE at ANDERNACH, after breaking through eastward north of the MOSELLE River. On 14 March they attacked southward across the MOSELLE. On the following day, U S Seventh Army attacked northward, toward the SIEGFRIED Line, and toward the Third Army.

Caught in the American pincers were two German armies, the First and the Seventh. In the ten-day melee which followed in the PALATINATE, 24 German divisions each yielded prisoners to both the U S Seventh and Third Armies. In addition, three enemy divisions were contacted only by the U S Seventh, and three others only by the Third. Of this total of 30 divisions, only a handful ever again mustered enough strength to put up a worthwhile fight east of the RHINE.

The two German armies thus liquidated were components of Army Group G. After the end of the war, the Army Group Commander, Oberstgruppenfuehrer (Colonel General of the Waffen SS) Paul HAUSSER, was questioned by Seventh Army interrogators about his defeat.

He blamed the disaster on the policy, dictated to him from higher up, of holding and fighting to the last man. He said he appreciated the vulnerability of his position and his lack of troops in the SAAR - MOSELLE sector, but his suggestion of shortening the lines was rejected by higher headquarters. The easy capture of TRIER (which led to Third Army's breakthrough to the RHINE) followed. When the REMAGEN bridgehead was established, he recommended a withdrawal to the RHINE. Again he was refused, and the result was the annihilation of his troops and the untenability of the RHINE line as well. In speaking of HITLER, HAUSSER expressed the highest esteem for the Fuehrer's abilities as a strategist - except that he was usually too late in ordering withdrawals!

The shortsightedness of the policy of which HAUSSER complains was fully demonstrated during the last week of March. On 23 March the U S Third Army crossed the RHINE west of DARMSTADT. Early on 26 March, Seventh Army went over in the WORMS sector. To oppose expansion of the bridgehead, the Germans had only a miscellany of stop-gap units and a very few survivors from west of the RHINE. Much of the burden of defense fell on elements of more than 40 different anti-aircraft battalions, who first used their guns in ground support roles, then fought as infantry when the guns were destroyed; a variety of service and guard units were also committed. But, it was estimated, the divisions which had fought west of the RHINE had extricated so few men that they were unable to provide more than 15 per cent of the combat effectives met during the first few days east of the river.

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R E S T R I C T E DII. CHRONOLOGY1 March - D/198

Enjoying a temporary respite from American attacks, the nine German divisions facing Seventh Army all remained quiet. They were, from the RHINE westward: 906 Mobilization Division, 257 Volksgrenadier Division, 47 Volksgrenadier Division, 36 Volksgrenadier Division, 16 Volksgrenadier Division (which was in the process of absorbing remaining combat elements of the 245 Infantry Division, whose staff and cadre had been withdrawn from the sector), 17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division, 19 Infantry Division, 559 Volksgrenadier Division, and 347 Infantry Division, the latter in the SAARERUCKEN - FORBACH sector. 6 SS Mountain Division, which had been in the HAARDT Mountains for two months, was enroute to the front of U S Third Army, whose MOSELLE breakthrough at TRIER was in progress.

2 March - D/199

The enemy remained inactive while displaying sensitivity to patrols on his left flank, in the HAGUENAU sector. Artillery was very light and scattered except in the SAARERUCKEN - FORBACH area, where a slight increase was noted.

3 March - D/200

U S XXI Corps' limited-objective attack met moderately heavy resistance beyond the ELIES River north of SARREGUEMINES, with small arms, automatic weapons, anti-tank and 88-mm fire encountered. At FORBACH, the enemy put up strong opposition initially but late in the day was reported to be falling back under pressure.

4 March - D/201

Continuing to offer stubborn resistance, the enemy gave ground only under pressure in the FORBACH - STIRING-WENDEL region and near GUDINGEN. MARIENAU, southwest of FORBACH, was cleared only after heavy house-to-house fighting. The enemy's defensive attitude remained unchanged elsewhere. Artillery was generally light except for heavy fire in the FORBACH area and some increase in harassing fire near HAGUENAU.

5 March - D/202

FORBACH was cleared, but the enemy offered stubborn resistance with small arms, automatic weapons and mortar fire in the area northwest of town. House-to-house fighting continued southeast of the railroad through STIRING - WENDEL. Elsewhere on the front, the enemy was generally quiet, with artillery light except in the FORBACH area. An estimated 1,200 French, Russian and Polish prisoners of war were liberated from a stockade near STIRING - WENDEL.

6 March - D/203

Elements of the 559 and 347 Divisions maintained strong resistance southwest of SAARERUCKEN, where the enemy was establishing dug-in defenses. An enemy counterattack was repulsed north of FORBACH at about noon, and heavy house-to-house fighting continued in SIMON Mine and the factory district west of STIRING - WENDEL. The front was generally inactive elsewhere, with normal patrol and harassing fire reported.

R E S T R I C T E D



RESTRICTED7 March - D/204

Heavy resistance was met in the area southwest of SAARBRUCKEN as elements of the 559 and 347 Divisions continued determined defensive fighting from dug-in positions behind STIRING - WENDEL and along the railroad toward GROSS-ROSSELN, west of FORBACH. The enemy was alert but generally inactive on the remainder of the front, with artillery light and scattered except in the STIRING-WENDEL area.

8 March - D/205

From the SAAR River east to the Army boundary, the enemy remained alert to U S patrols while continuing his defensive attitude south of SAARBRUCKEN. Artillery fire was negligible except in the FORBACH area, where the enemy was supplementing his defenses by heavy artillery concentrations on roads and forward elements.

9 March - D/206

Its limited objectives on the approaches to SAARBRUCKEN achieved, XXI Corps reported activity on its front now limited to scattered firing. Patrol activity was somewhat more lively east of the HAARDT Mountains, but in the SAAR Valley and in the SAARBRUCKEN area the enemy remained passive. Artillery and mortar fire decreased on the west flank but showed marked increases during daylight hours at the northwest fringes of the HAARDT Mountains.

10 March - D/207

Activity across the entire Army front was negligible, with artillery very light and scattered. Rail movement did not disclose any significant pattern, although there was a slight increase in activity in the SAAR Valley.

11 March - D/208

There was no change in the enemy's attitude. He remained alert and sensitive, as evidenced by strong patrol contacts and sharp reactions to a FWB broadcast in the VI Corps sector. The only aggressive action was an attempted raid by 25 men in the HAARDT Mountains south of LEMBERG, probably with the purpose of capturing prisoners.

12 March - D/209

The enemy showed increasing nervousness, particularly west from the HAARDT Mountains to the SAAR River. Elements of 17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division northwest of RIMLING and of 19 Infantry Division near FECHINGEN mustered a total of 100 men to probe our positions, but did not succeed.

13 March - D/210

While remaining alert and sensitive in the central part of the Army zone, the enemy offered only moderate opposition to a limited-objective attack whose aim was to secure a bridgehead across the MODER River at HAGUENAU. Increased artillery fire there was the principal reaction. In the SAARBRUCKEN area, civilians reported the enemy was evacuating the northwest part of STIRING-WENDEL and KLEIN ROSSELN, and was under orders to withdraw north of the SAAR before 2300A. Friendly patrols in this sector encountered only minor resistance, and a prisoner from the 347 Division, captured in SCHAFFHAUSEN, supported the civilian statements.

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14 March - D/211

A determined enemy effort to eliminate the bridgehead across the MODER River in the HAGUENAU area proved unsuccessful. Farther west, the enemy withdrew north of the SAAR in the SAARBRUCKEN area, leaving only isolated pockets of resistance.

15 March - D/212

Evidently appreciating that the front in northern ALSACE was threatened by the Allied breakthrough along the lower MOSELLE, the German First Army on 11 March had ordered its forces on the MODER River to withdraw to the SIEGFRIED Line, beginning 15 March. What had not been appreciated, however, was that 15 March was also the day on which our general offensive was to begin. The enemy put up only scattered resistance - though strong at a few points - as he began falling back under unexpected pressure.

The 3 Algerian Infantry Division, on our right flank, met moderately strong opposition south of CAMP D'OBERHOFFEN, and U S 36 Division was engaged in house-to-house fighting in the northern part of HAGUENAU. A number of towns northwest of HAGUENAU were cleared, but the U S 103 Division received a counterattack supported by five tanks at UTTEHOFEN. The U S 42 Division met strong resistance in the ROTHBACH - REIPERTSWILLER area, but later patrols to BAERENTHAL reported no contact. IV Corps (106 Cavalry, 71, 100, 3 and 45 Divisions) encountered spotty resistance except east of SARREGUEMINES, where enemy infantry counterattacked with armor support but were repulsed. XXI Corps (63 and 70 Divisions and 101 Cavalry Group) met no organized defensive positions on its right, where the enemy withdrew under cover of small arms and automatic weapons fire. An enemy counterattack east of the Bois de SAARBRUCKEN was contained.

To complete the picture of relative strength involved in the battle - the 6, 12 and 14 Armored Divisions were also under the Seventh Army command, to be committed later to exploit the German collapse. Also, a combat command of the French 5 Armored Division was operating with the 3 Algerian on our right flank. To meet this array of strength the Germans had nine divisions with an estimated strength in combat infantry effectives of 14,250 - the equivalent of 17 - 18 battalions - and 120 to 130 tanks and self-propelled guns.

16 March - D/213

The enemy offered only light to moderate resistance, delaying in nature, with the principal opposition coming from strong points in towns along the axis of advance. Four local counterattacks on the VI Corps front supported the delaying action. West of the HAARDT Mountains the Germans were withdrawing into SIEGFRIED positions, and were unable to prevent penetration into the south band of the line south of ENSHEIM. Enemy troops were getting little artillery support because of the rearward displacement of batteries which was in progress. Among the towns cleared were both HAGUENAU and HITCHE.

17 March - D/214

The enemy in the RHINE Valley and HAARDT Mountains continued withdrawing to the SIEGFRIED Line, delaying our pursuit with obstacles and mines. Only at GUNSTETT did VI Corps troops meet strong opposition.

West of the mountains, however, the Germans were already established in the SIEGFRIED Line, and put up stiffening resistance, supported by increasing artillery fire, as our forces advanced against the pillboxes and obstacles. A penetration into the outer belt of pillboxes near ALSCHBACH drew an enemy counterattack.

18 March - D/215

Little or no contact was reported in the RHINE Valley and HAARDT Mountains except in LAUTERBOURG, as the enemy continued withdrawing into SIEGFRIED positions. West of the HAARDT heavy fighting continued in the SIEGFRIED Line from south of ZWEIERUCKEN to south of ST. INGHEERT. A German counterattack in company strength retook BOTTENBOCH; south of ZWEIERUCKEN a similar enemy attack failed. West of ZWEIERUCKEN, heavy fighting was in progress in the SIEGFRIED Line on both sides of the ELIES River, where 24 bunkers were reported captured. U S patrols opened a lane in the "dragons' teeth" near WATTWEILER but met heavy mortar and artillery fire.

19 March - D/216

East of the HAARDT Mountains, the enemy lost WISSEMBOURG, but U S forces advancing across the border into GERMANY were engaged in a fire fight at OBER OTTERBACH. In the LAUTERBOURG sector the enemy put down small arms and automatic weapons fire from the north bank of the LAUTER River, and west of WISSEMBOURG the Germans occupied SIEGFRIED positions and offered increasing resistance.

West of the mountains, the enemy continued to resist stubbornly in the West Wall, and launched several small counterattacks; however, by the end of the day the main belt of fortifications had been penetrated near ZWEIERUCKEN. The German right flank, west of SAARERUCKEN, was beginning to be rolled up as a result of the deep penetrations of the U S Third Army in the direction of NEUNKIRCHEN. Although our first attempt to cross the SAAR River west of SAARERUCKEN was repulsed, a later attempt near VOLKLINGEN was unopposed and the first pillboxes north of the river were found unoccupied.

20 March - D/217

The entire right wing of the German First Army collapsed as enemy troops west of the HAARDT Mountains withdrew eastward into the mountains, enroute to the RHINE. Very little opposition was met by U S troops who passed through the SIEGFRIED Line at ZWEIERUCKEN and other points to the west. SAARERUCKEN was cleared, with only a few snipers encountered. Both bands of the SIEGFRIED Line in this sector were pierced and contact was made with the U S Third Army.

To salvage anything at all from this debacle, the Germans had to hold their east flank firm, to cover the escape routes across the RHINE. This they did by holding tenaciously to the SIEGFRIED positions in the RHINE Valley for several more days. Part of the line north of WISSEMBOURG was being manned by miscellaneous units, including some Volksturm battalions, organized into Division RAESSLER - some 3,000 men under command of Generalmajor RAESSLER. The 905 Mobilization Division, 257 Volksgrenadier Division, elements of the 47 Volksgrenadier Division, 36 Volksgrenadier Division, 16 Volksgrenadier Division and remnants of the 17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division were also holding sectors in the mountains and the RHINE Valley.



21 March - D/218

Heavy fighting continued in the SIEGFRIED positions from the RHINE Valley to the HAARDT Mountains, but even here the enemy began, late in the day, to show signs of getting out. A heavy increase in artillery fire in the BIENWALD Forest, on the RHINE flank, suggested enemy artillery was also shifting eastward. In the HAARDT resistance slackened somewhat late in the period, while a prisoner had stated earlier that the enemy was to withdraw from this area and cross the RHINE. West of PIRMASENS enemy artillery, which had been active, ceased firing after 1335A. East of HOMBURG only scattered contact was made with the disorganized and withdrawing enemy. North of SAARBRUCKEN remnants of the 19, 347 and 719 Divisions were pocketed and being mopped up.

22 March - D/219

The enemy still held firmly in SIEGFRIED Line positions in the RHINE Valley, but the sector being so held again narrowed considerably as troops in the HAARDT Mountains joined the wholesale withdrawal. Southeast of PIRMASENS another segment of the West Wall was found unmanned. PIRMASENS itself was taken against only scattered small arms fire, and organized resistance was negligible from there westward. Indicative of the completeness of the collapse of the entire German Seventh Army and most of the First Army was the U S IV Corps' identification of elements of 18 German divisions during the day - none of which offered any notable opposition. In an effort to cover his withdrawing columns, the enemy stepped up his air activity, bombing and strafing roads in the area east of KAISERSLAUTERN.

23 March - D/220

The progressive collapse of resistance in the west and center portions of the VI Corps zone, together with the large number of prisoners surrendering, indicated the withdrawal of enemy forces from west of the RHINE was nearing completion. Only three German divisions, 257, 905 and RAESSLER, were still in reasonably firm contact immediately west of the RHINE. Even here resistance began to break down during the day. To the west and north only scattered remnants were being mopped up, although moderate resistance was developing in the southwest portion of LUDWIGSHAFEN late in the day. West of GERMERSHEIM, whose bridge was still serviceable, dug-in enemy troops resisted Third Army troops who were advancing toward the RHINE.

24 March - D/221

Except for scattered pockets, enemy resistance ended west of the RHINE. The last organized enemy force disengaged in the BIENWALD Forest, and German infantrymen were reported crossing the RHINE on rafts in that area. Occasional roadblocks were lightly defended, and a small pocket still held out in LUDWIGSHAFEN, although most of the resistance there was liquidated during the day. U S troops on the RHINE received scattered fire from the east bank.

25 March - D/222

The day was characterized by continued mopping-up operations on the RHINE front and in rear areas. GERMERSHEIM, PFORTZ and MAXIMILIANSAU were cleared of enemy remnants, although snipers and small pockets were still met in LUDWIGSHAFEN. Some small arms and light artillery fire continued to fall along the river front from east of the RHINE.

26 March - D/223

XV Corps' crossings of the RHINE in the WORMS area met moderate to strong resistance, but by the end of the day the bridgehead was firmly established and the RHINE barrier had been breached at yet another point.

A major element in the German defense of the river was a large number of anti-aircraft weapons. Those firing from the vicinity of MANNHEIM and from a nearby island in the river laid down sufficient fire to interfere seriously with crossing operations by elements of the U S 3 Division. 45 Division crossings at first met only light resistance, but small arms, machine gun, mortar, bazooka and 20-mm fire later became intense. Artillery fire, however, was very light, indicating the seriousness of materiel losses west of the RHINE.

Three enemy counterattacks of platoon and company strength were repulsed in the SANDHOFEN - LAMPERTSHEIM area, and strong resistance had to be overcome before HOFHEIM, KLEINHAUSEN and GERNSHEIM were taken.

27 March - D/224

Advances from the bridgehead cleared all of the RHINE Valley to the foothills of the ODENWALD against disorganized and diminishing resistance. With the fall of BENSHEIM, the north-south DARMSTADT - HEIDELBERG axis was broken and rapid advances to the northeast cleared GROSS ZIMMERN and made contact with Third Army elements at the MAIN River south of ASCHAFFENBURG.

On the southern side of the bridgehead resistance was somewhat stiffer. Evidently trying to cover the NECKAR Valley, the enemy laid down considerable fire on the approaches to WEINHEIM. Contact with small enemy units led to fire fights and one small counterattack near NEUSCHLOSS.

28 March - D/225

The enemy lost virtually all the terrain between the RHINE and MAIN Rivers in the northern portion of the zone. Evidently he intended to stand on the east side of the MAIN, for after crossing the river U S troops were heavily engaged at ASCHAFFENBURG and SCHWEINHEIM.

In the center, isolated groups and roadblocks attempted unsuccessfully to slow the advance, but in the south resistance was again strong. WEINHEIM fell only after heavy fighting and the enemy was attempting to hold a line on the west slopes of the ODENWALD. Stubborn opposition was offered at KAEFERTAL and WALLSTADT. An enemy counterattack against our bridgehead over the NECKAR between HEIDELBERG and MANNHEIM was broken up. Mortar fire was still coming from the island in the RHINE at MANNHEIM, whose mayor was engaged in telephone negotiations for the surrender of the city. The negotiations failed when the German garrison commander objected.

29 March - D/226

After the Wehrmacht withdrew during the night, the mayor of MANNHEIM succeeded in surrendering his town. Telephone negotiations were then undertaken with the mayor of HEIDELBERG.

Two more small counterattacks were repulsed at the NECKAR bridgehead. Advancing southward along the main highway to HEIDELBERG, U S troops had to overcome strong opposition at SCHRIESHEIM before the town fell. Delays due to difficult terrain and scattered resistance failed to prevent deep penetration of the ODENWALD.

Our front on the MAIN River was broadened with the clearing of WOERTH after heavy fighting. The bridgehead across the MAIN at ASCHAFFENBURG and SCHWEINHEIM expanded slowly against very stiff opposition.

30 March - D/227

The pattern of enemy resistance was unchanged. Advances south of the NECKAR River reached KETSCH and SCHWETZINGEN against opposition which included a few tanks, but HEIDELBERG fell easily. Going downhill on the east slopes of the ODENWALD, with improvised roadblocks and bazooka fire providing the only obstacles, advance elements reached WALLDURN and points beyond. Farther north additional crossings of the MAIN River in the WOERTH area failed to bring an enemy reaction, but in the ASCHAFFENBURG - SCHWEINHEIM sector the enemy continued to defend stubbornly. Three counterattacks there were repulsed.

31 March - D/228

Enemy resistance was strong on the two flanks - the ASCHAFFENBURG - SCHWEINHEIM sector, where bitter house-to-house fighting was in progress, and the HAARDT Woods, near the RHINE south of the NECKAR, where an organized defensive line was developed. However, east of the ODENWALD in the area between HEILBRONN and WURZBURG, advances continued virtually unchecked.

### III. SUMMARY

The final result of operations during March 1945 is implicit in the situation. On the 15th the Germans were holding positions forward of the SIEGFRIED Line in ALSACE; on the 31st they had still not been able to re-establish a front east of the RHINE to block the Seventh Army's drive across Southern GERMANY.

In the sparring preliminaries of the first two weeks of March, the Germans had yielded 1,092 prisoners to the Seventh Army, lost an estimated 2,500 killed and wounded and only three tanks or self-propelled guns known to have been destroyed.

During the last two weeks 38,434 prisoners were processed through the Seventh Army cages. Because of the completeness of the collapse, no accurate estimate of battle casualties was possible. Eighty-two tanks and self-propelled guns were known destroyed or captured - but these were only a fraction of the vast quantity of artillery pieces and vehicles destroyed or abandoned during the flight across the RHINE.

In the trans-RHINE phase of the last six days of the month, somewhat more accurate estimates of enemy strength and losses could be made. An estimated 14,500 infantry effectives were committed piecemeal against our eastward thrust; only about 2,200 of these were identified as survivors of the routed divisions, the balance being hastily-assembled miscellaneous units, mainly replacement training units. An indication of their unreadiness for combat is their loss of about 6,500 prisoners (an estimate, not a cage count) and 2,000 killed and wounded between 26 March and 1 April.

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


However, it should be pointed out that the 2,200 referred to above were only the combat-effective survivors contacted within the first few days of the RHINE crossing; they by no means represented the total of German troops from the First and Seventh Armies who succeeded in crossing the river during the retreat. That overall figure, including all types of divisional troops in addition to combat infantrymen, is estimated at approximately 40,000. April, the last full month of the war, was to be well advanced before the Germans succeeded in redeploying these troops along some semblance of a cohesive front.

Meanwhile, the enemy order of battle was so nebulous that it is doubtful if even the High Command could have told with certainty what it had on the front at any given time; therefore, the usual annex, tabulating enemy strengths at regular intervals during the month, is omitted from this report.

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## ANNEX II

PRINCIPAL ENEMY COMMANDERS OPPOSING SEVENTH ARMY

## ARMY GROUP G

HAUSSER, Paul, SS Oberstgruppenfuehrer.

See G-2 History for February.

## FIRST ARMY

FOERTSCH, Herrmann, General der Infanterie.

General FOERTSCH held an appointment at the Kriegsakademie in 1938-39, and became Generalmajor on 1 February 1942. Eleven months later he was promoted to Generalleutnant, and in January 1944 was Chief of Staff of Army Group F. He served in the summer of 1944 as commander of 21 Infantry Division on the north Russian front, and for services rendered was granted the German Cross in Gold on 5 September 1944. He assumed his present command on 6 March.

The general was born in POTSDAM, near BERLIN. He has the reputation of being an able tactician. He is forward in expressing his opinions, and has been overheard criticizing some of his superiors. He is judged to be a loyal follower of HITLER, and according to his own version was to have been one of the victims of the ROEHRM coup, had it been successful.

His habits as a commanding general are similar to those of most generals. After an early breakfast, the General studies the morning reports, asking the Chief of Staff for required explanations. He keeps in touch with his division commanders, generally by visiting them, while the Corps commanders often come to see him. These Corps leaders or their representatives attend the combined G-2 and G-3 briefings at the General's headquarters, whenever he is present. Two situation maps are kept up to the minute for his use. Occasionally the Judge Advocate appears in the morning to read sentences and fines meted out. This is thought to constitute a warning to would-be offenders in the officer corps.

## SEVENTH ARMY

FELBER, Hans, General der Infanterie.

No biographical data available.

## NINETEENTH ARMY

OESTFELDER, General der Infanterie.

Former commander of First Army. See G-2 History for January.

Left the Nineteenth Army command 25 March to succeed FELBER as head of the Seventh Army.

R E S T R I C T E D

ANNEX II

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BRANDENBERGER, General der Panzer Truppen.

Came to Nineteenth Army as OESTFELDER's successor late in month.  
No biographical data available.

XIII SS CORPS

SIMON, Max, SS Obergruppenfuehrer and General der Waffen SS.

See G-2 History for December 1944.

XIII CORPS

ORIOLA, Ralph, Graf von, General der Artillerie.

General von ORIOLA comes from an old Silesian aristocratic military family. He differs from most high-ranking German officers, however, being neither arrogant nor rank-conscious, and exhibiting a pronounced non-Nazi attitude. His knowledge of politics is slight, though he has expressed his disgust with Nazi leaders and leadership during the war. His desire to see other countries and people is passionate; while at the same time he is intensely interested in the reconstruction of GERMANY.

With 18 Artillery Regiment in 1938-39, General von ORIOLA advanced successively through the ranks of Oberst and Generalmajor to Generalleutnant between June 1940 and November 1943, and later was awarded the Knight's Cross for action at GOMEL. In January 1945 he assumed command of VI Corps on the eastern front, and on 9 March 1945 succeeded General der Infanterie FELER as head of XIII Corps, FELER taking command of the Seventh Army.

LXXXII CORPS

HAHM, Walter, General der Infanterie.

See G-2 History for February.

LXXXV CORPS

KNISS, Baptist, General der Infanterie.

See G-2 History for August 1944 and February 1945.

LUETTWITZ, Smilo von, General der Panzer Truppen.

Assumed command 29 March, General KNISS being retired due to illness.

LXXXIX CORPS

HOEHNE, Gustav, General der Infanterie.

See G-2 History for December 1944.

XC CORPS (FORMERLY IV GAF CORPS)

PETERSEN, General der Flieger.

See G-2 History for October 1944.

2 MOUNTAIN DIVISION

UTZ, Willibald, Generalleutnant.

See G-2 History for February.

6 SS MOUNTAIN DIVISION

BRENNER, SS Gruppenfuehrer and Generalleutnant der Waffen SS.

See G-2 History for January.

16 VOLKSGRENADIER DIVISION

MOECKL, Generalmajor.

No biographical data available.

17 SS PANZER GRENADIER DIVISION

KLINGENBERG, SS Standartenfuehrer.

See G-2 History for January. (NOTE: Later it was learned that Colonel KLINGENBERG died shortly before the German flight back across the RHINE).

19 INFANTRY DIVISION

BRITZELMAYR, Karl, Generalmajor.

See G-2 History for December 1944.

36 VOLKSGRENADIER DIVISION

WELLM, Generalmajor.

See G-2 History for December 1944.

47 VOLKSGRENADIER DIVISION

BORK, Generalleutnant.

No biographical data available.

245 INFANTRY DIVISION

WAGNER, Oberst.

Acting commanding officer. No biographical data available.

257 VOLKSGRENADIER DIVISION

SEIDEL, Generalmajor.

See G-2 History for February. No other biographical data available.

347 INFANTRY DIVISION

TRIERENBERG, Generalleutnant.

No biographical data available.

## 559 VOLKSGRENADIER DIVISION

Von MUEHLEN, Kurt, Freiherr, Generalmajor.

See G-2 History for December 1944.

## 719 INFANTRY DIVISION

GAEDE, Generalmajor.

The 47-year-old GAEDE, who was captured 30 March, has been a Generalmajor since the end of 1943. Interrogators found him highly intelligent but extremely rank-conscious. He appeared to be a very lonely man, lacking in drawing-room manners despite much time in diplomatic life. As with so many others of his class, GAEDE appeared amazed that Allied troops did not consider him a hero for having successfully evaded capture during eight days of hiding behind Allied lines. The lack of chivalry displayed by American soldiers was incomprehensible to his Prussian mentality.

General GAEDE's military career began in 1916 when he was drafted into 46 Field Artillery Regiment as a Fahnenjunker (officer candidate). After the war he returned to civilian life and managed his private estate. This life was brief: In 1923 he was recalled to service and assigned to 2 Artillery Regiment. 1924 found him as inspection officer at an artillery school in WUENSdorf, later as physical training officer.

In 1931 GAEDE was a staff officer with 5 Infantry Division in STUTTGART, and three years later he was in BERLIN attending General Staff Officers' school. He became Oberst in 1937, and in 1939 was artillery advisor to OKH. A promotion followed and he went to FRANCE with 225 Infantry Division. He was in a G-3 capacity, and served similarly in RUSSIA with 110 Infantry Division in 1941. Shortly thereafter he was Chief of Staff of an Army Corps. He was ill early in 1942, but by June was in BULGARIA as chief of the German Training Staff attached to the Royal Bulgarian Army Staff. He reached his present rank in December 1943 and became commander of 719 Division, succeeding Generalmajor SCHWALBE, in December 1944.

## 905 MOBILIZATION DIVISION

KASTNER, Oberst.

No biographical data available.

## DIVISION RAESSLER

RAESSLER, Generalmajor.

No biographical data available.



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## ANNEX III

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

1 March - 31 March 1945

The attack by the Seventh Army on 15 March broke the month into two sharply divergent periods. Enemy intelligence and sabotage activities during the first half of the period were limited to unsuccessful attempts to discover the size and time of the attack which the Germans knew was coming. However, the interrogation of officer prisoners demonstrated that tactical surprise was achieved in the attack. Several enemy officers complained of the poor quality of intelligence received from higher headquarters, thereby indicating that German agents had encountered difficulty in accomplishing missions or had been almost inactive. In any case, no agents were apprehended in the first fifteen days as compared with seven espionage and two sabotage agents during the latter half of the month. The case of Grenadier Werner EHRHARDT, although not considered typical, may illustrate the type and esprit of agents. EHRHARDT had been reported by a German deserter to have made numerous successful line-crossings in the Seventh Army area. He was subsequently apprehended and interrogation of both EHRHARDT and the deserter revealed that EHRHARDT had not accomplished his missions, that, instead he had hidden in a relative's house on the German bank of the ROSELLE River and had faked reports on his missions, basing his information on the files of his own organization. His superiors had promoted him and awarded him the Iron Cross First Class. Further evidence of the failure of German Intelligence to obtain tactical information was a captured map of an unknown enemy headquarters. The order of battle of both German and Allied forces as of 18-20 March was shown on the map with numerous major errors regarding Seventh Army: one division was not identified, an armored division was located far from its actual position, one division listed as on the line actually was in reserve and a corps of another Army located in the vicinity was placed under the Seventh Army.

The reason for this comparative inactivity was not lack of interest but rather concentration on the Reich itself and on long-range activities. The trend of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt on operations outside the Reich was towards long-distance parachute operations which took priority over tactical operations. There were now enough trained parachutists of the French, Belgian, Dutch and Luxembourg subversive groups to continue dropping them regularly over Western EUROPE and the Sicherheitsdienst was primarily interested for its foreign operations in subversive and pro-Nazi movements in Allied-held territory, with the assassination of public figures still an assignment for its agents. Since the Abwehr lost its Kommandos and Trupps the armies had tightened control over them and the Sicherheitsdienst was not interfering with their routine work but it had certain jurisdiction in all operations due to its control of the quisling organizations from which the majority of agents was being drawn. Although it is difficult to point a finger at locations or activities of the Kommandos and Trupps whose operations resemble a blob of mercury broken into drops, certain information became known. A new espionage Kommando, Number 176, had moved from JUGOSLAVIA to the BLACK FOREST area and was reorganizing with reinforcements from Trupps formerly in the COLMAR pocket.

Stay-behind systems for Allied-occupied GERMANY preoccupied both the Reichssicherheitshauptamt and the Wehrmacht. The latter, showing considerably increased interest, was demanding that greater numbers of radio agents be trained for employment in the Rhineland. It was known that Kommando 180 had trained 30 agents for use in Western GERMANY solely for air intelligence.

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ANNEX III

R E S T R I C T E D

Kommando 120 was planning to emulate the short-term stay-behind network, a new development tried out successfully by Kommando 130 in the EIFEL area. Kommando 120's field of operations was to be against the Seventh Army in the FIRMASENS and SOULTZ areas. Although radio was the means of communication, this short-term network was independent of the long-term stay-behind radio agents. It was planned to counter the difficulty of supplying current for radio operation in the early days of Allied occupation by the widespread use of pigeons and couriers to supplement the usual radio communications.

The training of agents both for work abroad and inside GERMANY continued on an increased scale and in the BADEN area large numbers of HITLER Jugend were going to espionage and sabotage schools.

Evidence from our own and other sectors demonstrated that as early as September 1944 there had been a definite top-secret plan formulated by HIMMLER to establish a sabotage and subversive organization to operate under control of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt behind the Allied lines as well as after the war. This organization was called the Werewolf and was the only underground organization encountered by the Seventh Army which was worthy of the name. SKORZENY, Chief of Amt VI/S and Militaerisches Amt D, was charged with the bulk of training and supply of the Werewolf. HITLER Jugend, Gestapo and Sicherheitsdienst personnel had been trained, but not on a large scale. All aid given by SKORZENY to the Werewolf was at the expense of his Militaerisches Amt D and Jagdverbaende, both in personnel and materiel and, consequently, the Werewolf suffered. However, there were enough people trained and enough sabotage dumps established to cause some concern. Three 15-year-old boys were apprehended at the end of March in possession of a pistol and four hand grenades. The boys stated that they were members of a group of 250 boys in the area of BENSHEIM who were sworn to kill American soldiers. One sabotage agent apprehended with a terrorist and sabotage mission confessed that he was part of a group of 21 other persons in the same area with similar missions. Although there existed an unfounded tendency to attribute every out-of-the-way action by irate Germans to the Werewolf, it is probable that some of the high-level planning in BERLIN, even though modified, did seep down to various regions. A Party radio network in the Seventh Army area began Werewolf broadcasts at the end of March. Messages were mostly administrative, arranging for meetings, calling on Kreisleiters for aid in organizing a local Werewolf. One of the alleged tenets of the Werewolf was not to act until some time after the Allies had occupied an area. However, it appeared that this potentially dangerous organization, although planned and staffed, existed mostly on inter-office memoranda. Time had been against it, as well as a numbed German people. GOEBBELS' private propaganda Werewolf which represented the movement as a mass, atavistic uprising of the German people with scythes and plastic explosives, was no more of a genuine threat than the dragon in "Siegfried".

Descriptions of the nine agents apprehended, all in GERMANY, are given below: a chain of four stay-behind radio operators was uncovered. The organizer was a Sonderfuehrer K (assimilated grade of Captain) in Abwehr I H who had formerly worked as an evaluator of Abwehr intelligence for Abwehr branch offices in WIESBADEN, ST. GERMAIN, ANGERS and KAISERSLAUTERN. His mission was to establish three radio agents in the Rhineland and a network of satellite informers. The three operators whom he established were discharged Wehrmacht Signal Corps enlisted men whose homes were in the Rhineland.

The fifth radio operator apprehended was a German who claimed to have been a Communist of long standing and to have deserted the German Army, been imprisoned by the Russians and later released for a parachute espionage mission in BERLIN. There he was arrested by the Gestapo, forced to continue contact with the Russians and finally sent on a stay-behind mission against Seventh Army.

R E S T R I C T E D

He was to report all American military activities in the SAARERUCKEN area as well as all civilian political developments affecting the war. He had not yet transmitted any military intelligence when arrested.

The two HITLER Jugend members, one 15½, the other 16 years old, were vagrants who had been arrested for lack of papers and been impressed by a Wehrmacht officer into crossing the lines to find out from civilians the types and strength of American troops and vehicles. They had no cover story and no training.

Of the two sabotage agents apprehended:

One was a German Army Lieutenant arrested in civilian clothes on his way to a camouflaged cave of a resistance movement under SS control, on the outskirts of SAARERUCKEN. The cave, a former air raid shelter with its real entrance demolished, was elaborately furnished with complete facilities for all emergencies, including demolition materiel, arms and munitions. The cave had been established to serve as a resistance sabotage dump for operation in American-occupied territory.

The second sabotage agent apprehended was a Polish national, former Obergefreiter in the German Army, who had been working as an assistant to Military Government in the town of BRUCKWEILER and had been considered for mayor of the town. His confessed mission was to sabotage U S equipment and supplies and kill U S soldiers at night. He was also to transmit to another agent in PRIMASENS reports on troop movements, strength and insignia. He had attended two sabotage schools. Twenty-one other persons in the area had been given similar missions.

Actual sabotage was almost non-existent during the period. An enemy Schu mine was found near a bridge. Intended sabotage was indicated since the bridge had recently been repaired and the area cleared by U S Army engineers. Only one wire cut was reported, and that probably not due to sabotage. A German demolition squad expertly mined a hotel in NIEDERBRONN prior to the German retreat. A time bomb hidden in the hotel demolished it; U S troops occupying the hotel suffered 25 casualties, eight of whom were reported dead.

There was increased activity in the use of propaganda leaflets during the part of the period prior to attack. Two different leaflets distributed in the vicinity of GUDINGEN gave detailed instructions on malingering. The theme of both pamphlets was printed at the end, namely: "The most important thing about the war is to come back home alive!" The first pamphlet told, with illustrations, how to produce a simulated paralysis of the arm or leg. The cover of the second gave purported war profits of American firms and devoted the remainder of its four pages to directions for simulating tuberculosis sufficiently to give positive reaction to a sputum test.

The types of espionage and sabotage agents encountered can be seen from the breakdown below:

	<u>German</u>	<u>Polish</u>	<u>Total</u>
Espionage	7*		7*
Sabotage	$\frac{1}{8}$	$\frac{1}{1}$	$\frac{2}{9}$

\* Including 5 radio agents.

Total number of agents captured by the Seventh Army since 15 August 1944:

Espionage	93
Sabotage	18
Total	<u>111</u>

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


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# G-2 HISTORY



## SEVENTH ARMY

OPERATIONS

IN

# EUROPE



PART NINE

1 - 30 APRIL 1945

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HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH ARMY  
Office of the A. C. of S., G-2  
APO 750 US ARMY

AD/cv

3 June 1945

MEMORANDUM:

TO : All Concerned.

1. This document is a general summary of the activities of the German forces opposing the Seventh US Army during the period indicated.
2. It was prepared by the G-2 Section Seventh Army to relate chronologically, month by month, the enemy's tactics, composition and organization. It is not a history of Seventh Army operations, as such a document is being produced by the Seventh Army Historical Section.

3. THIS DOCUMENT IS RESTRICTED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. Par. 23b, AR 380-5, 15 March 1944.

CLASSIFICATION WAS CHANGED FROM CONFIDENTIAL TO RESTRICTED  
AUTHORITY COMMANDING GENERAL SEVENTH ARMY, BY: G. CALDWELL,  
COLONEL, AGO, ON 1 JUNE 1945.

*William A. Quinn*  
WILLIAM A. QUINN  
Colonel, GSC  
A C of S, G-2

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R E S T R I C T E D

HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH ARMY  
Office of the A.C. of S., G-2  
APO 758. US ARMY

G-2 HISTORY

OPERATIONS IN EUROPE

Part IX

1 - 30 April 1945

\* \* \*

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On 22 April 1945, Adolf HITLER, Fuehrer of the Third Reich, became convinced that the war had been lost.

That belated admission, reported by Hermann GOERING, is in itself a concise summary of the progress and results of enemy operations during this last full month of the war in EUROPE. However, the month during which defeat became disintegration still saw the enemy command demonstrating some of its old talent for improvisation, and still practicing its traditional tactics of holding critical strong points and defending by counterattack where possible. As a result, the war which had been lost long before the Fuehrer's admission did not end yet. Bitter battles were fought, and men died on both sides before unconditional surrender could be proclaimed.

General EISENHOWER had publicly stated that his intention was to destroy the German armies west of the RHINE. This had been done in March. By the first of April, American, British and French forces had shattered the RHINE position and were driving into the heart of GERMANY. Of the broken units which had survived the Rhineland disaster to take up positions on the east bank, 21 divisions and a third of a million men were cut off in the RUHR pocket on 1 April. The pocket was not liquidated until the 18th, but until then it was so completely isolated that its troops could play no part in the decisive final campaigns.

Through the great void thus left in the German center, the Allied armies swept toward the ELBE and the Russians. It soon became apparent that if the Germans were going to reform a front anywhere against the Western Allies it would have to be in the south, where BAVARIA and Upper AUSTRIA now constituted the larger part of the dwindling Reich.

Thus it happened that the reformation began on Seventh Army's right flank, which had driven southeastward through MANNHEIM and HEIDELBERG and was approaching HEILBRONN. In this sector were remnants of the divisions which had been on the SAAR-PALATINATE front in March and had escaped across the river. Holding firmly to HEILBRONN as an anchor position, they confronted VI Corps along the NECKAR and JAGST Rivers, fighting bitterly, and for a time successfully, to block our advance to the southeast.

The central and northern portions of the front, however, were much slower to reform. XXI Corps, driving due eastward from the WORMS bridgehead, met only spotty and disjointed defense as it cleared the great bend of the MAIN River, took WURZBURG, KITZINGEN and finally SCHWEINFURT. And XV Corps, fanning out from the bridgehead first to the northeast, then east, then southeast, found that the Germans had put everything they had into the vicious defense of ASCHAFFENBURG and then had little left with which to hold until they had fallen back clear to NURNBERG.

During the second week of April, Seventh Army completed its turn, pivoting on the right flank, and faced south. Opposing it, from the NECKAR River to BAYREUTH, was the only continuous front the Germans were able to construct during April. From west to east, the divisions were 246, 198, 553, 9, 212, 79, ALPEN, von HOE, 416, 256, 36 and a battle group of 2 Panzer, with 17 SS and 2 Mountain Divisions in the process of moving from their former sectors on the west flank to NURNBERG to bolster defense of the Nazi shrine. The use of divisional numbers to identify the German forces on the front is, however, little more than a bookkeeping convenience; they represented only staffs who gathered unto themselves any miscellaneous units they could lay their hands on to man a sector of the line. Included in the melange were nearly all of the replacement and training units of Wehrkreis XIII (Battle Group von HOE consisted entirely of these) together

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with a number from other Wehrkreise. Division ALPEN was one of several "name" divisions thrown together hurriedly to provide reinforcements; others were DONAU and BAYERN. They all disappeared in a manner similar to ALPEN, which gave up one of its regiments to 2 Mountain Division, the other to 212 Division.

The stubborn defense of HEILERONN, and the enforced withdrawal of our first breakthrough to CRAILSHEIM on 10 April, proved that these hard-pressed units still had some fight left. Under constant pressure they slowly fell back, finally losing HEILERONN on 12 April, and withdrawing into NURNBERG itself on the 16th; but still the front held together.

Not for long, however. The politically-inspired decision to hold NURNBERG to the bitter end required the dispatch eastward of two of the best remaining divisions, 2 Mountain and 17 SS Panzer Grenadier. The weakened NECKAR - KOCHER River sector from which they were withdrawn then became the first to crack, and VI Corps began its breakthrough north of SCHWAHISCH HALL on 18 April. On the 20th NURNBERG fell, despite the efforts devoted to its defense. And on the 21st still another breakthrough developed east of CRAILSHEIM. Southwest of NURNBERG the 2 Mountain Division fought a planned withdrawal back to the DANUBE; but elsewhere the Germans fell back in disorder, leaving large numbers pocketed in our rear.

South of the DANUBE, a few units put up vigorous fights, even counter-attacking on occasion. But never again did the Germans succeed in establishing a cohesive front. At the end of April, Seventh Army's left was in MUNICH and its right was in AUSTRIA; between it and ultimate victory lay only a few skirmishes, a few roadblocks and demolitions, and five days.

## II. CHRONOLOGY

### 1 April - D/229

The enemy's left flank, between the RHINE and NECKAR Rivers, fell back behind delaying action as far as BRUCHSAL, although he continued to hold out at WIESLOCH. On either side of the NECKAR, the Germans attempted to hinder our advance up river by resisting strongly at WOLLENBERG and on the MOSBACH - DALLAU road.

Endeavoring to halt further development of our breakthrough between the NECKAR and MAIN Rivers, the enemy established a defensive line forward of the TAUBER River athwart the road and railroad to WURZBURG. This position was out-flanked, however, and American troops reached the MAIN at WURZBURG and at several other points south of the city. West of WURZBURG the enemy counter-attacked at HETTSTADT and heavy fighting ensued before the town was captured late in the day.

The northeastward advance of our left wing was still being held up by the enemy's stubborn resistance at ASCHAFFENBURG. However, he put up only light opposition to initial penetration of the SPESSART Mountains southeast of ASCHAFFENBURG.

### 2 April - D/230

In the RHINE - NECKAR sector, enemy troops northeast of BRUCHSAL attempted to forestall the threat to HEILERONN from the west by delivering heavy fire from dug-in positions on high ground. Near BRUCHSAL they counterattacked with 200 infantry and five tanks and were repulsed only after five hours of fighting. However, a U S column advancing up the west side of the NECKAR toward HEILERONN reached the vicinity of WIMPFEN despite small arms, bazooka and anti-tank fire.

On the opposite side of the river stiff resistance was met in the ALLFELD area and U S columns also received heavy 88-mm fire from bypassed enemy in the high ground southeast of MOSBACH.

From here eastward to the MAIN River the enemy continued his efforts to contain the breakthrough - and with increasing success. Troops moving toward ADELSHEIM met strong resistance and on the TAUBER River line there was hard fighting at KONIGSHOFEN before the town was cleared. In the vicinity of OSFELD, heavy fire forced U S forces to withdraw. At the easternmost point of our penetration, the enemy counterattacked at ENHEIM, and resisted throughout the day.

On the northern half of the front, ASCHAFFENBURG was again the focal point of the fighting. A renewed attack took half of the town and 1,000 prisoners, but some strong points continued to hold out. Advances into the SPESSART on both sides of ASCHAFFENBURG met only scattered resistance, and a U S cavalry unit breaking into BAD ORB freed 6,500 Allied prisoners of war.

#### 3 April - D/231

West of the NECKAR River the enemy fell back behind strong delaying resistance, with the heaviest fighting at ODNHEIM and EICHTERSHEIM. On the west bank of the river, dug-in enemy stubbornly opposed the advance on HEILBRONN.

East of the NECKAR, the Germans fell back to its tributary, the JAGST, there placing heavy fire on forward U S elements on the north bank. Our crossing just east of the JAGST - NECKAR junction was strongly opposed by small arms fire from dug-in enemy. The bypassed enemy elements south of MOSBACH were mopped up and ADELSHEIM cleared despite stiff opposition. Farther east, the enemy lost KONIGSHOFEN, on the TAUBER River, but continued resisting from dug-in positions east of the TAUBER in the OSFELD area. South of MARKTREIT, on the tip of the MAIN bend, he was developing further dug-in positions.

Our crossing of the MAIN at OCHSENFURT at first met only light opposition, which stiffened later on the high ground near ZEUBELRIED. The crossing at WURZBURG was resisted with small arms, automatic weapons, mortar and flak fire.

On our left, ASCHAFFENBURG surrendered at 0900B and was cleared of snipers by 1300B. The effort to hold the city had cost the enemy an estimated 4,600 casualties. With its loss his resistance to our advance northeastward collapsed and our drive through the SPESSART reached the general line LOHR - BAD ORB against only scattered resistance.

#### 4 April - D/232

On our right flank the First French Army advancing southward along the RHINE cleared KARLSRUHE; between there and HEILBRONN the enemy offered scattered delaying action.

From the NECKAR eastward, however, resistance stiffened noticeably. A crossing of the NECKAR north of HEILBRONN drew an enemy counterattack which reached the river line before being halted and thrown back. The bridgehead across the JAGST also received a counterattack, and a second crossing near NEUDENAU met heavy fire.

In the MOCKMUEL - ADELSHEIM sector the enemy reacted with heavy fire throughout the day. In the KONIGSHOFEN - OSFELD area he also held dug-in positions, and counterattacked at MESSELHAUSEN. He opposed further eastward advances south of the MAIN.

The OCHSENFURT bridgehead over the MAIN still faced stiff resistance and



in the WURZBURG bridgehead the enemy was forced back to the railroad after heavy fighting.

North of the MAIN, the enemy was attempting to delay on the high ground west of the SINN River, with small towns in this sector taken only after fire fights. North of JOSSA, however, he could offer only scattered and disorganized resistance.

5 April - D/233

The enemy situation remained generally unchanged during the day as active defense of the NECKAR - JAGST River line continued in the southern part of the Army's area. The bridgehead north of HEILBRONN was again counterattacked. Resistance in the MAIN River bend south and east of WURZBURG collapsed during the day as the OCHSENFURT bridgehead broke out, and ROTTENDORF and KITZINGEN were cleared against spotty opposition. However, fighting continued in WURZBURG, where another counterattack was repulsed. The attempt to hold along the SINN River was short-lived, and only broken delaying action slowed the advance toward HAMMELBURG.

6 April - D/234

Defense of the NECKAR - JAGST River line continued unabated. A fresh crossing into HEILBRONN led to bitter house-to-house fighting and an unsuccessful counterattack, and the earlier bridgehead north of the city was also counterattacked.

However, farther east a breach was opened in the enemy line when a U S armored column broke through to the vicinity of CRAILSHEIM against only light opposition.

The enemy was driven from WURZBURG but continued scattered delaying stands at villages north and east of the city in the MAIN River bend. Rapid exploitation northeast through the HOHE RHON was developing little organized opposition.

7 April - D/235

The Germans defended aggressively on the NECKAR - JAGST River line, counterattacking three times at HEILBRONN and also against the ODHEIM bridgehead. Two more crossings of the JAGST farther east met strong resistance.

Opposition at CRAILSHEIM was still generally light, but an enemy buildup was apparent at the base of the corridor, indicating a probable attempt to cut off our spearhead.

Limited tactical withdrawals were undertaken in the KONIGSHOFEN - BAD MERGENTHEIM area, but the enemy was still fighting an active delaying action there, and counterattacked at WEIKERSHEIM. The advance toward SCHWEINFURT from the direction of WURZBURG developed stiffening artillery, mortar and anti-tank fire. Resistance east of the HOHE RHON continued generally disorganized throughout the day; the enemy increased his armor activity somewhat in this sector, and lost 14 tanks and two self-propelled guns.

8 April - D/236

The strong defense of the NECKAR - JAGST River line continued, with resistance focusing on HEILBRONN and JAGSTFELD. The enemy fought stubbornly throughout the day to maintain his positions between the JAGST and KOCHER Rivers. Supporting his ground troops with augmented air forces, the enemy made determined efforts to destroy the units which had broken through to CRAILSHEIM. Attacks

R E S T R I C T E D

were launched both against CRAILSHEIM itself and against the base of the supply corridor in the vicinity of BARTENSTEIN. The advance on SCHWEINFURT from the south and west met moderate to stiff opposition, with indications that the city was being prepared as a hedgehog strongpoint. Steady progress throughout the northern zone developed only sporadic resistance, but enemy armor again was active in that area.

9 April - D/237

Determined, aggressive defense in the NECKAR - JAGST River sectors, together with further strong air/ground efforts to eliminate the CRAILSHEIM corridor, indicated the enemy's extreme sensitivity to the threat now poised at southern GERMANY. During the day he pulled back under pressure from the JAGST River to alternate positions along the KOCHER River, while maintaining his static defenses in the TAUBER River zone. The Germans continued to fall back slowly on SCHWEINFURT, offering considerable anti-aircraft fire to the south and west; photo interpretation had revealed 104 heavy and 43 light anti-aircraft guns in the city's perimeter defenses. Rapid advances on the northern flank were still developing uncoordinated and weak resistance, and had progressed so far that SCHWEINFURT was now threatened from that direction as well.

10 April - D/238

Bitter house-to-house fighting continued in HEILBRONN, following an early morning enemy attack north of the city. Strong aggressive action against the CRAILSHEIM - ILSHOFEN spearhead, and against the base of the salient, continued until our forward elements were withdrawn.

In the SCHWEINFURT area, the Germans were falling back on the city under pressure, offering heavy resistance, while to the north and east they were still unable to make a stand and were being driven back in the direction of BAMBERG.

11 April - D/239

Resistance continued stubborn and aggressive on the west flank, but our withdrawal from CRAILSHEIM had not been followed up by the end of the day. In the TAUBER River area the enemy held, but on the central front he was unable to contain the advance toward NURNBERG, which reached MORLBACH, PFAFFENHOFEN and MARKT EIBART. House-to-house fighting was in progress at SCHWEINFURT. Generally light enemy contact was reported throughout the northern zone.

12 April - D/240

HEILBRONN finally fell and to the east the enemy appeared to be withdrawing from the KOCHER River line, although sharp actions were still being fought in this sector. On the central front he was defending along the upper reaches of the TAUBER River, trying to block our penetration of the FRANCONIAN Heights. Scattered groups with armor support resisted in the southern portion of the STEIGER Wald. All organized resistance ceased at SCHWEINFURT and our sweeping left wing crossed the MAIN north of BAMBERG against only light resistance.

13 April - D/241

Despite the loss of HEILBRONN and the breaching of the KOCHER River line, the enemy maintained his delaying action in this sector and elements of 17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division counterattacked between OHRINGEN and NEUENSTEIN. Civilians armed with machine guns and panzerfaust assisted the defense.

In the central zone, west of NURNBERG, stiffening resistance from dug-in positions, and a counterattack at BUCHHEIM, indicated that the Germans were

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probably attempting to establish a line along the AISCHE River between BURG-BERNHEIM and NEUSTADT.

On the northern front, south and east of the MAIN River, only scattered delaying opposition was met except at BAMBERG, where heavy fire was received and an enemy counterattack repelled north of the city.

14 April - D/242

The enemy on the west flank fell back from the KOCHER River to the high ground between HEILBRONN and SCHWAIBISCH HALL, but continued to resist advances south and east from HEILBRONN and counterattacked at OBER HEINRIET. On the approaches to the FRANCONIAN Plains he displayed some aggressiveness by counterattacking at HLAUBACH and at ILLESHEIM in an apparent attempt to prevent the outflanking and breakdown of his AISCHE River line. BAMBERG fell after a short but heavy fight, netting 1,820 prisoners; between there and BAYREUTH, rapid advances to the south and southeast encountered negligible resistance.

15 April - D/243

A determined and well-organized defense between HEILBRONN and NURNBERG was maintained by the enemy. In front of the VI Corps in the west he was falling back slowly on the LOHENSTEIN Mountains and WALDENBURG Hills west of SCHWAIBISCH HALL. Against the XXI Corps in the center he made determined efforts to hold in the HLAUFELDEN - ROTHENBURG sector and to prevent expansion of the U S bridgehead over the AISCHE River south of NEUSTADT. Artillery fire in that zone increased considerably. Advances by the XV Corps from the north toward NURNBERG found the enemy weak and disorganized, offering only delaying resistance, mostly in towns. Heavy traffic out of the NURNBERG area was taken to indicate that the city was being stripped of all unnecessary rear installations. The only major effort to halt the advance was a battalion-strength attack, supported by 15 tanks, against our east flank south of BAYREUTH, which was repelled.

16 April - D/244

Between the NECKAR River and ROTHENBURG the enemy continued his determined and well-formed efforts to hold the hill mass west of SCHWAIBISCH HALL and the plains to the east. Late in the day, however, the line started to give south of NEUENSTEIN and around ROTHENBURG. In the center of the Army sector, after losing the AISCHE River line, the enemy was unable to prevent penetrations in the direction of ANSBACH, which reached within 12 kilometers north of the town. Although the Germans lost NEUSTADT, they continued blocking on the western approaches to NURNBERG. On the Army's left flank, the advance to NURNBERG from the north met only scattered, disorganized resistance from roadblocks and delaying groups, but forward elements in the northeast outskirts of the city received heavy 88-mm fire. East of the city, a bridge was captured intact over the PEGNITZ River at LAUF and the town was occupied after a stiff fight.

17 April - D/245

The entire enemy front west of NURNBERG gave ground under constant pressure, although strong delaying action implemented by roadblocks, demolitions and mines slowed the advance. ROTHENBURG fell and advances reached within a short distance of SCHWAIBISCH HALL and ANSBACH. The defenders of NURNBERG put up a stiff fight, counterattacking repeatedly against our advance from the east astride the PEGNITZ River, but U S troops entered the outskirts after eliminating almost a hundred 88-mm guns.



18 April - D/246

Between the NECKAR River and NURNBERG the enemy continued to withdraw slowly under pressure, leaving SCHWAIBISCH HALL and ANSBACH as the main prizes for U S troops. But late in the day his orderly withdrawal began to break down; our penetration to a point five or six miles south of SCHWAIBISCH HALL was the first sign of the crumbling of the Germans' last cohesive front of World War II. From this sector between the NECKAR and KOCHER Rivers, 17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division and the remnants of 2 Mountain Division had been withdrawn three days earlier to be dispatched to the NURNBERG front. The latter went to the ANSBACH area west of NURNBERG. The former had been destined for the Nazi shrine city itself but was late in arriving and had to be committed outside it, against our enveloping flank. The shift left their former sector fatally weakened and did not for long postpone the fall of NURNBERG.

In NURNBERG the Germans were still fighting with unabated fury, defending every house and cellar with mortars, small arms, bazookas and hand grenades. The loss of so many anti-aircraft guns the previous day, however, led to a decrease in 88-mm fire. Civilian and prisoner statements, together with air reconnaissance, indicated an enemy buildup southeast of NURNBERG in the vicinity of NEUMARKT, and there were reports of an attack from this area northwestward toward FEUCHT being scheduled for the night of 18/19 April.

19 April - D/247

The enemy line in the west disintegrated rapidly as our armor driving southward from SCHWAIBISCH HALL broke through across the REMS River at LORCH and established a bridgehead over the FILS River at FAURNDAU. Volkssturm had been committed to the unsuccessful defense of LORCH. On the shoulders of the developing salient, enemy delaying resistance continued.

At NURNBERG, the satellite city of FUERTH surrendered at 1030B after the garrison commander, Gauleiter and selected troops moved into NURNBERG itself during the night. There, our attacks from both the north and east made progress, the former drive capturing intact two bridges over the PEGNITZ River. Bitter fighting continued as the enemy was compressed into the walled city. To the southeast, the anticipated attack in the vicinity of FEUCHT developed as battalion-strength elements of the 17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division attempted to relieve the pressure on NURNBERG. The first attack at 0600B was beaten back, but a second attempt was made in the afternoon. This, too, was contained by 1615B. Farther to the southeast, NEUMARKT was entered unopposed early in the morning but a stiff fight later developed.

20 April - D/248

On our right, the First French Army, breaking out eastward from the BLACK FOREST area, reached REUTLINGEN, due south of STUTTGART. Simultaneously, our own breakthrough beyond the FILS River reached KIRCHHEIM, only about 15 miles from the French spearhead. Thus STUTTGART was virtually encircled. The enemy had attempted to block our advance on KIRCHHEIM, but when his positions to the east were overrun and the town taken, some 500 vehicles and 2,000 troops were observed withdrawing southward. Meanwhile the towns inside the pocket were reported jammed with troops threatened with encirclement if they failed to escape through the 15-mile gap.

East of the breakthrough the Germans still fought strong delaying actions in the CRAILSHEIM sector. However, KIRCHBERG fell by noon, and CRAILSHEIM was entered by dark despite heavy fire. A dozen miles to the east, FEUCHTWANGEN fell, and large columns moving southeast indicated further withdrawals in that sector.

R E S T R I C T E D

It was HITLER's birthday - and the Party City of NURNBERG fell. The birthday gift had been a telegraphic pledge from the Gauleiter of NURNBERG to defend the city to the last. His pledge was good for a few hours, for the troops trapped in the old walled quarter resisted stubbornly throughout the night. But in the morning they collapsed, and by 1600H NURNBERG was completely in U S hands. Its defense had cost an estimated 5,000 prisoners and probably an equal number of killed and wounded.

To the southeast, the enemy continued resisting stubbornly and counter-attacking to prevent our exploitation along the NURNBERG - MUNICH autobahn. One battalion-size counterattack forced U S troops to withdraw from OBER FERRIEDEN.

21 April - D/249

The Germans fought stubbornly against expansion of the KIRCHHEIM bridgehead over the FILS River, counterattacking near NEIDLINGEN, while trying to withdraw their forces from the STUTTGART pocket. Inside the pocket, resistance began to collapse northeast of the city as U S forces closed up to the NECKAR and REMS River at new points.

Meanwhile the enemy was faced with still another breakthrough - this one east of CRALLSHEIM, where withdrawals in the FEUCHTWANGEN sector had been noted the previous day. DINKELSEUHL was contested by HITLER Youth who counter-attacked with small arms and panzerfaust, but when the attack was contained U S armor broke through and raced southward toward the DANUBE against only weak resistance.

South and southeast of NURNBERG stiff resistance and further enemy counter-attacks slowed our advance.

22 April - D/250

As the French reported STUTTGART occupied, the Germans were still fighting stubbornly in the KIRCHHEIM area to hold open the escape corridor. However, some of the columns which succeeded in escaping were subsequently shot up farther south, for U S armored units, driving southeastward from the KIRCHHEIM bridgehead, broke through the SWABIAN ALPS and reached to within two kilometers of the DANUBE at EHINGEN. Only moderate small arms and harassing artillery fire were met enroute.

Meanwhile, the second breakthrough farther east beat down resistance at BOPFINGEN and reached the DANUBE, which was crossed over an undestroyed bridge at DILLINGEN. The bridgehead was extended to KICKLINGEN, with small arms, bazooka and anti-tank fire encountered at FRISTINGEN. Simultaneously, U S troops advanced eastward along the northern bank of the DANUBE, taking HOCHSTADT against negligible resistance. On the way southward, an enemy horse-drawn column had been overrun and had yielded about 500 prisoners.

In the area south of NURNBERG, our forces were approaching WEISSENBURG, but were meeting stiff resistance throughout this sector.

23 April - D/251

On our right flank, west of the EHINGEN breakthrough, a large number of enemy troops without artillery or armor support still held out near URACH, despite the danger of encirclement. Bridgeheads across the DANUBE were expanded by both the EHINGEN and DILLINGEN spearheads without drawing much German reaction. In the area between the crossings AALEN and ELLWANGEN were

R E S T R I C T E D

entered as resistance collapsed and U S units advanced toward the DANUBE on a broad front. On the Army's east flank the enemy was forced back in the WEISSENBURG sector with his resistance progressively weakening during the day. Further crossings of the ALTMUHL River were made virtually unopposed and still another breakthrough to the DANUBE was in progress.

24 April - D/252

The enemy continued his disorganized and confused withdrawal along the entire front. Nowhere was there any determined attempt to make a stand. Absence of armor, the lack of artillery support and observations of numerous columns trying to break away to the south and southeast all indicated the enemy was unable to cope with the situation.

On the west flank considerable numbers of enemy forces were cut off in the SWABIAN ALPS by a new junction of our forces with the First French Army, south of the DANUBE. U S troops moving eastward along the south bank of the DANUBE broke resistance west of ULM and cleared half the town; south of the DANUBE they reached the ILLER River at several points. The DILLINGEN bridgehead was expanded against disorganized opposition and other units reached DONAUWORTH after dealing with scattered and slight opposition. On the east flank the advance to the DANUBE was gaining momentum scarcely hindered by the enemy's rearguard actions.

25 April - D/253

The enemy was making a determined effort to hold along the ILLER River, counterattacking in battalion strength against one of our eastward crossings south of ULM. Meanwhile he attempted to extricate encircled forces from the SWABIAN ALPS and withdrew remaining troops from the pocket north of the DANUBE between ULM and GUNZBURG. ULM was cleared. Late in the day a new crossing of the DANUBE west of GUNZBURG drew a heavy counterattack, and strong enemy blocking efforts were developing in the LEIPHEIM - GUNZBURG - BURGAU area. All attempts to expand the DILLINGEN bridgehead were meeting strong German reaction. The enemy was fighting a well-organized delaying withdrawal to the DANUBE east of DONAUWORTH, with the 2 Mountain Division bearing the brunt of the action.

26 April - D/254

The enemy front on the DANUBE between ULM and GUNZBURG was threatened with encirclement as U S armor again broke loose for long gains. The ILLER River line cracked and our forces south of ULM swept on to MEMMINGEN and MINDELHEIM, engaging in brief but sharp fights in villages along the way. Farther east the DILLINGEN bridgehead broke out against sporadic, disorganized resistance, and a bridge was seized intact over the WERTACH River at HILTENFINGEN, southwest of AUGSBURG. Between these two sectors, the Germans at first continued fighting stubbornly in the LEIPHEIM - BURGAU area but at the end of the day were withdrawing from their exposed salient.

East of DONAUWORTH, fresh crossings of the DANUBE met scattered but determined resistance along the LECH Canal and at OBERNDORF. Farther east the enemy still occupied a sector north of the DANUBE in the vicinity of ZELL, where he continued fighting to hold the high ground.

27 April - D/255

Resistance was broken on the west and central portions of the front. The disorganized enemy between the LECH and ILLER Rivers was rapidly falling back south and southeast toward the ALPS as our spearhead reached KEMPTEN. Large numbers of prisoners were overrun or surrendering. Some 3,000 Germans from the



ULM - GUNZBURG salient were bypassed at KIRCHHEIM and engaged by air and artillery. Forward troops entered AUGSBURG in the evening, receiving 88-mm fire from the anti-aircraft defenses. The LECH River was crossed near LANDSBERG, and expansion of the bridgehead was meeting no resistance. The enemy continued to withdraw slowly before the east flank north of MUNICH, and appeared better organized in that zone.

28 April - D/256

The enemy continued his rapid withdrawal into the ALPS on the south flank. The VI Corps' advance across the Austrian border at FUSSEN was developing increasing resistance at the close of the period. Meanwhile the enemy was demonstrating considerable anxiety over the threat to MUNICH from the LANDSBERG bridgehead and was making sporadic efforts to halt the advance near the AMMER See. AUGSBURG surrendered after a brief fight. The Germans were falling back rapidly on MUNICH from the north, offering only spotty delaying resistance.

29 April - D/257

Terrain and demolitions were the principal obstacles hindering the advance into the ALPS. GARMISCH PARTENKIRCHEN was entered late in the period, and other columns advancing from FUSSEN were stopped near RICHLBACH by a large crater. Troops were rapidly closing in on MUNICH from the north and west, meeting only scattered resistance and demolitions, with indications that the bulk of enemy troops had withdrawn south and southeast from the city. Over 30,000 prisoners were liberated at the DACHAU Concentration Camp.

30 April - D/258


The enemy was taking advantage of Alpine terrain in an attempt to block progress through the mountain corridors toward INNSBRUCK, employing road-blocks, large-scale demolitions and mines. The closeup to the ISAR River across the entire front developed little opposition, while no serious resistance was encountered in MUNICH. The ISAR was crossed at several points in, north and south of the city, and all resistance west of the river had ceased by dark.

### III. SUMMARY

The nearness of the end can be read in the figures for prisoners surrendered to the Seventh Army in April - 138,024 processed through the Army cage. Thus a daily average of 4,600 enemy troops anticipated the decision of their high command that further resistance was useless. From the German army's dwindling stocks of mobile equipment, 202 tanks and self-propelled guns were destroyed or captured.

But men and materiel had been lost before, from STALINGRAD and TUNISIA to POLAND and FRANCE. What was being lost now was the final gauge of disaster - GERMANY itself. The white sheets and tablecloths that hung from windows in town after town were the burghers' way of admitting the inevitable.

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R E S T R I C T E D

PRINCIPAL ENEMY COMMANDERS OPPOSING SEVENTH ARMY

ARMY GROUP G

SCHULZ, General der Infanterie.

No biographical data is available on General SCHULZ, who succeeded SS Oberstgruppenfuhrer Paul HAUSSER.

FIRST ARMY

FOERTSCH, Herrmann, General der Infanterie.

See G-2 History for March.

SEVENTH ARMY

OBSTFELDER, General der Infanterie.

Assumed this command 25 March, succeeding General der Infanterie Hans FELBER. For biography, see G-2 History for January.

NINETEENTH ARMY

BRANDENBERGER, General der Panzer Truppen.

Successor to OBSTFELDER as commander of Nineteenth Army, assuming the role late in March. No biographical data available.

XIII SS CORPS

SIMON, Max, SS Obergruppenfuhrer and General der Waffen SS.

See G-2 History for December 1944.

XIII CORPS

HAHM, Walter, General der Infanterie.

Successor to General ORIOLA. For biography, see G-2 History for February.

LXIV CORPS

FRIEHE, Generalleutnant.

No biographical data available.

LXXX CORPS

BEYER, Franz, General der Infanterie.

General BEYER, who was captured 30 April, is 55 years old. A former commander of 44 Infantry Division in ITALY, he gained his present seniority 1 January 1943. No other biographical data available.

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## LXXXII CORPS

TOLSDORFF, Generalleutnant.

Succeeded General HAHM sometime during April when the latter took over leadership of XIII Corps. No biographical data available.

## LXXXV CORPS

Von LUETTWITZ, Smilo, Freiherr, General der Panzer Truppen.

General von LUETTWITZ, who succeeded General KNISS on 29 March when the latter was retired by illness, assumed command at EISENACH and found himself holding a "hot potato". His new Corps was crumbling fast in strength, and his first concern was for more fighting men. By about 10-12 April the Corps contained only the 11 Panzer Division and a few Volkssturm battalions, so on 20 April von LUETTWITZ was ordered to take over the XII Corps adjoining to the south. Von LUETTWITZ insisted that he take his entire staff with him, and did so.

General von LUETTWITZ, 49, comes from an old Catholic nobility of SCHIESIEN. He is married to Freuen von THIEIMANN (of the estate JACOBSDORF in SCHIESIEN). He entered the Army in 1914. His rapid promotion from Oberst in 1941 to his present rank is attributed to the high military esteem in which KESSELRING held him. Von LUETTWITZ held high unit posts in five Armies, fighting in POLAND, FRANCE, RUSSIA, BELGIUM and ITALY, and for a time was commander of the Ninth Army (September 1944 to January 1945) in POLAND. After the 1944 attempt against HITLER's life, von LUETTWITZ' stock fell, his brother-in-law (Generaloberst von HAMMERSTEIN) having been convicted and executed for a role in the affair.

Von LUETTWITZ, who was captured shortly after the end of April, is reported to be an unassuming personality. Though he has suffered at the hands of the Nazi regime more than the average German general officer, he did not seem willing as a prisoner to capitalize on anti-Nazi avowals if he did not have the chance or, perhaps, the courage, to die for them. Von LUETTWITZ is a German, but his captors and interrogators report that he nevertheless approximates the definition of a gentleman very neatly.

## 2 MOUNTAIN DIVISION

UTZ, Willibald, Generalleutnant.

See G-2 History for February.

## 9 VOLKSGRENADIER DIVISION

KOLB, Generalmajor.

No biographical data available.

## 17 SS PANZER GRENADIER DIVISION

BOCHMANN, SS Oberfuehrer.

No biographical data available.

R E S T R I C T E D

36 VOLKSGRENADIER DIVISION

WELLM, Generalmajor.

See G-2 History for December 1944.

38 SS DIVISION NIEHLUNGEN

LAMMERDING, SS Gruppenfuehrer and Generalleutnant der Waffen SS.

No biographical data available.

BORCHERT, SS Standartenfuehrer.

Replaced LAMMERDING in April. No biographical data available.

47 VOLKSGRENADIER DIVISION

BORK, Generalleutnant.

No biographical data available.

79 VOLKSGRENADIER DIVISION

REINHARDT (REINHERR?), Oberst.

No biographical data available.

189 VOLKSGRENADIER DIVISION

HELLWIG, Oberst.

No biographical data available.

198 INFANTRY DIVISION

BARDE (BARTEL?), Generalmajor.

No biographical data available.

212 VOLKSGRENADIER DIVISION

ULLRICH, Generalmajor.

Succeeded the veteran commander, Generalleutnant Franz SENSPUSS, when the latter was captured on 29 March. No biographical data available.

246 VOLKSGRENADIER DIVISION

AUEHN, Generalmajor.

No biographical data available.

256 VOLKSGRENADIER DIVISION (BATTLE GROUP FRANZ)

FRANZ, Generalmajor.

See G-2 History for January.

General FRANZ was captured 10 April. There was no successor, as the unit's last remnants disappeared with the capture of the command element.

## 416 VOLKSGRENADIER DIVISION

PFLIEGER, Generalleutnant.

Born about 1889, PFLIEGER was commissioned a Leutnant in 1908 and saw war service from 1914 to 1918 as an officer in the 24 (HOLSTEIN) Artillery Regiment. Afterwards he retired with the rank of Hauptmann. Nothing is known of his activities until 1 December 1936, when he was promoted to Oberst. On 21 August 1937 he commanded 19 Artillery Regiment (HANNOVER). Two years later he was reported still commanding the same regiment. His activities during 1940-42 are not discernible, but he was promoted regularly, reaching the rank of Generalmajor on 1 October 1940 and Generalleutnant on 1 October 1942. He has commanded 416 Division since August 1943. Nothing is known about his personality or whether he has any connections with the Nazi Party.

## 553 VOLKSGRENADIER DIVISION

HUETHER, Generalmajor.

See G-2 History for December 1944.

## 559 VOLKSGRENADIER DIVISION

Von MUEHLEN, Kurt, Freiherr, Generalmajor.

See G-2 History for December 1944.

## 719 INFANTRY DIVISION

GAEDE, Generalmajor.

See G-2 History for March. Successor not immediately identified.

## BATTLE GROUP VON HOBE

Von HOBE, Oberst.

No biographical data available.

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The radio network carrying Werewolf broadcasts continued briefly and then disappeared from the air. The programs included appeals and reports on the activities of Werewolf members, most of which were fictitious. Werewolf men were urged to procure weapons, food and gasoline and to hide their booty in the woods for "der Tag". American canned food rations were said to be particularly suited for that purpose. Supplies were not to be stored at one point but to be spread over a large area.

The arrest of the Adjutant of the Werewolf organization for Wehrkreis VII, Ernst WAGNER, disclosed that HIMMLER had not ordered the establishment of a Werewolf in that district until early April 1945. Everyone connected with the project realized that the hour was too late. WAGNER attempted to contact the Chief of the General Staff in Wehrkreis VII, but was ignored. A half-hearted meeting of Nazi and police officials was held, the headquarters was evacuated from MUNICH and nothing was accomplished.

There were only three cases of wire cutting which could be ascribed to sabotage. Two boys were apprehended after they had been seen throwing a flaming rag at a boxcar containing gasoline. A probable time bomb exploded in the magazine of the Kreisleitung Building of REUTTE, AUSTRIA. Two U S soldiers were killed and more injured. The suspected perpetrator had attended a course in resistance.

As can be seen from the above catalogue of activities, rarely could the leaders and planners of German resistance find people willing to convert their plans into acts. With the entire nation sliding hell-bent, very few people wanted to play follow-the-leader.

As expected, there were few anti-Nazi organizations encountered and those were necessarily loosely organized. Former Communists and Socialists made up one of the two groups while Social Democrats, Centrists and Democrats composed the other group. This second group claimed to have opposed the Nazi regime since its inception and assisted C.I.C. in identifying and apprehending former Nazi leaders.

With all normal news channels cut off, GERMANY lay fallow for rumor-sowing. The most predominant rumor during the month was that on HITLER's birthday, 20 April, a general uprising of subversive German elements would occur in occupied GERMANY. Armed force and sabotage were to be used. The uprising would coincide with a counterattack by the German armies. According to civilian reports, each member of the Werewolf was supposed to kill an Allied soldier at any risk, as a birthday present for the Fuehrer. The origin of this rumor could scarcely have been Nazi-inspired since nothing unusual occurred on 20 April; it was more likely born of despair. Other widespread rumors concerned the fate of Nazi leaders. HITLER was said to have fled to JAPAN, GOERING was reported executed, GOEBBELS was said to have slit his arteries. A by-product of GOEBBELS' "beast" propaganda was the rumor that all children would be taken from their parents and shipped to the UNITED STATES as slave labor. This resulted in some families hiding their children until satisfied that the rumor was unfounded.

The time for organized psychological warfare was over, but the indirect, or home-brew, type of propaganda was attempted by some Germans with whom American officials and troops had contact. The points stressed by these "average Germans" were that they were taken in by the Nazis, that GERMANY and the UNITED STATES could profit much by learning to understand one another and that both GERMANY and the UNITED STATES have the Russian bear to fear.

One espionage agent was apprehended during the month. He was an agent of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt Amt III (SD Activities in GERMANY). He and a

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member of the RSHA Amt VI Kult had crossed the lines on a motorcycle, ostensibly to inform American troops on the defense plans of SALZBURG and MUNICH. He had been given the mission of aiding in the establishment of an underground movement and intelligence network in Western EUROPE after the Allied occupation of GERMANY. He had partially completed his task, which was to obtain forged Kennkarten for prospective agents and to provide cover jobs for some of them. These agents were all high-grade, experienced intelligence workers or important subversive or autonomist leaders.

The sabotage agent apprehended, one of 28 saboteurs divided into four groups, had crossed the lines with the primary mission of destroying gasoline dumps and the secondary mission of blowing up unattended tanks, halftracks and trucks, and of waylaying messengers to obtain their documents. The mission was to last two weeks, after which the men were to return to their units. The groups and individuals were very well equipped with weapons and demolitions. Members wore camouflage suits and German Army issue combat jackets, caps and shoes. They had all been well trained. This agent had attended an eight-weeks sabotage course.

The first ripples of the deluge of high-ranking Nazis and RSHA personalities to be arrested appeared in April. Four officials were apprehended. One was a member of RSHA Amt VI Kult (Cultural Matters in the Foreign Office) who had crossed the lines with the espionage agent described above. A Belgian national who had recruited and sent radio-equipped espionage agents to BELGIUM was apprehended as was a Gestapo official who had worked in FRANCE for RSHA Amt VI E 5 as an interpreter and case officer and later infiltrated agents into the French Resistance. The Chief of the Sicherheitsdienst III Office in AUGSBURG was also arrested.

Table of agents arrested during the period:

	German	Polish	Total
Espionage	1		1
Sabotage	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>

Total number of agents captured by Seventh Army since 15 August 1944:

Espionage	94
Sabotage	19
Total	<u>113</u>

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## ANNEX III

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

1 April - 30 April 1945

The activities of the German Intelligence Services during the month of April 1945 cannot be characterized in any general summary. Most of its personnel were in the process of attempting to save their own skins. The Bavarian and Austrian Alps were crowded with RSHA members who had decided that the mountains were far more healthy than stuffy Gestapo and SD offices. Only one bona fide espionage agent was apprehended during the period. His mission was not against Seventh Army, but was concerned with postwar espionage in Western EUROPE. However the G.I.S. emphasis on sabotage, begun months before, was evidenced by the capture of one of a group of 28 saboteurs, who had been well equipped and trained for a two-week mission behind our lines.

Results of the German resistance planning, begun eight months previously, showed up on a small scale, as did a few hastily organized and frenetic "Save the Fatherland" groups. Doctor Robert LEY, Party Labor Leader, had been charged with the organization and command of the SS Freikorps Adolf Hitler, an eleventh hour attempt to dam the inundation. Two hundred and fifty men had been chosen from the NURNBERG area as part of the nationwide quota of 3,000. The personnel of this unit were to be equipped with pistols, hand grenades and panzerfausts and were to use bicycles for infiltrating our lines. Their purpose was to disorganize supply lines and advance units, and especially to cut off tank spearheads. No organization was achieved and the unit remained inchoate.

As can be seen from the examples given below, resistance symptoms were spotty:

An AUGSBURG Ortsgruppenleiter attempted during the latter part of the month to organize the 29 Ortsgruppenleiter of AUGSBURG into a Stosstrupp, or combat assault troop, formed of volunteers to assist in the defense of the town. In the event that the city was taken, the group was to meet later. However, the organizer did not even attempt to attend this meeting.

Three companies of HITLER Jugend were organized in SCHWAELSCH GMUND, apparently to support the Wehrmacht. An attempt was made to encourage some of them to remain behind and operate as werewolves, but this appeared to have been nothing but this last-minute attempt at organization.

In mid-April ten HITLER Jugend members were arrested at BENSHEIM, all of whom were super-saturated with Nazi fervor and each of whom had sworn to kill an American soldier. They had been instructed to await secret orders concerning sabotage and assassination, to remain always good Nazis and to suppress any attempts at democratic re-education. All the boys had received instructions in the handling of various weapons.

A local werewolf was organized at NURNBERG, primarily to operate with the Wehrmacht and, after the passing of Allied troops, to incite general partisan warfare.

Two Sicherheitsdienst members apprehended had attended a sabotage school for "Spezielle Kampftruppen" in BAVARIA. They had been given a one-week course in the use of makeshift sabotage devices utilizing materiel abandoned by the retreating Wehrmacht. Students were instructed to act as Werewolf organizers.

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ANNEX III



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# G-2 HISTORY



## SEVENTH ARMY

OPERATIONS

IN

# EUROPE



PART TEN

1 - 31 MAY 1945

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HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH ARMY  
Office of the A. C. of S., G-2  
APO 750 US ARMY

AD/cv

3 June 1945

MEMORANDUM:

TO : All Concerned.

1. This document is a general summary of the activities of the German forces opposing the Seventh US Army during the period indicated.
2. It was prepared by the G-2 Section Seventh Army to relate chronologically, month by month, the enemy's tactics, composition and organization. It is not a history of Seventh Army operations, as such a document is being produced by the Seventh Army Historical Section.
3. THIS DOCUMENT IS RESTRICTED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. Par. 23b, AR 300-5, 15 March 1944.

CLASSIFICATION WAS CHANGED FROM CONFIDENTIAL TO RESTRICTED AUTHORITY COMMANDING GENERAL SEVENTH ARMY, BY W. G. CALDWELL, COLONEL, AGO, ON 1 JUNE 1945.

*William A. Smith*  
William A. Smith  
Colonel, AGO  
A C of S, G-2

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HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH ARMY  
Office of the A.C. of S., G-2  
APO 758 US ARMY

G-2 HISTORY

OPERATIONS IN EUROPE

Part X

1 - 31 May 1945

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I. OPERATIONS

By the first of May, the Wehrmacht had been so completely defeated and so much of the Reich had been overrun that there were only two questions yet to be answered about the military phases of World War II:

Would the long-anticipated "National Redoubt" actually materialize, with either the Army or the Party rallying for a final stand in the ALPS?

Would the end of the Wehrmacht come through a formal capitulation to the Allies, or through piecemeal battlefield surrenders of field commands, large or small?

Aside from the question of whether or not the Redoubt presented a deliberate Nazi plan for an heroic finale (and there were indications during the early spring that it did) it had also been looked on as the logical final phase of normal military operations. It had been reasoned that the successful development of the Allied plan to cut GERMANY in two would leave only the North German Plain and the southern mountains in the hands of the Wehrmacht; and the vulnerability of the northern flatlands would logically lead to an enemy decision to regroup in the south.

This had, in fact, happened. As has been observed in the April history, following the RHINE crossings the German Nineteenth and First Armies constructed a front running eastward from the RHINE-NECKAR sector to the general vicinity of NURNBERG. The line fell back slowly under the relentless pressure of the First French and U S Seventh Armies (later joined by the U S Third, which changed its direction of advance to join the southward drive), but it held together and for a short time succeeded in blocking the approaches to the Redoubt area. However, the enemy line began to fall apart on 18 April and Allied troops swept through to the DANUBE, and across it to the Austrian border and MUNICH, against disorganized the disintegrating German forces. The front had not been held long enough to permit organization of the Redoubt position in the rear. The simultaneous defeat of the German forces in ITALY, who might have withdrawn into the Redoubt area from the south, cancelled it out as a worthwhile military enterprise.

But while the Wehrmacht could no longer gain anything from an Alpine stand, there remained the possibility that some of the top Nazis and the SS would take refuge in the hills, waiting to be hunted down, and thus foster a "no-surrender" legend for the use of whatever jingoism might survive defeat to rebuild a future Nazism. This plan appears to have been blasted by HITLER's personal decision to die in BERLIN rather than flee to BERCHTESGADEN - but that his successors would not carry out the plan anyway could not be known at the time.

And so operations against the enemy remnants continued for a few days in May, as we made certain of the untenability of the Redoubt by seizing its vital points. On the first day of the month, the Germans were trying to prevent Allied penetration of the Alpine passes of Western AUSTRIA by executing demolitions and establishing stubbornly-defended roadblocks. The First French Army, driving on AUSTRIA's "back door" found BREGENZ, at the eastern end of LAKE CONSTANZ, strongly defended, and met an estimated battalion of SS troops attempting to block their advance up the ILLER Valley at IMMENSTADT.

The U S VI Corps, moving through the LECH Valley, south of FUSSEN, liquidated a defended roadblock near STANZACH, then continued to advance, slowed only by demolitions. Farther east, heavy fire and a 200-yard-long cratered roadblock halted progress through the FERN Pass. Entering AUSTRIA through the ISAR Valley, southeast of GARMISCH PARTENKIRCHEN, U S troops cleared a defended roadblock near SCHARNITZ and neared the crest before INNSBRUCK.

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North of the ALPS, however, the XXI and XV Corps rolled through BAVARIA virtually unhindered. The ISAR River at MUNICH had been spanned the previous day, and the enemy was falling back to the southeast and east offering only scattered and light resistance. A Second crossing of the ISAR was made at BAD TOLZ, where Generalfeldmarschall von RUNDSTEDT was captured, and armored units advancing along the autobahn southeast of MUNICH reached the INN River south of ROSENHEIM.

The following day, rapid advances in this area continued with more American units closing up to the Lower INN River, meeting notable resistance only at WASSERBURG, and capturing the entire 9 Hungarian Infantry Division in the process. German demolition crews, mounted in trucks, were systematically blowing all bridges, culverts and overpasses behind their fleeing forces.

Turning south, XXI Corps troops advanced up the INN Valley to penetrate the Alpine Redoubt at yet another point, meeting no resistance as they reached the Austrian frontier.

In the west, the Germans fell back from BREGENZ before the French, and VI Corps' drive up the LECH Valley was delayed only briefly by a small group of HITLER Youth. At FERN Pass, however, an enemy battalion came out of the hills to attack the rear of our column which was still held up by the demolitions. Only light sniper fire hindered the advance to the crest overlooking the Upper INN Valley, west of INNSBRUCK, and negotiations for the surrender of the city were in progress at the end of the day.

However, despite the willingness of the civilians to surrender, enemy troops on its western approaches resisted until late on 3 May, delaying our debouchment into the INN Valley with considerable fire and many obstacles at LEITHEIN and ZIRL. After this resistance was broken in the afternoon, INNSBRUCK was entered without further opposition, and was found to be in the hands of partisans.

In the western valleys, the FERN Pass was finally cleared after a stiff fire fight at FERNSTEIN, and American troops then advanced toward IMST without opposition. A determined blocking action at HOHENEMS in the BREGENZ Corridor failed to prevent French advances to FELDKIRCH.

To the east, our troops reported only spotty token resistance, except at WASSERBURG, where some strong points still held out; forward elements reached the SALACH River, west of SALZBURG. Those advancing up the INN south of ROSENHEIM were now being delayed by obstacles and occasional fire fights.

Prisoners were surrendering in vast numbers; in a 24-hour period ending at 1800 on 4 May, over 40,000 were processed by Seventh Army.

On that day, the "National Redoubt" ceased to be a mystery and became a legend. The area was cut sharply in two by the unopposed advance of VI Corps troops south from INNSBRUCK through the BRENNER Pass and into ITALY. There, contact was made with units of the U S Fifth Army, whose opposition had capitulated to them on 2 May.

The operation also bisected the enemy's Army Group G. Isolated west of the INNSBRUCK-BRENNER corridor was the German Nineteenth Army, which we had first met on the RIVIERA in August 1944; with it was the Twenty-Fourth Army, never an operational command in the field, which had been on guard duty on the Swiss-German border. They surrendered the following day.

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East of the corridor was the German First Army, which marked 4 May by losing both SALZBURG and BERCHTESGADEN. Of all its divisions, only its habitual work-horse, the 17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division, could still lay any claim to effectiveness. It stood in the mountains along the Austro-Bavarian border, northeast of INNSBRUCK, and with demolitions and fire blocked penetration of the ALPS in this sector.

However, this position was being rapidly cut off. The encirclement was completed on 5 May when our advance down the INN Valley from INNSBRUCK joined that moving upriver from the direction of ROSENHEIM. This vestigial "redoubt" was all that was left of Army Group G when it capitulated at 1400B 5 May, to take effect at noon 6 May.

Thus ended the Allies' fear that bloodshed would be indefinitely and unnecessarily prolonged by a death stand in the ALPS.

Thus also was partially answered the question as to the nature of the surrender. It was only a partial answer, however. For while it appeared at first glance that the Wehrmacht was capitulating in bits and pieces - the forces in ITALY had surrendered on 2 May, those in the Northwest early on the 5th, and now those in the ALPS on the 6th - it appeared afterwards that this was all part of a deliberate plan of the High Command and the DOENITZ Government to accomplish the maximum degree of surrender to the Western Allies before acknowledging the simultaneous victory of the Red Army. The few days' lapse between the seemingly local surrenders in the west, and the final conclusive capitulation to all the Allies enabled many German troops to move westward and give themselves up to Britons or Americans rather than to Russians.

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## II. THE SURRENDER

Formal surrender of German Army Group G, which included the First and Nineteenth Armies, was agreed to at 1400B hours 5 May 1945, after some 48 hours of negotiating on the part of General der Infanterie Hermann FOERTSCH, and became effective at noon 6 May 1945. FOERTSCH, who headed the German First Army, represented General der Infanterie SCHULZ, Commander of Army Group G, and his action was with the knowledge and consent of Feldmarschall Albert KESSELRING. The action was but one part of the surrender of all German military units, accomplished over the entire Eastern and Western fronts within a matter of some five days.

Signing of the unconditional battlefield agreement took place in the museum-like building of Prof. THORAK, HITLER's favorite sculptor, at HAAR, in the eastern outskirts of MUNICH, a scant six miles from the birthplace of Nazidom.

General FOERTSCH had first been received the night of 4 May by Brigadier General Robert YOUNG, assistant commander of the U S 3 Division, after having crossed through the American lines.

The next day as General FOERTSCH and his retinue entered the large room at U S XV Corps headquarters where they were to agree to give up, the American officers present did not rise. General FOERTSCH and his staff were told to be seated and then the general was requested to introduce the officers accompanying him. Each German officer arose and bowed. American officers were introduced. They did not rise.

Seated at a ponderous table in a room 40 feet high, in which were recently-completed heroic statues intended for new German buildings, the emissaries from the defeated enemy legions listened in grim silence as the instrument of surrender was explained to them point by point by General Jacob L. DEVERS, U S Sixth Army Group Commander.

During the four hours in which General DEVERS read and explained the document, General FOERTSCH displayed emotion only once. The word "armistice" came up, whereupon General DEVERS emphatically informed the German officers that there was to be no armistice whatsoever.

"You understand, do you not," said General DEVERS, "that this is unconditional surrender of Army Group G and of all the officers, the soldiers, the military personnel and para-military personnel within the prescribed area? Hostilities are to cease at once, although the surrender officially takes effect at noon 6 May, which is tomorrow."

General DEVERS also stated that all German military personnel were to be disarmed. At this point General FOERTSCH was unable, for a moment, to control his voice. He sat silently, with the muscles of his face working intensely. Finally he said:

"I have no power left but to accept." Then he signed.

General DEVERS signed the instrument for General EISENHOWER, Supreme Allied Commander, while FOERTSCH's signature was on behalf of Feldmarschall KESSELRING. Lieutenant General Alexander M. PATCH, Commanding General of the U S Seventh Army, and Lieutenant General Wade H. Haislip, Commanding General of the U S XV Corps, also signed.

Thus came about the order for the surrender - without conditions - of nearly 100,000 square miles of territory held by the German Army Group G south of Allied lines to the Swiss and Italian borders, and from the RHINE eastward, roughly, to 20 miles beyond SALZBURG.

Due to a general breakdown of enemy communications, and the rapid development of American arms and German chaos, there was such confusion during the final day that Army Group G's component Nineteenth Army (commanded by General BRANDENBERGER) took surrender upon itself. Apparently unaware of the larger negotiation, the Nineteenth gave itself up at INNSBRUCK to Major General Edward H. BROOKS, commanding the U S VI Corps, effective 1800 hours 5 May.

Immediately after the signing of surrender articles for Army Group G, however, all American and German troops were informed at once and ordered to cease firing and remain in place for further instructions.

While none but the most fanatical German SS men and diehards could have expected other than immediate and complete surrender to the Allies, the task of formally ending hostilities in an orderly manner was a staggering one.

The Germans were not certain how many men they had left in Army Group G - mass surrenders and developing seal-offs had long since made daily recapitulation impossible. Thousands of Germans, beaten and confused, had not waited for formal surrender. As the negotiations proceeded at HAAR they were streaming in from the hills in a never ending procession. Roads were jammed with German military cars, horsedrawn vehicles, bicycles; columns up to five and six abreast clogged toward prison enclosures.

They were still being processed three weeks after the surrender. During the month of May 307,707 prisoners were counted, bringing to 624,204 the total number processed through Seventh Army prisoner of war cages since 15 August 1944. This final figure includes prisoners taken by other forces temporarily operating under command of the Seventh Army - 49,150 by the First French Army, 3,692 by the First Airborne Task Force, 379 by the First Special Service Force, all between 15 August and 15 September 1944; and 3,675 by the French 2 Armored Division between 29 September and 5 December 1944.

It does not include, however, the enemy troops and auxiliaries still under German control in our area at the time of the surrender. That figure, as finally computed by the Germans themselves and submitted on 20 May 1945, stood at 272,006; a further 82,000 subsequently entered the area from ITALY. These troops, awaiting demobilization, were disposed by the Germans as indicated on the map which follows. They were then moved under American control to designated assembly areas, where they were discharged and sent homeward.

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#### FULL TEXT OF SURRENDER INSTRUMENT

Specifications of Surrender, presented by General Jacob L. Devers, U. S. Army, Commanding 6th Army Group, on behalf of General Dwight D. Eisenhower, U. S. Army, Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and accepted by General Schulz, Commander-in-Chief, Army Group "G", Army of the German Reich.

1. It is agreed that the territory covered by this instrument includes the areas bounded on the East generally by the line: KIRCHBERG (inclusive) -

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RIED (inclusive) - FRANKENMARKT (inclusive) - FREUDENTHAL (inclusive) - SOUTH CORNER ZELLER SEE - RADSTADT (inclusive) - OBERDRAUBURG (exclusive) - FLOCKEN PASS (exclusive), on the South by the Italian and Swiss frontiers, on the West by the River RHINE, and on the North by the present Allied front line, which are under the jurisdiction of General Schulz. All German military and para-military forces in this area are under command of General Schulz. All these forces, including General Schulz, are bound by this instrument and shall be subject to such other specifications as may be applied hereafter by the authorities of the UNITED NATIONS.

2. All forces, including all para-military forces, under command of General Schulz, shall cease unconditionally all acts of hostilities towards forces of the UNITED NATIONS not later than 1200 hours, 6 May 1945.

3. All such forces under command of General Schulz, except as indicated in Annex A, shall disarm themselves immediately and remain in their present areas retaining all mess and transportation equipment, food and forage necessary for self maintenance and subsistence until directed otherwise by authorities of the Armed Forces of the UNITED NATIONS.

4. Concentration of all equipment and personnel as prescribed in Annex A will be effected not later than 1200 hours, 8 May 1945, after which time offensive ground and air action will be taken by the Allied Forces against all unauthorized movement of forces affected by this instrument. Other instructions indicated in Annex A will be carried out promptly.

5. This instrument is independent of, without prejudice to, and will be superseded by any general instrument of surrender imposed by, or on behalf of the UNITED NATIONS and applicable to Germany and the German Armed Forces as a whole.

6. The official language of this instrument shall be the English text.

Signed and agreed at HAAR, BAVARIA, this 5 day of May 1945.

For General Schulz

\_\_\_\_\_  
Commanding General, First  
German Army

\_\_\_\_\_  
General Jacob L. Devers  
United States Army.

#### ANNEX "A"

1. Pending further orders all officers and not to exceed one hundred other ranks per division may retain their rifle, machine pistol, pistol, or other sidearm for internal security purposes. All such armed personnel will wear a 3-inch white arm band above the left elbow for easy identification. All other arms, weapons and ammunition of whatever nature will be placed in dumps of appropriate size in convenient locations in areas occupied by companies, troops, batteries, and other detachments of a comparable or smaller size. Appropriate guards will be posted on all such dumps to insure their security pending further disposition as directed by authorities of the Armed Forces of the UNITED NATIONS. All military equipment such as telephone, telegraph and radio equipment, motor vehicles, horse-drawn vehicles and other means of transport (both ground and air), and other movable military impediments not needed for execution of these specifications will be similarly assembled and guarded in convenient locations pending their further disposition. All such dumps will be kept clear of lines of communication and axes of advance required by the Allied Forces.

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2. All weapons and equipment will be deposited in dumps with breech blocks, bolts, sights and/or other operating mechanisms intact.

3. Having disposed of all weapons, ammunition and combat equipment of whatever nature, all forces under command of General Schulz will stand fast in their respective areas until given further direction by authorities of the Armed Forces of the UNITED NATIONS, and will keep clear of all highways, railroads, trails and other routes of advance which may be required by Allied Forces.

4. By hour and date indicated in paragraph 2 this instrument, General Schulz shall furnish the Commanding General, Sixth Army Group, an order of battle of all major units, including Allied Prisoner of War Camps, concentration camps and similar installations under his command, and as soon as possible shall furnish the Commanding General, Sixth Army Group, with a complete troop list showing by unit designation, type, strength and location, all elements of his command affected by this instrument.

5. All minefields within areas controlled by General Schulz shall be plainly marked immediately by signs and shall be outlined with white tape or other suitable means which are readily identifiable. All mines, booby traps and other types of demolition charges shall be removed from all highways and railroad bridges, tunnels, overpasses and underpasses on all lines of communication, and from all buildings and means of transport, highway, rail and air, within the areas controlled by General Schulz, and all such mines, booby traps and other means of demolitions so removed shall be rendered harmless; those mines, booby traps and other means of demolitions which cannot be removed or rendered harmless immediately shall be plainly marked and placed under guards.

\* \* \*

IV. PRINCIPAL ENEMY COMMANDERS OPPOSING SEVENTH ARMY

ARMY GROUP G

SCHULZ, General der Infanterie.

No biographical data available.

FIRST ARMY

FOERTSCH, Herrmann, General der Infanterie.

See G-2 History for March.

SEVENTH ARMY

OBSTFELDER, General der Infanterie.

See G-2 History for January.

NINETEENTH ARMY

BRANDENBERGER, General der Panzer Truppen.

No biographical data available.

XIII SS CORPS

SIMON, Max, SS Obergruppenfuehrer and General der Waffen SS.

See G-2 History for December 1944.

XIII CORPS

HAHM, Walter, General der Infanterie.

See G-2 History for February.

LXIV CORPS

FRIEHE, Generalleutnant.

No biographical data available.

LXXX CORPS

BEYER, Franz, General der Infanterie.

General BEYER (see G-2 History for April) was captured 30 April. If there was a formal successor during the remaining few days of the war, his identity was not learned.

LXXXII CORPS

TOLSDORFF, Generalleutnant.

No biographical data available.

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2 MOUNTAIN DIVISION

UTZ, Willibald, Generalleutnant.

See G-2 History for February.

9 HUNGARIAN INFANTRY DIVISION

LOSKAY, Brigadier General.

General LOSKAY's division was captured intact, with a strength of 8,000 men, on 2 May. No biographical data is available concerning the Commanding General.

17 SS PANZER GRENADIER DIVISION

BOCHMANN, SS Oberfuehrer.

No biographical data available.

47 VOLKSGRENADIER DIVISION

BORK, Generalleutnant.

No biographical data available.

79 VOLKSGRENADIER DIVISION

REINHARDT (REINHERR?), Oberst.

No biographical data available.

151 FIELD TRAINING DIVISION

Von BADE, Hans-Albert, Generalmajor.

No biographical data available.

189 VOLKSGRENADIER DIVISION

HELLWIG, Oberst.

No biographical data available.

198 INFANTRY DIVISION

BARDE (BARTEL?), Generalmajor.

No biographical data available.

212 VOLKSGRENADIER DIVISION

ULLRICH, Generalmajor.

No biographical data available.

246 VOLKSGRENADIER DIVISION

KUEHN, Generalmajor.

No biographical data available.



407 VOLKSGRENADIER DIVISION

ELUEM, Generalmajor.

No biographical data available.

465 MOBILIZATION DIVISION

HOFFMANN, Generalleutnant.

No biographical data available.

553 VOLKSGRENADIER DIVISION

HUETHER, Generalmajor.

See G-2 History for December 1944.

559 VOLKSGRENADIER DIVISION

Von MUEHLEN, Kurt, Freiherr, Generalmajor.

See G-2 History for December 1944. Taken prisoner by French in May.

BATTLE GROUP VON HOE

Von HOE, Oberst.

No biographical data available.

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# V. CIVILIAN AND MILITARY PERSONALITIES APPREHENDED BY SEVENTH ARMY

Note: Upon advancing into the Nazi redoubt area during the war's final days, the Seventh Army unexpectedly became the captor of hundreds of prominent German personalities and their associates. Some were arrested, others deserted their refuges for the safer confines of official custody, while a few (unwilling "guests" of the Nazis) were liberated. Listed below is some of the more interesting flotsam from the shipwreck of Germany

\* \* \*

GOERING, Hermann Wilhelm, Reichsmarschall.

Successor-designate to HITLER and long one of the "Big Three" in GERMANY, GOERING was captured by the 36 Infantry Division. Organizer and leader of the SA in 1922, wounded in the HITLER Putsch, he later assumed a dazzling array of titles: Reichsmarschall, SS Obergruppenfuehrer, SA Obergruppenfuehrer; chairman of the War Cabinet; member of the Secret Cabinet Council; Reich Minister for Air; Commander-in-Chief Air Force; Prime Minister of PRUSSIA; president of the Prussian State Council; Reich Hunting Master; Reich Chief Forester; head of the Hermann Goering Industrial Concern, etc.

AMANN, Max, SS Obergruppenfuehrer.

Chief of Publishing for the Party Press. Editor of all policy-making publications, leading periodicals and HITLER's book, "Mein Kampf."

SZALASI, Ferenc.

Prime Minister of HUNGARY the last half year of the war, SZALASI was among a party of 72 Hungarian government personages apprehended as a unit at MATTSEE. Others included: Geza SZOGEL, State Secretary, and Kurt HALLER, German diplomat. The group included 12 soldiers acting as guard to a safe containing the crown of HUNGARY.

HORTHY, Nicholas, Admiral.

Regent of HUNGARY until ordered jailed by HITLER six months before the war ended.

LEOPOLD III, King of BELGIUM.

King LEOPOLD, his wife and four children, with two aides and servants, all reportedly in good health, were liberated 7 May when their home near STROEL was captured from SS guards. They had been GERMANY's "guests" since BELGIUM capitulated early in the war.

OSHIMA, Hiroshi.

Japanese ambassador to GERMANY, apprehended with his family and staff.

Altogether, 127 Japanese diplomatic and press officials were detained (at BAD GASTEIN). Among them were Military Attache Lieutenant General Mitsuhiro KOMATSU and staff; Major General Osamu OTANI, member of the mixed commission under the Tripartite Pact, and his staff; Naval Attache Rear Admiral Hideo KOJIMA and staff; Chancellor of the Consulate General VIENNA and staff; and four journalists of Domei and Asahi Shimbun news agencies.

FUNK, Dr. Walter.

Reich Minister of Economics; president of the Bank of GERMANY; Plenipotentiary-General for Economy; member of the War Cabinet; vice-president of the Reich Chamber of Culture.

LAMMERS, Dr. Hans Heinrich, SS Obergruppenfuehrer.

Reich Minister, Chief of Chancellory, as such signed all State documents. Secretary of the Secret Cabinet Council and of the War Cabinet. Member of the Academy for German Law.

OHNESORGE, Dr. Wilhelm, NSKK and NSFK Obergruppenfuehrer.

Reich Postmaster General. A veteran Nazi.

Von RUNDSTEDT, Gerd, Feldmarschall.

Former Commander-in-Chief West, captured with his son at BAD TOLZ, where he said he had gone to take treatments for heart trouble. Had lost favor with HITLER after his December ARDENNES campaign failed.

KESSELRING, Albert, Feldmarschall.

Long a leading German military strategist; last Commander-in-Chief West.

CHANDLER, Douglas.

American traitor; radio commentator for Nazis under the name "Paul Revere." Native of PITTSBURGH, he once wrote feature articles in EUROPE for the National Geographic Magazine. Claims he was motivated by an "altruistic desire" to keep AMERICA out of the approaching war, but denied knowledge of the atrocities now laid at the Nazis' feet.

SKORZENY, Otto, SS Obersturmbannfuehrer (Lieutenant Colonel).

Chief of RSHA Amt VI/S (sabotage) of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt. Famed for his exploits, such as the rescue of MUSSOLINI after the Italian dictator's fall, he prefers to minimize the more spectacular deeds of his undercover career and have himself referred to as a "ground force commander."

LEY, Dr. Robert, SA Obergruppenfuehrer.

Chief Party Organization Manager; leader of the German Labor Front; Reich Housing Commission. Led the "Strength through Joy" movement.

IMREDY, Bela.

Prime Minister of HUNGARY, 1938-39.

REIFENSTAHL, Leni.

Famed German film star and producer. Close friend and admirer of HITLER.

Von SCHIRACH, Baldur.

Leader of all HITLER Youth organizations.

WOLF, Mrs. Paula.

HITLER's sister, age 44, found in a village near BERCHTESGADEN.



WOLF, Johanna.

Private secretary to HITLER for 15 years.

SCHRODEN, Christa.

Private secretary to HITLER.

BRUECKNER, Wilhelm, Oberst.

HITLER's personal adjutant, 1930-40. Dismissed after argument with him.

Von PUTTKAMER, Karl Jesko, Rear Admiral.

Aide-de-camp to HITLER.

FERDINAND, Czar.

Ex-king of BULGARIA, who had been living in GERMANY since the end of the first World War. Taken into custody with other Bulgarian notables.

KOMOROWSKI, Tadeuz, Lieutenant General (known as "General BOR").

Hero of the WARSAW uprising of 1944. Liberated.

DELADIER, Edouard.

Former premier of FRANCE, liberated by Seventh Army.

WEYGAND, General.

French military hero, released from German-imposed confinement.

REYNAUD, Paul.

Former premier of FRANCE, liberated by Seventh Army.

GAMELIN, General.

French military leader, released from German-imposed confinement.

SCHAUB, Julius, SS Obergruppenfuehrer.

Personal aide-de-camp to HITLER. Took part in the 1923 Putsch.

SCHWARZ, Xaver Franz, SS Oberstgruppenfuehrer and SA Obergruppenfuehrer.

Reich Treasurer of the Party.

PATIN, Dr. Wilhelm August, SS Obersturmbannfuehrer.

Cousin of HIMMLER, Dr. PATIN was in charge of Applied Ideological and Psychological Research. He was chiefly concerned with the perversion of history to suit the Nazi ideology. One of his principal services to the Nazis was to advance the contention that the Catholic Church, Social Democracy and Freemasonry had been detrimental factors in German history.

MANTEL, Ernst, Generalmajor.

Until recently the Judge Advocate General of OKH (German High Command).

FRANK, Dr. Hanns, SS Obergruppenfuehrer.

Governor General of POLAND, in which post he was responsible for the deaths of millions. President of the International Chamber of Law; member of Reichstag. Dr. FRANK made several attempts at suicide after his arrest, twice slashing his wrists.

PETRI, Leo, SS Gruppenfuehrer and Major General of Waffen SS.

Chief of Supreme Executive Office of SS. Was responsible for the security of HITLER and high foreign notables. Tried to escape but was recaptured at once.

HOFER, Franz, NSKK Gruppenfuehrer.

Gauleiter and Reichsstatthalter of Gau, TIROL-VORARLBERG.

WAGNER, Ernst.

Confessed head of the werewolf movement in MUNICH.

FRIEDRICH, Fritz, SA Obergruppenfuehrer.

Staatssekretar Reich Ministry of Finance.

Von RINTELEN, Emil.

Professional diplomat; ambassador. Deputy Chief of German Foreign Office Political Department.

Von BEHR, Karl Heinrich Max.

Waffen SS Lieutenant General and member of the General Staff.

SCHMIDT, Dr. Paul.

Chief of Press Department of German Foreign Office; personal assistant to RIBBENTROP.

MAYR, Franz.

Regierungspraesident of Upper BAVARIA.

BOUSQUET, Rene.

Secretary General, VICHY Ministry of the Interior under LAVAL. In charge of all VICHY police.

SEYDELL, Joseph, NSKK Obergruppenfuehrer.

Member of Reichstag.

WILLIKENS, Werner, SS Gruppenfuehrer.

State Secretary in the Reich Ministry of Food and Agriculture; member of the Reichstag; Prussian State Councilor.

Von DOERNBERG, Alexander, Baron, SS Oberfuehrer.

Chief of Protocol in the German Foreign Office.

SCAPINI, Jean Georges.

French Minister of Prisoners under VICHY government. VICHY ambassador to BERLIN for French prisoners of war in GERMANY. SCAPINI was blinded in World War I; documents in Braille were found in his luggage when he gave himself up.

KNOFFLER, Dr. Josef Franz.

General director of all State archives.

SCHEEL, Dr. Gustav, SS Obergruppenfuehrer and Generalmajor der Polizei.

Gauleiter and Reichsstatthalter, SALZBURG; Reich Students' Leader. Police Chief of ALSACE, 1940; senior SS and Police Leader Wehrkreis XVIII, 1941-42.

GOERING, Albert.

Business agent for SKODA and BRNO Works; brother of Hermann GOERING.

MEYSZNER, August, SS Gruppenfuehrer and Generalleutnant der Polizei.

Senior SS and Police Leader, SERBIA. Organizer of the illegal SA in AUSTRIA.

SAUCKEL, Fritz, SS Obergruppenfuehrer.

Gauleiter and Reichsstatthalter, THURINGIA. Member of NSDAP since 1921 and a Party official.

LANGE, Dr. Kurt.

Ministerialdirektor Reich Ministry of Economics. Vice-president of the Reichsbank.

RADER, Dr. Kurt, SS Brigadefuehrer and Generalmajor der Polizei.

Inspector of Ordnungspolizei, VIENNA district.

NEUMANN, Erich.

Head of the German Potash Syndicate; from 1937-42, State Secretary for the Four-Year Plan.

PARSON, Herbert, NSKK Brigadefuehrer.

Deputy Gauleiter, TIROL-VORARLBERG.

FRAUENFELD, Alfred Eduard.

Former Commissioner-General for the CRIMEA; chief of VIENNA Propaganda Office. General counsel to RIBBENTROP, 1940-43. Admits the attempted Anschluss in May 1934 for which he was imprisoned six months by Austrian authorities.

ALBERT, Josef.

Generalleutnant of Police.

ERIDOUX, Eugen, General.

Secretary of State for War and Air, VICHY government.



ESSER, Hermann.

State Secretary, Ministry of Propaganda. Party Member No. 2. First vice-president of Reichstag. Party journalist.

PLESCH, Hans, SS Brigadefuehrer.

Police President of MUNICH.

KOGLMEIER, Max, SA Gruppenfuehrer.

Former State Secretary in Bavarian Ministry of Interior.

Von BARGEN, Dr. Werner.

Chief of Western European Division in Foreign Office.

SCHLUMPRECHT, Dr. Karl.

Acting Minister of Interior, BAVARIA.

EHRENSBERGER, Otto.

Chief of two departments in Reich Ministry of Interior.

HINKEL, Hans, SS Gruppenfuehrer.

Secretary-General and chief editor of Reich Chamber of Culture.

NEUBACHER, Dr. Hermann.

Special economic envoy of Reich in BALKANS; Foreign Office representative in various BALKAN countries.

HAUSHOFER, Dr. Karl.

President of German Geopolitical Society. Ex-president of the League for Germanism Abroad.

KOERNER, Paul, SS Oberguppenfuehrer.

Civil Service secretary with the Trustee for Four-Year Plan. Old Party member.

SPERLE, Hugo, Feldmarschall.

Former commander of the Third Air Fleet, he was responsible for the LONDON blitz.

Von EBERSTEIN, Freiherr, Friederich Karl, SS Oberguppenfuehrer and General der Waffen SS.

HITLER's assistant; Hoherer SS and Polizeifuehrer South. Had authority to issue any special orders concerning the DACHAU Concentration Camp. Reportedly, HITLER had put von EBERSTEIN in charge of werewolf plans for BAVARIA.

FRICK, Dr. Wilhelm.

Reich Protector for BOHEMIA and MORAVIA since 1943. Leader of Nazi Party in the Reichstag. Reich Minister of Interior until August 1943. Early Nazi. As premier of THURINGIA, he had conferred citizenship on Austrian-born Adolf HITLER.

BUCH, Walter, Oberster Parteirichter (Supreme Party Judge), SS Obergruppenfuehrer.

Reichsleiter. Actively assisted HITLER in organizing the Party in MUNICH between 1923 and 1927.

JUNG, Philip Wilhelm.

Mayor of VIENNA from April 1940 to January 1944. Held high offices with the Party for 14 years.

SUCHENWALD, Richard, SA Brigadefuehrer.

Founder of the HITLER movement in AUSTRIA (1926). Member of the Reichstag. Lifelong personal friend of HITLER.

SACHS, Willy.

Famed industrialist, owner and director of FITCHEL and SACHS, world's largest coaster brake manufacturers, and owner of largest factory in GERMANY producing small motors. Personal friend of HITLER and GOEBBELS, and often entertained them at his estate.

STROELIN, Karl.

Lord Mayor of STUTTGART. An expert on postwar building plans.

de BRINON, Alfons.

Ambassador-at-large and special envoy from Marshal PETAIN to the German government, 1942-46. VICHY supposedly charged him with supplying the necessary quotas of forced French laborers for work in GERMANY.

REMEY-SCHNEIDER, Lajos.

Hungarian Finance Minister under SZALASI (Fascist) regime.

HAYLER, Franz.

Secretary of State, Reich Ministry of Economics.

LUTHER, Dr. Hans.

Former Reich Chancellor.

POTTHAST, Hedwig.

HITLER's mistress. Age 33, she bore him two children out of wedlock.

OBERG, Karl Albrecht.

"The Mad Butcher of FRANCE." Senior SS and Police Leader in FRANCE during the occupation.

TIMMLER, Dr. Markus.

Legation councilor on Russian political and economic affairs in the Foreign Office. "Go-between" for RIBBENTROP, STALIN and MOLOTOV in other days.

STEANE, Anthony.

British renegade; radio commentator for Nazis.

BUTTMANN, Dr. Rudolph.

Ministerial Director in Reich Ministry of Interior; Chief of NSDAP Office for Political Education; general director of Bavarian State Library; Nazi Party Member No. 4.

SCHOENICKE, Dr. Martin.

Chief executive of German Broadcasting System.

STEPP, Walter, SS Brigadefuehrer.

President of MUNICH Court of Appeals. Chief of BAVARIA Gestapo (1935-37).

Von SCHUBERT, Conrad.

Senior Councilor of German Embassy in CROATIA. Former observer for Foreign Office in the UKRAINE.

Von EPP, Ritter.

Reichsstatthalter of BAVARIA.

WANDERER, Madeleine.

Robert LEY's 19-year-old mistress, an Estonian ballet dancer.

\* \* \*

German General Officers Captured by Seventh Army in Final Operation

* * * * *	GERMAN RANK	EQUIVALENT	* * * * *
*	Generalfeldmarschall	-- British Field Marshal	*
*	SS Oberstgruppenfuehrer	-- U S General	*
*	Generaloberst	-- U S General	*
*	SS Oberguppenfuehrer	-- U S Lieutenant General	*
*	General der Infanterie		*
*	(Artillerie, etc.)	-- U S Lieutenant General	*
*	SS Gruppenfuehrer	-- U S Major General	*
*	Generalleutnant	-- U S Major General	*
*	SS Brigadefuehrer	-- U S Brigadier General	*
*	Generalmajor	-- U S Brigadier General	*
* * * * *			* * * * *

Von ALBERTI, Conrad, Generalmajor, CG Battle Area XII South (a defensive sector east of the RHINE).

ALMENDINGER, Karl, General der Infanterie, ex-CG Seventh German Army in CRIMEA.

ANGERSTEIN, Generalleutnant, Judge Advocate Department.

ARPS, Theodor, Vice-Admiral, Naval Advisor and Judge High Military Court.

Von AXTHEIM, Walter, General der Artillerie, AA officer.

BARDOCY, Franz, Generalleutnant, Hungarian Military Mission to German Army schools.

BAYER, Alfred, General Arzt, Chief of Medical Corps, Wehrkreis VII.



BECHT, Ernst, Generalmajor, Military Economic and Armament Office.

BEHNKE, Surgeon General.

Von BEHR, Karl Heinrich Max, SS Obergruppenfuehrer (?), ex-CG Guard Regiment VIENNA.

Von BERCHTOLDSHEIM, Gustav, Generalmajor, CG Replacement Inspectorate, REGENSBURG.

BERGER, Gottlob, SS Obergruppenfuehrer, Chief of Prisoner of War System; also CG of Volkssturm.

BEYER, Dr. Franz, General der Infanterie, CG LXXX Corps.

BINGLER, Surgeon General.

BIRON, Generalstabsrichter (U S Lieutenant General), Judge Advocate General, GERMANY.

BLOCK, Generalmajor, Judge Advocate Department.

Von BLOMBERG, Werner, Generalfeldmarschall (retired), C-in-C German Army until 1931.

BLUEHM, Oscar, Generalleutnant, CG 407 Mobilization Division.

BOEHAIMB, Hans, Generalmajor, Commandant of INNSBRUCK.

BOEMERS, Generalmajor, ammunition expert.

BOETTICHER, Friedrich, Generalleutnant, ex-military attache in UNITED STATES.

BOGATSCH, Rudolf, General der Flieger, CG IV AA Corps.

BONARTZ, Ernst, GAF (in German Air Ministry).

Von BOTH, Hans Kuno, General der Infanterie, ex-CG Operation Sector South.

BOTSCH, Generalleutnant, Chief of Staff Nineteenth Army.

BOTSH, Generalleutnant, ex-CG XXVIII Panzer Corps.

BRUCH, Hermann, Generalleutnant, from 1942-44 representative of Wehrmacht in war industry in UKRAINE and FRANCE.

BUFFA, Ernst Joachim, Generalleutnant, CG 21 AA Division; CG Military Court TORGAU.

BULCKE, Richard, Generalmajor, Chief of Motor Transport of the Army.

Von BUTTLER, Edgar, Generalleutnant, Signal.

EYRON, Generalleutnant, Judge Advocate Department.

Von CLAER, Bernhard, Generalleutnant, CG Wehrkreis XIII. Also CG Battle Group VON CLAER.

CUNO, General der Panzer Truppen, Transportation Officer OKH.

DANHAUSER, Paul, Generalleutnant, G-4 OKH.

DEGEN, Generalleutnant, ex-CG 2 Mountain Division.

DEHNER, Ernst, General der Infanterie, Officer Replacement Pool OKH.

DETLING, Generalleutnant, CG 363 Volksgrenadier Division.  
DIETRICH, Sepp, SS Oberstgruppenfuehrer, CG Sixth SS Panzer Army.  
DIPPOLD, Benignus, Generalleutnant, CG Straggler Collecting Point, LXXXII Corps.  
DOERFFLER-SCHUBAND, Werner, SS Brigadefuehrer, Chief of Bureau of Officers' Reserves and Schools, Waffen SS.  
DROGAND, Wilhelm, Generalleutnant, Inspector of Welfare and Veterans' Offices.  
EBERHARDT, Friedrich Georg, Generalleutnant, former judge in High Military Court.  
EHLING, Generalmajor, Personnel Officer GAF.  
Von FALKENHORST, Nikolaus, Generaloberst, ex-CG Twenty-First Army (NORWAY).  
FEGELEIN, Hermann, SS Gruppenfuehrer (?), Liaison Officer at HITLER's headquarters.  
FEHN, Franz, Generalmajor, commandant of AUGSBURG.  
FITZAU, Erich, Generalmajor, CG GAF Straggler Collecting Point OBERREIN.  
FOERTSCH, Herrmann, Generalleutnant, CG First German Army.  
FRANZ, Generalmajor, CG 256 Division.  
FRIES, Walter, General der Panzer Truppen, ex-CG XLVI Armored Corps.  
FUNKE, Heinz, Generalleutnant, CG Air Academy.  
GAEDE, Generalmajor, CG 719 Infantry Division.  
GALLAND, Adolf, General, Luftwaffe expert on jet-propelled craft.  
GALLENKAMP, Kurt, General der Artillerie, ex-CG LXXX Corps.  
GANDERT, Hans Eberhardt, Generalmajor, CG training camp.  
GAUL, Hans, Generalmajor, Volksturm commander.  
GEHIEN, Reinhardt, Generalleutnant, ex G-2 GHQ for Eastern Front.  
Von GELDENFELDT, Generalmajor, AA officer.  
GELLMANN, Generalleutnant, CG Wehrkreis VII.  
GERETEBALMI-CZEYDNER, Ferenc, SS Hungarian general.  
GESCHWANDTNER, Generalmajor.  
GEYR, Freiherr von Schweppenburg, General der Panzer, Inspector General of Panzer Troops/OKH.  
GILLE, Herbert, SS Obergruppenfuehrer, ex-CG IV SS Panzer Corps.  
GOERING, Hermann, Reichsmarschall, ex-Commander-in-Chief Luftwaffe.  
GOERITZ, Werner, Generalleutnant, ex-CG 92 Division.

GOETTKE, Ernst, Generalleutnant, CG Fortress Coast Artillery.

GOLUHINTSEV, General, staff officer in VLASSOW Army.

Von GRAIM, Ritter, Air Marshal. Succeeded GOERING as head of Luftwaffe. Committed suicide after capture.

GREIFELT, Ulrich, SS Obergruppenfuehrer and General der Polizei, deputy of HIMMLER.

GREINER, Heinz, Generalleutnant, ex-CG 362 Division.

GROOS, Otto, Admiral, Chief of the Special Staff for Economic Warfare, OKW.

GUDERIAN, Heinz, Generaloberst, ex-Chief of Staff, OKH.

Von GUNDELL, Walter, Generalleutnant, commandant OKH.

GUNZELMANN, Emil, Generalleutnant, Chief of Prisoner of War System, Wehrkreis VII.

HAUSSER, Eduard, Generalleutnant, Commander of Task Force EAST PRUSSIA.

HAUSSER, Paul, SS Oberstgruppenfuehrer, ex-CG Army Group G.

HENSCHKE, Generalleutnant, CG Air Signal Replacement & Training Units.

HERBERT, Theodor, Generalmajor, GAF Collecting Staff Air District VII MUNICH.

HERMANK, Generalmajor, Chief Engineer BERLIN Air Ministry.

HERRLEIN, Friedrich, General der Infanterie, HQ Commander-in-Chief West.

HEUENER, Kurt, Generalmajor, Commandant of ERFURT.

HILGERS, Josef, Generalleutnant, CG Technical Flying School.

Von HOEBERT, Eugen, Generalmajor, ex-CG Field HQ CRACOW.

HOEFLE, Hermann, SS Obergruppenfuehrer (Police), ex-Commander-in-Chief CZECHOSLOVAKIA.

HOFFMANN, Hans, Generalleutnant, Staff of General der Artillerie UNRUH in Air District Command XVII.

HOFMEISTER, Edmund (Georg), Generalmajor, CG BERLIN until 4 October 1944.

Von HOLTZENDORFF, Generalmajor, CG Drivers' Training School, ERFURT.

HORNUNG, Ferdinand, Generalmajor, Veterans' Administration.

Von HORSTENAU, Glaise, General der Infanterie, OKW sbV Section 3.

IBEL, E., Generalmajor, GAF.

KASTNER-KIRKDOFF, Gustav, General der Flieger, member of HITLER's staff.

KEILER, Wilhelm, Generalmajor, CG MONTENEGRO.

KEIPER, Wilhelm, Generalmajor, Fuehrer Reserve OKH.

KEITEL, Bodewin, General der Infanterie, ex-CG Wehrkreis XX (DANZIG). Brother of Feldmarschall KEITEL.



KEPPLER, Georg, SS Obergruppenfuehrer, ex-CG XVIII SS Corps.  
KESSELRING, Albert, Generalfeldmarschall, ex-Commander-in-Chief West.  
KIEFFER, Maximilian, Generalleutnant (retired), Horse and Vehicle Inspector, ULM.  
KITTEL, Heinrich, Generalmajor, Ordnance Department.  
KLEINKAMP, Helmut, Generalmajor, ex-CG 36 Volksgrenadier Division.  
KNISS, Baptist, General der Infanterie, ex-CG LXXXV Corps.  
KNOBLAUCH, Kurt, Obergruppenfuehrer, head Department V (Personnel) SS Fuehrungs-  
hauptamt BERLIN.  
KOEHLER, Dr. Alfred, Rear Admiral, Naval Administrative Officer.  
KOESTRING, Ernst, General der Kavallerie, in charge of training foreign troops.  
KOHL, Otto, Generalleutnant, CG First Army Rear.  
KOLB, Generalmajor, GAF, CG 9 Volksgrenadier Division.  
KORTUEM, Generalmajor, Inspector GAF women's auxiliary forces.  
KRADL, Generalleutnant, Judge Advocate Department.  
KRAUSS, Robert, Generalmajor, Officer Replacement Pool, OKL.  
KRIEBEL, Karl, General der Infanterie, Deputy CG of Wehrkreis VII.  
KUMM, Otto, SS Brigadefuehrer, CG 1 SS Panzer Division.  
LANGE, Kurt, Generalmajor, Commandant of SALZBURG.  
LATTMANN, Generalleutnant, Judge Advocate Department.  
Von LEEB, Wilhelm Ritter, Generalfeldmarschall, CG Army Group at beginning of  
Russian campaign.  
LENZ, Franz, Generalstabsintendant (U S Major General), Officer Replacement Pool OKH.  
Von LEYSER, Ernst, General der Infanterie, CG XXI Mountain Corps.  
LICHT, Rudolf Eduard, Generalleutnant, ex-CG 710 Infantry Division Russian front.  
LIEB, Generalmajor, ex-CG 112 Infantry Division.  
LIEBERMANN, Generalmajor, head of five GAF hospitals.  
LINN, Philipp, Generalleutnant, Inspector General Transportation Corps.  
LIST, Wilhelm, Generalfeldmarschall, CG Fourteenth and Twelfth Armies.  
LOERNER, Georg, SS Gruppenfuehrer and Generalleutnant der Waffen SS, Chief of  
Supply in Central Office for SS Economic Administration.  
LONGIN, Generalmajor, GAF CG WUERTTEMBERG 6 and 7.  
LUETKENHAUS, Generalmajor (retired), Commandant at MANNHEIM.

MACKELDAY, Lothar, Police General.  
MAHLMANN, Paul, Generalleutnant, Fuehrer-Reserve OKH, ex-CG 353 Infantry Division.  
Von MAHN, Ferdinand, Generalmajor, Commandant of MUNICH.  
MANTEL, Ernst, Generalmajor, ex-Judge Advocate General, OKH.  
MARZINKLEWICZ, G., Generalmajor, CG 14 Engineer Fortification HQ.  
MATTERSTOCK, Otto, Generalleutnant, Fuehrer Reserve, OKH.  
MATTNER, Generalmajor, GAF searchlight specialist.  
MERZ, Wilhelm, Generalmajor, Deputy CG GAF Supply Troops.  
METZ, Eduard, Generalleutnant, Artillery.  
MEYER, Generalmajor, GAF.  
MEYERHOEFER, Hans, Generalmajor, Armament Inspectorate.  
MICHELMANN, Axel, Generalmajor, G-1 Section, OKH.  
MUNTZ, Otto, Generalmajor, Air Ministry.  
MUSSHOFF, Walter, General der Flieger, retired, ex-Chief of Welfare Department,  
 Personnel Office GAF.  
NAGEL, Wilhelm Friedrich, Generalmajor, Inspector of Armament, Army Group S.  
Von NEUBRONN, Freiherr, Generalleutnant (retired), former representative of Feld-  
 marschall von RUNDSTEDT in VICHY, FRANCE.  
NEUMAYR, Franz, Generalmajor, Motor Transport Procurement, Wehrkreis XIII.  
OBERHAEUSSER, Eugen, Generalleutnant, Fuehrer Reserve OKH; Chief Signal Officer,  
 Commander-in-Chief West.  
Von OBERKAMP, Karl, Reichsritter, SS Brigadefuehrer, ex-CG SS Division PRINZ EUGEN.  
OELLER, Generalmajor.  
OPPENLAENDER, Kurt, Generalleutnant, ex-CG CRACOW.  
PAPPE, Kurt, Generalmajor, CG 7 Volkswerfer Brigade.  
PAUER, Generalstabsintendant (U S Major General), Army Administrative Office.  
PETERSEN, Wilhelm, Generalmajor, Engineering School at DESSAU-ROSSLAU.  
PETERSON, Hans, SA Oberguppenfuehrer, SA High Command.  
PETRI, Hans, Generalmajor, CG MURNAU Prisoner of War Camp.  
PILZ, Generalleutnant.  
RAAPE, Generalmajor, CG 7th Volkswerfer Brigade.  
RATH, Generalmajor.

RAUS, Erhard, Generaloberst, CG Third Panzer Army.

REINEFARTH, Hans, SS Gruppenfuehrer, ex-CG troops in fortifications, FREIBURG -  
Swiss frontier.

REINHARDT, Heinz, Generaloberst, CG Army Group Center.

Von RICHTHOFEN, Wolfram, Freiherr, Generalfeldmarschall, ex-CG Second Air Fleet.

RINGEL, General (exact rank unknown).

RODE, Brigadefuehrer.

RODENWALDT, Dr. Ernst, Generalmajor, Medical Corps.

ROESCH, Rudolf, Generalmajor, head of Armament Inspection Wehrkreis VII.

ROESINGER, Otto, Generalmajor, Engineer officer.

ROESSLER, Rudolf, Generalmajor.

Von ROMAN, Rudolf, Freiherr, Generaloberst.

Von ROTTBERG, General (exact rank unknown), GAF.

RUEDEL, Gunther, Generaloberst, ex-Chief Air Ministry.

Von RUNDSTEDT, Gerd, Generalfeldmarschall, retired Commander-in-Chief West.

SCHAUB, Julius, SS Obergruppenfuehrer, Aide-de-camp to HITLER.

Von SCHAWEN, Erich, Generalleutnant, inspector of engineer construction.

Von SCHEELE, Hans Karl, General der Infanterie, President of Reichskriegsgericht  
(highest military court).

SCHEURLIN, Generalleutnant, GAF officer.

SCHIEDT, Generalmajor.

SCHILEST, Walerian, Generalmajor, custodian of Cossack Museum.

SCHLEICH, General der Flieger (?), ex-CG Luftwaffe in NORWAY.

SCHMID, Josef, Generalleutnant, CG Air Command 6; former CG Air Command West.

SCHMIDT, Generalmajor.

SCHNIEWIND, Otto, General Admiral, Commandant of Navy Group North, KIEL.

SCHOERNER, Ferdinand, Generalfeldmarschall, ex-CG Army Group Center. Member of  
German General Staff.

SCHULER, Generalleutnant, GAF.

SCHUMACHER, Karl, Generalmajor, GAF.

SCHUSTER, Admiral.

SEIET, Konrad, Generalmajor (retired).



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Von SEIDEL, General, GAF.

SEIZ, Generalmajor, Traffic Control Officer, First Army.

SENSFUSS, Generalleutnant, CG 212 Volksgrenadier Division.

SHILENKOFF, General, Anti-Soviet Russian Forces.

SIMON, Max, SS Obergruppenfuehrer and General der Waffen SS, CG XIII SS Corps.

SOUCHAY, Kurt, Generalmajor, Military Police Commandant First Army.

SFERLE, Hugo, Generalfeldmarschal, ex-CG Third Air Fleet.

SPETH, General der Artillerie, ex-Chief of Staff Eighteenth Army. Member of German General Staff.

SPIES, Rudolf, Generalmajor, Chief Engineer HQ Replacement Troops GAF.

SPONHEIMER, Otto, General der Infanterie, ex-CG LXVII Corps.

STAUDINGER, SS Gruppenfuehrer, ex-Artillery officer, Sixth SS Panzer Army.

STEIGLEHNER, Wilhelm, Generalmajor, Inspector Ammunition Dumps.

Von STEIN, Johann, Generalmajor, Inspector of German Railroads.

STEINBACH, Paul, Generalmajor, Fuehrer Reserve.

STEINBAUER, Gerhard, Generalleutnant, Inspector of Replacements, MUNICH.

STURM, Barthold, Generalleutnant, Chief of Military Police, Army Group G.

TAEGLICHSECK, Generalmajor, Standortaeltester (senior officer), DUERRENZEN.

THUMM, Helmut, General der Infanterie, ex-CG LXIV Corps.

TOLSDORF, Generalleutnant, CG LXXXII Corps.

TRAUCH, Generalleutnant, Transport Corps Training.

Von TREUENFELD, SS Generalleutnant, Commander of 10 SS Panzer Division.

UHL, Ernst, Generalmajor, AAA Training School at SUESUM until October 1944.

UNTERRIESER, William, Generalleutnant, Air Ministry.

VEIEL, Rudolf, General der Panzer Truppen, CG Wehrkreis V.

VERSOCK, Kurt, General der Gebirgs Truppen, ex-CG XLIII Corps.

VEYER, Generalmajor.

VOGLER, Anton, SS Brigadefuehrer, ex-SS Garrison Commander, MUNICH.

Von VORMANN, Nikolaus, General der Panzer Truppen, CG Fortress Area Southeast.

VOSS, Erich, Generalmajor, Chief of Prisoner of War System, Wehrkreis IX.

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WALTHER, Paul, Generalleutnant, Chief Medical Officer of Wehrkreis VIII, BRESLAU.  
WARLIMONT, Walter, General der Artillerie, Deputy Chief German Joint Operations Staff.  
WEBER, Friedrich, Generalleutnant, ex-CG WARSAW Division.  
Von WEICHS, Maximilian, Freiherr, Feldmarschall, ex-CG Army Group F (BALKANS).  
WEIDINGEN (?), General der Pioniere.  
WEISS, Walter, Generaloberst, ex-CG Army Group North.  
WERNER-EHRENFUCHT, Heinz, Chief of Training Film Section, OKH.  
WESTHOFF, Adolf, Generalmajor, Inspector Prisoner of War System.  
WILKE, Gustav, Generalmajor, CG 9 Parachute Division.  
WINCKLER, Max, Generalmajor, Artillery Officer of Fortress Area W.  
WINKLER, Generalleutnant, ex-CG Replacement Units for Armored Forces.  
WINTER, Paul, Generalleutnant (retired), ex-CG 9 GAF Division.  
WITEK, Otto, Generalintendant (U S Brigadier General), Quartermaster Staff of  
Army Group G.  
Von WITZENDORF, Gotthard, Generalmajor, GAF.  
Von WITZENDORF, Hans Juergen, Generalleutnant, CG Flak Ers (Replacement) Division.  
Von WITZLERAN, Hermann, Generalmajor, Military Attache HUNGARY.  
WOELSS, Generalleutnant.  
WOESSNER, Eugen, Generalleutnant, ex-AA officer, OKH.  
WOLFF, General der Infanterie.  
WOLKS, General der Artillerie.  
WOLLMAN, Generalleutnant.  
ZIEGLER, Karl, Generalleutnant, Chief of Feldpost.

## VI. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

1 May - 30 June 1945

The counterintelligence mission of Seventh Army in GERMANY involved primarily the destruction of the German Intelligence Services, the NSDAP and their affiliates. This mission in its operational phase really began after the surrender of GERMANY and continued for approximately two months, by which time most of the Party and GIS leaders were either arrested or suicides. This summary will therefore include the period from 01 May to 30 June 1945, on which latter date the occupational mission may be said to have begun. This division is necessarily rough as there was no formal surrender of the GIS or the NSDAP. The occupational mission, although still concerned with the eradication of all the children of HITLER, is primarily to prevent their renaissance under any form.

The number of persons arrested during May and June was approximately 10,000, a large percentage of whom were major counterintelligence targets. The list of the more important of these will be found at the end of this summary. Those persons arrested who are not of primary counterintelligence interest are described in Chapter V of the present History. The great majority of arrests of all types were made by CIC detachments.

Resistance remained practically dormant throughout the period. Several caches of arms and munitions, sometimes food, were found. Apprehended SD and SIPO personnel told of several planned postwar resistance groups, only one of which survived the debacle.

The surrender of a courier revealed the existence of a postwar resistance organization created by HIMMLER in January 1945. Its purpose was the continuance underground of the Sicherheitsdienst, its methods the terrorization of the population in order to prevent cooperation with occupation authorities and killing all those who threatened the existence of the organization. The organization, as planned, was staffed by 122 men and 40 women, divided into smaller groups of not more than five, with a complex system of message centers and a chain of command. Contact was to be maintained with Werewolf groups, the Sicherheitsdienst and Sicherheitspolizei as well as with a higher echelon. This organization, planned on a nationwide basis, could not at all function on that scale or even on a much smaller one, since its personnel were scattered and communication was virtually non-existent.

Fifteen fused 250-kilogram aerial bombs were placed along highways entering the town of WINSBACH, for the purpose of rendering the roads temporarily useless to American forces. The bombs were to be detonated by line-crossers after the arrival of American troops. The project had been organized by the Ortsgruppenleiter of the town, on orders of a Luftwaffe officer.

A graph of wire cuts made during the period would show a steady climb through May, a sharp increase in the first two weeks of June, which was reduced by half during the last two weeks. Still no organized sabotage was apparent, the few individuals arrested having acted independently. Many wire cuts were due to U S Army vehicles or mistakes of civilians.

About 15 training planes, Becker 181s, took off on the first of May from a hastily-organized sabotage training school at BAD AILING. Five of the planes were to land at HEILBRONN, five near STRASBOURG and five near NURNBERG, each plane carrying two men and sabotage materiel. The men were to place demolitions on bridges, railroads and other vital installations and then surrender to American troops. One of the group was arrested after he and his partner had



decided not to pursue their mission. Two of the other planes were found a few days later. One had been destroyed by its crew, who had escaped after burying several boxes of high explosives nearby. The second plane had crashed, killing its two occupants.

Rumors during the period were dominated by the Russian theme. During May prevalent rumors were that war was impending or had been declared by RUSSIA (sometimes in coalition with other nations) against the UNITED STATES. Although this rumor continued on a diminished scale, emphasis shifted more towards RUSSIA vis-a-vis internal German conditions rather than inter-Allied relations. Attitude toward Russian occupation see-sawed between fear and approval. Reasons given for approval were that the Russians allowed civilians more freedom of movement, good entertainment, the right to hold public meetings and to form labor unions. Disapproval was shown principally regarding alleged Russian appropriation or requisition of property. Apprehended SS soldiers continued to volunteer their services for fighting the Russians; conversely, German soldiers returning from CZECHOSLOVAKIA circulated the rumor that Russians were drafting men of military age. Confusion and wonderment at what would be their future caused Germans to speculate out loud. The most widespread rumor in this regard was that the Allies were going to forbid marriage between Germans for the next five years. It was also stated that German civilians would be sterilized and would suffer a "loss of honor" for ten years. Evidence of possibly directed rumor-spreading was seen in justification given to posters of German concentration camp atrocities. It was reported by civilians that these pictures were not authentic but were actually photographs of famine victims in INDIA or bomb victims transferred to the camps by the Americans.

With the Wehrmacht fleeing pell-mell, very little time could be spent on the destruction of valuable documents. Tactical documents flowed in waves into American hands; and strategical documents, even those for which elaborate hiding plans had been made, were picked up by the ton. Many of these documents, because of the involved processing required, will not be exploited for some time. However, it is possible to list several of the more important finds:

- Sixty-eight kilograms of Party records and documents of Reichsleitung SA discovered in a paper mill at FREIMANN. Included were all Party membership cards with photographs.

- Fifty dossiers of files belonging to Botschafter z.b.V. RITTER, of the German Foreign Office. The documents contained economic, political, military and diplomatic information gathered by the German Foreign Office on most countries of the world, on counterintelligence, Allied shipping, "Big Three" meetings, prisoners of war, propaganda broadcasts to AMERICA, liaison between the Foreign Office and the Wehrmacht High Command, Allied shipping. Foreign Office organization, overlays of Allied dispositions in various theaters of operations and various other intelligence of world-wide scope.

- SKORZENY's report on activities in BERLIN following the attempt on HITLER's life on 20 July, his report on the freeing of MUSSOLINI and a part of MUSSOLINI's diary written during his imprisonment.

- Documents and other materials used by RSHA Amt VI F in a large-scale counterfeiting operation, corroborating the story of two Jewish internees released from concentration camp just prior to the end of hostilities. Since January 1945, 140 Jewish printers, engravers, bookbinders and bank clerks, all internees of concentration camps, had been assembled at SACHSENHAUSEN Concentration Camp for the purpose of counterfeiting British currency and falsification of a wide variety of foreign documents and credentials. Over 130,000,000 British pounds had been manufactured, of which 50,000,000 had been destroyed as faulty. Some 60,000,000 pounds were taken to the TIROL and 20,000,000 were already in

circulation in Allied territory. The materiel recovered included stored records of RSHA Amt VI F, blank passports of European and South American countries, sample passport pages with visas, official metal die stamps, wax impressions of foreign and diplomatic seals, American AGO and social security cards, counterfeiting materiel, including wire meshes for imitating watermarks of British currency and for the U S State Department seal.

Organized propaganda was non-existent. A German woman artist prepared and posted in two towns nine posters ridiculing and reviling Germans who now deery HITLER and Nazism and those who assist the Allies. However, this effort was merely the work of a hugh-strung and unregenerate individual.

Anti-Nazi organizations in both GERMANY and AUSTRIA began creeping back to the light of day. The best organized in GERMANY was the "Freiheits Aktion Bayern" in the MUNICH area, which gained control of the MUNICH radio station for a few hours. This action, more spectacular than indicative of genuine strength, gained the organization considerable prestige and thrust into short-lived greatness minor figures of the movement. The FAB contained a full complement of opportunists. Ritter von EPF, who started HITLER on his career, had been involved in the plotting behind the arras, but had dissimulated cleverly enough so that when the coup d'etat failed and some of its plotters were executed he was able to disclaim participation.

The Bavarian Auxiliary Police was a rather well organized anti-Nazi group. It attempted to patrol the streets of MUNICH and to propagandize the civilian population to maintain order and refrain from looting.

There was a somewhat larger and older group, though less well-organized for actions: the TURICUM, claiming existence from 1933 and reorganized into its present form in 1940, which was allegedly to facilitate Allied control after victory and to promote German understanding and cooperation. Due to the loose and secret manner of organization, no accurate total of membership can be given, but the group supposedly numbered about 2,000.

A large anti-Nazi group in AUSTRIA, the Free AUSTRIA Movement, was really a composite of several resistance groups brought together by a Dr. GRUBER, a native of INNSBRUCK, who, although he joined the NSDAP prior to HITLER's advent to power, was not a supporter of the regime and was, in fact, on the Gestapo wanted list. He had begun the organization of an Austrian resistance movement in 1941. At the end of May this organization attempted to recruit the services of a U S enlisted soldier to circulate a pamphlet, in English, entitled "Austrian Movement of Liberation." The pamphlet had two apperent purposes: the first, to demonstrate that AUSTRIA was not a willing participant in the Nazi regime, but was rather GERMANY's first victim and second, to paint in glowing colors the efforts of the Free AUSTRIA Movement in assisting the Allies in their conquest of AUSTRIA. Circulation of these pamphlets was stated by Dr. GRUBER to have been made erroneously and without his consent. There was a strong possibility that this attempt was a trial balloon employed to determine how much of such activity might be tolerated by us.

Seven anti-Nazi organizations were found in AUGSBURG. The largest, called "Deutsche Freiheits Bewegung", was apparently responsible for the bloodless surrender of the town. Such organizations were instrumental, in some instances, in securing the surrender of towns and were generally cooperative with American troops, both in keeping order and informing on persons of CI interest.

In June the former pre-Nazi political parties became much more active. Communists, Social Democrats, Centrists and various anti-Fascist committees commenced to operate. The Free Labor Unions, abolished in 1933, were the backbone of these organizations.

The 17 espionage agents apprehended during the period are described below:

1. A member of the SD, Amt VI E 7 (Balkan Espionage) who had been in charge of dispatching agents to RUMANIA from VIENNA, and had later done similar work in BELGIUM, in addition to reporting on Belgian political sentiment. In 1943, under cover of working in the German Embassy in BUCHAREST, he collected political information on RUMANIA. Seven other members of Amt VI E 7 were arrested with him.

2 and 3. Two Luxembourgers, naturalized Germans, whose mission, given them by the Commander of the SIPO and SD for SCHWABEN, was to observe American troops in AUGSBURG and to await further instructions from a Werewolf agent who had not yet contacted them. They had previously worked for the SD and Gestapo as agents provocateurs penetrating Luxembourg patriot groups. The two agents had come to CIC, posing as friendly informants.

4 and 5. Two French members of the Waffen SS, who had been voluntary workers in GERMANY. Their mission was to enlist in the French Colonial troops and report to the SD.

6. An agent of Abwehr I, who had bribed his way out of the Luftwaffe into the Abwehr and continued to pay the Abwehr 500 marks a month until September 1944. Under cover of a stock brokerage and real estate business, he had traveled to ITALY on economic espionage missions and had also organized a radio network. He had worked in SWITZERLAND in 1943-44 on counterespionage.

7. A Kriminal Sekretar of the NURNBERG Kriminalpolizei who was charged with the mission of crossing American lines to observe Party members in Allied-occupied territory and to report how and to what extent they were cooperating with the Americans. The Sicherheitspolizei had been divided into two groups, according to age, and all of them charged with this mission. The project was poorly organized and this agent returned to his home.

8. An Abwehr agent who had performed minor missions in SWITZERLAND, apparently coerced because of his half-Jewish parentage.

9. A Norwegian agent who had attended a six-months sabotage and espionage school as well as radio school for foreigners. He had worked in DENMARK on the suppression of anti-German activities, and later in CROATIA reporting partisan activities. In April 1945 he helped set up two radio stations with the entire staff of Amt VI E (Middle-European Espionage) at KREMSMUNSTER and at RINN, AUSTRIA. The group was disbanded on the approach of U S troops.

10. A Russian member of Sonderkommando Ost (a special organization under the RSHA for controlling and collecting all information on Russians living in German-occupied EUROPE) and of Sicherheitsdienst Amt III D. A radio instructor and known anti-Communist in SMOLENSK when the Germans entered the city, he was included in the municipal administration and became a member of SD Amt III, reporting on economic conditions of the Russian people.

11. An OSS agent, controlled by the Germans after his arrest by the Gestapo in CARCASSONNE, FRANCE, in 1943. His double status was revealed by two American OSS agents after their release from DACHAU Concentration Camp and who had been betrayed by him in MARSEILLE.

12. A Swiss espionage agent operating for GERMANY against SWITZERLAND. As a truck driver for a Swiss freight firm, he was able to cross the border freely. His missions were to report on Swiss military installations on the frontier and to transmit reports of other German agents in SWITZERLAND.



13. An Italian woman, 52 years old, who had worked for the Gestapo as an interpreter for 11 years and had accomplished two espionage missions as an agent for the SD.

14. An Estonian physician who had emigrated to GERMANY in 1920 and subsequently been naturalized a German citizen. At the beginning of the war he had worked for the French Intelligence Service in ESTHONIA watching Russo-German relations. After the Armistice he was recruited by the GIS and worked reporting political intelligence on French MOROCCO for the Sicherheitsdienst, Amt VI B 4 (Intelligence on SPAIN), with knowledge and concurrence of the French. Arrested by the French Territorial Security in MOROCCO, he was released by the Germans and given the mission of going to SPAIN and observing English politics in EUROPE, particularly the British Ambassador, Sir Samuel HOARE. With deportation by SPAIN of all GIS members in September 1944, he was given the mission of recruiting Russian agents for work in FRANCE as an anti-Soviet spy ring. The events of spring 1945 frustrated these plans and he was ordered to remain in MUNICH with one radio operator and to report on all Allied military and political developments during the occupation. He and other SD officials involved were to lay low for a period of one and a half to two years.

15. A member of SS Jagdverband NW, who had worked for the GIS in SOUTH AFRICA and who claimed to have been appointed by SKORZENY to proceed to Allied headquarters in PARIS and kill General EISENHOWER. Nothing further came of this and he requested false papers. Upon the approach of American troops, he arranged for the surrender of his home town and was used temporarily as an interpreter for an American unit.

16. An Abwehr agent who was forced to perform minor missions because he was Jewish. On business trips to BRUSSELS in 1940 and later in GREECE and BULGARIA he was required to report on civilian morale and airplane traffic. Twice denounced, he was finally forced to sign over his business to a Party member.

17. An agent of Abwehr III F who had performed several counterespionage missions in SWITZERLAND, although he claims that most of his reports had been faked and he had joined the Abwehr only to avoid military service.

One sabotage agent was apprehended:

He was a Belgian national, 18 years old, member of Frontaufklaerungstrupp 249, mission to proceed to BELGIUM on his own with other members of FAT 249, posing as displaced persons, for the purpose of sabotaging supply lines under guise of Communistic action, and killing members of Belgian law courts, Belgian nobility and higher officers of the American Army. He had attended a sabotage school near COLENZ along with approximately 300 other agents.

During the months of May and June, Seventh Army apprehended thousands of NSDAP and RSHA members. Several hundred of these were top-drawer personalities. A list of the more important of these is contained in Section V of this History. Personalities of strictly counterintelligence interest are listed below:

Otto SKORZENY, SS Obersturmbannfuehrer.

Chief of the Reichssicherheitsdienst Amt VI/S (Sabotage and Subversion) and of the Militaerisches Amt D (former Abwehr II, Sabotage; Commanding Officer of SS Jagdverbande. "Superman" of the German Sabotage Services, SKORZENY was best known for his rescue of MUSSOLINI. He had also planned the assassination of various Allied leaders, including General EISENHOWER, and the group of Germans in U S uniforms and vehicles which spearheaded the ARDENNES offensive.

Karl RADL, SS Sturmbannfuehrer.

Personal adjutant to SKORZENY.

Freiherr Frederick Karl von EBERSTEIN, Waffen SS Obergruppenfuehrer.

Senior SS and Police Leader in Wehrkreis VII since 1939. HIMMLER had delegated him as leader of the Werewolf organization in Wehrkreis VII.

Dr. Wilhelm August PATIN, SS Obersturmbannfuehrer.

Oberregierungsrat in RSHA Amt VII (Applied Ideological and Psychological Research); cousin of Henrich HIMMLER. PATIN's job since 1934 was to rationalize Nazi misdeeds by giving them historical justification. His chief work was on religion.

Ernst WAGNER.

Kriminalrat in MUNICH Police, adjutant to von EBERSTEIN in organizing the Werewolf movement in Wehrkreis VII.

Otto LAUTENBACH.

Member of SD Amt VI C 2 (Ost), SD propaganda office; employe of the press section of the Reichsfuehrer der SS in 1942 and 1943.

Friedrich SIEKMEYER.

Captain in Abwehr III W1 (Security of German Industry). For six weeks in 1942 OKW representative to the Hungarian War Ministry.

Dr. Fritz NEUERT.

Reserve major in German Army; member of Abwehr III F (Counterintelligence). Worked in Ast/STUTTGART in 1939, helped activate Ast/DIJON and was chief of Nest/NANCY.

Heinrich BERNHARD, SS Standartenfuehrer.

Member of RSHA Amt VI B 2, BERLIN, (SD Activities in Western EUROPE). His duties were to submit daily reports on the political and economic situation in FRANCE, BELGIUM and HOLLAND, and to coordinate the BERLIN and PARIS SD offices.

Walter GROSSBAUER, SS Hauptscharfuehrer.

A member of SD Abschnitt, SALZBURG, he had been instructed to organize a stay-behind net in AUSTRIA.

Anton JANETSCHEK, SS Hauptscharfuehrer.

Chief of SD Aussenstelle Zell am See.

Johann POLONY.

In charge of organizing a stay-behind network in BELGIUM to cover the Allied invasion. In 1944 transferred to VIENNA for work with SD Amt VI E 7 (RUMANIA), where he briefed agents about to be sent to the BALKAN countries.

Reinhardt WOLFF, SS Sturmbannfuehrer.

Chief of SD Amt VI B 1 and VI B 3 of RSHA BERLIN; former Gestapo chief of FRANKFURT ON ODER and WEIMAR; Commanding Officer of Positive Intelligence Training School, "Leitstelle Siegfried" of MARBURG ON LAHN.

Friedrich HERMES.

Captain in Abwehr Ast VII, MUNICH, where he worked for III F Section, placing agents among foreign workers and prisoners of war. Transferred to the Gestapo, he continued with the same assignment and was involved in the "Siegrune" organization, a postwar resistance group organized on the assumption that part of GERMANY would continue resistance and would not become occupied.

Johanna Marie Louise FLOCK.

Abwehr and SD official. Worked in Abwehr Abteilung III F maintaining records of enemy agents and manipulating German agents, then in the special Abwehr Section VI 3 for high-level censorship of foreign mail, and thereafter with SD Section III G with the mission of investigating all high Party officials, generals and members of nobility involved in the 20 July 1944 attempt on HITLER's life.

Dr. Rudolf Hermann Ferdinand BRASCHWITZ (alias Rudolf KNEPPE), SS Sturmbannfuehrer.

Regierungs-kriminalrat; Chief of KRIPO, SALZBURG. BRASCHWITZ admits having attended meetings of the Sicherheitspolizei in SALZBURG regarding postwar resistance, but claims that plans never materialized.

Dr. Julius BUCHLEITNER.

Chief of Section III C of Ast/SALZBURG; Wehrmacht Major.

Joseph DAUSER, SS Obersturmfuehrer.

Chief of SD VI Leitabschnitt MUNICH. Chief duty was to arrange for the performance of incidental espionage missions by travelers to SWITZERLAND. He also took part in "aktion Wendig", a plan for the wholesale passing of counterfeit currency in foreign countries.

Max DORN (alias FISCHER).

Captain Ast/MUNICH, Section III F, in which he dispatched agents to various European countries.

Julius ELSASSER.

Chief of SD III D (Internal Economy) for the MOSBACH area. ELSASSER committed suicide after interrogation.

Hans GERLACH.

Commanding Officer of SS Jagdverband South-West.

Dr. Christian von GROCH.

Chief of SD Amt VI, NANCY, FRANCE. His main mission was the preparation of semi-monthly report on public opinion.



Alfred HERB.

Technical leader in the Abwehr; Espionage Commissioner of Arming Command at ULM.

Dr. Anton HURDT.

Chief of Ast/MUNICH from 1939 to 1942. Left in 1943 for active duty as an artillery officer. Retired 1944.

George Michael HUTTERER, Lieutenant Colonel.

Dr. Wilhelm SCHWARDER, Major.

Friedrich LAUDIEN, Captain.

Horst NEUKIRCHNER, First Lieutenant.

All of Abwehrstelle South West, also known as Leitstelle III für Frontaufklärung, Army Groups F and E, which included Frontaufklärungskommando 310, AGRAM, JUGOSLAVIA. The group pretended to be infantry officers awaiting orders from American units. They had traveled to AUSTRIA to await delivery of radio equipment, consisting of approximately 18 cases of radio and teletype units. This equipment was found at LEND, AUSTRIA, and was believed to have been intended for establishing radio teletype incapable of interception.

Karl von KEDL.

Member of Abwehr I-M (Naval Intelligence). He had no mission but had previously worked in counterintelligence in KIEL and NORWAY, had observed marine traffic through GIBRALTAR and performed liaison work between the Abwehr and Naval Operations.

Christian (Graf) von KROGH.

Lieutenant in the SD in NANCY until November 1944, then with Army Group G.

George LERMER (alias Maurice Jean JADIN).

In charge of Section III B (German Welfare) at the SD Hauptaussonstelle, MUNICH. In April 1945, LERMER was contacted by the RSHA, BERLIN, for the purpose of organizing a pan-European underground movement based on the Maquis model for the purpose of perpetuating Nazi ideology and preparing the ground for a European revolution, to be known under the code name "Regenbogen" (rainbow). LERMER was to be leader of the Belgian group and had surrounded himself with French and Belgian fascists in MUNICH. It was his plan to be repatriated as a displaced person to BELGIUM.

Ernst LIND.

Leader of Frontaufklärungstrupp 181 L; Major; member of the Abwehr. Had worked for the HAMBURG-AMERICA Line on the liner "BREMEN". Since May 1943 he had worked with the Luftflotte III in Abwehr I-C III, evaluating reports of line-crossers. LIND was apprehended with eight other members of FAT 181 L in a house containing arms, demolitions, food and a large amount of various Allied currencies.

Friedrich von LOSSOW (alias Franz LORENZ; alias Dr. Franz AMMER).

Lieutenant Colonel; chief of Abwehr I W1, MUNICH. His duties were the establishment of economic espionage channels in the BALKANS and Middle East, using German export firms.

Alfred PIFF.

Lieutenant in Abwehr; had done counter-sabotage work at the PLOESTI, RUMANIA, oil fields. He had been in charge of agents on the south-eastern Russian front in 1944.

Erich ROESEKE.

Adjutant to GERLACH, Commanding Officer of SS Jagdverband South West.

Wilhelm RUF.

Major in Ast/MUNICH. RUF stated that Ast/MUNICH had been ordered in April 1945 to continue to serve as an underground organization in close cooperation with the Werewolf, acting in three groups of from 25 to 35 men each, but that the order was disobeyed by all except one Abwehr officer, BERMES. All the others requested dismissal and returned to their homes.

Felix RUHL, SS Hauptsturmfuehrer.

Chief of Gestapo, AUGSBURG. He had also received orders on the formation of the "Siegrune" intelligence organization.

Martin SANDBERGER, SS Standartenfuehrer.

Chief, RSHA Amt VI A, BERLIN.

Gunter SCHOTT.

Agent of SD III B, Aust/ULM. SCHOTT claimed to have worked for a British agent, sending all copies of his agents' reports to him. In April 1945, he was given general preliminary instruction on a resistance plan probably pertaining to the Werewolf, but nothing more came of it.

Kurt SENDTNER.

Lieutenant Colonel in Abwehr, Section I Wi, Ast/MUNICH. His office was mainly concerned with Southern and Southeastern EUROPE until these countries were occupied. After 1942, interests turned toward obtaining economic intelligence from ENGLAND and AMERICA through SWITZERLAND.

Friedrich SIEKMEYER.

Captain, Ast/MUNICH, Section III WI (Economic counterintelligence).

Wilhelm SPACIL, SS Oberfuehrer.

Chief, RSHA Amt II (Budget and Management), BERLIN. Posing as a corporal in the Wehrmacht, SPACIL had tried to bribe a member of an MII team with 1,000,000 marks in exchange for a discharge. His apprehension led to the arrest of his deputy and other associates, as well as the seizure of part of the treasury of the RSHA, including several millions of dollars in jewels, gold and paper money.

Stefan ULRICH.

Captain, Ast/MUNICH, Section III F. Retired in February 1944.

Lothar CZECH.

Abwehr radio specialist. CZECH had worked at an Abwehr radio station in direct contact with German patrol boats on the north English coast which sent weather reports used in planning air attacks on ENGLAND. In April 1942 he joined Frontaufklarungskommando I in RUSSIA, where he trained 300 Russian agents in the use of radio. He was transferred to Frontaufklarungskommando III, charged with counterintelligence, in April 1942. In the last two months of the war, the Kommando was requested to furnish volunteers for radio operators for the Werewolf, but nothing came of it and the personnel surrendered to U S troops.

Johann (Johnny) ZUANG (alias Jean ZURING; alias Hans ZIEGLER).

Employee of SD Amt VI, PARIS, where he served as interpreter, translator, paymaster and supply official. After the withdrawal from PARIS, he taught electricity and radio at a school in OFFENBURG to agents about to be dispatched into FRANCE. In April he was given a radio to use after American occupation, with an organization named "Scorpion", believed to be connected with the Werewolf plan. Instead, he disposed of the apparatus and surrendered to Military Government.

Hans Sigismund von BERGE.

Captain in Abwehr III F; Ic of 168 Infantry Division in 1939, when he was transferred to the Abwehr. He dealt with the large number of Russian agents sent into SILESIA. In mid-summer 1944 he requested to be relieved and was assigned as Ic of "Festungsbereich Sued-Ost", and in March 1945 was made aide-de-camp to the White Russian General, TURKUL.

Albert BEUGRAS (alias Paul DROESCH; alias Marcel LATAPIE; alias Andre BERGER; alias Paul Roger).

Member of the Directorate and National Corporative Secretary of the PPF; Liaison official with Abwehr I, II, III and IV; Chief of the DTF (Clandestine Work in FRANCE). Head of the PPF Foreign Intelligence; French national. In April 1943 he went to TUNIS to establish three wireless networks there, and later contacted German authorities in SPAIN in order to install agents in TANGIER. He was made Inspector General of the GIS schools training Frenchmen for underground work in FRANCE. In April 1945 he went to BREGENZ, GERMANY, from where he sent information to an OSS base in ITALY.

Peter Heinz EROLERSEN, SS Sturmbannfuhrer.

Hauptsturmfuhrer in the SS Führungshauptamt; professor at the University of FRANKFURT; consultant to the SD on radio communications and shortwave transmission.

Igor DIMITRIEW (alias George DRUMESCH; alias Gheorge DANILJEVESCHI), SS Obersturmfuhrer.

Official of SD Amt VI 7 (Intelligence on RUMANIA); Rumanian national. He worked for the Rumanian Intelligence Service and the Rumanian General Staff. Later he fled to HUNGARY and then was accepted for work with SD Amt VI E 7 in VIENNA, where he instructed and dispatched German agents to RUMANIA.

Erich ISSELHORST, SS Standartenfuhrer.

Commander of Security Police, STRASBOURG (ALSACE).



~~RESTRICTED~~Fritz KUENKELE.

Sonderfuehrer "K" RSHA Militaerisches Amt, Abteilung G' (forged documents, secret writing).

Dr. Hans O'GILVIE.

Regierungs and Kriminal Rat of RSHA Amt VI, Gruppe Wi-T. He was charged with the responsibility for all technical information received from agents in foreign countries and appropriate dissemination.

Benno PAULISCHKIES (alias Fritz BECK), SS Hauptsturmfuehrer.

Member of SD Amt III, for which he worked in TILSIT, LUXEMBOURG, and DROHOBITCH (POLAND).

Friedrich PESCHKE.

Member of the Abwehr; Captain in Frontaufklaerungstrupp 126 at SAGREB, SERBIA, where his duties were to coordinate all information concerning TITO's troop movements.

Robert WAGNER, SS Obersturmfuehrer.

SD Aussenstellenleiter. Furnished the SD with information on popular reaction in INNSBRUCK, in 1939. In July 1943 he took part in the rescue of MUSSOLINI. Plans were discussed with him regarding the setting up of an SD Amt VI post in the Austrian ALPS, in order to receive reports on the Russians and turn this information over to the Americans for the purpose of ingratiating itself with American authorities.

Walter ZUECHRISTIAN.

Member of SD Section VI D (Anglo-American Sphere) since the beginning of the war. His first assignment was to analyze the British press; in July 1941 he was transferred to PARIS to deal with White Russians willing to cooperate with the Germans.

Agents apprehended during the period are listed below:

	<u>Belgian</u>	<u>German</u>	<u>French</u>	<u>Norwegian</u>	<u>Russian</u>	<u>Swiss</u>	<u>Italian</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Espionage		11	2	1	1	1	1	17
Sabotage	1	11	2	1	1	1	1	18
	<u>1</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>18</u>

Total number of agents captured by Seventh Army since 15 August 1944:

Espionage	111
Sabotage	20
Total	<u>131</u>

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R E S T R I C T E DVII. THE G-2 SECTION AND ITS AGENCIES

On announcement of the ANVIL mission in January 1944, the G-2 Section of Seventh Army Headquarters immediately put into effect the "Planning Plan" which had been drawn up during the rest period following conclusion of the Sicilian campaign. Compiled on the basis of experience gained in the invasion of French NORTH AFRICA (as Western Task Force) in November 1942, and of SICILY in July 1943, the Planning Plan consisted of job specifications and target dates for the completion of each of the many critical tasks involved in the G-2 planning for a major amphibious operation.

The Planning Plan had been based on the arbitrary assumption that approximately 90 days would be allotted to the preparation and mounting of any operation to which Seventh Army might be committed. Although the ANVIL - DRAGOON planning period was actually extended to more than seven months, the Planning Plan was closely adhered to, the time limits being extended to accommodate revisions required by the postponement of the operation.

By the time the section went aboard ship in NAPLES, G-2 plans for the landing and its exploitation were ready to be put into operation; studies of beaches, defenses and inland terrain had been made; potential enemy opposition to the beachhead had been evaluated, and reams of basic intelligence had been disseminated to units for further detailed study.

Simultaneously the G-2 section organized itself and its attached agencies for the transition from a planning to an operational role. A complex mechanism was created, and closely integrated with the G-2 facilities of other headquarters, to provide a constant flow of information on the enemy, his operations and his capabilities. The record of the work of the G-2 section and its agencies is embodied in voluminous files of correspondence, messages and published reports, and summarized in this series of G-2 monthly histories. This final chapter is devoted to the intelligence machine that provided that vast fund of information.

The G-2 Section of Seventh Army Headquarters, formed on a Table of Organization providing 17 assigned officers and 25 enlisted men, was the executive and coordinating office for intelligence and counter-intelligence activities carried out by a variety of specialized agencies which at peak strength numbered over 1,200 officers and men. In addition, it established the basic policies for the intelligence operations of three Corps and a maximum of 16 divisions, each of which had its own G-2 organization.

Under the A. C. of S., G-2, and his Executive Officer, the section was organized in four major subsections, each responsible for certain G-2 functions and each controlling or coordinating certain specialized agencies:

1. COMBAT INTELLIGENCE.

The Combat Intelligence subsection processed all information on enemy ground forces opposing us - their identity, strength, location, attitude and capabilities - and studied other factors such as terrain and weather which might affect our own and the enemy's operations. It maintained the War Room, where the situation map was hung, where tactical intelligence was interchanged by telephone with Corps G-2s and with adjacent and higher headquarters, where intelligence summaries and daily reports were prepared, and where the Commanding General and his staff were given a daily briefing on the situation.

R E S T R I C T E D

Incoming intelligence from all sources and agencies was screened at the Combat Intelligence subsection and important items were either given spot dissemination to interested officers or were published in the G-2 Information Bulletin. Combat Intelligence published G-2 Estimates, Target Area Analyses and special studies on various topics, and maintained a research library for the use both of G-2 and of other staff sections.

Its agencies:

Order of Battle Section. One Major and an attached team of a Captain and two enlisted men composed the Order of Battle section. Its principal responsibility was the issuing of estimates of enemy strength, normally compiled on the basis of enemy combat effectives actually fighting as infantry on the Seventh Army front. The OB section contributed to all G-2 publications those paragraphs and overlays dealing with enemy order of battle, kept detailed records on German Army organization, disposition, materiel and personalities, and maintained a tabulation by unit of all prisoners captured.

Interrogation of Prisoners of War. The IPW detachment, which was responsible for interrogating hundreds of thousands of prisoners of war, was formed from trained Military Intelligence Service personnel, most of whom were former residents of GERMANY and hence as familiar as their captives with German language and dialects. Integrated throughout the Seventh Army from Headquarters to regimental levels (one team flew in with 1st Airborne Task Force), they were able to screen and interrogate prisoners with surprising speed.

Altogether, Seventh Army IPW processed 624,204 prisoners between 15 August 1944 and 1 June 1945. Every one of this vast number was questioned for basic information; those deemed worthy of further interrogation due to their military background or specialties were questioned in detail. From this extended interrogation, Seventh Army IPW issued 989 special reports.

Early in 1945 a Target team was added to IPW, its purpose to pinpoint enemy installations, important industrial plants, communications centers and the like. Locations extracted from prisoner questioning proved of great aid to our tactical air force as well as to ground troops, and facilitated the completion of annotated town maps for occupational purposes.

Detailed Interrogation Center. Formerly known as MU 500, CSDIC (Mobile Unit 500, Combined Services Detailed Interrogation Center), the Seventh Army Interrogation Center was activated in NORTH AFRICA early in 1944 and served under this designation until early 1945. By the end of 1944 the detachment had interrogated some 500 specially selected prisoners and civilians, including the majority of senior German officers captured by the Seventh Army in FRANCE.

MFIU No. 5, FID, MIS (Mobile Field Interrogation Unit No. 5, Field Interrogation Detachment, Military Intelligence Service) was activated 5 April 1945 and the entire personnel of MU 500, CSDIC, was transferred to this new unit. At once it acquired a rapidly-growing roster of important enemy officers and civilians, necessitating the addition of infantrymen as guards, the requisitioning of German vehicles for transporting the prisoners, and the expansion of the cadre from ten officers and 48 enlisted men to a July total of 40 officers and 110 enlisted men. As the war reached its climax, MFIU No. 5 served as the nucleus for the Seventh Army Interrogation Center, extracting valuable information from its prize crew of "guests", which included approximately 200 of the German general staff and some of the leading figures of GERMANY (see Section V).



The Center detained 1,725 persons between 1 December 1944 and 1 July 1945, securing detailed interrogations of some 450-500 of them and publishing the results. Special reports have been prepared on technical, governmental, political and military matters.

An example of the work done by the Center is seen in the totals of persons processed there: December, 69; January, 100; February, 107; March, 177; April, 163; May, 884; June, 225.

Strategic Services Section. New to U S Army organization, SSS sprang from an abstract plan in pre-invasion days to a vital, fast-moving agency preceding the 1945 spring offensive. The SSS, probably not as picturesque and sinister a group as often depicted in Hollywood and fiction accounts of espionage, provided hundreds of needed items of enemy information during the crucial last six months of the war - not without cost to its own unheralded personnel.

SSS began planning early in 1944, with 130 trained officers and men in its section. Strategic and tactical data was needed, and began to flow back the very day these American agents infiltrated into FRANCE. While sending back information for immediate use and long-range planning, these agents also began training trustworthy Frenchmen for airborne operations against the Germans, and the entire program began to pay dividends as the Seventh Army rolled northward toward EPINAL in the weeks after the ST. TROPEZ entry into FRANCE. To assure receipt of intelligence by the proper agencies while it was still new, SSS eventually secured permission to bypass routine channels; thus the reports of Frenchmen sent behind German lines and of American agents, both in the battle zone and behind the enemy, began to flash directly to interested parties without delay.

The Seventh's arrival in ALSACE changed the pattern, for the German language was needed from here on, Alsations were of mixed loyalties, and the pro-Allied citizens feared Nazi reprisals. New tactics were adopted. German-speaking agents who had completed radio training were prepared for airborne operations into GERMANY. Prisoner-of-war cages also were combed for a select number of anti-Nazi enemy soldiers to volunteer for espionage. The results were beyond hopes. Equipped with identifications and "cover", some 30 Germans who formerly had faced the Seventh Army as fighting enemies did such notable work (not one of them "doubled") that the German Army officially admitted its confusion, while Allied advances through troublesome areas were speeded by essential information which, otherwise obtained, might have cost lives and delay.

As the spring offensive got under way, divisional control of agent operations passed on to Army level, and agents began the tactics of parachuting down behind the Germans to cover assigned itineraries (parachuting halved the danger of detection in front-line crossing). Returning, an agent would be picked up and his findings published for all parties concerned. So fast did the Americans advance into GERMANY - due in no small manner to the data supplied at constant risk by these Americans and anti-Nazi Germans - that by April our agents sometimes found their assigned areas overrun by the Americans, and turned their attention to identifying the local Nazis for Counter Intelligence units. Agent reports from advance sectors continued to come back by radio up to the last, however; a few days before the end, agents sent in a valuable report on enemy dispositions in the INN Valley.

Signal Intelligence Section. Its functions reverting early in 1945 to the Radio Intelligence Department, Signal Intelligence subsection, of the Army Signal Service, this unit had as its assignment the constant monitoring of the air to intercept enemy radio signals and transmit such messages to the proper G-2 subsections - and at the same time to locate the source of such enemy signals, thus contributing to the pinpointing of enemy units by our Order of Battle section.

Close liaison with Army Group and Corps Signal Intelligence units and with flanking armies made S.I.S. a valuable link for Seventh Army G-2 functions. For example, contact with CSDIC MU 500 (interrogation center) resulted in the obtaining of valuable collaborating technical data from captured German signal personnel. It was also the responsibility of S.I.S. to see that all captured German signal documents and equipment, especially those pertaining to codes and ciphers, were turned over to the nearest Signal Intelligence unit for extraction of needed information.

G-2 Documents Section. This section (now known as the Seventh Army Documents Center, and functioning as a reference library and central collection point) consisted of some five officers and ten enlisted men, all qualified in German and/or French, who systematically catalogued and made available thousands of documents during the campaign.

Most documents handled concerned German order of battle and miscellaneous reports. However, there were major papers processed as well; for instance: original correspondence between HITLER, MEISSNER, PAPEN, RIBBENTROP and others, giving details of HITLER's rise to power and his seizure of the government; orders on what art collections were to be removed from FRANCE to GERMANY; original documents on HITLER's order to invade CZECHOSLOVAKIA, along with details; filmed top secret reports on German V weapons experiments, plans and production figures; Gestapo lists; new complete reports on the German Air Force order of battle; jet plane production figures; copies of orders and conferences of the German Army High Command; secret German list in book form giving the names of all officers in the German Army in May 1944.

During its operations, the Documents staff has processed 349 U S mail bags of documents for SHAEF, 32 for Seventh Army, 45 for AFHQ and 14 for Sixth Army Group.

G-2 Translation Section. This section translated enemy intelligence documents and French intelligence reports of wide and varied scope, most of this work being done on documents submitted by G-2 Documents Section.

In the winter of 1944-45, especially, translations were primarily of combat intelligence value: mine field sketches and descriptions of newly-developed mines and fuses; overlays for the location and removal of thousands of mines in the path of our approach; German manuals giving all data on mines and their employment; logistical data on the Germans; the identification, locations, movements and strength of German Army units; information on the Volks-sturm; location of enemy ammunition dumps and depots; use of SS and police personnel for defense; security measures against Allied airborne attacks; German light signal codes, aircraft recognition signals and unit code names; descriptions of new German armaments and field weapons; reports on the gasoline and fuel situation; the effects of air bombings; damage to German transportation systems; effects of the winter campaign on the German Army; training given to new replacements; terrain studies; enemy comments on our tactics, strategy, equipment and morale; and similar data.

Increasingly important with the crossing of the RHINE was counter-intelligence; in this capacity, the G-2 Translation Section did much research on the organization of the Nazi Party and its appendages, translations of Nazi plans and membership lists which made possible automatic arrests of certain ranks of the enemy hierarchy.

## 2. G-2 AIR.

The G-2 Air Section had as its main combat mission the coordination of air reconnaissance, both visual and photographic, and the selection of targets

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for aerial bombardment. G-2 Air turned out reams of collation maps, annotated photos and maps. A trained crew of specialists supervised the production and interpretation of the photographs and saw to their proper dissemination with a minimum of delay.

Not all targets and areas unveiled by the Air section were presented for tactical or demolition purposes. Thousands of buildings, roads, tunnels, municipal facilities and the like were photographed or studied to assist Allied units in efficient and rapid occupational exploitation of captured localities. The section's work was carried on by these subsections:

Seventh Army Photo Center. Here, for rapid distribution, were produced interpreted aerial photographs giving information on enemy organization. Information gleaned from the stereoscopic study of air photographs was disseminated through overprinted defense maps, annotated photo prints and written reports, with urgent information also sent by wire or telephone to tactical units. Combat units also received from the Photo Center stereo pairs with which to make their own studies, and aerial photos in bulk for use as map supplements. As examples of the amount of work thus accomplished: between 29 September 1944 and 22 February 1945 a total of 1,677 enemy gun batteries were located on the VI Corps front alone (with air photo interpretation alone providing 41 per cent of all locations); between 50 and 75 per cent of the area covered by Seventh Army was photographed for terrain, engineer and intelligence studies; many special missions were flown to secure interpretative photos for particular ground unit needs, and were delivered in the required quantities to the ordering units within hours of the request.

Tac/R (Tactical Reconnaissance). Using plane-to-ground radio, teletype, telephone and courier, two (later three) Tac/R squadrons reported on movements, dispositions and other activity observed behind the enemy front. As finally evolved after many experiments, each Corps was allocated a certain number of air reconnaissance mission requests daily (usually five on routine days), to be flown entirely within the Corps boundaries and at the direction of the Corps. On these flights, pilots maintained direct radio contact with Corps controllers on the ground, reporting their observations as they flew.

Photo Reconnaissance. The Photo Reconnaissance squadron flew assigned missions over enemy territory ahead of Seventh Army, to produce photographs of enemy installations for processing and interpretation by the Photo Center.

Air Target Section. This section was instituted in July 1944 to select bombing targets and to supply bulk quantities of annotated prints of targets. Major targets thus surveyed were coastal defenses, fuel and ammunition dumps, communication bottlenecks, command posts and barracks. In March 1945, special attention was given to SIEGFRIED Line defenses. During the European campaign, a total of 570 targets was prepared, 211 of which were hit by the Air Forces.

"T" Section. Established in February 1945, "T" Section collected, edited and disseminated target information to advancing field units and to technical experts who were following the troops into occupational areas. Purpose of this target information was not demolition, but seizure for exploitation. Targets thus identified included German industrial and political arteries, points of counterintelligence interest (Nazi Party offices and certain government and public buildings) and targets of tactical importance (bridges, dumps, tunnels, power dams, airfields, radio stations, public utilities, etc.). Records thus prepared proved of immense value to the Allies in exploiting and occupying the Reich.

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A total of 15,000 targets were listed, German headquarters and factories leading the list. These targets fell into 15 categories: airfields (also landing strips, hangars, etc.); barracks, hotels and schools; camps (prisoner of war, concentration, foreign worker, prisoner hospitals, prison buildings and areas); dumps (ammunition, fuel, warehouses, cold storage plants, etc.); dams; factories; headquarters (Nazi Party, Gestapo, static military); hospitals; radio stations and radar installations; utilities (electricity, water, gas, etc.); critical points (important bridges, key terrain features); mines (coal, minerals); public buildings (city halls, libraries, museums, etc., omitting postoffices); telecommunication centers and postoffices; railroad installations and ports.

### 3. COUNTER INTELLIGENCE.

Responsible for the maintenance of security in the Seventh Army, the Counter Intelligence section's task was to deny information of intentions, capabilities, operations and movements to the enemy, and further to prevent the enemy from accomplishing sabotage and other clandestine acts.

These functions were accomplished chiefly through C.I.C. (Counter Intelligence Corps) detachments holding key spots in the operations area. Coordinated from Army level, policies and operations of these C.I.C. detachments resolved into two phases, (1) close supervision of the civil population and apprehension of clandestine enemy personnel concealed therein, and (2) military security through surveillance and constant training in security measures.

Security of the civil population was effected through strict travel control in the Army area (mainly by the roadblock system) and through screening and checking of the people. Both of these measures netted many espionage agents. Military security meanwhile was doubly secured by the inspection of installation guard systems, security training of troops, checks on persons whose background indicated possible subversive tendencies, and by strict policies on revealing troop movements, operational plans and the nature of communications.

Security suspects of all types were interrogated, and C.I.C. units then made rapid dissemination of resultant target information and other target data for proper exploitation.

While civilian economic activity was disturbed at times because of restrictions on travel, and some small groups of military personnel inadvertently were handicapped in their movements because of all-embracing rules, Counter Intelligence emphasized that maximum Allied tactical effectiveness came first. At the same time, it made continuous study of the justification of all restrictive regulations against both civilians and the military.

To accomplish the above functions, C.I. divided itself into three subsections: (1) Civil Security, to keep civilians from purposely or unwittingly interfering with Army operations, (2) Military Security, to make policies for safeguarding military installations, prevent the activities of subversive personnel, and promote security training, and (3) Operations and Reports, to prepare for rapid dissemination the reports of C.I. findings along with evaluations and suggested counteractions.

Attached C.I. agencies were:

307 C.I.C. (Counter Intelligence Corps) Detachment. Its mission to combat espionage and sabotage, and in general provide military security of a

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counterintelligence nature, 307 C.I.C. found its duties changing in detail but multiplying in scope as the Seventh Army rolled from the invasion beaches northward to ALSACE and later into GERMANY for victory and occupation.

Before the invasion, 307 C.I.C., busy training its agents for field work in FRANCE, also had the assignment of security training for troops. During the operational phase, the unit took on more serious responsibilities, such as the investigation of cases of enemy espionage, sabotage and subversive activity; arrest of known enemy agents and dangerous enemy collaborators; investigation of harmful rumors and suspected enemy propaganda; security surveys and recommendations; internal security violations; liaison with Allied and civil authorities; establishment of informant nets at all levels; observation of civilian morale and relations between civilians and military personnel; and observation of local political and economic conditions.

Of paramount interest throughout the operations and in the present occupation has been the identification and apprehension of enemy agents, subversive and underground enemies of known present or past records. Complete file indexes have been prepared from information secured from many sources, and these are proving valuable in the progressive combing of the occupied area to remove suspects.

Other C.I.C. activities have included the supervision of installation of roadblocks and a close check there to apprehend enemy agents and others bent on missions against the Allies; a system for the spot locating of parachutist landings by radar during periods of tension; protective measures for lines of communication; and the screening of large numbers of suspects brought in through apprehension at roadblocks or through the following of "leads" from file cards or field contacts; and the training of C.I.C. Detachments throughout the Army on methods found through operational experience.

To a major degree, the effectiveness of C.I.C. Detachments within the Army was gained by recruiting and training additional agents from the ranks of combat troops.

Securite Militaire/Surete aux Armees. These French equivalents of the C.I.C., and their detachments, working closely with C.I.C. but specializing in matters which were primarily of French interest, concerned themselves with subversive French nationals, border control between FRANCE and both GERMANY and SWITZERLAND, and the detention of German agents recruited from FRANCE and French-speaking regions. The SM detachment with Seventh Army was primarily an administrative unit, while the Surete aux Armees detachment was an operational one.

#### 4. G-2 ADMINISTRATION.

G-2 Administration, a small group of enlisted men headed by two officers, has performed stenographic and clerical duties, maintained the general files, logged incoming and outgoing message traffic, and made routine distribution between the subsections and other command post installations. Included in its duties: management of official correspondence, personnel problems, preparation of the morning report as well as memoranda and duty rosters, and requisitioning of office supplies and equipment. The dissemination department has mimeographed daily and weekly G-2 publications and distributed them, and also has disseminated publications originated by SHAEP, ETOUSA, AFHQ, etc.

Seventh Army MIS Liaison Section. To handle the administrative activities of the far-flung Military Intelligence Service throughout Seventh Army G-2 units, the MIS Liaison Section has functioned as a link between Headquarters MIS, the Seventh Army G-2 Section and MIS teams in the field. Under its admin-

istrative jurisdiction have been 50 officers and 150 enlisted men and, according to the number of divisions attached to Seventh Army, some 300 to 500 other MIS personnel. First known as Detachment 2680 Headquarters Company, the administrative unit later was called Detachment 6823 Headquarters Company before assuming its present designation. The Liaison Section has shifted its teams and personnel as Seventh Army G-2 directed, and also has taken care of supplies, records, furloughs and the like for its teams.

#### 5. PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE BRANCH.

Reporting directly to the G-2 Executive, FWB started in NORTH AFRICA in pre-invasion days, with a staff of 19 persons (U S, British and French civilian and Army personnel) who launched what was to prove a highly effective propaganda campaign against the enemy. Through radio and the medium of leaflets, the FWB aim was to strengthen and direct the French fighting behind enemy lines, and to weaken and raise doubts in the enemy's mind.

From 11 May to 30 July 1944, 21 special leaflets and 65 leaflet newspapers rolled from FWB presses, the latter at five editions weekly for each language. A total of 25,611,600 leaflets and newspapers thus showered into southern FRANCE via airplane in this period. In August 1944, FWB disseminated 60,313,200 leaflets and newspapers from planes, also sent in another half million by shell-fire.

Results were forthcoming at once. Most Frenchmen saw the pamphlets addressed to them, listing invasion behavior rules. The effect on the German enemy was doubtful at first, but the continuing pressure of events lent weight to the messages later. Satellite enemy troops were first to admit that the aerial propaganda barrages influenced their surrender; later, as the Germans themselves began coming in, half of those interviewed by CSDIC said the leaflets had specifically convinced them that further fighting was senseless. Although it became an offense punishable by death for a German to retain any of the safe-conduct passes contained in the FWB leaflet offerings, some 80% of German prisoners had them by January.

The FWB tempo was stepped up, despite the difficulties of constant moves, mechanical failures, non-delivery of paper and other unforeseen complications. The staff was steadily enlarged, and new machinery was secured. Concentrating during winter and spring on all-German literature, dropped directly into GERMANY, FWB made the following airplane dissemination each month: December, 9,843,128 units; January, 8,747,000; February, 9,515,000; March, 10,542,000; April, 23,111,000.

Artillery was used with increasing effectiveness during the winter and early spring to fire barrages of leaflets and front-line propaganda newspapers into enemy combat formations. Total rounds of leaflet-filled shells fired, by months: December, 2,968; January, 5,287; February, 5,474; March, 6,552; April, 818.

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#### ORGANIZATIONAL CHART

The attached chart illustrates the basic organization of Seventh Army G-2. However, no chart can be uniformly accurate, for the section was kept flexible to meet changing conditions. Assigned G-2 personnel and attached Military Intelligence Service specialists were often interchanged; duties varied according to whether we were fighting in FRANCE or GERMANY, and whether we were deployed on a static front or pursuing a retreating enemy; and even such arbitrary factors as the physical layout of the Command Post affected internal G-2 organization.


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# ORGANIZATION G-2 SECTION SEVENTH ARMY (SPRING 1945)



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NORTH AFRICAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS  
UNITED STATES ARMY  
APO 534

GENERAL ORDERS)  
NUMBER 55 )

Director Messmore Station In- Africa Kaneel Air, Liberia	RETURN TO: 13 July 1943	682,207-1 13 July 1943
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ANNOUNCEMENT OF ACTIVATION OF SEVENTH ARMY (U.S.)

Announcement is made of the activation of the Seventh Army (U.S.),  
under the command of Lieutenant General GEORGE C. PATTON, JR., on  
10 July 1943.

By command of General EISENHOWER:

OFFICIAL:

E. L. FORD,  
Brigadier General, G. S. C.,  
Chief of Staff.

*H. V. Roberts*  
H. V. ROBERTS,  
Colonel, A.G.D.,  
Adjutant General.

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HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH ARMY  
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From: 170800B Aug 44  
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G-2 REPORT

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Map: GSGS 4242, EUROPE, 1:100,000.

Hq. Seventh Army

180800B August 1944

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1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

- a. Enemy front line - Annex No. 1, Overlay.  
b. Defensive Organization.

(1) Civilian sources report light German resistance point with trenches and several MG's being prepared at U-875325.  
(2) An enemy roadblock at U-247048 defended with small arms, MG and mortar fire, was reported by the 3rd Division. The same source reported enemy pillbox at U-235257.

- c.
- Units in Contact.

(1) New Identifications.242nd Inf. Div.917th Gren. Regt.

1st &amp; 2nd Bns. in 3d Div. Sector

918th Gren. Regt.

11th Co. in 3d Div. Sector

242nd Sig. Bn. in 36th Div. Sector.148th Res. Div.237th Res. Regt.

327th Res. Bn. identified in 36th Div. Sector.

252nd Res. Regt.

7th Res. Bn. in 36th Div. Sector.

118th Engr. Bn.

Hqs. Co. in 3d Div. Sector.

148th Fusilier Bn. in 36th Div. Sector.189th Res. Div.189th Battlegroup West of LE LUC.17th GAF Arty Regt. in 36th Div. Sector.610th Sig. Regt. S.B.V.

1st Bn. in 36th Div. Sector.

1038th PAK Arty Bn. (See G-2 Info Bulletin #4, dated 18 Aug. for history and organization).

3d Co. in 45th Div. Sector.

9th Festungs Stamm Co. in 45th Div. Sector.557th Inf. Bn.

6th Btry. in 45th Div. Sector.

- (2)
- Organization and Strength.

Garrison of TOULON.

A civilian who left TOULON on the 15th of August reported that only one Regt. is defending the city.

- d.
- Reserves.

(1) Enemy troop and M/T concentrations were reported in FAYENCE (U-5156) at 1730B.

(2) Elements of a German Division reported crossing the RHONE River over the JULES (S-8556) bridge during 15 August. Subsequent identifications proved this to be the 189th Res. Div. Battlegroup. (See G-2 Report #2 for organization).

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

- a.
- General Summary.

Enemy resistance was generally light except in scattered areas. Elements of two new divisions were identified on our front. A battle-

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group of the 189th Res. Div. crossed the RHONE River at ARLES and elements were subsequently identified west of LE LUC (U-2229). Elements of two regiments and auxiliary units of the 148th Res. Div. showed up opposite the U.S. 36th Div. Up to this time the detailed enemy battle order still remains rather nebulous as to position, with the units being thrown in where needed as they arrive on the scene and become available. No new indications of 11th Panzer Divisions moving to this area are at hand.

b. Operations of Component Units.

(1) Armor.

An intercept through the 3rd Div. at 171245B reported enemy tanks and personnel at U-236296.

(2) Artillery.

On the right flank of the 36th Div. heavy artillery fire was received from the islands off CANNES (ILE ST. MARGUERITE, and ILE ST. HONORAT) on the morning of the 17th. Otherwise enemy artillery fire appears to have remained slight.

(3) Aviation.

At 171907B, 2 ME 109's on reconnaissance flying at 4500 feet altitude were engaged by "A" Btry of the 72d AA Gun Bn. One aircraft was destroyed and crashed at U-3505 about 1 mile North of CAFE NEGRE (U-3302).

(4) Engineers.

An enemy airfield at U-2728 was reported mined and booby-trapped and another airfield at U-0712 was reported to be mined around its perimeter.

(5) Infantry.

(a) VI CORPS.

By morning of the 17th, elements of the US 143d Inf, 36th Div., were in BANGOLS EN FOJET (U-5546), U-5948, and U-620448, where they were receiving only scattered resistance from the enemy. In the center sector of our front during the morning, the 2nd Bn. of the 30th Inf. met strong opposition in the vicinity of U-163353. 2 AT guns were subsequently knocked out.

By 1100 hours, elements of the 3d Div. were reported to be in possession of LES MAYONS (U-2620), GOMPARON (U-2021) and CARRIOULES (U-1318).

During the afternoon, elements of the 45th Inf. Div. penetrated to U-305427 without making contact with the enemy.

During the afternoon the 36th Div. reported 300 infantry and 2 tanks dug in on the North edge of FAYENCE (U-5156), and a heavy troop movement S. along the railroad at U-554555, then Southwest to road and on to FAYENCE.

The last fort on PORT CROS island fell at 171330B. An unknown number of PW's were captured.

An observation plane during the afternoon reported that two white flags were flying on C.P. DE BREGMICON (Z-2495) but that Fort C.P. DE LEOUBE (Z-2197) and a strong point to the NW were apparently still held by the enemy. The pilot further reported that the entrance to the canal at U-122964 appeared to be very strongly held.

By evening of the 17th, our troops in the 3d Div. area were moving West on the PIERREFEU (U-0910) - GUERS (U-0311) road, North on the CARRIOULES-BESSE (U-1123) road without contact.

Units moving West of BRIGNOLES (U-0129) were at U-0629 by 2200B. Contact was obtained by reconnaissance elements in the vicinity of U-040294. No opposition was being received by our elements in the 45th Div. Sector at 2200B, as they moved NW and W to LE THORONET (U-2036) and C.B.SSE (U-1432). Other units reported moving West from DR. GUIGLON (U-3335) with no contact. Subsequently considerable opposition in the vicinity of LE THORONET was encountered by the 179th Inf. and caused difficulty until morning 18 August.

(b) FIRST AIRBORNE TANK FORCE.

Reports indicated that little resistance was met during the occupation of DR. GUIGLON (U-3335) on the morning of 17 August.

c. Miscellaneous.

Motor Movements.

30 L/T and tanks were seen moving East from NIMES to AVIGNON at 171200Z by friendly planes. Planes subsequently strafed vehicles.

Considerable traffic in both directions was observed just West of BRIGOLLES (U-0129) on the BRIGOLLES - ST. MAXIMIN (T-8534) road. Traffic consisted of trucks loaded with troops.

*William W. Quinn*  
WILLIAM W. QUINN,  
Colonel, G. S. C.,  
... C. of S., G-2.

Encl: Annex No. 1  
Overlay.

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
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HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH ARMY  
Office of the A. C. of S., G-2  
APO 758 US ARMY

From: 180800B Aug 44  
To : 190800B Aug 44

Copy No. 122  
Ref. Nr. X-1466

G-2 REPORT

Hq. Seventh Army in the  
Field  
191200B August 1944

No. 4.

Map. GSGS 4249, EUROPE, 1:100,000.

## 1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

a. Enemy front line - Annex No. 1, Overlay.

b. Defensive Organization.

(1) A road block at T-6961 was observed on 18 August.

(2) 142d Inf. Div. reported new enemy trenches were observed by our troops at U-300483, and was subsequently taken under fire.

c. Units in Contact.

(1) New Identifications.

189th Res. Inf. Div.

232nd Res. Inf. Co.

Hqs. Co.

Sturm Co.

Identified in 3rd Div. Sector.

198th Inf. Div.

305th Inf. Regt.

244th Inf. Div.

933rd Regt.

1st Bn. 2nd Cos.

932nd Regt.

9th &amp; 11th Cos.

244th Inf. Div.

2d Bn. 7th Btry West of BRIGNOLES

3d Bn. identified by PW's taken in vic LE LUC, 17 Aug.

338th Inf. Div.

338th Inf. Co. by prisoners taken in 3d Div. Sector

757th Inf. Regt.

5th &amp; 6th Cos. by PW's taken in vic BRIGNOLES (U-0322)

20th G.F. Sig. Bn.

90th Mieger Regt.

1st Co. in 3d Div. Sector

14th Flak Regt.

1st Bn. in 3d Div. Sector

16th Flak Ersatz Bn. vic U-262300

d. Artillery.

(1) P.M.U. on 17 August reported a possible 3-gun battery of field guns at U-146030.

(2) 1 enemy artillery piece was reported at U-240554 at 180025B.

(3) In the afternoon 18 August, 170mm guns were reported in the vic S-282719.

(4) Friendly planes reported enemy 40mm AA guns in the woods at T-4438.

(5) Reports dated 18 August state that 5-25mm (perhaps Hotchkiss AT guns) are being emplaced East of ST. MAXIMIN (T-8534) grade crossings. These guns are about 300 meters from the grade crossing among the vineyards on the South side of Route 7. T-85653325 is the location.

e. Supply &amp; Evacuation Establishments.

(1) A military hospital at T-1967 was reported on 18 August.

(2) T.L.C/R at 1250B reported observing a red cross at PUGET THIEVIERS (VH-3100).

## 2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

a. General Summary.

Enemy resistance stiffened on the left flank during the period while in the center sector and on the right flank he appeared to be withdrawing

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his forces and offering little resistance. Artillery was negligible. The Hq LXII Corps was captured complete with general at DRAGUIGNAN (U-3345) the afternoon of the 17th after moderate resistance.

Elements of three new divisions made their appearance among the identifications today. These were the 198th Inf. Div., the 244th Inf. Div., and the 338th Inf. Div. The identifications were made generally on the left half of our sector. Information at hand now places the bulk of 11th Pz. Div. SW of AVIGNON despite the identification of elements of 15th Pz. Regt. near CARENTES. In Northern France considerable train movement from their last reported position, eastward has been noted. The question now is, will they turn north up the Rhone Valley to reinforce the divisions in Northern France or continue east to appear on our front. The next few days should tell. Four loaded troop trains were observed on the 17th moving S. in the BOURG-LYON sector. It is possible that these are parts of remaining regiments of 330th Inf. Div., sometimes reported to have moved north, returning, or elements of 157th Res. Div. moving into our area, or an unidentified unit.

Over 650 M/T have been seen during the last two days moving S. and SW. from TURIN and ALESSANDRIA in N. Italy. Probably more moved than were seen. If tactical this would appear to be a move in at least division strength, however, this could also be routine supply traffic destined for the Italian Front. As yet no information as to the destination or nature of this traffic is available.

b. Operations of Component Units.

(1) Armor.

13rd Div. outpost at BRIGNOLES (U-0129) during the day reported hearing armor moving in a SW direction towards the town. No contact was reported, however.

TAC/R reported 2 armored cars moving N at U-0104 at 1320B.

Reports dated 18 August state that 3 armored cars have been emplaced at T-85903308 by the Germans 500 meters E of the St. MAX-IMIN grade crossing, about 50 meters from the S. side of the road. The report further stated that at approximately T-905298, other armored cars are located on a hill in the NW corner of the junction of Route 7 and GRAND CHATEAU No. 34.

(2) Antiaircraft Artillery.

181236B: Intense, heavy, accurate flak in the vic of battleship in TOULON Harbor.

181320B: Moderate, accurate, heavy and light flak E. side of TOULON.

181750B: Heavy, moderate flak T-3347; light, moderate flak ARLES (S-3883).

182030B: Intense, accurate, heavy flak at SALON DE PROVENCE (T-2255) FLY MAUSSANE (S-9861)

(3) Aviation Combat.

TAC/R at 180830B observed 18 twin-engine aircraft on VALENCE (C-0293) airdrome. At about the same time 2 HE 109's were observed at 2500 foot altitude flying E. at MONTPELLIER (U-9284).

Fighter bombers at 181200B destroyed 1 HE 111 and damaged another plane.

(4) Artillery.

141st Inf. reported enemy artillery fire from the island of ST. MARGUERITE (VS-3961) was resumed at 180800B.

During the evening of the 18th, artillery fire was received in the 36th Division area from the CARNES (S-3666) area. 36th Division reported they were unable to see the flash of this artillery fire.

(5) Engineers.

(a) 36th Div. reported the road mined at U-573393.

(b) Large explosion was heard in CARNES during the afternoon, probably indicating demolitions.

(6) Infantry.

(a) VI CORPS.

Enemy elements S. of L. LONDE-LES MAURES (U-1501) held up elements of the 3rd Div. during the night 17/18 August. 40-50 enemy were killed in this engagement.

In the 45th Div. sector, the 179th Inf. resumed their attack to the NW at 180600B, and immediately began to run into stiff

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resistance vic LE THORONET (U-2136).

In the 36th Div. sector, no enemy was contacted between GALLAS (U-3852) and BERGEON (U-3955).

In the 3rd Div. sector, by 180800B, troops were in FLASSANS (U-1426), PIERREFEU (U-0810), U-077290, U-037196, U-235022. Our forces were also at FORCALQUEIRET, (U-035220) at this time. The station agent in the town stated that there were approximately 1500 enemy troops on the high ground to the N. of the town.

At 0910B, 36th Div. reported enemy mortar fire from the NW was falling at U-315468.

BROVES (U-4262) was reached by a 36th reconnaissance patrol at 1318B. No enemy were encountered.

By 1345B reconnaissance elements of the 45th Div. had reached a point 1 mile W. of GARGES (U-1137) where they were encountering light opposition.

During the afternoon, elements of the 36th Div. Recon troop continued to advance, and by 1730B had reached LA BASTIDE (U-4568) without encountering any of the enemy.

At 1620B 3d Div. reported that the enemy in BRIGNOLES was still resisting with small arms fire. At the same time Air OP reports showed no activity on the highway W. of BRIGNOLES or on the axis W. of FORCALQUEIRET. Resistance at LA LONDE-LES MAURES had been overcome by that time and our reconnaissance elements were proceeding W. on the coastal road without opposition. W. of FORCALQUEIRET our reconnaissance elements reached MAZANQUES (T-1923) without opposition from the enemy.

By 2200B it was reported that 157th Inf. of the 45th Div. had captured VARAGES (T-9250).

(7) Task Force BUTLER.

Task Force Butler reported that by 180800B they had reached MONTFERRIAT (U-3455).

By 1600B elements of the Task Force were reported to have advanced to the vicinity of U-0057.

VI Corps at 182100B reported BARJOLS (T-9646) clear of the enemy and that reconnaissance elements were at CASTELLANE (U-3681), COMPS (U-3665), and GRASSE (VS-3077).

By evening the Task Force was reported to be on the line DURANCE RIVER, VALENGOLE (T-9377), RIEZ (U-0275).

#### c. Miscellaneous.

##### (1) Naval.

(a) P.R.U. reported the following naval craft on 17 August: 5 barges on the N. bank and 3 barges on the S. bank of the RHONE River at S-9886; a battleship refueling, a large ship, and small boats in TOULON Harbor; 10 barges in the RHONE River at M-9057.

(b) At 181135B, TAC/R observed 1 cargo vessel and a barge in a canal in PORT ST. LOUIS (T-0024).

(c) Five barges were also seen in the river of BEAUGAIRE (S-8670) north of ARLES.

(d) One destroyer, 1 tanker and 3 cargo vessels were observed in MARSEILLE Harbor. Two large submarines were seen near the sea station in TOULON.

(e) Two power barges 200 feet long, loaded, moving W. at T-2217 observed by TAC/R at 1750B.

(f) Tactical airforce reported at 2155B that as result of the bombardment of TOULON the battleship was on fire, a cruiser was listing and a heavy submarine and destroyer were sunk.

##### (2) Rail Movement.

(a) AT SORGUES (T-0494), a heavily-loaded tank train split-up was observed on the 17th.

(b) Increased movement in Eastward direction from the 11th Pz Div. entraining area was noted. (CARCASSONE (R-0202) - MONTPELLIER).

(c) Photo cover on 17 August revealed 2 loaded infantry trains moving S. over the BOURG-LYON line. Another infantry train at the same time was observed in LYON moving S.

(d) TAC/R at 180800B reported 2 locomotives and 20 railroad cars parked in the M/Y at CAVAILLON (T-1774) and 1 locomotive and 20 railroad cars parked 5 to 10 miles S. of AVIGNON.

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- (e) At 181715Z, TAC/R observed a 15 car train moving E. at O-1002.
- (f) Friendly aircraft at 181200Z observed 125 railroad cars in groups of 20 in small towns between AVIGNON and VALENCE (O-0296).
- (g) TAC/R at 181500Z observed at 25 car train with steam up facing SE at T-1970.
- (3) Motor Movements.
  - (a) 10 M/T pulling guns and heading NW from LANBESC (T-3654) were observed by TAC/R at 181135Z.
  - (b) TAC/R at 181730Z observed 300 M/T moving S. and SW out of TURIN (ITALY).
  - (c) 50 M/T were observed moving SW from CUNEO, Italy on 18 August.

## 3. MISCELLANEOUS.

- a. XII TAC Estimate of Enemy Air Capabilities in Seventh Army Sector.

Enemy has fifty fighters, seventy bombers, and twenty tactical reconnaissance planes capable of operating against Seventh Army area. About 50% of this total will be operational at one time.

The bomber planes could be used for anti-shipping and are broken down into fifty JU 88's and twenty Dornier 217's with possibly a few HE 111's. Of the fifty fighters, forty are ME 109's, and ten are FW 190's.

Main fighter base is the ORANGE/CAUTAT airfield. The principal bomber fields are ORANGE/Plan de DIEU, AVIGNON/CHATEAU BLANC, and VALENCE.

## 4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.

- a. To exert the maximum delaying action to Seventh Army advance with those forces now in contact.
- b. To reinforce his present troops in this area by four weak divisions available in or near this theatre.
- c. To harass the Seventh Army right flank with limited counterattacks, employing the bulk of 148th Reserve Division at present in the CARNES - NICE area, reinforced with such units from ITALY as are able to move thru the lower ALPS mountains.
- d. To delay our advance along the general line PERTUIS - TOULON, establishing his right flank on the high ground to the north and east of TOULON and with the aid and protection of strong fixed installations maintain a stubborn defense of TOULON and MARSEILLE, in order to deny us the use of these ports for the longest possible time.

## 5. DISCUSSION OF CAPABILITIES.

a. Capability 1.

It appears that the enemy is at present attempting to maintain the maximum amount of delay, however, the units in contact are not complete and apparently Allied air activities and lack of sufficient motor vehicles is causing the enemy to commit his forces piecemeal and without considerable effect.

b. Capability 2.

The four divisions which may be used to reinforce present forces are the 716th Inf Div, 198th Inf Div from west of the RHONE River, the 157th Reserve Div. from the GRENOBLE - LYON area, elements of the 11th Panzer Div. from the AVIGNON area, and elements of the 34th or 42nd Inf. Divisions from ITALY. Again transportation difficulties, destruction of RHONE River bridges Allied air operations, and resistance activities will undoubtedly delay the commitment of all of these divisions.

c. Capability 3.

Although any movement of German forces from the Italian theatre must pass through the defiles of the ALPS Mountains which have been reported impassable by the resistance groups, and which should be possible to block by Allied air, it is believed that limited numbers of troops could be assembled in the NICE - CARNES area. The decision to continually harass this right flank would necessitate holding a portion of the Seventh Army forces and limit the possibility of using these troops for exploitation.

d. Capability 4.

The enemy must realize the importance to Seventh Army of a large port and therefore may adopt Capability 4 to cause us a maximum amount of inconvenience, although knowing that eventually the troops involved in such a stand would be sacrificed.

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6. CONCLUSIONS:

Capability 4 is believed to be the capability most likely of adoption for the following reasons:

a. The German forces are continually being split and lack of communications or orders from the headquarters responsible for the defense of this sector (captured at DRACUIGNAN) make it impossible to establish a coordinated defensive line extending from the DURANCE River to the Sea.

b. Rapidity of advance makes it unlikely that a considerable reinforcement will arrive in time.

c. The hold-out of DREST in the BRITTANY Peninsula indicates the enemy's desire to delay as long as possible the surrender of large ports to the Allies.

*William W. Quinn*

WILLIAM W. QUINN  
Colonel, G.S.C.,  
A. C. of S., G-2

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH ARMY  
Office of the A. C. of S., G-2  
APO 758 US ARMY

From: 220800B Aug 44  
To : 230800B Aug 44

G-2 REPORT

Hq. Seventh Army  
In the Field  
231200B August 1944

Copy No. 37Ref. No. X-1602

No. 8

Map: GSGS 4249, EUROPE, 1:100,000.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.a. Enemy front line - Annex No. 1, Overlay.b. Defensive Organization.

Civilian sources report that the railroad line connecting CAVAILLON (T-1674) and ORGON (T-1769) is well protected by enemy troops. Installations include pillboxes, AT obstacles and mines. Several civilian reports say that AVIGNON is strongly held and that the NW corner of the ETANG DE BERRÉ (T-23) has a strongly defended position constructed for small arms and MG fire.

c. Units in Contact.(1) New Identifications.11th Pz. Div.116th Pz. Regt.

2nd Bn. by PW taken at LES PUY (T-4955). PW stated the mission of the Bn. was to cover the withdrawal towards AVIGNON.

148th Res. Div.239th Inf. Res. Regt.327th Inf. Res. Bn. - FAYENCE (U-5156)8th Res. Engr. Bn. - CALLIAN (U-5656)157th Res. Div.157th Res. Regt.179th Res. Bn.217th Res. Bn.

} Identified in the vic of GAP (O-9757)

189th Res. Div.15th Res. Regt.151st Res. Inf. Bn. vic AUBAGNE (T-6316)198th Inf. Div. - Elements W of SIMIANE (T-5892)242nd Inf. Div.917th Inf. Regt.1st Bn.2nd Bn.

} Identified vic TOULON.

918th Inf. Regt. Identified vic TOULON.242nd Replacement Bn. Identified vic TOULON.244th Inf. Div.932nd Inf. Regt.3rd Bn. - BEDOULIE (T-6711)933rd Inf. Regt.3rd Bn. - SOLLIES PONT (U-0106)11th Co. vic AUBAGNE (T-6316)934th Inf. Regt.1st Bn.2nd Bn.3rd Bn.

} Vic AUBAGNE

244th Engr. Bn. LE BEAUSSET (T-8105)338th Inf. Div.Elements 757th Inf. Regt. vic AUBAGNE.Elements 1038th AT Arty Bn. - FAYENCE (U-5156)C O N F I D E N T I A L

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C O N F I D E N T I A Ld. Artillery.

- (1) Civilian sources report that an unknown number of 105 mm. guns and 155 mm. guns were moved towards AVIGNON on 18 August and that they were now installed between CAVAILLON (T-6174) and ORGON (T-1769).
- (2) TAC/R at 212000B reported 4 heavy AA guns active at T-1769.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.a. General Summary.

The enemy continued to withdraw in front of the 3rd and 45th U.S. Divs. leaving behind rear-guards who fought stubborn delaying actions at ROGNES (T-4256), West of AIX, West of APT (T-4579) and at T-4928. To the North, elements of the U.S. 36th Div. occupied GRENOBLE against only light opposition after a sharp fight at CORPS (O-8586). MONTELMAR (N-9254) and VALENCE (O-0296) were reported still in the hands of the enemy at 221800B by Task Force Butler. On the extreme right flank, the enemy continued to harass 1st A/B TF with small arms and light arty fire. Subsequently, the enemy was forced from FAYENCE (U-5156) and CALLIAN (U-5656). French Army "B" continued to close on TOULON from all sides against very stubborn resistance. By nightfall white flags were reported by an observation plane over one of the batteries on GIENS (Z-0989). Six hundred eighty two (682) vehicles were seen moving up the RHONE Valley during the day. Evident haste was indicated by the enemy risking his vehicles in daylight. Night bombers again reported a large column moving West in the ALPS vic S-7594.

b. Operations of Component Units.(1) Antiaircraft Artillery.

- 221100B: Moderate, inaccurate, heavy flak CAUMONT (T-0980) area.  
 221840B: Scant, heavy flak CAVAILLON and ORANGE (N-9807); moderate, light flak ORANGE.  
 221950B: Scant, inaccurate, heavy flak AVIGNON and T-1496; scant, accurate, heavy flak CAVAILLON.

(2) Armored Force.

Infantry and tanks were reported to be in the vic of ST. CANNAT (T-3951).

(3) Infantry.(a) VI Corps.

Our troops occupied APT (T-4579) at 1400B without opposition. To the S of this town, LAMBESC (T-3554), CADENET (T-4463), LAURIS (T-3965) and PELLISANNE (T-2752) were found to be clear of the enemy. A sharp engagement with the enemy forced our forward reconnaissance elements to withdraw from T-495280. In the area S of MARIIGNAN (T-3328), groups of enemy were seen attempting to escape to the NW. These were taken under TD fire. W of AIX (T-5242) troops of the 3rd Div. encountered slight opposition from the enemy while attempting to occupy a defensive position. Enemy infantry and tanks were reported in the vic of ST. CANNAT (T-3951). In the 45th Div. sector slight opposition was encountered in the vic of ROGNES (T-4256). N of highway 561 in the vic of T-4460, no enemy were encountered. N of DURANCE river, W of APT, and along highway 100, light resistance was met. In the 3rd Div. sector, the latter part of the period, reconnaissance units to LANCON (T-2547) and to T-428335, encountered no resistance. 6 to 8 tanks, possibly 700 enemy, and a probable roadblock were reported by civilians to be in the woods vic T-332569. In the 36th Div. sector our troops occupied GRENOBLE (J-6627) against only light opposition, after a sharp fight at CORPS (O-8586). An enemy column of 4/500 men, then retired N. FFI reports that 6000 Germans and Italians are at BRIANCON (P-3997).

(b) 1st A/B Task Force.

On our right flank elements of 239th and 8th Res. Regts. of the 148th Res. Div. continued to engage our forces with small arms and light artillery fire in the GRASSE (Vs-3077) - FAYENCE (U-5156) area. Later in the period, FAYENCE and CALLIAN (U-5656) were cleared of Germans who were reported in retreat in this vic.

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HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH ARMY  
Office of the A. C. of S., G-2  
APO 758 US ARMY

From: 230800B Aug 44  
To : 240800B Aug 44

## G-2 REPORT

Copy No. 41Ref. No. X-1607

No. 9

Map: GSGS 4249, EUROPE, 1:100,000.

Hq. Seventh Army  
In the Field  
241200B August 1944

## 1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

a. Enemy front line - Annex No. 1, Overlay.

b. Defensive Organization.

(1) Civilian sources report a German Corps Hqs located in the Caserne Ecole des Artes Bldg. at the junction of Rue des Lycees and Petit Dardis in AVIGNON. (Source: VI Corps, G-2 Report No. 7).

c. Units in Contact.

(1) New Identifications.

11th Pz. Div.110th P.G. Regt.

1st Bn. } W of AIX (T-5042)

2nd Bn. }

189th Res. Div.401st Res. Inf. Bn. - W of AUBAGNE (T-6215)242nd Inf. Div.705th Inf. Regt. - Scattered remnants N of TANNERON (S-2470), also vic LA FARLEDE (U-0103).217th Inf. Regt.

4th Co. }

7th Co. }

14th Co. }

Identified at LA FARLEDE.

244th Inf. Div.932nd Inf. Regt.

2nd Bn. - LA CIOTAT (T-6603).

933rd Inf. Regt.

1st Bn. }

2nd Bn. }

S of AUBAGNE.

934th Inf. Regt. W of AUBAGNE.244th Field Repl. Bn. at LA FARLEDE.338th Inf. Div.575th Inf. Regt.

1st Bn. }

3rd Bn. }

E of MARSEILLE.

3rd Fortress Engr. Bn. - at AURIOL (T-6724). Elements were also reported at CASSIS (T-5907).

## (2) Organization and Strength.

(a) 217th Inf. Regt.

A PW from this unit stated that the 3rd Bn. was destroyed and exists only as a small Battle Group commanded by a Lt.

(b) 148th Res. Div.

PW stated bulk of 144th Res. Inf. Bn. is stationed on ILES de LERINS (Vs-36).

(c) 11th Pz. Div.

PW's from this division stated that the division has 70 to 80 tanks remaining in S. FRANCE, mostly Mk. V "Panther" tanks, and that 40 panthers had previously left for N. FRANCE. A captured map indicates that the area of responsibility for the 11th Pz. Div. is, or was, ARLES (S-8455) - ORGON (T-1769) - CRILLON (O-0736), with the Southern part of the area held by 110th P.G. Regt., and the Northern part by 111th P.G. Regt.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

d. Artillery.

- (1) The batteries on ST. MANDRIER (Y-9493) continued to fire on our troops advancing on TOULON.
  - (2) Batteries at FRIOUL (T-4113) and T-410128, delivered their fire into the town of MARSEILLE during the period.
  - (3) Source evaluated A-1 by 3rd Div., there are 3 blockhouses for three guns larger than 200 mm. located at T-285460.
  - (4) A Polish PW taken in the 1st A/B TF sector stated that at Vs-342704 there are 365 mm. guns.
  - (5) FFI reports enemy blockhouses at Vs-321651, Vs-302648, Vs-298539, a 155 mm. gun at Vs-302648, and a 170 mm. rr gun in tunnel at Vs-325675.
- e. Supply and Evacuation Establishments.  
 FFI reports indicate ammunition dumps at Vs-284638 and Vs-299638.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.a. General Summary.

Heavy fighting continued in and East of TOULON, where enemy infantry were supported by coast defense guns on ST. MANDRIER (Y-9493) and GIENS (Z-0989). MARSEILLES was reported captured at 231730B, but Germans remaining in the town continued to fight in the harbor area. The Isle of PORQUEROLLES fell during the period yielding 145 PW's. To the North, TFB reported considerable resistance at LIVRON (N-9877) and MONTELMAR (N-9254) and that the enemy still held VALENCE (O-0296). On the extreme right, a Polish PW reported that the enemy began withdrawing from the GRASSE (Vs-3077) area two days ago. Arty fire increased slightly on the left flank. The pattern of M/T movement again indicated enemy withdrawal to the Northeast from NIMES (S-6673) and North from AVIGNON. Night bombers reported heavy movement South and Southwest of ALESSANDRIA (ITALY).

b. Operations of Component Units.

- (1) Antiaircraft Artillery.  
 231410B: Heavy flak T-403133.
- (2) Armored Force.  
 2 enemy tanks fired on one of our patrols at RJ T-325577.
- (3) Artillery.
  - (a) Heavy artillery fire fell in the area of SANARY (Y-8297) and OLLIOULES (Y-8599). The batteries on ST. MANDRIER and GIENS (Z-0989) continued to shell our troops heavily.
  - (b) 88 mm. fire fell on our troops at T-470297.
- (4) Aviation.
  - (a) At 221140B two RE 2001's (Italian fighter rcn planes) flew N from GRENOBLE at 3000 feet on a rcn and strafing mission. One E/A turned to the E when engaged by AA and was destroyed. It crashed in the vic N-8018. The second plane was also engaged by AA, turned S, and was probably destroyed. (Source: S-2, AA Section, Hqs Seventh Army)
  - (b) GUILLESTRE (P-4270) was bombed at 221730B by seven E/A believed to be ME 109's. No damage was reported.
- (5) Engineers.  
 Heavy demolitions and destruction in the harbor of MARSEILLE were reported by photo rcn.
- (6) Infantry.
  - (a) VI Corps.  
 During the early part of the period, the enemy continued to withdraw under cover of scattered delaying actions. He withdrew from GARDANNE (T-5333), ALLAUCH (T-5520) and LE PARILLON (NW of AUBAGNE). Strong resistance was also encountered E of LA PENNE (T-5814). In the 3rd Div. area, no contact was reported in the area E of MARIGNANE (T-3428). Patrols were engaged in sharp fighting SW of GARDANNE (T-5333). No contact was met in the 45th Div. sector as far S as T-4262 on highway 561. Enemy tanks fired on our troops at T-412616.

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


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ENEMY DEFENSE LINES FROM CAPTURED MAP

Map of FRANCE, AIR 200,000, JUNE 25, 27, 28, 29  
ITALY, AIR 250,000, JULY 17, 18





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HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH ARMY  
Office of the A.C. of S., G-2  
APO 758 US ARMY

From: 240800B Aug 44  
To : 250800B Aug 44

## G-2 REPORT

Hq. Seventh Army  
In the Field  
251200B August 1944

Copy No. 131Ref. No. X-1609

No. 10

Map: GSGS 4249, EUROPE, 1:100,000.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

- a. Enemy front line - Annex No. 1, Overlay.
- b. Defensive Organization.

(1) Roadblocks, MG's, snipers, small arms and extensive mining encountered in capture of CANNES (Vs-3665) and ANTIDES (Vs-4567). Strong roadblocks supported by SP guns at SAULT (O-4604). Enemy roadblock and small arms fire, vic ST. PAUL (P-5055).

- c. Units in Contact.

(1) New Identifications.11th Pz. Div.

119th Pz. Arty. Regt. - Vic CLEON (O-0660).

4th Co. 11th Pz Rcn. Bn.

157th Res. Inf. Div.

7th Engr. Bn. - PW taken in vic GIERES (J-7126).

198th Inf. Div.

326th G.R. Regt. - Elements in vic AIX (T-5141).

308th G.R. Regt.

1st Bn. - Elements vic SALON (T-2253).

198th Fusilier Bn. - in 3d Div. sector.

244th Inf. Div.244th Arty. Regt.

1st Bn. - in 3d Div. sector, 22 August.

338th Inf. Div.

758th Inf. Regt. Elements W of AIX (T-5142). PW states Regt. located at AMES (S-8455).

(2) Organization and Strength.a) 11th Pz. Div.

PW states 2nd Bn of 110th P.G. Regt. was transported from AVIGNON to front on towed bicycles; 6-20 men holding to ropes strung from rear of available trucks. Another PW states that Div. largely composed of inexperienced troops; only 20% had combat experience.

- b) An undated captured document mentions following units under 11th Pz Div.:

27th Pz. Regt.1st Bn.15th Pz. Regt.

2nd Bn. - old and new

61st Pz. AT Bn.89th Pz. Sig. Bn.277th AT Bn.

- c) Captured map shows Pz. Rcn. Bn. in 11th Pz. Div. bivouac area in NYONS (O-2332).

- d) Captured document of the 11th Pz. Div. shows loading of Div. in CASTRES (Q-9245) - ALBI - CARCASSONE (R-0201) area to have started 13 August and included 8 Companies of 17 panthers each.

e) 157th Res. Div.

36th Div. reports indicate that 157th Div. has moved North of GRENOBLE (J-6527).

f) 198th Inf. Div.

PW states Maj. Gen. RICHTER is Commanding General of Division.

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2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.a. General Summary.

- c. Ren Pockets of resistance and CD batteries continue fight in MARSEILLES. Enemy opposes French on approaches to TOULON. Reconnaissance elements meet no opposition ARLES. MARTIGUES (T-2026), ORGON (T-1769), CAVAILLON (T-1775) occupied with no resistance; CANNES (Vs-3665), ANTIBES and GRASSE (Vs-3077) occupied against light opposition. Enemy concentrations reported Northeast GRENOBLE. Enemy engaged in RHONE Valley North of MONTPELLIER. MT movement northward through RHONE Valley continues.

b. Operations of Component Units.(1) Antiaircraft Artillery.

240840-241020: Intense, heavy AA at MARSEILLES.

(2) Armored Force.

- (a) An enemy armored car destroyed vic CIERES (J-7126) NE of GRENOBLE.  
 (b) Task Force Butler engaged enemy armor and infantry at O-075580.  
 (c) 20+ AFV's and infantry in general area W of APT (T-4579). (FFI report).  
 (d) 2 tanks with 250 infantry reported by FFI moving from LYON to BORGON (Y-4050).

(3) Artillery.

- (a) Our advance elements received artillery fire on contacting enemy forces vic J-726265.  
 (b) Artillery from SP. MANDRIER (Y-9292) peninsula continues to support enemy resistance in TOULON.  
 (c) Some artillery support being given points of resistance in MARSEILLES.  
 (d) PW states that 105 Btry and AT Co. equipped with 88's and 1 Engr. Co. on road NE of GRENOBLE.  
 (e) Heavy artillery, AA, and small arms fire, received vic airport O-0692. Heavy gun reported to be over 200mm. rr gun shelled area O-0063.

(4) Aviation.

TAC/R reports approximately 20 enemy aircraft at airdrome vic H-9436. 4+ JU 52's seen at airdrome at VALENCE.

(5) Engineers.

PMU reports nearly complete demolition port of MARSEILLES, including quays, warehouses, dry docks and installations. MIRABELU at N end damaged, also old port and small boat harbor at S end. Entrance to this area blocked by 290 ft. scuttled liner. Lost scuttle ships sunk away from quay sides or used to obstruct internal berths or main harbor entrance.

(6) Infantry.(a) VI Corps.(i) 3rd Div. Sector.

Ren elements met no resistance in ARLES (S-8555), but 5/600 enemy reported withdrawing NE of city. MARTIGUES (T-2026) occupied with no resistance; ren to MOURIES area (T-0457) developed enemy position of 100-men. No enemy resistance encountered as ren troops occupy ORGON (T-1769) and CAVAILLON (T-1775).

(ii) 36th Div. Sector.

In the 36th Div. sector, enemy forces in RHONE Valley N of MONTPELLIER engaged.

(iii) 45th Div. Sector.

Enemy Forces, approximately 150 to 200, reported moving NE from vic J-726265. FFI reports concentration of enemy NE of GRENOBLE. Estimated 2 enemy regiments reported moving S on DORTHE (J-7528) - GRENOBLE road early in the period.

(b) French Army "B".

On approaches to TOULON enemy continues to resist E of OLLIOULES (Y-8599), Six Fours Fort, and in TOULON arsenal. Scattered points of resistance remain in MARSEILLES.

(c) 1st L/B TF.

1st L/B TF captured CANNES (Vs-3665) and ANTIBES against light opposition. Captured GRASSE (Vs-3077), and exploited

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Northward against light resistance, reaching ST. VALLIER (Vs-2482). Only slight opposition encountered in readjustment of position in LA. NAPOULE - GRASSE sector.

(d) Task Force Butler.

Task Force Butler engaged enemy armor and infantry at O-075580.

c. Miscellaneous.(1) Motor Movements.

150 vehicles including horse-drawn moving N to MONTELIAR (N-9254) - LIVRON (N-9878) at 0815H. 40 MT from N-8753 to N-9059 at 1400H. 150 MT moving North from N-8755 to N-9275 at 1400H. 40 MT moving North and 10 MT moving South on secondary roads between BOLLENE (N-9323) and SOUZE (N-9924). Only light scattered traffic observed from VALENCE to LYON. 3 T.C/R missions over ALPINE passes observed only light scattered traffic. Night bombers reported enemy movement West from NICE. Task Force Butler claims 100 MT and 2 trains destroyed by artillery and tanks on road and railroad East of RHONE River.

(2) Enemy Intentions.

(a) PW from 7th Engr. Bn, 157th Res. Div., taken vic GIERES (J-7126) stated that they were to recapture PONT DE CLAIX (J-6519) and assist troops withdrawing from the South. 157th Res. Div. was to escape to the North and cross into GERMANY by way of CHALIBERY (Y-8070).

(b) PW from 198th Div. states Maj. Gen. Richter said the Div. would be sent to the WESTWALL.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.a. Enemy Terrain.

Bridges: See Section III, G-2 Information Bulletin No. 8, 25 August 1944.

b. Weather Forecast.26 August:

Clear. A few high, scattered clouds. Visibility 8 to 10 miles. Light haze. Wind Easterly, 12 MPH. Continued warm.

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.

No change (See G-2 Report No. 8).

*William W. Quinn*

WILLIAM W. QUINN, S  
Colonel, G. S. C.,  
A. C. of S., G-2.

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(c) Task Force BUTLER.

Reports from Task Force Butler say that the enemy still held MONTELMAR (N-9254) and VALENCE (O-0296) at 221800B.

(d) French Army "B".

Remnants of 242nd Inf. Div. offered determined resistance before TOULON. They were ably supported by coast defense guns on the ST. MANDRIER (Y-9493) peninsula. The enemy was driven from COUDON (T-9702) and SOLLIES VILLE (U-0105) between LA CRAU (U-0401) and LA FARLENE (U-0103). Resistance and strongpoints were encountered. W of TOULON on the coast the enemy was still resisting W of the town of BANDOL (Y-8798) in the woods W of TOULON, S of DARDENNES (T-9202) and W of SOLLIES PONT (U-0106). At 221920B, a report was received from an observation plane that a white flag was waving vic GIENS (Z-0989) over one of the batteries. White flags had previously been reported during the morning flying over PORQUEROLLES Island (Z-18).

c. Miscellaneous.(1) Motor Movements.

The enemy again risked large movements during daylight (morning) in his apparent haste to move forces Northward up the RHONE Valley. IAC/R reported a total of 682 enemy vehicles moving N from NIMES to MONTELMAR (N-9254) between 0930B and 0945B. No observations were reported of where the vehicles were crossing the RHONE but the traffic pattern indicated a likely crossing in the PONT D'ESPRIT (N-8520) area. 3 missions on road nets to the W of the RHONE reported very little traffic. The mountainous country has been reported as a center of Maquis operations and the winding roads are usually blocked. Two missions over the passes through the ALPS reported practically no movement on the roads, and no indications of enemy reinforcements on our Eastern flank were discernible during the day. However, bombers again reported a large column moving at S-7594 at 220400B. The situation in the ALPS is evidently not sufficiently critical, however, to force the enemy to risk day movements at this time.

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.

1. With a minimum force, establish a delaying position before AVIGNON; meanwhile, assemble the remainder of the Nineteenth Army South of MONTELMAR and, attack to the North in an attempt to clear the RHONE Valley in order to effect a junction with the main body of the German Army in North Central FRANCE.
2. Establish a delaying position before AVIGNON, engage our forces in the LIVRON area, then assemble the remainder of the Nineteenth Army on the West bank of the RHONE River, and withdraw Northward to effect a junction with the main body of the German Army in North Central FRANCE.
3. To move the forces believed to be present in the TURINO - ALESSANDRIA - CUNEO triangle East through the passes of the ALPS and attack our right flank in order to relieve the pressure that is being exerted on the Nineteenth Army.
4. To move the force mentioned in Capability 3 through the MT CENIS and ST BERNARD passes, assemble them in the vicinity of LYON and VALENCE, and attack to the South to assist in clearing the RHONE Valley.

DISCUSSION OF CAPABILITIES.Capability 1 and 2.

Since D+2, when the Nineteenth Army found itself split, its position has grown progressively more critical. The establishment of Task Force Butler, reinforced, on the high ground North of MONTELMAR, should be giving him grave concern. In order to extract his troops Northward up the RHONE Valley, he must clear our troops from this position, or else re-route his forces to the West bank of the RHONE and attempt to withdraw Northward on that side of the river. To date, no movement has been observed on the West bank of the RHONE River, as the Germans have confined themselves entirely to using the East bank of the river. The parallel roads Westward pass through very difficult terrain easily blocked by the resistance elements. If the enemy finds it difficult or impossible to use the road on the West bank of the RHONE River, he will then be forced to engage our forces in the MONTELMAR area in order to maintain the flow of supplies and, more important still, effect a withdrawal. Much depends on the success he encounters on the movement West of the RHONE River, as it is considered that these two routes are the

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only practical escape routes out of Southern FRANCE. For delaying purposes, the LURE - LUBERON Mountains offer an excellent Northern hinge, with the CHAINES des ALPINE and the DURANCE River offering excellent positions for delaying action. The availability of the 157th Reserve Division to assist in an attack from the North is dependent upon how much of this division is needed in the GRENOBLE area to contain elements of the 36th Division, which currently occupy the town. Capability 3 and 4.

It is possible, but not considered probable, that the Germans could move troops through the East-West passes of the ALPS and engage our troops on the East flank, but such an operation would be an expensive one and could be blocked by a comparatively small force of the Seventh Army, as these passes lend themselves well for defensive action. However, it is felt that the elements reported in the TURINO - ALESSANDRIA - CUNEO triangle are primarily concerned with preventing our debouchment into Northern ITALY and engaging Maquis elements in that sector, rather than having the mission of assisting German troops in Southern FRANCE.

CONCLUSION.

A combination of Capabilities 1 and 2 is considered as the capability most likely of adoption, for the following reasons:

1. The fall of MARSEILLE, and the early liberation of TOULON, eliminates any further military objectives worth holding in Southern FRANCE; therefore, a withdrawal out of the current battle area would be more economical to the Germans.

2. The traffic pattern of MT movement Northward up the RHONE Valley has, until to-day, been confined entirely to the East bank, indicating that the West bank route was not considered a satisfactory one. Further, the activities of the resistance elements in the MASSIF CENTRALE have reputedly kept this route blocked, and it may be that a withdrawal up the West bank will not prove feasible. Therefore, it should be expected that a concentration of troops South of MONTE LIMAR will be effected, and a determined effort made to re-open this avenue in order to accommodate escape traffic.

3. There is sufficient evidence to indicate that the RHONE Valley is the only practical route of supply and escape for the German troops in Southern FRANCE. Intelligence from Southern FRANCE, West of the RHONE River, indicates that the Germans have completely evacuated this area, burning billets and destroying supply dumps. Therefore, any attempt to withdraw through the NARBONNE - TOULOUSE area, thence Northward, would be a difficult operation, particularly from a supply point of view. Further, a withdrawal in this direction would ultimately encounter the Southwestern drive of the Allied armies in Northern FRANCE. The roads and railways West of the RHONE River to the North pass through extremely difficult terrain in the MASSIF CENTRALE, easily blocked by the resistance groups, who have been extremely active in there.

In conclusion, the Nineteenth Army finds itself pressed from the South, from the East, and from the North, with the West available for withdrawal, but certainly not practicable. In Northern FRANCE, the Allied forces, in their drive to the East, pose a threat to their eventual withdrawal into GERMANY. This, in conjunction with current indications, makes it reasonable to believe that a withdrawal is now in progress up the RHONE Valley, that every effort will be made to force a way through. If routes West of the river prove to be usable, a light engagement of our forces in the MONTE LIMAR area can be expected, while the bulk of the force attempts to escape via the West bank. If unable to withdraw on the West side of the RHONE, he will be forced into decisive action South of MONTE LIMAR.

*William W. Quinn*  
WILLIAM W. QUINN  
Colonel, G. S. C.,  
A. C. of S., G-2.

Encl: Annex No. 1, Overlay.

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


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


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From: 250800B Aug 44  
To : 260800B Aug 44

## G-2 REPORT

Hq. Seventh Army  
In the Field  
261200B August 1944Copy No. 124Ref. No. X-1614

No. 11

Map: GSGS 4249, EUROPE, 1:100,000.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.a. Enemy front line and forward elements - Annex No. 1, Overlay.b. Defensive Organization.

- (1) Mines in CARPENTRAS (T-2798) - AVIGNON area (S-9885).
- (2) Enemy reported digging in N-9755 to N-9555.
- (3) P.R.U. reports 3 strong points near BAGNOLS SUR CEZE (N-8209) at N-846141, N-847134 and N-829139.

c. Units in Contact.(1) New Identifications.11th Pz. Div.11th Pz. Rcn. Bn. - Elements in MONTELMAR (N-9255) and NYONS (O-2332) area.15th Pz. Regt. - Elements LIVRON (N-9877) - CLEON (O-0760) area.148th Div.7th Res. Gren. Bn. of 8th Res. G.R. - JUAN LES PINS (Vs-4466), (23 August).157th Res. Div.1st Res. Mtn. Regt.98th Res. Mtn. Bn. - NE GRENOBLE (J-6526).198th Inf. Div.326th Regt. - Elements encountered in area MOURIES (T-0457).Elements of 198th Div. in LIVRON (N-9877) - CLEON (O-0760) area.2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.a. General Summary.

Resistance in MARSEILLES and TOULON received support from coastal guns. ARLES, TARASCON, AVIGNON, CARPENTRAS occupied without resistance. Enemy employed armor in attacks on positions NE of MONTELMAR. 1000 PW's taken NE GRENOBLE. Northward motor movement continued in RHONE Valley.

b. Operations of Component Elements.(1) Antiaircraft Artillery.

P.R.U. reports all 31 AA btrys AVIGNON evacuated as of 24 Aug. Seven unoccupied AA btrys between AVIGNON (S-98) and ORANGE (N-9807).

(2) Armored Forces.

6 tanks, 300 Inf., vic N-9557 at 1200B. 8 enemy tanks, believed Mk VI, with 200 M/T, moved E toward CREST (O-1273), under cover heavy arty fire, 1030B - 1200B. 3 tanks destroyed, column dispersed. Enemy penetration with two Tigers at O-0260 under control at 2020B.

(3) Artillery.

MARSEILLES CD btrys active. TOULON area - heavy arty fire from ST. MANDRIER (Y-9393) and CAP SICIE (Y-8986). 36th Div. received harassing arty fire night 24/25. GRANE (O-0473) shelled; heavy fire from 88 mm. and 210 mm. cover enemy movement toward CREST (O-1273), 251030B.

(4) Aviation.

MARSEILLES bombed by enemy morning 25 Aug.

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## (5) Infantry.

## (a) Army "B".

Pockets of resistance being mopped up in MARSEILLES. At TOULON, street fighting general. ARLES (S-8555), TARASCON (S-8669) occupied, no resistance. Maquis report 3000 enemy in pocket vic T-2020, planning escape via MARTIGUES (T-2025).

## (b) VI Corps.

3rd Div. Sector: Bulk of 110 PGR of 11th Pz. Div., believed astride DURANCE River, fighting intermittent delaying action. In MOURIES area (T-0457), elements of 326th Inf. of 198th Div. encountered. Rcn passed through AVIGNON, CALPENTRAS, and N on E bank of RHONE, without contact.

36th Div. Sector: Enemy atk gains high ground NE MONTELMAR. Enemy garrison VALENCE reported to be 1200 men. See para. (2), (3), above.

45th Div. Sector: Enemy force advancing on LARCHE from Italian side of pass (FFI report). BRIANCON occupied, no opposition. 3000 enemy withdrew NE BRIANCON, 23 Aug. (FFI report). Agent reports approx. 2 bns. German Inf. with MG and 6 mtn pack hows advancing W vic P-5251. 1000 PW's of 157th Div. surrendered GRENOBLE area.

## (c) 1st Airborne T/F Area.

Light contact, GRISSE - CANNES area. Heavy mining.

## c. Miscellaneous.

## (1) Motor Movements.

348 vehicles moved N on road E of RHONE Valley. Traffic stopped in MONTELMAR area. No indications of Southward movement from roadnets N and NE of VALENCE. Ground observation reports 200 M/T, plus tanks, moving Eastward from LORIEL (N-9776) to CREST (O-1273). W of RHONE, 35 MT moving Northward at CHATEAUBOURG (H-9704); 60 horse-drawn vehicles and M/T moving NE into BARJAC (N-6125). Fighters reported eight-plus vehicles, some tracked, moving CESANA (K-5203) to BRIANCON (P-3997).

## (2) Rail.

Fighter bombers report 50 RR cars with white stars at AUBENAS (N-6460).

## (3) Barges.

On RHONE between PONT ESPRIT (N-8520) and MONTELMAR (N-9254), 44 barges were seen. Possible barge crossing place over RHONE River at LA VOULTE (N-940811).

## 3. MISCELLANEOUS.

## a. PW Statements.

PW states 157th Res. Div. ordered into ITALY but unable to comply and ordered back to hold GRENOBLE.

## b. Weather Forecast, 27 August.

High clouds appearing after 1200B. Few cumulant over mountains building up to 15,000 feet. Light thunderstorms in the LYON area.

## c. Terrain Under Enemy Control.

See Para. II, G-2 Information Bulletin No. 9, 27 August.

## 4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.

a. To attack the MONTELMAR position from the South, North, and West in order to clear the MONTELMAR - VALENCE road and enable the remainder of the Nineteenth Army to be extracted.

b. To engage the MONTELMAR position in sufficient strength to enable the 11th Pz. Div. and such other mobile units as may be present to be filtered through the block.

c. Otherwise, no change.

## DISCUSSION.

There is increasing evidence that units of the 11th Pz. Div. and other mobile elements, are infiltrating and forcing their way through the MONTELMAR block. It is difficult to estimate the strength of the enemy forces that have slipped by. The policy of the Nineteenth Army may be to engage the MONTELMAR position in sufficient strength to keep it occupied in order to allow its mobile units to

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run the gauntlet. Aerial reconnaissance indicates that the less mobile units may be using, or attempting to use, the parallel roads to the West, in order to get out. Frequent probing by infantry and tanks, heavily supported by artillery, suggests that he will employ his maximum strength to force the MONTELLMAR position. It is possible that the current fighting in the MONTELLMAR area may be the enemy's maximum effort. Currently, the Nineteenth Army strength should not be strong. Two of his divisions have been bottled up at MARSEILLES and TOULON and can be considered lost. The 198th Division, which has borne the blunt of the delay from BRIGNOLES, has undoubtedly taken heavy losses. The 148th and 157th Res. Divisions are cut off from and may be no longer under the control of the Nineteenth Army. This leaves three units available to augment the strength of the 11th Pz. and 198th Divisions in the MONTELLMAR area. These are the remnants of the 189th, 338th and 716th Inf. Divs., plus such other miscellaneous units as may have gathered in this area. Currently, there has been no evidence of the 716th Div. in the battle area. The 338th Div. has had only one regiment identified, and PW's state that the other two regiments have gone to NORMANDY. The strength of the 189th Div., if present at all, can only be surmised. All this tends to indicate that the current fighting in the MONTELLMAR area may be the maximum effort that the Nineteenth Army can effect.

*William W. Quinn*

WILLIAM W. QUINN S.  
Colonel, G. S. C.,  
A. C. of S., G-2.

Encl: Annex No. 1 - Overlay.

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## (b) French Army "B".

The enemy continued to defend TOULON. Heavy resistance was met at LA MOULINS (T-9102), MT. FARON (T-9401), and MT. JENES. At MARSEILLE there were indications that the enemy was attempting to evacuate some of his forces to the NW. Coast defenses at ST. MANDRIER were active. Heavy resistance was met at CAP DE GARDE DE CARQUEIRANNE (Z-0194) and in a pocket S of LA GARDE (Y-9998). PORQUEROLLES Island surrendered and 145 Armenian PW's were taken. At 231730B, MARSEILLE fell to French Army "B". Pockets of resistance still held out but by 1900B the enemy had been pushed back to the port area and were in FT. ST. JEAN, FRIOL, NOTRE DAME DE LA GARDE LA FHARO and FT. ST. NICHOLAS.

## (c) 1st A/B Task Force

A Polish PW reported that GRASSE (Vs-3077) was being evacuated in the direction of MICE for the past two days.

## (d) Task Force BUTLER.

The enemy was still in MONTELLMAR and VALENCE at 231200B. Towards the end of the period, enemy resistance was met in the LIVRON - MONTELLMAR area. The strength was estimated at 1500.

## c. Miscellaneous.

## (1) Naval.

Information rated A-2, stated that the last few days a train carrying aerial torpedoes moved from LYON towards VALENCE.

## (2) Motor Movements.

TaC/R reported heavy movement northward up the RHONE Valley. The largest movement reported was 200 M/T including guns and tanks observed moving northwest from CARPENTRAS (T-1798) to ORANGE (N-9707) at 1215B hrs. TaC/R at 0800B hrs reported 50+ M/T moving north from PERVES (T-1892) to CARPENTRAS. At 0910B hrs TaC/R reported 100+ vehicles moving northeast into NIMES. At 1215B hrs heavy traffic was reported moving north from BAGNOL (N-8209) to PONT ST. ESPRIT (N-8419). Heavy traffic was reported moving north west of the RHONE opposite MONTELLMAR by a 36th Div. observer.

## 3. MISCELLANEOUS.

## a. Weather Forecast.

## (1) 25 August:

Clear at dawn. Standard low clouds and increasing high clouds in afternoon; no rain. The visibility 6 to 10 miles. Surface wind SE 12 MPH.

## 26 August:

Increasing cloudiness, no rain.

## 4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.

No change in basic capabilities. (See G-2 Report No. 8)

William W. Quinn  
WILLIAM W. QUINN  
Colonel, G. S. C., S.  
A. C. of S., G-2.


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
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
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
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
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


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HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH ARMY  
Office of the A. C. of S., G-2  
APO 758 US ARMY

From: 280800B Aug 44  
To : 290800B Aug 44

G-2 REPORTCopy No. 40Ref. No. X-1622

No. 14

Map: GSGS 4249, EUROPE, 1:100,000.

Hq. Seventh Army  
In the Field  
290800B August 1944

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

- a. Enemy front line and Forward elements - Annex No. 1, Overlay.  
b. Units in Contact.

(1) Identifications.11th Pz. Div.

Rearguard identified vic GRIGNAN (O-0539).

119th Arty. Regt.

1st Bn. - vic MONTEILMAR (N-9153)  
157th Res. Div. - Whereabouts unknown at this time, however, reports continue to be received of German troops attempting to escape into ITALY, and it is possible that 157th Div. may be the unit concerned.

198th Inf. Div.305th Inf. Regt.

1st Bn. - vic MONTEILMAR.

198th Fusilier (Ren) Bn - vic MONTEILMAR.338th Inf. Div.338th Arty. Regt.

1st Bn. } - vic LA THOR (T-1484)  
3rd Bn. }

716th Inf. Div.

736th Inf. Regt. - identified by two paybooks in the REMOULINS (S-7885) area. Subsequently, ren on the roads around REMOULINS and UZES (S-6792) saw no movement.

Nineteenth Army Hqs.

Sig. Serv. - reported by French to be in VIVIER (N-8745) on 26 August. Gen. BLASKOWITZ and his staff were reported to have passed through LYON on 21 August heading for DIJON.

14th Fortress Engr. Bn. - elements vic MONTEILMAR.

200th Sicherungs Regt. - vic VALENCE (O-0196) on 25 Aug. PW stated bulk of Regt. at LYON.

c. Artillery.

36th Div. reported enemy heavy gun battery moving in position at N-9675, at 1512B.

d. Supply and Evacuation Establishments.

- (1) TAC/R reported hospitals at VIENNE (X-9862) and NANTUA (T-5332).  
(2) TAC/R at 1810B reported enemy dump area in the woods at S-6464.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.a. General Summary.

By accepting heavy casualties the enemy was able to extract the better part of his forces from the MONTEILMAR pocket. As yet, however, no large movement N of LYON has been seen, and it appears that the bulk of the Nineteenth Army is still S of that city. Despite heavy shelling, bombing and strafing which cost him 189 vehicles destroyed, the enemy continued to move N on the E side of the RHONE all during the daylight hours. Rear guard elements fought desperately until penetrated by the U.S. 3rd Div.

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On his E flank the enemy made several costly counterattacks in an effort to keep the road clear.

The remainder of the front was quiet with an increase in artillery fire reported in the 1st A/B TF sector and no contact opposite the U.S. 45th Div.

MARSEILLE and ST. MANDRIER formally surrendered to Army "B". Considerable PW's were taken including a General and an Admiral.

Paybooks from elements of 716th Div. were found at REMOULINS. (S7885). Enemy air was again active with three strafing attacks reported.

b. Operations of Component Elements.

(1) Antiaircraft Artillery.

280855B: Scout, heavy flak CHATEAU du RHONE (N-8945)

281615B: Flak heavy at H-9530 in vic of large enemy convoy, bumper to bumper.

281810B: Intenso, heavy flak VALENCE. (O-0296)

(2) Aviation.

(a) 271710B: 2 ME-109's flying SE BOURGOIN (Y-2969). Recon mission: altitude 250 ft. No attack. Engaged by AAA. One hit in fuselage by 37mm. tearing off portion and causing plane to burst into flames. Crash verified by Frenchman vic CULIN (Y-2763). Both carried spare fuel tanks, indicating planes came from long-distance bases. Destroyed by 106th AAA Bn.

(b) 280700B: 2 ME-109's strafed highway out of GRENOBLE, flying very low from N to S. Engaged by AAA of 106th AAA Bn (SP) Bn. Several hits observed. No planes reported damaged.

(c) 280745B: Enemy AAA fire damaged a P-47 which crashed vic O-0729.

(d) 280955B: 2 ME-109's flying low from W to E over DROME River toward CREST (O-1373). Engaged by C Btry. 443rd AAA Bn (SP) Bn. Alt. 100 ft. 1 plane hit by 37mm. and 50 cal. fire. Crashed at O-227720. The planes were on strafing and recon missions. No casualties.

(e) 281015B: 2 ME-109's over GRENOBLE on recon mission. Flying in the valley to SW engaged at tree-top level by 106th AAA Bn (SP) Bn. 50 Cal. hits observed. One seen to be damaged.

(3) Engineers.

Large explosions and fires between LIVRON (N-9877) and VALENCE (O-0296) were reported.

(4) Infantry.

(a) VI Corps.

The enemy continued to withdraw from the MONTEILIER - L. COUCOURDE (N-9464) pocket suffering heavy casualties in equipment and personnel. At L. BATTIE ROLLAND (O-0154), 100 infantry and 3 AT guns were overrun by our troops and the town reoccupied. Strong delaying actions were offered by the enemy opposing the US 3d Div. which increased its pressure from the S on the MONTEILIER pocket. Advance elements in this sector broke through the enemy delaying line vic TAULIGNAN (O-1042) - GRIGNAN (O-0438) - DONZERE (N-8941) in the face of very stiff resistance, which included artillery, mortars and AAA fire. A double column of enemy vehicles 2 kms. in length was captured in this area. Heavy resistance was also met vic N-9441, and contact continued vic O-0652. In the 36th Div. sector, the enemy continued to cross the DROME River despite our artillery fire on the ford.

By evening of the 28th, the enemy had practically completed his evacuation of the MONTEILIER pocket suffering heavy losses in men and materiel. The US 3rd Div. continued Northward meeting only sporadic resistance NE of MONTEILIER. In the 36th Div. sector, heavy traffic N on the MONTEILIER - LYON road continued. At MONTEILIER, itself, the enemy continued engaging our troops all day to

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keep his escape route open. He crossed the DROME River by 3 fords in the vic of LIVRON (N-9877). Subsequently, a rise in the river forced him to establish a pontoon bridge at this place. A pontoon bridge was also observed over the river W of LORIOL (N-9675). In the 45th Div. sector, no contact was reported with the enemy. Our roadblock at BOURGOIN (Y-2969) continued to be maintained. Reports from the FFI stated that the enemy had established roadblocks on all roads leading into LYON. FFI reports also stated that there are 1000 enemy troops dug in NW of LYON and that there are 300 enemy in VIENNE. (X-9861) 1st A/B TF: In this sector, enemy artillery fire increased slightly but infantry activity continued light. Artillery positions were believed to be generally located along the E bank of the LE LOUP River. Reports indicated that coastal defense guns in the NICE area are being dismantled and faced inland to assist in the defense of the VAR River. Task Force Butler: Forced to withdraw slightly in vic of LA COUCOURDE (N-9464) where they met extremely heavy resistance. Fighting, however, continued on the ridge E of the town. An enemy counterattack, of estimated 2 company strength, supported by tanks in the vic of N-9360, was repulsed with heavy losses to the enemy. Heavy resistance was also met in the vic of SAUZET (N-9759). French Army "B": During the morning 28 August, the garrison on ST. ANDRIER Peninsula surrendered, yielding between 1800/2000 prisoners, of which one was an Admiral. During the afternoon, the surrender of Marseille was completed and Gen. SCHAEFER of the 244th Inf. Div. was captured. Rem W of the RHONE River went as far as PONT ST. ESPRIT (N-8419) and REMOULINS, (S-7885) with no contact.

c. Miscellaneous.(1) Motor Movements.

Heavy traffic Northward and many destroyed and burning vehicles were reported from MONTELLIER to VLENCE as artillery fire and fighter planes continued to take their toll of the escaping remnants of the 11th Pz., 198th, 338th and 189th Divs. Reports from fighter groups total 189 M/T destroyed. Five missions between 0700B and 1800B from VLENCE to LYON reported a total of 424 M/T, including about 200 horse-drawn moving N on the RHONE, and a total of 55 scattered M/T moving N on the W side of the RHONE. Three missions over the ALP passes reported light scattered traffic, the largest movement was 18 M/T including 2 tanks moving NE at 045240. No movement was observed through LARCHE Pass. Two missions on road nets N of LYON gave no indications of reinforcement or large scale withdrawal. It would appear from air recon that the bulk of the Nineteenth Army is still S of LYON.

(2) Rail Movements.

TAC/R at IO15B, observed a 40-car train moving N from ELCON (S-9248) and a 20-car train moving slowly N at S-8507. S of LYON, TAC/R reported 1 train of 15 cars moving at X-9270 and 1 train of 15 cars moving N at X-9068.

(3) Naval.

FFI reports state that 5 enemy motor torpedo boats cruise at sea during the night and take refuge in NICE Port during the day, camouflaged by nets.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.a. PW Captured:

42,011 PWs were captured by the Seventh Army in Southern France by 28 August.

b. PW Statements.(1) 338th Artillery Regt.

PW's from the 2nd Bn. reported that the regiment went N several days ago.

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- (2) PW stated that the assembly point for the 148th Div. is at MENTON (Vs-7786)

#### 4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.

Continue delaying action along RHONE, and blocking on South-east approaches to LYON, in order to effect an assembling of his forces further to the North.

#### DISCUSSION.

The bulk of the 242nd, 241st, 148th and 157th Divisions must be assumed lost to the Nineteenth Army, although isolated battle groups from these units may be contacted from time to time to time.

Assuming that the 716th Div. is now present in the area of LIVRON, E of the RHONE, this would then give the Nineteenth Army the remnants of two Infantry Divisions (716th, 198th) and one Armored Division (11th), plus some miscellaneous battle groups available to continue the fight.

Although LYON can have very little military value to the enemy it will be necessary for him to defend temporarily in order to cover his withdrawal to the North. PW's from both the 11th Pz. and 198th Inf Divisions state that they had been told by their officers that they were to withdraw to DIJON and then into the West Wall.

North of LYON in the direction the enemy will follow in order to effect a junction with the remainder of the German Army are two main communication routes: the LYON - CHALLON - DIJON axis leading Northward to a junction with the main German armies, and the LYON - BOURG - BESANCON axis which leads toward the West Wall. The LYON - DIJON route is the main axis from South to North following the SONE River Valley and is the better of the two routes for fast movement; but it leads into the present battle area, a situation the Nineteenth Army Commander may be trying to avoid. The LYON - BESANCON route travels through more mountainous country but has the advantage of leading directly into Germany.

The enemy is faced with a desperate need for speed to evacuate into Germany before being cut off in the North. His alternative is continued delaying action from LYON Northward with the accompanying likelihood of being destroyed. His lack of vehicles and possible lack of gasoline places increasing importance on the railroad transportation out of LYON along the two routes mentioned above. Therefore, it is expected that the enemy will fight only where necessary in order to effect his extraction to the West Wall and it is anticipated that the 11th Pz. Div. will move Northward along one or both roads mentioned above, with the less mobile units attempting to escape into Germany by rail.

*William W. Quinn*  
WILLIAM W. QUINN  
Colonel, G. S. C.,  
A. C. of S., G-2.

Encl. Annex No. 1, Overlay.

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
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
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
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




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
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



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







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HEADQUARTERS 7TH ARMY  
 Annex No 1 to G-2 Periodic  
 Report No 10-250800 B  
 Quinn COL. G-2 Patch MAJ. GEN.

MAP SCALE 1:500,000

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HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH ARMY  
Office of the A. C. of S., G-2  
APO 758 US ARMY

From: 290800B Aug 44  
To : 300800B Aug 44

G-2 REPORT

Copy No. 39Ref. No. X-1640

No. 15

Map: GSGS 4249, EUROPE, 1:100,000.

Hq. Seventh Army  
In the Field  
301200B August 1944

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

- a. Enemy front line and forward elements - Annex No. 1, Overlay.  
b. Units in Contact.

(1) Identifications.11th Pz. Div.110th P.G. Regt.1st Bn.2nd Bn.

in MONTELIBAR area.

111th P.G. Regt. - vic LORIOL (N-9675).

90th P.G. Div. - FFI again reported elements this Div. were seen in the area ALBERTVILLE (WZ-1583) - ST. PIERRE de BAIBIGNY (J-9870) - and MODANE (K-4031).

189th Inf. Div.28th Res. Regt.1st Co.

NE of MARSANNE (O-0164).

198th Inf. Div.

Brig. Gen. Otto RICHTER, CG, 198th Div. captured vic LORIOL.

305th Inf. Regt.308th Inf. Regt.326th Inf. Regt.235th Arty. Regt.235th AT Bn.235th Fusilier (Rcn) Bn.235th Sig. Bn.

in MONTELIBAR area.

338th Inf. Div.MP Det. - MONTELIBAR area.716th Res. Div.736th Inf. Regt. - PW's taken by FFI at NIMES, 24/28 August.606th Ost. Bn. - PW's taken by FFI at NIMES, 24/28 August.669th Engr. Bn. - in MONTELIBAR area.(2) Organization and Strength.148th Res. Div.

PW's state that 75% of this Div. are non-Germans.

c. Supply and Evacuation Establishments.

PW's report that the ration dump for the 148th Res. Div. has moved to SAN REMO, ITALY, and that due to the acute shortage of gasoline, M/T are used only for evacuation of wounded and for urgent missions.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.a. General Summary.

Enemy resistance in the MONTELIBAR pocket collapsed during the morning of the 29th. He continued to cross the DROME River West of LIVRON and LORIOL (N-9675). LIVRON was taken with no opposition, but LORIOL was defended and subsequently successfully counter-attacked by the enemy. Seventh Army attempts to push West of the North - South line LIVRON - LORIOL met bitter resistance. On the Northwest flank increased enemy activity was

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reported. A small U. S. security force was pushed out of BRIANCON (P-3998), and considerable enemy activity and traffic was reported in the ST. JEAN (K-1538) - MODANE (K-4131) area. French Army "B" pushed West across the RHONE River West of AVIGNON but made no contact. On the extreme right flank demolitions were heard in the NICE area.

b. Operations of Component Elements.(1) Antiaircraft Artillery.

290735: Intense, accurate, light flak VALENCE.

(2) Artillery.

(a) VI Corps: During the morning enemy pack howitzers fired on BRIANCON (P-3998) and ST. PAUL (P-5056). During the afternoon forward elements in the vic of BRIANCON received considerable mixed caliber artillery fire. On the high ground E of highway 7 mixed caliber artillery fire was received from self-propelled guns, tanks, and flak wagons located on highway 7, between the 61st and 67th Northing.

(3) Aviation.

291515B: 2 ME 109's on a recon mission flew low along road S of BOURGOIN (Y-2969). Aircraft were spotted by 106 MM A W Bn. vic J-4151, but were so low that fire could not be brought to bear because of danger of hitting our troops. Aircraft flew as low as 25 ft.

(4) Engineers.

The following is a list of changes and additions to the bridge list appearing in G-2 Bulletin No. 9, 27 Aug 1944.

1. Changes:

Bridge numbers 29, 75, 535 should be changed to read: "29...Photo".

2. Additions:a. Road Bridges.

90.	LIVRON	BN-955772	Drome	In (New)	29	Photo
91.	MONTÉLIMAR	BN-920537	Roubions	Out	29	Photo
92.	PUYGIRON	BN-990528	Jabron	Out	29	Photo
93.	CHAROLS	BO-075582	Roubions	Out	29	Photo
94.	SETE	BS-098245	Canal	Out	29	Photo
95.	SETE	BS-105241	Canal	Out	29	Photo
96.	SETE, N.	BS-122258	Canal	Out	29	Photo
97.	SOLOMEL	BK-525076	Minor Stream	Out	29	Photo
98.	SAUZE	QH-382211	Minor Stream	Out	29	Photo
99.	PERRERE	QH-5718	Minor Stream	Out	29	Photo
100.	LENTOULLES	QH-5826	Minor Stream	Out	29	Photo
101.	MENTOULLES	QH-5827	Minor Stream	Out	29	Photo

b. Railroad Bridges.

550.	SETE, N.	BS-111258	Canal	Out	29	Photo
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(5) Infantry.

(a) VI Corps. During the night, an enemy counterattack recaptured LORIOL (N-9675). During the morning enemy resistance in the MONTÉLIMAR (N-9153) - LE COUCORDE (N-9484) - SAUZET (N-9759) pocket collapsed, and scattered resistance was being mopped up. Our troops encountered no resistance in occupying LIVRON (N-9877), but met some scattered resistance W of there. An enemy delaying action N of LIVRON with AT guns, MG's and small arms, developed. By 1200B, an enemy counter-attack of estimated regimental size supported by 12 tanks was reported forming W of LORIOL. An enemy roadblock E of BRIANCON (P-3998) held by an estimated one bn. was reported and also a strong point at P-470985. The enemy established a roadblock at K-2330 covered by an estimated 2 platoons, and a roadblock of 2 light tanks and 2 MG's at J-2011.

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During the afternoon mopping up of scattered resistance N of MONTPELLIER continued. Our attacks Westward through LORIOU and LIVRON (N-9877) were heavily opposed by enemy infantry. Further to the E the enemy forced our withdrawal W and S from BRIANCON and captured the town. Enemy activity in the ST. JEAN (K-1538) - MODANE (K-4131) area was reported. Enemy infantry supported by armor was active vic BOURG PELAGE (J-1408) and BEAUREPAIRE (J-1241). Although enemy traffic on highway 7, decreased considerably late in the afternoon, the enemy continued to cross the DROME river at N-945773. Enemy attempts to evacuate RR guns and tanks along the RR N of MONT-ELIER were protected by enemy roadblocks in the BOURG de PELAGE (J-1408)- BEAUREPAIRE (J-1241) area.

1st A/E TF.

Demolitions were heard in NICE and to the N of town.

French Army "B"

Elements of French Army "B" reached ST. GILLES (S-6855), PONT ST. ESPRIT (N-8419), ILES and BAGNOLS Sur CEZE (N-8309) with no new identifications reported. No contact was reported by elements occupying NIMES and UZES (S-6892). Further ren to ALAIS (N-4005) and BOURG ST. ANDEOL (N-8333) reported no contact with the enemy.

c. Miscellaneous.

(1) Motor Movements.

The FFI reported heavy traffic including artillery on the MODANE (K-4131) - ST JEAN DE MAURIENNE (K-1438)- road (MT. CENIS Pass). Heavy traffic was again observed on the road immediately E of the RHONE and subjected to continual strafing. Moderate traffic was reported around ST. ETIENNE (X-6050) at 0930B, otherwise four missions on the road nets W of the RHONE to LE PUY (H-2107) saw little movement. Three missions over the CENIS - GENEVRE and LARCHE Passes saw only light scattered traffic. Two missions N of LYON reported very little movement. Fighter-bombers saw 25 M/T moving N into MACON (S-9248) at 0800B.

(2) Rail Movements.

Enemy continued to use rail line from VALENCE to LYON. One ammunition train S of VALENCE exploded after being strafed and the locomotive of another train moving S at ST. RAMBERT (H-9435) was left in flames. Further W, a locomotive with 30 cars moving N at X-4691 was strafed and the locomotive destroyed.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. PW Captured.

52,000 (approx.) PW's were captured by the Seventh Army in Southern France as of 300800B August.

b. PW Statements.

PW's reported that the artillery personnel in the NIMES area had received orders to return to GERMANY by their own resources.

c. Weather Forecast.

31 August: Clear in night and dawn with low clouds during the day. Scattered showers in afternoon in mountains. Visibility 12 miles. Surface wind from the South at about 12 MPH.

1st September: Scattered clouds and no rain.

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.

No change. (See G-2 Periodic Report No. 14 dated 29 Aug.)

*William W. Quinn*

WILLIAM W. QUINN  
Colonel, G. S. C.,  
A. C. of S., G-2.

Encl: Annex No. 1 - Overlay

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
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
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
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Annex N° 1 to G-2 Periodic  
Report N° 15-300800 B  
Quinn Patch  
COL G-2 LT. GEN.  
Map Scale 1:500,000

Major Weyler:  
Please include marked  
sections in Int/Spec  
for Annex 4 Sept.

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HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH ARMY  
Office of the A. C. of S., G-2  
APO 758 US ARMY

From: 300800B Aug 44  
To : 310800B Aug 44

## G-2 REPORT

Hq. Seventh Army  
In the Field  
311200B August 1944

Copy No. 112

Ref. No. X-1654

No. 16

Map: GSGS 4249, EUROPE, 1:100,000.

## 1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

- a. Enemy front line and forward elements - Annex No. 1, Overlay.  
b. Units in Contact.

## (1) Identifications.

## 11th Pz. Div.

## 11th P.G. Regt.

2nd Bn. - in LORIOL (N-9675) area.

## 61st AT Bn.

## 61st Med. Det.

in LORIOL area.

## 90th P.G. Div.

## 200th Gren. Regt.

PW reported captured by Chief of FFI  
in BRIANCON (P-3998) area.

## 716th Res. Div.

## 726th Res. Regt.

1st Co. - LIVRON (N-9978) area.

## 736th Res. Regt.

## 716th Engr. Bn.

## 1716th Arty Regt.

Stragglers of these units captured  
by 3rd Div. S of LIVRON. (N-9878).

## 665th Ost. Bn.

## 624th Ost. Bn.

in LIVRON area.

## 71st G.A.F. Regt.

## 2nd Bn.

By PW's captured by FFI on roadblock between  
LYON and BOURG (T-2338).

## (2) Organization and Strength.

## (a) 11th Pz. Div.

PW's stated that the Div. now has a maximum strength  
of 40 tanks.

## (b) 338th Inf. Div.

## 757th Inf. Regt.

Regimental Surgeon stated all medical personnel  
in this unit are now armed.

## (c) LXXV Corps.

A document captured in the 1st A/B TF area indicates  
that the LXXV Corps is responsible for the defense of the  
Western ALPS to the Mediterranean Sea along the French-  
Italian border, and the Ligurian coast from the West  
front to ST. LORENZO al MARE.The mission of the LXXV Corps will be to prevent  
the U.S. Seventh Army from swinging Eastward through  
the ALPS into Northern ITALY. According to the document  
the following divisions are assigned to LXXV Corps to  
accomplish this mission:157th Res. Div. to the N opposite BERNARD & CENIS  
Pass.

5th Mtn. Div. in the center opposite LARCHE Pass.

148th Res. Div. on the left or Southern flank, with  
Div. Hqs. at SOSPEL (Vs-7497).

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The following units are attached to 148th Res. Div.:

4th High Mtn. Bn.  
Mittenwald Mtn. Demonstration Bn.  
80th Regt. Combat Group, including 2nd Bn. of the  
80th Regt., 34th Fusilier Bn. Reinforced, and a  
Btry of Italian Mtn. Arty. This combat group,  
according to the document, will be relieved the  
night 2/3 September.

Mtn. Regt. z.b.V. Meeralpen

The same document which detailed the mission and organization of LXXIV Corps, stated that the above-named Regt. will carry out tasks determined by 90th P.G. Div., and will proceed to defense reserve sector.

(7th Army G-2 Report)

*Comment: Some formations from the  
space taken within, which now  
appear to be relatively  
to be made available in the identical  
sector, as suggested by the  
above document.*

## 2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

### a. General Summary.

Along the east bank of the Rhone river, the enemy continued to withdraw northward, fighting a stubborn rear-guard action in the early part of the period, but breaking contact North of LIVRON (N-9978) during the afternoon. He also protected the east flank of his column strongly and two stiff engagements were fought during the day, one at O-0295 (Southeast of VALENCE) and the other at BOURG du PEAGE (J-1403). In the extreme north, elements of the 45th Div moved northward east of LYON as far as AMBERIEU (T-3411) and MEXIMIEUX (T-2104) without contacting the enemy. On the extreme right flank, elements of the 1st A/B TF entered NICE and LEVENZO (Vs-5497) which has been evacuated by the 148th Res. Div. French Army "B" made contact with two disorganized groups of enemy in VALLON (N-6336) and North of BOURG ST. ANDEOL (N-8333).

An enemy field order captured in the 1st A/B TF sector revealed the enemy intentions regarding the ALPS passes. These appear to be purely defensive and involve the 157th Res Div, the 5th Mtn Div, the 148th Res Div from North to South with the 90th P.G. Div. in defensive reserve.

Motor movements for the day showed the enemy to be still moving North from VALENCE in the direction of LYON. Only scattered movement was seen in the ALPS passes.

### b. Operations of Component Elements.

#### (1) Airlandcraft Artillery.

300550B: Scant, inaccurate, heavy flak VALENCE. (O-0295)  
301100B: Intense, accurate, light flak J-0003.

#### (2) Armored Force.

1007R at 1000B reported 20 tanks moving N at H-9343.

#### (3) Aviation.

300755B: 2 ME 109's approached RHONE Valley from N bearing E near ALLEX (O-0477), proceeding along the DROIE River towards CREST (O-1273). Before reaching CREST, planes turned S and disappeared. E/A flew extremely low altitude, AA fire limited due to danger of hitting friendly troops.

301125B: 2 ME 109's flew recon mission S over BOUVESSE (Y-3993), at cruising speed and very low altitude.

301130B: 2 ME 109's carrying belly tanks, strafed troops of 179th Inf. in MEXIMIEUX (T-2104) area, along Highway 84. LAA engaged and probably destroyed one of the attacking planes.

#### (4) Infantry.

##### (a) VI Corps.

Activity along Highway 7 in the vic of LIVRON (N-9978) and LORIOL (N-9675) decreased during the period as the enemy withdrew to the N. An estimated 1500 enemy in

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a pocket vic N-9378 were reported. N of the DROME River the road between ETOILE (O-0285) and MONTISON (O-0681) was reported clear of the enemy. BEAUMONT (O-0588) and road junction at O-1108 were found to be clear of the enemy. BOURG du PELLE (J-1408) was occupied about noon after reduction of stiff enemy resistance which included enemy tanks. At the same time further to the N in the vic J-187412, U.S. patrols received small arms fire and contacted 2 armored vehicles. SE of VALENCE (O-0295), the 36th Division's Northward advance encountered stiff resistance at O-1292.

Late in the afternoon the enemy broke contact N of LIVRON after fighting bitterly all morning. In the 45th Division sector, U.S. elements advanced Northward E of LYON as far as AMBERIEU (T-3411) and HEXIMIEUX (T-2104) without contacting the enemy. Further Eastward, U.S. troops established a roadblock at AIGUEBELLE (Z-0967). This block cuts the Mt. GENIS MODANE (K-4031) - CHAMBERY (Y-8069) route from ITALY into FRANCE. No enemy had approached the roadblock at last report.

## (b) French Army "B".

French troops occupied BOURG ST. ANDEOL (N-8333), NIMES and reconnoitered beyond LUNEL (S-4454). No enemy contact was reported. Later in the period, contact was gained with an enemy force estimated at 1000 men N of BOURG ST. ANDEOL (N-8333). In VALLON (N-6336), a disorganized force of approximately 3,000 enemy, were reported to be raping and pillaging the country.

## (c) 1st A/B Task Force.

Friendly patrols succeeded in entering NICE during the early part of the period. Subsequently, U.S. troops entered the town in force and moved in to LEVENZO (Vs497). Enemy mines and booby-traps were found in the NICE area as the 148th Div. withdrew Eastward under pressure of the 1st A/B TF advance.

The road from CONDOMINE (P-5049) - ST. PAUL (P-5055) was under artillery fire throughout the day. CONDOMINE was burned by the enemy. In the vic of CONDOMINE - JAUSIERS (P-5044) enemy patrols were active.

## (d) Task Force BIBO.

Reports from FFI indicated that they have lost COL de LARCHE (P-5949), BARCELONETTE (P-4440) and BRIANCON (P-3997), to the enemy. The latter town was burned by the Germans.

## e. Miscellaneous.

## (1) Motor Movements.

A total of 483 vehicles including 20 tanks and 10 horse-drawn guns were observed moving N on the E side of the RHONE during the day. A total of 264 vehicles, including 100 horse-drawn, and very heavy traffic moving N from GIVORS (X-9067), to X-9072 were reported on the W bank of the RHONE. In addition, a late TAC/R mission reported 200 horse-drawn vehicles, 100 M/T and many troops moving N on both sides of the river N of VALENCE at 1750B. The movement out of VALENCE is reported to have continued throughout the night.

Four missions on the road nets LE PUY (H-2107) - CLERMONT-FERRAND (W-5887) ST. ETIENNE (X-6050) observed very light movement and 30 M/T parked in LE PUY.

Three missions over the GENIS - GENEVRE and LARCHE passes again observed light scattered traffic.

Four missions N of LYON reported very little traffic with no significant trend

## (2) Rail Movements.

35-car train moving W at DIGOIN (S-2666) was reported by TAC/R at 1035B.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

C O N F I D E N T I A L3. MISCELLANEOUS.a. Estimated Enemy Losses.

VI Corps reported on 30 August the following losses of enemy equipment and personnel scattered along Highway 7, vic MONTELIBAR, for 18 kms.:

2000 M/T mostly destroyed  
1000 horses  
100/200 enemy killed  
20 - 75mm AT guns  
12 - 88mm AA guns  
3 - Batteries of artillery  
1 Mk V tank  
6 railway guns of up to 14.6 in caliber  
40 - 50 20mm AA guns  
8 - 10 SP guns  
Large quantities personal equipment.

b. PW Captured.

54,997 PW's captured by the Seventh Army in Southern France as of 310800B August.

c. Weather Forecast.

1 September

RHONE valley South - cloudy in morning, clearing afternoon. Rhone Valley North - cloudy throughout day. Rain showers early morning and thunderstorms in afternoon. Wind will be SE, shifting to W, 15-18 MPH. Colder tomorrow afternoon. Visibility 2-4 miles morning, becoming unlimited afternoon.

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.

No change (See G-2 Periodic Report #14 dated 29 Aug)

*William W. Quinn*  
WILLIAM W. QUINN  
Colonel, G. S. C.,  
A. C. of S., G-2.

Encl: Annex No. 1, Overlay

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HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH ARMY  
Office of the A. C. of S., G-2  
APO 758 US ARMY

From: 010800B Sept 44  
To : 020800B Sept 44

G-2 REPORT

Hq. Seventh Army  
In the Field  
021200B September 1944

Copy No. 38

Ref. No. X-1667

No. 18

Map: GSGS 4249, EUROPE, 1:100,000.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

a. Enemy front line and forward elements - Annex No. 1, Overlay.

b. Defensive Organization.

Reports dated 31 August indicate there is a German delaying position near LYON running from FEYZIN (X-9677) to GENAS (Y-0785).

c. Units in Contact.

(1) Identifications.

11th Pz. Div.

119th Art. Regt.

3rd Bn. in vic of MONTENILMAR.

5th M. Bde. - vic MONTENILMAR.

Elements 71st Flieger Regt. - JAMMEYRAS (Y-1587)

(2) Organization and Strength.

338th Inf. Div. Battle Group.

Captured document dated 22 August gives the following units as components of the 338th Inf. Div. Battle Group:

757th Regt. staff

993rd Regt. staff

1st Bn. of 244th Arty Regt.

1st Bn. of 338th Arty Regt.

338th Sig. Bn.

Engt. Co.

338th M. Co.

Remnants of 242nd Inf. Div. and 716th March Bn., were attached to 338th Div. Battle Group. Other miscellaneous unit in Northwest withdrawal 640th RR Arty Bn, including one Naval RR Arty Btry.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

a. General Summary.

The enemy continued his withdrawal North of LYON during the period. He allowed U.S. Troops to cross the AIN almost unopposed but when their advance Northwest appeared to threaten the BOURG (T-2339) - LYON road stiff opposition was offered by the enemy along the general line MONTLUEL (Y-1196) - CHALMONT (T-1914). This consisted mainly of well defended road blocks. One counterattack was launched in the vic LEXIMIEUX (T-2104) supported by tanks. This engagement continued throughout the afternoon of the 1st September. Elements of the 36th Division advanced up the East bank of the RHONE with slight opposition until late afternoon when tank and mortar fire was received vic Y-0078, a few miles South of LYON.

To the North of BOURG elements of the 117 Rcn Sqdn reached TREFORT (T-3446) with no contact.

The situation remained quiet along the East flank of Seventh Army.

French Army "B" pushed up the West bank of the RHONE to a line ST. AGREVE (H-6204) - VALENCE without contact.

Observation of M/T movement was hampered by weather.

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C O N F I D E N T I A Lb. Operations of Component Elements.(1) Armored Force.

At 011245B, enemy infantry supported by mortars and 6-8 tanks, counterattacked in the vic of HEXIMIEUX (T-2204). This engagement was still going on at 1740B and PW's reported 30 tanks in the vicinity.

(2) Engineers.

The following changes to the Road and Rail bridge report listed in Section II, "Communications", G-2 Information Bulletin No. 9, dated 27 August 1944, have been noted.  
Changes: (Refer to previously listed bridges by number)

Number 31 change status to OUT, date to 1 Sept., source to VI Corps.  
Number 32 and 33 change date to 1 Sept., source to VI Corps.

Additions:Road Bridges

NUMBER	LOCATION	CO-ORDINATE	OBSTACLE	STATUS	DATE	SOURCE
122	Digoin, E.	WS-284654	Minor Stream	Damaged	29	Visual
123	Hauterives	BJ-110318	Galaure	Out	31	VI Corps
124	Pont de					
	1'Isere	EH-999028	Isere	Out	31	VI Corps
125	Chateaufort	BJ-050052	Isere	Out	31	VI Corps
126	Briancon, S.	BP-3693	Durance	Out	1 Sept	Photo
127	Jons	WY-141940	Rhone	Out	1 Sept	VI Corps
128	St. Maurice	WY-236947	Lin	In	1 Sept	VI Corps
129	Neuville	WT-352244	Lin	In	1 Sept	VI Corps

(3) Infantry.(a) French Army "B".

French Army "B" moved N on the W bank of the RHONE to general line VALENCE - ST. AGARVE (H-6204) without contacting the enemy. Late in the afternoon, French troops occupied TOURNON (H-9610) and MONTAUCON (H-5522).

(b) VI Corps.

During the early part of the period the enemy continued to build up a cover position S and E of LYON - BOURG EN BRESSE (T-2338). In the 36th Div. sector a recon patrol received small arms fire at J-1841, but made no contact at COTE ST. ADRE (Y-2948) or at ST. JEAN (Y-1959). In the 45th Div. sector small arms fire was received at T-2611 and a fire fight took place at T-1814. Subsequently, the enemy pushed US recon elements out of CHALLMONT (T-1914) and occupied FAREMANS (T-1804), MONTAUCON (Y-1198) and D. GNEUX (Y-1398). In the Alpine pass sector, no enemy activity took place around the U.S. roadblock at LIGUEBELLE (Z-1067).

During the afternoon the enemy continued to withdraw Northward from LYON and appeared worried over the E flank at U.S. troops crossed the LIN river NE of LYON. The 36th Div. continued N up the RHONE Valley meeting little opposition. In the 3rd Div. sector, the area elements of an enemy convoy, attempting to escape from LYON, were overtaken in vic J. MEYRAS (Y-1587), and 100 PW's from the 71st Flieger Regt. were taken. These PW's stated that LYON was practically empty of enemy troops. The 45th Div. after crossing the LIN River, began to encounter opposition in the form of roadblocks covered by infantry and tanks, which appeared to be a screening operation to cover the enemy retreat. Blocks were encountered at PONT D'AIN (T-3321), CHALLMONT (T-1915), PONT DE CHLEY (T-2505), and MONTAUCON (Y-1198). In the vic of TREFPORT (T-3446) no contact was gained. At 1245B enemy infantry supported by mortars and 6 - 8 tanks launched a counterattack in the vic of

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HEXIMIEUX. At 1740B the enemy was still fighting. At 1730 enemy mortar and tank was encountered South of LYON vic Y-0078.

1st A/B Task Force.

In this sector the enemy continued to withdraw slightly to the E under pressure of U.S. elements.

c. Miscellaneous.

Intentions of the Nineteenth Army.

Captured document reveals the Nineteenth Army intentions to withdraw as rapidly as possible to the N and join the South wing of Army Group B.

Nineteenth Army, in order dated 29 August, states that a speedy withdrawal of XXXXV Corps is of utmost importance in order to relieve the 11th Pz. Div. for another assignment.

Still another document indicates IV GAF Corps including 716th Inf Div, Elements of 189th Res. Div and other misc units previously on the West bank of the RHONE are or were moving North on the West bank of the river.

3. MISCELLANEOUS

a. PW Captured.

50, 531 PW's captured by the Seventh Army in Southern France as of 020800B September.

b. PW Statements

PW's from the 110th P.G. Regt. stated that 30 tanks were slated to attack HEXIMIEUX (T-2204).

c. Weather Forecast.

3 September: Rain and low clouds during the day. Thunderstorms in the afternoon. Visibility six miles at dawn, becoming unrestricted in afternoon. Surface winds Southwest 15 to 20 MPH. Temperature cooler. Further outlook for September 4, cloudy and scattered showers.

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.

Delay at LYON; meanwhile with his mobile elements, screen the LYON, BOURG, LOW LE SAUMIER Axis from the Southeast in order that the remainder of the Nineteenth Army may escape to the North and Northeast.

DISCUSSION OF CAPABILITIES.

In view of the rapidity of the Allied advance Eastward in Northern France, a defense or delay in the LYON - DIJON - BESANCON triangle can now have little military value to the enemy. Therefore, it can be assumed that his immediate desire is to withdraw with the utmost haste to the Northeast in order to effect a junction with Army Group B to the North. At the moment it would appear that the most logical place for this junction would be behind the West Wall. That the West Wall is the ultimate objective of the Nineteenth Army is borne out by PW statements and captured documents.

Considering the enemy's present situation in regard to mobility and the losses he has taken in personnel and equipment enroute North to his present location, it should not be expected that he will fight at any point other than at those localities necessary to effect his extraction.

Out of LYON the enemy has two main escape routes North and to the Northeast: LYON - CHALON - DIJON and LYON - BOURG - BESANCON.

The crossing of the AIN river by our own troops without opposition from the enemy indicated earlier that the LYON - BOURG - BESANCON route was of secondary importance; however, the enemy has now reacted strongly to this threat by heavily engaging our forces North of the AIN river with infantry and tanks, suggesting that he intends to use this route also.

The LYON - CHALON - DIJON route is probably the better of the two escape routes, having more parallel roads and following established supply routes, but it has the disadvantage of leading away from the more desirable direction of retreat. It is likely, however, that the enemy

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will utilize this route, but somewhere along the way North he must swing East or face the danger of isolation from the remainder of the remainder of the German Army in the North.

In conclusion, it should be expected that the enemy will continue his rapid disengagement actions, fighting only where necessary to effect his extraction. It is doubtful that he will be willing to continue to sacrifice his only mobile unit, the 11th Panger Division, in order to get his entire force to the North. It then becomes likely that some of the less mobile units, unable to keep up, may be sacrificed.

*William W. Quinn*  
WILLIAM W. QUINN  
Colonel, G. S. C.,  
A. C. of S., G-2

Incls: Annex No. 1, Overlay

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COL G-2 LT GEN

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HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH ARMY  
Office of the A. C. of S., G-2  
APO 758 US ARMY

From: 020800B Sept 44  
To : 030800B Sept 44

G-2 REPORTCopy No. 39Ref. No. X-1671

No. 19

Map: GSGS 4249, EUROPE, 1:100,000.

Hq. Seventh Army  
In the Field  
031200B September 1944

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.a. Enemy front line and forward elements - Annex No. 1, Overlay.b. Units in Contact.(1) Identifications.11th Pz. Div.

209th Engr. Bn. by PW's taken vic of bridge over the AIN River vic T-2611. PW's stated their mission was to blow bridges in the vic of CHALAMONT (T-1915).

Field Repl. Bn.1st Co. -

by PW's captured at T-3127. PW's stated the mission was to delay our advance, and that there were two or three companies of 60 or 70 men on the same road.

1021st Sich. Bn.

at ST. ETIENNE DU BOIS (X-6151).

(2) Organization and Strength.(a) 11th Pz. Div.

PW's from the 209th Engr. Bn. captured vic T-2611 stated that 11th Pz. Div. had withdrawn to BELFORT (JA-3393), and that the Div. Rcn. Bn. had been left to fight a rear guard action.

(b) Field Repl. Bn. of 11th Pz. Div.

PW's captured say that their mission was to delay our advance with the help of two or three other companies. These companies were stated to have a strength of 60 or 70 men. PW's said they had no MG's, AT guns, artillery or tanks.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.a. General Summary.

The enemy continued his withdrawal North of LYON, while continuing to screen the SE flank of his axis of withdrawal. By 022000B the U.S. 36th Div. reported the city of LYON clear of enemy south and east of the Rhone River. In the U.S. 45th Div. sector road blocks were encountered on the BOURG (T-2337) - AMBERIEUX (T-3411) road and in the CHALAMONT (T-1915) area. French Army "B" reported contact in the BRIANCON (P-3998) area. West of the Rhone French troops reached the outskirts of LYON without contact. Observation of M/T movement was again hampered by weather.

b. Operations of Component Elements.(1) Armored Forces.

(a) At 021430B unknown number of tanks observed at T-275293 and fired on by our artillery.

(b) 4 enemy tanks were observed during the morning in CHALAMONT (-1915) and 12 on the road N from CHALAMONT.

(2) Antiaircraft Artillery.

311140B: 2 ME 109's flying N along Highway 75 strafed the road just N of GRENOBLE. Altitude very low. No reported damage. Planes not within range of AA.

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311724Z: 2 ME 109's strafing E along Highway 85 in the vic of RIVES (J-450438). Altitude: 300 feet. Engaged by 50 cal. MG's of 72d AAA Gun Bn. One plane probably destroyed.

(3) Engineers.

Agents report a minefield on the road E from ST. LAURAIT de MURE (Y-1180) and on the route NATIONALE to BROWN (Y-0085)

(4) Infantry.(a) VI Corps.

During the very early morning 2 Sept, U.S. recon elements E of BOURG (T-2337) were engaged in a fire fight at T-310391. They estimated the enemy strength to be about 75 infantrymen. At Y-156874 in the vic of JANNEYRIAS (Y-1587), where they had been fighting a delaying action, the enemy broke contact a little later in the morning.

In the 36th Div. sector, light resistance was offered by the enemy during the day, S of LYON, but by 2000B the city was clear S and E of the RHONE River. German pockets, however, remained in portions of the city N of the RHONE and E of the SAONE Rivers.

In the 45th Div. sector, an enemy roadblock supported by infantry and tanks was encountered in the CHALLMONT (T-1915) sector and another across the AMBERIEU (T-3411) - BOURG road.

In the 1st A/B Task Force sector, reports from patrols indicated that the enemy's main position was believed to be along the general line LENTON (Vs-7786) - CASTILLON (Vs-7593) - SOSPEL (Vs-7498).

French Army "B" Troops: In the 2nd DIM sector contact was maintained with the enemy in the vic of BRIANCON (P-3998). The enemy confined his action in this sector to sporadic mortar firing and patrolling. This mortar fire fell on LA RYES (6 kms. S of BRIANCON), LE LANS (2 kms S of CERVIERES (P-4695) and PRELLES (P-3592). The enemy was believed to occupy LA CROIX DE PRETANE, PUY ST. ANDRE (P-3695) and TERRE ROUGE (6164) NE of BRIANCON, the enemy was patrolling as far as ST. CHEFFREY (K-3700).

French II Corps: In this sector, French troops continued to advance rapidly N on the W bank of the RHONE River and at last report were approaching the outskirts of LYON with no enemy contact reported. By 1730B, French patrols had occupied ST. ETIENNE (K-6150), and had reconnoitered beyond ST. CHAMOND (K-7055).

c. Miscellaneous.(1) Motor Movements.

Weather again restricted TAC/R and fighter-bomber observation. One mission during the morning in the LYON area observed no movement from LYON to BOURG, and only 10 M/T moving NE out of BOURG. Light, scattered movement was reported on secondary roads N of BOURG.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.a. PW Captured.

61,716 PW's captured by the Seventh Army in Southern France as of 030800B September.

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.

Withdraw rapidly to the Northeast along the axis of the BOURG (T-2337), LONS LE SAUNIER (T-4591), BESANCON (O-7955) Highway, screening from the South with engineers and mobile elements meanwhile assembling

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ling the remainder of the Nineteenth Army East of the BELFORT (WA-3393) Corridor for further action.

DISCUSSION.

Reference is made to the discussion of the enemy capabilities in G-2 Periodic Report No. 18.

The lightly opposed occupation of LYON this last evening, the nature of the resistance in the CHALAMONT (T-1915) - BOURG sector, and statements of PW's all indicate that the Nineteenth Army is concerned primarily with extracting itself to a more favorable locality where it can participate in the Battle of Germany.

The danger of being cut off from effecting a junction with the German Army now in Northern France and the unfavorable nature of the terrain Southwest of the VOSGES Mountains make it appear unlikely that the enemy will offer any major defense or delay West of the BELFORT Corridor.

*William W. Quinn*  
WILLIAM W. QUINN  
Colonel, U. S. C.,  
A. C. of S., G-2

Encl: Annex No. 1, Overlay

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

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
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


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HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH ARMY  
Office of the A. C. of S., G-2  
APO 758 US ARMY

From: 030800B Sept 44  
To : 040800B Sept 44

Hq. Seventh Army  
In the Field  
041200B September 1944

G-2 REPORT

Copy No. 34

Ref. No. X-1675

No. 20.

Map: GSGS 4249, EUROPE, 1:100,000

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

- a. Enemy front line and forward elements - Annex No. 1, Overlay.
- b. Defensive Organization.  
TAC/R on 3 September observed 154 open top concrete pillboxes covering a road junction at S-7858.
- c. Units in Contact.  
(1) Identifications.  
171st Repl. Bn. by PW's captured vic JASSERONS (T-3039).
- d. Artillery.  
(1) An active enemy battery at T-234318 was observed during the night 02/03 September.  
(2) During the morning 3 September, 1-80mm. gun was reported firing from T-234502.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

- a. General Summary.  
The enemy continued to withdraw his forces north along the LYON, MACON (S-9248), DIJON (C-0561) axis while screening his withdrawal to the southeast. This screening movement appears to be a continuation of his tactics first noticeable when U.S. forces crossed the AIN river. It manifested itself by delaying actions fought in the vic of BOURG (T-2337) in this case. A slight increase in arty fire was noted during the period. Large enemy M/T and H/D movements were again observed during daylight north of MACON on the MACON - DIJON road.
- b. Operations of Component Elements.
  - (1) Antiaircraft Artillery.  
3 September: Scant, inaccurate, heavy flak MACON (S-9248); intense, accurate, heavy flak CHAGNY (N-8415) to DIJON (C-0561); scant, inaccurate, heavy and light flak CHALON (N-9202) area.
  - (2) Armored Forces.
    - (a) Two enemy Mk VI tanks were seen at T-285285 during the night 02/03 September and one was seen at MONTMARLE (T-350428).
    - (b) Around noon enemy tanks moving N from BOURG (T-2337) engaged elements of 117th Rcn. Sqdn.
    - (c) U.S. troops were reported attacked about mid-day by an unknown number of tanks at MONTREVEL (T-1452).
  - (3) Artillery.
    - (a) Enemy artillery fire was encountered by U.S. troops attacking JASSERONS (T-3039) during the night 02/03 September and was believed to be coming from enemy artillery firing from the W of JASSERONS.
    - (b) During the morning enemy artillery fire from a Westerly direction fell E of MONTREVEL (T-1452).
  - (4) Infantry.
    - (a) VI Corps.  
During the night, American patrols contacted the enemy at RAVONNAS (T-3133), JASSERONS (T-3039) and MONTAGNAT (T-2834). An American attack on JASSERONS

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## C O N F I D E N T I A L

at 030300B was met by artillery and small arms fire. No contact was met at MARLEUX (T-1122), TREFFORT (T-3345) and LA MONTELEUR (T-3852) by ren elements of the U.S. 3rd Div. During the morning 3 September, U.S. foot patrols pushed across the RHONE river at LYON and reported no enemy E of the SAONE river. After a fire fight which lasted two hours, the Eastern half of MONTREVEL (T-1452) was captured by elements of the 117th Ren Sqdn. However, enemy resistance in the form of snipers and infantry continued from the Western half of the village and by noon the troops were being attacked from the S by enemy tanks.

During the forenoon, fire fights with the enemy were reported to be taking place at T-265295 and T-260278. Enemy resistance continued at CEYZERAT (T-315355) at this time and an enemy roadblock was observed at T-260420.

During the afternoon the U.S. 45th Div. reported that BOURG (T-2337), LONS LE SAUNIER (T-4591) and CHAMPAGNOLE (T-7199) were occupied without contacting the enemy. However, the enemy were reported to be in PONTARLIER (Wp-0717), ARBOIS (O-6118) and DOLE (O-4038).

By morning of the 4th of September, elements of the U.S. 3rd Div. reached a point 12 miles N of POLIGNY (O-5709), and had not encountered the enemy.

French Army "B". During the morning, French troops entered VILLEFRANCHE (S-8513) with no enemy contact. During the afternoon stiff resistance was met at MOREZ (T-8376).

c. Miscellaneous.(1) Motor Movements.

During the morning TAC/R and fighter-bombers reported very heavy enemy movement on the axis MACON (S-9147) - CHALON (N-9202) - DIJON (O-0462).

500 horses and carts were seen N of CHALON at 0935B and were attacked by fighter-bombers who claimed 300 horses and carts destroyed, the remaining carts damaged and many personnel killed. 200 M/T were observed moving Northward from TOURNAI (S-9777) to CHAGNY (N-8415).

100 M/T and horse-drawn vehicles were seen moving Northward between MACON and DIJON, and 100 M/T from M-8605 to N-2500; both convoys were strafed, and 25 were claimed destroyed and 25 damaged.

40 M/T were seen moving from TOURNAI (S-9777) to CHALON and a 50-car train with 2 locomotives were seen moving from BEAUNE (N-9025) to DIJON. 100 M/T were seen moving E from M-8804.

TAC/R observed 200 M/T and one train moving N; and one train moving E from DIJON, early on the morning of 4 September.

An enemy column of tanks and other vehicles were observed moving E from CUISERY (T-0476) to LOUHANS (T-2185) on the morning of the 4th.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.a. Enemy Ruses.

VI Corps reported an enemy soldier in a U.S. uniform riding in a jeep fired on troops at T-2616.

b. PW Captured.

61, 117 PW's captured by the Seventh Army in Southern France as of 040800B September.

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.

No change. (See G-2 Report No. 19, dated 3 September 1944)

William W. Quinn  
Colonel, G. S. C.,  
A. C. of S., G-2.

Encl: Annex No. 1, Overlay.

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From: 040800B Sept 44  
To : 050800B Sept 44

Copy No. 120

G-2 REPORT

Ref. No. X-3

Hq. Seventh Army  
In the Field  
051200B September 1944

No. 21.

Map : GSGS 4249, EUROPE, 1:100,000.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

a. Enemy front line and forward elements - Annex No. 1, Overlay.

b. Defensive Organization

- (1) Agent's reports indicate that the enemy is making preparations for demolition of bridges over the RHONE - RHINE Canal, and the DOUBS River in the DOLE area (O-4037). The DOUBS River runs parallel to the probable future enemy line of withdrawal, and approximately perpendicular to the axis of advance of the Seventh Army. Major roadnets North of this river lead toward the BELFORT corridor. The river, therefore, offers excellent possibilities to the enemy as a screening line to cover his withdrawal.
- (2) VI Corps Air OP's observed an enemy roadblock at T-235858 during the day.
- (3) PONTARLIER (Wp-0717) - Agents reported that on Sept 2nd there were three double machine guns and a few automatic weapons in the town. Two anti-tank guns were stated to have been placed on the road to MOUTHER (O-9934).
- (4) The road bridge over the LOUE River, at PARCEY (O-3929), is reported by agents to be guarded by enemy positions consisting of zig-zag trenches. The same source reports an enemy road block has been constructed at SOUVANS (O-4426), on the road from MONT SOUS VAUDREY (O-4825) to DOLE.

c. Units in Contact.

(1) Identifications.

11th Pz. Div.

111 PG Regt.

1st Bn. - Identified in the vic of HEXIMIEUX (T-2104).

71st Flieger Regt. - Elements identified vic VILLETE (T-2714).

(2) Organization and Strength.

(a) PONTARLIER (Wp - 0717).

Agents reported that there were 1200 enemy, commanded by a major, in this town as of 2 September. They have a German cadre but the troops themselves include Russians, Poles, and Hungarians.

(b) MOUTHE (T-9497).

Agents report 300 MT troops in this town.

(c) 716th Inf. Div.

Information from undated captured documents indicates that the 4th (Russian) Bn. of the 932nd Gren. Regt., and the 4th (Russian) Bn. of the 934th Gren. Regt., are under command of 716th Inf. Div.

(d) LXXV Corps.

The CO of the 8th Res. Regt. 148th Res. Div. captured by French partisans in NICE on 28 August confirmed the fact that LXXV Corps is under the Supreme Command of Field Marshal KESSELING.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

a. General Summary.

No contact by ground troops was made with the enemy main body during the period. Fairly sizeable groups of enemy were reported by agents to

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be in occupation of towns in the PONTARLIER (Wp-0717) area between the DOUB river and the Swiss border. M/T continued to move north to DIJON and one group of 200 M/T were observed moving north out of DIJON. Heavy movement NE from DOLE (O-3937) to BESANCON was reported by agents.

## b. Operations of Component Elements.

## (1) Armored Forces.

On Tuesday, 29 August, 16 FT (Renault) tanks came to the station at DOLE (O-3937), and were subsequently camouflaged in the forest at RUPPES (O-4140), according to reports from agents.

## (2) Aviation.

At 040735B, 3 ME 109s strafed the LYON - BOURGOIN (Y-3060) road from NW to SE. No damage reported and no planes damaged or destroyed.

## (3) Infantry.

## (a) VI Corps.

Until 042400B, contact with the enemy main body had not been made, but rcn and FFI reports indicated that contact was imminent.

A few enemy were reported to be in the town of SALINS (O-6921) during the day.

## c. Miscellaneous.

## (1) Motor Movement.

The only Tac/R report received during the day observed 200 plus MT running North out of DIJON, and three trains moving NW and one train moving NE from DIJON early on the morning of the 4th. This movement was reported in G-2 Report No. 20, 4 Sept. The destination of heavy traffic for the last two days into DIJON has not been observed, as this city is the limit of aerial rcn.

VI Corps Air OP's, at 0850B, reported enemy traffic bumper to bumper from LOUHANS (T-2185) to DIJON, and at 1130B observed a column of enemy tanks and vehicles moving NE into LOUHANS (T-2185). At 1600B, a large convoy was observed moving East into BESANCON.

Agents report a heavy movement along the DOLE (O-3937) - BESANCON highway.

## 3. MISCELLANEOUS.

## a. Shortage of Infantry Officers.

A captured IV GAF Corps order, dated 18 July, stated that there was a serious shortage of officers in the organization, and that it would be necessary to retrain arty and signal officers as Inf officers.

## b. PW Captured.

65,092 PW's captured by the Seventh Army in Southern FRANCE as of 050800B September.

## c. Weather.

## Weather Forecast 05/06 September:

Showers during night and ending by 1000B in morning. Sky will be cloudy until noon, then scattered clouds. Visibility 5 miles with haze and patches of ground fog, improving to over 15 miles by 0900B. Surface wind through night 5 m.p.h., shifting to NW at 15 m.p.h. after 0900B.

## 4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.

The Seventh Army was given the mission of establishing a beachhead East of TOULON exploiting up the RHONE River in the direction of LYON and VICHY.

Although VICHY has not been formally entered by our troops its importance as a military objective no longer exists. In the strictest sense, therefore, the assigned mission of Seventh Army has been accomplished and there remain no courses of action open to the enemy capable of interfering with its success. Therefore, his capabilities during the remainder of the current phase are limited to those which might adversely affect the accomplishment of an implied mission; of pursuit namely, to effect his escape before the trap can be closed, or to force his way out of the trap once it has been effected.

WILLIAM W. QUINN  
Colonel, G.S.C.,  
A. C. of S., G-2

Encl: Annex No. 1, Overlay

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
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
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


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


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
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Copy No. 34Ref. Nr. X-11

G-2 REPORT

No. 22.

From: 050800B Sept 44  
To : 060800B Sept 44

Hq. Seventh Army  
in the Field  
061200B September 1944

Map : GSGS 4249, EUROPE, 1:100,000.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

- a. Enemy front line and forward elements - Annex No. 1, Overlay.  
b. Defensive Organization.

- (1) An enemy defensive line on the N bank of the LOUE river between the confluence of the LOUE and the DOUBS river and route NATIONALE 83 (O-64) was reported. Heavy mg's, mortars and 1500 enemy were reported to be in this line. During the afternoon of 5 September, small arms fire was received by patrols in the region N of ARBOIS (O-6217).  
(2) On the army right flank, 1st A/B Task Force reported the enemy MLR on 4 September to be MT. AGEL - ST. AGNES (S-7489) - CASTILLON (S-7593) - BARBONNE - MT. ESCOBET and E of COL DE LARCHE (N-3562). Defended points E of PELLE were reported by 1st SSF.  
(3) U.S. 3rd Div. reported during the evening 5 September that the enemy had blown the bridge in the vic PARCEY (O-3829) on Highway 5, (O-4028) and had set up defenses there.

c. Units in Contact.(1) Identifications.11th Pz. Div.

11th Pz. Rcn. Bn. - elements identified vic MONTREVEL (T-4262) on 4 September.

119th Pz. Arty. Regt.

2nd Bn. - elements identified vic BOURG (T-2337) on 4 September.

16th Inf. Div.

Reported by SHAEF on 1 September to be in assembly area vic MONTBARD (N-5094). (Based on captured document)

30th S.S. Inf. Div.

Reported to be in the vic of DIJON by SHAEF (Information from P4).

(2) Organization and Strength.

1st Flieger Ausbildungs Div. (1st G.A.F. Training Div.)

Commanding General: Gen. Maj. WIELAND.

Excerpts from captured documents show the following component regiments:

22th )

32nd )

\* 63rd )

\* 71st )

\* 90th )

91st )

92nd )

G.A.F. Training Regiments.

No artillery, engineers, or other auxiliary units were indicated. The division appears to be designed as a training and replacement pool.

d. Artillery.

Enemy artillery was reported to be in position as follows:

3 Btrys vic Vs-749969

2 Btrys vic VS-735980

3 Btrys on road between SOSPEL and CASTILLON and 3 enemy mortars in position at Vn-683007.

During the afternoon an 88mm. gun position was reported at Vn-695003 and Vn-679012.

\* Identified in Seventh Army Area.

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## C O N F I D E N T I A L

e. Supply and Evacuation Establishments.

At 051610Z a huge cloud of smoke appeared NW of DOLE (O-3937). VI Corps estimated this to be an enemy gas dump on fire.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.a. General Summary.

The enemy continued his withdrawal Northeast from DIJON during the period. He continued to show concern for the Southeast flank of his route of withdrawal and at BESANCON (O-7955) moved troops south of the DOUBS river to counter the US-French threat of envelopment and the possibility of being cut off from the BELFORT corridor. Resistance in this area was strong. Resistance was encountered by US trps SE of DOLE (O-3937). Further West, enemy rearguards in LOUHANS (O-2185) moved North and at the end of the period were in ST. GERMAIN (O-2299). West of the SAONE river, French troops encountered the enemy north of CHALON-SUR-SAONE (N-9202).

Reports from SHAEF indicated two new divisions to be in the vicinity of 7th Army's route of advance. These were the 16th Inf Div in assembly area vic MONTBARD (N-5094) and the 30th SS Div. in the vic DIJON.

b. Operations of Component Elements.(1) Antiaircraft Artillery.

051040Z: Scant, light flak Vn-5547.

051300Z: Scant, accurate, heavy flak DIJON.

(2) Armored Forces.

VI Corps reconnaissance revealed 60 enemy tanks moving S through FRANCOIS (O-7154) towards BESANCON (O-7955) during the morning 5 September.

(3) Artillery.(a) VI Corps.

U.S. troops advancing in the vic of O-7145 SW of BESANCON received enemy shell fire during the afternoon.

During the morning 88mm. fire fell at CHAUSSIN (O-3323).

(b) 1st A/B Task Force.

Sporadic enemy artillery fire was received from the direction of MT. AGEL on 4 September.

(4) Aviation.

(a) During the afternoon a ME 109 attacked a U.S. air OP (Cub plane) SW of BESANCON.

(b) During the morning, 3d Div. air OP was shot down by small arms fire S of BESANCON.

(5) Engineers.

A patrol of the 517th RCT (1st A/B TF) reported an unmapped road built from VALLON (663103) to BARAQUEMENT (705094), and a roadblock at 695970.

(6) Infantry.(a) French Army "B".I Corps.

French units reported during the morning that BAUME (Wp-0367) was in the hands of the enemy and that fierce street fighting was taking place in PONTARLIER (Wp-0619).

During the afternoon the French reported that they had been heavily engaged all afternoon with enemy forces in the vic of LA VALDAHON (Wp-0446). In the vic of L'HOPITAL (O-9448), an enemy column of vehicles and tanks were observed and engaged.

II Corps.

During the morning the French armored division occupied CHALON-SUR-SAONE (N-9202) with no opposition from the enemy. However, in the afternoon they received stiff opposition N of the town.

(b) VI Corps.

In the U.S. 3rd Div. sector an enemy roadblock consisting of felled trees was encountered E of LOUHANS (T-2185) early in the morning. Further to the E, two half tracks and two small vehicles were encountered at O-8824. On the outskirts of BESANCON (O-7955) U.S. rcn tanks clashed with an estimated 2 bns. of enemy. SE of DOLE (O-3937), a U.S. patrol received

C O N F I D E N T I A L



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fire from heavy MG's and mortars. An FFI report at this time stated that there were 2,000 enemy in the vic of DOLE with light tanks, slit trenches and MG positions.

In the 36th Div. sector enemy rear guards held ST. GERMAIN du BOIS (T-2198), 15 kms. to the N.

In the 3rd Div. sector resistance increased throughout the day in the vic of BESANCON and by night a heavy fire fight was in progress in that vicinity with the enemy holding the bridges on the southern outskirts of the town, and using MG, mortar and tank fire. The enemy controlled the road at this time SE of BESANCON as far as O-9745. Throughout the day heavy traffic including tanks was observed along this road. In the vic of RJ (O-9747) U.S. and French forces engaged an enemy column moving along the road. Enemy patrols crossed the DOUBS river vic O-7145. In the vic of O-6827 a fire fight with enemy infantry and a few tanks was reported. Small arms fire was received by patrols at three points N of ARBOIS (O-6817).

1st A/B Task Force. Enemy patrols were active during the period 3/4 September along the entire front. His attitude in the vic of LANCHE Pass remained defensive in nature. At approximately 031600B U.S. troops in MONACO (S-7082) received fire from enemy positions at (S-705823). The enemy then withdrew Eastward from the vic of MONACO.

The FFI reported 2800 enemy at N-745105.

During the afternoon 5 September, 50 enemy were seen advancing W up a draw at S-677993 and an estimated 200 men were reported at S-688999. 15 enemy with MG's were reported in position at S-6801.

## c. Miscellaneous.

## (1) Motor Movement.

Traffic pattern during the day indicated withdrawal Northeast from the AUTUN area and north from the CHALON area. Air OP and ground observers reported heavy enemy traffic including 60 tanks moving East into BESANCON throughout the day, and TAC/R reported 80 M/T moving North into BESANCON at 1500 hrs. from O-7749. A total of 219 vehicles were reported moving North throughout the day on the TOURNUS-CHALON-DIJON area which was a considerable reduction from the 1400 vehicles withdrawing on this axis the previous day.

Only light scattered traffic was reported moving north of DIJON by three missions. This was probably due to DIJON being the maximum range of aerial reconnaissance.

Four missions over the passes on the French-Italian border again reported light scattered traffic. No fighter-bomber reports were available.

1st A/B TF reported heavy enemy motor movement to the North along the MENTON (S-7786) - SOSPEL (S-7498) - BREIL (N-8102) road and along the VENTILIGLIA (S-8788) BREIL road.

## (2) Enemy M/T Shortages.

A captured document dated 30 August indicates that an officer of the 198th Infantry Division was ordered to procure every civilian vehicle between LYON and DIJON in order to transport the division.

## 3. MISCELLANEOUS.

## a. Rumors.

Rumors that secret weapons V-2, V-3 and V-4, will be used in the SIEGFRIED LINE are increasing among P.M.'s.

## b. Weather Forecast 6 September.

## Northern Area.

Cloudy to partly cloudy. No rain except in the mountain districts along the Eastern slopes of the ALPS. Wind very light, 5/6 m.p.h. from the West. Visibility about 15 miles.

## Southeastern Area.

Scattered Rain showers and cloudy. Visibility restricted to about 8/10 miles. Wind from SW, 10 m.p.h.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.

No change.

WILLIAM W. QUINN  
Colonel, G.S.C.,  
A. C. of S., G-2.

Encl:  
Annex No. 1, Overlay.

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
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


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
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
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HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH ARMY  
ANNEX N° 1 TO G-2 PERIODIC  
REPORT N° 22 - 000800B SEPT  
Quinn Patch  
COL G-2 LT. GEN

MAP 1:100,000

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HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH ARMY  
Office of the A. C. of S., G-2  
AFO 758 US ARMY

From: 060800B Sept 44  
To : 070800B Sept 44

Copy No. 38Ref No. X-25

G-2 REPORT

No. 23.

Hq. Seventh Army  
in the Field  
071200B September 1944

Map : GSGS 4249, EUROPE, 1:100,000.

## 1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

- a. Enemy front line and forward elements - Annex No. 1, Overlay.  
b. Defensive Organization.

- (1) US Air OP's reported that the enemy had successfully blown all important bridges over the DOUBS river between DOLE (O-3937) and BAUME (Wp 0469).  
(2) Agents continue to report troop concentrations and the construction of fortifications in the VOSGE mountains N of BELFORT.

## c. Units in Contact.

- (1) Identifications.  
11th Pz. Div. - Elements NE of BESANCON (O-7955).  
16th Inf. Div. - This unit previously reported by SHAEF to be in MONTBARD (N-5393) area is now reported by same source to have elements in the DIJON area.  
198th Inf. Div.  
328th Inf. Regt. - elements identified via O-3712.

## 2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

## a. General Summary.

The enemy continued his withdrawal to the northeast screening his route north of the DOUBS river. BESANCON was strongly held during the early part of the period but its defense gradually weakened. Rear guards were left behind in the town. Reconnaissance in the area between the LOUE and DOUBS river indicated that the enemy had withdrawn north of the DOUBS in this sector. Northeast of BAUME (P-0469) French troops re-established contact at GLAINANS (P-2072) and at P-1473 southeast of the DOUBS. West of the SAONE river stiff resistance was met along the general line MONTCHANIN (S-6396) CHAGNY (N-8315) BEAUNE (N-9028) and was believed to be enemy elements protecting the flank of a column moving east from AUTUN (N-4918) towards DIJON.

## b. Operations of Component Elements.

- (1) Armored Forces.  
12 enemy tanks were reported at P-040695 at 061355B, and 2 enemy tanks at O-785557. Other tanks were reported firing from BESANCON.  
(2) Artillery.  
The enemy shelled NAVILLY (O-1319), NEUBLAN (O-2717) and CHAUBSSIN (O-3323) during the night 5/6.  
(3) Aviation.  
One enemy a/c reported over the 3rd Division area during the early hours of 6 September.  
(4) Infantry.

## (a) French Army "B".

## I Corps.

French troops continued to push N and occupied PIERREFONTAINE (P-1854) and MAICHE (P-3759), and were reported to have re-established contact with one of their bns which had been cut off in BAUME (P-0469). Subsequently contact was made with the enemy at GLAINANS (Wp-2062) and Wp-1463.

## II Corps.

French troops in this area encountered stiff opposition along the line MONTCHANIN (S-6396) - CHAGNY (N-8415) - BEAUNE (N-9028). This resistance was believed to be flank protection for an enemy movement reported being executed from AUTUN (N-4919) towards DIJON. The enemy still held BEAUNE at 0800 on 7 September.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L(b) VI Corps.

During the morning the enemy continued his withdrawal toward BESANCON. In the 3rd Div. area several enemy vehicles were destroyed at a roadblock at O-7454. Fighting continued during the morning at O-856500; small arms fire was received in the area between O-8053 to O-7749.

During the afternoon the enemy left small delaying forces in BESANCON who opposed the U.S. 3rd Div. entry into the town on three sides with small arms, mortars and MG fire plus a few tanks and SP guns.

In the 36th sector no contact with the enemy was reported during the afternoon. All bridges across the DOUBS river between DOLE and BESANCON reported blown.

An escaped American officer PW reported that the 11th Pz. Div. had cleared BESANCON on the night of 5 September. During the latter part of the period the enemy was driven from the high ground SW of BESANCON at O-775535, and after determined resistance U.S. elements then advanced to O-8355.

In the 36th Div. sector reconnaissance W on the Highway N of the LOUE river between O-4532 and O-5430 contacted no enemy. No contact was reported by the 117th Ren Sqdrn north of MERVANS (O-1704) as far as O-1712.

In the 45th Div. sector enemy resistance in the L'HOPITAL (O-9499) was liquidated and elements advanced to O-9051 with no resistance.

c. Miscellaneous.

Two air OP missions reported no enemy movements between BESANCON and DOLE and between DOLE and ST. VIT (O-6348). Heavy traffic was noted N from BESANCON. 100 M/T were seen moving E on the road V-4255 to V-5255.

Weather restricted observation during the day. Light scattered traffic was reported in the DIJON - LANGRES (J-2322) - VESOUL (O-8798) - GRAY (O-4577) - BESANCON area on two missions. The most significant report was 100 M/T at A-651948 and 100 M/T at A-665956, revealed by TAC/R photo taken at 1215B; direction of the vehicles was not reported, but it indicated activity E of BELFORT.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.a. Weather Forecast.

8 September : Northeastern area.: Partly cloudy. Visibility 10 miles. Wind from NW about 10 mph. Comparatively cool tonight, warmer tomorrow.

Southeastern area.: Cloudy, visibility 8-10 miles. Wind from W about 10 mph. Few scattered rain showers in the mountains.

9 September : General improving conditions, no rain next 36-40 hours in NE area; continued showers in mountains, SE area.

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.

No change.

*William W. Quinn*

WILLIAM W. QUINN  
Colonel, G.S.C.,  
A. C. of S., G-2

Encl:  
Annex No. 1, Overlay.

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


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
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


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


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HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH ARMY  
Office of the A. C. of S., G-2  
APO 758 US ARMY

Copy No. 39Ref. No. X-26

G-2 REPORT

From: 070800B Sept 44  
To : 080800B Sept 44

No. 24.

Hq. Seventh Army  
In the Field  
081200B September 1944

Map : GSGS 4249, EUROPE, 1:100,000.

## 1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

- a. Enemy front line and forward elements - Annex No. 1, Overlay.  
b. Defensive Organization.

- (1) A modern fort with 155mm. guns is reported to be 1 km. E of BESSON-COURT (Wa-3893). On route Nationale No. 19, a similar modern fort with 155mm. guns was reported to be at ROPPE (Wa-3897). A tunnel was reported to connect these forts.  
(2) Agents reported the following defenses on 7 September:  
Light defenses on the DELLE (Wa-4478) - MORVILARS (Wa-3983) road and also at CHATEMOIS (Wa-3384) and NOMMAY (Wa-3382); small roadblocks between BOULOT (O-7267) and SORANS (O-8073).

## c. Units in Contact.

## (1) Identifications.

## 11th Pz. Div.

209th Engr. Bn. - Elements defending BESANCON 7 September. Further elements identified in the BOURG area 4/6 September.

119th Arty Regt. - identified in BOURG area 4/6 September.

## 110th Pz. Div.

## 2nd Bn.

- elements identified vic O-7952 on 5/7 Sept.

## 61st AT Bn.

- identified in BOURG area 4/6 September.

## 159th Res. Inf. Div.

## 9th Res. Regt.

## 57th Res. Bn.

- identified in BESANCON area 7 Sept. PW stated regt. arrived at BESANCON on 6 Sept. and that the 261 (probably 251) Res. Regt. was also in the BESANCON area.

## 189th Res. Div.

## 28th Res. Regt.

) Elements identified in the ANSE - VILLEFRANCHE area (on SAONE river N of LYON) area 3 Sept. Elements also identified CHALON N-9101 area.

## 214th Res. Sig. Bn.

## 116th Res. Inf. Bn.

## 244th Inf. Div. (destroyed)

## 93rd Inf. Regt.

- identified vic O-7957 on 5/7 Sept. This unit was attached to 338th Inf. Div. Battle Group.

## 338th Inf. Div.

## 759th Inf. Regt.

- elements identified in the ANSE - VILLEFRANCHE area (S-8412) on 3 Sept.

## 338th Engr. Bn.

- elements identified at S-7500, 5/7 Sept.

## 560th Admin. Hqs. (Feldkommandantur)

## Gen. Maj. FELBERT, commanding.

Reported to be in BESANCON. General FELBERT was taken by the French on 6 Sept. vic VALDAHON (P-0347).

## 716th Inf. Div.

## 736th Inf. Regt.

## 2nd Bn.

- identified in the ANSE - VILLEFRANCHE area on 3 Sept.

## 716th Engr. Bn.

- identified in the ANSE - VILLEFRANCHE area on 3 Sept.

Elements of the Div. also identified 5/7 Sept. in the GIVRY (P-8401) area.

## 781st Turkestan Bn

- vic S-9649 on 4 Sept.

## 19th SS Police Regt.

- identified in the ANSE - VILLEFRANCHE area on 3 Sept.

## 71st Flieger Regt.

- identified in the BOURG (T-2238) area 4/6 Sept.

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- 601st Ost. Bn. - identified in BOURG area 4/6 Sept.  
 625th Landesschutz Bn. - CHALON (N-9101) area.  
 303rd Regt. - identified vic BESANCON, 7 Sept. This unit reported as a Sicherungs regt., but prior to D-Day had always been reported a G.A.F. regt.  
 95th Sicherungs Regt. - identified vic BESANCON, 7 Sept.  
 198th Sicherungs Regt. - vic BESANCON. PW stated the 1st Bn was responsible for the area DOLE - BESANCON - MONTELLIARD (P-3688).  
 199th Sicherungs Regt. 2nd Co. - by PW taken in vic O-9564.  
 200th Sicherungs Regt. - identified in the ANSE - VILLEFRANCHE area on 3 Sept.

## (2) Organization and Strength.

## (a) 11th Pz. Div.

According to PW statements the 11th Pz. Div. now has the following additional units with it:

- 110th Repl. Bn.  
 119th Repl. Bn.  
 11th Auffangs (Holding) Bn.

## d. Artillery.

Agents reported that on 5 September there were 10 artillery pieces of unknown caliber set in concrete emplacements vic of LONGVIC (O-0657), and that at PERRIGNY (O-0255) there were 4 large caliber AA pieces on rail.

## e. Reserves and other Forces Capable of Intervention.

Agents report that fresh SS troops from Germany are moving toward the BELFORT Gap.

## f. Supply and Evacuation Establishments.

Agents report that at ROCHE (O-8659) there is a gasoline dump containing 900,000 liters of gasoline.

## 2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

## a. General Summary.

The enemy continued his withdrawal to the northeast screening his route of withdrawal on the southeast. Elements of a new division, the 9th Res. Regt. of the 159 Res. Div. was identified in the vic of BESANCON (O-7956). On the left flank of Army "R" the enemy continued to maintain strong flank guards south of BEAUNE (N-9028) and at MOULINS (R-7674), DOMPIERRE (S-0370) and DIGOIN (S-2706) indicating he was probably still covering movements northeast toward DIJON (O-0462). In the VI Corps area fighting continued for BESANCON and BAUME (P-0469). In the vicinity of BAUME the enemy launched a counter-attack supported by six tanks. Enemy movements were seen moving northeast between the SAONE and DOUBS rivers west of DOLE (O-3937) and northeast of DOLE.

## b. Operations of Component Elements.

## (1) Engineers.

1st A/E Task Force reported the ST. MICHEL (K-2532) - MODANE (K-3930) road heavily mined.

## (2) Infantry.

## (a) VI Corps.

Although the enemy withdrew from the area between the DOUBS and LOUE rivers on 6 September, between DOLE (O-3937) and PRAISANS (O-6044), he continued to occupy the N bank of the DOUBS in this sector. U.S. patrols to the river bank drew MG fire from enemy elements to the N, guarding the sites of blown bridges.

In the 3rd Div. sector by the morning of 7 September only scattered resistance from small isolated groups of enemy remained in BESANCON, which was isolated by U.S. troops on the E, S and N. The enemy at this time was believed to be using Russian labor troops and elements of the 11th Pz. Div's Engineer Bn to defend the town. By evening of the 7th, scattered but determined resistance continued in the vic of BESANCON, with the Forts in the city area offering strong opposition.

The U.S. 45th Div. encountered the enemy at BAUME during the night 6/7 Sept. 2000 Russians were reported by the FFI to

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be between BESANCON and VLSOUL (O-8797). Enemy resistance in BAUME continued. An enemy counter-attack with 6 tanks in this area at P-02877 forced our outposts to withdraw.

In the 36th Div. sector no contact was made during the afternoon. During the morning reconnaissance patrols received self-propelled MG and mortar fire from the vic of DOLE at O-400375 and encountered a roadblock at O-406347 at 1130B. A fire fight developed between a U.S. patrol and an enemy force consisting of 75/100 soldiers supported by 1 AT gun and an armored car in the vic of O-4036.

1st A/B Task Force. The enemy continued to work on his defensive positions in the ALP passes E of NICE. Aerial reconnaissance, however, continued to report only scattered M/T movement in the passes. 1st A/B TF reported 239th and 8th Inf. Regts. of the 148th Res. Div. still in contact.

(b) French Army "B".

I Corps.

On the Corps right flank the situation remained quiet; mopping up operations continued at BRIANCON (P-3937). The ST. MICHEL (K-2532) - MODANE (K-3930) road was reported heavily mined.

II Corps.

The French troops W of the SAONE river continued to receive stiff resistance S of BEAUNE (N-9028), and reported that the enemy was holding MOULINS (B-7674), DOMPIERRE (S-0370) and DIGOIN (S-2766) as a flank guard to the evacuation of the area W of DIJON. Two German troop trains were captured, including 600 PW's, 2 tanks and 1 at gun at MONTCEAU LES MINES (S-5587) by the FFI.

c. Miscellaneous.

(1) Movement.

At 061830B, 700 Germans were seen moving E on the road between O-568440 and O-596447, and at 061915B, 2 separate columns of enemy bicycle and foot troops and horse-drawn artillery were observed moving E on the highway from LA PARRIE (O-5344) to DAMPIERRE (O-5745). A large HD column moving North at O-2523 and a large convoy moving northeast in vic O-3340 were observed at 071830B. A large column of HD vehicles and arty were seen moving northeast vic O-6566 at 1100B. Two further enemy columns moving northeast at O-6853 and at O-6849 at 1400B and 1800B respectively.

(2) Rail Movement.

Thirty trains, one of which was armored, all loaded with material, were reported by agents to be held up at 1100B on 6 September by a knocked out bridge just E of MONTBELLARD (P-3668).

3. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Maj. Gen. SCHMIDT.

Gen. Maj. SCHMIDT was reported killed on September 6th by U.S. MG fire while he was enroute from DIJON to BESANCON. He was reported to be scheduled to take command of the 159th Res. Div.

b. Weather Forecast.

Upper Rhone Valley to Belfort, Period from 080001 to 090001 Sept.: Clear at night, scattered clouds in morning, increasing in afternoon. Low clouds topping mountains in afternoon. Scattered thunder storms in afternoon. Visibility, unrestricted. Surface wind SW to W, 15m.p.h. Temperature cool.

Further Outlook, September 10th:

Scattered, low clouds and scattered showers in afternoon.

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.

No Change.

WILLIAM W. QUINN  
Colonel, G.S.C.,  
A. C. of S., G-2.

Encl:

Annex No. 1, Overlay.

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APO 758 US ARMY

*w/c Wiseman  
Lt Col. Adams*

Copy No. 158Ref. No. X-41

G-2 REPORT

From: 080800B Sept 44  
To : 090800B Sept 44

Hq. Seventh Army  
In the Field  
091200B September 1944

No. 25.

Map : GSGS L249, EUROPE, 1:100,000.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.a. Enemy front line and Forward elements - Annex No. 1, Overlay.b. Defensive Organization.

- (1) 1st A/B Task Force reported 2 camouflaged enemy blockhouses on MT. AGAISEN at approx coordinates Vs-7599.
- (2) Agents report enemy infantry positions are being dug at AUDINCOURT (Wa-3276), FESCHE (Wa-4178) and NOMEY (Wa-3382). At NOMEY there is also an AT ditch.

c. Units in Contact.(1) Identifications.1st G.A.F. Trng. Div.

63rd Flieger Regt. - PW, straggler from 7 Co., captured vic BAUME (P-0469), stated regt. had orders to move to MONTBELLARD (P-3688) as best it could.

5th Mountain Div.

84th Mtn. Regt. - elements identified by PW's BRIANCON area (P-3997), 7/8 Sept.

11th Pz. Div.

11th P.G.R. - PW's from 8 Co., captured vic BAUME (P-0469), 7/8 Sept.

11th Pz. Rcn. Bn. - elements identified by PW's vic BAUME, 8 Sept.

16th Inf. Div.

215th G.R. } - elements identified by PW's W  
1516th Arty Regt. } of CHAGNY (N-8415), 7/8 Sept.  
NOTE: (215th Res. G.R. was organic part of 158th Res. Div. prior to upgrading of 158th to 16th Field Div.)

159th Res. Div.

21st Res. Arty Regt. - elements identified by PW's W of CHAGNY (N-8415), 7/8 Sept.

251st Res. Inf. Regt. - elements identified by PW's vic BESANCON (O-7955), 8 Sept.

189th Res. Div. } - elements identified S of BEAUNE (N-9028),  
716th Inf. Div. } 6 Sept.

San Marco Marine Bn. (Italian) - PW's from 2 Co. taken vic W of CHAGNY (N-8415), 7/8 Sept.

14th Fortress Engr. Bn. - elements identified by PW's vic BAUME (P-0469), 7 Sept. PW stated two companies of Bn. withdrawing toward BELFORT (Wa-3493).

805th Ost Bn. (Azerb) - elements identified by PW's vic ECUILLY (X-8989), 6 Sept. PW stated Bn. was withdrawing to MENDE (M-9246).

809th Marine Arty Bn. - identified by PW's vic BESANCON (O-7955), 8 Sept.

950th Hindu Regt. - elements identified by PW's vic. of ST. LEGER (N-7507), 8 Sept.

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d. Supply and Evacuation Establishments.

Agents report that during the last few days many trains moving E from BELFORT have been unloaded at PETIT CORIX (Wa-430910), and that the town may become a large enemy supply dump.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.a. General Summary.

The enemy continued to withdraw to the northeast on the north side of the DOUB river. BESANCON (O-7955) was captured after heavy fighting and the enemy then contested U.S. advances north of the town. A counterattack with tanks forced U.S. elements out of BAUME (P-0469). In the area south of BELFORT (Wa-3493) the enemy countered the threat of 3rd D.I.A. with two columns including tanks who engaged the French in vic GLAY (Wa-3667) and BLAMONT (Wa-3365). West of the SAONE enemy resistance in BEAUNE (N-9028) was overcome but fighting continued between MONTCHLAIN (S-6396) and CHAGNEY (N-8415). Heavy rail movement northeast towards BELFORT and MULHOUSE was noted during the day.

b. Operations of Component Elements.(1) Antiaircraft Artillery.

000845B: Heavy Flak BELFORT (Wa-3493).

(2) Armor.

During the morning 8 Sept. enemy tanks supported infantry columns which counterattacked and succeeded in recapturing BAUME. The tanks remained in the town all day.

Enemy Mk V (Panther) tanks were included in two enemy columns which moved S from MONTBELLARD (P-3688) on the morning of 8 Sept. and attacked positions of the French D.I.A. in the GLAY (Wa-3667) - BLAMONT (Wa-3365) area.

During the morning, 3 enemy tanks were reported firing from O-766515 and 1 from O-771616. Civilian reported 30 enemy tanks at P-150750 and tank assembly area at P-166763. Air OP during morning reported 6 tanks at O-960615.

Three tanks during the morning opposed elements of the U.S. 3rd Div. moving N. vic RJ O-766595.

(3) Artillery.

(a) During the morning, artillery of unknown caliber fired on a bridge at O-747508, and a RR gun was reported to be firing into the U.S. 3rd Div. area.

(b) Artillery fire was encountered by U.S. troops attempting to move N from BESANCON on the afternoon of Sept. 8th.

(4) Aviation.

Two ME 109's flying NE at P-0060 strafed U.S. artillery on 7 Sept.

(5) Infantry.(a) VI Corps.

By noon of 8 Sept., U.S. 3rd Div. had captured BESANCON after heavy fighting against elements of the 159th Res. Div., several Sicherungs regiments and miscellaneous Russians. In the 45th Div. area the enemy heavily resisted the crossing of the DOUBS river at BAUME (P-0469). During the morning an enemy counterattack with infantry and tanks recaptured the town. No contact was made by U.S. reconnaissance elements 10 miles W of BAUME and N of the DOUBS river.

During the afternoon in the U.S. 3rd Div. sector, the enemy resisted U.S. advances N and W of BESANCON with small arms, mortars, tanks and artillery. Several engagements were reported in the area O-7661. In the U.S. 36th Div. sector during this period, light scattered resistance was encountered vic O-7155 and O-6351. In the U.S. 45th Div. sector, enemy resistance continued strong in the vic of BAUME and enemy tanks were still reported in the town.

(b) French Army "B".I Corps.

In the 3rd D.I.A. sector during the morning 8 Sept., a heavy column including tanks was reported moving S from MONTBELLARD (P-3688) towards forward elements of the Div. along the DOUBS river. Subsequently, two enemy columns

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supported by panther tanks attacked the French positions at GLAY (Wa-3667) and BLAMONT (Wa-3365) and succeeded in recapturing GLAY. Heavy engagements took place around BLAMONT. In the 2 D.I.M. area, BRLANCON (P-3997) was occupied, but heavy fighting continued in the general area during the morning.

During the afternoon 8 Sept. in the 3 D.I.A. sector, the enemy continued to strongly hold GLAINANS (P-2173), PONT DE ROIDE (P-3574), VANDONCOURT (Wa-3774) and HERIMONCOURT (Wa-3471). In the 2 D.I.M. sector during the afternoon the French estimated that the enemy held COL PETIT ST. BERNARD with 1500 men and that COL MONT GENIS appeared to be held by two bns. supported by artillery.

#### II Corps.

During the afternoon 7 Sept. enemy infantry and tanks attempted to evacuate the MONTCHAMIN (S-3696) - CHLIGNY (N-8415) area. By morning of 8 Sept. enemy resistance in BEUNE (N-9028) had been mopped up by the French armored division. During the morning the enemy brought an estimated infantry bn. up on an armored train to the area between MONTCHAMIN (S-3696) and CHLIGNEY (N-8415). This unit was engaged by French troops and 400 enemy were killed and 30 taken prisoner. During the afternoon, 2000 enemy were reported moving from CORBERON (O-0226) to SEURNE (O-1326).

#### c. Miscellaneous.

##### (1) Motor Movements.

TAC/R reported only limited M/T movement in the BESANCON - LANGRES - DIJON - MULHOUSE area from 1745B - 1915B. 10 M/T observed moving N from BESANCON at 1800 hours and 25 M/T moving both ways vic of FREIBERG.

During the morning of 8 Sept. only 15 M/T were observed moving N between DIJON and LANGRES (T-2323).

During the afternoon a column of horse-drawn artillery were seen moving NE in the vic of O-6254.

##### (2) Rail Movement.

Heavy train traffic was observed moving E from MULHOUSE and N into EPINAL. From 1745 to 1845 TAC/R observed 4 trains moving E from MULHOUSE, heavy train movement V-7005, V-8012, V-1033, V-7041, and 5 trains moving N toward EPINAL. At 1900B train with steam up observed at O-0682.

Armed/Ren M, NW and NE of the Bomb Safety Line reported the following results of its activity from 1500B to 1750B: 13 locomotives destroyed, 5 damaged, 29 M/T destroyed, 13 damaged, 10 H/D transports destroyed, 3 damaged, 4 box cars destroyed, and 1 armored car destroyed.

Very heavy rail movement between VESOUL (O-8798) to MULHOUSE (V-6905) and VESOUL to BELFORT. These movements were effectively engaged by fighter-bombers.

At 0845B a 30 car train was seen moving NE into BELFORT and a 25 car train was seen moving E at O-6295. At approximately the same time, 6 engines and 100 cars were seen moving NE in the area O-7091 and J-9002.

##### (3) Captured Documents.

Document captured by French Armored Div. reveals three battlegroups of 716th Inf. Div. to be responsible for holding Allied advance in CHALON (N-9202) area. Their mission was to hold so that elements of the German 1st Army could pass through CHLIGNY and CHALON in their movement to the NE.

##### (4) Agent Reports.

Agents report HQ of Nineteenth Army to be at GIROMAGNY (Wk-3614).

#### 3. MISCELLANEOUS.

##### a. PW Statements.

(1) PWs from the 159th Res. Div. captured at BESANCON stated that the entire Div. had been committed there with mission to hold till the 15th of Sept., and that the 11th Pz. Div. had left for BELFORT.

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- (2) a straggler from the 7th Co. of the 63rd Flioger Regt. stated that his regiment was ordered to move to MONTBELLARD (P-3688) as best it could.
- b. Route of Withdrawal of 11th Pz. Div.  
An enemy captured document indicated that the route of withdrawal for the 11th Pz. Div. was planned to be NE along the general line MURRY (O-6060) - VILLERSEKEL (P-0891) - BELFORT.
- c. Weather Forecast.  
BELFORT G.F. Sector, 10 September.  
Overcast low clouds at dawn and rain and thunder storms during the day. Visibility unrestricted except in storm. Surface wind SW 15 MPH. Temperature cool.  
Future Outlook - 11 September.  
Scattered low clouds in morning, increasing afternoon, and showers in the mountains.
- d. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.  
No Change.

*W. Quinn W. Quinn*  
WILLIAM W. QUINN  
Colonel, G. S. C.,  
A. C. of S., G-2.

Encl: Annex No. 1, Overlay.

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
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





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HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH ARMY  
ANNEX NO. 1  
To Accompany  
G-2 PERIODIC REPORT NO. 25-100000 SENT  
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MAP SCALE 1:500,000



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HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH ARMY  
Office of the A. C. of S., G-2  
APO 758 US ARMY

Copy No. 39Ref. No. X-46

G-2 REPORT

From: 090800B Sept 44  
To : 100800B Sept 44

No. 26.

Hq. Seventh Army  
In the Field  
101200B September 1944

Map : GSGS 4249, EUROPE, 1:100,000.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.a. Enemy front line and forward elements - Annex No. 1, Overlay.b. Units in Contact.(1) Identifications.159th Res. Div.251st Res. Inf. Regt.205th Res. Inf. Bn. - elements identified via VORAY (O-7886).1022nd Guard Regt. - elements identified by PW's via BAUME (P-0469), 8 September.c. Artillery.

Several enemy self-propelled guns were observed in the area W of BESANCON during the afternoon.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.a. General Summary.

The enemy continued to withdraw to the northeast. Because of U.S. crossings of the DOUBS he was unable to continue to use this river as a screen, and had to resort to delaying and rear-guard actions north of BESANCON (O-7955) and BAUME (P-0469). On the right flank opposite 3eme DIA the enemy continued to resist French advances north toward MONT-BELLARD (P-3668) but he was unable to prevent the recapture of several towns in that vicinity. West of the SAONE river isolated units of enemy troops continued to engage French troops between MONTCHANIN (S-6396) and BEAUME (N-9028) although the French had pushed on the AUPIN (N-4918) and forced the enemy out after a hard fight. Continued heavy train movement eastward was observed on the VESOUL - BELFORT - MULHOUSE - FRIEBURG - STRASBOURG lines. Weather again limited observation of M/L.

b. Operations of Component Elements.(1) Antiaircraft Artillery.091450B: Intense, accurate, light flak over landing ground at Wv-0835.091600B: Moderate, accurate, heavy and light flak at P-3790; intense, accurate, heavy flak Wv-1545.091700B: Intense, accurate, light flak Wv-7242.091755B: Intense, accurate, light flak MULHOUSE (Wv-7005).(2) Armored Forces.

During the morning 9 Sept. several enemy tanks were fired upon via O-6958. During the afternoon enemy infantry and tanks opposed our elements at P-0571. Enemy resistance at SOYE (P-1480) during the afternoon included several tanks.

(3) Artillery.

During the morning scattered enemy artillery fire fell in the area W of BESANCON, particularly in vic of bridge at O-7450.

(4) Aviation.

At 081900B, 2 ME 109's strafed in the vic P-090369.

1st A/B Task Force reported that 4 enemy planes were operating in the vic of CASTILLON (Vs-7593).

(5) Infantry.(a) French Army "B".I Corps.

During the day the enemy continued to strongly hold PONT DE ROIDE (P-3574) and GLAMANS (P-2173). By evening, 3 DIA reported that they had recaptured PIERREFONTAINE (P-1855), BLANCOET (Wa-5365) and VILLARS LES BLANCOET (Wa-3564). French

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elements reported reaching the area W of MT. GENEVRE and ST. ANDRE (6 kms. W of MODANE).

#### II Corps.

A strong enemy counterattack was made via NEURSAULT (N-8422) but was repulsed by a flank guard of II Corps. Enemy losses were high with 300 dead and 300 PW's, 300 vehicles and 12 guns of different calibers destroyed. The enemy successfully reoccupied COUCHE (N-7010) and contact was maintained SW of ST. LECER (N-7508) and SW of ST. GILLES (N-7711). By noon French troops had reached the N edge of AUTON (N-4918) and found the place strongly held by the enemy. Enemy elements were reported occupying the complete length of the BOURGOGNE canal between DIJON and ST. JEAN DE LOISNE (O-2238). All the bridges over the canal were blown.

#### (b) VI Corps.

During the morning 9 Sept., enemy resistance to U.S. advances N of the DOUBS river began to weaken. Heavy resistance was met on the route NE between BESANCON (O-7955) and BRILLINS (O-3363). A small enemy pocket of resistance remained on the NE edge of BESANCON and was mopped up. Heavy resistance was encountered in vic O-7631.

In the 36th Div. sector, reconnaissance to the W was delayed by an AT gun vic O-7057 and several enemy tanks were seen vic O-6958. S of GRANDFONTAINE (O-7050), an estimated enemy company engaged U.S. reconnaissance elements. In the 45th Div sector enemy infantry remained in BAUME (P-0469) during the morning supported by AT guns and mobile flak wagons. However, they were unable to prevent U.S. troops from crossing the river.

During the afternoon determined resistance in the 3rd Div sector was encountered and overcome S of VORAY (O-7866), and an enemy counterattack of unknown strength was made in the vic of TRAITIFONTAINE (O-8375). Enemy re-occupied the town of ANTOIR (O-6148). Enemy infantry and tanks were encountered P-7571 where they were holding the road.

In the 36th Div sector only light scattered opposition was encountered by U.S. elements moving W and NW. Light resistance was encountered N of BAUME in the 45th Div sector. After a stiff fire fight with enemy tanks and infantry, SOYE (P-1480) was reported clear of the enemy.

#### 1st A/B Task Force.

Situation continued unchanged in this sector. The enemy manned prepared strongpoints and harassed our defensive positions with artillery, mortars and automatic weapons. During the afternoon, U.S. Air CP reported an enemy armored column moving N at (Vs-741963).

#### c. Miscellaneous.

##### (1) Movements.

The enemy had an opportunity to move for the fourth consecutive day without being observed by our air in the DIJON - MONTBARD (N-5093) CHATILLON (H-6720) - LANGRES (J-2423) - GRAY (O-4577) area as weather again restricted TAC/R. One mission with good visibility reported no movement seen from O750B to O845B on road nets DIJON - SAULIEU (N-4356) - CHATILLON and could not confirm ground reports of large movement in this area. However, foot troops are easily dispersed and concealed and TAC/R usually has not been able to observe columns of foot troops. The largest motor transport movements observed was 50 M/T moving southwest from FRIEBURG to MULHOUSE at O90830B.

Heavy rail activity was observed and attacked for the second day on the VESUL (O-8798) - BELFORT - MULHOUSE - FRIEBURG - STRASBOURG lines. Incomplete claims for the day were nineteen locomotives and twenty two RR cars destroyed, six locomotives and 54 RR cars damaged. Several other reports of the trains observed had M/T and tanks loaded on flat cars. A train of two locomotives and thirty flat cars loaded with tanks and M/T was observed moving west toward BELFORT at A-6031 indicating possible reinforcement of the BELFORT area. One locomotive was claimed destroyed, three M/T destroyed, three damaged, and fire spreading to the rear of the train.

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Reconnaissance missions over the FRANCO-ITALIAN passes reported very little movement on the roads but a definite impression of military occupation on the terrain in front of the Airborne Task Force.

An enemy column of approximately 3 miles long moving N vic O-7273 during the afternoon was seen and shelled by U.S. artillery.

A reliable agent reported that the highways W of DIJON were filled with enemy columns moving slowly E in the afternoon of 8 September.

An enemy attempt to move motor troops into CLERVAL (P-1374) was detected and column taken under fire by U.S. tank destroyers.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. PW's taken by Seventh Army to 100800B: 68,584.

b. Weather Report.

11 September 0600B to 2100B: Light rain during the night ending before dawn. Low clouds and fog in the river valleys until 0830B. 6 to 10 tenths of middle clouds at 8000 ft dissipating by 0800B but reaching 6 to 10 tenths at 3500 feet. Ceiling unlimited lowering to 3500 feet over mountains. Visibility unrestricted except in river valleys until 0830B. Surface winds N to NE at 10-12 m.p.h.

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.

No change.

*William W. Quinn*  
WILLIAM W. QUINN  
Colonel, G.S.C.,  
A. C. of S., G-2

Encl:

Annex No. 1, Overlay.

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
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
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INFORMATION BULLETIN

No. 8

25 August 1944

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

T A B L E   O F   C O N T E N T S

I   Air

New German Plane Markings

II   Communications

Road and Rail Bridges

III   Personalities

Consolidated Personality List (Southern France)

IV   Supply

German Ammunition Supply

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## I AIR

New German Plane Markings

A captured letter of the 894 Army Area Command, dated 31 July 1944, contains the following instructions:

A distinctive marking of our planes in the area WESTERN EUROPE (Germany, France, Italy) has been newly ordered as follows:

1. a. Single and twin engined fighters, bombers and reconnaissance planes: Black and white spiral on propeller hub.  
b. All other planes employed in combat: No special markings.
2. Captured Planes:  
a. If employed in combat: like No. 1.  
b. If not employed in combat: The outer third of wing undersides painted yellow.
3. Commercial aircraft: Entire motor hood and underside including elevators yellow, rudder yellow.
4. The new distinctive marking went into effect on 20 July 1944.

## II COMMUNICATIONS

## A. Road Bridges.

<u>Location</u>	<u>Coordinate</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Date</u> <u>August</u>	<u>Source</u>
VIENNE	X-980614	In	23	Photo Reconnaissance
LOYES	T-248049	In	23	" "
ST. MAURICE	T-264113	In	23	" "
AMBERTEA	T-323105	In	23	" "
PRIAY	T-292157	In	23	" "
VERTREIA	T-337026	In	23	" "
SAULT-BRENAZ	Y-387996	In	23	" "
PONT DE				
BLAUVOISIN	Y-607650	In	23	" "
LES ECHELIS	Y-675541	In	23	" "
LA TERRASSE	J-829413	Out	23	" "
CONCELIN	J-846450	Out	23	" "
GRENOBLE	J-645265	Out	23	" "
GRENOBLE	J-645268	Out	23	" "
VALENCE	O-009957	Out	24	" "
PONT ST ESPRIT				
	N-825225	Out	24	" "
LE POUZIN	N-912759	In	24	Visual Reconnaissance
LE POUZIN	N-909756	Out	20	Photo Reconnaissance
ARLES	S-843558	Out	24	" "
TARASCON	S-864699	Out	25	" "
ARAHON	S-892797	In	25	" "
AVIGNON	S-977865	Out	25	" "
AVIGNON	S-999873	Out	17	" "
ROQUEMAURE	S-949997	Out	24	" "
PONT ST ESPRIT				
	N-849203	Out	24	" "
BOURG ST. ANDEAL				
	N-845326	Out	24	" "
DANZERE	N-879419	Out	20	" "
VIVIERS	N-877450	Out	24	" "
LA TIEL	N-870529	Out	24	" "
MONTELDAR	N-885565	Out	24	" "
AVIGNON S.	S-987825	Out	21	" "
BOMPAS	T-073797	In	18	" "
CAVAILLON	T-166733	In	18	" "
PUBBARD	S-525756	In	22	" "
	S-518774	Out	19	" "
ST. ISADORE	S-516800	Out	19	" "
	S-5195	Out	17	" "
	S-533953	In	17	" "

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

<u>Location</u>	<u>Coordinate</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Date</u> <u>August</u>	<u>Source</u>
	S-5497	Out	17	Photo Reconnaissance
	N-537032	In	17	" "
	T-067910	Out	22	" "
	S-862546	Out	24	" "
	S-835569	In	25	" "
	O-277330	Out	21	" "
	C-173281	Out	21	" "
LA VOULTE	N-936808	Out	20	" "
LIVRON	N-981771	Out	24	" "
PERTUIS	T-546568	Out	20	" "
	T-437616	Out	20	" "
BOURG DE PEAGE	J-136083	In	23	" "
	J-167083	In	23	" "
VINAY	J-427264	In	23	" "
ST. QUENTIN	J-503368	In	23	" "
DOMENE	J-745294	In	23	" "
ST. MAZAIRE	J-764320	In	23	" "
CHATEAU DU MAS	J-797355	In	23	" "
LE VILLARD	Y-862506	In	23	" "
LE GACHE	Y-869551	In	23	" "
GRENOBLE	J-659270	In	23	" "
	J-677275			

B. Railroad Bridges.

ARLES	S-847564	Out	24	" "
TARASCON	S-862696	Out	25	" "
AVIGNON	S-962852	Approach	25	" "
		Out		
AVIGNON	S-975825	Out	21	" "
PONT de L'ISERE	H-998025	Out	19	" "
LE POUZIN	N-908757	Out	20	" "
PONT ST. ESPRIT	N-827227	Out	24	" "
ST. GEORGE	N-962852	Out	24	" "
	N-863458	Out	25	" "
VAR VALLEY	S-522760	In	19	" "
VAR GATTURA	S-535872	Out	22	" "
VIENNE	X-980644	In	23	" "
LOYES	T-255063	In	23	" "
AMBERIEU	T-323105	In	23	" "
LES SUNES	J-623638	Out	23	" "
LYONS	All Bridges	In	23	" "
CHAMBORIGANO	N-316240	Out	19	" "
	J-837407	Out	21	" "
LA VOULTE	N-934803	Out	20	" "
	N-972095	Out	20	" "
LIVRON SUR DROME	N-968775	Out	24	" "
PERTUIS	T-587564	Out	20	" "
LA VOULTE SUR RHONE				
	N-933803	Out	24	" "
	T-8279	Out	15	Fighter/Bomber
	S-859545	Out	24	Photo Reconnaissance
	T-181962	Out	25	" "
TOULON W.	Y-794992	Out	22	" "
BOURG DE PEAGE	J-120067	In	23	" "
" " "	J-143082	In	23	" "
	S-835739	In	24	" "
	N-972095	Out	20	" "
LIVRON SUR DROME	N-968775	Out	24	" "
PERTUIS	T-587564	Out	20	" "

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## III. PERSONALITIES.

## Consolidated Personality List (Southern France)

Name	Rank	Function Unit	Source & Date
ADAM	1st Lt.	CO 8/244 A. R.	FW 18 Aug
ALBIER	1st Lt.	157 Res Div.	MIRS
ALLEAT	Col.	Staff Off. 19th Army	AFHQ June 21
ALTHOFF	Lt. Col.	Lyons Area Cmdr.	AFHQ 6/21 44
AMANN	Maj.	G-3 157 Res Div	MIRS
ATHOS	Maj.	8 Res A.R.	AFHQ 6/21 44
BLESSLER	Maj Gen	CG 242 I.D.	IPW 16 Aug
BLETTUCH	Capt.	Hq 19th Army	AFHQ 22 Dec
BARTENWERFER	Lt. Col.	800 Admin Staff	IPW 18 Aug
BARTH	2nd Lt.	3/242 AR	IPW 16 Aug
BASSE-KORFT	Col.	Kmdtr P.M.	AFHQ 17 Mar
BASSOMPIERE	Col.	Marseilles	AFHQ Apr
BAULT	1st Lt.	Kmdtr Nice	AFHQ Apr
BAUSENHAUT	2nd Lt.	894 Admin Staff	AFHQ 2 Apr
BECKER	1st Lt.	Asst G-3 244 I.D.	IPW 20 Aug
BERGER (PW)	Capt.	G-2 244 Div	IPW 20 Aug
BERGH, von	Maj.	CMO 62nd Corps	capt 18 Aug
BERGMAYER	Maj.	CO II/934 GR	AFHQ 21 Jun
BERTHOMIE	Capt.	Lyons Liaison Staff	AFHQ 6 Feb
BETTE	Maj.	Staff Off. 19 Army	AFHQ 18 Aug
BEUTSCHER	Capt.	Arty Staff Off.	Doc 19 Aug
BIERINGER (PW)	2nd Lt.	157 Res Div	MIRS
BLANKE	Gen Ma.	Flk Admin Staff 800	capt 19 Aug
BLASKOWITZ	Lt. Col.	G-3 242 I.D.	Doc 19 Aug
BLATT	FM	CG Army Group G	AFHQ Feb
BLUMETT	1st Lt.	Staff LXII Corps	IPW 18 Aug
BODSCH	Maj.	Staff 19th Army	AFHQ 1 Dec
BOOSE	Maj.	Lyons Liaison Staff	AFHQ 6 Feb
BONDEL	2nd Lt.	CO 262 AT Co 189 Div	FW 20 Aug
BOESEN	Col.	CO 29 Fortress Engr Bn	IPW 19 Aug
BOEWER	Maj.	Staff 19th Army	AFHQ Jan
BOEWER	Maj.	Liaison Staff Avignon	AFHQ 21 Dec
BOEWER	Capt.	Armament Control Avignon	AFHQ 21 Dec
BOGERMANN	Maj.	CO Annency L. Staff	AFHQ 4 Apr
BOJE	Maj. Gen.	Former CO 541 Liaison Staff	AFHQ 19 Feb
BOLLE	Lt. Col.	Sig Off. XLII Corps	Doc 19 Aug
BORAK	Capt.	Comdg ILES DU FAUCON	AFHQ 15 Oct
BOTSCH	Maj. Gen.	G of S 19 Army	AFHQ 23 Apr
BOUVERET	Capt.	G-1 244 I.D.	IPW 20 Aug
BRAND		244 AR	IPW 18 Aug
BRANDT	Maj.	(CLERMONT FERRAND) L. Staff	AFHQ 21 Jan
BRATZ	1st Lt.	564 Liaison Staff	AFHQ Mar
BRUN	Capt.	541 Liaison Staff	AFHQ 23 Mar
BREITENBACH	1st Lt.	9th Fortress Stamm Bn (JOK 19)	capt 19 Aug
BRETTSCHEIDER	Lt. Col.	G-3 244 I.D.	IPW 20 Aug
BRODOWSKI	Lt. Gen.	Clermont-Ferrand	AFHQ 8 Jun
BROSER	2nd Lt.	CO 262 Res AT Co.	IPW 20 Aug
BRUENDER (Bruendel)	Col.	CO 932 GR	IPW 20 Aug
BRUENKLEIN	Capt.	CO 5/501 AA Bn	IPW 19 Aug
BRUSSNER	Maj.	157 Res Div	MIRS
BUELOW v.	1st Lt.	2/757 GR	IPW 19 Aug
BUEX	Capt.	CO Landesschuetzen Bn 625	IPW 18 Aug
BUHRLARDT	Capt.	CO Ost Bn 661 (239 Regt)	IPW 17 Aug
BURKLE Dr.	Surgeon	III/244 AR	IPW 20 Aug
BUSCH Dr.	Capt.	Hq. 735 Liaison Staff	AFHQ 19 Feb
BUSSARD	2nd Lt.	6/305 GR	IPW 19 Aug
CANTZLER	Lt. Gen.	Army Group G Toulouse	AFHQ 10 May
CHFREYER	1st Lt.	CO 5/627 Marine Arty Bn.	IPW 15 Aug
COLLET	Capt.	4/14th AA Bn	IPW 19 Aug
COURBIERE de RENE			
de l'HOMME	Lt. Gen	CO 338 ID	AFHQ 21 Jan
CZERLAK	Lt. Col.	CO 1291 CA Arty Regt	Doc 19 Aug
DLEUNERT	Maj.	CO III/757	Doc 19 Aug

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Name	Rank	Function	Unit	Source & Date
DEMBOVSKI		Finance Sect 244 ID		IPW 20 Aug
DENNER-S.UGER	2nd Lt	157 Res Div		MIRS
DENNERT	Maj.	CO III/765 Inf Regt		IPW 16 Aug
DOERING	1st Lt.	LXII Res Corps		IPW 19 Aug
DOLCIUS	1st Lt.	8/933 GR		IPW 19 Aug
DORNBUSCH	Capt	502 Admin Staff		AFHQ 23 Mar
DOTTINGER	Maj.	CO Flak (Marseilles zone)		AFHQ 20 Mar
DRABER	Capt	Lyons Admin Staff.		AFHQ 6 Feb
DREWS		Lyons Liaison Staff		AFHQ 6 Feb
EBER	Capt	CO I/933 GR		IPW 19 Aug
EBERHARD	1st Lt.	Ordinance 244 I.D.		IPW 20 Aug
EBERLE	Lt Gen	Chief Engr S. France		AFHQ Feb
EBERT	Capt	7/934 GR		AFHQ 21 Jan
EBLERT	Maj.	Staff Off. 244 arty Regt.		IPW 20 Aug
EICHLUER	2nd Lt.	157 Res Div		MIRS
ELSTER	Maj Gen	Liaison Staff 894		AFHQ 18 Mar
ENDLER	2nd Lt.	Adj 244 Sig. Bn.		IPW 20 Aug
ESTER	Capt	Supply Off. 735 Liaison Staff		AFHQ 19 Feb
FASSOLD	Maj.	BEZIER		AFHQ 25 Feb.
FEHLER	2nd Lt.	8/765 GR		IPW 15 Aug
FETHKE	Capt	CO I/918 GR		Doc 19 Aug
FEUERZINGER	Capt	735 Liaison Staff		AFHQ 19 Feb
FLALL	Col.	QM 19th Army		AFHQ 21 Dec
FICK	2nd Lt.	9/917 GR		Fr 21 Aug
FIEDLER	Capt	Kmdtr Lyons		AFHQ 6 Feb
FIMMERN	Capt	QM 244 Div.		IPW 20 Aug
FINKENSTEIN	Lt. Col.	Lyons (Garrison CO)		AFHQ 21 June
FISCHER	Lt. Gen	Supply Off. (Marseilles area)		AFHQ 21 June
FISCHER (PW)	Maj.	Adj LXII Corps		capt 18 Aug
FLEISCHUT (Fleischut)	Maj.	CO 481 AA Bn.		IPW 15 Aug
FOHNING	Maj.	Agency Kdtr.		AFHQ 20 Jan
FORSTER	1st Lt.	Adj 917 GR		Doc 19 Aug
FRANK	1st Lt.	1/305 GR		IPW 19 Aug
FRETTER-PICO	Maj Gen.	CO 148 Res Div.		AFHQ 10 Mar
FRESEN	2nd Lt.	Adj III/244 arty		IPW 20 Aug
FRICKE	Capt	CO I/934 Regt.		IPW 20 Aug
FRICKE	1st Lt.	2/244 Sig. Bn.		IPW 20 Aug
FRITZE	1st Lt.	99 Res Arty Bn.		MIRS
FROEHLICH	1st Lt.	CO I/Res arty Bn 7		AFHQ 23 Dec
FROER (PW)	Maj	G-2 LXII Corps		capt 19 Aug
FROMBERG	Maj Gen	Liaison Staff CO (Clermont-Ferrand)		AFHQ 8 June
FUSSBERGER	Capt	CO II/765 Regt		IPW 15 Aug
GALLIS	Capt	CO 13/239 Res Regt.		IPW 16 Aug
GALLWITZ	Capt	CO 1038 arty AT Bn.		IPW 17 Aug
GASTAR	Maj.	CO I/14 GAF AA		IPW 18 June
GAUL	Lt Col.	former CO 765 GR		Doc 19 Aug
GEBHARDT		157 Res GR		AFHQ 10 Feb
GEHRKE		CO II/917 GR		IPW 19 Aug
GEIER	1st Lt.	CO 7/917 GR		IPW 17 Aug
GEHLERT	Lt Col.	CO 147 Flak Bn.		AFHQ 2 Feb
GENTERBRUECK	Maj.	CO 6/556 AA Bn.		IPW 19 Aug
GEORGES	Col.	former CO 734 Liaison Staff		AFHQ 23 Mar
GERLAR	?	Adj 244 Arty Regt.		IPW 20 Aug
GESSWEIN	Capt	CO III/242 AR		IPW 19 Aug
BETTLER	Intendant	244 ID		IPW 20 Aug
GENZER	1st Lt.	Adj 242 AR		Doc 19 Aug
GILBERT	Gen Lt.	former CO 244 ID		IPW 20 Aug
GLAESER	2nd Lt.	1089 Field Tr Bn.		Doc 20 Aug
GOEBEL	Col.	CO 305 Regt.		IPW 19 Aug
BOETZ	1st Lt.	CO 4/242 AR		IPW 16 Aug
GOLDAU	2nd Lt.	Act. CO 12/933 GR		IPW 19 Aug
GRIFFEL	Maj.	CO II/1291 CA Regt.		Doc 19 Aug
GROHLMANN (PW)	Capt	CO 10/1291 CA Regt.		IPW 15 Aug
GRUENE	Capt	LXII Corps		Doc 19 Aug
GRUENKE	1st Lt.	CO 4/114 AA Bn. (GAF)		IPW 19 Aug

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Name	Rank	Function	Unit	Source & Date
GRUNDMANN	Lt Col.	CO 918 GR		Doc 19 Aug
GUEMPEL	Col.	CO 308 GR		IPW 20 Aug
GUENTHER (PW)	Lt. Col.	QM LXII Corps		capt 18 Aug
GUTZER	Maj.	Asst. Int. 189 Div.		AFHQ 21 Jan
HAEHN	2nd Lt.	CO 7/765 GR		IPW 16 Aug
HAHN	Col.	CO 299 Res GR		AFHQ 27 Mar
HAMMER	2nd Lt.	157 Res Div		MIRS
HANCKE	Maj.	Bn. CO 239 Res GR		AFHQ 12 Apr
HANS	Capt.	CO III/ GR 239		AFHQ 25 Mar
HARTWIG	Capt.	CO Para Air Sig Bn 41		AFHQ Jan
HASSBERG	Maj.	Staff 19th Army		AFHQ 1 Dec
HAUKE	Capt.	CO 244 Sign Bn		IPW 20 Aug
HAUSCHILD	Capt.	QM 244 ID		IPW 20 Aug
HAUSTEIN V.		244 ID		AFHQ 29 Mar
HEED	Capt.	157 Res Div		MIRS
HEIN	2nd Lt.	157 Res Div		MIRS
HEINILARDT	Capt.	CO I/198 Ost Regt (IV/918)		AFHQ 8 May
HEINRICH	2nd Lt.	Adj 99/Res Mtn Regt 1		AFHQ Mar
HELSON	Capt.	CO Gestapo XIX LES BAINS		AFHQ Dec
HELL	Capt.	CO 3/1038 AT ARTY Bn		IPW 17 Aug
HENKE PW	1st Lt.	I/757 GR		capt 19 Aug
HERION	Capt.	Verb. Stab 998		AFHQ Mar
HERRENBRUCH		CO 28th Res Inf Regt		IPW 17 Aug
HERRMANN		Ordnance 244 Arty Regt		IPW 20 Aug
HILDEBRAND	1st Lt.	CO 2/917 GR		IPW 18 Aug
HILLE	Maj.	Staff Off. 242 ID		IPW 21 Aug
HILLTROPP	Maj.	Staff Off. 19th Army		AFHQ 18 May
HOEPPNER	1st Lt.	Co 4/Para Sig Bn 41		AFHQ Jan
HOFFMAN	Lt. Gen.	CG 277 ID		AFHQ Apr
HOLTHOFF		Naval O. Harbor Cmdr Toulon		doc 19 Aug
HOZER	2nd Lt.	CO 3/99/Res Mtn Regt 1		AFHQ 2 Apr
HOOK	Capt.	242 ID Res. Bn		AFHQ 23 Feb
HOPPACH Dr.	Maj.	Liaison Staff 590		AFHQ 6 Feb
HORETH Dr.	Surg.	Liais. Staff 541		AFHQ 19 Feb
HORNIG	2nd Lt.	Adj. 934 G.R.		IPW
HUDRIG	Maj.	Staff. Res Arty Regt 8		AFHQ 17 Mar
HUNDERT	Maj.	Supply, LXII Corps		Captrd doc. 8/14
J. LENCKE	Capt.	CO 8/757 GR.		IPW 19 Aug
J. COB	Lt.	244 Arty Regt		IPW 20 Aug
J. KOB	Maj.	CO 244 Engr Bn		IPW
J. ANKUHN	1st Lt.	242 I.D.		doc 19 Aug
JEHRING	Capt.	Liais Staff 541		AFHQ 21 June
JORDA	Maj.	Staff 19th Army		AFHQ 17 Jan
JORDAN	Maj.	Liais. Staff 761		AFHQ 23 Oct
JOURDAN	Capt.	Adj. Liais. Staff 735		AFHQ 19 Feb
JUDENHOFFER	1st Lt.	Liais. Staff 998		AFHQ Mar
K. HL	1st Lt.	4/757		IPW 19 Aug
K. LBE	1st Lt.	CO II/917 GR		IPW 17 Aug
KAMMER	Maj.	CO II/244 AR		IPW 20 Aug
KAPFER	1st Lt.	CO 98 Res Arty Bn		AFHQ 23 Dec
K. FLE	1st Lt.	CO 2/148 Fus. Bn		IPW 16 Aug
KAPFER	2nd Lt.	I/98 Mtn. Inf. Bn		MIRS
KARL	1st Lt.	CO 338 AT CO		IPW 19 Aug
KAUTING		Adj 99 Mtn Res Bn		MIRS
K. VALLA	1st Lt.	Einheit "VOELKER"		IPW 18 Aug
KERSCHING	2nd Lt.	157 Res Div		MIRS
KERSTEN	Maj.	CO Field Repl Bn 244		Doc
KESSLER (PW)	Col.	148 Res Div.		IPW 16 Aug
KESTNER	2nd Lt.	CO II/918 GR		IPW 17 Aug
KIRSTEN	Col.	CO Liaison Staff 735		AFHQ 21 Jun
KITZMANN	1st Lt.	Liaison (LYON)		AFHQ 24 Nov
KLAGES Dr.	Vet.	244 Inf. Div.		IPW 20 Aug
KLEEWELN	1st Lt.	5/305 GR		IPW 19 Aug
KLEIN	2nd Lt.	8 Res Engr Bn		Doc 23 Aug
KLINKE	Capt.	CO 12/1291 C. Regt		Doc 19 Aug
KOTTMAYER	2nd Lt.	Res GR Pn 163		Doc 20 Aug
KLUTZ	Lt. Col.	Staff Officer 19 Army		AFHQ 18 May

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Name	Rank	Function	Unit	Source & Date
KNEITTINGER	Lt. Col.	157 R.D.		AFHQ Dec
KNISS	Gen.	CG LXXXV Corps		IPW 18 Aug
KNORR	Maj.	G-3 LXII Corps		Doc 19 Aug
KOBITZI	Maj.	CO Res Mtn Inf Bn 99		AFHQ 15 Jan
KOCH	Capt.	CO 1/Landesschuetzen Bn 625		IPW 18 Aug
KOLB	1st Lt.	CO 12/917 GR		IPW 18 Aug
KOHLER	Capt.	CO 13/Res Gren R 157		AFHQ 12 Apr
KOENING	Maj.	HQ GR 933 GR		AFHQ 20 Mar
KOROBITZEN (PW)	1st Lt.	CO 1/661 Ost Bn		capt 17 Aug
KRAFT	1st Lt.	CO 3/148 Fus Bn		IPW 16 Aug
KRAFT	Capt.	CO 2/1038 Arty AT BN		IPW 16 Aug
KRAMER	1st Lt.	CO 3/918 GR		IPW 18 Aug
KRAMICH	Maj.	CO V Sich Regt 95		AFHQ 2 Feb
KRAUSE (PW)	2nd Lt.	Adj 1/933 GR		capt 19 Aug
KRAUSS	1st Lt.	2/Res Arty Bn 7		AFHQ 21 Dec
KRAUTHAUSEN	Maj.	Bn CO Regt 51 (air Sig)		IPW 19 Aug
KRIEGLER	Capt.	CO 3/242 AR		IPW 16 Aug
KRIEGER	1st Lt.	CO 9/932 GR		IPW 18 Aug
KUHL	1st Lt.	1/244 Sig Bn		IPW 20 Aug
KUNZE	2nd Lt.	2/Res GR Bn 461		Doc 20 Aug
KUPKE (PW)	1st Lt.	G-3 LXII Corps		capt 18 Aug
KUSPEK	1st Lt.	157 Res Div		MIRS
KUTCH	Capt.	CO II/244 AR		IPW 18 Aug
KUTSCHER	Capt.	CO II/AR 244		IPW 20 Aug
LADELMANN (PW)	Maj.	G-3 62 Corps		capt 18 Aug
LAHMER	Capt.	Staff LXII Corps		Doc 19 Aug
LAJPE	1st Lt.	CO 8/934 GR		AFHQ 21 Jan
LANG	Maj.	CO 7Bn Fortr Engr Bn 14		AFHQ 19 May
LANGE	Col.	CO 917 GR		IPW 19 Aug
LANGEN v.	Capt.	8 Res AR		AFHQ 25 Apr
LEEP	2nd Lt.	918 GR		IPW 17 Aug
LEONARD	1st Lt.	CO 2/933 GR		IPW 18 Aug
LIEBLICH	Capt.	G-4 148 Res Div		Doc 19 Aug
LIEBNIG	2nd Lt.	CO 14 8th Res. Regt		IPW 17 Aug
LIEL	Capt.	CO 1/242 AR		IPW 16 Aug
LIESER	Navy Lt.	CO Marine Arty Bn 627		Doc 19 Aug
LINDEQUIST	Lt. Col.	Adj. 189 Res Div.		Doc 19 Aug
LOHR	Col.	CO Flak Regt 69		AFHQ Feb
LOERTZER	Maj.	CO 244 Div Supplies		IPW 20 Aug
LOESSER	Maj.	CO 8 Res Eng Bn		Doc 19 Aug
LOPIZ (?)	Maj.	CO 1195 Arty Bn		IPW 16 Aug
LUNGWITZ	Maj.	CO 1195 Arty Bn		IPW 17 Aug
LUSCHNAT	2nd Lt.	3/305 GR Res		IPW 19 Aug
LUTZ	2nd Lt.	99 Mtn Res Bn		MIRS
MACKENSEN v.	1st Lt.	CO 14/917 GR		IPW 18 Aug
MAENNER	Capt.	1/305 GR		IPW 18 Aug
MANEKE	Col.	HQ 338 ID		AFHQ 27 Jan
MARSCHALL	Col.	CO 1 Res Mtn Inf Regt		MIRS
MARTIN	Capt.	CO I (98) Res Mtn Regt 1		AFHQ 11 Dec
MATTHES (PW)	2nd Lt.	CO 4/661 Ost Bn		capt 16 Aug
MAURER	1st Lt.	2/28 Res Arty Bn		IPW 19 Aug
MEIER	Maj.	CO I Bn 308 Regt		IPW 20 Aug
MEINSHAUSEN (PW)	Col.	Chief of Staff, LXII Corps		Capt 19 Aug
MEY	Lt.	157 Res Div		MIRS
MEYER	Capt.	CO 3rd Co Fortress Eng Bn 14		IPW 16 Aug
MEYER	Capt.	3/757		IPW 19 Aug
MEYER	2nd Lt.	Staff Res Gr. Regt		Doc 20 Aug
MILTZOW	?	242 Inf. Div.		IPW 21 Aug
MODEROW	Capt.	Supply, 19 Army		AFHQ Feb
MOECKEL (Killed)	1st Lt.	CO 10th Co., 765 Regt		IPW 16 Aug
MOMBERGER	1st Lt.	Adj. Army Coastal Arty Regt 1291		Doc 19 Aug
MORGENROT	Lt. Col.	CO 242nd Arty Regt		IPW 19 Aug
MORGENSTERN	1st Lt.	Res Gren Bn 217		Doc 23 Aug
MUKLAU	Capt.	Staff Offr, 19 Army		AFHQ 18 May
MUELLER	Capt.	8/99 Res. Mtn Inf. Bn		MIRS

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Name	Rank	Function	Unit	Source & Date
MUNCHHOF	Capt.	CO 242 AT Co.		IPW 17 Aug
MUNKER	1st Lt.	III/244 AR		Doc 19 Aug
MULLER	Maj.	Staff, 19 Army		AFHQ Jan
MUNCHOW	Capt.	CO Omdr., AT Co. 242		Doc 19 Aug
MURHLUPT	1st Lt.	CO 3/361 Ost Bn		IPW 17 Aug
NEIDLICK	1st Lt.	CO IV/765 GR		Doc 15 Aug
NEULING	Gen d. Inf	CG LXII Corps		capt 18 Aug
NEULING	Capt.	CO 2 Landesschutz Bn 625		IPW 18 Aug
NIEPER	Col.	Arty Cnd 219		Doc 19 Aug
NOLK	Lt. Col.	CO 244 AR		IPW 20 Aug
OBERDORF	2nd Lt.	5/933 GR		IPW 19 Aug
OBERGRUBER	2nd Lt.	262 Res AT Co		Doc 20 Aug
OPFITZ	2nd Lt.	CO 1/242 AR		IPW 16 Aug
PAUL	Capt.	Liaison Staff 800		AFHQ Oct
PETERMANN	Maj.	Staff 19th Army		AFHQ 1 Dec
PETERSEN	Gen	CO IV GAF Corps		AFHQ 1 Jan
PELFF	Col.	Intendant 189 Res Div		AFHQ 21 Jan
PFLUM	Gen	CG 157 Res Div		AFHQ 12 Apr
PIONTEK (Pw)	Capt.	CO I/1195 Arty Bn.		capt 17 Aug
POMMERING (Pw)	2nd Lt.	7/757 GR		capt 18 Aug
PAUSE	1st Lt.	Adj 918 GR		Doc 19 Aug
PRECHTL	2nd Lt.	4 Mtn Inf. Bn 99		MIRS
PRESCHNER	Col.	157 Res Div		MIRS
PREYER	Capt.	G-3 242 AR		Doc 19 Aug
RIEDERS	1st Lt.	CO I/917 GR		IPW 18 Aug
RUMSCH	1st Lt.	CO 9/51st GAF Sig Regt		IPW 16 Aug
RUNCKE (or HUNCKE)	Maj.	932 GR		AFHQ 21 Mar
REDZER	2nd Lt.	8 Res Arty Regt.		AFHQ 25 Apr
REHBOCK	Col.	CO 15 Res GR Regt.		IPW 22 Aug
REINHARDT	Col.	CO 157 Res GR		AFHQ 15 Aug
REITH	1st Lt.	CO 4/401 M. Bn		IPW 15 Aug
RELKES	1st Lt.	99 Mtn Res Bn		MIRS
REMBEINER	Col.	CO 917 Gren Regt		AFHQ 22 May
RENDER	??	933 GR		AFHQ 29 Mar
RENNER	Capt.	CO IV/918 GR		Doc 19 Aug
RESINGER	2nd Lt.	157 Res Div		MIRS
RICH	2nd Lt.	157 Res Div		MIRS
RIEFENBERG	1st Lt.	CO 6/934 GR		AFHQ 21 Jan
RICHTER	Capt.	Staff Res GR 239		Doc 23 Aug
RIEGEL	Capt.	CO 3/242 AR		IPW 16 Aug
RITTER	2nd Lt.	8/99 Res Arty Bn		MIRS
RODEWOLT (Pw)	2nd Lt.	CO 4/194 Sich Regt		capt 20 Aug
ROESKE	Capt.	CO Field Repl Bn 242		Doc 19 Aug
ROLIN	Col.	CO 933 GR		AFHQ 29 Mar
RUDLOFF	1st Lt.	Sig Co 157 Res Regt.		AFHQ 12 Apr
RUEDIGER	Capt.	Regtl HQ 305 GR		IPW 19 Aug
RUST	Capt.	III/1291 CA Regt		Doc 19 Aug
SALZFELD	Maj.	CO I/244 Arty Regt		IPW 20 Aug
SALZWEDEL	Lt. Col.	LXII Corps		capt 19 Aug
SANDER Dr. (Pw)	Oberarz	LXII Corps		capt 18 Aug
SANFTLEBEN	1st Lt.	3/917 GR		Doc 17 Aug
SANTHOFFEN	Lt.	99th Mtn Res Bn		MIRS
S.UEBBIER	2nd Lt.	2/28 Light Res Arty Bn		Doc 20 Aug
SCHLEW	Capt.	242 Engr Bn		Doc 19 Aug
SCHLEIDER	Maj.	157 Res GR Regt		AFHQ 15 Jan
SCHERKL	Capt.	99th Mtn Res Bn		MIRS
SCHLEGEL	Maj.	7th Res Arty Bn		MIRS
SCHIKEDAN	2nd Lt.	CO 11/933 GR		IPW 20 Aug
SCHIPPLANK	2nd Lt.	CO 2/327 Res Bn		IPW 18 Aug
SCHLEGL	Maj.	Res Arty Bn 7		AFHQ 12 Apr
SCHMIDT	Maj.	Staff, 19th Army		AFHQ Jan
SCHMIDT	Maj.	163 Reg Bn		IPW 17 Aug
SCHMIDT	1st Lt.	Res Gren Bn 444		Doc 22 Aug
SCHMIDT	2nd Lt.	CO 2/1195 Arty Bn		IPW 16 Aug

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Name	Rank	Function Unit	Source & Date
SCMITT	2nd Lt.	Res Arty Bn 8	AFHQ 25 Apr
SCHNEIDLITZ, Von	Col.	L. C. 19th Army	AFHQ Feb
SCHOELER	Capt.	CO III/917 GR	Doc 19 Aug
SCHOENAGEL (P.)	Lt. Col.	CO 765th GR	capt 17 Aug
SCHOERNIG	1st Lt.	6/933 GR	IPW 19 Aug
SCHOENFELD	Lt. Col.	CO 757 GR	IPW 16 Aug
SCHOLL	?	565 AA Bn	IPW 19 Aug
SCHOMBORN	Maj.	244 I.D.	IPW 20 Aug
SCHONWETTER, Dr.	Vet. O	99th Mtn Inf Bn	MIRS
SCHUETZ	1st Lt.	Staff, Res Arty Regt 7	Doc 23 Aug
SCHULB	Capt.	CO 28 Res Arty Bn 189 Arty Regt	IPW 18 Aug
SCHLUB (P.)	1st Lt.	CO, Admin Div, 189 Div	capt 20 Aug
SCHUBERT	Capt.	157 Res Div	MIRS
SCHUBERT	Col.	CO Res Mtn Regt.	AFHQ 12 Apr
SCHUBERT	Lt. Col.	CO, 99th Mtn Res Bn	MIRS
SCHUELER	2nd Lt.	3/ Light Res Arty Bn 28	Doc 20 Aug
SCHUETZ	Capt.	242 I.D.	Doc 19 Aug
SCHULZ	1st Lt.	1046 Mobile Bn	Doc 19 Aug
SCHULTZE	Maj.	G of G, 148 Res Div	AFHQ 10 Mar
SCHULBE	Capt.	CO II/934 GR	IPW 20 Aug
SEIDEL	1st Lt.	Res Gren Bn 164/8 Res GR	IPW 23 Aug
SEILE	1st Lt.	CO 2/661 Ost Bn (239 GR)	IPW 17 Aug
SELEFF	2nd Lt.	10/932	
SILL	Capt.	CO I/932 GR	IPW 20 Aug
SIMON	2nd Lt.	CO 3/327 Res Bn	IPW 18 Aug
SIRAKOWSKI	?	757 GR	AFHQ 7 Jan
SREBINSKI	1st Lt.	308 Regt	IPW 20 Aug
SLEITTLE	Maj.	Staff 19th Army	AFHQ 1 Dec
SPAT	2nd Lt.	5/305 GR	IPW 19 Aug
SPECKMEIER	1st Lt.	CO 5th Btry 481 AA Bn	IPW 16 Aug
STAHL	1st Lt.	CO 1/148 Fus Bn	IPW 16 Aug
STEFINUS	Maj.	I/918 GR	IPW 18 Aug
STEIER	2nd Lt.	182 Res Div	Aug
STEIN	Capt.	CO II 242 AR	Doc 19 Aug
STEINRUCKE	2nd Lt.	Adj II/244 Arty Regt	IPW 20 Aug
STENGLIN Frhr. v.	Lt. Col.	CO 1st Bn. 933 Inf. Regt	IPW 20 Aug
STODERER	Capt.	CO II/194 Sich. Regt	IPW 20 Aug
STROMMEYER	Maj.	1197 Arty Bn.	Doc 19 Aug
STRUWER	1st Lt.	Adj 932 GR	IPW 20 Aug
SUCKER	Col.	CO Res Arty Regt 8	Doc 19 Aug
TERCK	2nd Lt.	CO 5/917 GR	IPW 18 Aug
THIAS	1st Lt.	II/305 GR	IPW 19 Aug
TIELSCH	2nd Lt.	Adj, 1st Bn 933 GR	IPW 20 Aug
TIEROLLER	Col.	CO 18 Flak Reg (Cavaillon)	AFHQ 10 Apr
TORNER	Maj.	Task force of 148 Div	IPW 22 Aug
TORNOW	Maj.	CO 327 Res Bn	IPW 18 Aug
TWIRDY (P.)	1st Lt.	CO 4/148 Fus Bn	capt 16 Aug
TYROLLER	Lt.	Res Gren Bn. 179	Doc 23 Aug
TYROLE	Col.	CO 14 C.F. M. Regt	IPW 18 Aug
UPITZ	2nd Lt.	CO of I/933 GR	IPW 18 Aug
VOGLER	2nd Lt.	LXII Corps	Doc 19 Aug
VOGT	Capt.	28 Res Arty Bn	Doc 23 Aug
VOIGT, Dr.		244 Inf. Div.	IPW 20 Aug
VOSS, Dr.	Vet.	244 Inf. Div	IPW 20 Aug
WABTIG	Capt.	CO 1190 Arty Bn	Doc 19 Aug
WAGNER	Lt.	99 Mtn Res Bn	MIRS
WAGSTEL		933 GR	AFHQ 29 Mar
WEBER	Maj.	III/933 GR	IPW 19 Aug
WEBER	Capt.	CO II/933 GR	IPW 20 Aug
WEBER	2nd Lt.	5/765 GR	IPW 15 Aug
WEINDL	Pay M.	99 Mtn Res Bn	MIRS
WELLERSHAUS	1st Lt.	Supply, 242 I.D.	Doc 19 Aug
WENZLAFF	2nd Lt.	CO 13/917 GR	IPW 18 Aug

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Name	Rank	Function	Unit	Source & Date
BERDICH	Maj.	Services,	157 Res. Div.	AFHQ 12 Apr
BEUTH	Maj.	CO II/918		Doc 19 Aug
BECKELSKY	2nd Lt.	Adj I/244 Arty Regt		IPW 20 Aug
BEETAL	Maj.	CO GI 934		AFHQ 21 Jan
WIESE	1st Lt.	CO 1038 AT Arty Bn		IPW 17 Aug
WIESE	Gen D/Inf	CO 19th Army		Doc 19 Aug
WINDISCH	2nd Lt.	Staff Res GR Regt 157		Doc 23 Aug
WOLFE		933 GR		IPW 20 Aug
WOLICKI	2nd Lt.	Staff/Res GR Bn 163		IPW 20 Aug
WUICKER, Dr.	Surgeon	242 I.D.		IPW 20 Aug
WURTZ	1st Lt.	Adj 933 GR		IPW 20 Aug
ZENDER	2nd Lt.	14/305 GR		IPW 19 Aug
ZILFF	2nd Lt.	CO 10th Co. 932 Regt		IPW 20 Aug
ZORN		933 GR		AFHQ 29 Mar

## ADDITIONAL

Name	Rank	Functions	Unit	Source & Date
BRUMANN	2nd Lt.	Div Train 148 Res Bn		Doc 23 Aug
BRUNGBERTEL	2nd Lt.	Res Gren Bn 327		Doc 23 Aug
FISCHER	Capt.	148 Div		Doc 23 Aug
BERGELANN	1st Lt.	Staff/Res GR Regt 8		Doc 23 Aug
DUSCHER	1st Lt.	157 Res Div		Doc 23 Aug
GELLE	2nd Lt.	Res Gren Bn 444		Doc 23 Aug
GROEGER	1st Lt.	Res Gren Bn 327		Doc 23 Aug
HARDEGEN	2nd Lt.	Res Mtn Arty Bn 79		Doc 23 Aug
HEINRICH	1st Lt.	99 Res Mtn Bn		Doc 23 Aug
HOFFMANN	1st Lt.	Staff Res Arty Regt 8		Doc 23 Aug
DOSE	2nd Lt.	CO 14/15 Res GR		Doc 24 Aug
LEROZEN	2nd Lt.	CO 2/8 Res Eng Bn		IPW 26 Aug
PAULI (PW)	1st Lt.	Supply, 242 I.D.		capt. 22 Aug
JENKE	Maj.	CO Div Supply, 242 I.D.		IPW 23 Aug
KROEGER	2nd Lt.	1/305 GR		IPW 22 Aug
LAUPE	1st Lt.	1/933 GR		IPW 19 Aug
BERICH	2nd Lt.	9/244 AR		IPW 20 Aug
KESSLER	Capt. (?)	CO III/244 AR		IPW 20 Aug
SEDIEMTER	1st Lt.	CO 13/157 Res Regt		IPW 21 Aug
WIMMER	1st Lt.	CO 14/157 Res. Regt.		IPW 21 Aug
SCHLEF	1st Lt.	CO 13/932 GR		IPW 21 Aug
DULCZUS	1st Lt.	CO 8/932 GR		IPW 21 Aug
MUELLER	Maj.	CO II/757 GR		FR 22 Aug
JENKE	Capt.	CO 5/757 GR		FR 22 Aug
THOMAS	Capt.	CO 6/757 GR		FR 22 Aug
HANTSCH	Capt.	CO 7/757 GR		FR 22 Aug
KELLNER	Capt.	CO 8/757 GR		FR 22 Aug
MULENTHREY	2nd Lt.	5/757 GR		FR 22 Aug
GLASER	2nd Lt.	6/757 GR		FR 22 Aug
SCHMIDT	2nd Lt.	IX/757 GR		FR 22 Aug
SCHMELDTFEGER	2nd Lt.	CO 8/757 GR		FR 22 Aug
ROTHFUCHS	2nd Lt.	8/757 GR		FR 22 Aug
REDER	2nd Lt.	7/757 GR		FR 22 Aug
GLOGER		Paymaster 757 GR		FR 22 Aug
RAUTER (PW)	Capt.	Maj. 792 Liaison Staff		capt 22 Aug
STADLER	Capt.	CO I/194 Sign. Rgt		Doc 24 Aug
SCHAEFFER	Gen Lt.	CG 244 Inf Div		AFHQ 30 May
SCHUBERTH	Commaj.	CG 792 Liaison Staff		capt 19 Aug
SPINDLER	1st Lt.	CO 1/217 Res Inf Bn.		IPW 21 Aug
HARTER	Capt.	CO 3/217 Res. Inf Bn		IPW 21 Aug

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

<u>Name</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Function</u>	<u>Unit</u>	<u>Source &amp; Date</u>
ROTHEWILD	2nd Lt.	CO 1/194	Sich Regt	IPW 22 Aug
SCHILLER	Capt.	CO 5/194	Sich Rgt	IPW 22 Aug
ERNST	1st Lt.	CO 6/194	Sich Rgt.	IPW 22 Aug
BIRKE	1st Lt.	CO 13/194	Sich Rgt.	IPW 22 Aug
HERMAN (P.O.)	Capt.	HQ/157	Res. Rgt.	capt 22 Aug
KOLB	Maj	CO 179	Res Inf Bn.	IPW 22 Aug
REETH	Capt.	CO 217	Res Inf Bn.	IPW 22 Aug
STUBE	1st Lt.	I/232	GR	FR 22 Aug

LEGEND :

IPW -- Interrogation Prisoners of War  
 AFHQ -- Allied Force Hq. Publications  
 FR -- Army "F" Forces (French)

IV SUPPLYGerman Ammunition Supply

A munitions investigation form from the CO of a battery of the 1190th Bn (GHQ) to the Bn Ordnance Section has been captured. This form is a pertinent comment on the quality of German ammunition being turned out at the present time. The Captain states in the document that out of a total supply of 4372 rounds of ammunition inspected, 1312 rounds, or 30%, were defective. He adds that in range practice on 13 July 1944, one out of every two rounds was a dud.

*William W. Quinn*  
 WILLIAM W. QUINN  
 Colonel, G. S. C.,  
 A. C. of S., G-2.

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
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No. 7

22 August 1944

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

T A B L E   O F   C O N T E N T S

- I   Air  
    Luftwaffe Dispositions
- II   Battle Order  
    Static Coastal Defense
- III   Communications  
    Demolitions
- IV   Terrain  
    Fords of the Durance

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This publication is designed to provide Seventh Army Units and Staff Sections with current enemy information which does not appear in any other widely disseminated publication. Although the contents are highly selected and screened, the title "Information Bulletin", is used in order to allow a wider latitude in the presentation of pertinent items which, in some instances, are not classed as verified intelligence.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

C O N F I D E N T I A LI. AIR.Luftwaffe Dispositions in Southern FRANCE.

As of 20 August, the only apparent Luftwaffe reinforcements over the air order of battle of two weeks previous were about 25 single-engine fighters and part of a staffel (squadron) of long-range reconnaissance aircraft.

At the present time, therefore, there are about 40 operational single engine fighters in this sector with their bases believed to be VALENCE and LYON/BRON airfields. Photo cover indicates that the former bases of ORANGE/CARITAT and AIX LES MILLES are now unused.

The long range bombers now total about 80 aircraft, composed of approximately 65 JU-88's and 15 DO-217's. The DO-217's and some JU-88's are located at TOULOUSE/FRANCAZAL Airdrome. Other JU-88 bases, on 18 August, were LYON/BRON, VALENCE, MONTELMAR and ORANGE/PLAN DE DIEU. However, it is believed that the latter three have been evacuated due to the proximity of Allied troops and that the bulk of the bomber force will be found at airdromes in the LYON and DIJON areas.

II. BATTLE ORDER.Artillery Units Responsible for Static Coast Defenseof MARSEILLE - HYERES and CANNES - VILLEFRANCHE Sectors

A captured document dated end of May 1944, gives detailed information on artillery units and their respective number of guns responsible for the coast defense of the following sectors.

A. MARSEILLE - HYERES SectorMARSEILLE.

1 battery Naval Artillery Battalion 611	- 4 guns
2 battery Naval Artillery Battalion 611	- 3 guns
4 battery Naval Artillery Battalion 611	- 3 guns
6 battery Naval Artillery Battalion 611	- 4 guns
7 battery Naval Artillery Battalion 611	- 6 guns
8 battery Naval Artillery Battalion 611	- 4 guns
2 battery Coastal Artillery Regiment 1291	- 4 guns
3 battery Coastal Artillery Regiment 1291	- 4 guns
4 battery Coastal Artillery Regiment 1291	- 4 guns
5 battery Coastal Artillery Regiment 1291	- 4 guns
Flak battery 10021	- 2 guns
Flak battery 10023	- 2 guns
Flak battery 10024	- 4 guns
1 battery Flak Battalion 597	- 3 guns

LA CIOTAT.

7 battery Coastal Artillery Regiment 1291	- 4 guns
8 battery Coastal Artillery Regiment 1291	- 4 guns
9 battery Coastal Artillery Regiment 1291	- 3 guns

BANDOL.

4 battery Artillery Regiment 244 *	- 3 guns
5 battery Artillery Regiment 244	- 3 guns
6 battery Artillery Regiment 244	- 3 guns

SALZERY.

II Battalion Artillery Regiment 242 *	- 16 guns
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C O N F I D E N T I A L

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6 battery Naval Artillery Battalion 682	- 4 guns
7 battery Naval Artillery Battalion 682	- 4 guns
1 battery Naval Flak Battalion 819	- 4 guns
2 battery Naval Flak Battalion 819	- 4 guns
3 battery Naval Flak Battalion 819	- 4 guns
1 battery Flak Battalion 355)	
3 battery Flak Battalion 355)	
7 battery Flak Battalion 355)	- Number of guns
8 battery Flak Battalion 355)	not reported.

HYERES.

1 battery Naval Artillery Battalion 627	- 4 guns
2 battery Naval Artillery Battalion 627	- 3 guns
2 battery Artillery Battalion 1197	- 4 guns

B. CANNES - VILLEFRANCHE Sector.CANNES.

12 battery Coastal Artillery Regiment 1291	- 3 guns
13 battery Coastal Artillery Regiment 1291	- 4 guns

NICE.

1 battery Flak Battalion 497	- 5 guns
2 battery Flak Battalion 497	- 6 guns
1 battery Artillery Battalion 1194	- 4 guns

VILLEFRANCHE

2 battery Artillery Battalion 1194	- 4 guns
3 battery Artillery Battalion 1194	- 4 guns

\* Note

It is reasonable to assume that the divisional artillery will be encountered in a tactical role in support of infantry battle groups rather than static coast defense. 4 battery of 242 Artillery Regiment has already been identified in the 36 Division sector.

III. COMMUNICATIONS.Demolitions

Mediterranean Allied Photographic Reconnaissance Wing reports the following demolitions as of 20 August:

1. S.980863 One span of road bridge over R. RHONE at AVIGNON demolished.
2. N.849203 Road bridge across R. RHONE at PORT ST. ESPRIN demolished.
3. N.845326 Road bridge over R. RHONE at BOURG ST. ANDROL demolished. Piers remain and parts of 2 spans; third span on west side no trace.
4. H.879419 Road bridge over R. RHONE North of DONZERE demolished. Center piers only remain.
5. N.877451 Road bridge demolished.
6. N.930808 Road bridge at LAVOULTE SUR RHONE demolished.
7. O.009958 Road bridge over R. RHONE at VALENCE destroyed.
8. S.950997 Road bridge over R. RHONE at MONTFAUCON. Span on west side demolished; remainder partly damaged.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

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9. N.981771 Road bridge over R. DROME at LIVRON partially destroyed.
10. T.546568 Road bridge over DURANCE blown at PERTUIS.
11. T.437616 Road bridge damaged.
12. N.908757 Rail bridge demolished at LE POUZIN blocking approach to road bridge over R. RHONE, which may also be damaged.
13. N.878452 This road bridge over R. RHONE does not exist.
14. N.870529 Road bridge over R. RHONE demolished.
15. N.934803 Rail bridge at LAVOULT SUR RHONE demolished.
16. N.972095 Rail bridge over R. AIGUES damaged by bombing.
17. N.968775 Rail bridge over R. DROME partially destroyed.
18. N.587564 Rail bridge across DURANCE, east of PERTUIS is blown.
19. N.885565 This road bridge over R. RHONE may be damaged but no definite statement on the very poor cover.
20. N.909756 Road bridge over R. VOULTE damaged at LE POUZIN.
21. O.003876 Marshalling at CHARMES SUR RHONE badly damaged by bombing. Rail tracks at choke point porably blocked.

(See also Section VII, Terrain and Communications,  
G-2 Information Bulletin, No. 6, 21 August 1944.)

IV. TERRAIN.Fords of the DURANCE

AFHQ forwards the following data received from LONDON:

Reference Map: GSGS 4471, 1:50,000, Sheets XXX-42, XXXI-43.

Positions are given in Eastings only, following the course of the river from west to east.

<u>Position</u>	<u>Condition</u>
ROGNONAS Bridge 985 to 995	Sandy bottom, flat. Depth 1 ft. 8 inches favorable to fording.
995 to 034	Water shallow, but north bank steep and 6 to 16 ft. high.
034 to 035	Cross toward NE, rejoining at point marked 28 on right bank 042.
054	Banks steep and high.
054 to 059	Fordable for approximately 550 yards.
059 to Bridge 072	Impassable
072 to 096	Impassable
096 to 135	Fordable, but no road approach.
135 to ORGON Bridge 180	Water deep and dangerous.

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<u>Position</u>	<u>Condition</u>
219	Fordable
219 to 222	425 yard stretch impassable due to deep holes.
222 to 230	Fordable
230 to 235	Dangerous
235 to 239	Fordable
239 to 241	220 yard stretch with holes
241 to 280	Fordable
280 to 282	Steep banks
282 to MALEMORT Bridge 285	Fordable

*W. W. Quinn*  
WILLIAM W. QUINN  
Colonel, G. S. C., NVB  
A. C. of S., G-2.

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


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INFORMATION BULLETIN

No. 5

20 August 1944

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

T A B L E O F C O N T E N T S

- I Battle Order Notes
  - 242 Infantry Division
- II Counter Intelligence
  - Sabotage
  - Resistance
- III Morale
  - Reactions of PW to Plot in Germany
- IV Personalities
  - Wiese
  - Baessler
  - Schaefer
- V Psychological Warfare
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- VI Resistance
- VII Technical Notes
  - Flamethrower Installation
  - Shell Mines

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C O N F I D E N T I A LI. BATTLE ORDER NOTESA. 242 INFANTRY DIVISION

A captured document dated 10 August gives the detailed organization of 242 Infantry Division.

242 Infantry Division Headquarters

Tank Platoon 22 (NOTE: It is surprising to find tanks in a Limited Employment Division. However, due to the large coastal sector for which the division was responsible, it is not unlikely that old or possibly captured tanks were assigned to the division).

Grenadier Regiment 917, consisting of 4 battalions, the 4th battalion an Ost Battalion, originally the 2nd battalion of 9 Armenian Regiment.

Grenadier Regiment 918, consisting of 4 battalions, the 4th battalion an Ost battalion, originally the 1st battalion of 198 Armenian Regiment.

Grenadier Regiment 765, consisting of 4 battalions, the 4th battalion an Ost Battalion, originally the 807 Azerbaijanian Battalion. (NOTE: Over 2,200 PW's have been taken from this Regiment. It can therefore no longer be considered tactically as a regiment. Scattered remnants of this regiment are not larger than battalion size).

Artillery Regiment 242, consisting of 3 battalions.

Field Replacement Battalion 242

Engineer Battalion 242

Signal Battalion 242

Divisional Anti-Tank Co 242

Divisional Services 242

Administrative Company 242

Bakery Company 242

Slaughter Company 242

Medical Company 242

Veterinary Company 242

Military Police 242

Divisional A.P.O.

NOTE: From the document it appears that the following units were under command of 242 Infantry Division:

Pak Artillery Battalion 1038

Static (bodenständig) Artillery Battalion 1190

Static (bodenständig) Artillery Battalion 1191

Static (bodenständig) Artillery Battalion 1195

Static (bodenständig) Artillery Battalion 1197

Coastal Artillery Regiment 1291

Technical Battalion (Mot) 23

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## C O N F I D E N T I A L

B. Organization and Armament of 242 Artillery Regiment  
and artillery units under command 242 Infantry Div.

A captured document dated 24 July 1944 gives the following details:

Hq and Hq Btry, 242 Arty Regt:I Bn, 242 Arty Regt:

Hq Btry  
1st Btry)  
2nd Btry) each: 4x100mm howitzers, Yugoslavian, (leichte  
3rd Btry) Feldhaubitze 317) range 10.7 kms.  
4th Btry)

II Bn, 242 Arty Regt:

Hq Btry  
5th Btry)  
6th Btry) each of these: 4x100mm howitzers, Italian, (leichte  
7th Btry) Feldhaubitze 315") range 9.2 kms.  
8th Btry) 4x105mm howitzers, French (leichte Feldhaubitze  
324") range 10.7 kms.

III Bn, 242 Arty Regt:

Hq Btry  
9th Btry)  
10th Btry) each of these: 4x100mm howitzers, Czech, (leichte  
11th Btry) Feldhaubitze 14/19) range 9.6 kms.  
12th Btry)

Attached Units for AA protection:

1x20mm AA Gun (Italian)  
6x20mm AA guns (German) Model 30  
8x20mm AA Guns (German) Model 38  
1 AA Platoon, consisting of 4x20mm AA guns (German)  
1x20mm AA Guns (Italian)

Attached Arty Units:

Arty Bn 1190: Hq Btry  
1st Btry) each of these: 4x100mm 18tn hows,  
2nd Btry) Italian, (Gebirgshaubitze 316/1"),  
3rd Btry) Range 9.2 kms.

Arty Bn 1191: Hq Btry  
1st Btry: 4x152mm Gun Hows, Russian, (Kanonen-  
haubitze 433") range 17 kms.  
2nd Btry: 3x152mm Gun Hows as in 1st Btry.  
3rd Btry: 3x105mm guns (A18, 10cm)  
range 19 kms.

Arty Bn 1195: Hq Btry  
1st Btry) each of these: 4x155mm Howitzers  
2nd Btry French (schwere Feld Haubitze  
3rd Btry) 414") range 11.3 kms.

Arty Bn 1197: Hq Btry)  
1st Btry) each of these: 4x149mm howitzers  
2nd Btry) (schwere Feld Haubitze 404"),  
3rd Btry) Italian, range 14 kms.

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Attached units for  
 AA protection of the above: 1 AA platoon, consisting of 3x20mm AA guns  
 3x20mm AA guns, Italian  
 6x20mm AA guns, German, model 30  
 9x37mm AA guns, German

Note: 1 gun, belonging to 2nd Btry, 1191 GHQ Arty Bn, is undergoing repairs; will be ready shortly.

II. COUNTER INTELLIGENCEA. Sabotage.

Signs have been put up along all principal wire routes with the warning that sabotage is punishable by death. No cases of any kind of sabotage have yet been reported.

B. Resistance.

The part played by the FFI has been of great military value, especially in the ST. THOPEZ area. Information given by them has led to many successful arrests. An exception to this was at ST. NAILLE where it was necessary to disarm local FFI members to prevent civil disturbances. This was done by the Security Militaire who turned the Arms over to the local FFI leader.

III. MORALEReactions of German Prisoners to the Recent Plot in Germany

(From "A" to Fifth Army G-2 Report No. 336)

The majority of prisoners captured on the Italian front during the first few days following the events of July 20th knew little or nothing of the upheaval inside Germany. Information had been withheld from them, or at best had reached them by way of rumors. Many prisoners heard the news first from Allied interrogators. Most of them were surprised that such a thing could happen, a few had expected it as an inevitable step following the recent series of German defeats. All were confused and unwilling to commit themselves one way or another.

German propaganda intervened as soon as the scope and danger had become evident. Captured documents show that the enemy expected a propaganda offensive from our side, and he moved to defend himself as well as he could. Goebbels's speech was rebroadcast over German military stations, and Hitler's address of July 20th was mimeographed and distributed among the troops. One of these copies, designed for distribution in 26th Pz Div, has been captured. While all prisoners agree that the revolt was an event of major importance with far reaching implications, many different opinions were expressed, which can be roughly divided into three main categories.

1. One group of young, inexperienced replacements, with Hitler Jugend indoctrination still firmly impressed on their minds, evidently believe every word of the propaganda line. Some are fanatical, but most of them are surprisingly naive. They feel that the plot was a dirty trick, played by a small group of thick-headed scoundrels, to remove the only man destined to see Germany through this war. Most of them hope for an early end, but few feel that Hitler would fail them. Some hope for a miracle; others condemn Hitler's advisors. The Fuehrer himself, however, enjoys the lofty position of a man beyond all reproach. Although it was easy to change the minds of most of these men, the fact that they initially believed in Hitler's innocence, is important at this point.

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2. The second group is headed by Volksdeutsche and other foreign elements from occupied territories, as well as Austrians, and, more recently, a number of discontented Germans. This group is outspoken in its disgust with the Hitler regime and the war, belligerent in its contempt of the German Army, and noisy in its disappointment in Hitler's escape from death. Interrogators quote comments such as: "I wish they had gotten rid of the bastard" and: "If the dog had only died." Independent action, however, cannot be expected from this quarter, as it is improbable that these men would run even the slightest risk. Most of their colorful abuses were probably voiced after their capture.

3. While the first and second groups are comparatively small, by far the majority of German soldiers show a surprising lack of concern. They feel things might have been better if the attempt had succeeded, but they don't know for sure. They all feel that the war has reached a point, where any change - short of a Russian invasion of German territory - would be welcome. A captured German officer admitted after some hesitation that the death of Hitler might have been as good a way as any to end the war. All prisoners feel sure that they would follow orders of the Army to lay down arms, even if contradictory instructions were issued by the SS, but all of this group agree that individual action would be suicide. The idea of the "little man" as a mere tool in the hands of the "big" is still a favorite German dramatization of adherence to the "Fuehrerprinzip". Little people have no right to decide or even think. They merely serve, and whoever wins in the struggle of the big will gain their loyalty. Prisoners insist that any revolt must come from a high level, while the little men at the front must serve silently as long as they are told to do so.

The effect of the revolt has been only partly demoralizing. Though some cheer at the Fuehrer's salvation and others see hope for an early end of the war, the bulk of the soldiers merely long for the day they can return to their families. They may recognize the plot as a sure sign of bigger events to follow but most of them have reached the point where they hardly care. German soldiers are afraid of Russia, but beyond a faint hope of keeping them from their soil they care little for Hitler, National Socialism, or the Greater German Reich.

IV. PERSONALITIESA. Friedrich HIESE

CG 19 ARMY

5/12/92	Born Nordhastedt, Schleswig-Holstein, son of a civil servant.
19/14/18	Served in 65 Infantry Regiment.
Jan-Aug 1919	Member of the Iron Division of the notorious 'Freikorps'.
Sept 1919	Retired with rank of Lieut. of the Reserve, and joined Police.
1935	Rejoined the Army with rank of Major in 69 Infantry Regt.
1/6/1938	Promoted Lieut. Colonel, commanding II Bn, 116 Infantry Regiment.
1/6/41	Promoted Colonel.
23/2/42	Commanding an infantry regiment, awarded Knight's Cross to the Iron Cross.
25/3/42	Awarded German Cross in gold.

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1/9/42 Promoted Major General.  
 1/1/43 Promoted Lieut. General, commanding a Lower Rhenish Infantry Division.  
 1/10/43 Promoted General (Infantry).  
 24/1/44 Commanding 35 Army Corps, awarded Oakleaves to the Knight's Cross for fighting at GOMEL and SW of ZHLOBIN.  
 July 44 Commanding General, 19 Army.

The Russians accused him of being responsible for atrocities at ZHLOBIN. Although there is no definite evidence that he is a Nazi, the fact that in 1919 he belonged to the notorious 'Freikorps' which was composed of the extreme Nationalist elements of the German Officer Corps, and from which many Nazis were recruited, suggests that he may have Nazi sympathies. His rapid promotion from Major General to full General in just over a year, with little evidence to account for it, also points to his being in favor with some high authority.

B. Erich BAESSLER

## CG 242 Infantry Division

Born 1891 (?)

1/6/10 Gazetted Second Lieutenant.  
 1914-18 Served in 154 Infantry Regiment (5 Nieder-schles.)  
 1919 Retired with rank of Captain.  
 1/1/38 Promoted Colonel, in 65 Infantry Regiment.  
 6/10/41 Commanding 399 Infantry Regiment (170 Div), recommended for German Cross in gold.  
 1/1/42 Promoted Major-General.  
 May 42 Commanding 377 Infantry Division in KURSK sector.  
 Aug 43 Commanding 242 Infantry Division in Belgium.  
 June 44 Still commanding above division.  
 No reports on personality and no known connection with Nazi Party.

C. Dr. Gotthold SCHAEFER

## CG 244 Infantry Division

Owing to the great number of officers of this name it is impossible to supply an early history, but it is likely that from 1938 onwards the following particulars are accurate.

1/4/38 Promoted Colonel, serving in O.K.A.  
 1939 In Defence Section III, Ministry of War.  
 19/1/43 Commandant of LILLE.  
 1/4/43 Promoted Major General.

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May 44

Commanding 244 Infantry Division.

No reports on personality. No known connection with Nazi Party.

V. PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARESurrender Leaflets

PWB reports that a captured German Chaplain confirmed the value of multi-lingual leaflets. Many illiterate non-Germans took them to Frenchmen for explanation. The PW added that large numbers of these troops surrendered as a direct result of these leaflets.

VI. RESISTANCE

A PW from 5 Co, 757 GR, 338 Inf. Div., stated that his regiment was the only regiment of the division in this area and that the other two (758 GR and 759 GR) were last reported near LYON.

He believed that even if these two regiments were ordered back to this area, they would have difficulty returning because of partisan activity in watching roads and blowing bridges.

VII. TECHNICAL NOTESA. Fougasse Emplaced Flame Thrower Installation

A position consisting of ten emplaced flame throwers has been encountered in vicinity of Villa du Bouchage (441188). These flame throwers were part of the local security of a 149 mm. coastal defense battery. Position was at top of gradual slope. Flame throwers were installed in mutually supporting pairs in a straight line, dug in immediately in front of a continuous double apron wire fence. Nozzles were directed at a 50 degree angle to the fence. Batteries of ten individual flame throwers were controlled from a single revetted switchboard position. Firing was by electrical circuit, with provision made for individual or simultaneous battery firing. All wiring was in wooden conduits only two inches below the surface, subject to easy destruction by mortar or artillery fire. Nozzles were only three inches above the surface of the ground and were well camouflaged with vegetation. The two flame throwers in each pair were installed six feet apart. Pairs were 45 yards apart.

One flame thrower has been fired. It projected a very hot flame to a range of 70 yards in a very moderate cross wind. Flame was six to eight feet wide and eight to ten feet high and was accompanied by a large cloud of smoke. This is a "one-shot" apparatus. Duration of burst was two seconds only and was preceded by the flickering of a three second delay magnesium ignition fuse. The flickering of this fuse was clearly visible. The direction of burning of this fuse - which is mounted just below the nozzle of the flame projector and in a direct line with it - indicates the direction of fire.

In the event flame throwers of this type are captured intact, the magnesium ignition fuse on the bottom of the nozzle should be severed from the nozzle in order to preclude accidental firing.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

B. Shell Mines.

In addition to more common types of enemy mines, six and eight inch naval shells, fitted with pull-igniter screwed in the nose and attached to a trip wire, have been encountered (see sketch, Annex No. 1).

*William W. Quinn*

WILLIAM W. QUINN  
Colonel, G.S.C.  
A. C. of S., G-2.

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
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




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TYPICAL GERMAN ARTILLERY SHELL  
USED WITH TRIP WIRE FOR BOOBY TRAP  
SCALE 3"=1'

# ANNEX 1 G-2 INFORMATION BULLETIN NO 5



IGNITER DETAIL  
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
HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH ARMY  
Office of the A. C. of S., G-2  
APO 758 US ARMY

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INFORMATION BULLETIN

No. 4

18 August 1944

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S E C R E T

T A B L E   O F   C O N T E N T S

- I    Battle Order Notes
- II   Civil Affairs
- III   Defense Information
- IV   Documents
- V    Personalities
- VI   Resistance

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This publication is designed to provide Seventh Army Units and Staff Sections with current enemy information, which does not appear in any other widely disseminated publication. Although the contents are highly selected and screened, the title "Information Bulletin", is used in order to allow a wider latitude in the presentation of pertinent items which, in some instances, are not classed as verified intelligence.

S E C R E T



SECRETI. BATTLE ORDER NOTES.

1038 PAK Arty. Bn.

Unit was organized at GROSSBORN in June 44. Belongs to a series of similar units including 1037, 1038, 1039, 1040 PAK Arty Bn.

Organization:

3 Batteries of 3 sections each.

Weapons and Equipment:

3 - 88mm AT Guns in each Section (Total of 27 in Bn)

9 - Tractors (3 Italian) in each Battery.

Strength:

3rd Battery had 85 men on 15 August. Expected 15-20 replacements.

Ammunition:

900 shells for each gun in position. Additional 1000 rounds per gun were on the way but did not arrive due to recent bombings.

II. CIVIL AFFAIRS.

The Civil Affairs Officers with the Third Division have covered 13 towns. In each town the French Forces of the Interior were well organized and, no problems of replacement of public officials have arisen which were not handled by the F.F.I. The condition of these towns is good, the people healthy and enthusiastic. Food is likely to be the big problem in the near future.

The Airborne Division with one Civil Affairs Officer, took the town of LE MUYS. When the French Forces of the Interior said the Mayor had to be replaced, our liaison officer installed a substitute. Apparently the action was satisfactory to the local groups.

36th Division Civil Affairs Officers have been in ST. RAPHAEL, FREJUS, and DRAGUIGNAN. In each town the French Forces of the Interior were completely organized and prepared to take over the government, install a Mayor and care for civilian needs.

ST. RAPHAEL is only slightly damaged and has food and a hospital sufficient to care for its needs and those of the population of FREJUS, which was badly damaged and has no food. These towns, under their new Mayors and the French Forces of the Interior, are well-organized, and it is believed they will be efficiently run. The town of DRAGUIGNAN is also well-organized, the French Forces of the Interior having obtained control of it before the 36th Division arrived.

Gasoline and oil on a temporary basis have been secured to run the auxiliary power plants at ST. TROPEZ and STE. MAXIME. It is hoped that water and some light will be shortly available as a result. As yet the Medical and Displaced Persons problems have not been of any importance, as no large centers were uncovered and because little evacuation, in fact, had been done by the Germans.

Two banks function in temporary quarters in ST. TROPEZ and also the Caisse D'Epargne, with bank staffs intact and tax collectors present. \$29,000 worth of freshly-printed French currency were captured on a German near LE MUYS. The supplemental currency is circulating freely with tradespeople. There is no apparent shortage of cash.

Ration cards used in ST. TROPEZ are the CARTE FAMILIALES issued by the Commune, rather than those issued by RAVITAILLEMENT GENERALE. No over-stamping of ration cards by local Mayors has yet been undertaken.

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Public health is generally normal. A bombing at ST. TROPEZ has put a strain on the hospital and medical facilities and has revealed a shortage of some medical supplies. Local medical statistics are poor but generally the situation appears to be in hand.

The postal system in the ST. TROPEZ and other areas is ready to function. The only delay is due to lack of transportation and lack of military censors. All between-town telephone and telegraph lines are apparently broken. Central office equipment is generally intact and merely requires power to put it into operation. Construction men are available to fix the lines when that becomes necessary and when their civilian use is militarily permissible. Efforts are being made to get the water running in those towns (ST. TROPEZ, STE. MAXIME and ST. RAPHAEL) where there have been stoppages. Diesel stand-by plants must be used for pumping in the absence of electric power and fuel must be secured from the army.

III. DEFENSE INFORMATION

The following information has been received from ground sources. It has not yet been confirmed on aerial photos, and is included here as a warning of the possible existence of the installations described.

The information covers the following map sheets in the following order:

XXI-43, XXII-43, XXIII-42, XXIV-42, 1/50,000  
 XXII-43, 1/50,000  
 XXIII-43, 1/50,000  
 XXIV-43, 1/50,000  
 XXII-44, 1/50,000  
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 XXII-45, 5 & 6, 1/25,000  
 XXIII-45, 7 & 8, 1/25,000  
 XXIII-45, 1/50,000  
 XXIII-46, 1 & 2, 1/25,000  
 XXIII-46, 5 & 6, 1/25,000  
 XXIII-46, 7 & 8, 1/25,000  
 XXIV-46, 5 & 6, 1/25,000

SHEET NOS. XXI-43, XXII-43, XXIII-42, XXIV-42, 1/50,000.

A secondary line of defense reported to exist as follows: COMPS (U-359652), CASTELLANE (U-357805), ROUGON (U-269747); thence N. side of VERDON River to GRENOUX (T-855602); across the DURANCE River to MANOSQUE (T-770765), to MINDEAU (T-675614) to PERTUIS (T-552597) to CADENET (T-445640). This line of defense consists of strong points and infantry concentrations.

SHEET NO. XXII-43, 1/50,000.

(a) Construction work reported between PERTUIS (T-552597) and CADENET (T-445640, Sheet No. XXI-43).

(b) T-5454 Route N. 561 mined for length of 500 meters.

(c) T-474456. 2 RR guns on 5 August on tracks at LA CALADE - EGUILLES station, 100 meters N. of grade crossing over route N. 7, 12 km. N.W. of AIX.

Date of information: 6 August

Evaluation: B-2

SHEET NO. XXIII-43, 1/50,000

T-795652. Trenches reported.

Date of information: 21 June

Evaluation: B-3

SHEET NO. XXIV-43, 1/50,000

Mines being laid along roads which connect DRAGUIGNAN and the NARTUBY valley and the Plateau of the BASSES ALPES.

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SHEET NO. XXXII-44, 1/50,000. (T 5242)

## (a) AIX-en-PROVENCE.

In the town, at all major cross-roads, construction of M.G. blockhouses, with underground firing compartments, loopholes and embrasures 1 1/2 feet above ground.

## (b) LEGEND TO DEFENSE AREA "A".

1. T 51054105. Blockhouse on Rue VILLEVIEILLE commanding freight station and TRAVERSE de L'AIGLE D'OR.
2. T 51074110. Blockhouse on PLACE B. NIOLLON commanding COURS SEXTIUS and BOULEVARD de la REPUBLIQUE.
3. T 51204103. Blockhouse in front of CASINO MUNICIPAL and connected with it.
4. T 51284100. Blockhouse on PLACE MARCHEAL PETAIN facing la ROTONDE and COURS MIRABEAU.
5. T 51304095. Blockhouse on PLACE MARCHEAL PETAIN facing RUE LICE du COUR.
6. T 51354075. Blockhouse on AVE VICTOR HUGO, facing BOULEVARD DU ROI RENE, near HOTEL MODERNE (the latter occupied by Germans).
7. T 51534076. Blockhouse on BOULEVARD DU ROI RENE facing AVE VICTOR HUGO.
8. T 51274067. Blockhouse in front of station, connected with station garages, facing AVE BENJAMIN ABRAM.
9. T 51614070. Blockhouse at corner of COURS d'ORBITELLE AVE St. JEROME, and CLEMEN DU COTON ROUGE, facing latter two.
10. T 51624076. Blockhouse on Blvd. du ROI RENE facing Blvd. CARNOT.
11. T 52244170. Blockhouse at the end of COURS des ARTS et METIERS, commanding the AIX-RIMS Departmental Highway.
12. T 51674169. Blockhouse on PLACE BELLEGARDE, commanding the ROUTE DES ALPES.
13. T 51674203. VILLA HIGNET on MONTRE St. EUTROPE is a Naval Headquarters. Residence of Admiral at VILLA PARADIS.
14. T 51164092. Blockhouse on AVE DES BELGES facing National Highway N. 8.
- 15 & 16. Pits prepared for the placing of mines.  
Date of information: 24 April. Evaluation: B-2.
- (c) T 494364. A/T ditch on both sides of the road North of the stream.
- (d) T 497363. Armored train, carrying 380 mm gun at LUYERS Station on GARDANNE-AIX line. During alerts it moves into the tunnel.  
Date of information: 28 June. Evaluation: B-2.
- (e) At CADOLIVE (T 6027) road block consisting of vertical posts with concrete cubes leaving clear passage for 1 vehicle.

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SHEET NO. XXXIII-44, 1/50,000.

At T 875325, light German resistance point with trenches and several M.G.s being prepared at MAITELLE farm, 4 km, S.E. of St. MAXIMIN.  
Evaluation: B-2.

SHEET NO. XXXII-45, 5 &amp; 6, 1/25,000.

Pointed concrete stakes, 2 m. 50 high and connected by barbed wire on road from MARSEILLE-CASSIS between LOGISSON (T 563087) and MASSUGUET (T 583093).

Date of information: May.

Evaluation: B-3.

SHEET NO. XXXII-45, 7 &amp; 8.

Mines being laid on CUGNS plain.

Date of information: 26 April.

Evaluation: B-3.

SHEET NO. XXXIII-45, 1/50,000.

Approximately T 730199, directly East of Vieille Chapelle there is an observatory of masonry construction surmounted by a glass rotunda. From this point there is an extensive view in all directions, as far as LA CIOT-T and SALLARY. There is a small searchlight; no sound-detecting devices. Some telephone communications exist. Post vulnerable by air and land having no local defenses.

Date of information: 22 May.

Evaluation: B-2.

SHEET NO. XXXIII-46, 1 &amp; 2.

SALLARY (Y 8297). Port closed to all circulation. Defense installations and camouflage erected. Newstands built on square. They hide small pill-boxes, well-constructed and well-armed. Road signs bear false directions.

SHEET NO. XXXIII-46, 5 &amp; 6.

ST. HENDRIER Peninsula (Y 9292). Civilian population reported to be evacuated.

Date of information: April.

Evaluation: B-3.

Scrapped ship at entrance to roads reported to be equipped with AA guns and searchlight.

Date of information: June.

Evaluation: B-3.

SHEET NO. XXXIII-46, 7 &amp; 8.

At LE PLADET (Y 990960) there were pyramidal blocks to close the road at CR 999964. There were also emplacements for mines at same location.

SHEET NO. XXXIV-46, 5 &amp; 6.

(a) LE CEINTOURON-PLAGE (Z 122963). The minefields indicated in area of LE CEINTOURON are laid out in transversal lines and mines are from 3 to 6 meters apart. There are some extra-sensitive mines which will explode under the weight of a dog, and others explode under a weight of 30 kilos.

Date of information: March.

Evaluation: B-2.

(b) Z 087940. At MENDRIER Station, a blockhouse disguised as a dwelling.

Date of information: 15 April.

Evaluation: B-2.

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SECRETIV DOCUMENTS

(From Captured Document)

189 Reserve Division  
 Section G-3/Sig  
 No 3998/44 secret

SECRET

List of Code Names of 189 Res Div  
 Valid from 0000hrs, 10 August 1944

Hq 189 Res Division	FEDORA
1089 Ambulance Flat	GARTENZAUN
1089 Field Hospital	ORGELPFEIFE
1089 MT Co	RITTERSPORN
1089 Div Ration Office	MAERCHENBUCH
Div Tool Park	TITELBILD
Horse Assembly Area	ZAUBERSPRUCH
Hq 234 Sig Bn	BEELWEISS
1 Co (Tel)	STUDENT
2 Co (Rad)	KURFURST
Operations Hq MONTPELLIER	RUTSCHBAHN
Strongpoint Commander SETE	HAULKORB
Hq 461 Res Gren Bn	IMMERGRUEN
1 Co	GRAUSCHIMMEL
2 Co	SPINNET
3 Co	KARFFEN
4 Co	PFEFFERKUCHEN
Hq 15 Res Gren Regt	WALDELAUS
Hq Co	BOTENFRAU
35 Res Inf How Co	VERKAUFSLAGER
262 Res Inf AT Co	HEBDECKKNOPF
15 Res Mort Co	BEERENWEIN
Hq 163 Res Gren Bn	PROTESTANT
1 Co	GESANGBUCH
2 Co	OBERKELLER
3 Co	HAENGELALPE
4 Co	EMIGRANT
Hq IV (Russ) Bn, 932 Gren Regt	VORZEILER
1 Co	LEBETKASTEN
2 Co	RISIERMESSER
3 Co	KINDERGARTEN
4 Co	IRNGARD
Hq II Bn, 235 Arty Regt	KURSBUCH
Hq Btry	ABENTEUER
4 Btry	DIENTSTALLEN
5 Btry	RUDEBODT
6 Btry	INSTRUMENT
7 Btry	FABELTIER
Hq 28 Lt Res Arty Bn	FEUERTAUPE
Hq Btry	EISZIEFFEN
2 Btry	WOHNEMOND
3 Btry	SCHLAFNAGELN
4 Btry, static Btry 1196	WANDELWALLE
Hq Engr Bn BOEHMEN	SCHAFERHUND
352 A Engr Co	HAUKLEFER
352 B Engr Co	GERANIUM

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Hq 1089 Pz Div	KIESEWETTER
3 Co	KRAHLADEN
4 Co	MEHLSPFIE
5 Co (Btry)	FAHNERSTANGE
8 Fortress Recruit Co, Hq 19th Army	STACHELBEERE
52 Res Co for Inf Engr Plats	ADRESSBUCH

Only extracts of this code list are permitted forward of Regimental and independent Bn Cps. Such extracts must contain only those code names which are necessary for the communications of the respective units.

It is prohibited to make complete copies of this code list.

This list supercedes the old code list which will be destroyed as per AR-99.

Loss or compromise of this list must be reported to the Signal Officer, 189 Res Div without delay.

V PERSONALITIES.

## Generalmajor BIERINGER

Generalmajor BIERINGER, Feldkommandant (Chief Administrative Officer) of the War Department was captured at DR. GUICHEN at 2200H 16 August.

When interviewed he confirmed the enemy order of battle as previously known and confirmed identification of the commanding generals of 148 Reserve Division and 242 Infantry Division. General MEULING, CG of 62 Reserve Corps, was located slightly north of DR. GUICHEN, and General KNEISS, CG of Korps Gruppe Kneiss, in the CAVAILLON area. BIERINGER knew that the 9 Panzer Division had moved north from AVIGNON, and had heard several days ago that another armored division, unidentified, had arrived in NIMES-AVIGNON area.

Bieringer gave himself up because French resistance elements had threatened to kill him and his entire staff. His efforts to persuade General Meuling to surrender were unsuccessful, Meuling replying that he had orders to fight to the end. (Note: Meuling, however, surrendered on 18 August and a report of his interview is reproduced below.)

Bieringer reported that General SOPELSTERN had been relieved of command of 19 Army at same time as Field Marshal RUNDSTEDT was relieved of command in France, and had been replaced by General Wiese, described as a young fervent Nazi general.

According to Bieringer, the enemy was informed on 13 August that an Allied landing would take place on 15 August, but it was believed that the landing would be made in the GENON area and the actual area came as a complete surprise. He expressed amazement at the speed of the American advance.

He confirmed Field Marshal ROMMEL's injury in Normandy in an attack by low-flying aircraft in which Rommel's driver was killed and the car overturned.

He did not believe in the possibility of revolution in Germany, since Himmler and the SS are in complete command of the army and replacement army, as well as German civilians. However, he foresees a "tragic end" for Germany.

## General MEULING

General der Infanterie Meuling, commanding general of 62 Reserve Corps, was captured with his entire operational staff in the DR. GUICHEN area at 0600 16 August.

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So far as he knew, only the rear echelon was still fighting. His communication lines to 19 Army were cut by our paratroopers, and only one overworked radio was functioning. He was impressed by the accuracy of American artillery fire.

MEULING was very secure and is a believer in HITLER. He had specific orders to fight to the last man and the last bullet.

VI RESISTANCE ACTIVITIES.

During the first two weeks of August a series of successful actions was fought by the F.F.I. in SAVOIE, culminating in the occupation of MOUTIERS (W) 226. Enemy losses in action at MOUTIERS and NOTRE DAME DE BRILLON (W) 226 amounted to 10 killed and 74 prisoners. The enemy garrison at DOURE ST MAURICE (W) 247, alarmed at the F.F.I.'s successes, withdrew in confusion over the COL PETIT ST BERNARD into ITALY. F.F.I. chiefs admitted that their success was partly due to the fact that the enemy had withdrawn a large number of troops from the department to take part in the big attack against the F.F.I. in the VERCORS.

Reports from the area of the DROME south of the road CREST 017 - DIE 037 indicated that the enemy, having successfully dispersed the maquis on the VERCORS plateau in the course of his offensive, which opened on 21 July, did not intend to proceed with large scale mopping up operations. Later reports stated that the enemy was withdrawing his troops from the VERCORS altogether. It is difficult to make an accurate estimate of the situation in this area, but it is hoped that the F.F.I. in the VERCORS will again be able to assist operations by harassing the enemy's lines of communication in the RHONE valley and on the ROUTE-NEPOLEON running SOUTH from GRENOBLE J62 to DIGNE.

Anti-sabotage teams in NARBONNE, TOULON and SETE have sent back considerable information concerning German preparations for port demolitions. In NARBONNE a number of blockships have already been sunk and others are available in the harbor to complete the blocking of the channels.

Half of the Armenian garrison at LUNDE 194, comprising some 600 men, have deserted to the maquis. Difficulties of liaison between the Resistance Groups and Ost Legion troops have prevented many other foreign elements in the German army from doing likewise.

Sabotage of roads, railways and telecommunications has continued in S.W. FRANCE. Reports on 13 August spoke of the movement north from CASTRES Q94 of a panzer division, as well as an infantry division believed to be formed of German elements from the Eastern front. No Mk. VI tanks have been seen.

*William W. Quinn*  
WILLIAM W. QUINN  
Colonel, G.S.C.,  
A. C. of S., G-2

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## SICILIAN CAMPAIGN

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## PART I - AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS

SECTION A: INITIAL PLANS AND PREPARATIONS

SECTION B: TACTICAL PLANS AND METHODS

## PART II - COMBAT

## PART III - GENERAL NOTES (TACTICAL AND TECHNICAL)

## PART IV - NOTES ON CORPS AND ARMY

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NOTES ON SICILIAN CAMPAIGNPART I - AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONSSECTION A: INITIAL PLANS AND PREPARATIONS

1. General. From the standpoint of the ground troops, it is vital that before planning starts a definite agreement to be secured from the Navy as to the number and type of ships available, and the depth of loading permissible in the smaller craft.

2. The Selection of Objective. The general area to be attacked is selected by the High Command. It then becomes the duty of the Force Commander, in conjunction with the Navy and with the Air Force, to determine the precise localities where the various landings will be attempted. The interest of the Navy in this is a determination of the beaches which, from a naval standpoint, are available. The interest of the Air is largely where and to what extent fighter cover can be provided. Time and argument will be saved if the Navy, Army, and Air planning staff, with their respective commanders, make this decision immediately after the amount and type of lift is determined. The reason that the lift must be determined first is that on the lift depends the amount of troops available, and on the amount of troops available depends the number of landings which may be attempted.

3. Extra Personnel. The Navy and Air Force through their senior officers must state their requirements for men and equipment. Since these requirements will invariably be excessive, the Ground Force Commander, the Navy, and the Air must thrash the matter out under the presidency of the senior officer from the officer of the Commander-in-Chief who can make the final decision. Not only must this final decision state the number of men and amount of equipment but it must also specify in which convoy they will be carried. After these decisions have been reached, nothing except enemy action should in any way reduce the list of vessels or change the order of loading.

4. Combat Leaders. When combat leaders are used at night, it is most desirable that they have sufficient landing craft carried in davits to lift a complete assault unit without having to call on other ships to supply small craft.

5. Air Support. Another point which should be settled at the commencement of the planning is whether or not air support will be supplied during the landing and subsequent to the landing, and the nature of support in each case. If close air support is to be supplied, an effort must be made to utilize directional smoke. This directional smoke, produced either by shells or hand grenades, comes in three colors and is analogous to recognition lights.

For instance: On D Day, from zero to 2400 hours, yellow smoke means friendly troops; red smoke means enemy. Where the front line is uncertain, or if friendly air attacks our own troops through error, yellow smoke is put out by the use of hand grenades. When the front line is marked by yellow smoke, anything beyond it in the direction of the enemy may be attacked by close support airplanes. If, on the other hand, some particularly obnoxious enemy installation is beyond the power of the ground troops, e.g., a reverse slope position, and is in artillery range, it will be outlined in red smoke. From zero to 2400 D plus 1, red smoke will indicate friendly troops; blue smoke enemy, etc.

It is felt that could our airplanes utilize some method of showing a recognition signal of the same color as that which has been designated for friendly troops on that day, it would reduce accidental firing at them.

6. Naval Gunfire Support. Whether or not Navy gunfire support is to be used prior to H hour, must be definitely determined for the entire force. It is my

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personal opinion that Navy gunfire support should not be used sooner than H minus 1 hour and then only against enemy units which are firing, or against searchlights. In the daytime, Navy gunfire support is of immeasurable value, and the means now developed by the Navy for putting it on are extremely efficient.

7. Troop Lists. In making up the troop list for the assault convoy, it must always be remembered that while men and equipment to operate harbors, or beaches, or graves registration, or hospitals or to restore and maintain airfields are necessary, they are utterly valueless until the fighting infantry, supported by artillery and tanks, has captured a beachhead.

From my experience I know that units not engaged in the initial fight at the beaches, are always super-optimistic as to how long it takes to secure a beachhead. Non-killers must be held to an irreducible minimum in early echelons.

A great saving in non-fighting men and heavy equipment can be effected by providing hospital ships. The presence of these ships removes the initial necessity for hospitalization and provides much better care for the wounded men. However, steps must be taken to see that the Navy provides a list of wounded taken on board and turns this over to the Army prior to sailing, otherwise, men will be reported missing who are actually on the hospital ship or transports.

8. Safe-arrival cards. Safe-arrival cards should be mailed for all members of an expedition the day it disembarks and then exceptions mailed later. This saves time and alleviates much heart burning at home.

9. Feeding Prisoners. Arrangements must be made with the Navy for a definite responsibility for the feeding and guarding of prisoners of war. If this guarding cannot be done by the Navy, additional MP Battalions must be provided. However, to put such men in the assault convoy reduces the assault personnel. Food for prisoners of war while on board ships should be provided by the Navy.

10. Command Ships. A combined Army, Navy, and Air Force command ship is necessary not only for the Task Force Commander but for the Sub-Task Force Commanders and even as far down as the Regimental Combat Team Commanders. The complexity of the installations diminishes with the size of the unit involved.

Command ships should be specially constructed and not improvised at the last moment. They should in no case be naval fighting ships since involvement in a fire fight results in immediate disruption of all radio communication channels.

A suitable officer must be provided for each of the following: The Commanding General, Chief of Staff, G-3, G-2, and Air Support.

Each command ship should have three separate code rooms: One for the Army, one for the Navy, and one for the Air Force code sections. Each of these code rooms must be large enough to permit of efficient operation of British and American Code Teams. The message center room should be convenient to the code rooms, and of sufficient size to accommodate the three message center installations, namely, Army, Navy, and Air Corps. All three services, however, may use a common radio operation room.

In the two operations in which I have participated we lacked an adequate number of radio channels. It is desirable that a special channel be provided aboard the principal command ship, and later ashore, to handle press dispatches. The use of command channels for the transmission of press material is impractical since such use causes interruptions in tactical traffic. It may however be necessary to modify Naval policy to permit of individual transmission of press reports.

The Task Force Commander's headquarters ship should be accompanied by alternate command ship carrying sufficient radio equipment to take over the channels if the principal headquarters ship is lost. Where possible all command ships

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should have alternates particularly when the unit in question equals or exceeds the size of a division.

11. Speedboats. There should be -- and this need is vital -- at least two speedboats solely for Army use which should lie close to the command ship. There are innumerable occasions when the possession of such speedboats to take messages would facilitate matters because, up to a distance of fifteen to twenty miles, a staff officer in a speedboat can deliver and receive messages far faster than they can be coded, sent, and decoded. When the headquarters goes ashore speedboats should still be available till land communication is assured.

12. Amphibious Radios. It is essential that high powered radio channels be established ashore at the earliest possible moment. This was effectively accomplished by installing water-proofed sets, SCR-299, in 2½-ton amphibious trucks. Two such units should be provided for each Army, Corps and Division Headquarters and loaded in such manner as to permit of unloading over the ramps of landing vessels while still some distance off shore.

13. Amphibious Training. Too much time is devoted to teaching soldiers to debark from large craft into small craft. This is a very simple operation and can be very readily accomplished. A great deal of time should be put on teaching soldiers to get out of small craft on the run and keep running across the beach.

More emphasis must be placed by the Navy on training coxswains to handle boats and to find the proper beaches. Also more training is necessary in the arrival at and the manipulation of vessels in the transport area.

14. Battle Practice. Some of the battle practice to which our troops have been subjected is more sensational than battle and as a consequence gives a false idea of the violence of war, with the result that some troops are unduly perturbed. It is certainly necessary that troops be fired over at very close heights by their own supporting weapons. They should also be habituated to following closely on artillery preparations, both percussion and air bursts. In doing so, they should have targets at which they fire so as to habituate them to fire while moving and to using their own arms in addition to the fire protection provided by the supporting arms. On the other hand, firing towards our troops close over their heads and bursting unduly large number of small mines amongst them as they move forward under circumstances which almost invariably inhibit their firing, have a bad effect. Troops must always fight back, not just take it.

15. Physical Condition. Too much emphasis cannot be placed on the physical condition of officers and men. Only by being extremely inured to terrific hardships can they produce successful results under the conditions of actual war.

16. Equipment. The equipment of troops engaged in landing operations must be reduced to the minimum. For the infantry rifleman, who has the hardest job, a hundred rounds of ammunition, one canteen, one or two grenades, and probably the light type of gas mask are sufficient. Supporting troops should, in addition to the grenades, or as an alternative to them, depending on the circumstances, carry one light trench mortar projectile a piece.

For landing operations the use of A or B bags for the initial assault is expensive and valueless. All they need in the way of extra equipment is a toilet set, including shaving equipment, towel and soap.

As soon as the beaches are taken over by the Army, additional clothing and equipment in appropriate sizes must be immediately made available for issue. In the Sicilian Campaign we carried in the assault convoy, but in a late priority to land, water proof bags containing full field equipment, including pistol belts for 5 per cent of the assault infantry. The contents of these bags are for the purpose of immediately replacing equipment lost or destroyed during the landing. Experience indicates that the ratio could be reduced to 2½% of the assault infantry.

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17. Gadgets. In planning landing operations, there is an invariable tendency to put too many gadgets in the small boats and consequently to overcrowd them. The only accessories necessary are the following: One grapnel projectile for 81-mm mortars in the ratio of one per assault company. In the same ratio there should be a two section Bangalore torpedo raised on skids to a height of four feet. These are used for opening lines through minefields. Every assault platoon should have two pairs of bolt cutters. One wire mat per small landing boat is useful for crossing entanglements and does not take up too much room. The above applies to assault waves only.

18. Antiaircraft Fire. The ground troops and the Navy, particularly in the case of Navy small boats and non-AA ground troops, must be trained never to fire on airplanes unless they are attacked or the planes are so close that there is not any possible doubt as to their nationality. If this is not done, we simply deprive ourselves of air support by shooting our own planes, or demand of our own aviators very high courage, which, to their credit, I have often seen them display in flying through our own AA fire. Our Air Force must be equally well trained not to attack friendly troops or craft.

19. Beach Parties. Combined Army and Navy beach parties are of great potential value but very seldom produce the results they should. This is due to the lack of force of character in the men of the Army and Navy commanding them.

They also have a tendency to develop unnecessarily complex forms of procedure. The best solution I know of is to have a senior Naval and Army officer on each beach who are known to possess sufficient force and drive to see that things work.

20. Balloons. Balloon barrages do not justify the amount of space and trouble they take in the assault wave. If it is necessary to put balloons on the beach, they should not be emplaced until the arrival of the reserve wave when space is not so important.

21. Mutual Recognition by the Air and Ground. It is very important that more instruction be given both ground troops and air troops in recognizing each other. I believe that the number of friendly planes shot down by ground troops in any operation is considerably less than the number of friendly vehicles destroyed by our air. This fact is not an argument against close air-ground support which is of sufficient value to warrant the casualties above mentioned, but it is regrettable that such casualties occur, and more thorough training would certainly reduce their number.

22. Supply. The initial supply for all classes must be decentralized to the Sub-Task Forces. The amount and character of supply will depend on circumstances, which are governed by the character of the terrain, the type of beach or port, and the distance from home. In any event the Force Commander should not attempt to intervene in the supply problem until the initial objectives of the landing have been attained. Then the G-4 of the Army and his assistants, with the aid of special beach engineer battalions, should take over the beaches. As the operation progresses, the G-4 of the Army should be relieved by units from the SOS who take over the harbor and other successive supply installations as the Army moves forward. To make this transition smooth, it is desirable that representatives of each section of the SOS accompany the G-4 of the Army. No T/O allows sufficient personnel for the G-4 Section in a landing operation. A transportation section in G-4 is essential and should contain from ten to twelve officers and about twenty enlisted men. This is probably the most important section in G-4.

23. Build-Up. In the TORCH Operation, due to time and space, the earliest probable build-up was 60 days after landing, which meant that the initial landing lived or died on what it took with it. In the Sicilian Campaign, and in other possible operations, the second and third convoys can arrive sooner, and in fact, ships making the assault landing will return and bring up the successive increments. There is a tendency to arrange the sequence in which these increments will arrive. This is wrong. The best a Commander can do is to estimate what he

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would probably want, but the action of the enemy will determine the order in which he will want them. An officer of force and experience must remain behind to command these build-up increments and send whichever type is called for promptly and completely.

24. Engineers. The faster an Army intends to go and the more violent the blows it intends to strike, the larger must be the tail. Without tremendous supplies of gasoline, ammunition, and other stores, an Army cannot develop its elasticity or striking power. It cannot attain these supplies except through the use of a tremendous number of troops behind the front line. At one time in the Sicilian Operation, the seventh Army had thirteen Infantry regiments and nine Engineer regiments, besides Ordnance, maintenance, and other non-fighting but vitally essential units. In fighting in bad country against an enemy who trusts to demolitions for delay, it is conceivable that the ratio of Engineer regiments to Infantry regiments should be fifty-fifty. Certainly every Infantry division actively engaged requires the services of one Engineer regiment in addition to its divisional Engineers. The Corps Artillery certainly requires an Engineer regiment, and others must be utilized to see that the supplies brought up by the Army reaches the Corps and Divisions.

#### SECTION B: TACTICAL PLANS AND METHODS

1. General. The plans for a landing operation must be simple, not only for the Force as a whole but also for the Sub-Task Forces. In order to insure co-ordinated effort, the Commanders of the Sub-Task Forces should be assembled and the general plan and objectives of the landing should be explained to them so that in the inevitable fog of war, in which they will find themselves, they can use their best efforts for the accomplishment of the general end.

2. Terrain. The Sub-Task Force Commanders should be given a free hand in planning the details of their operation, but they should make their plans conform to the terrain. By the same token the training of their troops must conform to the type of terrain over which they will fight.

3. Speed over the Beach. The primary function of a landing operation is to secure a beachhead which means we must get ashore and proceed far enough inland to insure that we will not be evicted. The greatest importance must be placed on the rapid leaving of the landing craft and of the rapid and relentless advance across the beach. Troops must not stop on the beach.

4. Initial Assault Equipment. All boats which are capable of being beached from the LST on down should approach the beach with mortars or tank guns and machine guns emplaced to fire. The support battalions in the initial assault must be equipped with the antitank guns and tanks, also with self-propelled dual-purpose antitank, antiaircraft guns on half-tracks.

5. Surprise Element. If surprise can be insured until H. minus 1 hour, the chances of landing successfully are greatly enhanced. Owing to the noise of the ships in the transport area, it is highly improbable that surprise later than H minus 1 hour will ever be secured. This being so, it is very desirable that the air assault the selected beaches between H minus 30 minutes and H minus 15 minutes. It must be definitely arranged that if for reasons of weather or other causes the air is unable to attack before H minus 15, the air attack must be dispensed with.

6. Initial Objective. The first objective for a sub-task force is to secure before dawn a well-marked terrestrial objective, far enough inland and so situated that its capture prevents the enemy from putting small arms and mortar fire on the beach. It is permissible to reorganize on this line. However, if the enemy is retiring, do not stop to reorganize but push on to what is called the artillery line; that is, a terrestrial objective which will prevent the enemy, either through distance or by depriving him of observation, from bringing effective artillery fire, except by very large pieces, on the beach or shipping.

7. Mental Attitude. The greatest importance must be placed on enthusiastic elan and self-confidence on the part of the troops making the initial assault. Battle is a violent and elemental occupation. Men to conquer in battle, particularly in a night landing, must be imbued with this elemental viciousness.

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A landing operation which does not continue its attack is bound to fail.

8. Confusion. In any landing operation confusion is bound to occur. This is due to the fact that in spite of the best intentions, landing craft do not land where they are supposed to and stores get ashore regardless of categories. The main thing is to get the men and the stores ashore. If they are there they can be used. If we waste time trying to get them ashore in some preconceived order, they will not be available.

9. Closing in of Transports. As soon as the enemy shore batteries are put out of action, the transports should close on the beach. There are two reasons for this from the Army standpoint. First, it greatly facilitates the speed of unloading by shortening the turn-around. Second, the air cover, which is protecting the beach, is also available to protect the ships. This is not true if the ships are lying near the horizon.

10. Aircraft vs Counterattack. In any landing operation, the most critical period is from about noon on D Day to the night of D plus 1, because during that time we are probably inferior to the enemy in guns and possibly in infantry, and he has had time to make his reconnaissance and bring up reserves.

It is therefore essential that if the mastery of the air permits, we have suitable aircraft aloft to be used against hostile counter-attacks. A solution is to have these aircraft wait on over-head for ten minutes in every hour. They can have a secondary bombing mission to which they can proceed and drop their bombs at the close of their ten minute wait. They should be replaced in fifty minutes by another similar group with a similar secondary target. These airplanes must be in radio communication with the air support unit on the ground. By such a method any counter-attack can be met from the air.

11. Function of Force Commander. The Force Commander should interfere as little as possible until the artillery line has been reached by the Sub-Task Forces. This having been done, he can issue orders for the grouping of the units for the further operations which present themselves. However, the physical presence of the Force Commander on shore during the early and generally critical phases of the operation is very important.

Every effort should be made never to issue orders below the next echelon of command. The higher an officer is, the greater temptation he seems to undergo to by-pass his juniors by telling them the size and type of unit with which they are to execute instructions.

#### PART II - COMBAT

1. General. Much has been written on war but little on fighting. In what follows I have attempted to give a cross-section of the actual combat procedure from the infantry regiment down. To obtain this data I personally visited each division and made a short talk on what they had done, explained to them what they were fighting for, and gave them a picture of their future operations as I visualized them. At the close of each of those talks, the most outstanding officer in each grade in the infantry and the artillery liaison officers of the particular division were questioned by me. What follows is a cross section of the opinions thus gathered.

It is of interest to note that nothing hereinafter presented varies materially with what we teach; however, the emphasis is somewhat different.

2. Infantry Regiment in Open Country. The infantry regiment in open country normally attacks with two battalions in line, the cannon company in close support in the center, and the third battalion back. When the regiment is acting alone, the artillery of the combat team supports it. When two regiments are attacking abreast, the support is generally from the massed artillery of the division.

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The advantage of attacking with two battalions abreast is:: In the first place you have more artillery observers and can therefore place fire more accurately; in the second place you hit harder from the beginning and thereby give the enemy less chance of building up. You still retain flexibility of maneuver through your third battalion.

Except in particularly difficult country, it is usually possible through the use of engineers to maintain two battalions abreast. These engineers, working at night behind an infantry screen, make extemporized roads up which the necessary vehicles can move in support of their battalions. As the fight moves on the engineers must extend the roads.

3. The Infantry Regiment in Close Country. In very close country the regiment attacks in column of battalions with the cannon company in rear of the second battalion. The chief disadvantage of this formation is that the regiment will frequently extend to a depth of 5,000 yards and it will require considerable time to deploy its full power.

The advantage is however that in fighting against an enemy who utilizes delaying action, we usually have one fresh battalion for the next day's advance. This rotation of battalions permits a regiment to fight at its maximum efficiency for quite a while.

In deep penetrations against an active enemy, particularly if he is provided with tanks, it has been found expedient to leap-frog battalions. The leading battalion advances and occupies or captures a limited objective on a commanding site. The second battalion passes through the first battalion which immediately begins to organize a defensive position. When the new leading battalion has reached a suitable limited objective further to the front, it will halt and the third or rear battalion will pass through it. The second battalion then begins to organize. In this way the danger of a counterattack is materially reduced, since, if the deployed leading battalion is over-run, the enemy comes up against a partially prepared position, and if this is broken through, he finally strikes a fully prepared position. As a matter of fact, the enemy never got to the third or fully prepared position in Sicily.

In following the above-mentioned method, care must be taken not to become defensively minded. If everything is going well, the battalion which first halted should quit its defensive position and move up so as to be available to support the leading battalion or the second battalion or the second battalion with a counterattack, the direction and nature of which must be planned and reconnoitered.

4. The Infantry Battalion in Open Country. The infantry battalion in open country normally advances with two companies up followed by the heavy weapons company, with the third rifle company back. All companies advance in column of platoons, the platoons being in a line of squad wedges. In cases where the terrain necessitates excessive intervals between the leading companies, the heavy weapons company is split three ways, a portion going to each company. This has two disadvantages. First, it lessens the possibility of battalion control and volume of fire; and second, there is a tendency on the part of rifle companies to outstrip the heavy weapons attached. It is our experience that the rate of progression of the heavy weapons company must and should determine the rate of progression of the battalion. However, the tendency of all heavy weapons, whether they be artillery, mortar, or machine guns, to squat in a good position must be prevented. The heavy weapons company must push forward. So must the guns.

5. The Infantry Battalion in Close Country. In close country the battalion advances in column of companies with two rifle companies up followed by the heavy weapons company and then the third rifle company.

In one division which has been very successful, there is a tendency to create special task forces of varying strength by a mixture of rifle companies, artillery tanks and heavy weapons companies, and sometimes 4.2 mortars. While this system has certain advantages, it is not recommended. The force is not homogeneous, and it is felt that in most cases one of our infantry battalions has sufficient power to

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accomplish any mission which a force of that size can be expected to carry out. My personal observation is that a battalion is the smallest unit which should ever be given a detached mission. We have tried using companies but this practice has almost invariably resulted in costly failures.

Note:- In the case of regiments and battalions the formations above described are equally applicable by day or night.

6. The Rifle Company in Open Country. In open country the leading rifle company or companies deploy with one platoon up and two rifle platoons echeloned back, the automatic weapons platoon less detachments following on the axis in the rear of the two flank platoons. The platoons are in column of squad wedges. One section of antitanks usually follows the leading platoon; the other section is with the leading element of the automatic weapons platoon. Usually one section of 60-mm mortars and occasionally a section of machine guns accompanies the leading platoon. At night, in operations through open woods or orchards, the leading platoon deploys as skirmishers and covers the whole front of the company. Distances are very much reduced.

7. The Rifle Company in Close Country. In close country the company moves in column of platoons with the automatic weapons behind the second platoon and one section of anti-tanks behind the first platoon. In any type of country, open or close, when the fire fight starts the leading rifle platoon, aided by such automatic weapons as are with it, becomes the base of fire. The other rifle platoons are used to build up the firing line in the case of a regimental attack. In case the battalion is alone or where it is the flank battalion of a line, the second and third platoons are used for outflanking operations on the open flank.

At night the advance is made in column of platoons, one squad of the leading platoon acting as point. In this case a squad from the second platoon is split to provide a close-in right and left flank protection.

8. The Cannon Company. In utilizing the cannon company of the infantry regiment, it is highly desirable that it be as far forward as possible. However, due to the lack of cover in Sicily, this would only be accomplished by night movements which were not always possible. It is necessary that the cannon company know the artillery plan so that it may specialize on targets other than those which are probably to be engaged by the artillery. An observer from the cannon company accompanies the leading battalion or battalions.

Note:- It is my personal opinion that if a suitable carriage were available the cannon company would be considerably strengthened by the inclusion of a platoon of at least four 4.2 mortars.

9. Heavy Weapons Company. The best practice, as has been previously stated, is for the heavy weapons company to work as a unit under the battalion to support one or both leading companies, and to provide covering fire for the first rifle company when the latter is used to maneuver. It has been found that in very difficult country the heavy machine gun section of two guns produces better results if one gun is left with the transportation and all members of that gun squad act as relief carriers and bring up ammunition. In countries such as Sicily it is almost necessary to have pack animals. The largest number of rounds fired by a heavy machine gun in one day was between 5,000 to 6,000. The high average for 81-mm mortar was 800 a day, normally many less. Our men prefer the light shell to the heavy for the 81-mm. There is one case on record where two 60-mm mortars fired 1,000 rounds in one day. To provide ample ammunition for starting a fight, all members of the rifle company carry one or sometimes two 60-mm mortar shells with them and deposit them near the mortars as they go into the fire fight.

The heavy machine guns come into action between 500 and 1,000 yards and provide overhead supporting fire at ranges at close at 1,000 yards. In this dry country it is possible to pick up the splash of machine guns by using field glasses at 1500 yards. The guns go into action at an estimated range short of the target and creep up by bursts of from 5 to 10 rounds.

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In the daytime the mortars are all directed at point targets or used to attack enemy mortars on reverse slopes. At night they are used for demoralizing fire, which has considerable effect.

It is felt that as in the case of rifle fire we do not use sufficient fire from the heavy weapons on infested localities, either by day or by night.

10. The Rifle Platoon in Open or Close Country. The leading squad of the leading platoon acts as a point with an advance element of two men as scouts preceding it. The squad less the two men moves in wedge formation. In open forests or in orchards, particularly in night operations, the leading squad does not send two scouts forward but deploys a line of skirmishers across the whole platoon front. The two remaining squads of the platoon act as support and follow the point either in column of two's or in wedge according to the terrain. One section of 37's is immediately behind the point if it can possibly be kept there. This gun is especially desirable where the intervention of enemy tanks is expected.

It is frequently the practice to attach one section of 60-mm mortars and one section of light machine guns to the leading squad. The platoon leader of the leading platoon, with a runner, moves directly in rear of the leading squad. When the enemy is encountered, the leading squad automatically becomes the base of fire. The Lieutenant then calls upon the automatic weapons platoon through the runner for whatever fire support is indicated. He also immediately directs, by voice, his remaining squads to execute an enveloping attack. Normally, this attack is executed by the second squad moving to the uphill side of the base of fire and the third squad extending the line beyond the second squad.

In hilly country it is nearly always desirable to envelop from the uphill side so as to work downhill. In open flat country the Lieutenant decides on which flank to execute the envelopment, depending on enemy resistance and the availability of whatever cover exists. The leading squad informs the others of the approximate location of the enemy through connecting files which carry the information by voice to their respective squads.

The 60-mm mortar with the leading squad generally gets on the target in 4 rounds. Its chief mission is to deal with automatic weapons or mortars rather than with the immediate small arms resistance. It is very effective up to from 1200-1500 yards.

The German does not engage in a fire fight at what we would call medium ranges. He either opens fire at grenade range with his rifle elements, followed almost immediately by his automatic weapons and mortars at longer range, or else he uses machine guns and rifle fire at excessive ranges. This latter form of fire, while demoralizing, has little actual effect, and it is found where our men have any cover they move forward readily in face of it. In open country where there is a lack of cover, it is necessary for the platoon and squad leader to insure the progression through personal leadership. In such cases our men must be made to fire, example often gets results.

It is the custom of our men to fix bayonets when the shooting starts, and there have been numerous cases in which the enemy while still fighting has been killed with the bayonet. This particularly true at night. The German, on the other hand, seldom if ever fixes bayonets except at night, and even at night he is more prone to shoot than to close.

It is the general consensus of opinion of all the officers who have actually participated in battle that our men do not shoot enough. This is because we have for years been taught not to shoot unless the target was seen and was a profitable one. This is a mistake, and it is highly desirable that controlled but continuous fire be directed on any infested locality from which enemy fire is emanating whether or not the individual doing the shooting can be actually seen. This statement applies to all types of fire available to the infantry regiment.

Fire reduces fire, that is firing on the enemy reduces his ability to fire at you. If men halt and lie down, without firing, they are immediately subjected to intense fire, whereas if they keep moving forward, or if they open fire on the

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enemy or on the locality from which he is firing, his fire is immediately reduced. This point must be emphasized in training and in battle, too much stress cannot be put on it.

Intimately connected with the foregoing is the question of fire distribution. Our men have a deplorable tendency to shoot at obvious portions of a target rather than to fire straight to the front at less visible targets. This results in those portions of the enemy who are visible receiving all the fire while our men receive the undisturbed fire of those portions of the enemy who are not so clearly visible. Ground once captured must never be given up.

11. Night attacks. There is considerable feeling in favor of night attacks. When these are used, and to be successful one must attack both day and night continuously, they should be executed by taking advantage of the moon, or they should be put on about 2½ hours before dawn if there is no moon, in either case on a limited objective. The heavy weapons and artillery should be put into position and registered the night before. They can then cover the attack until the flashes of the leading infantry show they are coming close to the objective.

A night attack, whether executed by moonlight or just prior to dawn, must be confined to limited objectives and these objectives must be carefully reconnoitered the previous day, and the men who made the reconnaissance must lead the units to the objectives. In making this reconnaissance it is sometimes necessary for patrols to expose themselves in order to draw fire.

Night attacks against unreconnoitered positions, particularly in hilly country, are very apt to fail because viewed against the stars or moonlight, one hill looks like another and troops misjudge their locality by as much as a thousand yards.

12. Counterattack. The German will invariably counterattack immediately after dawn and is very adept in supporting this with artillery and mortar fire. After he believes the position has been softened by supporting fire, he advances on it from the front with a small number of infantry and seems to envelop one or both flanks with the majority of his infantry. This infantry starts to attack between 800-1000 yards and comes forward at a continuous fast walk using marching fire or firing from the halt, or from the kneel.

In no casewhere our infantry utilized the full power of their rifle did an attack get home. In fact, our troops looked forward to the German counterattack as the surest and most effective way of killing Germans. Nevertheless, the certainty of receiving such an attack makes it very evident that the position gained at night must be ready for an attack by daylight.

If the observers from the batteries are in contact, it frequently is possible to stop the counterattack by a combination of percussion and air bursts. I only know of one case where the Germans, stopped by artillery fire, resumed his attack. Normally, he moves forward until human nature can stand no more then quits. While going forward he shoots a great deal and makes all the noise he can. However, his small arms fire is of little value.

13. Artillery Liaison Officers. It was our experience that 65 per cent of the artillery fire put down by the 105's was through forward artillery observers and liaison officers; 17 per cent was harassing and preparatory fire; and 18 per cent was observed from liaison planes or battery positions.

The liaison officer with an infantry battalion must and should control the forward observers who accompany the assault companies. These observers should report to the liaison officer to get instructions from him and be made conversant with the infantry plan. They should then join the infantry companies to which assigned. Both the liaison officers and the forward observers must remain with the infantry for the duration of the fighting and must not attempt to return to their artillery organizations during the night.

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The forward observers should remain in contact by voice or runner with the nearest infantry platoon because it is our experience that more than one-half of the targets fired on by the infantry and reported to the forward observers. Similarly, much of the tactical information received by the High Command came through the artillery channels.

As soon as a position has been captured, the forward observer must report to the liaison officer what probable channels of hostile counterattack he is in a position to cover with observer fire. This information is transmitted by the liaison officer to the infantry battalion commander.

It is noteworthy that the T/O does not provide adequately--if at all--for the parties who must accompany the forward observers. Practically the same party as accompanies a liaison officer is needed for the observer. It is best practice for the forward observer's vehicular transport not to advance in front of the reserve platoon of the company he is operating with.

Many forward observers and some liaison officers have the erroneous opinion that in a war of movement, fire cannot be put out at night. This is wrong. Also, observers can point out the location of objectives for night attacks by smoking them. It is believed that if each forward observer were provided with two infantry radio sets, SCR-536, it would greatly facilitate his work and double the chance of getting his information through.

There is also a belief that the larger the gun the farther to the rear the observer should be. This is wrong; any gun should engage any target it can bring under effective fire.

PART IIIGENERAL NOTES (TACTICAL)

1. "Dig or Die". The expression, "dig or die" is not only untrue but harmful. Troops must not be permitted to dig until they have reached the final objective.

2. Keep Moving! It is necessary that officers and non-commissioned officers prevent the men from remaining prone and passive after they have been induced to lie down by enemy fire. Men in such positions offer ideal targets and the enemy fire will increase. Therefore, they must be required to move forward or, if that is impossible, to at least open fire. During the forward movement the troops should fire not rapidly but continuously. The act of firing produces self-confidence on the part of the firers and reduces the self-confidence on the part of the recipients of the fire.

3. Replacements. All officers are unanimous in their belief that infantry rifle battalions should enter combat with 15 per cent overstrength in basic privates and lieutenants, and that in calling for replacements this ratio should be maintained. If this is not done, the whole theory of squad and platoon performance breaks down through lack of manpower. It is futile to say that casualties do not occur sufficient to justify the above demand. Whether the casualties occur or not, the men are not present. They are sick, they are on detached service, they are lost. We are not dealing with supposition but with facts.

When active operations are in progress, divisions do not and cannot provide even educated guesses as to the number of replacements necessary, therefore, during active operations, calls for replacements should be based on experience tables. When a lull occurs, accurate check ups can be made and inequalities then corrected. However, we will always be short. In providing replacements it is the experience of Morocco, Tunisia, and Sicily that at least 75 per cent of the casualties occur in the riflemen of the rifle companies, therefore, in training replacements, this consideration should be borne in mind.

4. Geneva Convention. In training troops for battle, it is highly desirable that pertinent facts of the Geneva Convention be brought to the attention of all concerned.

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5. Night Practice. Night combat has such an important place in the operations of the Germans that we should specialize in it. Great improvement in night operations, particularly with regards to eyesight, are produced by practice.

6. Reconnaissance. From the highest units down there is a notable lack of understanding of the value of reconnaissance and how to execute it. Unquestionably, the reconnaissance troop in the infantry division is not adequate in size. It should certainly be doubled. Further, all infantry rifle soldiers must be taught how to scrutinize the country for concealed or camouflaged gun emplacements and pillboxes.

7. Air Support. Air support divides itself into three phases. The first one is the removal or control of hostile air activities in the air. This is solely a function of the air. The next one is bombing ahead of the ground forces. This has been in the past satisfactorily accomplished by the ground stating those targets on which an attack would apparently facilitate the movements of the ground troops or hamper those of the enemy, and by the establishment of a bomb line. The bomb line should err on the side of being too far in front of our own troops, and it should be picked out after consultation with air officers so that it will be delineated by terrain features easily discernible from the air. To draw a line between map coordinates is quite dangerous because people passing over the ground several hundred miles an hour have difficulty in picking out hypothetical land marks.

Finally, we come to what is known as close air support; that is, utilizing airplanes to attack in conjunction with and close to an attack put on from the ground. However, until definite air units can be provided to train with ground troops and to have as a primary mission the duty of attacking targets which are adversely affecting the progress of the ground troops at the time called for by the ground, it is illusory to count on a very great effect. On the other hand, the ground troops have a tendency to expect more prompt assistance from the above form of attack than is always possible. They must be taught that it requires quite a while to mount an attack with the appropriate bombs, etc.

The tendency to credit air attacks on roads and railways with the capacity of destroying such arteries is also illusory. In the first place the chances of getting a direct hit with a bomb on a vulnerable place are very small, certainly no better than the chances of getting a point hit with long range artillery, but this is not the primary defect. We all know that a demolition to be effective must be defended or else it will be readily removed. This fact is equally true whether the demolition is caused by a mine planted in the ground or by a bomb dropped from the air.

8. Amphibious Attacks. When a parallel flank command by the Navy exists, it is very important to use amphibious attacks in rear of the enemy's position. These amphibious attacks should be in a strength at least equivalent to a reinforced combat team, because such a force can land further in rear of the enemy and can be self-sustaining for a period of days. Navy gunfire support is vital.

9. Amphibious Supply. Under the conditions just mentioned, amphibious supply is of tremendous value both in saving time and vehicles, and also in by-passing blown-out bridges.

10. Defensive Works. It is believed that the construction of numerous powerful defensive works has a very bad effect on the morale of the troops constructing them, because, not trusting to their own weapons and courage, they begin to place confidence in wire and concrete. Wire and concrete are valueless against any enemy who will not be fooled into frontal attacks, or who, in the case of a landing operation, passes through the obstacles prior to dawn.

11. Air Photos. The impossibility of securing air photos from the Air Force in time makes it necessary that photographic planes of suitable type with suitable equipment and developing laboratories be attached to each corps.

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12. Retrograde Movements. Nothing is more subversive of morale than retrograde movements during combat, even when these movements are for the purpose of reforming troops. When the movements take place at night, they are doubly disadvantageous. Generals and staff officers must consider this danger whenever issuing orders for movement.

## GENERAL NOTES (TECHNICAL)

13. Mortar Sights. None of the mortars provided American troops have any means of illuminating the sight for night firing. This is a grave defect. The Germans have a small flashlight strapped around the forehead under the helmet which throws a pencil of light on the elevating and traversing mechanism of the mortar. Some such device for all our mortars should be developed.

14. Illuminated Sights. The tank 75, the 57, and 37, as well as all larger calibers, should all be provided with illuminated sights for night firing. The tank is particularly valuable in firing at point targets at night, provided these targets have been picked out in the daytime. The direct fire from the tanks in turret defilade can be kept up, especially while firing uphill, until the infantry attack is within 50 yards of the target.

15. Ammunition. In Sicily we had nothing but armor-piercing ammunition for the 57. It is believed that 10 per cent of the rounds for a 57 should be armor-piercing, and the rest should be 20 per cent white phosphorus and 70 per cent high explosive.

If a projectile can be developed for the 37 with more penetrating effect, it is superior to the 57 as an offensive antitank weapon for two reasons: First, it can be pulled by the low-relief 2-ton truck. The 57 cannot, and must be pulled either by a half-track or a high-relief 3/4 ton truck. Second, with the limited crews available, the 57 cannot be manhandled any distance over bad country while the 37 can. Even with present ammunition the 37 is deadly against tanks up to 400 yards.

16. Bazooka. On four specific occasions the Bazooka accounted for Mark-4 tanks. It is believed that if the Bazooka were provided with a personnel shell with an "all-way" fuze in addition to its armor-piercing shell, its effectiveness would be materially improved. Most of the officers I have talked with prefer the rifle grenade to the Bazooka as a close range antitank weapon.

17. Hand Grenades. The majority of opinion favors the percussion grenade over the fragmentation grenade. This is based on the fact that at the close ranges, at which grenade fights take place, the shocking effect of the percussion grenade is sufficient to let troops in with bayonets, whereas if they use fragmentation grenades, they have to take cover and lose time getting close. The troops in Sicily were not provided with any means of carrying grenades. This is an error and should be corrected. Thermite and white phosphorus grenades in the ratio of 5 per cent each should be available in a theater.

18. 4.2 Mortars. The 4.2 mortar firing a white phosphorus or high explosive shell is a terrifically destructive weapon, but as its present mount is almost wholly immobile it can only be used in the first phase of an attack. If it could be provided with a tractor-drawn mount from which it could fire, it would be tremendously valuable. The range should be increased to 4,000 yards.

19. Plastic Mines. In Sicily we met only one plastic mine, however, it is certain that this type will become more and more prevalent. I feel confident that the inventive genius of America can devise some device for locating such mines. Certainly an intensive study for the creating of such a device should have a very high priority.

In training, the detection of mines by all types of troops must be stressed and each infantry rifle company should be provided with ten mine detectors.

Owing to the fact that mine explosions are usually fatal, and we do not

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classify the cause of death, it is impossible to say what per cent of our losses were due to mines. My personal opinion is that not over ten per cent of our losses were due to mines. Mines are mental hazards and must not be over-emphasized in training.

#### PART IV - NOTES ON CORPS AND ARMY

1. Composition of an Army. While an Army is a nebulous organization, it is felt that as a datum plane a minimum Army should consist of two infantry corps of three divisions each. Each corps should be reinforced by a corps artillery brigade. The necessity for three divisions is that by using them it is possible to maintain the pressure. Very rarely to situations arise where a two division corps can rest one of its divisions.

In addition to the two infantry corps, such an army should have two armored divisions. Offensively these armored divisions are for the purpose of exploiting a break through or enveloping a flank when the door has been opened by the Infantry. Defensively, the armored divisions are the most powerful and readily available means of stopping major hostile counterattacks. In addition to the two armored divisions above specified, there should be one GHQ medium tank battalion, including a complete reconnaissance company, in the ratio of one for each infantry corps. The purpose of these tank battalions is to maintain the integrity for the armored divisions. Many occasions arise when largely for morale purposes it is desirable to shove tanks up behind the Infantry or to make a defensive flank with tanks. If elements of the armored divisions are used for these piecemeal operations, the armored divisions are dissipated. On the other hand, the presence of the GHQ tank battalions with adequate reconnaissance (at the present moment the GHQ tank battalions are deficient in reconnaissance) provides a means of augmenting the tank strength of the armored divisions should circumstances demand it.

In almost any conceivable theater of operations, situations arise where the presence of Horse Cavalry in a ratio of a division to an Army will be of vital moment. Had we possessed Horse Cavalry in Tunisia or Sicily, not a German would have escaped.

2. Artillery. The corps artillery brigade should consist of one regiment of 155 guns, one regiment of 8-inch howitzers, and one regiment of 4.5 inch guns, also one observation battalion. All corps artillery should be provided with M-4 tractors as now used by the CA AA.  
Note -- Where the maps are bad, the position of the front line can be determined by having front line units fire "very" light pistols at a specified hour. The observation battalion picks these up and the front line is accurately located.

For an army of two to three corps, one duplicate corps artillery brigade as above specified should be provided and in addition two battalions of pack artillery, four battalions of 155 howitzers, two battalions of 105's towed, and two battalions of 105 self-propelled. These additional weapons will be utilized by attachment to corps artillery brigades or to divisions, depending on circumstances. An army of four corps needs double this amount.

The proportion of white phosphorus in corps and army reserve artillery should be at least 20 per cent. All other projectiles should be high explosive.

There has been considerable comment about the fact that in Tunisia and Sicily the American artillery fired at extreme ranges most of the time. This is accounted for by the fact that since front lines do not exist, guns cannot be pushed up as they were in World War I.

It is the consensus of opinion that a 6-gun battery is better than a 4-gun battery in the case of the 105 and 155 howitzers. In the case of longer range weapons, the necessity for accurate control at the batteries, coupled with the need of dispersion, makes a 4-gun battery preferable to a 6-gun battery.

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3. The Men. Since the capture of Messine, I have had the opportunity of examining many of the battlefields from the side of the enemy. As a result of this, I am more than ever impressed with the self-sacrificing valor, endurance, and resourcefulness of the American soldier. He is a peerless fighting man.

/s/ G. S. PATTON Jr.  
G. S. PATTON, Jr.,  
Lieut. General U.S. Army  
Commanding.

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HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH ARMY  
APO 758  
US Army

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1. G-1 SECTION
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9. CHEMICAL WARFARE SECTION
10. SIGNAL SECTION
11. ENGINEER SECTION
12. FIELD ARTILLERY SECTION
13. ANTI-AIRCRAFT SECTION

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REPRODUCED: Hq ETOUSA, 30 October 1943.

*R.P.F.*  
R.P.F.

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HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH ARMY  
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NOTES ON SICILIAN CAMPAIGNAIRTEX

The following is a summary of the comments of the respective General and Special Staff Sections, Headquarters Seventh Army, on lessons learned in operation HUSKY.

1. G-1 Section.

a. Overstrength Allowance. In order to maintain effective strength in combat, it was found to be essential to have fifteen per cent overstrength in enlisted men and company grade officers assigned to all assault units well before the start of operations.

b. Replacements. Replacement battalions should be assigned to the task force to provide a replacement reserve and to re-equip and redistribute all casualties. Each replacement battalion should be operated by and work in close coordination with the task force to which it is assigned.

Units should be allowed to requisition replacements during initial stage of combat against anticipated losses due to the lag between the time when a verified requisition can be submitted and the time when the actual replacements can arrive. Requisitioning on the basis of battle casualties will not work.

c. Graves Registration. There should be an increase in the number of graves registration personnel and also military police to make available, in the case of the latter, a sufficient number of personnel for prisoner of war processing and escort guard.

All graves registration and military police personnel should be available on D Day.

Graves registration was immeasurably facilitated in the Third Division by requiring the identity of every officer and enlisted man of the division to be marked on the inside of each legging. It is recommended that this be made standard practice.

d. G-1 Reports. The twice a day G-1 reports based on estimates proved accurate and invaluable supplement. Verified reports got in too late to be of much value. G-1 strength figures should be effective, and not roster strength as was required during the HUSKY operation.

2. G-2 Section.

a. Administration. The table of basic allowances for army headquarters should include a multilith unit, including operation personnel, and a HEHR-OGRAPH (a device which projects vertical planes from a horizontal plane, as tracing contours on a map to get reliefs of the terrain).

Experiments should be conducted to provide built-up vans or trucks as mobile field offices.

b. Combat intelligence. It is recommended that the personnel of this section be increased to a minimum of four officers.

Enemy battle order should be emphasized and stressed in peace time training.

Photo intelligence personnel should be selected according to their qualifications. They should receive a higher degree of training. In this connection it is recommended that combat officers, incarcinated for field work, be considered for such an assignment.

Photo interpretation detachments should become an integral part of all headquarters down to include divisions.

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An officer of each G-2 Section should be trained as a photo intelligence officer.

It is recommended that photos for front line units be sent direct to these units and that higher headquarters be sent copies when they are available.

c. Air tactical reconnaissance. Officers of the G-2 Section should be trained in the capabilities and uses of the aircraft serving their section.

d. Maps. Detailed road maps should be issued to each vehicle driver and to each military policeman. Accompanying these maps should be booklets of town plans, indicating the changes of direction of main roads passing through the towns.

e. Counter-Intelligence and Security. Tactical Counter-Intelligence Corps personnel is inadequate to take over management of occupied territory. Additional personnel trained in civil government should follow more closely behind combat units.

f. Prisoner of War Interrogation. It is recommended that prisoners of war be separated according to age and, if possible, according to political affiliations and military organizations.

g. Intercent Services. In order that "Y" Services be of maximum benefit to an operation, it should follow closely in rear of combat elements. A decision must be made as to degree of security necessary for the proper functioning of this service.

h. Miscellaneous. It is recommended that a representative of the psychological warfare section and all other special intelligence agencies, be on the planning and operational staff. Such representatives should be directly responsible to G-2 for the proper placing and activities of the personnel they represent.

### 3. G-3 Section.

a. Organization. Each staff section should be brought to full strength when the initial directive is received and planning begins. The volume of work is usually greater during the planning and preparations phase than it is during the actual operation. Augmenting the staff after planning has been started is satisfactory. Officers who are assigned to the staff late in the planning stage have little opportunity to become oriented and consequently lack the necessary working knowledge of the detailed plans and troops involved to be of material assistance during this phase. They do not develop a background of familiarity with the operation which enables them to be helpful until the campaign is well under way.

b. Joint Planning. The naval and air arms participating must plan in conjunction with the ground force. In HUSKY as in TORCH the Army and Navy staffs were widely separated during the critical period of planning. In both operations this resulted in needless misunderstandings and the loss of valuable time. The plan for a combined operation must be developed in close cooperation by all participating arms. This requires that ground, naval and air force staffs be immediately and continuously available to each other so that all the details of training, rehearsals, movement to staging areas, loading of convoys and embarkation may be effectively coordinated. It is essential that the air service command be represented on the air planning staff. Representatives of air tactical units are not sufficiently familiar with air service units to indicate with the required exactness service command requirements for shipping space.

c. Special Amphibious Operations. The same degree of coordination and planning required for the initial landing phase between ground, naval and air forces involved, is demanded for amphibious attacks executed subsequent thereto. It is essential therefore that a well qualified naval officer, in direct communication with naval headquarters, be available to cooperate with the ground and air staff. To provide naval gunfire support for such operations it is essential that shore fire control parties be reorganized and that the Navy direct naval gunfire liaison officers to join promptly the headquarters of the force which is to make the attack.

d. Air Support. The following recommendations are offered to further improve the technique of ground-air support:

- (1) A staff officer for air should be assigned to the G-3 Section of all divisions and higher units. He should be from the Air Force, preferable of field grade and thoroughly trained in ground-air support.
- (2) The radio communication of air support parties should be improved by more intensive training of operators.
- (3) Air support parties, supervised by the G-3 for air, should regularly participate in joint exercises with the ground units with which they are to work during combat. Pilots who are to fly missions in the operation would benefit immeasurably by participating in such training.

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4. G-4 Section.

- a. Transportation Section. A transportation section as an additional special staff section is essential to the successful operation of the supply function of a modern field army or an amphibious task force.
- b. Base Area Group. A base area group, or a similar organization, must be provided early in the planning stages of any contemplated overseas operation and must operate directly under the command of army or task force commander.
- c. Pack Animals. The pack animal still has a definite role to play in modern warfare. Pack transportation is essential to the infantry soldier for the forward movement of supplies through difficult terrain, such as mountains, where the employment of motor elements is limited or often impossible.
- d. Rear Headquarters. Establishing a rear headquarters facilitated to a great extent the operation of supply, troop movements and forwarding of replacements.

5. Provost Marshal.

- a. Civil Affairs Personnel. Civil Affairs police personnel should be assigned to Army headquarters at the beginning of the planning phase, to permit their participating in the preparation of joint police plans for the operation.
- b. Military Police. There should be an increase in the number of trained military police personnel. Attachment of additional personnel to military police organizations should be accomplished in time to allow for their training.

The military police personnel for an Army should be of sufficient number to provide the following:

- (1) One military police battalion for the protection of vital army installations, to include guards for line of communications, traffic control and protection of all towns within the Army area.
- (2) One military police battalion to be divided in such a manner as to provide support for individual task forces.
- (3) An escort guard unit and prisoner of war processing unit to provide an escort guard company and a prisoner of war processing platoon with each task force.

c. Provost Marshal Staff. The Provost Marshal should have his staff increased to a total of six officers to supervise and control Provost Marshal activities. There should be additional officers to provide for one liaison officer with each sub-task force.

d. Prisoners of War. Transportation allowances for prisoners of war should be increased as follows: A minimum of four two and one-half ton trucks with trailers and two one-quarter ton reconnaissance trucks for each military police escort guard company, and two two and one-half ton trucks with trailers for each prisoner of war processing platoon.

There should be one army prisoner of war stockade within the Army area and convenient to transportation facilities. Any additional cages necessary to operate as transfer cages to be located at army supply points.

e. Personnel Released from Hospital. When it is necessary to return released hospital patients through the medium of straggler control posts, all medical installations should be directed to return such personnel direct to the nearest straggler collecting point, together with a list of the names of personnel delivered. Transportation should be made available at each collecting point to transport the personnel so received to their units.

6. Medical Section.

- a. Planning. The medical plan as prepared and approved should be issued in the form of a directive, to prevent alterations of the plan which might seriously handicap medical service rendered to the operation as a whole.
- b. Equipment. Planes with slow landing speed, or helicopters, should be available at all times to the Army Surgeon for maintaining constant liaison with widely scattered medical units.
- c. Medical Units. The Corps type medical battalion should be reorganized into a battalion headquarters and three collecting-clearing companies.

Field hospitals must be augmented by surgical teams.



Medical personnel, their equipment and vehicles, should be loaded, insofar as possible, on the same ship. Under no circumstances should the personnel and equipment be shipped on separate convoys.

Medical units which are to be landed with assault troops should be combat loaded.

The semi-mobile evacuation hospitals (400 bed) should arrive complete with personnel and equipment by D plus 3 or D plus 4, and in the proportion of one hospital to each division. The larger evacuation hospitals (750 bed) should land not later than D plus 14 in the proportion of one to each two semi-mobile evacuation hospitals (400 bed).

Medical supply personnel should land on early priority to assure that medical supplies landed on the beaches are quickly collected, stored and made ready for issue.

d. Evacuation. Hospital ships and hospital carriers should be under the direct control of the Army Surgeon. The exact time of arrival of these ships should be determined prior to D Day so that the Surgeon can make definite plans for their utilization.

All hospital ships should be equipped with water ambulances similar to those on the hospital carriers, if they are to be utilized to evacuate from beaches.

Air evacuation is the most desirable method and should be utilized to the maximum.

Every effort should be made to establish landing fields for air evacuation as close to the combat troops as the tactical situation permits.

#### 7. Ordnance Section.

a. Section Organization. An Army ordnance staff for an operation similar to HUSKY should consist of eighteen officers, three warrant officers and thirty enlisted men. This group should be assembled prior to the start of planning.

b. Supply. Ammunition supply should be required to function at all times along normal ordnance supply lines.

New weapons develop new supply and maintenance problems. These problems must be anticipated by careful study and prior planning. The nature of the terrain to be operated over must be carefully considered with respect to its effect on maintenance.

c. Organization of Units. The organization of ordnance units is in general satisfactory and no changes are recommended at this time. In this campaign circumstances required that they operate at reduced strength.

Maintenance sections were successful in meeting their mission of "pushing maintenance service to forward echelons at all times under all conditions".

Bomb disposal units proved fully equal to their tasks of removing and destroying unexploded bombs and unserviceable enemy ammunition.

#### 8. Quartermaster Section.

a. Supply. Plans for re-supply for the entire operation should be made at the same time as plans for the initial phase.

A large proportion of B-5-1 rations should be included in the plan for supply of any similar operations.

The hospital supplement as packed for this operation and marked with a red cross should be adopted as standard for issue at any time the straight B ration is not issued.

b. Personnel and Equipment. Graves registration personnel assigned to units must accompany elements on the assault convoy in sufficient proportion to adequately take care of the needs of the assault elements.

The organization and equipment of quartermaster units is in general satisfactory. Extra personnel should be assigned all units in appropriate proportions to provide relief drivers. Additional vehicles with trailers to transport the dead are required by graves registration units.

#### 9. Chemical Warfare Section.

a. 4.2 inch Chemical Mortar. The employment of the 4.2 inch mortar in the Sicilian Campaign indicated that infantry regimental and battalion commanders and staffs should be given instruction and demonstrations in the use of this weapon to thoroughly familiarize them with the value of the fire support it can give their organizations.

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The organic transportation of 4.2 inch mortar battalion needs to be changed by the substitution of one-quarter ton trucks and trailers for the two and one-half ton trucks and trailers.

The range of the weapon should be increased to 4500 yards.

A more suitable mortar sight is needed.

Base plates and elevating screws need to be strengthened.

A traverse of 1,000 mils is needed.

A water-proof shipping container for the mortar shell is

needed.

b. Miscellaneous Equipment. The flame thrower is not of sufficient tactical value to warrant its retention as standard equipment for engineer troops.

Grenades, smoke, HC, M8 (burning type) are of little tactical value.

Incendiary grenades M14 were required in only limited quantities.

Colored smoke is an effective method for ground to air identification, but a larger cloud of smoke is needed than is obtained from the present smoke grenade.

A larger, longer burning smoke pot with a flash-hider is needed.

Grenade, frangible, M1 (FS) proved to have little tactical value and is very difficult to handle under field conditions.

c. Personnel. This operation disclosed that the administrative personnel of separate companies was not adequate, that the chemical maintenance company should have more organic transportation to make it more mobile, that a chemical laboratory section should be available to the army chemical officer, for on-the-spot analysis of captured enemy material and that a chemical smoke battalion headquarters is needed, due to the fact that two or more smoke generator companies were required in all ports and their work must be coordinated.

10. Signal Section.

a. Message Center. The importance of efficient message center operation must be further impressed on all military personnel.

It is recommended that the message center officer of an army message center be of field grade in order to provide adequate supervision and direction of the message center. He must be an experienced officer, thoroughly trained and well versed in message center procedure. There is a definite need for a higher degree of training for all message center personnel.

All outgoing operational messages should be cleared through the Chief of Staff or through a central agency designated by him. This procedure is necessary to properly coordinate operational instructions, prevent repetition, eliminate errors, and to control the volume of messages in order to stay within the normal capacity of our communication facilities.

Many messages are over classified, both as to priority and security.

Messages to be relayed to another station should have the complete address in the proper place on the message.

b. Communications. The chief signal officer should coordinate all codes and ciphers used within the army by subordinate units. Local codes, used by subordinate units, are a means of identification by which the enemy can discover movements and the relief of these subordinate units.

The link-sign procedure should be used from division down only. The CCBP-1 and CCBP-2 should be used from division upwards.

Maintenance specialists for code device M-134 (SIGABA) should be included in T/O for army and corps.

When several agencies require wire channels, it is necessary to establish priorities.

When moving forward, it is better to lay new wire lines than to repair existing enemy lines. Some equivalent to the British multi-airline MAL should be provided for rapid construction.

Spiral - 4 cable does not furnish reliable wire communication for active field use.

Rehabilitated civilian or commercial circuits are unreliable for carrier equipment.

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Rehabilitated civilian or commercial circuits are unreliable for carrier equipment.

Tactical radio channels should not be used for administrative traffic during assault landings.

Signal operations personnel should always load, unload, and accompany signal equipment.

Radios, SCR-299, mounted in DUKWS provided satisfactory and reliable high-powered channels of radio communication during landing operations. However, these radios should be so constructed that they may be later removed intact, and mounted in two and one-half ton trucks, thus releasing DUKWS for unloading operations. Power units, PE-95, for SCR-200 sets must be shipped in on the first follow-up convoy, to permit the modified power units, PR-75, used in DUKWS to be returned to signal depot for stock or other use. The larger power units PE-95 will be lost or damaged if brought over earlier. Smaller power units PE-75 are only adequate to operate SCR-299 radios for limited periods.

c. Training. More emphasis should be placed on the training of Signal Corps personnel in army supply problems.

More training is required in mine detection and removal.

d. Division Signal Section. It is recommended that the division signal officer have an assistant in the grade of major, that the T/O of the division signal company be changed to provide for an increase in personnel and that the radio intercept platoon of this company be named "monitoring platoon". The information picked up by this platoon should be sent to division G-2 and thence to Corps and Army headquarters.

e. Photographic Personnel with Combat Units. One unit of the photographic company should accompany each front line division. The company, less these units, should be in a general army pool under the direction of the signal officer.

f. Equipment. The Army and Corps signal sections require equipment for reproducing line route maps, traffic diagrams, and SOI's.

Twelve SIGABA are required for each Army headquarters and four for each Corps headquarters.

There is definite need for Converter, M-131, or Converter, M-228.

One extra SIGIVI basket should be provided for each two SIGABA machines issued.

Speech plus simplex and speech plus duplex, or other similar repeater equipment capable of furnishing long range transmission over poor lines is needed.

The principal Army wire axis should be constructed of number 12 gauge, Browne and Sharpe, .104 copper wire.

Piper cub or equivalent light planes, with operation and maintenance personnel must be provided the signal corps for Army and Corps messenger or courier service on the basis of six for Army headquarters and three for Corps headquarters.

Proper focal length lenses on all types and makes of camera must be provided for in the combat area.

Old or used cameras must not be issued to combat photographers.

Sound recording equipment should be made available for the recording of historic and important news reel events.

During the initial landing phase some type of speed boat should be provided for messenger service between Task Force headquarters ship and the headquarters ships of Sub-Task Forces.

Direction finding equipment has no place in the infantry division. Division signal companies should not be provided with this equipment.

The DFC was not used. It should be withdrawn from circulation. The converter M-309 has completely replaced it.

g. Modification of Equipment. Telephone switchboards must be re-designed to permit supervision of inter-trunking between the various types of switchboards, and between switchboards and dial systems.

The number of dial trunks on BD-89A and BD-90A switchboards should be increased to ten.

The switchboard BD-96 must be equipped with a pilot light.

Existing carrier equipment does not provide sufficient channels considering the amount of equipment and weight of equipment involved.

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The SCR-299, originally installed in the panel trucks, is not satisfactory. There is insufficient room for the operating personnel and the peculiar outline of the vehicle renders it particularly susceptible to recognition by enemy aviation.

The half-truck or scout car are not suitable vehicles for mounting the SCR-193 or SCR-299 radio sets.

Signal corps units should use standard rather than special types of trucks.

The RL-31 should be mounted on all one-quarter ton trucks issued to signal units.

The internal mechanism of the mine detector must be shock-mounted and the loads made flexible.

There is great need for standard type test board.

#### 11. Engineer Section.

a. Water. Maximum use of halazone tablets and hypochloride capsules for purifying local water sources is to be insisted on. Small detachments in isolated areas frequently called on engineers to establish water points when an abundant local supply needing only chlorination to make it potable was available.

b. Maps. While photomaps are not regarded with favor by many combat elements, their use when interpreted by a trained officer was of great value in planning combat engineer work in forward echelons. Fresh information on demolitions, mine fields and defensive installations which greatly assisted engineer planning was regularly received.

All ranks must be indoctrinated with the necessity for economy in the use of maps. The initial issue of maps for this operation was generous. This may have been responsible for their wasteful use and for subsequent unreasonable requisitions.

In any event there is a definite need for a mobile map depot company or similar organization. The supply of maps was a vital function of the engineers during this campaign. The volume was large and additional personnel was required to assist the small map depot detachments in sorting, packing and issuing. It is also self evident that in any fast moving situation the map supply must be mobile.

c. Organization. The organization of engineer units in general proved satisfactory. No changes are recommended at this time.

Key personnel of the Base Area Group who are to take over the administration of the area should be available early in the planning stage to facilitate continuity of policy and a smooth transfer of responsibilities.

d. Equipment. In general, equipment was found to be satisfactory. B-4 angle-dozer proved to be inadequate for the type of terrain encountered. D-7 angle-dozer in the amount of one per combat engineer battalion and three per combat engineer regiment are absolutely necessary to permit those organizations to keep lines of communication open.

The specialized equipment of engineers, particularly angle-dozers, trailers, and prime movers, must accompany units on their initial landing or immediately thereafter, otherwise they are incapable of performing their missions. Bailey bridges must be available from the start of the operation if the progress of the advance is not to be delayed. Additional end pieces for Bailey bridges should be provided in this type of terrain. The greater number of bridges erected were in lengths of less than the bridge unit of 120 feet.

e. Mines. The need for more thorough training in mine recognition and removal by all personnel, particularly engineers, cannot be over-emphasized. This is a matter of grave importance, and should particularly be stressed in the training of replacements.

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trained in prodding (A rubber is good in the sand) and ashore.

In the latter stages of the campaign a considerable number of wooden mines were used by the Germans. This was a new but anticipated development. These mines are in all respects as effective as the metal mine and are not picked up by the mine detector. The only known method of discovering the wooden mine is by prodding.

f. Loading of Supplies. Control of loading operations should not be too greatly decentralized. It is admitted that sub-task force commanders must be permitted wide latitude in the making of decisions as to the loading of personnel and supplies, but since higher headquarters will eventually assume control, loading plans must provide for the arrival of all troops and supplies based on the overall picture.

Loading of items of a technical nature should be supervised by trained personnel, e. g., a Bailey Bridge lacking an essential part may better remain on the dock.

Trailers and their prime movers must be loaded on the same craft.

g. Beach Markers. Some confusion is inevitable in the landing of large numbers of vehicles and quantities of supplies on an unfamiliar beach. Confusion can be reduced and mines avoided only by proper sign-posting and traffic control. Therefore, adequate traffic control personnel and a large quantity of signs are to be landed early. Beach markers must be simple. Flank markers to define the limits of the beach, landing point markers and road exit markers for vehicle and DUKW drivers are all that are required.

## 12. Field Artillery Section.

a. General. When the 105mm Howitzer M7 is employed, heavy supply and maintenance requirements must be planned for, since frequent repairs and parts are needed.

It is again emphasized that integrity of Field Artillery units should be maintained in order to secure the most effective fire support. When decentralization is necessary, units should revert to centralized control at the earliest possible time.

Survey must always be instituted in every position, even when good maps are available.

Mixed lot numbers on projectiles, powder charges and fuses were furnished to the artillery in this campaign. It is recommended that care be exercised to issue ammunition with the same lot numbers.

White phosphorous smoke shell which is to be replaced as a screening agent by the new HC-base ejection smoke shell should not be completely withdrawn, since it has proved to have excellent casualty and incendiary effects, and has a very strong morale effect on the enemy. This last was testified to repeatedly by prisoners. It is therefore recommended that both HC - BE and WP continue to be provided for artillery units. Recommended percentages (of total smoke) are: HC - BE - 80%, WP - 20%.

Extensive enemy use of land mines in defensive and delaying operations has made it essential that Field Artillery units be equipped with mine detectors to avoid heavy personnel and materiel losses when occupying positions. Engineer personnel is normally not available for this purpose, since road clearance and other missions have a higher priority than clearing artillery position areas. Authority has been secured from SOS MATOUSA for the issue of mine detectors to field artillery units in this theater on the basis of one per headquarters battery and three per firing battery. It is recommended that Tables of Equipment be modified to allow these mine detectors for all field artillery units, especially those in the US, to permit necessary training of artillery personnel in their use.

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It is believed that we need longer range guns for counter-battery action against enemy medium and heavy artillery.

The artillery air OP has fully proven its effectiveness. Communication difficulties were encountered due to the short range of the SCR-610. A longer range set is needed.

It is essential that the time shell furnished for the 155mm Howitzer be fused with the M57 fuze.

Steps must be taken to reduce the shine of the fore part of the barrel of the 155mm Howitzer M1, since positions are revealed by the reflected light.

Better machining and finishing of the parts of the breech-block and firing mechanism of the 155mm Howitzer M1 is needed to prevent jamming and malfunctioning.

Both the four and six ton trucks have proven inadequate as prime movers for the 155mm Howitzer M1.

A stronger limber-lifting screw must be provided for the 155mm Gun M1.

Elimination by rigid ordnance inspection of all artillery weapons which do not have an expectancy and service ability beyond the immediate campaign in prospect should be accomplished from both units and replacement stocks prior to shipment from staging areas.

The training of more highly-specialized air photograph interpreters in division and higher photo interpretation units is essential to provide artillery units with proper photo interpretation.

The 105mm Howitzer M7 can be fired with fair accuracy from the deck of an LCT prior to the grounding of the craft on the beach.

b. Landing Field Artillery on the Beach. It was found to be entirely feasible to land light, medium and heavy artillery early during the initial phase of the assault, directly on the beach from modern landing craft.

The 105mm Howitzer M7 (SP) proved to be one of the best non-amphibian landing vehicles of any arm. This vehicle was debarked in as much as six feet of water but came ashore under its own power without difficulty.

### 13. Antiaircraft Artillery.

a. Planning. During the planning phase of an operation the antiaircraft officer should coordinate with the air planning staff in order to insure that adequate antiaircraft defense will be provided for all airdromes and landing fields that are to be used by our air force during the operations.

b. Training. Antiaircraft units which are to be attached to a division for an operation should join the division in time to get adequate training with the division prior to the operation.

Radar officers should receive frequent refresher training. All antiaircraft gun battalions must be proficient in radar firing methods in order to do effective night firing.

c. Amphibious Operations. Automatic weapons, on LST's, must be placed on the upper deck in a firing position that will give a maximum field of fire.

The 90mm guns must be landed as early in the operation as possible. The two-bogie gun with M-4 tractors should be available for these early landings.

Radars must be landed with the other fire control equipment for 90mm guns especially for night operations.

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d. Equipment. The 37mm gun on a M-15 mount cannot traverse fast enough for close-in, high speed courses. Change in gear ratio or electric traversing is essential.

The auto-rammer on the 90mm gun does not operate in a satisfactory manner also its mechanism is too delicate. Parts for it were not available in this operation.

The semi-trailer which carries the SCR-547 is too weak in the center. The one and one-half ton tractor with this trailer is under powered for this use.

e. Amount of Antiaircraft Artillery. It is recommended that in order to provide adequate protection antiaircraft units be employed as follows:

For a division, a group on one gun and two automatic weapons battalions, one of which should be self-propelled.

For a corps, a brigade headquarters with one group of two of three gun battalions and one group of three automatic weapon battalions.

For an army, as many battalions as will be required for the defense of ports, airports, railheads, and landing beaches, with necessary group and brigade headquarters.

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